Physical Security (1979) FM 19 30

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Field Manual
No. 19-30

*FM 19-30

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 1 March 1979

You, the user of this manual, are the most important element in keeping this
publication current and viable. You are encouraged to submit any comments or
recommendations pertinent to this field manual. Comments should be keyed to
the specific page and line of the text in which you feel an improverment is
needed. You should provide reasons for each comment made to insure complete
understanding and evaluation Make your comments on DA Form 2028
(Recommended Changes to Publications) and forward to the Commandant,
USAMPS/TC, ATTN: ATZN-TDP-C, Fort McClellan, AL 36205. Every comment
will be considered.

The word “he” in this publication is intended to include both the
masculine and feminine genders and exception to this will be noted.

FM 19-30

1 MARCH 1979

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

J . C. PENNINGTON
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 A,
Requirements for Physical Security (Qty rqr block no. 142).

Additional copies can be requisitioned from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center,
2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1994 - 153-846

Physical Security

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1 The Systems Approach 1

2 Planning, Programing, and
Budgeting 8

3 Education 42

4 Personnel Movement Control 47

5 Protective Barriers 66

6 Protective Lighting 82

7 Intrusion Detection Systems 92

8 Lock and Key Systems 1 37

9 Security Forces 1 54

10 Port and Harbor Terminal
Security 1 83

11 Computer Security 197

12 Transportation Security 206

13 Hospital Security 220

14 Personal Security of Designated
Individuals 228

15 Nuclear Reactor Facilities 240

1 6 Military and Civil Works
Projects 248

1 7 Security Analysis and
Evaluation 263

Index 501

Appendix

A Pilferage 267

B Sabotage 285

C Espionage 293

D Bomb Threats 297

E Countering Terrorism 301

F Physical Security Plan 312

G Contract Guards 319

H Game Warden's Role 357

I Cargo Security Management 360

J Commissary Outlets and
Storage 365

K Escorting Public Funds 369

L Closed Circuit Television 373

M Finance and Accounting
Office 377

N Mail and Postal Effects 380

O Checklists 384

P Organizational Effectiveness Ap-
proach to Physical Security 403

Q Contingency Plans 406

R IDS Application and Component
Charts 412

S Glossary of Terms 415
T Forms 422

U Convoys, Trains, and

Pipelines 465

V References 495

Chapter 1

The Systems

(5=1 Mission

~T "V

Design

Approa

Threat jjf

r>M-

1^1

WHHi

The commander must insure that
appropriate physical security measures
are taken to minimize the loss of sup-
plies, equipment, and materiel through
threats, natural or human. He normally
exercises this charge through the provost
marshal and/or physical security officer.

Security Posture

Formulating

Section I

1-1 System Design

You should formulate and imple-
ment your basic physical security design
from a total system approach. It should be
organized in depth and contain mutually
supporting elements and be coordinated to
prevent gap or overlap in responsibilities and
performance.

a. Total system approach is based on:

(1) Thoughtful and continuing analysis of
existing protective measures.

(2) Determination of the possibility of
interference with the operational capabili-
ties of the installation or facility from any
or all sources.

(3) Careful evaluation of the measures
necessary and practicable that maintain
security at a desired level.

(4) Tailored to the needs and local condi-
tions of each installation or activity.

b. Mutually supporting elements in-
clude:

(1) Physical perimeter barrier(s).

(2) Clear zones.

(3) Protective lighting.

(4) Entry control facilities.

(5) Detection, including the use of sensors
and assessment systems.

(6) Warning systems.

(7) Perimeter defensive positions, if ap-
propriate.

Note: Selection and use of means
beyond minimum requirements:

■ Established by command directives.

■ Coordination and cooperation be-
tween physical security officers and
facilities engineers is a necessity.

■ Wherever threat indicates need for
increased security.

1-2 Design Considerations

a. Available resources must be used
in the most efficient manner to achieve
adequate protection for an entire installation.

b. Emphasis goes to the operational
requirements of the installation in
determining the type and extent of physical
protection. The physical security manager
should consider the following pertinent
factors in the indicated sequence.

(1) Mission assignment— importance of
the installation or unit to the mission of the
Army.

(2) The area to be protected, including the
nature and arrangement of the activity;
classification of information, data, activi-
ties; the number of personnel involved;
monetary and/or strategic value of mate-
riel located therein; or other important
features inherent to the problem, such as
existing threats, either natural or human.

(3) Criticality and vulnerability of

information, materiel and personnel.

(4) Integration of operating, mainte-
nance, and other requirements.

(5) Environment, such as political and
economical aspects, legal considerations,
terrain, weather, climate, etc.

(6) Feasibility, effectiveness, and desira-
bility of various possible methods of
providing adequate protection.

(7) Costs of materiel and equipment to be
installed as well as availability of finds to
provide at least minimum protection for all
critical areas and activities This mini-
mum may be less than the desirable degree
of physical protection; therefore, the pro-
gram must be flexible so that refinements
can be added as additional resources
become available.

(8) Possible changes in operation,

such as expansion, relocation and re-
trenchment. Coordination must be main-
tained with appropriate staff offices so
that changes may be projected as far in
advance as possible, and necessary supple-
mental personnel and/or funds can be
requested.

c. Changes in mission and activities of
an installation or activity may also require
adjustments in security. Physical security
planning and programing must be a
continuing process if security managers
are to provide the best protection possible.

d. All security measures should be
employed so that they complement and
supplement each other. Lack of integration of
security measures may result in a waste of
money, equipment, and manpower. But more
important, the security of an installation may
be placed in jeopardy. By the considerations
outlined, a sound physical security program
should evolve.

e. The formulating procedure is sound
whether it is applied to changes on existing
installation or the construction of a new
facility.

1-3 Assessment

Of Security Posture

The degree of protection desired on
any installation is predicated upon an analy-
sis of twofactors-criticality and vulnerabil-
ity.

a. Resource Criticality

(1) Determination

(a) Importance to the national defense
structure.

(b) Effect of its partial or complete loss.

(2) Evaluation

(a) I nstallation. High criticality-great
effect on national defense structure.

(b) Command/activity. High critical-
ity—partial or complete loss-
immediate and serious impact to per-
form its mission for a considerable
period of time.

b. Resource Vulnerability

(1) Determination

(a) Susceptibility to threats that result
in damage, loss, destruction or disrup-
tion.

(b) Type Of installation or activity
involved, industrial or other processes
performed, physical layout and con-
struction.

(2) Evaluation

(a) High vulnerability— one or more
threats easily causing sufficient loss,
damage, or destruction to affect the
mission of the whole installation or its
subordinate commands/activities.

(b) Decreased vulnerability— existing
threats not likely to cause interference
with the mission.

protective measures in terms of equip
ment and manpower may not allow for
optimum security for the entire installa-
tion. Also, determination of security
priority based on criticality and vulnera-
bility is essential to proper allocation of
resources.

criminal act or will be detected and appre-
hended before he can successfully complete
the criminal act. Accumulated delay time
for the intruder must be built into a
system for protection in depth. This
protection results from the security in-depth
ring (se4 figure 1).

c. Security in depth (guards, physical
barriers, and systems) is always the goal of
those individuals responsible for the security
of an installation or activity. No object is so
well protected that it cannot be stolen,
damaged, destroyed, or compromised. There-
fore, access must be made so difficult that an
intruder will be deterred from committing a

d. Physical security is only part of the
overall defense plan of an installation. It does
not include dispersion of facilities, continuity
of operations, civil defense structures, con-
struction specifications, or plans formulated
to cope with natural or human threats that
happen. The formulating process must allow
for the integration of all these measures.

LEGEND

A IDS C Barrier

B Guards D Building (barrier)

Figure 1 — Security in-depth ring.

Security Threats

Section II

Security threats are acts or conditions that
may result in the compromise of information;
loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction of
property; or disruption of the mission of the
installation or facility. Before the physical
security manager can develop an effective
security program, he must determine the
possibility of interference with the opera-
tional capabilities of the installation or
facility from any and all sources. Recognition
of all risks is mandatory if he is to make
recommendations for physical security mea-
sures to control or eliminate them. The sever-
it y of security threats depends on such varia-
bles as the type of installation or facility
involved, mission or processes performed,
physical layout, and construction. The geo-
graphical location, the enemy situation, and
the existing state of law and order are most
important factors.

1-4 Definition

a. Security threats are acts or condi-
tions, which include human threats, that may
result in:

(1) Disruption of the installation or facil-
ity.

(2) Damage, loss or destruction of proper-
ty.

(3) Personal injury or loss of life.

(4) Compromise of defense information.

b. Threat severity depends on such vari-
ables as:

(1) Type of installation or facility.

(2) Mission or processes performed.

(3) Physical layout and construction.

(4) Geographical location.

(5) Stability of the situation.

(6) Existing state of law and order.

(7) Protection measures in effect.

1-5 Categories

Security threats are classified as
either natural or human.

a. Natural Threats

(1) Usually the consequence of natural
phenomena.

(2) Normally not preventable by physical
security measures.

(3) May greatly affect security operations
in one or more of these ways.

(a) Require an increase in protective
measures.

(b) May reduce the effectiveness of
existing security measures by such
occurrences as:

• Collapsed perimeter fences.

• Inoperable protective lighting.

• Damaged patrol vehicles.

• Poor visibility.

Examples of natural threats are:

Floods— flooding of the installation with
resulting property damage, destruction of
perimeter barriers and short circuiting of
intrusion detection systems. Heavy rains or
snowfalls, even though they do not result in
floods, may cause some of the same damages.

Storms— high winds or rain causing nui-
sance alarms and short circuiting in IDS, and
limiting visibility of security personnel.

Earthquakes— causing nuisance alarms,
possible fires from broken gas mains, build-
ings weakening and falling down.

Winds— disrupting power lines, setting off
nuisance alarms, causing safety hazards
with flying debris.

Snow and Ice— blocking patrol roads,
increasing response time to alarms, and
freezing of locks and alarm mechanisms.

Fires— damage/destruction of perimeter
barriers or buildings.

Fog— causing reduced visibility for security
forces and increased response time to alarms
and may require additional security person-
nel.

b. Human Threats

1-6 Risk Analysis

This process is invaluable to the
security manager in establishing priorities of
protection of assets. Basically, it consists of

a. Identifying items and functions in
terms of:

(1) Total replacement

(2) T emporary replacement

(3) Unrecoverable costs

(4) Allied and related costs.

b. Conducting a hazards and vulnerability
study of personnel, facilities, items, and
functions.

c. Conducting a probability of occurrence
assessment through indicators, such as:

(1) Documented records

(2) Insurance claims or adjustments

(3) Weather, etc.

These threats are the result of a state of
mind, attitude, weakness, or character trait
on the part of one or more persons. They
include acts of commission or omission-
overt and covert— which could disrupt or
destroy the operation or mission of an
installation or facility.

Examples of human threats are:

d. Establishing a range of losses based on
experience involving specific items (mini-
mum to maximum in terms of dollar value),
and assessing the losses over a 3-5 year
period.

e. Correlating the degree of loss experi-
enced with the ranges of losses or functions.

□ Pilferage Itappendix

□ Sabotage (lappendix BD.

□ Espionage dappendix~C).

□ Bombing (Appendix Dp.

□ Pilferage in Consumer Outlets (lappendix
[a]).

□ Attacks on Key Persons (Ichapter 14|).

□ Carelessness and accidents in perfor-
mance of official duties.

□ Disaffection and disloyalty of employees.

□ Safety hazards from equipment malfunc-
tion.

□ Human Intelligence Threat (HUMINT).

f. Comparing the low against high ele-
ments of ranges for all items and functions;
then averaging weight against risk value in
terms of criticality (Defense Industrial Secu-
rity Institute, DSA).

1-7 Evaluation of Risks

The actual degree of risk involved
depends on two factors:

■ Probability of adverse effects occurring as
a direct result of the threat(s).

■ Extent to which the installation or activity
will be affected by the threat(s).

Security threats significantly impact on a
physical security program by requiring the
incorporation of the following considera-
tions:

□ All determinable threats.

□ Continuing activity beginning in peace-
time and expanding to meet the particulari-
ties of formal hostilities.

□ Coordination and integration with other
protective programs, such as crime preven-
tion and safety.

Chapter 2

Planning, Programing, and
Budgeting

Programming

I o insure that the security responsi-
bility of an installation or activity receives
maximum emphasis, the security manager
must be totally aware and involved in the
installation planning, programing, and
budgeting process. This involvement in-
cludes preparation of manpower reports and
appropriate submissions.

Planning

Section I

Planning for the security defense of an
installation must remain constant, practical,
flexible to the mission and certainly respon-
sive to the needs of the commander. Only
through adequate planning can we provide
an effective counter response to security
threats-as outlined in chapter 1.

2-1 Planning Basis

a. Implementation of Department
of the Army (DA) policy, AR 190-13, and those
supplemental directives by installation and
higher commanders is imperative to having a
sound security, program.

b. The following must be considered when
planning security measures for an installa-
tion:

(1) Mission.

(2) Vulnerability.

(3) Impact on operations.

(4) Budget limitations.

(5) Personnel and equipment limitations.

2-2 Objectives

To be effective, planning must in-
volve a phased approach, be flexible in
incorporating changes, and have clearly
defined courses of actions. It must be con-
cerned with realistic protection in depth and
be based on:

a. Relative standards.

b. Personnel, materiel and equipment
available.

c. Probability of the most serious incident.

d. Implementation in the interest of conti-
nuity of all security operations.

2-3 P re-operational Phase
(Estimate)

a. Sound prior estimates of the
security operational situation will reap big
dividends when planning is ongoing. As a
minimum, the preoperational estimate
should be concerned, with the latest

(1) Security Analysis and Vulnerability
Estimate (SAVE)

(2) Security Vulnerability Assessment
(SVA)

(3) Operational Security (OPSEC).

b. The estimate must involve determina-
tion of all available resources and acts as the
basis for developing a sound security plan.

c. The estimate should entail maximum
use of existing organizational structures,
supervisors, materiel and equipment, and
available technical skills.

(1) Identification of unknown factors and
limitations.

(2) Identification of the necessary aug-
mentation of personnel and equipment to
support the operational phase.

2-4 Operational Phase

Planning for the operational phase
must be all inclusive. It involves training
programs concerning duties and responsibili-
ties prior to, during, and after the operational
phase. As a minimum, this phase should
cover:

a. Employment of assigned and attached
personnel.

procedures will identify plan deficiencies and
allow for necessary corrections and adjust-
ments.

b. Evaluation of the plan will actually
acquaint personnel with their duties and
responsibilities as well as the mechanics of
the plan.

c.The methods of evaluation should in-
clude:

b. Serviceable equipment.

2-5 Awareness Phase

(1) Testing techniques in which all por-
tions of the plan are exercised individually
and collectively.

To insure that the operational phase
is sound and that the plan is workable and
practical, all personnel must be aware of their
duties and responsibilities. Contents of the
plan must dictate requirements and courses
of action to include the interface of security
personnel.

Extracts of the plan must be provided to key
personnel and supervisors to insure areas of
responsibility are executed. Also, supervisors
must brief their personnel on appropriate
duties and responsibilities, and monitor their
actions to insure a successful plan exists.

2-6 Development

Developing a sound security plan
must involve an integrated approach as to
who, what, when, where and how. Specifi-
cally, the development should be in accor-
dance with appendix F of this manual.

2-7 Evaluation

a. This is an important element of
any plan to insure the plan's overall appropri-
ateness and workability. Sound evaluation

(2) Testing conditions which are as close
as possible to real world conditions and
which simulate security threats as appro-
priate.

(3) Quality control through selecting eval-
uators who can provide a complete critique
of the workability and appropriateness of
the plan. Evaluators should be instructed
to place special emphasis on personnel
actions, both individually and collectively
as a team, when weaknesses in training
are evident. The evaluator should make
note. An essential element of the evalua-
tion is the feedback by evaulators. This
feedback acts as a procedure for revising
and modifying the plan. Revision should
be immediate and all personnel must be
made aware of the changes.

(4) Evaluation Frequency:

(a) The plan must be evaluated at
irregular intervals based on published
directives and as deemed necessary by
the responsible commander.

(b) Mechanics involving development

of a security plan shou
processes outlined in

d consider the

figure 2| and

incorporate the data set forth in| appen-

dix F.

Figure 2— Process steps in effective planning.

Programing and Budgeting Section II

As the Army continues to mature in terms
of complexity and sophistication of weapons
and equipment, the management of Army
resources becomes an increasing responsibil-
ity. Inherent to this responsibility is the need

for advanced security equipment, more and
better trained security personnel, both civil-
ian and military. Therefore, the security
manager must be knowledgeable in resource
management.

It is essential, in the management of
installation security measures and require-
ments, that the security manager knows the
working relationships and necessary require-
ments involving budget formulation and
execution of the following:

□ Command Budget and Manpower Guid-
ance (BMG).

□ Program Budget Advisory Committee
(PBAC).

□ Command Operating Budget Estimate
(COBE).

□ Major Activity Directors (MAD).

□ Budget Requests.

□ Manpower Procedures.

□ J ustification for Additional Security Per-
sonnel and Equipment.

2-8 Budget and Manpower
Guidance (BMG)

a. Budget and manpower guidance
is generated at Headquarters, DA, to insure
that Army responsibilities spelled out in the
FYDP are passed down to major commands
and agencies.

b. Through this guidance DA spells out for
each major command and agency precisely
what will be required and what limitations
are to be imposed. Based on this guidance,
major commands and agencies update their
5-year programs and generate budget esti-
mates for the budget year. The document each
command or agency develops is its budget
and manpower guidance (BMG).

2-9 BMG Objectives

a. The BMG is the basis for plan-
ning, programing and budgeting for all
assigned missions, objectives and workloads.

b. This document provides higher head-
quarter's approval for use of all assigned
resources for a specific period. The document
is an extract from the Army portion of the
FYDP of those resources that have been
contemplated for allocation and contains
goals and workloads that such resources are
designed to support.

