FM 90 10 1 An Infantrymans Guide To Combat In Built Up Areas 1995

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LIBRARY FM 90-10-1

Pee TANT KAN,
nee ( 2 M 7
USA i 3)

MAY 25 1993

ACU tuoi win REO

PO REGISTR ———-—-_—————

AN INFANTRYMAN’S GUIDE TO
COMBAT IN BUILT-UP AREAS

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION—
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

C1, FM 90-10-1

Change 1 HEADQUARTERS s%
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington, DC, 3 October 1995 5

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peana = = a”
AN INFANTRYMAN’S GUIDE TO COMBAT =, oe /
IN BUILT-UP AREAS fe A a Se,
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1. Change FM 90-10-1, 12 May 1993, as follows: N
Remove old pages Insert new pages
i through ii i through ii
-© v through vii v through vii
- F-5 through F-6 F-5 through F-6
G-1 through G-10 G-1 through G-7

J-1 through J-10
K-1 through K-24
L-1 through L-4
M-1 through M-8
N-1 through N-4
Glossary 1 through Glossary 5 Glossary 1 through Glossary 5

2. A star (*) marks new or changed material.

3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited. |

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMER
pi General, United States Army
Gilera: Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSON
Acting Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

00822

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with

DA Form 12-11E, requirements for FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman’s Guide to
Combat in Built-Up Areas (Qty rar block no. 1232).

*FM 90-10-1
FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS
No. 90-10-1 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington, DC, 12 May 1993

; AN INFANTRYMAN’S GUIDE TO COMBAT
IN BUILT-UP AREAS
CONTENTS
Page
sl id ob. Pn en ROY PEE PRE NER AE EO nce ver mn Tere errr err er rrr v
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 0000000 ccc cenceene ents e eee enneetesesseeneeeeaes EEEF 1-1
Section I Backøsroundiiessiicnriia a a E EEE AEA A A E S E 1-1
1-1. AirLand Battle... Se rr ren nan MAI er AT A 1-1
= 1-2. Definitions... ees ETE EE teeta cs AAE TT 1-1
Ve E = ETE E E E T A N EE E E deanna A Meet 1-2
1-4. The Threat in Built-Up Areas...............eesesesesssrsersssseseerissererrsrseeserneoniosieneserneeneesesres 1-3
Section II. Characteristics and Categories of Built-Up Areas...........00eccsnrereereee 1-4
Ite Character stie S auna aa a a a E E 1-4
1:6- Categories suras i A EEE E E A E E TA AA 1-5
Section MI. Special Considerations ..............0sa a cece eee cee cee ne cesses enneeecnseeeeaeenneeeenneeens 1-5
1-7, Battlesin Bult- Up Areas niitoe en E vias E cbaaiadnes 1-5
1-8, Target Engagement occi i ire E A a EE SA 1-5
19 Small- -Umit BAES orraa a EN A E EA Ea 1-5
1-10. Munitions and Special Equipment .....0..00..c cece een cence renee ene tne enneeeeeeeniee 1-6
LaDy Communications sn os sass caches sta ics E eigen thicsadaia AOE RE 1-6
DZS USS aaraa ceeded a o A E Wate pausinG veo ees ga a at hs 1-6
Vt ES RESUIT GUL ONG cic 2a vistas heaisirsh seu se iosaneussre E oe aga ieee ty ect E nce 1-6
Leta Prati cid Avoidantë icusi nia TE secon ws EEE EOE E O 1-7

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 90-10-1, 30 September 1982.

C1, FM 90-10-41

page
Chapter 2. URBAN ANALYSIS |
Section I. Models of Built-Up Areas ....0....0...0.ccccccccccccccssccsecsseenteceneceeeseessesseseneenieenses 2-1
2-1. Regional Urban Characteristics ......0..0ccccceccccsccscssecsessecrsessessecseesecssetecsseesseneeseeereens 2-1
2-2. Specific Characteristics of Urban Areas... cccccccccecssccesecenscesseesseesseecseecsseensesens 2-2
2-3. Characteristics of Urban Areas................0008 sath dh faa alee AN UNM E 2-2
Section II. Terrain and Weather Analysis ..0........0...000c0cccccccccccccccsscssesssecssecessenseeeseeses 2-6
2-4. Special Terrain Considerations......0...00.cccccccccccseccsccsseceecesescaseeesesessessasenseesseeseess 2-6
2-5. Special Weather Considerations ........00..00cccccccccecescccseceseeeessesseeesesessesssessseeteeesens 2-7
Section III. Threat Evaluation and Integration .......0...0..00ccccccccccccceesceescenecssessseeesenes 2-8
2:6: Operai onal E ACTON ean A T kanes waa a 2-8
2-7. Urban Counterinsurgency, Counterguerrilla, and Counterterrorist
Operations eai aE E AIEEE E E EEE 2-9
2-8. Projected Threat Capabilities ............ccccccscssssescecssscessseescnsensevssesatearsecsenseensesenesaes 2-11
Chapter 3. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Section I. Offensive Considerations .............0..00c0ccccccccccceessececsseeseecsceeseeseetseseaseeseseeessens 3-1
3-1. Reasons for Attacking Built-Up Areas 3-1
3-2. Reasons for Not Attacking a Built-Up Area 3-1
Section II. Characteristics of Offensive Operations i in a Built-Up Area... 3-2
3-3. Troop Requirements......... Luci nase pisses ta cnt ue Manat eee a em ene et en neo 3-2
BF MAn SUVE saat ec scars chensntealaretesn 9a 5 Relat so cheer tuts R AA Babee 3-2
BHD, USE OL EQUIP GI asi iain a an E tives dau basumansandesauemesnaon la AAS 3-2
Section III. Types of Offensive Operations sie Nites athena rae ences 3-3
De Oe HAAKE ranr o rA ES A E 3-3
3-7. Deliberate Attack... A AA EEE A AET T A 3-3
section TV METI-T Factors i ccciac cctovnars a ice onan O EE eeeenialeiadh 3-7
BeBe NISSO oa EE AS ENEA 3-7
Dy BIEMA E A A AR A A 3-8
3:10 Tea Mea AO Fe NON T E A 3-8
E le [TOON ERE E A E A ORE EA E A fasdinake EEA, 3-9
I2 TIME cyaan an A T EN E A E N Me see 3-16
Section V. Command and Control ...........cccccccscscssecseessessseeseeeeees EEE E 3-17
3-13. Command uotis uien ne EEE E E E A E S. 3-17
BE COMER OD e eaa OE AS TREET EEIE EE 3-17
Section VI. Battalion Task Force Attack on a Built-Up Area........0.0..0.000.0. ee 3-17
3-15. Conduct of Deliberate Attack... ccc cccccccecsssencecsectseceneesseesereeeneeenaeernreees 3-17
3-16- Seizure OL Key ODI SCUVE nren E a T R 3-18
3-17. Infiltration... cece cree EEE ET EE T A N 3-19
SE rS Route SEU Ye e EE EE ENA 3-20