2-10 Concepts

a. Major command/agency 5-year
programs, written in terms of appropriations,
budget programs, and elements of expense,
are detailed statements of the planned
application of the resources (based on DA
guidance) to accomplish assigned missions,
goals, and workloads of the command for 5
years.

b. DA's budget and manpower guidance
for major commands and agencies does not
constitute authority to obligate finds.
Rather, it is guidance to which recipients
respond with their budget estimates and,
finally their command operating budget
estimates (COBE). This guidance document
from Headquarters, DA, is formally updated
three times a year.

c. Each successive headquarters trans-
lates the guidance it receives from above into
expanded guidance for its subordinate com-
mands. This action carries guidance from
Headquarters, DA, down to the operating
levels where, in response, the COBE is gener-
ated.

2-11 Command Operatin

Budget Estimate (COBE)

a. The command operating budget
estimate (COBE) is the field commander's
estimate of resource requirements for the
approaching fiscal year and an estimate of
the following fiscal year based on advanced
budget plans. Headquarters, DA, will advise

field commands of their approved operating
budgets through four interrelated actions.

(1) J une update of program and budget
guidance.

(2) DA issuance of the resources guidance.

(3) Issuance of approved operating bud-
get.

(4) Command operating budget markup.

b. Missions are assigned and resources are
allocated to the installation commander in
the command operating program of higher
headquarters. The allocation is expressed in
terms of the Army management structure,
AR 37-100 (basic fiscal code), and AR 37-100-
XX (FY fiscal code). Within this broad frame-
work the installation commander develops a
more detailed description of activities to be
performed during the year. When approved,
the COBE becomes the plan of action for ex-
ecutors of the program.

c. The COBE is a command, agency or
installation plan of action for a specific fiscal
year covering the activities for which it was
responsible.

Installation Management

We have already noted that the resource
management system requires installation
commanders to identify the costs of their
military personnel. In the future, therefore, a

2-12 Purpose of COBE

a. To record in one place the activi-
ties to be conducted for a given year and the
resources for their support. These are the
activities necessary to achieve objectives
assigned by higher authority based on
guidance extracted from the Army portion of
the FYDP.

(1) Identify that portion of the budget to
be accomplished by each subordinate ele-
ment in terms of objectives, policies, priori-
ties, and resources available.

(2) Establish a basis against which ac-
complishments and resource utilization
can be measured.

b. Each command, agency, and installa-
tion in the Army establishment prepares an
annual COBE covering operations for which
it receives funds. These COBEs are prepared
in sufficient detail to identify

(1) What has to be done.

(2) When it must be done.

(3) What resources are available.

c. The COBE is prepared by each com-
mand and developed in response to program
and budget guidance received from higher
headquarters.

Section III

much higher portion of the DOD budget will
be reflected annually in Army installation
budgets.

2-13 Budget Formulation

At the installation level, you will be
concerned with a budget cycle divided into
two phases— formulation and execution.

a. The budget cycle for operation and
maintenance, Army, appropriation which
finances most of the day-to-day operating
costs of the Army, actually starts 18 months
ahead of the target budget year (BY). Most
installations do not become formally in-
volved in the actual budget until 6 to 8 months
before the beginning of the target BY. As soon
as the annual Army budget estimate has been
finalized [following joint DOD/Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) hearings on
the Army budget estimate], DA revises its
guidance by sending to all of its major
commands revised budget and manpower
guidance (BMG) in J anuary (about 6 months
before the target BY). Based on this revised
guidance, each subordinate command makes
necessary changes in its local plans and
programs.

b. On receipt of the guidance document at
the installation in October— six months prior
to the BY— it is sent to the Directorate of
Resource Management (DRM), who is the
primary staff officer charged with financial
management responsibility. After briefing
the installation commander and adding the
commander's desires, the DRM breaks down
the guidance into terms and segments that
are meaningful at the installation level. He
then distributes guidance with a minimum of
delay to the major activity directors (MADs).

c. The DRM develops a time-phased sched-
ule of actions necessary for completion of the
installation budget. This is similar to a
suspense-date calendar.

d. Aided by his staff, the DRM establishes
objectives and resource limitations, using
local historical data and experience. He then

prepares the draft installation BMG.

e. To facilitate and coordinate preparation
of program/budgets, the staff forms a pro-
gram budget advisory committee (PBAC) to
serve as atop management advisory group to
the commander. The Chief of Staff is nor-
mally chairman. Other members are the
principal staff officers responsible for the
functional areas of personnel, operations,
and logistics, and other representatives as
desired by the commander.

f. The committee considers all aspects of
the internal management of the command.

g. Each member insures that his area of
staff responsibility is accorded full considera-
tion by the committee.

h. The use of financial data (that is,
expressions of resource requirements in
dollar terms) permits comparison of total
input, using a common unit of measure.

i. The goals and requirements of individ-
ual areas are coordi nated and molded into
overall goals and requirements for the com-
mand.

j. Recommendations of the PBAC repre-
sent the consensus of the top management
officials of the command.

k. The comptroller presents the draft BMG
to the PBAC along with any unresolved
differences that could not be settled by staff
coordination.

2-14 PBAC Functions

a. Interpretation of BMG from
higher authority and integration of the local
commander's guidance.

b. Development of a plan for preparation
of a proposed program/budget that will
effectively and efficiently accomplish the
command's mission.

Figure 3— Installation budget cycle.

c. Application of judgment and experience
to specific program areas.

d. Achievement of reasonable balance and
coordination between proposed missions,
activities, and resources assigned to subordi-
nate commands and agencies.

e. Presentation of a staff-coordinated pro-
posed command operati ng budget esti mate
(COBE) to the commander.

f. Review of the reports of program/budget
execution and preparation of recommended
revisions to the operating program/budget
based on the results of operations.

g. Principal members of the PBAC are
assisted by their subordinates who function
as a junior or working PBAC. Representation
in this junior group is expanded to include at
least one representative of each category
within each functional area. For example, the
DPCA represents the provost marshal (secu-
rity officer). The program/budget officer from
the comptroller's office also participates as a
working member. Much of the detailed work
for the senior PBAC is done by the junior
PBAC prior to the senior PBAC's being
convened. The junior PBAC works up de-
tailed alternative courses of action for consid-
eration of the senior PBAC.

h. Action agencies receiving the BMG are
the major activity directors (MADs). They are
also frequently called program directors.
Specific determinations of what is a major
activity and of the designation of the MAD
depend on the installation and its mission.
However, primary staff officers are normally
designated MADs for activities falling in
their areas of primary staff responsibility.
Major activities usually follow the break-
down of the Army management structure.

2-15 Major Activity Directors

For example, the director of indus-
trial operations (DIO), is responsible for the
central supply and maintenance program.

Also, the Guard and Reserve forces program
would belong to the director of plans and
training. Physical security equipment (pro-
vost marshal's office) belongs to the director
of personnel and community activities
(DPCA).

a. At the installation level, organization
more clearly reflects the functional manage-
ment requirements, but does not clearly ad-
dress the program as a whole. The installa-
tions have subdivided their programs by
functional area responsibilities. The name
coined for the subdivisions is "key accounts."

b. One rule that must be followed in this
subdivision is that the data collected for the
accounts must be identifiable to insure that
when this data is combined with data
concerning other key elements in the pro-
gram, it does not lose its identity with the
major programs that it supports.

c. Guidance is analyzed by the major
activity directors and passed down to the
activity chiefs who report to them. The
activity chiefs analyze their guidance and
pass appropriate guidance down to subactiv-
ity chiefs who report to them. For example,
the DPCA is the MAD for G-641. Under him
there are normally activity chiefs and subac-
tivity chiefs (physical security managers).

d. When the guidance finally gets down to
the activity/subactivity chief, it is translated
into budget requirements. This is theturna-
a round point. Detailed budget segments are
prepared by subactivity chiefs; reviewed, and
consolidated by activity chiefs; again re-
viewed and consolidated by major activity
chiefs; until the draft installation COBE is
consolidated by the DRM. Requirements are
justified by use of performance factors (PF)
listed for budget codes in the Army manage-
ment structure.

e. The basic program/budget document
prepared at the installation is the activity
budget schedule, reflecting, within cost guid-
ance, dollar requirements for resources by

Figure 4 — Typical organization for programing and budgeting (OMA).

type (element of expense), manpower by man-
years and type, and work output in terms of
PF. Data is projected for each quarter of the
fiscal year. The same three types of data are
provided for unfinanced requirements; that
is, the workload considered essential for
mission accomplishment and its associated
resource requirements that cannot be per-
formed within the cost guidance received. The
activity budget schedule establishes a stan-
dard cost per unit of output, composed of la-
bor, supply equipment, and other costs at the
programed level of output.

f. The activity budget schedule is normally
supported by schedules of temporary duty
travel, supply requirements, contracts, and
unfinanced requirements and a narrative
statement by the activity manager. When
automatic reimbursements are expected to be
earned by the activity, a list of sources and
anticipated amounts is also prepared.

g. Activity budget schedules are reviewed
by functional category managers. Particular
attention is paid to the balance of unfinanced
requirements of activities having similar
priorities. When balance has been achieved
among activities of the same functional
category, functional category managers,
acting now as the working PBAC, propose
adjustments in activity cost ceilings to
achieve balance installation wide among all
functional categories and activities.

action for a specific fiscal year and has a
threefold purpose:

• Record activities to be conducted and
resources needed for the installation's sup-
port.

• Identify action to be accomplished by each

subordinate element.

• Establish basis to measure accomplish-
ment and resource consumption.

j. Of special interest in the COBE is
IT] Commander's Narrative Analysis.

section, the commander is provided the
opportunity to defend his views on the
adequacy or inadequacy of his COBE which
has been developed in response to guidance
received from parent headquarters.

k. After review and approval, the COBE is
submitted to the major command which
reviews all COB Es submitted to determine
consistency with guidance, magnitude, and
type of resources requested and also the
urgency of unfinanced requirements.

l. Major command COBEs are reviewed,
adjusted, and consolidated at Headquarters,
DA, and form the basis of the Army's annual
apportionment request, which is submitted
through DOD to OMB.

section
In this

2-16 Budget Execution

h. The PBAC will review and make neces-
sary modifications to the draft COBE before
submitting it to the commander with its
recommendations. Those items that the
installation feels are necessary for the accom-
plishment of its mission, but cannot afford
within the dollar guidance received from
higher headquarters, are included in the
COBE as unfinanced requirements. Unfi-
nanced requirements are listed in order of
priority with justification and impact state-
ments supporting the installation's request
for additional funds.

i. The installation COBE is a plan of

a. The installation budget execu-
tion phase begins 1 October with receipt of the
approved operating budget (AOB) or marked
up COBE indicating the action taken in
response to the DA-approved COBE. The
markup of the installation COBE at this
point reflects all changes to the installation's
COBE resulting from budget reviews at all
levels of DOD, OMB, and Congress. As such,
it represents the approved installation plan of
execution for the BY.

b. An approved budget establishes annual
limitations and/or objectives to include the
amount of expense or obligations that maybe

incurred for a specific program (or other
classification) for the BY.

c. The installation marked up COBE and
the AOB for the first quarter of the fiscal year
are sent to the DRM for action. The DRM
reviews and analyzes these documents,
determines adjustments required, and in-
forms major activity directors concerned of
pertinent adjustments.

d. Through the coordinated efforts of the
DRM and the working PBA, the installation
program is updated. The DRM sends the
original of the AOB to the finance and
accounting office. Authority to obligate the
Government comes to the installation in the
form of a Funds Authorization Document
(FAD). This authority is provided on a
quarterly basis.

2-17 First-half-year Data

a. Actual data (experience) on ex-
penses incurred and performance (workload)
accomplished for the first 3 months (that is 1
October through 31 December).

b. Cumulative projected data for the first 6
months that include the first 3 months of
actual data plus 3 months (1 October through
31 March) of projections of the expense to be
incurred and the performance (workload) to
be accomplished.

c. Cumulative projected data for the entire
fiscal year. The last half estimated data are
included in the cumulative projections or
expenses to be incurred and performance to
be accomplished for the entire fiscal year.

e. If the magnitude of changes warrants,
the PBAC meets to review the revised
installation program for balance in re-
sources, levels and workloads. When satisfied
with the plan of operation, the PBAC recom-
mends that the plan be approved by the
installation commander. The commander
either approves the recommended program or
directs that changes be made. After final
approval, the program is returned to the
installation DRM . The DRM finalizes, pub-
lishes, and distributes the approved installa-
tion operating program which serves as the
overall plan of operations for the fiscal year.

f. The budget execution review (BER) is the
midyear review report and provides the basis
for funding adjustments by higher headquar-
ters during the latter half of the current fiscal
year. In preparing the BER, program and
activity directors should carefully review all
resource requirements to insure that esti-
mates are accurate, and that the unfinanced
requirements are completely justified to
insure that no mission-essential activities are
hampered by the lack of resources.

d. Segments of the BER are submitted
similar to sections of the COBE; they are
reviewed, analyzed, and consolidated by
activity chiefs and the major activity direc-
tors, and finally, the draft installation COBE
is composed of five sections.

e.|Section I, | Commander's Narrative An-
alysis, is the one in which the installation
commander informs higher headquarters of
major problems involved in performing
assigned missions, programs, and workloads
within existing resources. It is the highlight
feature of the BER on which all reviews are
finally focused for decision and action. It is
developed under the management-by-
exception concept and oriented to facilitate
budget execution, management, review, and
analysis processes at each succeeding level of
command. See section IV, chapter 2, AR 1-1,
for a more detailed explanation of the Army
budgeting system.

J -SI I DS issue is based on request made to
the National Inventory Control Point
(NICP). Other equipment may be obtained,

153-846 0-94-2

as a result of an annual unprogrammed and un-
financed request, by providing the necessary
justification for input to the command op-
erating budget estimate (COBE).

2-18 Security Equipment

Procurement Procedure

a. Security manager conducts an
inspection to determine the need.

b. Determine requirement authority
(DOD/DA letter, AR, directive, etc).

c. Brief provost marshal/installation com-

mander on installation vulnerability, equip
ment criticality, and need. This will also
assist the commander in preparing section I
of the commander's narrative analysis.

d. Coordinate with necessary installation
primary staff elements and solicit docu-
mented support.

e. Prepare the installation budget forms
and a security equipment decrement list to be
submitted to the comptroller. (The decrement
list is a priority list for items to be removed
from the program if resource guidance is
reduced. As such, the document list goes from
lowest priority to highest priority in terms of
the critical needs of the installation.)

Sample Budget Request

Section IV

Budget requests provide for police services,
maintenance of order, traffic control, crim-
inal investigations, correctional facility, and
physical security services, equipment,
and inspections. The physical security man-
ager must review the design of Military Con-
struction Army (MCA) projects and provide
recommendations.

The cost estimate must be submitted with
the appropriate transmittal document, ac-
cording to local policy. DA Pamphlet 140-
series explains this subject in great detail.

The samples included in the next 15 pages are
physical security oriented (6 pages for COBE
and 9 for SPE funding).

If the DPCA receives cuts in its request, the
budget request may be returned to the
installation in initial FY 80 budget guidance
because of cuts in the DPCA request. If, for
instance, the security manager's request for a
radio network was not funded, he must
submit a second request for special equip-
ment finding to the installation DRM.

Sample Estimates
And request for SPE Funding
(next 1 5 pages)

PY 80 COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET ESTIMATE
SCHEDULE OF EQUIPMENT

o o o o
o o o o
o o o o
vO v£> vD VO
O O O O

m <

o <

<N <

<T» (

o o o in
o in o rH
r- p- ro m

H CN H f**»

•H

- J

TJ*

f-H

Q) 10

•H

•H O
•H -H

•H

X 73

»H

0 (0

*•

6 p

•H

•r4

•H

73i

a ,

IT)

Sample COBE (1 of 6 pages).

SECTION I - REQUIREMENTS ACTIVITY TITLE » Provoat Marshal

(Security)

COBE summary (2 of 6 pages).

SECTION III

COBE summary continued (3 of 6 pages).

CO fM Tf o o o

n rf m n

n Tf Mn in in

0> rH

in co

(«

■H a

> o
a> 43 >,
'O m m
<d

MW
(0

0 -H
•H <0
P ‘
O
<D
P

& I

u o

U ^ flj H 6

g«0 C *H o

P P *H Id o

Q W X

c <d 0 Q P

o & a .c p p

•hh o jx <u ae

WrHCCCcnc*

2 | 3 3 2 u £

P W X X ffl ffl "

0
m

«H

Sample COBE continued (5 of 6 pages)— Contractual services.

Traffic control materials I .G6000 I NA NA I 31,300

I-*

«■

§ s s

<u m
co ®

id 04
43

•

try

•H

4»

•H

-H O

6 o
o
m -
o O
4-i C

o B

u
p
0)

p -
O P

*« c

p .
M *H
Id 3
0U O1
4)
M

H CO

<d c
a 4 o

4) *»H
05 P

Sample COBE continued (6 of 6 pages)— Supplies and materials.

10 November 1979

SUbJect: Request for Special Equipment (spe) Funding

Commander

US Army Military Police School/

Training Center and Fort McClellan
ATTN: ATZN-DRM

Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205

1. Request SPE funding in the amount of $45,000 be made available for the
purchase and installation of equipment required to renovate and expand the
nontactical radio network of the security police force,

2. The timing of this funding request has been accelerated by the change
in mission storage and shipment requirements and approved expansion of
personnel and other equipment to the security force TDA. When the security
mission increased in criticality, number of items, and shipment procedures,
the current communication network became overextended, outdated, and lacked
the number required to provide for a safe and secure environment during
operations.

3. The present nontactical network is restricted in its range and cannot
make contact with security patrols during convoy operations while off the
installation. Additionally, the current network will not provide adequate
communication for the installation during periods of war emergency,
installation confrontations, terrorists activities, natural disasters, or
other situations which may result in the disruption of normal
communications .