FM 90-10-1

( page
a Section VII. Company Team Attack of a Built-Up Area ............ 3-21
3:19 Attack OF ad Block -Xena Fee ate OY a Be en Bed 3-21

3-20. Attack of an Enemy Outpost ............. 2.002 eee 3-23

3-21. Seizure of a Traffic Circle 2... 1... ee en 3-24

3-22, Seizure OF Key Terral) s.cs .d ener eer can Late Bayada 3-26

329: INECOMNAISSANCE, Ve A kG ha a, ae cee ee Re SS) Reel a a es 3-27

Section VIII. Platoon Attack ofa Built-Up Area ................ 3-29

| 3-24. Attack ofa Building .. 1... 2... ee ee ee 3-29
= 3-25. Movement Down a Street ...... 0... eee eee te ee 3-29
3-26, Counterattacks. aiveu3o 46654 %82 645 Gow oa ula dope an 3-31

. Chapter 4. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I. Defensive Considerations ..........0...0 00 eee eee 4-1

4-1. Reasons for Defending Built-Up Areas .................. 4-1

4-2. Reasons for Not Defending Built-Up Areas ........... tie AR?

Section II. Characteristics of Built-Up Areas ...............4.. 4-2

IES Be @ ) 619071 0 (<1 | cece eee ae 4-3

4-4. Avenues of Approach ............ 0... eee ee ee eee 4-4

AS. ICV. | Chall ia, ere eae of ts ee ea ee a A a ee S 4-4

( 4-6. Observation and Fields of Fire... 0.2... 0... eee eee eee 4-4
ee 4-7. Cover and Concealment: <-4c6 fae ee ok haa Re EE Bw 4-4
ASU FIVE Hazards diepen RG EEG ak a Rk i GE 4-4

4-9. Communications Restrictions ............ 00 ee eee eens 4-4

Section III. Factors of METT-T ............ 0... eee eee eee 4-5

aO MISSION > 0.25: Fae is Anse Ti Sav ose E cae LI wah EE a a my Gh cal BS 4-5

LREN oaaae acorn hae ae ie 8 eh ne he es ee 4-5

dl TErnman yeaa pcm Sos gee Awe Bree ae 8 ee See A ee RA 4-5

4-13. Troops Available. <2. we Siac awe ee oe Hee ae aa eA 4-9

4-14 Time: Available: cps a aes oe whe ele lee 4-13

Section IV. Command and Control ............ 2.2.00 2 ee eee 4-16

4-15. Command Post Facilities ........... 0... eee ee ee eens 4-16

4-16. Organization of the Defense ............ 0... 00.002 eee 4-16

= eT eCOUNTETAUIACK: yota ar ae O e aa a 4-18
4-18. Defense During Limited Visibility ..................0.. 4-18

Section V. Defensive Plan at Battalion Level .................. 4-19

4-19. Defense Of a Village sore tte awa eR ih ee ea ie A 4-19

4-20 Detense M Sector: wer aea Be EE a a aaa a aS 4-20

4-21. Delay in a Built-Up Area 2.0... ee 4-21

FM 90-10-1

page
Section VI. Defensive Plan at Company Level ................. 4-23
4-22: Defense of a Village sosa iow. Soe $a te a ake wae SW ee 4-23
4-23. Defense of a City Block .......... nananana e y a Nace 4-25
4-24. Company Delay .. nannan ee A exis 4-26
4-25. Defense of a Traffic Circle 4a aos oo SLY GREW WSS! 4-27
Section VII. Defensive Plan at Platoon Level .................. 4-27
4-26. Defense of a Strongpoint ......... ETE E A E E EEEN 4-28
4-27. Defense Against Armor ......... 0.00. eee eee ee ee eee 4-29
4-28. Conduct of Armored Ambush ...............-..22008.% 4-32
Chapter 5. FUNDAMENTAL COMBAT SKILLS |
Section I- Movement. sabare rennen oaa i e RS ER EEO 5-1
Sal Crossing of a Walls s s eis oa a ak ab om dw elk 6 Oe ed Gee 5-1
5-2. Movement Around: Corners 0:0 vd6. He Boe he EE ES 5-1
5-3. Movement Past Windows .......... 0... eee eee ee eee 5-2
5-4 USE OL DOGEWAYS> ane eaae Eaa owe me eB] Sas ks ee oe Gee es 5-3
5-5. Movement Parallel to Buildings ..................0045 5-4
5-6; (Crossing of OpemAreas: iy ire moman erana yo Oe HEWES ES ee Sutin sO
5-7. Fire Team Employment ..... 0... 0... 0. eee eee eee eee 5-6
5-8. Movement Between Positions ...... a ee ee a eee a 5-7
5-9. Movement Inside a Building ............... 0002200048 5-9
Section II. Entry Techniques ............... eee eee eens 5-11
5-10. Upper Building Levels: sac aa we ASE A OE i 5-11
Sit: Useof Ladders: <5. ey tesa ne ee G8 hfe ee SE WERE Bee 5-12
5-12. Use of Grappling Hook «1... ee ee ee eee 5-13
0-13; Sealing OL Walls: <.4:3.4:4.¢-@ ce 8 eke Sa ase aa a hd Bi wine 5-14
J14 Rappelling: sa Nee eon ae ee he a Ee HR 5-16
5-15. Entry at Lower Levels. -ce dain ck ee ee bea OES SEES S 5-16
5-16:Hand Grenades: sas a me aaa 5-19
Section III. Firing Positions .............. 00... ee eee ee eee 5-23
S17. Hasty Firing Position’ .c/a se ee Reece & Poe be Oe OA A 5-23
5-18. Prepared Firing Position ... 2... 2... ... 2 eee eee eee eee 5-26
5-19; Target ACguisitlon" “ex gcanete Sy ee na nen Bee BAe Solen Bee S 5-34
5:20. Flame Operations ennhi en dca aa ee a aw HS 5-37
5-21. Bmployment Of Snipers. 042% oie ee la te RE OES BS 5-38
Section IV. Navigation in Built-Up Areas ..............220004 5-39
5-22: Miltary Maps- ax satay mea Wilks een > Oe A aw Fee eS a 5-39
5-23. Global Positioning Systems ........... 0.0.0.0 0 eee eee 5-40
IA Aenal Photographs: csay a de: yk Se ae eel ae 5-40