4. Following is a listing of the required items with acquisition costs.

Item Quantity Cost

Repeater 1 $ 2,700
Consolette 2 3,500
Base station 1 3,300
2-channel mobile radios 7 9,205
Hand-held portables 17 18,989
Antennas 4 7 , 000

Total $44,694

Sample SPE funding request (1 of 9 pages).

5. An economic analysis for this requested action was done by the
operational research/systems analysis branch. The purchase alternative is
recommended based on the analysis and a copy of each, purchase v. lease,
is inclosed.

4 Incl GARY R. MOORE

as CPT, MPC

Security Manager

Coordination:

PM: Concur/Nonconcur

DPTSEC : Concur /Nonconcur

Sample SPE funding request continued (2 of 9 pages).

Date_

Date

SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS

1. Submitting Component: Security Branch, Provost Marshal Office

2. Date of Submission: 10 November 1979

3. Project Title: Funding Request for Nontactical Radio Network

Description of Project Objective: Update Overaged

Current

System

Alternative: Purchase

Economic Life:

5 years

8. Project

Costs

Nonrecurring

Recurring

Discounted

Project

Annual

Discount

Annual

Year Investment

Operations

Cost

Factor

Cost

1 46,521.10

272.74

46,793.84

.954

44,641.32

272.74

.867

236.47

272.74

.788

214.92

272.74

.717

195.55

272.74

.652

177.83

TOTAL

45,466.09

10a ,

Total project cost (discounted)

45,366.

.09

10b.

Uniform Annual Cost

(without terminal value)

9,093.22

11.

Less Terminal Value

(discounted)

-0-

12a.

Net Total Project Cost (discounted)

45,366.

,09

12b.

Uniform Annual Cost

(with terminal

value)

9,093.22

13.

Source Derivation of

Cost Estimates

; (use as much

space as

required) :

See attached documentation.

a. Nonrecurring Costs: (Entries may vary.)

1) Research & Development

2) Investment:

b. Recurring Cost: (Entries may vary.)

c. Net Terminal Value: Not available.

d. Other Considerations: (Entries may vary.)

Sample SPE request continued (3 of 9 pages) — Enclosure 7.

SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS

1. Submitting Component: Security Branch, Provost Marshal Office

2. Date of Submission: 10 November 1978

3. Project Title: Funding Request for Nontactical Radio Network

4. Description of Project Objective: Update Overaged Current System

5. Alternative: Lease

Economic Life:

5 years

a. b.

Nonrecurring

Recurring

Project Costs
c.

Annual

Discount

Discounted

Annual

Project

Investment

Operations

Cost

Factor

Cost

4,683.25

14,613.46

19,296.71

.954

18,409.06

14,613.46

.867

12,699.87

14,613.46

.788

11,515.41

14,613.46

.717

10,477.85

14,613.46

.652

9,527.98

TOTAL

62,630.17

10a.

Total Project Cost (discounted)

62,630.17

10b.

Uniform Annual Cost (without terminal value)

12,526.03

11.

Less Terminal Value (discounted)

-0“

12a.

Net Total Project Cost (discounted)

62,630.17

12b.

Uniform Annual Cost (with terminal value)

12,526.03

13.

Source Derivation of Cost Estimates (use as
See attached documentation.

much space as

required)

a. Nonrecurring Costs: (Entries may vary.)

1) Research & Development

2) Investment:

b. Recurring Cost: (Entries may vary.)

c. Net Terminal Value: Not available.

d. Other Considerations: (Entries may vary.)

Sample SPE request (4 of 9 pages) — Enclosure 2.

OTHER FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION (PURCHASE VS. LEASE)

1. Status Quo:

Based on information received from various security supervisors and
patrolmen, the current radio network is overaged and maintenance
costs are high. Additionally, the security branch received an IG
deficiency because we could not reach all security patrols.

By installing a new system, all of the above problems could be
alleviated.

2 . Purchase :

a. Benefits:

(1) The provost marshal would own the equipment. We could modify
it to suit our needs.

(2) A one-time cost would be incurred which eliminates much
bookkeeping .

b. Costs:

(1) Return on investment for state-of-the-art updates would be less
than with a lease agreement.

(2) Maintenance and installation costs are the same as leasing.

3. Lease:

a. Benefits:

(1) The return on investment for leased items is higher than for
purchased equipment. For state-of-the-art updates, commercial firms
will allow credit for investment-to-date .

(2) The total cost of the radio network can be spread out for 5
years, at which time we would own the equipment.

b. Costs:

(1) As shown in the Present Value equation, the total cost would
be $17,119.73 higher for lease.

(2) Associated with the lease is an increased nonquantif iable
bookkeeping cost (monthly entries for 5 years) .

(3) To modify a leased radio system, we have to get the leasor's
permission and pay them for the modification.

4. Extent of the System:

Some further review of the number of MX Portables and Page com Pagers
needed should be made to insure that all units listed are necessary.

5. Contact with Other Suppliers:

Sample SPE request (5 of 9 pages)-Enclosure 3.

6. Use of Army Tactical Radios:

This alternative was found unsuitable for the following reasons:

a. Wide band radios, as tactical radios, are restricted to tactical
use only.

b. The frequencies assigned to the security branch are outside the
tactical radios' capabilities; they are FM radios and our frequencies
are VHF.

c. Tactical radios are much more expensive than nontactical ones,
and this use would not be cost effective to the US Army as a whole.

Sample SPE request (6 of 9 pages) — Enclosure 3 continued.

PRESENT VALUE EQUATIONS FOR LEASE AND PURCHASE OF NONTACTICAL RADIO
EQUIPMENT

PURCHASE

PVp = 41837.85 (PVi) + 3732.85 (PV-^ + 950.40 (PVi) + 272.74 (SPV5)

= 41837.85 (.954) + 3732.85 (.954) + 950.40 (.954) + 272.74 (3.977)
= 39913.31 + 3561.14 + 906.68 + 1084.69
= 45465.82

Explanation of Costs :

41837.85 = Cost of equipment purchase

3732.85 = Antenna installation
950.40 = Equipment installation
272.74 = Annual maintenance cost

PV = 3732.85 (PVi) = 950.40 (PVi) = 14613.46 (SPV5)

= 3732.85 (.954) + 950.40 (.954) + 14613.46 (3.977)
= 3561.14 + 906.68 + 58117.73
= 62585.55

Explanation of Costs:

3732.85 = Antenna installation
950.40 = Equipment installation
14613.46 = Annual cost (lease + maintenance*)

LEASE COST ALTERNATIVE:

Purchase of equipment

TIME LINE FOR INVESTMENT

ECONOMIC LIFE 5 Years

PURCHASE OF NONTACTICAL RADIO NET EQUIPMENT

41837.85

3732.85

950.40

EXPLANATION OF COSTS

41837.85 - Purchase of Radio Equipment

3732.85 - Antenna Installation
950.40 - Equipment Installation
272.74 - Annual Maintenance

Sample SPE request (8 of 9 pages) — Enclosure 4 continued.

TIME LINE INVESTMENT
ECONOMIC LIFE 5 Years

LEASE OF NONTACTICAL RADIO NET EQUIPMENT

3732.85

950.40

J.4613.46,

0 12 3 4

EXPLANATION OF COSTS

14613.46 - Annual Lease Cost and Maintenance
14340.72 - Annual Lease Cost
272.74 - Annual Maintenance
3732.85 - Antenna Installation
950.40 - Equipment Installation

Sample SPE request (9 of 9 pages) — Enclosure 4 continued.

Manpower Procedures

Section V

Review and revision of tables of organiza-
tion and equipment (TOEs) is accomplished
on a recurring basis, coinciding with HQDA
planning requirements and the Army imple-
mentation of the Five-Year Defense Program
(FYDP) as discussed earlier.

The TOE Documentation Program is con-
trolled by the TOE program letter and
schedule. This letter specifies the TOE to be
developed or revised during the fiscal year,
and is published in J uly and updated in
J anuary. Security managers are not involved
in the revision and development of TOEs.
This action depends on the TOE proponent
agency within the TRADOC school system. It
is based upon and in concert with, DA
approved doctrine and concepts, etc. (See AR
310-31.)

2-19 Security Manager's
I nterface

a. Security managers, at various
times, must be involved with revision of
modification tables of organization and
equipment (MTOEs) and tables of distribu-
tion and allowances (TDAs)-mainly the
latter. This involvement usually requires an
interface with the supporting force develop-
ment officer or the next higher headquarters
operation section (S3) to prepare documents
in accordance with the Army Authorization
Documents System (TAADS) which is a
system used for:

□ Developing organizational structures

□ Requirements

□ Personnel authorizations and equipment.

b. The final product of this system is a
unit's authorization documents (MTOE/
TDA), which provide for subsequent person-
nel and equipment transactions. The MTOE
provides the commander with the means to
modify or adjust the DA approved TOE to
meet specific operational requirements. The
TDA, on the other hand, establishes its own
organizational structure to meet the needs of
each specified unit. A flow chart showing the
processi na of a T AADS authorization docu-
ment is at figure'll Authorizations to support
this document are as follows:

• MTOE

• TDA

• Augmentation TDA

• Mobilization TDA.

c. TDA security units organized to support
the Army's peacetime posture may not be
sufficient in terms of personnel strength and
equipment. The requirements column of the
TDA must be based on requirements recog-
nized in an approved manpower survey.
Adjustments by the survey authority maybe
made when changes in mission, function, or
workload occur between manpower surveys.
Requirements for a new TDA unit must be
based on the mission, projected workload,
and applicable staffing guides.

d. The manpower authorizations column
of the TDA must be based on allocations of
resources, and normally will be equal to or
less than the manpower reflected in the
requirements column. When authorizations
are less than requirements, reduced capabili-
ties must be reflected in the appropriate
paragraphs of section 1 1 of the TDA.

Directives

And

Decisions

Directives

And

Decisions

* Security manager involvement

Figure 5 — Flow chart for TAADS data.

e. Grades of DA civilian personnel posi-
tions in the TDA must be established by
application of civil service and DA civilian
personnel policies, regulations, and proce-
dures.

f. Organizational structures of TDA units
must adhere to applicable DA regulations
governing organization of specific units; or in
the absence of such regulations, they must
adhere as closely to the appropriate DA
staffing guide as local conditions permit.

g. Military and civilian manpower utiliza-
tion policies in AR 570-4 must be followed
when organizing and staffing TDA units to
perform security missions.

2-20 Manpower Management

The objective is to achieve optimum
use of manpower in accomplishing the
security mission.

a. The security manager must realize that
the two primary constraints on manpower
are:

(1) Man-years generated during a fiscal

year.

(2) Strength at the end of a fiscal year.

b. The total strength of an activity at any
given time in the year is important because it
is the basis for computing man-years.

c. As security strengths change during a
fiscal year, adjustments must be made to:

(1) Total man-years and, if appropriate,

(2) E nd-year strengths.

Manpower planning and allocation docu-
ments, as discussed previously, are as an-
nounced in Chapter IV of the Program and
Budget Guidance (PBG) provided to major
activity directors (MADs).

2-21 Establishing Manpower
Requirements

a. The security manager must ob-
tain the following documents to prepare his
requirement:

(1) TOE manpower authorization criteria

(2) DA staffing criteria

(3) DA staffing guides

(4) Manpower surveys

(5) Various work measurements

(6) The physical security plan.

b. The civilian personnel officer will ac-
tively participate in TDA development in-
volving civilian security positions. Civilian
position structures in the TDA will be in
accordance with regulations of:

(1) The office of management and budget

(2) Civil Service Commission (CSC)

(3) HQDA.

2-22 Grade and Position
Change

a. To change security grade level
or position at the local level, unless instructed
otherwise, must be done I AW the following:

(1) Civilian Personnel Regulation 501.

(2) J ob reengineering.

(3) Civil Service Commission Research &

Development Engineering Grade Evalua-
tion Guide.

(4) Civil service classification guidance.

b. Grade levels and position structure of
positions in grade GS-15 and below, and in
wage board pay categories may be submitted

as proponent-approved, unless HQDA in- tional elements for greater security mission
structs otherwise. efficiency.

c. Evaluation of civilian personnel officer
positions are subject to the provisions of
Civilian Personnel Regulation (CPR) 501.

b. Proponent-initiated changes must com-
ply with organizational policies, as set forth
in chapter 2, AR 310-49.

d. Application of job evaluation decisions
of the CS or HQDA is mandatory. Action on
such mandatory decisions must betaken in
accordance with civilian personnel regula-
tions and instructions, even though applica-
tion results in grade levels that exceed the
current approved TDA.

e. Prior approval requirements. The secu-
rity manager must realize that successive
echelons of command are not authorized to
establish prior approval requirements be-
yond the provisions of CPR 501, unless
determined to be necessary to improve
position management and the civilian posi-
tion structure. The HQDA policy of decentral-
izing authority for civilian personnel man-
agement and for position classification to the
lowest practicable level must, be observed
both in principle and in practice.

c. Changes in the organization and man-
ning of units and activities must conform to
the manpower management policies in AR
310-49, and to information on position catego-
ries, classifications, and grading.

d. Requests for additional security person-
nel spaces required because of increased
workload or similar factors must be made in
accordance with AR 570-4.

2-24 J ustifi cation

For Personnel Changes

a. J ustification is an explanation of
the situation and circumstances which re-
quire personnel changes to cope with the
security mission.

f. Civilian grades listed in DA-approved
TDA. Civilian grades listed in DA-approved
TDAs are not authorized until finalized by
the security element's supporting civilian
personnel office in accordance with the above
paragraphs. DA review normally will be
accomplished on a post audit basis. Com-
ments addressing civilian positions in ap-
proved TDAs, if any, will be furnished
separately by DAPE-CPP.

2-23 Proponent-Initiated
Changes

a. The organization structure of
security units and activities may be changed
at the initiative of commanders. Changes
may be necessary to respond to changes in
mission or to realine resources and organiza-

(1) Your justification is the major basis on
which the Army staff forms its judgment
regarding the request.

(2) Explanations must be sufficiently
clear, well -organized, concise, and com-
plete to allow an analyst who is unfamiliar
with the unit and local conditions to
understand the rationale for the proposed
action.

b. Organization charts and diagrams help
to clarify the reasons for a justification
proposal.

c. A citation of Army directives, previously
obtained approval of actions, and approved
manpower survey reports frequently are
adequate justification.

Section VI

shows conditions that influ-
ence personnel spaces and the actions re-

quired by proponents to justify specific
changes.

e. When new security organizational ele-
ments are formed, an explanation of the
mission or functions of the newly formed
organization and an estimated workload will
often suffice to justify positions, grades, and
M OSs of members.

(1) J ob descriptions provided must be fully
explained to assist in the justification.

(2) To further substantiate the require-
ment for a position, the grade and MOS or
civilian series code, workload data, and an
indication why the work is performed,
must be included in the justification.

f. Guidance for preparation and sub
mission of justification for security personnel
changes in TAADS is reflected in AR 310-49.

2-25 J unification for Security
Personnel and Equipment

a. The security manager must docu-
ment necessary justification in accordance
with:

(1) AR 570-2

(2) AR 611-1

(3) AR 611-101

(4) AR 310-34

(5) AR 310-49

(6) AR 750-43.

b. As a security manager, you realize that
TDA units rely primarily on manpower to
establish manpower requirements. There-
fore, between surveys, manpower survey
forms must be used and documented to assist
in developing changes in requirements
caused by changes in the activity's security
mission and/or workloads.

c. To increase the personnel strength level
of the local security office in an effort to

supplement the TDA, you will be required to
justify the increase IAW DA Pamphlet 570-4,
The Manpower Procedures Handbook. Act-
ing as a check and balance to strength levels,
manpower surveys by specialized teams are
conducted on a programed basis; therefore, as
a security representative of the commander,
the burden of proof that additional manpower
is needed to accomplish the security mission
rests with assessment of individual capabili-
ties and documentation of normal workloads.

d. In accomplishing this documentation,
there are several survey documents that
present data about the operation of the
security office in terms of:

(1) Organization

(2) Manpower utilization

(3) Workloads

(4) Estimated manpower requirements in
relation to existing guides.

e. The security manager, when preparing
for manpower surveys, must take a two-prong
approach— (1) strong justification must be
documented to prevent loss of existing
manpower, and (2) strong detailed justifica-
tion must be documented to obtain additional
manpower spaces. Survey documentation
involves the following forms:

(1) DA Form 140-1 (Remarks)

(2) DA Form 140-2 (Schedule A - Man-
power Inventory)

(3) DA Form 140-3 (Schedule T -I dentifica-
tion of Manpower)

(4) DA Form 140-4 (Schedule X - Man-
power and Workload Data)

(5) DA Form 140-5 (Schedule A - Man-
power Inventory Continuation Sheet).

f. Initial entries on the forms must be made
by the security manager, and the applicable
portions must be completed during the on-site
visit by the manpower teams.

2-26 Staffing Guides

Appropriate staffing guides must
be used in preparing TDAs. It is essential that
the security manager use the correct yard-
stick for manpower appraisals and require-
ments to accomplish the following:

(1) Indicate the total number of positions
required to perform a security function.

(2) Consider:

(a) Annual leave

(b) Sick leave

(d) Orientation

(e) Other activities not contributing

directly to the performance of the desig-
nated function.

2-27 Yardstick Examples

a. The following yardstick determi-
nation for 8-hour-day/7- and 5-day-week
positions involve basic man-years (BMY) and
nonavail able time (NAT) computations for
security positions. The computations are a
modified version of those outlined in DA
PAM 570-4; however, they have been accepted
by various manpower survey teams as unique
to a security unit or depot.

b. Eight-Hour-Day-Week Position

(1) Determine nonavail able time (NAT):

(a) Days off (2 days per week)=2 x 8 x 52
= 832 hours.

(b) Leave (30 days per year)=30 x 8 = 240
hours.

(This should be based on historical
records taken from sick slips but in lieu
of accurate data, 1/3 day per month is
acceptable average per man.)

(d) Training (3 days per month) = 3 x 8 x
12 = 288 hours.

(Again, this number must be based on
actual and programed training, includ-
ing time for SQTs, SQT preparation,
actual job training, and mandatory unit
training such as RR/EO, etc., per man.)

(e) Total nonavailable time = 1,392
hours.

(2) Determine available time (AT):

AT= BMY - NAT 2,920 - 1,392 = 1,538

(3) Determine yardstick (YS):

YS = BMY divided by AT
2,920 divided by 1,528 = 1.9 men
per required position.

(a) For a 24-hour-7-day-week position,
multiply the basic yardstick by 3 (5.7).

(b) For a 16-hour-day-7-day-week posi-
tion, multiply the basic yardstick by 2
(3.8).

(c) For less than a 7-day position,
multiply the proper yardstick by the
number of days required and divided by
7 (such as, 24-hour day, 6 days per week =
1.9x3x6 = 4 9)

c. Eight-Hour-Day- 5-Day-Week Position

(1) It is necessary to determine basic man-
years.

(2) Determine nonavailable time without
considering days off, since it is a 5-day
week position:

(a) Leave (30 days per year) = 30 x 8 = 240
hours.

(b) Sick (1/3 day per month) = 1/3 x 8 x
12 = 32 hours (determined the same as
for 7-day week position).

(d) Total nonavailabletime=560.

(3) Determine available time:

2,920-560 = 2,360

(4) Determine yardstick:

2,920 divided by 2,360=12.

Chapter 3

Education

\ Crime Prevention
\ Program

ny security program or system
designed to combat the security threats
discussed ini chapter"! appendixesIXEE
and [d] will prove ineffective unless it is
supported by an effective security education
program. Security personnel cannot effec-
tively accomplish their mission without the
active interest and support of everyone on the
installation. Such interest and support can be
secured only through an effective security
education program.

3-1 Program Considerations

a. It is obvious from a review of
the security threats as presented, that a
security education program must approach
security from a total package,
comprehensive-360-degree viewpoint. It must
be concerned not only with physical security
measures designed to prevent such purely
criminal acts as pilferage; but just as impor-
tant, with counterintelligence measures de-
signed to provide security of classified intelli-
gence information and materials. The close
relationship of the two types of security is
made evident from a review of the Coun-
terintelligence Survey Checklist in FM 30-17,
Counterintelligence Operations. The rela-
tionship and importance of physical security
to all other security is also well documented in
DA Pam 380-1. Both of these documents are
highly recommended reading for the physical
security manager.

b. It is also essential that the security
education program include all pertinent
aspects of the crime prevention program (ARs
190-31, 190-33, 195-10, and FM 19-20). Many
aspects of this program have a direct per-
sonal application to all installation person-
nel.

c. The individual and collective concern of
every soldier and Department of the Army
(DA) civilian is involved in protection efforts.
Security education must be designed to
supplement mission accomplishment and be
considered essential to the successful imple-
mentation of a physical security program.

d. Your educational program should en-
courage prompt reporting of security
breaches and attempt to:

■ Reduce security infractions and violations.

■ Act as a communications feedback for
improved protective measures.

■ Reduce vulnerabilities.

■ Instill security consciousness, which will
solicit potential-threat information.

e. The essential interrelationship of both
types of security, plus the need for close
coordination between Military Police and
Army Counterintelligence personnel in the
formulation and operation of a security
education program were considered in pre-
paring this chapter.

3-2 Program Formulation

To insure integration of security
education, your plan must be developed at the
installation level, which will require actions
by the major commands. Based upon vulnera-
bility and criticality, statistical data of
incidents and criminal information formula-
tion must complement both crime prevention
and military intelligence educational efforts.

3-3 Program Objectives

a. The objectives of a security edu-
cation program are to acquaint all personnel
with the reasons for security measures and to
insure their cooperation. The assumption by
installation personnel (military and civilian)
that they are not concerned with security
unless they work with classified matter or in a
restricted area must be overcome. It must be
impressed upon them and be continually
reiterated that a locked gate or file cabinet
does not constitute an end in itself, but is
merely an element in the overall security
plan.

b. A continuous program should be pre-
sented to selected audiences (primarily super-
visors and other key personnel) on timely and
applicable topics to develop and foster a high
degree of security consciousness.

3-4 Educational Requirements

Security consciousness is not an
inherent state of mind— it must be acquired.
Many people are naive and trusting, and are

153-846 0 - 94 - 3

inclined to accept things at face value,
Desirable as these characteristics are, they
are not conducive to vigilance or security
consciousness. Structural and mechanical
aids to security are valueless without the
active support of all personnel. All installa-
tion personnel must be made aware of the
constant threat of breaches of security and of
their individual responsibilities to detect and
thwart such threats. A continuous and
forceful education program provides the
constant awareness that successful security
demands.

3-5 Personal Presentations

Very effective at commander's call.

Requires formal instruction at the unit and
activity level.

Technical advice may be presented by the
provost marshal or security manager.

Security content is presented in accordance
with the 190-series Army regulations.

3-6 Graphic Media Aids

Posters -are effective since they
may be large in size, brief and to the point,
and impact their message at a glance. Posters
should be displayed in locations where the
majority of people pass and/or congregate.

Placards -used where attention is neces-
sary and people are expected to loiter and
have time to read, such as bulletin boards,
telephone booths, vending machines and
recreation areas.

Leaflets -are economical and are usually
pocket size for easy carrying. Distribution of
leaflets is determined by the commander or
activity chief.

3-7 I ndoctr i nati on

AR 380-5 requires the commander to
establish security indoctrination and educa-

tion programs within his command and
insure the following:

a. Each individual is indoctrinated and
kept proficient in the particular security
procedures which apply to him in the per-
formance of his duties.

b. All personnel are aware of their security
responsi bilities.

c. All newly assigned personnel must be
given security indoctrinations. The reading
of printed security regulations is not suffi-
cient to insure complete understanding.
Indoctrination should consist of a general
orientation on the need for and dangers to
security, and the individual's responsibility
in preventing infractions. It should include a
discussion of those hazards common to all
personnel, with emphasis on the dangers of
loose talk and operational carelessness. It
should define general security measures in
effect, such as the pass system, private
vehicle control, and package inspection. The
security indoctrination is an introduction to
the subject as applied to the particular
installation. Further instruction should be
applicable to the individual's duty assign-
ment.

d. Further orientation, on an initial and
annual basis, is prescribed by AR 381-12,
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against
the US Army and Deliberate Security Viola-
tions.

e. AR 360-81, The Command Information
Program, discusses news media that can be
used in security education programs, includ-
ing those prescribed by AR 381-12.

3-8 Crime Prevention

All security education programs
should include materials on the crime preven-
tion programs (AR 190-31, AR 195-10, FM 19-
10, and FM 19-20) which are designed to
reduce crime. This is done by eliminating or

neutral izi ng factors that cause individuals to
commit criminal acts and that remove or
minimize opportunities for committing such
acts.

FM 19-20 provides detailed guidance on
conducting a crime prevention program.
Such a program includes both the conduct of
crime prevention surveys for the purposes
mentioned in above paragraph, and an
education program to emphasize security
consciousness on the part of all personnel,
and to educate them in the importance of
securing and protecting both military and
personal property.

A security education program, therefore,
provides an excellent means of disseminating
crime prevention information, and of encour-
aging the active participation of all personnel
in observing and reporting security deficien-
cies, violations, or hazards of any nature.

3-9 Program of I instruction

a. The security manager is responsi-
ble for planning an effective program of
instruction. Profitable use of the limited time
normally available for such instruction
demands the techniques of a competent
instructor. The security manager should give
the more important portions of the instruc-
tion. Other competent instructors may be
used for less important phases or for phases
which concern their areas of responsibility,
training, and experience.

b. FM 30-17 provides an excellent discus-
sion of the planning and implementation of a
security education program. While the pro-
gram outlined is directed primarily to intelli-
gence security, a review will indicate many
points at which physical security and crime
prevention education can be integrated.

c. Each of the offices listed here can assist
in the formulation of the program by contrib-

uting materials from its own areas of re-
sponsibility, knowledge, and interest. Each
can also assist by presenting security brief-
ings within those areas.

Staff judge advocate
Chaplain

Special services officer
Safety director
Information officer
Post surgeon
CID representative

Character guidance council representative
Major organizational command represent-
atives

Local police and allied agencies

d. The program should be based on an
evaluation of the total security posture of the
installation. It should begin with an explana-
tion of the program, its aims and objectives—
the WHY.

e. It should then develop the necessary
tools to reach those aims and objectives— the
WHAT.

f. It should proceed to delineate methods of
education by which the program will be
conducted-th rough individual and group
conferences, meetings, speeches, use of news
media, posters, placards, leaflets, etc.— the
HOW.

g. Each program must provide for initial
and refresher training. It will also provide for
debriefing of appropriate personnel upon
their reassignment, retirement, departure on
leave, and at other appropriate times.

h. The program must, above all, stress the
absolute requirement for the support of every
individual, regardless of any security clear-
ance he mayor may not have, and regardless
of his work assignment.

i. As a minimum, each program should
include materials on any recent incidents of
security deficiency or violation, and any
areas of laxity or trends that have become

apparent in the security posture of the instal-
lation.

3-10 Scheduling and Testing

Frequent short periods of instruction
are more effective than less frequent long
periods. The ideas contained in four well-
planned weekly 15-minute classes are more
readily absorbed than those contained in a 1-
hour lecture once a month-regardless of how
well the latter is planned and delivered.
Instruction that infringes on the free time of

the audience is seldom well recaved. Short
periods of instruction to selected groups are
easier to schedule without disrupting the
operation.

I n any form of instruction, testing serves
the dual purpose of keeping the audience alert
and indicating the efficiency of the presenta-
tion and the total program. Tests do not
necessarily involve written answers. In fact,
skits and hypothetical situations tend to
enliven the instruction. Audience participa-
tion in giving consequences or solutions to
situations presented will accomplish the
same results.

Chapter 4

Personnel Movement

Contjoi yowhsawd vetff/

AID ADMISSION

Without

cards and badges, badge exchange proce-
dures, and personnel escorts contribute to the
effectiveness of movement control systems.

The best control is provided when systems
incorporate all these elements. Simple, under-
standable, and workable identification and
movement control procedures should be used
to achieve security objectives without imped-

Identification of Personnel

4-1 Purpose of Movement

Control and Identification

a. Prevent introduction of harmful
devices, materiel, or components.

b. Prevent misappropriation, pilferage, or
compromise of materiel or recorded informa-
tion by means of:

• Package

• Materiel

• Property Movement Control.

c. This prevention is accomplished
through:

(1) Initially determining who has a valid
requirement to be in an area.

(2) Limiting access to those persons who
have that valid requirement.

(3) Establishing procedures for positive
identification of persons within, and of
persons authorized access into, areas.

(4) Issuing special identification cards or
badges to personnel authorized access into
restricted areas.

(5) Using access lists.

ing efficient operations. Properly organized
and administered, a personnel and move-
ment control system provides a means not
only of positively identifying those who have
the right and need to enter or leave an area,
but also of detecting unauthorized personnel
who attempt to gain entry.

Section I

(6) Using identification codes.

(7) Using duress codes

4^2 Employee Screening

a. Screening job applicants and
employees to eliminate potential espionage
and sabotage agents and other security risks
is important in peacetime and is extremely
important in time of a national defense
emergency. For such screening to be most
effective, it should be incorporated into
standard personnel policies for peacetime as
well as for times of emergency.

b. Personnel Security Survey Ques-
tionnaire. The use of a personnel security
questionnaire is essential in the investigation
of both applicants and employees. The
security questionnaire should be screened for
completeness and, in the case of applicants,
obvious undesirables eliminated from further
consideration. A careful investigation should
be conducted to assure that the applicant's or
employee's character, associations, and suit-
ability for employment are satisfactory.

c. Sources of Data. The following

sources may be helpful in securing employ-
ment investigative data:

(1) State and local police, to include
national and local police in overseas areas.

(2) Former employers.

(3) References (including those not fur-
nished by applicant or employee. These are
known as throw-offs, and their names are
obtained during interviews of references
furnished by applicants or employees).

(4) Public records.

(5) Credit agencies.

(6) Schools (all levels).

(7) Others as appropriate. (These may
include the FBI, the US Army Criminal
Records Repository, etc.). In requesting
investigative data from any of the above
sources, enough information should be
furnished to properly identify the appli-
cant or employee and avoid error in
identity.

4-3 I denti f i cati on System

a. An identification (ID) system
should be established at each installation or
facility to provide a means of identifying all
military personnel, civilian employees, and
visitors. The system should provide for the
use of security identification cards or badges
to aid in control and movement of personnel
into, within, and out of specified areas or
activities.

b. The standard identification media, DD
Form 2A (Military) or DA Form 1602 (Civil-
ian Employee), may be prescribed for person-
nel by installation or facility commanders as
valid identification for access to areas that
are basically administrative in nature, con-
tain no security interest, and are not in the
restricted area category.

c. Personnel requiring access to restricted
areas should be issued a security identifica-
tion card or badge as prescribed in AR 606-5.

The identification card or badge should be
designed as simply as possible and still
provide for adequate control of the movement
of personnel.

d. Provisions for identification by card or
badge control at an installation or facility
should be included as part of the physical
security plan.

4-4 Use of Identification Media

a. Designation of the various areas
where media are required.

b. Description of the various types in use
plus authorizations and limitations placed
upon the holder.

c. Required presentation at times of enter-
ing and leaving each area, including nonop-
erational hours.

d. Details, of where, when, and how worn,
displayed, or carried.

e. Procedures to be followed in case of loss
or damage.

f. Disposition on termination of employ-
ment or as a result of investigations and
personnel actions.

g. Prerequisites for reissue.

4-5 Types of Systems

Most Common
Identification Systems

□ Single card or badge

□ Card or badge exchange

□ Multiple cards or badges

4-6 Card and Badge System

a. A security identification card or
badge system should be established to admit
and control the movement of all persons
admitted to restricted areas employing 30 or
more persons per shift. However, the com-
mander may at his discretion authorize a
card or badge system in restricted areas
where less than 30 persons per shift are
employed.

b. Of the several identification systems
used in access control, three of the most
commonly used are the single card or
badge system, the card or badge ex-
change system, and the multiple card or
badge system. These I D systems may be
used either for cards carried on the person or
for cards or badges worn on outer clothing.

c. A system may be established (in an
appropriate situation) for issuance of identifi-
cation cards or badges at the main entrance
to an installation. Such a system can be used
for visitors and similar personnel.

4-7 Single Card or Badge

a. With this system, permission to
enter specific areas is shown by letters,
numerals, or colors. It has a major
limitation-loose control. The opportunity for
alteration or duplication is high.

b.This system gives comparatively loose
control and is not recommended for security
areas. Permission to enter does not always go
with the need to know, and the fact that I D
cards and badges frequently remain in the
bearer's possession during off duty or off post
hours gives the opportunity for alteration or
duplication.

4-8 Card or Badge Exchange

a. I n this system, two items contain
identical photographs but different back-
ground colors, or one item has an overprint.
One is presented at the entrance to a specific
area and exchanged for the other, which is
carried or worn while in that area. Individual
possession upon issuance is only in the area,
to decrease the possibility of forgery or
alteration.

b.This method provides extra security by
having both photographs identical. In this
type of system, the second badge or card is
kept in the security area and never leaves the
area.

4-9 Multiple Card or Badge

a. Instead of having specific mark-
ings on the ID card or badge denoting permis-
sion to enter various restricted areas, the mul-
tiple card or badge system makes an ex-
change at the entrance to each security area
within the installation. Exchange cards or
badges are kept at each area for only those in-
dividuals who have the appropriate card or
badge. By virtue of the localized and con-
trolled exchange requirements, this is the
most secure and effective system.

b. Card and badge data are identical and
must be so to allow comparisons.

4-10 Card and Badge
Specifications

a. Security ID cards and badges
should be of a type of design and construction
which will make them, for all practical
purposes, tamperproof, and which will meet
the requirements of AR 606-5.

b. Security ID card and badge inserts
should be prenumbered to avoid any possibil-
ity of reissuing any number. Acquisition,
storage, and control of card and badge
components and all engraved plates must be
accompli sher as prescribed in AR 606-5.

c. Issuance and Accountability:

(1) Identification card or badge issuance,
accuntability, and control should be
accomplished at a central office, preferably
the office of the provost marshal or
physical security office, so a minimum of
time me elapses between change in the status
of a card or badge and noti fi cation of the
security forces.

(2) A duplicate of each issued card or
badge and a file on each hearer should be
kept including, in addition to the data
entered on the card or badge, the bearer's
residential address and telephone number.

(3) Why such strict control?

(a) Because any I D card or badge may
be altered or reproduced by a person
havi ng the ti me and suffi ci ent ski 1 1 in
printing, engraving and photocopying,
the makeup, issuance, and accountabil-
ity of cards and badges must be fully
controlled.

(b) Because control commences with the
manufacturer or supplier.

control is exercised by the supplier. This
is especially important when engraving
or special paper is concerned.