C1, FM 90-10-1

| page
se Section V. Camouflage nene irina te teowiawn os ranean helio waadenccin OEEC Eitt 5-40
SLS APPEAU O inn e E a ET EANN 5-40
5220 Use Or Shado WS ouian na ATA A T 5-41
5:27- Color and Texeria E AEA EA 5-43
Chapter 6. COMBAT SUPPORT
Gk MOAT e r A A N 6-1
O2 FEC AmE aana a A E AOE 6-3
6-3; Nava GUND 0 aaan E O TETEA A 6-4
o4 Tactical A sta Ea A a a Ga ee vere 6-4
O25: AIT DEENSE a a esas E S T AAO 6-5
GeO Am AVIAOM srine e NE AAT E A AAN Ai 6-6
O7 HenCO eiS e n AE Pee tn tn ee 6-6
a8 ITC TS o A A AE TOA 6-8
6o Military POCE lansuar ee A A 6-8
6-10; Commun CANONS enia e E neater aan ea eae 6-9
Chapter 7. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND LEGAL ASPECTS
OF COMBAT
Section I. Combat Service Support........0.......0cccccccccccccesscesecesseeceeeeenteseeeesececneeeeeeneneeenes 7-1
Tlo CUI SS craic as a EAN A E A E A 7-1
Tad: Principal PUNCH ONS ainei aa e EA RPE EE 7-1
7-3. Supply and Movement FunNctions.............0ccccccccssceesceeseecssesssceseeecseecnseseseeesseenseees 7-4
STEAM E EE AE E A T E E E AS E E 7-5
= 7-5 cP CFSONMEL SETVICES rario iid chi asses E E E 7-7
Section I. Legal Aspects of Combat.........0...0..ccccccccccccscesecsseeseeseeneeseeenecseesseetesseesseeaees 7-8
7-6. Civilian Impact in the Battle Area......... A cada a sae gua aah ang EE AE ache ts 7-8
ds fe Command AWHONN ceed ds tend carn taaa A atetin Ait are ta nied Matava matics aan 7-8
128. SOUNCE UE ZAt ON Gs sac ith caress OTA OAR EAN 7-9
Te) ICAL AIG Wearer iiia Sie aha Uh cae ac ae ttl aha Ne as E usando 7-9
7-10. Law and Ordert................... Prisashis dated ated das oslnca hes aso mest a as N otra aaa ATEA 7-9
7-11. Public Affairs Officer and Media Relations ...........0..ccccccccccsseceereesseeeesteeeeeeennees 7-9
7-12. Civil Affairs Units and Psychological Operations .......0...0..c eee TEO 7-9
I3: Provost Marshallin ia e E E EE ton A A 7-10
7-14. Commander’s Legal Authority and Responsibilities «00.0.0... ee ne 7-10
Chapter 8. EMPLOYMENT AND EFFECTS OF WEAPONS
8-1. Effectiveness of Weapons and Demolitions.............ccccecccccecsesccceestecessteeeeenaeeeeeaee 8-1
8-2. M16 Rifle and M249 Squad Automatic Weapon/Machine Gutv................0..0ce. 8-2
8-3. Medium and Heavy Machine Guns (7.62-mm and .50-Caliber)....00.0 ee 8-4
8-4. Grenade Launchers, 40-mm (M203 and MK 19)... 8-7
8-5. Light and Medium Recoilless Weapons.............ccccccecceecceeeeeeceeneceeeeeeeneeeneeseeneeens 8-9
8-6. Antitank Guided Missiles .......0...0ccccceceeseetseeteeeees EEE EAEE OE EAA . 8-19
8-7: Plame’ Weapons ic wins Soviets a a a aia e pi TONET 8-23
8-8. Hand Grenades enaa a aT EA IEE ETE A N thas aon 8-26
GI MONAT S o E A N E N onsen tices en Rata eoteng tae 8-28

C1, FM 90-10-1

Page
8-10: 25mm Aútomatie Guiera Sages ashes aad E tnd sea eee eoda teow dane: 8-31
Ba ME Tank CANNON asirian a N A A I a e 8-34
8-12. Combat Engineer Vehicle Demolition Gun .............ccccccceccseceeeeeeeeeeeeeecnneeeeaes 8-38
8-13. Artillery and Naval Gunfire... ccc cccccesceeceeeeeeeeceeeeeaeecseeeeesaeeseaaeeeeeeeeeas 8-38
8:14: Aerial Weapons oirir iania tre N S sayin a lanten has Satent ane aaiadhatanees 8-40
S-13 DEMONON S rozoga yscanisesaansnncatwasienan.vsmuaaenidth E Leanniedelk 8-41
Appendix A. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL
CONSIDERATIONS cieri E E an ees A-1
Appendix B. BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE ...000.0..00.cccccceeceeneeeeeees OEA B-1
Appendix C. OBSTACLES, MINES, AND DEMOLITIONS 1.0000 C-1
Appendix D. SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS. .......0. cc ccccccceeeceeeeeeeeeeeesneeesnaeenneees D-1
Appendix E. FIGHTING POSITIONS ....0.0. oe eccceceenteeeeesenteeecestieeeeeseentesenenns E-1
* Appendix F. ATTACKING AND CLEARING BUILDINGS |... eee F-]
*Appendix G. MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN
(MOUT) UNDER RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS ..........00000.000.. E ea nena G-1
Appendix H. URBAN BUILDING ANALYSIS 0... rrene H-1
Appendix I. LIMITED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS UNDER MOUT
CONDITIONS snan E A alan aon eacatone: heeled
* Appendix J. COUNTERING URBAN SNIPERS 0.0 Cea AEA J-1
* Appendix K. CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT TECHNIQUES... K-1
* Appendix L. EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED HELICOPTERSIN
BUILI-UPF AREAS Ta NO E A EOT L-1
* Appendix M. FIELD-EXPEDIENT BREACHING OF COMMON
URBAN BARRIERS nunen niia a AO N A ATA T K-1
* Appendix N. INFANTRY AND ARMOR SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS
DURING MOUT cion cee dee IN etal Sha stn dae pees e cant anette cielo orcas N-1
§ GLOSS ATY naneo nnana a a EE EE E E EEA EAE T Glossary 1
RROT OPEN COS 5) cost densesestys Waveute nies RaseaSe ited ia E E E E AE taecennatanes References 1

EVN ON AE E R cia eek eke ese eee tao PENNA eed coset ect etal Back ee ha aed os Index 1

*PREFACE

The urban growth in all areas of the world has changed the face of the
battlefield. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) constitute the
battlefield in the Eurasian continent. It includes all man-made features (cities,
towns, villages) as well as natural terrain. Combat in built-up areas focuses on
fighting for and in those cities, towns, and villages.

The probability is great that United States forces will become engaged by
enemy forces who are intermingled with the civilian population. Therefore,
units using the techniques outlined in this manual under these conditions must
obey the rules of engagement issued by their headquarters and the laws of land
warfare. Infantry commanders and staffs should concentrate on the skills
contained in Chapters 3 through 5 as they train their units.

This manual provides the infantryman with guidelines and techniques for
fighting against an organized enemy in built-up areas who may or may not be
separated from the civilian population. Some techniques for dealing with
insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists are included; however, the manuals which
best address these issues are FM 7-98 and FM 90-8. This manual does not
address any techniques for missions that require the restoration of order to
urban areas. Information and techniques to accomplish this mission are
addressed in FM 19-15.

The proponent of this publication is the US Army Infantry School. Send

comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commandant,

US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, Georgia —

31905-5410; E-mail DURANTEA @ Benning-emh2.army.mil; FAX DSN
835-7500; and DSN 835-7114/4539 or commercial 1-706-545-7114/4539.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.

Vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Ihe increased population and accelerated growth of cities have made
the problems of combat in built-up areas an urgent requirement for the

Army, This type of combat cannot be avoided. The make up and
isinbiltion of smaller built-up areas as part of an urban complex make
the isolation of enemy fires occupying one or more of these smaller
enclaves increasingly difficult. MOUT is expected to be the future bat-
tlefield in Europe and Asia with brigade- and higher-level commanders
focusing on these operations. This manual provides the infantry battal-
ion commander and his subordinates a current doctrinal source for
tactics, techniques, and procedures for fighting in built-up areas.

Section |. BACKGROUND

Friendly and enemy doctrine reflect the fact that more attention must be
given to urban combat. Expanding urban development affects military op-
erations as the terrain is altered. Although the current doctrine still applies,
the increasing focus on operations short of war, urban terrorism, and civil
disorder emphasizes that combat in built-up areas is unavoidable.

1-1. AIRLAND BATTLE

AirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army’s approach to generating and
applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. It is based on
securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to accom-
plish the mission. The four basic AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, agility,
depth, and synchronization are constant. During combat in built-up areas,
the principles of AirLand Battle doctrine still apply—only the terrain over
which combat operations will be conducted has changed.

1-2. DEFINITIONS
MOUT is defined as all military actions that are planned and conducted
on terrain where man-made construction affects the tactical options
available to the commander. These operations are conducted to defeat
an enemy that may be mixed in with civilians. Therefore, the rules of
engagement (ROE) and use of combat power are more restrictive than
in other conditions of combat. Due to political change, advances in
technology, and the Army’s role in maintaining world order, MOUT now
takes on new dimensions that previously did not exist. These new condi-
tions affect how units will fight or accomplish their assigned missions.
The following definitions provide clarity and focus for commanders
conducting tactical planning for MOUT. The terms “surgical MOUT
operations” and “precision MOUT operations” are descriptive in nature
only. These are conditions of MOUT, not doctrinal terms.

a. Built-Up Area. A built-up area is a concentration of structures, facili-

ties, and people that forms the economic and cultural focus for the surround-

ing area. The four categories of built-up areas are large cities, towns and
small cities, villages, and strip areas.

b. Surgical MOUT. These operations are usually conducted by joint
special operation forces. They include missions such as raids, recovery

1-1

FM 90-10-1

operations, rescues, and other special operations (for example, hostage |
rescue).

€ T MOUT. Conventional forces conduct these operations to
defeat an enemy that is mixed with noncombatants. They conduct these
operations carefully to limit noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.
Precision MOUT requires strict accountability of individual and unit actions
through strict ROE. It also requires specific tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures for precise use of combat power (as in Operation Just Cause). (See

_ Appendix G for more detailed information.)