4-11 Enforcement Measures

The most vulnerable link in any
identification system is its enforcement.
Perfunctory performance of duty by the
security forces in comparing the bearer with
the card or badge may weaken or destroy the
effects of the most elaborate system. Positive
enforcement measures should be prescribed
to insure effective operation of the personnel
and identification system. These should
include, but not be limited to the following:

a. Security personnel designated for
duty at entrance control points should be
chosen for their alertness, quick perception,
tact, and good judgment.

b. Formalized, standard procedures
for conducting assemblies, posting, and relief
of personnel, and frequent inspection of
personnel on post at irregular times are
effective means to preclude posting of unqual-
ified personnel and perfunctory performance
of duty.

c. A uniform method of handling or
wearing security ID cards or badges

should be prescribed. If carried on the person,
the card must be removed from the wallet or
other container and handed to security
personnel. A badge should be worn in a
con spicuous position to expedite inspection
and recognition from a distance.

d. Entrances and exits of restricted
areas should be arranged so that arriving and
departing personnel arc forced to pass in a
single file in front of security personnel. In
some instances, the use of turnstiles may be
advisable to assist in maintaining positive
control of entrance and exit.

e. Artificial lighting at the control
points should be arranged so that it illumi-
nates the arriving and departing personnel

and should be of sufficient intensity to enable
security personnel to compare and identify
the bearer with the I D card or badge.

f . E nforcement of access control sys-
tems rests primarily on the installation
security forces. However, it is essential that
they have the full cooperation of the employ-
ees, who should be educated and encouraged
to assume this security responsibility. Em-
ployees should be instructed to consider each
unidentified or improperly identified individ-
ual as a trespasser. In restricted areas where
access is limited to particular zones, employ-
ees should report movement of individuals to
unauthorized zones.

g. Identification card and badge racks

or containers used at control points for an
exchange system should be positioned so they
are accessible only to guard personnel.

h. A responsible custodian should be
appointed by competent authority to accom-
plish control procedures required by AR 606-5
for issue, turn in, recovery, or expiration of
security I D cards and badages, The degree of
compromise tolerable in the identification
system is in direct proportion to the degree of
security required or indicated. The following
control procedures are recommended for
preserving the integrity of a card and badge
system:

(1) Maintenance of an accurate written
record or log listing, by serial number, all
cards and badges, showing those on hand,
to whom issued, and disposition (lost,
mutilated, or destroyed).

(2) Authentication of records and logs by
the custodian.

(3) Periodic inventory of records by a
commissioned officer.

(4) Prompt invalidation of lost cards and
badges.

(5) Conspicuous posting at security con-

trol points of current lists of lost or
invalidated cards and badges.

(6) Establishment of controls within re
stricted areas to enable security personnel
on duty to determine promptly and accu-
rately the number of persons within the
area at any time.

(7) Establishment of a two-man rule when
required.

(8) Establishment of procedures to control
movement of visitors to security areas. A
visitor control record should be maintained
and located where positive controls can be
exercised.

4^12 Visitor Identification
And Control

a. Physical security precaution
against pilferage, espionage, and sabotage
requires screening, identification, and con-
trol of visitors. Visitors are generally in the
following categories:

(1) Persons with whom every installation
or facility must have dealings in connec-
tion with the conduct of its business, such
as representatives of suppliers, customers,
licensers or licensee, insurance inspectors
or adjusters, government inspectors (na-
tional, state, and local), service industry
representatives, contractors, employees,
etc.

(2) Individuals or groups who desire to
visit an installation or facility for a
purpose not essential to, or necessarily in
furtherance of, the operations of the
installation or facility concerned. Such
visits may be desired, for example, by
business, educational, technical, or scien-
tific organizations and individuals or
groups desiring to further their particular
interests.

(3) Individuals or groups specifically
sponsored by government agency organi-

zations such as foreign nationals visiting
under technical cooperation programs and
similar visits by US nationals. Requests
for visits by foreign nationals should be
processed in accordance with AR 380-25.

(4) I ndivi duals and groups who the gov-
ernment generally encourages but does not
specifically sponsor, because of the contri-
bution they make to economic and techni-
cal progress or to defense production in the
United States and/or in friendly nations.

(5) Guided tour visits to selected portions
of installations in the interest of public
relations.

(6) Further information concerning re-
quirements and procedures for visits will
be found in AR 381-130 and AR 550-50.

b. Arrangements for identification and
control of visitors may include the following:

(1) Positive methods of establishing the
authority for admission of visitors, as well
as any limitations relative to access.

(2) Positive ID of visitors by means of
personal recognition, visitor permit, or
other identifying credentials. The em-
ployee, supervisor or officer in charge
should be contacted to ascertain the
validity of the visit.

(3) Availability and use of visitor registra-
tion forms and records that will provide a
record of identity of the visitor, time and
duration of his visit, and other pertinent
control data.

(4) Availability and use of visitor ID cards
or badges. Such identification media
should be numbered serially and indicate
the following:

(a) Bearer's name.

(b) Area or areas to which access is
authorized.

(d) Time limit for which issued.

(e) Signature (or facsimile).

(f) Photograph, if desired and available.

(5) Procedures which will insure support-
ing personal identification in addition to
check of visitor cards or badges at re-
stricted area entrances.

(6) Procedures for escorting visitors hav-
ing limitations relative to access through
areas where an uncontrolled visitor, even
though conspicuously identified, could
acquire information for which he is not
authorized. Foreign national visitors
should be escorted at all times.

(7) Controls which will recover visitor ID
cards or badges on expiration, or when no
longer required.

(8) Twenty-four hour advance approval
when possible. Where appropriate, the
installation should prepare an agenda for
the visit and designate an escort officer.

4-13 Sign/Countersign
And Codeword

This additional measure to verify
identity is primarily used in tactical maneu-
vers and during Army Training and Evalua-
tion Programs (ARTEP). The sign/counter-
sign or codeword procedure should be checked
and tested to insure immediate change if.
compromised.

4-14 Duress Code

This is a simple word or phrase used
during normal conversation. It alerts other
security personnel that an authorized person
has been forced to vouch for an unauthorized
individual. A viable duress code requires
preplanning to insure appropriate response.
And it is changed frequently to minimize
compromise.

Methods of Control Section II

Equipment And/Or Manpower

This system assists in the control of entry
and departure of personnel to and from these
areas and provides a strict control and identi-
fication system within the area.

4-15 Use of Escorts

Escorts must be chosen because of
their ability to accomplish tasks properly and
effective y and their knowledge of areas to be
visited, to include all security requirement.

a. Each should be a representative of the
person or activity visited.

b. Escort personnel should be other than
military police or civilian guards.

c. Whether or not the escort remains with
such visitor during the time he is within the
restricted area is determined by local regula-
tions. Personnel listed on the access list may
be admitted to restricted areas without escort,
depending upon local policy.

4-16 Entry Roster

Admission of unit or installation
personnel to restricted areas should be
granted only to those positively identified

and whose names appear on a properly
authenticated roster of all persons authorized
by competent authority to enter.

a. Each time a permanent addition or
deletion is made, this correction can initially
be accomplished by pen and ink.

b. Changes may be published in the same
manner as the original roster.

c. Rosters should be maintained at access
control points to facilitate positive control
and be kept current, verified, authenticated,
and accounted for by an individual desig-
nated by the commander. Admission of
persons other than those on the authorized
roster should be subject to specific approval
by the installation or facility commander, or
his designated representative. Such persons
will be escorted or supervised.

4~17 Two-man Rule

a. At least two authorized persons,
each capable of detecting incorrect or unau-
thorized procedures with respect to the task
being performed and who are familiar with
applicable safety and security requirements,
will be present during any operation that
affords access to sensitive weapons.

b. The rule is designed to prohibit access to
sensitive weapons by a lone individual. Two
authorized persons will be considered to be
present when they are in a physical position
from which they can positively detect incor-
rect or unauthorized procedures with respect
to the task and/or operation being performed.
When application of the two-man rule is
required, it will be enforced constantly by the
persons who constitute the team while they
are accomplishing the task or operation
assigned and until they leave the area in
which it is required.

c. The two-man rule should not, however,
be considered applicable only in the cited
situations. It can, and should, be applied in
many other aspects of physical security
operations, such as the following:

(1) When uncontrolled access to vital
machinery, equipment, or materiel might
provide opportunity for intentional or
unintentional damage which could affect
the mission or operation of the installation
or facility.

(2) Where uncontrolled access to funds
could provide opportunity for diversion by
falsification of accounts.

(3) When uncontrolled delivery or receipt
for materials could provide opportunity for
pilferage through "short" deliveries and
false receipts.

(4) When uncontrolled access to an arms
or ammunition storage room could provide
an opportunity for theft. Keys should be
issued so as to require the presence of at
least two men to unlock the three locks
required under provisions of AR 190-11.
(This is analogous to the safe deposit box
system, which requires two keys in the
possession of two different persons.)

d. The foregoing are only a few examples
the listing is virtually limitless. The impor-
tant point to be stressed is that the provost
marshal and the physical security manager
should explore every possible aspect of
physical security operations in which the
two-man rule would provide additional secu-
rity and assurance, and include all appropri-
ate recommendations and provisions in the
overall physical security plan.

4~18 Additional Procedures
For Specific Groups

a. Visitors— Entrance prerequi-
sites:

(1) Verify identity.

(2) Contact person or activity to be visited
to insure identity and validity of visit.

(3) Record visitor information.

(a) Issue visitor badges.

(b) Use registration forms.

b. VIPs and foreign nationals, special
consideration— Coordination with protocol
off i ce:

(1) Twenty-four hour advance notice desir-
able.

(2) Agenda for visit and designation of
escort officer, if appropriate.

c. Civilians working on jobs under
government contract— The security
manager should:

• Coordinate with procurement office to
determine applicable provisions of con-
tract.

• Identify procedures to control the move-
ment of those employees.

• I nsure that protection of the construc-
tion site is accomplished with available
resources.

d. Supervisors using cleaning teams

should seek technical advice from the physi-
cal security office on internal controls for
each specific building.

e. Public utility and commercial ser-
vice representatives:

(1) Entrance prerequisites same as for
visitors.

(2) Designated activity personnel check
on authority to remove equipment for
maintenance.

f. DOD employees in work areas after
normal operational hours:

□ Supervisors establish internal controls,
based on coordination with the security
manager.

□ Notify security personnel of workers'
presence and expected duration of work.

4-19 Security Personnel

At Entry and Exit Points

The security manager responsible
for these individuals must insure that the
personnel:

a. Are alert, very perceptive, tactful, and
capable of exercising sound judgment in
executing their duties and responsibilities.

b. Conduct frequent, irregular checks of
their assigned areas during periods of inac-
tivity (holidays, weekends, after-duty hours,
etc.). (Also, see chapter 5.)

4-20 Mechanized/Automated
Systems

Identification and access control
systems base their identification judgment
factor on a remote capability through a
routine discriminating device for positive ID,
as opposed to the manual system's using a
guard force member to conduct identification
based on access rosters and personal recogni-
tion.

a. In a mechanized identification
system, the following actions occur within
the machine:

(1) Receives physical ID data from an
individual.

(2) Encodes this data for use.

(3) Compares this data to stored data.

(4) Makes ago or no go decision based on
the comparison.

(5) Translates the results into readable
form.

b. Several mechanical devices add to the
security posture and are expanding in popu-

Computer makes go or no go decision
based on data received.

larity and use. Such devices use the following
techniques:

(1) Magnetic coding.

(2) Embossing.

(3) Optical characters.

(4) Dielectric coding.

c. Specialized mechanical systems are
ideal for highly sensitive situations because
these systems use a controlled process in a
controlled environment to establish the
required data base and accuracy.

(1) One innovative technique with appli-
cation to identification and admittance
procedures involves dimension compari-
sons. The dimension of a person's full hand
is compared to previously stored data to
determine entry authorization. Another
specialized machine reader can scan a
single fingerprint and provide positive
identification of anyone attempting entry.
(Good for semi remote environment.)

(2) The voiceprint technique is being
widely used as an identification means and
features rapid processing with accuracy.

d. An all-inclusive automated ID and
access control system reinforces the security
indepth ring through its easy and rapid
change capability. The computer is able to do
this through its memory, stored on magnetic
tape or disc. Changes can be made by remote
use of specific code numbers. The big advan-
tage for this system is that changes do not
require wiring or media alterations.

e. The commercial security market has a
wide range of mechanized and automated
hardware-software systems interfacing for
the enhancement of any security posture.
Assessment of security needs and use of the
planning, programing and budgeting proce-
dures outlined in chapter 2 will greatly assist
a security manager in improving the overall
security posture.

Designation of Restricted Areas

Section III

4~21 Restricted Areas

The term "restricted area" as used
here, is defined (AR 380-20) as "Any area,
access to which is subject to special restric-
tions or controls for reasons of security or
safeguarding of property or material."

a. Designation and establishment of re-
stricted areas is the responsibility of the
military commander of the installation or
facility. His authority is derived from Depart-
ment of Defense Directive No. 5200.8, dated
20 August 1954, which was issued pursuant to
the provisions of section 21, Internal y y
Act of 1950. Within the Army, the DOD
Directive was implemented by AR 380-20.

b. AR 380-20 states, "these regulations
apply only to Army installations or activities
within the continental United States. Over-
sea commanders may utilize these regula-
tions for guidance in establishing local proce-
dures."

c. The terms, "restricted area," "controlled
area, " "limited area," and "exclusion area,"
are described by AR 50-5 as standard termi-
nology. The regulation states that these
terms "will be employed wherever United
States Army nuclear weapon material is
involved." Such employment outside the
continental United States would, however,
require publication of an appropriate com-
mand directive, since AR 380-20 would not
apply.

d. It is clearly the meaning and intent of

these documents that the security protection
afforded by a restricted area pertains particu-
larly to subversive activities control, that is,
protection against espionage, sabotage, or
any such actions adversely affecting the
national defense of the United States. Within
this context, the designation "restricted
area, " as defined, is not applicable to an area
solely for protection against common pilfer-
age or misappropriation of property or
material which is not classified or not
essential to the national defense. For exam-
ple, an area devoted to the storage or use of
classified documents, equipment or materials
should be so designated to safeguard against
espionage. An installation communications
center should also be so designated, to
safeguard against sabotage. On the other
hand, a cashier's cage or an ordinary me-
chanic's toolroom should not be so desig-
nated, although the commander may impose
controls on access thereto. This may be as
simple a matter as posting a sign, "Off Limits
to Unauthorized Personnel," or it may require
the erection of fences, railings, etc. The
responsibility for designation is, of course,
the commanders. However, in furnishing
advice to him, the provost marshal or
physical security manager should consider
carefully the foregoing guidance; evaluate
the purpose of any proposed or necessary
designation of a restricted area; coordinate
with the intelligence officer and staff judge
advocate; and formulate his recommenda-
tions accordingly.

e. To comply with the requirements of the
Internal Security Act of 1950 and the provi-
sions of implementing directives, and to

Warning
Restricted Area

It Is unlawful to enter this area without
permission of the installation commander

(Sec. 21 , Internal Security Act of 1950 50 USC 797)

While on this installation all personnel
and the property under their control
are subject to search

Use of Deadly Force Authorized

provide for proper procedures in cases of
violation, a restricted area must be desig-
nated in writing as such by the military
commander and must he posted with warning
signs or notices of the type described in AR
380-20. 0-20.

f. The establishment of restricted areas
improves security by providing defense in
depth (see alsofparaqraph 1- 3c)|and increases
efficiency by providing degrees of security
compatible with operational requirements.
These specially designated areas may also
provide for economy of operation by reducing
the need for stringent control measures for
the installation or facility as a whole.

4-22 Types of Restricted Areas

a. The degree of security and con-
trols required depends upon the nature,
sensitivity, or importance of the security
interest or other matter involved. Restricted
areas may be established to provide the
following:

(1) Effective application of necessary
security measures and exclusion of unau -
thorized personnel.

(2) I ntensified controls over those areas
requiring special protection.

(3) Conditions for compartmentalization
of classified information or critical equip-
ment or materials, with minimum impact
on operations.

b. Different areas involve different degrees
of security interest, depending upon their
purpose and nature of work, information,
and/or materials concerned. For similar
reasons, different areas within an installa-
tion may have varying degrees of impor-
tance. I n some cases, the entire area of an
installation may have a uniform degree of
importance, requiring only one level of
restriction and control. In others, differences
in degrees of importance will require further
segregation or compartmentalization of ac-
tivities.

c. To meet these different levels of sensitiv-
ity and to provide for an effective and
efficient basis for applying the varying
degrees of restriction of access, control of
movement, and type of protection required,
restricted areas or portions thereof may be
further administratively designated as "ex-
clusion," "limited," or "controlled" areas. It
must be understood that the term "restricted
area" is in effect a legal designation (Internal
Security Act of 1950), whereas the terms,
"exclusion" and "limited" are administrative
only (AR 380-20). The term "controlled area, "
is not mentioned in either the Security Act or

AR 380-20, and is used only as a matter of
convenience.

d.The primary criteria for administrative
designation of exclusion, limited, and con-
trolled areas is the degree of restriction or
controls required to prevent compromise of
the security interest or other matter therein.
Characteristics of these areas are:

(1) Exclusion area— A restricted area
containing one of the following:

(a) A security interest or other matter of
such nature that access to the area
constitutes, for all practical purposes,
access to such security interest or mat-
ter.

(b) A security interest or other matter of
such vital importance that proximity
resulting from access to the area is
treated as equivalent to (a) above.

(2) Limited area— A restricted area con-
taining a security interest or other matter
and in which uncontrolled movement will
permit access to such security interest or
matter, but within which access may be
prevented by escort and other internal
restrictions and controls. Individuals who
have a legitimate reason for entering a
limited area may do so if internal restric-
tions and controls are provided to prevent
access to the security interest or other
matter. These measures usually consist of
escorts and other physical safeguards.

(3) Controlled area— An area, usually
adjacent to or encompassing limited or
exclusion areas. Access to a controlled area
is restricted to those with a need for access.
However, movement of authorized person-
nel within this area is not necessarily
controlled, since mere access to the area
does not provide access to the security
interest or other matter within the exclu-
sion or limited areas. The controlled area is
provided for administrative control,
safety, and/or as a buffer zone for depth in
security for the exclusion or limited areas.

The degree of control of movement within
this area will, therefore, be as prescribed by
the appropriate commander.

e. You can see from the foregoing that an
installation may have varying degrees of
security designation, or none at all. It maybe
designated in its entirety as a restricted area,
with no further degree of restrictions or
controls. It may, however, provided that it is
first designated as a restricted area, to bring
it under the provisions of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, be further administra-
tively classified, in whole or in portions, as an
exclusion area, limited area, or controlled
arpa with specific clear zones (fi gu res 1617118191
and 10 1.