1-3. CITIES

Cities are the centers of finance, politics, transportation, communication,
industry, and culture. Therefore, they have often been scenes of important
battles (Table 1-1).

RIGA 1917 BUDAPEST 1956
MADRID 1936 BEIRUT 1958
WARSAW 1939 < SANTO DOMINGO 1965
ROTTERDAM 1940 1968
MOSCOW 1942 1968
STALINGRAD 1942 1968
LENINGRAD 1942 1972
WARSAW 1943 MONTEVIDEO 1972
PALERMO | 1944 QUANGTRI CITY 1972

BREST 1944 AN LOC 1972

WARSAW 1944 XUAN LOC 1975
AACHEN 1944 | _ SAIGON 1975
ORTONA 1944 BEIRUT 1975-1978

CHERBOURG

BRESLAU

WEISSENFELS

BERLIN

MANILA

SAN MANUEL
* SEOUL

1944
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1950

MANAGUA
ZAHLE

TYRE

BEIRUT
PANAMA CITY
COLON
KUWAIT CITY

1978
1981
1982
1983

1989-1990
1989-1990

1991

*Direct US Troop Involvement

Table 1-1. Cities contested during twentieth
century conflicts.

a. Operations in built-up areas are conducted to capitalize on the strate-
gic and tactical advantages of the city, and to deny those advantages to the
enemy. Often, the side that controls a city has a psychological advantage,
which can be enough to significantly affect the outcome of larger conflicts.

b. Even in insurgencies, combat occurs in cities. In developing nations,
control of only a few cities is often the key to control of national resources.
The city riots of the 1960’s and the guerrilla and terrorist operations in Santo
Domingo, Caracas, Belfast, Managua, and Beirut indicate the many situ-
ations that can result in combat operations in built-up areas.

FM 90-10-1

c. Built-up areas also affect military operations because of the way they
alter the terrain. In the last 40 years, cities have expanded, losing their
well-defined boundaries as they extended into the countryside. New road
systems have opened areas to make them passable. Highways, canals, and
railroads have been built to connect population centers. Industries have
grown along those connectors, creating “strip areas.” Rural areas, although
retaining much of their farm-like character, are connected to the towns by
a network of secondary roads. |

d. These trends have occurred in most parts of the world, but they are
the most dramatic in Western Europe. European cities tend to grow together
to form one vast built-up area. Entire regions assume an unbroken built-up
character, as is the case in the Ruhr and Rhein Main complex. Such growth
patterns block and dominate the historic armor avenues of approach, or
decrease the amount of open maneuver area available to an attacker. It is
estimated that a typical brigade sector in a European environment will

-include 25 small towns, most of which would lie in the more open avenues
. of approach (Figure 1-1). |

Figure 1-1. Urban areas blocking maneuver areas.

e. Extensive urbanization provides conditions that a defending force can
exploit. Used with mobile forces on the adjacent terrain, antitank forces
defending from built-up areas can dominate avenues of approach, greatly

improving the overall strength of the defense.

f. Forces operating in such areas may have elements in open terrain,
villages, towns, or small and large cities. Each of these areas calls for different

tactics, task organization, fire support, and CSS.

1-4. THE THREAT IN BUILT-UP AREAS

The Commonwealth of Independent States and other nations that use Soviet
doctrine have traditionally devoted much of their training to urban combat
exercises. Indications are that they believe such combat is unavoidable in

FM 90-10-

1-4

future conflicts. But, the threat of combat in built-up areas cannot be limited
to former Soviet doctrine. Throughout many Third World countries, the
possibility of combat in built-up areas exists through acts of insurgents,
guerrillas, and terrorists. (Information on operations in this environment is
found in the reference list.)

Section Il. CHARACTERISTICS AND CATEGORIES
OF BUILT-UP AREAS

One of the first requirements for conducting operations in built-up areas is
to understand the common characteristics and categories of such areas.

1-5. CHARACTERISTICS

Built-up areas consist mainly of man-made features such as buildings. Build-
ings provide cover and concealment, limit fields of observation and fire, and
block movement of troops, especially mechanized troops. Thick-walled
buildings provide ready-made, fortified positions. Thin-walled buildings that
have fields of observation and fire may also be important. Another important
aspect is that built-up areas complicate, confuse and degrade command and
control.

a. Streets are usually avenues of approach. However, forces moving
along streets are often canalized by the buildings and have little space for
off-road maneuver. Thus, obstacles on streets in towns are usually more
effective than those on roads in open terrain since they are more difficult to
bypass.

aa Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas are easily over-
looked but can be important to the outcome of operations. They include
subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems (Figure 1-2).

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Figure 1-2. Underground systems.

FM 90-10-1

1-6. CATEGORIES
Built-up areas are classified into four categories:
e Villages (population of 3,000 or less).

¢ Strip areas (urban areas built along roads
connecting towns or cities).

e Towns or small cities (population up to 100,000
and not part of a major urban complex).

e Large cities with associated urban sprawl (population in
the millions, covering hundreds of square kilometers).

Each area affects operations differently. Villages and strip areas are com-
monly encountered by companies and battalions. Towns and small cities
involve operations of entire brigades or divisions. Large cities and major
urban complexes involve units up to corps size and above.

Section Ill. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Several considerations are addressed herein concerning combat in built-up
areas.

1-7. BATTLES IN BUILT-UP AREAS
Battles in built-up areas usually occur when—
¢ A city is between two natural obstacles and
there is no bypass.
e The seizure of a city contributes to the
attainment of an overall objective.

¢ The city is in the path of a general advance
and cannot be surrounded or bypassed.

e Political or humanitarian concerns require
the seizure orretention of a city.

In the city, the ranges of observation and fields of fire are reduced by
structures as well as by the dust and smoke of battle. Targets are usually
briefly exposed at ranges of 100 meters or less. As a result, combat in built-up
areas consists mostly of close, violent combat. Infantry troops will use mostly
light and medium antitank weapons, automatic rifles, machine guns, and

hand grenades. Opportunities for using antitank guided missiles are rare

because of the short ranges involved and the many obstructions that inter-
fere with missile flight.

1-9. SMALL-UNIT BATTLES

Units fighting in built-up areas often become isolated, making combat a
series of small-unit battles. Soldiers and small-unit leaders must have the
initiative, skill, and courage to accomplish their missions while isolated from
their parent units. A skilled, well-trained defender has tactical advantages
over the attacker in this type of combat. He occupies strong static positions,
whereas the attacker must be exposed in order to advance. Greatly reduced
line-of-sight ranges, built-in obstacles, and compartmented terrain require
the commitment of more troops for a given frontage. The troop density for
both an attack and defense in built-up areas can be as much as three to five

1-5

FM 90-10-1

times greater than for an attack or defense in open terrain. Individual
soldiers must be trained and psychologically ready for this type of operation.

1-10. MUNITIONS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

Forces engaged in fighting in built-up areas use large quantities of munitions
because of the need for reconnaissance by fire, which is due to short ranges
and limited visibility. LAWs or AT-4s, rifle and machine gun ammunition,
40-mm grenades, hand grenades, and explosives are high-usage items in this
type of fighting. Units committed to combat in built-up areas also must have
special equipment such as grappling hooks, rope, snaplinks, collapsible pole
ladders, rope ladders, construction material, axes, and sandbags. When
possible, those items should be either stockpiled or brought forward on-call,
so they are easily available to the troops.

1-11. COMMUNICATIONS

Urban operations require centralized planning and decentralized execution.
Therefore, communications plays an important part. Commanders must
trust their subordinates’ initiative and skill, which can only occur through
training. The state of a unit’s training is a vital, decisive factor in the execution
of operations in built-up areas.

a. Wire is the primary means of communication for controlling the
defense of a city and for enforcing security. However, wire can be compro-
mised if interdicted by the enemy.

b. Radio communication in built-up areas is normally degraded by
structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines. Many buildings
are constructed so that radio waves will not pass through them. The new
family of radios may correct this problem, but all units within the built-up
area may not have these radios. Therefore, radio is an alternate means of
communication.

c. Visual signals may also be used but are often not effective because of
the screening effects of buildings, walls, and so forth. Signals must be
planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned and attached
units. Increased noise makes the effective use of sound signals difficult.

d. Messengers can be used as another means of communication.

1-12. STRESS

A related problem of combat in built-up areas is stress. Continuous close
combat, intense pressure, high casualties, fleeting targets, and fire from a
concealed enemy produce psychological strain and physical fatigue for the
soldier. Such stress requires consideration for the soldiers’ and small-unit
leaders’ morale and the unit’s esprit de corps. Stress can be reduced by
rotating units that have been committed to heavy combat for long periods.

1-13. RESTRICTIONS

The law of war prohibits unnecessary injury to noncombatants and needless
damage to property. This may restrict the commander’s use of certain
weapons and tactics. Although a disadvantage at the time, this restriction
may be necessary to preserve a nation’s cultural institutions and to gain the
support of its people. Units must be highly disciplined so that the laws of
land warfare and ROE are obeyed. Leaders must strictly enforce orders
against looting and expeditiously dispose of violations against the UCMJ.

1-14. FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

The overriding consideration in any tactical operation is the accomplishment
of the mission. Commanders must consider fratricide in their planning
process because of the decentralized nature of execution in the MOUT
environment. However, they must weigh the risk of fratricide against losses
to enemy fire when considering a given course of action. Fratricide is avoided
by doctrine; by tactics, techniques, and procedures; and by training.

a. Doctrine. Doctrine provides the basic framework for accomplishment
of the mission. Commanders must have a thorough understanding of US,
joint, and host nation doctrine.

b. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. TTP provide a “how-to” that
everyone understands. TTP are disseminated in doctrinal manuals and
SOPs.

(1) Tactics. Tactics is the employment of units in combat or the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and or the
enemy in order to use their full potential.

(2) Techniques. Techniques are the general and detailed methods used
by troops or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions.
Specifically, techniques are the methods of using weapons and personnel.
Techniques describe a method, but not the only method.

(3) Procedures. Procedures are standard, detailed courses of action that
describe how to accomplish a task.

(4) Planning. A simple, flexible maneuver plan that is disseminated to
the lowest level of command will aid in the prevention of fratricide. Plans
should make the maximum possible use of SOPs and battle drills at the user
level. They should incorporate adequate control measures and fire support
planning and coordination to ensure the safety of friendly troops and allow
changes after execution begins.

(5) Execution. The execution of the plan must be monitored, especially
with regard to the location of friendly troops and their relationship to friendly
fires. Subordinate units must understand the importance of accurately re-
porting their position.

c. Training. The most important factor in the prevention of fratricide is
individual and collective training in the many tasks that support MOUT.

(1) Situational awareness. Well-trained soldiers accomplish routine tasks
instinctively or automatically. This allows them to focus on what is happening
on the battlefield. They can maintain an awareness of the relative location
of enemy and friendly forces.

(2) Rehearsal. Rehearsal is simply training for the mission at hand.
Commanders at every level must allow time for this critical task.

(3) Train to standard. Soldiers that are trained to the Army standard are
predictable. This predictability will be evident to any NCO or officer who
may be required to lead them at a moments notice or who is observing their
maneuvers to determine if they are friend or foe.

FM 90-10-1

CHAPTER 2

URBAN ANALYSIS

Intelligence preparation-of the battlefield (IPB) is key to all operations
conducted in built-up areas—intelligence is an important part of every
combat decision. To succeed as fighters in built-up areas, commanders
and leaders must know the nature of built-up areas. They must analyze
its effect on both enemy and friendly forces. The focus of the matenal
presented in this chapter will be on those issues of urban analysis that
commanders and their staffs must be aware of before conducting the
IPB process. (For a detailed explanation of IPB in the urban battle, see
FM 34-130.)