4^23 Other Considerations

a. There are other important consid-
erations which should be kept in mind
concerning restricted areas and their com-
part mental izat ion. Some of these are:

(1) Immediate and anticipated needs

can be determined by survey and analysis
of the installation or facility, its missions,
and the security interests or other matters
on hand which require protection. Antic-
ipated needs can be determined from future
plans.

(2) The nature of the security interest

or other matter to be protected. Classified
documents and small items may be pro-
tected by securing them in safes or locked
containers, whereas large items may have
to be placed within guarded enclosures.

(3) Some security interests are more
sensitive to compromise than others.
Brief observation or a simple act by an
untrained person may constitute a compro-
mise in some cases. In others, detailed
study and planned action by an expert may
be required.

(4) All security interests should be evalu-
ated according to their relative im-
portance. This may be indicated by a

security classification such as TOP SE-
CRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL, or by
their criticality. That is, the effect their loss
or compromise would have on national
defense or the mission of the installation or
facility.

b. Parking areas for privately owned
vehicles must be established outside restrict-
ed areas, if at all possible. This is due to the
fact that large amounts of articles can be
readily concealed in vehicles, and would then
be harder to detect than if they were on a
person. Also, entrances should be kept at a
minimum necessary for safe and efficient
operation and control.

c. Establishment of restricted areas within
an installation improves overall security by
providing security in depth. Limited and
exclusion areas serve as inner rings of
security; the controlled area serves as a buffer
zone. As a general rule, an increase in
security results in some slowdown in opera-

tions. However, without security there
may be no operations. The use of security
areas makes it possible to have security
compatible with operational requirements.
Instead of establishing stringent control
measures for the installation as a whole
varying degrees of security can be provided
as required and as conditions warrant. In
this way, interference with overall
operations is reduced to a minimum and
operational efficiency can be maintained at a
relatively high level.

d. Where required, adequate physical safe-
guards such as fences, gates, and wi ndow
bars must be installed to deny entry of
unauthorized persons into restricted areas.
Except where such action would tend to
advertise an otherwise concealed area, warn-
ing signs or notices must be posted in
conspicuous and appropriate places, such as
ordinary entrances or approaches to these
areas, and on perimeter fences or boundaries
of each area.

ngle Concertina
Other Material

Foxhole, Vehicle, or

J& T* Tent to Shelter Weaoon

/*> EDM

i i

LEGEND

Personnel in PRP
(Personnel Reliability Program)

X Security Unit Personnel

Additional Security Posts if
Determined Necessary by

ji / Laur

2 Single Concertina i m 1 11 1 i ■ i

3 or Other Material

^ f

Launcher

ciiudncc ouaros

EDM (Emergency
Destruct Measures)

Commander Equipment, personnel, and positioning according to unit SOP

Figure 6 — Sample layout of temporary tactical restricted areas.

M60 machinegun
(mounted or dismounted)
— X ^

Typical Exclusion Area
For Halted Convoy

\y X
I

i 4d'v'

^Driver N

\ ^<5

\ i® ,

N /

x ^

s® / *

- X <<-M60 machinegun-

Note: Other vehicles and personnel, to include the LPs, form a defensive perimeter inside
the primary directions of fire of the M60 machineguns. During attack, alternate
machinegun crews should be placed in the perimeter away from primary machineguns and
be spaced so that if they are needed as replacements, large gaps do not appear in the
perimeter.

xy r;fj8maR Q Temporary exclusion area (size depends on terrain and

jend — v threat force)

<£) PRP qualified (see AR 50-5)

^ ^ Principal direction of fire 4**' Listening Post

Depot Complex

(Restricted Area— Base Defense)

Chainlink fencing with top guard on perimeter of restricted area
□ Guard tower xzt Restricted area warning signs

Legend tr*" Listening post fVIG Depending on direction of attack and terrain features, the

• Protective lighting MG teams may displace to establish final protective fires

trO Fighting position (FPF) or principal direction of fire (PDF).

Figure 8— Diagram of depot complex example .

Legend

o=-o Gate

Security post

* Chainlink fence
with top guard

l 1

Main.

Power

Shop

House

Limited I

Exclusion |

Area |

Controlled

Area

Admin.

Area

Barracks

□ □□

Figure 9 — Schematic diagram of simplified restricted area and degrees of security.

Package, Materiel, and Property Control Section IV

4^24 Package Control

a. A good package control system
helps prevent or minimize pilferage, sabo-
tage and espionage. Only packages with pro-
per authorization should be permitted into re-
stricted areas without inspection.

b. A positive system should be estab-
lished to control movement of packages,
materiel, and property into and out of
the installation.

c. A package checki ng system, usi ng I n-
dividual Property Pass, DA Form 1818, or a
similar form, may be used at the entrance
gate for the convenience of employees and
visitors. When practicable, inspect all out-
going packages except those properly au-
thorized for removal. When 100 percent in-
spection is impracticable, conduct frequent
unannounced spot checks.

4-25 Property Controls

a. Property controls must not be
limited to packages carried openly; but must

include control of anything that could be
used to secret property or materiel of any
type.

b. Persons should not be routinely
searched except in unusual situations. When
they are, it should be only in accordance with
published command directives.

4-26 Vehicle Control

a. All privately owned/visitor-
operated motor vehicles on the installation
should be registered with the provost mar-
shal or the installation physical security of-
fice. Requirement to display a tag or decal
should be I AW A R 190-5 and AR 210-10.

b. Vehicles belonging to visitors should be
identified by a temporary decal or identifi-
cation media different from permanent regis-
tration to permit ready recognition by secu-
rity personnel.

c. When authorized vehicles enter or exit a
restricted area, each must undergo a sys-

Figure 10— Drawing of standard physical security layout.

tematic search, including, but not limited
to, the following areas:

• Interior of vehicle

• Engine compartment

• External air breathers

• Top of vehicle

• Battery box

• Cargo compartment

• Undercarriage.

4^27 Truck and Railroad
Car Control

a. Movement of trucks and railroad
cars into and out of installations or facilities
should be supervised and each inspected to
prevent the entry or removal of unauthorized
persons or materiel. Inspectors should be es-
pecially watchful for explosives or incendiar-
ies.

b. Truck and railroad entrances should be

controlled by locked gates when not in
use, and should be under security supervision
when unlocked or opened for passage.

c. Identification cards or badges

should be issued to operators of trucks and

railroad engines to insure proper identifica-
tion and registration of those entering and
leaving the area. Such cards or badges
should permit access only to specific loading
and unloading areas.

d. All conveyances entering or leaving a
protected area should be required to pass
through a service gate manned by security
forces. Drivers, helpers, passengers, and ve
hide contents should be carefully examined.
The security check should include

■ Appropriate entries in security log, date,
operator's name, description of load, time
entered and departed.

■ License check of operator.

■ Verify seal number with shipping docu-
ment and examine seal for tampering.

e. Incoming trucks and railroad cars
must be assigned escorts before they are
permitted to enter designated limited or
exclusion areas. Commanders should es-
tablish published procedures to control the
movement of trucks and railroad cars that
enter designated restricted areas to dis-
charge or pick up cargo. Escorts should be
provided when necessary.

Chapter 5

Protective Barriers

rotective barriers are used to define
the physical limits of an installation, activity
or area and are used to restrict, channel or
impede access.

Protective barriers are divided into two
major categories— structural and natural.
Natural protective barriers may be moun-
deserts, or other terrain difficult to traverse.
Structural protective barriers involve man-
made devices such as fences, walls, floors,
roofs, grills, bars, roadblocks or other con-
struction to make penetration difficult.

5-1 Benefits

5-3 Positive Barriers

The use of barriers offers two impor-
tant benefits to a physical security posture.
First, they create a psychological considera-
tion for anyone thinking of unauthorized en-
try. Second, barriers have a direct impact on
the number of security posts needed and on
the frequency of use for each post.

5-2 Considerations

Protective physical barriers should
be used in the protection of the entire
installation or facility and in establishing
restricted areas. The following guidance may
be used for protective structural barriers and
the types of areas they serve:

a. The size of an area, which in some cases
may embrace extensive tracts of land, will
depend upon the nature of the security
considerations. These considerations will
have a bearing on the essentiality and cost
effectiveness of establishing structural barri-
ers on the outer perimeter. You can define the
outer perimeter of a restricted area by:

(1) Structural barriers at control points
and other points of possible entrance and
exit.

(2) Natural or structural barriers between
control points that are sufficiently obstruc-
tive and difficult to traverse— to control
and to preclude accidental intrusion.

b. The size of a restricted area will depend
on the degree of compartmentalization re-
quired and the complexity of the area. As a
rule, size should be kept to a minimum
consistent with operational efficiency. Posi-
tive barriers should be established for:

(1) Controlling vehicular and pedestrian
traffic flow.

(2) Checking identification of personnel
entering or departing.

(3) Defining a buffer zone for more highly
classified areas.

Positive barriers should be designed
in view of the threat, to deter access to the
maximum extent.

a. Positive barriers are required for the
entire perimeter of controlled, limited, or
exclusion areas (seelchapter 3). Specific types
of barriers cannot be predesignated for all
situations; however, they should incorporate
the following elements:

(1) Structural perimeter barriers, such as
fences, walls, etc.

(2) Provisions at points of entrance and
exit for identification checks by either pass
and badge exchange or badge examination

(chapter 4)

(3) Opaque barriers to preclude visual
compromise by unauthorized personnel
may be necessary in certain instances.

b. When the greatest degree of security is
essential, additional structural barriers may
be required. Two lines of structural barriers
should be installed on the perimeter; such
lines of barriers should be separated by not
less than 15 feet and not more than 150 feet
for optimum enforcement, protection, and
control .

c. If the nature of a secure area dictates a
requirement for a limited or exclusion area on
a temporary or infrequent basis, you may not
be able to use the types of physical, structural

perimeter barriers described in paragraph 5-

3a I In such cases, a temporary limited area or

exclusion area may be established in which
the lack of proper physical barriers is com-
pensated for by additional security posts,
patrols, and other security measures during
the period of restriction [(chapter 4],

5-4 Fence Design Criteria

Four types of fencing authorized for
use in protecting restricted areas are chain-

153-846 0 - 94 - 4 (Fold-in No. 1)

ELEVATION-CHAIN LINK FABRIC FENCE/ BARBED TAPE T0PPIN6
AHflBiZgttHAL SLIB1N6 SATE

NOT TO SCALE

Figure 11 — OCE drawing 40-16-10 of chain link fence construction.

link, barbed wire, concertina, and
barbed tape. Choice of type depends primar-
ily upon the degree of permanence of the
installation, availability of materials, and
time available for construction. Generally,
chain-link fencing will be used for protection
of permanent limited and exclusion areas. All
four types of fencing maybe used to augment
or increase the security of existing fences that
protect restricted areas. Examples would be
to create an additional barrier line, increase
existing fence height, or provide other meth-
ods that add effectively to physical security.

a. Chain-link (Federal Spec. RR-F-191/1,
Type I). Chain-link fence, including gates,
must be constructed of 7-foot (approximately
2.13 m) material (6 foot or 1.83 m for

controlled areas), excluding top guard. Fence
heights for conventional arms/ammo securi-
ty must be 6 feet for standard chain link, wire-
mesh fencing. Chain-link fences must be of 9-
gauge (.1508 inches or 3.77 mm) or heavier
wire galvanized with mesh openings not
larger than 2 inches (approximately 5.1 cm)
per side, and a twisted and barbed selvage at
top and bottom. It must be taut and securely
fastened to rigid metal or reinforced concrete
posts set in concrete. It must reach within 2
inches (5.1 cm) of hard ground or paving. On
soft ground it must reach below the surface
deeply enough to compensate for shifting soil
or sand (OCE Guide Specification 02711). Se-
curity commensurate with FE-6 fence con-
struction standards will be provided. Con-
struction must be in accordance with specifi-

cations in Office. Chief of Engineers (OCE)
drawing 40-16-10 (figure 11). For added resist-
ance to climbing, optional top rail or taut wire
may be omitted. Fencing may be painted
with a nonreflective substance to reduce the
glare to security forces (TM 5-830-3). Weak-
nesses in the chain link fence occur as a re-
sult of weather (rusting) and failure to keep
fencing fastened to the post which affects the
desired tightness.

b. Barbed Wire. Standard barbed wire is
twisted, double-strand, 12-gauge wire, with
four-point barbs spaced an equal distance
apart. Barbed wire fencing, including gates,
intended to prevent human trespassing
should not be less than 7 feet (2.13 m) high,

Figure 12 — Example of properly constructed barbed wire fence.

excluding the top guard, and must be firmly
affixed to posts not more than 6 feet (1.82 m)
apart. The distance between strands will not
exceed 6 inches (approximately 15.3 cm) and
at least one wire will be interlaced vertically

and midway between postsl (figure 12)

c. Concertina. Standard concertina
barbed wire is a commercially manufactured
wire coil of high-strength-steel barbed wire,
clipped together at intervals to form a
cylinder. Opened, it is 50 feet long and 3 feet in
diameter. When used as the perimeter barrier
for a restricted area, concertina must be laid

between poles with one roll on top of another
or in a pyramid arrangement (minimum of
three rolls). The ends must be staggered or
fastened together and the base wire picketed
to the ground.

d. Barbed TaDe (Mil Fed Spec. MIL-B-
52775A) (figure 13)

(1) The barbed tape system is composed of
three items— barbed tape, barbed tape
dispenser, and concertina tape. These
items were type classified "standard A
type," 16 December 1965.

Barbed Tape Mounting Detail
Not To Scale

Strapping

Barbed Tape
(barbs omitted
for clarity)

L / 30" (0.76) Dia. \ J

II 24" (0.61) Dia. J

Reinforcing

Wires

Extension Arms

Fence Post

Inside Area

Secure barbed
tape to reinforcing
wires with wire
ties at each loop

Barbed Wire Strands

Reinforcing Wire

•Chain Link Fabric

Outside Area

Figure 13 — OCE drawing 40-16-10, barbed tape details.

Figure 14 — Supporting arms on top guard point outward.

(2) Barbed tape is fabricated from a steel
strip (0.020 inches thick nominal) with a
minimum breaking strength of 500
pounds. The overall width is 3/4 of an inch.
The tape has 7/16-inch barbs spaced at 1/2
inch intervals along each side. Fifty meters
of tape are wound on a plastic reel 8 3/4
inches in diameter and 1 inch thick. The
finish is electro-galvanized 0.0001-inches
thick on each side.

(3) Barbed tape concertina consists of a
single strand of spring steel wire and a
single strand of barbed tape. The sections
between barbs of the barbed tape are
securely clinched around the wire. Each
coil is approximately 37 1/2 inches in
diameter and consists of 55 spiral turns
connected by steel clips to form a cylindri-
cal diamond pattern when extended to a
coil length of 50 feet. One end turn is fitted
with four bundling wires for securing the
coil when closed and each end turn is fitted
with two steel carrying loops. The concer-
tina extends to 50 feet without permanent
distortion and when released, can be

retracted into a closed coil.

(4) The handling of barbed tape requires
the use of heavy barbed tape gauntlets
(FSN 8415-926-1674) instead of standard
barbed wire gauntlets.

e. Top Guard. A top guard must be
constructed on all perimeter fences and may
be added on interior enclosures for additional
protection. A top guard is an overhang of
barbed wire or barbed tape along the top of a

fence, facing outward and u

pward at approxi

mately a 45-degree anal a (figure 14)1 Top

guard supporting arms will be permanently
affixed to the top of fence posts to increase the
overall height of the fence at least 1 foot
(approximately 30.5 cm). Three strands of
barbed wire, spaced 6 inches (15.2 cm) apart,
must be installed on the supporting arms. The
number of strands of wire or tape may be
increased when required. The top guard of
fencing adjoining gates may range from a
vertical height of 18 inches (45.7 cm) to the
normal 45-degree outward protection, but
only for sufficient distance along the fence to

open the gate(s) adequately. Top fence rails
should not be specified where protection is of
utmost importance. Top rails will assist a
climber. A bottom and top wire reinforcement
should be used as a substitute (OCE-02711).

f. Gates and Entrances. The number of
gates and perimeter entrances must be the
minimum required for safe and efficient
operation. Active perimeter entrances must
be designed so that the guard force maintains
full control. Semi active entrances, such as
infrequently used vehicular gates, must be
locked on the inside when not in use. Gates
and entrances, when closed, must provide a
barrier structurally comparable to their
associated barrier(s). Top guards, which may
be vertical, are required for all gates.

g. Type Field Perimeter Fence. A

combination of concertina fencing, developed
in Vietnam, uses a double-barbed wire fence
(the cattle fence described in FMs 5-15 and
100-50), with five rolls of concertina between
the fences. This fence has, in many situa-
tions, been used in place of chain link fence,

and has been found to be most effective
(figure 15).

h. Tanglefoot Wire. Barbed wire or tape
may be used in appropriate situations to
construct a tanglefoot obstruction either
outside a single perimeter fence or in the area
between double fences, to provide an addi-
tional deterrent to intruders. The wire or tape
should be supported on short metal or wood
pickets spaced at irregular intervals of 3 to 10
feet, and at heights between 6 and 12 inches.
The wire or tape should be crisscrossed to
provide a more effective obstacle. Depth of
the field is governed by the space and
materials available.