Section |. MODELS OF BUILT-UP AREAS

Each model of an urban area has distinctive characteristics. Most urban
areas resemble the generalized model shown in Figure 2-1.

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RESIDENTIAL SPRAWL
CORE PERIPHERY

CITY CORE

OUTLYING INDUSTRIAL AREAS
i COMMERCIAL RIBBON

OUTLYING HIGH-RISE AREA

Figure 2-1. Typical urban area.

2-1. REGIONAL URBAN CHARACTERISTICS

Cities of the world are characterized by density of construction and popula-
tion, street patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor sections,
modernization, and presence of utility systems. The differences in built-up
areas are in size, level of development, and style.

a. Due to colonization, most major cities throughout the world have
European characteristics. They have combination street patterns, distinct
economic and ethnic sections, and areas known as shanty towns. All of which
present obstacles to vehicles. Also, concrete and steel high-rise structures
hinder wall breaching and limit radio communications.

b. Variations in cities are caused mainly by differences in economic
development and cultural needs. Developed and developing countries dif-
fer more in degree and style rather than in structure and function. Major

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2-1

FM 90-10-41

urban trends are: high-rise apartments, reinforced concrete construction,
truck-related industrial storage, shopping centers, detached buildings, sub-
urbs at outer edges, and apartment complexes.

c. The spatial expanse of cities throughout the world in the last three
decades presents problems for MOUT. The increased use of reinforced
concrete framed construction is only one example of the trend to use lighter
construction, which affects how forces will attack or defend such an area.
Another example is the growing apartment complexes, shopping centers,
and truck-related industrial storage that lie on the outskirts of towns and
cities. This change in style causes offensive action to be more difficult and
enhances the defense of such an area.

2-2. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN AREAS

_Asummary of regional urban characteristics is as follows:

a. Middle East and North Africa. All nations in the region can be
reached by sea and urbanization rates are high. This region has long, hot,
dry summers and mild winters, making life outside cities difficult. In spite of
its vast deserts, greater urban congestion has resulted. Ancient cities have
expanded into their current metropolises, and many new cities have been
created because of the petroleum industry (mainly in the Persian Gulf).
European influence and petroleum revenues have resulted in urban centers
with modern sections of multistory buildings.

b. Latin America. Most urban centers can be reached by sea with many
capitals serving as ports. This is a region that has mainly a tropical climate.
It has a strong Spanish influence characterized by broad avenues that radiate
outward from a central plaza with a large church and town hall. Upper and
middle class sections combine with the urban centers, while the lower class
sections are located farther out. The poor sections are located in slums at
the outer edges of the city.

c. Far East. Except for Mongolia, all nations in this region can be
reached by sea. Urbanization is dense, especially in coastal cities where
modern commercial centers are surrounded by vast industrial developments
and residential districts.

d. South Asia. This region has great European influence with wide busy
streets that are overcrowded. Urban centers may be composed mainly of
poorer native sections with few or no public services and alleys no more than
a yard wide.

e. Southeast Asia. This region also has strong European influences with
all capitals and major cities serving as seaports. Urban centers contain both
the older, high-density native quarters with temples or religious shrines, and
modern sections with boulevards, parks, and warehouses.

f. Sub-Sahara Africa. In contrast to other regions, this region cannot be
accessed by sea and has impassable terrain. Except for a few kingdoms,
towns did not exist before the arrival of the Europeans. As a result, urban
areas are relatively modern and without “an old quarter,” although many do
have shanty towns.

2-3. CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN AREAS |
A typical urban area consists of the city core, commercial ribbon, core periphery,
residential sprawl, outlying industrial areas, and outlying high-rise areas.

FM 90-10-1

a. In most cities, the core has undergone more recent development than
the core periphery. As a result, the two regions are often quite different.
Typical city cores of today are made up of high-rise buildings, which vary
greatly in height. Modern planning for built-up areas allows for more open
spaces between buildings than in old city cores or in core peripheries.
Outlying high-rise areas are dominated by this open construction style more
than city cores (Figures 2-2 and 2-3). =

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FM 90-10-1

b. Commercial ribbons are rows of stores, shops, and restaurants that
are built along both sides of major streets through built-up areas. Usually,
such streets are 25 meters wide or more. The buildings are uniformly two
to three stories tall—about one story taller than the dwellings on the streets

behind them (Figure 2-4).

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c. The core periphery consists of streets 12 to 20 meters wide with
continuous fronts of brick or concrete buildings. The building heights are
fairly uniform—2 or 3 stories in small towns, 5 to 10 stories in large cities

(Figure 2-5).

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d. Residential sprawl and outlying industrial areas consist of low build-
ings that are 1 to 3 stories tall. Buildings are detached and arranged in
irregular patterns along the streets with many open areas (Figures 2-6 and

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FM 90-10-1

2-5

FM 90-10-1

2-6

Section ll. TERRAIN AND WEATHER ANALYSIS

Terrain analysis for urban combat differs significantly from that of open
country, whereas a weather analysis does not. Although special considera-
tions peculiar to the urban environment must be considered, a weather
analysis for urban combat is mostly the same as for other operations. (See
Appendix H for more detailed information.)