5-5 Utility Openings

Sewers, air and water intakes and
exhausts, and other utility openings of 10
inches (25.4 cm) or more in diameter that pass
through perimeter barriers must have secu-
rity equivalent to that of these barriers (TM 5-
820-4).

a. Interior manhole covers 10 inches (25.4
cm) or more in diameter must be secured to
prevent unauthorized opening.

b. Unavoidable drainage ditches, culverts,
vents, ducts, and other openings having a
cross-sectional area greater than 96 square
inches (624 sq cm) and a smallest dimension
greater than 6 inches (16.3 cm) will be
protected by securely fastened welded bar
grills (TM 5-280-4). As an alternative, drain-
age structures may be constructed of multiple
pipes, each pipe having a diameter of 10
inches (25.4 cm) or less. Multiple pipes of this
diameter also may be placed and secured in
the inflow end of a drainage culvert to prevent
intrusion into the area. (See examples in
figure 16. j]

5-6 Other Perimeter Barriers

a. Building walls and roofs, when
serving as perimeter barriers, must be con-
structed and arranged to provide uniform
protection equivalent to that provided by
chain-link fencing. If a building less than two
stories high forms part of the perimeter, a top
guard must be used along the outside coping
to deny access to the roof] (figure 17).

b. Masonry walls, when used as perimeter
barriers, must have a minimum height of 7
feet (approximately 2.13 m) and must have a
barbed wire top guard, sloped outward at a 45-
degree angle, carrying at least three strands
of barbed wire and increasing the vertical

Figure 16 — Examples of secured utility openings.

height of the barrier by at least 1 foot
(approximately 30.5 cm); or they must have a
minimum height of 8 feet (2.4 m) and have
broken glass, set on edge and cemented to the
top surface.

c. Windows, active doors, and other desig
nated openings must be protected by securely
fastened bars, grills, or chain-link screens.
Window barriers must be fastened from the
inside If hinged, the hinges and locks must
be on the inside. If an instrusion detection
system is used, consideration should be given
to using the security screen detailed in OCE
drawing DEF 40-26-01.

d. Construction Procedures. Detailed
guidance on construction procedures, mate-
rial and manpower requirements for field

Concertina as
Added security
Measure

construction of barriers
is in FM 5-15.

Figure 17 - Sample of top guard on roof.

153-846 .0 - 94 - 6

5-7 Security Tower Design

Reliance on towers as the only
means for observation of a perimeter is
usually considered unsatisfactory. However,
all towers should be located to provide
maximum observation and be constructed for
protection from small arms fire.

ties that use towers must have a support force
available for emergencies, and tower person-
nel should be rotated at frequent intervals.

b. Psychologically, the mere elevation of
the observer has an unnerving effect on a
potential intruder. However, as mentioned
above, the isolation of the tower tends to
reduce the alertness of its occupants.

a. Mobile towers are useful in some
temporary situations, such as a large open
storage area where there is activity in
receiving and storing equipment. All facili-

c. The height of a tower increases the
range of observation during daylight hours
and at night with artificial illumination.
However, during inclement weather and
during blackout, towers lose this advantage
and must be supplemented by on-the-ground
observation.

5-8 Tower Use

I V ■ i At l

(2.5) i C " 1

j. i S NS i

Security
Guard
Tower

VARIES

In planning the use of towers,

consideration must be given to the following:

a. A possible necessity for hardening the
tower (by use of sandbags, salvage armor-
plating, etc.) to protect the occupant. This
may require strengthening of the support,
which should be performed only under the
supervision of an engineer.

V k

Figure 18 — Details of tower design.

b. Communications and alarm systems,
both audible and visual (primary and alter-
nate).

c. The possibility of using appropriate
STANO equipment with the tower and
perimeter barriers being surveilled. Some of
the infrared items may be especially valu-
able.

d. Protective lighting {chapter 6, AR 50-5).

e. Protection of the route to the tower.

5-9 Installation/Activity
E ntrances

a. The number of installation/ac-
tivity gates and perimeter entrances inactive
use should be limited to the minimum
required for safe and efficient operation of the
installation. Protective lighting must be IAW

chapter 6 of this manual. When necessary,

crash beams should be installed in front of
vehicle gates according to the design specifi-
cations in figure 19.

f. Height of the tower according to the area
of observation.

g. Mutually supporting in terms of small
arms fire.

h. Allows for egress and ingress of support-
ing alert forces, as appropriate.

b. Entrance plans (primary and alternate)
for an installation or activity to control
vehicle traffic using guard personnel is
outlined in figures 2C| andfzl on | page 76{ The
type guard post used to support the entrance
plans is detailed in| figure 22).

i. Backed up by a fortified defensive
fighting position, as appropriate.

j. Located within the exclusion area. (See
figure 18| for tower design details.)

c. Active perimeter entrances should be
designated so security forces maintain full
control without unnecessary delay in traffic.
This is largely a matter of having sufficient
entrances to accommodate the peak flow of

6" wide alternate black & yellow
painted stripes

Drive

Crash Beam Elevation

Not to Scale

Figure 19 — OCE drawing 40-16-10 crash beam details.

Figure 20 — Primary entrance plan.

Figure 27— Alternate entrance plan.

pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and ade-
quate lighting for rapid and efficient inspec-
tion. When gates are not manned during
nonduty hours, they should be securely
locked, illuminated during hours of darkness,
and periodically inspected by a roving patrol.
This also applies to doors and windows that
form a part of the perimeter.

d. Semi active entrances, such as extra
gates for use during peak traffic flow and
railroad siding gates, should be locked at all
times when not guarded. Keys to such
entrances should be in the custody of the

provost marshal (security manager) or the
chief of the security force and should be
strictly controlled (chapter £).

5-10 Entry Control Stations

Entry control stations normally
should be provided at main perimeter en-
trances where such entrances are manned by
security personnel on a full-or part-time basis.
Considerations for construction and use

should be based, in part, on the in

r pa

outlined ini paragraphs 5-8land

5-9

brmation

a. Entry control stations should be located
as near as practicable to the perimeter
entrance to permit personnel inside the
station to maintain constant surveillance
over the entrance and its approaches.

b. Entry control stations that are manned
24 hours each day should have interior and
exterior lighting, interior heating (where
appropriate) and sufficient glassed area to
afford adequate observation for personnel
inside. Where appropriate, entry control
stations should be designed for optimum
personnel identification and movement con-
trol (chapter 4)-

c. Equipment in a station should include:

(1) Telephone or radio.

(2) Badge racks.

(3) Electronic boards for checking lights.

d. Procedures for hardening against at-
tack.

(1) Reinforced concrete.

(2) Steel plating and bullet-proof glass.

e. Inactive entrances (those used only
occasionally) should be kept locked and be
subject to the same key control and inspection
as semi active entrances.

(3) Sandbags two layers in depth.

5-11 Signs and Notices

f. Sidewalk elevators and any other utility
openings that provide access to areas within
the perimeter barrier should be locked,
guarded, or otherwise provided security
equivalent to that of the perimeter barrier.

Signs should be plainly displayed
and be legible from any approach to the
perimeter from a reasonable distance. The
size and coloring of such signs, lettering
thereon, and the interval of posting must be
appropriate to each situation.

a. Control Signs. Signs should be erected
where necessary to assist in control of
authorized entry, to deter unauthorized entry,
and to preclude accidental entry.

b. Warning Signs.

(1) A system must be provided to warn
intruders that the arena is restricted and
that trespassing may cause the use of
deadly force. The system must include
warning signs and a method of challeng-
ing intruders.

(2) Warning signs must be installed along
the limited area physical barriers and at
each entry point so they can be seen readily
and understood by anyone approaching
the peri meter. I n areas where E ngl i sh is
but one of two or more languages com-
monly spoken, warning signs must con-
tain the local language(s), in addition to
English; and the wording on the signs will
denote warning of a restricted area. Warn-
ing signs must be positioned on or outside
the limited area physical barrier and
should be at intervals of no more than 100
feet (30.5 m).

(3) Signs must not be mounted on fences
equipped with IDA equipment because
nuisance alarms could be caused by
environmental movement of the signs.
Additionally, the restricted area warning
signs prescribed in AR 380-20 must be
posted at all entrances to limited and
exclusion areas.

that may be prescribed by the installation
commander (AR 210-10).

(2) Signs or notices legibly setting forth
the designation of restricted areas and
provisions of entry thereto should be
plainly posted at all entrances and at other
points along the perimeter line as neces-
sary. The wording of such signs or notices
is prescribed in AR 380-20, andl chapter7!:

section III

of this manual.

5-12 Installation/Activity
Perimeter Roads
And Clear Zones

When the perimeter barrier encloses
a large area, an interior all-weather perimeter
road should be provided for security patrol
vehicles. Clear zones should be maintained
on both sides of the perimeter barrier to
provide an unobstructed view of the barrier
and the ground adjacent to it.

a. Roads should meet these requirements:

(1) Be within the clear zone and as close to
the perimeter barrier as possible, but not
close enough to cause soil erosion.

(2) Constructed to allow for effective road
barriers to deter motor movement of
unauthorized personnel during mobiliza-
tion periods.

b. Clear Zones.

c. Other Signs.

(1) Signs setting forth the conditions of
entry to an installation or area should be
plainly posted at all principal entrances
and should be legible under normal condi-
tions at a distance not less than 50 feet
from the point of entry. Such signs should
inform the entrant of the provisions of
search of the person, vehicle, packages,
etc., or prohibitions (such as against
cameras, matches, lighters, entry for
reasons other than official business, etc.)

(1) Clear zones should be kept clear of
weeds, rubbish, or other material capable
of offering concealment or assistance to an
intruder attempting to breach the barrier.

(2) A clear zone of 20 feet or more should
exist between the perimeter barrier and
exterior structures, parking areas, and
natural or manmade features. When possi-
ble, a clear zone of 50 feet or more should
exist between the perimeter barrier and
structures within the protected area, except
when a building wall constitutes part of the
perimeter barrier.

(3) When it is impossible to have adequate
clear zones because of property lines or
natural or manmade features, an increase
in the height of the perimeter barrier,
increased security patrol coverage, more
protective lighting, or an intrusion detec-
tion device along that portion of the
perimeter barrier may be necessary.

5-13 Protection In Depth

a. On a very large installation such
as a proving ground, it is obviously impracti-
cable to construct an expensive perimeter
fence and to keep it under constant observa-
tion. Such an installation is usually estab
lished in a sparsely inhabited area. Its
comparative isolation and the depth of the
installation itself give reasonable perimeter
protection. Under these circumstances the
posting of warning signs or notices, reducing
access roads to a minimum, and periodic
patrols in the area between the outer perime-
ter and the conventionally protected vital
area of the installation may be sufficient.

b. An alternate to erecting new or replac-
ing old chain-link fence involving an entire
installation, perimeter is to relocate/isolate
the sensitive area or item by:

(1) Relocating the item within a safe
perimeter.

(2) Consolidating the item with other
items.

(3) Erecting a chain-link fence (regulation
permitting).

5-14 Nuclear Weapons

Construction Design
Criteria

For design and construction crite-
ria, see DOD Directive 5210.41M and AR 50-5.

The interest of security must be kept in
mind when walls, ceilings, floors, and roofs
are constructed. Facilities that house arms
and ammunition should be constructed as
security barriers in the interest of deterring
penetration. Protection should be equivalent
to that provided by chain-link fencing.

Arms Facility Structural Standards

Section II

5-15 Wall Construction
Standards

a. Walls should consist of 8 inches
of concrete reinforced with No. 4 bars on 9-
inch centers in each direction and staggered
on each face to form a grid approximately 4 Vi
inches square. An alternative 8-inch concrete
block with No. 4 bars threaded through block
cavities at 8-inch centers, with the cavities
then filled with mortar or concrete and with

horizontal joints reinforced at every course.
As a minimum alternative, use 8 inches of
brick interlocked between inner and outer
courses. These options are stated in order of
most to least secure.

b. Selection must depend on local threat
and vulnerability.

c. See AR 190-11 for information concern-
ing USAR consolidated arms storage facili-
ties.

5-16 Ceiling Construction
Standards

a. The ceiling of the arms storage
facility must be reinforced concrete, structur-
ally designed for the spans between support-
ing walls. The resulting slab should offer
security comparable to that provided by the
walls.

b. If the ceiling is of concrete pan joist
construction, the pans must be reduced in
depth over the vault area so the thinnest
portion is not less than 6 inches and the clear
space between joists does not exceed 20
inches. The reinforcing grid requirement for
flat slab construction also applies.

c. Reinforcing bar spacing should form a
grid in which the area of any opening does not
exceed 96 square inches, using No. 4 bars or
larger.

5-17 Floor Construction
Standards

Floor slab thickness, if on grade,
should be a minimum of 6 inches reinforced
with 6x6— W4xW4 mesh or equivalent bars. If
the floor forms the ceiling of an underlying
room or area, the ceiling standards apply.

5-18 Windows and Entrances

a. Entrances and issue windows
should have two doors.

b. Doors should be 1 3/4 inch-thick, solid
wood doors with 12-gauge metal plate se-
curely attached to the outside face; or stand-
ard 1 3/4-inch-thick, hollow metal, industrial
type doors (minimum thickness of skin plate
14-gauge) internally reinforced vertically
with continuous steel stiffeners spaced 6
inches maximum on center.

c. The locking device used on the most

secure door (usually the inner door) must be a
high security padlock and hasp (MILP-
43607). The other door must have a secondary
padlock (Ml LP-17802B) or an equivalent
mortise cylinder lock approved by the Intelli-
gence Material Development Officer, Ft.
Holabird, Maryland.

d. One of the doors in the double-door
concept may be a rod and bar grid door; and
the other may be either solid wood with metal
plate or hollow metal. Grid doors must be
constructed of 1 1/4-inch x 3/8-inch flat steel
bars horizontal at 8 inches maximum on
center, and l/2-inch diameter rods vertical at
4 inches maximum on center welded to, or
passing through, the 1 l/4-inch surface of the
flat bars, resulting in a grid with openings of
32 square inches or less.

e. The grid door is more suitable for
accommodating the high security hasp (MIL
P-43607D) and should be used as the inner
door. Door hinges must be fixed-pin security
type, safety-stud hinges, or must have hinge
pins spot-welded to prevent removal. Hinge
mounting screws will not be exposed to the
outside of the arms room.

f. Frames must be compatible with adja-
cent doors and walls and must be securely
anchored.

g. Class 5 steel vault door (Fed. Spec. AA-
D-600B) with a built-in three-position, dial-
type, changeable combination lock may be
used in lieu of the two doors described above.
A vault door day-gate does not provide
adequate penetration resistance for an unat-
tended vault, and, if used, should be intended
only to prevent inadvertent entry when the
vault is open and occupied.

(1) Anchor rings in arms and ammunition
vault construction should be placed every 6
feet along the length of each wall.

(2) Review Engineer Technical Letter,
1110-3-229, 11 Apr 75, and definitive
drawing, DEF 33-33-18, Consolidated Stor-
age Building.

h. Openings such as windows should be
limited to meet the essential minimum, or be
eliminated entirely by removal and sealing of
the resultant openings with material compar-
able to that forming the adjacent walls. Any
required windows or openings greater than 96
square inches (the smallest dimension is
greater than 6 inches) must be protected by a
rod-and-bar grid as described in AR 190-11.
Grid ends should be imbedded in the structure
or welded to a frame that is securely attached
to the structure from the inside.

NOTE: It is next to impossible to build
a protective barrier that cannot be
penetrated by a human or heavy armor.
Therefore, as opposed to protecting an
installation or facility using only one
barrier, a combination of barriers wiJJ

provide security as discussed in chapter

Chapter 6

Protective Lighting

Rotective lighting provides ameans
of continuing, during hours of darkness, a
degree of protection approaching that main-
tained during daylight hours. This safeguard
also has considerable value as a deterrent to
thieves and vandals and may makethejob of
the saboteur more difficult. It is an essential
element of an integrated physical security
program.

6-1 R equ i rements

a. Protective or security lighting
needs at installations and facilities depend
upon each situation and the areas to be
protected. Each situation requires careful
study to provide the best visibility practicable
for such security duties as identification of
badges and people at gates Chapters 41 ancGI),
inspection of vehicles, prevention of illegal
entry, detection of intruders outside and
inside buildings and other structures, and
inspection of unusual or suspicious circum-
stances.

b. When such lighting provisions are
impractical, additional security posts, pa-
trols, sentry dog patrols, or other security
means will be necessary.

c. Protective lighting should not be used as
a psychological deterrent only. It should be
used on a perimeter fence line only where the
fence is under continuous or periodic observa-
tion. Protective lighting may be unnecessary
where the perimeter fence is protected by a
central alarm system.

d. Protective lighting maybe desirable for
those sensitive areas or structures within the
perimeter, which are under specific observa-
tion. Such areas or structures include pier and
dock areas, vital buildings, storage areas,
and vulnerable control points in communica-
tions, power, and water distribution systems.
In interior areas where night operations are
conducted, adequate lighting of the area
facilitates detection of unauthorized persons
approaching or attempting malicious acts
within the area.

6-2 Characteristics

fighting is inexpensive to maintain
and, when properly employed, may reduce the
need for security forces. It may also provide
personal protection for forces by reducing the
advantages of concealment and surprise for a

determined intruder, security forces thus
relieved may be used to better advantage
elsewhere.

Protective lighting usually requires less
intensity than working light, except for
identification and inspection at authorized
portals and in emergencies. Each area of an
installation or facility presents its particular
problem based on physical layout, terrain,
atmospheric and climatic conditions, and the
protective requirements. Data are available
from the manufacturers of lighting equip
ment and from the Army Corps of Engineers,
which will assist in designing a lighting
system. Included in these data are:

■ Descriptions, characteristics, and specifi-
cation of various incandescent, arc, and
gaseous discharge lamps.

■ Lighting patterns of the various luminar-
ies.

■ Typical layouts showing the most efficient
height and spacing of equipment.

■ Minimum protective lighting intensities
required for various applications.

6-3 Commander's
Responsibility

a. Each commander must deter-
mine perimeter lighting needs dependent
upon the threat, perimeter extremities, sur-
veillance capabilities, and the available
guard forces.

b. He must insure that protective lighting
is designed and employed to discourage
unauthorized entry and to facilitate detection
of intruders approaching or attempting to
gain entry into protected areas.

c. The commander must insure that protec-
tive lighting operates continuously during
periods of reduced visibility, and that
standby lighting is maintained and periodi-
cally tested for use during times of emergency
and mobilization alerts.

6-4 Planning Considerations

In planning a protective lighting
system, the physical security manager must
give specific consideration to the following
areas:

a. Cleaning and replacement of lamps

and luminaries, particularly with respect to
costs and means (such as ladders, mechani-
cal buckets, etc.) required and available.

b. Advisability of including mercury and
photoelectric controls. These may be
desirable in a peacetime situation, but unde-
sirable when blackout is a possibility.

c. The effects of local weather condi-
tions on various types of lamps and lumina-
ries.

d. Fluctuating or erratic voltages in the
primary power source.

e. Requirement for grounding of fix-
tures and the use of a common ground on an
entire line to provide a stable ground poten-
tial.

f. Establishment of a ledger to maintain a

burning-time (80 percent) record based
on the life expectancy of the lamp. The ledger
should contain as a minimum the following:

■ Type and wattage of lamp.

■ Area, facility, or utility pole used.

■ Date of insertion.

■ Programed date (based on life expectancy)
for extraction and where used (admin area).

g. Limited and exclusion areas.

(1) All limited and exclusion areas must
have protective lighting on a permanent
basis at perimeter and access control
points. The lighting must be positioned to:

(a) Prevent glare that may temporarily
blind the guards.

(b) Avoid silhouetting or highlighting
the guards.

(2) Lighting in these areas must be under
the control of the security force.

(3) The perimeter band of lighting must
provide a minimum intensity of 0.2 foot
candles, measured horizontally 6 inches
(15.2 cm) above ground level, at least 30 feet
(9.1 m) outside the exclusion area barrier.
Lighting inside exclusion areas or on
structures containing nuclear weapons
must be of sufficient intensity to enable
detection of persons in the area or at
structure entrance(s). fighting at entrance
control points must be of sufficient inten-
sity to enable guards to compare and
identify bearers and badges.

(4) Protective lighting systems will be
operated continuously during hours of
darkness.

(5) Protective lights should be employed so
that the failure of one or more lights will
not affect the operation of remaining
lights.

h. Interior and exterior arms storage
lighting. Interior and exterior security
lighting must be provided as follows for all
arms storage facilities, buildings in which
arms storage rooms are located, arms storage
rooms, motor pools, hangars, and outdoor
parking areas for vehicles or aircraft that
have weapons stored on board:

(1) During hours of darkness, exterior
entrances of arms buildings and motor
pool bays and hangars where vehicles or
aircraft are parked with weapons aboard
must be illuminated to an intensity of not
less than 1.0 foot candle at any point to a
height of 8 feet on their vertical surfaces
and to a horizontal distance of 8 feet from
the entrance.

(2) Interior entrances of arms rooms must
be illuminated a minimum of 0.10 foot
candle at any point within a 20-foot radius
of the entrance.

(3) Vehicles and aircraft parked outside
with weapons aboard must be illuminated
0.10 foot candle at any point within a 30-
foot radius of the vehicle or aircraft.

(4) Switches for exterior lights must be
installed so they are not accessible to
unauthorized individuals. Exterior lights
must be covered with wire mesh screen or
other material that will prevent their being
broken by thrown objects.

(5) New construction lighting require-
ments must conform to ammunition and
explosive safety requirements of appendix
C, TM 9-1300-206.

(6) Lighting requirements on existing
facilities should be programed for and
upgraded as needed.

i. Other Suitable Employment Loca-
tions:

(1) Warehouses

(2) Mot or pool s/parks

(3) Commissaries

(4) Post exchanges/annexes

(5) Clubs (EM, NCO, Officer, Country)

(6) Bank/finance and accounting office

(7) Medical /dental facilities

(8) Salvage yards

(9) Helipads and hangars

(10) Museums

(11) Gasoline dispensing areas

(12) Recreational areas (isolated/admin-
istrative areas)

(13) Troop billet areas

(14) Individual troop movement areas

(15) Housing areas

(16) Perimeter entrances/exits (isolated/
used)

(17) Troop working areas.

6-5 Principles

Of Protective Lighting

Protective lighting should enable
guard force personnel to observe activities
around or inside an installation without
disclosing their presence. Adequate lighting
for all approaches to an installation not only
discourages attempted unauthorized entry,
but also reveals persons within the area.
However, lighting should not be used alone. It
should be used with other measures such as
fixed security posts or patrols, fences, and
alarms. Other principles of protective light-
ing are listed next.

a. Good protective lighting is achieved by
adequate, even light upon bordering areas,
glaring lights in the eyes of the intruder, and
relatively little light on security patrol routes.
In addition to seeing long distances, security
forces must be able to see low contrasts, such
as indistinct outlines of silhouettes, and must
be able to spot an intruder who may be
exposed to view for only a few seconds. All of
these abilities are improved by higher levels
of brightness.

b. In planning protective lighting, high
brightness contrast between intruder and
background should be the first consideration.
With predominantly dark dirty surfaces or
camouflage type painted surfaces, more light
is needed to produce the same brightness
around installations and buildings than
when clean concrete, light brick, and grass
predominate. When the same amount of light
falls on an object and its background, the
observer must depend on contrasts in the
amount of light reflected. The ability of the
observer to distinguish poor contrasts is
significantly improved by increasing the
level of illumination.

c. When the intruder is darker than his
background, the observer sees primarily the
outline or silhouette. Intruders who depend
on dark clothing and even darkened face and
hands may be foiled by using light finishes on
the lower parts of buildings and structures.
Stripes on walls have also been used effec-
tively, as they provide recognizable breaks in
outlines or silhouettes. Good observation
conditions can also be created by providing
broad lighted areas around and within the
installation, against which intruders can be
seen.

d. Two basic systems, or a combination of
both may be used to provide practical and
effective protective lighting. The first method
is to light the boundaries and approaches.
The second is to light the area and structures
within the general boundaries of the proper-
ty.

e. To be effective, protective lighting
should:

(1) Discourage or deter attempts at entry
by intruders. Proper illumination may lead
a potential intruder to believe detection is
inevitable.

(2) Make detection likely if entry is at-
tempted.

6-6 T ypes of L ighti ng

The type of lighting system to be
used depends on the overall security require-
ments of the installation concerned. Lighting
units of four general types are used for
protective lighting systems-continuous,
standby, movable, and emergency.

a. Continuous lighting (stationary
luminary). This is the most common protec-
tive lighting system. It consists of a series of
fixed luminaries arranged to flood a given
area continuously during the hours of dark-
ness with overlapping cones of light. Two
primary methods of employing continuous

lighting are glare projection and controlled
lighting:

(1) The glare projection lighting

method is useful where the glare of lights
directed across surrounding territory will
not be annoying nor interfere with adja-
cent operations. It is a strong deterrent to a
potential intruder because it makes it
difficult for him to see the inside of the
area. It also protects the guard by keeping
him in comparative darkness and enabling
him to observe i ntruders at considerable
distance beyond the perimeter. (Sed figure

23| for installation details.)

(a) Glare projection or other protective
perimeter lighting may not be appropri-
ate in some instances. In combat,
tactical perimeter security considera-
tions are given first priority over secu-
rity against pilferage. Generally, the
tightening of tactical perimeter security
strengthens other physical security
efforts. A blending of tactical and
physical security principles is
required— especially true with regards to
perimeter lighting.

(b) Glare projection is not appropriate
where security troop emplacements may
be silhouetted or illuminated for the
enemy to see from the enemy's approach
to the secured site. Where glare projec-
tion is desired, security troops placed in
front of the perimeter fence should be
moved, but still be able to take up
effective fields of fire for defense of the
perimeter. If such blending of protective
lighting and tactical security cannot be
accomplished, perimeter lighting should
not be used. Floodlights that provide a
band of light with great horizontal
angular dispersal and which directs the
glare at a possible intruder while re-
stricting the downward beam, is pre-
ferred in this application.

(2) Controlled lighting is best when it's
necessary to limit the width of the lighted
strip outside the perimeter because of
adjoining property or nearby highways,

Fixture Type
FHPS-250 -

Switching Relay Enclosure

Welded to Steel Pole

Flood

/ '

Glare

Steel Support Plate

weioea to rose

fj+ — Glare

\ Fixture type PMQ-250500 Install 90 degrees apart

aiming out on the ground 40 feet away from the pole.

Round tapered steel pole with 3" (7.7) OD top Finish

shall be hot dip galvanized. Thickness of wall shall be
such as to withstand a wind velocity of 87 knots when
a fixture is used whose effective projected area is at
least 5 square feet (.45 sq meters) and whose weight
is at least 42 pounds (19 KG).
i-KVA Transformer
220 V Primary, 110 V Sec.

Welded 3/4' (1 905) HUB

Fuse Box

Splice Box

Base Welded
To the Pole

2 "! 5 08

•ij'.il- tFJ

.if . 1 . I! I

“jr-;

a Jr ...

.U— ..

Tnrm

Si* i ♦♦

.4-

L41

mote:

2” (5.08) x 4" (10.16)
Handhole Located On
Back of Pole.

*3/4 "(1.905) Anchor
Bolts

Concrete Foundation.

Foundations should be designed to suit local soil
condition.

High Pressure Sodium Type Floodlight

Figure 24 — Example of boundary lighting near adjoining property

(controlled lighting).

railroads, navigable waters, or airports. In
controlled lighting, the width of the lighted
strip can be controlled and adjusted to fit
the particular need, such as illumination of
a wide strip inside a fence and a narrow
strip outside; or floodlighting a wall or
roof. This method of lighting often illumi-
nates or silhouettes security personnel as
they patrol thei r routes |fi qu re 24 shows
controlled lighting).

b. Standby lighting (stationary lumi-
nary). The layout of this system is similar to
continuous lighting. However, the luminaries
are not continuously lighted, but are either
automatically or manually turned on only
when suspicious activity is detected or
suspected by the security force or alarm
systems.

c. Movable lighting (stationary or
portable). This type of system consists of
manually operated movable searchlights
which may be either lighted during hours of

darkness or lighted only as needed. The
system normally is used to supplement
continuous or standby lighting. (The 18-inch
2.2 KW Xeon searchlight, using a 106 Recoil-
less Rifle mount on a 1/4-ton truck is excellent
for this purpose).

d. Emergency lighting. This system
may duplicate any or all of the above systems.
Its use is limited to times of power failure or
other emergencies which render the normal
system inoperative. It depends on an alterna-
ative power source, such as installed or
portable generators, or batteries.

6-7 Other Lighting

a. Fenced perimeters.

(1) Isolated fenced perimeters are

fence lines around areas where the fence is
100 feet or more from buildings or operat-

ing areas, plus the approach area is clear of
obstruction for 100 or more feet outside the
fence and is not used by other personnel.
Both glare projection and controlled illumi-
nation are acceptable for these perimeters.
Patrol roads and paths should be kept
unlighted.

(2) Semi-isolated fenced perimeters

are fence lines where approach areas are
clear of obstruction for 60 to 100 feet
outside the fence and the general public or
installation personnel seldom have reason
to be in the area. Patrol roads and paths
should be kept in relative darkness.

(3) Nonisolated fence perimeters are

fence lines immediately adjacent to operat-
ing areas within the installation, other
installations or to public thoroughfares,
where outsiders or installation personnel
may move about freely in the approach
area. The width of the lighted strip in this
case depends on the relative clear zone
inside and outside the fence. It may not be
practicable to keep the patrol area dark.

b. Building face perimeters consist of
faces of buildings on or within 20 feet of the
property line or area line to be protected, and
where the public may approach the buildings.
Guards may be stationed inside or outside of
the buildings. Doorways or other insets in the
building's face should receive special atten-
tion for lighting to eliminate shadows.

c. Active entrances for pedestrians and
vehicles should have two or more lighting
units with adequate illumination for recogni-
tion of persons and examination of creden-
tials. All vehicle entrances should have two
lighting units located to facilitate complete
inspection of passenger cars, trucks, and
freight cars as well as their contents and
passengers. Semiactive and inactive en-
trances should have the same degree of
continuous lighting as the remainder of the
perimeter, with standby lighting of sufficient
illumination to be used when the entrance
becomes active. Gate houses at entrances
should have a low level of interior illumina-

tion to enable guards to see better, increase
their night vision adaptability and avoid
making them targets.

d. Areas and structures within the
installation property line consist of yards,
storage spaces, large open working areas,
piers, docks, and other sensitive areas and
structures.

(1) Open yards (defined as unoccupied
land only) and outdoor storage spaces
(defined as material storage areas, railroad
sidings, motor pools, and parking areas)
should be illuminated as follows:

(a) An open yard adjacent to a perimeter
(between guards and fences) should be
illuminated in accordance with the
illumination requirements of the perime-
ter. Where lighting is deemed necessary
in other open yards, illumination should
not be less than 0.2 foot candle at any
point.

(b) Lighting units should be placed in
outdoor storage spaces to provide an
adequate distribution of light in aisles,
passageways, and recesses to eliminate
shadowed areas where unauthorized
persons may conceal themselves.

(2) Piers and docks located on an installa-
tion should be safeguarded by illuminating
both water approaches and the pier area.
Decks on open piers should be illuminated
to at least 1.0 foot candles and the water
approaches (extending to a distance of 100
feet from the pier) to at least 0.5 foot candle.
The area beneath the pier floor should be
lighted with small wattage floodlights
arranged to the best advantage with
respect to piling. Movable lighting capable
of being directed as required by the guards
is recommended as a part of the protective
lighting system for piers and docks. The
lighting must not in any way violate
marine rules and regulations (must not be
glaring to pilots). The US Coast Guard
should be consulted for approval of pro-
posed protective lighting adjacent to
navigable waters.

(3) Critical structures and areas should be
the first consideration in designing protec-
tive fencing and lighting. Power, heat,
water, communications, explosive materi-
als, critical materials, delicate machinery,
areas where highly classified material is
stored or produced, and valuable finished
products need special attention. Critical
structures or areas classified as vulnerable
from a distance should be kept dark
(standby lighting available), and those
that can be damaged close at hand should
be well lighted. The surroundings should
be well lighted to force an intruder to cross
a lighted area, and any walls should be
lighted to a height of 8 feet to facilitate
silhouette vision.

6-8 Wiring Systems

Both multiple and series circuits
may be used to advantage in protective
lighting systems, depending on the type of
luminary used and other design features of
the system. The circuit should be arranged so
that failure of any one lamp will not leave a
large portion of the perimeter line or a major
segment of a critical or vulnerable position in
darkness. Connections should be such that
normal interruptions caused by overloads,
industrial accidents, and building or brush
fires will not interrupt the protective system.
In addition, feeder lines should be located
underground (or sufficiently inside the pe-
rimeter in the case of overhead wiring) to
minimize the possibility of sabotage or van-
dalism from outside the perimeter. The
design should provide for simplicity and
economy in system maintenance and should
require a minimum of shutdowns for routine
repairs, cleaning, and lamp replacement. It is
necessary in some instances to install a
duplicate wiring system.

6-9 Maintenance

a. Periodic inspections should be
made of all electrical circuits to replace or

repair worn parts, tighten connections, and
check insulation. Luminaries should be kept
clean and properly aimed.

b. Replacement lamps can be used in less
sensitive locations. The actuating relays on
emergency lines, which remain open when
the system is operating from the primary
source, need to be cleaned frequently since
dust and lint collect on their contact points
and can prevent their operation when closed.

c. The intensity of illumination and speci-
fication for protective lighting for fences or
other antipersonnel barriers should meet the
minimum requirements (next page).

6-10 Power Sources

Power sources should meet the
following criteria:

a. Primary— usually a local public utility.

b. Alternate— the following should be
provided:

(1) Standby batteries or gasoline-driven

generators may be used.

(a) If cost effective, a system should
start automatically upon failure of
outside power.

(b) Must insure continuous lighting.

(d) Tested to insure efficiency and
effectiveness. The frequency and dura-
tion of tests depend on:

■ Mission and operational factors.

■ Location, type and condition of equip
ment.

■ Weather (temperature affects batter-
ies very strongly).

(2) Located within a controlled area for

additional security.

(3) Generator or battery-powered portable

and/or stationary lights.

Location

Foot-candles on
horizontal plane at
ground level

Perimeter of outer area

0 15

Perimeter of restricted area

Vehicular entrances

1 0

Pedestrian entrances

2.0

Sensitive inner area

0 15

Sensitive inner structure

1 0

Entrances

1 .V

0 1

Open yards

V/. 1
0.2

Decks on open piers

1.0

Type of area

Type of
lighting

Width of lig

ihted strip (ft)

insiae Tence

Outside fence
200

20-30

30-40

50 (total

width

from

build-

ing

50 face)

50 (total

width

from

struc-

ture)

Isolated perimeter
Isolated perimeter
Semi-isolated perimeter
Non-isoiated perimeter
Building face perimeter

Vehicle entrance
Pedestrian entrance
Railroad entrances
Vital structures

Glare

Controlled

Lighting Specification Table

(a) For use in a complete power failure

(b) Includes alternate power supply

c. Security— a must.

(1) Starts at the points where power feeder
lines enter the installation or activity.

(2) Security emphasis goes to sources in
terms of mission essential/vulnerable
activity, IAW AR 190-13.

(3) Continual physical security inspec-
tions of power sources is required to
determine security measures and replace-
ment of equipment (transformers, lines,
etc.).

Chapter 7

Intrusion Detection
System

SECURITY FORCE
MOVES

TO ^/INVESTIGATE

basic electronic security system
consists of an interior sensor (integrated by
data transmission and links) into a moni-
tored annunciator console backed by a
security response force.

Intrusion detection systems are an in her-
ent element of the Army's security in depth
ring and play a vital part in the overall

protection of military installations, activi-
ties, equipment and materiel assets. These
systems detect through sound, vibration,
motion, electrostatic and/or light beams.
Basically, for an item to be secure, the system
must focus upon detecting unauthorized
individuals at the entry point (gate, door,
fence, etc.), area (building, etc.), and at a
specific object (vault, file, safe, etc.).

The basic electronic security consists of an
interior senso
…[truncated]

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