2-4. SPECIAL TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS

Several special considerations have implications in a terrain analysis and
must be considered when developing the tactical plan for combat. Special
terrain products must be developed to include specialized overlays, maps,
and plans augmented by vertical or hand-held imagery. The depiction of
GO, SLOW-GO, NO-GO, obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain,
observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment must focus on the
terrain analysis.

a. Military maps, normally the basic tactical terrain analysis tool, do not
provide sufficient detail for a terrain analysis in built-up areas. Due to
growth, towns and cities are constantly adding new structures and demolish-
ing existing ones. Therefore, any map of a built-up area, including city maps
or plans published by the city, state, or national government, will be inaccu-
rate and obsolete.

b. The nature of combat can radically alter the terrain in a built-up area
in a short period. Incidental or intentional demolition of structures can
change the topography of an area and destroy reference points, create
obstacles to mobility, and provide additional defensive positions for defenders.

c. Maps and diagrams of sewer systems, subway systems, underground
water systems, elevated railways, mass transit routes, fuel and gas supply and
storage facilities, electric power stations and emergency systems, and mass
communications facilities (radio, telephone) are of key importance during
urban operations. Sewer and subway systems provide covered infiltration
and small-unit approach routes. Elevated railways and mass transit routes
provide mobility between city sectors, and point to locations where obstacles
might be expected. Utility facilities are key targets for insurgents, guerrillas,
and terrorists, and their destruction can hinder the capabilities of a defend-
ing force.

i d. Certain public buildings must be identified during the terrain-analysis
phase of an IPB. Hospitals, clinics, and surgical facilities are critical because
the laws of war prohibit their attack when not being used for military
purposes other than medical support. As command and control breaks
down during urban operations, hospitals become an important source of
medical support to combat forces. The locations of civil defense, air raid
shelters, and food supplies are critical in dealing with civilian affairs. The
same is true during insurgency, guerrilla, or terrorist actions.

e. Stadiums, parks, sports fields, and school playgrounds are of high
interest during both conventional and unconventional operations in built-up
areas. They provide civilian holding areas, interrogation centers, insurgent
segregation areas, and prisoner of war holding facilities. These open areas
also provide helicopter landing sites. They provide logistic support areas
and offer air resupply possibilities because they are often centrally located
within a city or city district.

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f. Construction sites and commercial operations, such as lumberyards,
brickyards, steelyards, and railroad maintenance yards, serve as primary
sources of obstacle and barrier construction materials when rubble is not
present or is insufficient. They can also provide engineers with materials to
strengthen existing rubble obstacles or with materials for antitank hedgehogs
or crib-type roadblocks.

g. Roads, rivers, streams, and bridges provide high-speed avenues of
movement. They also provide supporting engineer units locations to analyze
demolition targets and to estimate requirements for explosives.

h. Public baths, swimming facilities, and cisterns are useful in providing
bathing facilities. They also provide an alternate water source when public
utilities break down.

i. A close liaison and working relationship should be developed with
local government officials and military forces. In addition to information on
items of special interest, they may provide information on the population,
size, and density of the built-up area; fire fighting capabilities; the location
of hazardous materials; police and security capabilities; civil evacuation
plans; and key public buildings. They may also provide English translators,
if needed.

2-5. SPECIAL WEATHER CONSIDERATIONS |
Some weather effects peculiar to an urban environment are discussed
herein.

a. Rain or melting snow often floods basements and subway systems.

This is especially true when automatic. pumping facilities that normally

handle rising water levels are deprived of power. Rain also makes storm and

other sewer systems hazardous or impassable. Chemical agents are washed |

into underground systems by precipitation. As a result, these systems con-
tain agent concentrations much higher than surface areas and become
contaminated “hot spots.” These effects become more pronounced as
agents are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls.

b. Many major cities are located along canals or rivers, which often
creates a potential for fog in the low-lying areas. Industrial and transporta-
tion areas are the most affected by fog due to their proximity to waterways.

c. Air inversion layers are common over cities, especially cities located
in low-lying “bowls” or in river valleys. Inversion layers trap dust, chemical
agents, and other pollutants, reducing visibility, and often creating a green-
house effect, which causes a rise in ground and air temperature.

d. The heating of buildings during the winter and the reflection and
absorption of summer heat make built-up areas warmer than surrounding
open areas during both summer and winter. This difference can be as great
as 10 to 20 degrees, and can add to the already high logistics requirements
of urban combat.

e. Wind chill is not as pronounced in built-up areas. However, the
configuration of streets, especially in closed-orderly block and high-rise
areas, can cause wind canalization. This increases the effects of the wind on
streets that parallel the wind direction, while cross-streets remain relatively
well protected.

f. Light data have special significance during urban operations. Night
and periods of reduced visibility favor surprise, infiltration, detailed recon-
naissance, attacks across open areas, seizure of defended strongpoints, and

FM 90-10-1

reduction of defended obstacles. However, the difficulties of night navigation
in restrictive terrain, without reference points and near the enemy, forces
reliance on simple maneuver plans with easily recognizable objectives.

Section Ill. THREAT EVALUATION AND INTEGRATION

Threat evaluation for urban combat uses a three-step process: developing
a threat data base, determining enemy capabilities, and developing a doc-
trinal template file as threat evaluation for open terrain. Due to the unique
aspects of urban combat, certain operational factors and future threat
capabilities must be recognized. These factors must be considered before
preparing the required templates during threat integration of the IPB process.

2-6. OPERATIONAL FACTORS

The basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine are the rapid deployment and
employment of US forces across the operational spectrum to achieve na-
tional and strategic objectives. This doctrinal concept, and recent changes
in the international security environment, presupposes the increasing
chance of conflict with regional threats. These conflicts will be with the
conventional forces of one or more Third World nations, to include the
possibility of a regional war or, at the lower end of the operational spectrum,
combat operations against insurgent forces. Because of the political and
socioeconomic structures within the Third World, urban combat will be a
greater probability in the future.

a. Most regular armies emphasize managing combined arms operations
in built-up areas. Among the conventional force structures, the poorer the
nation, the less likely it is to field, maneuver, and sustain forces beyond
logistic centers. Also, the extreme environment in some regions restricts
operations beyond urban centers.

b. Urban structural characteristics are shaped by social, cultural, and
economic factors. These elements are the prime reasons that MOUT
doctrine and tactics differ between nations. Coupled with the restrictive
nature of urban combat, the differences in tactics may be superficial. More
than any other factor, the advent of high technology, precision weapons has
enabled nations to modify and update their MOUT doctrine and tactics.
Research has revealed many factors to consider in the planning and execu-
tion of MOUT. Some key factors are—

(1) Urban combat is only combat in different terrain. Urban combat
consumes time. A well-planned defense, even if cut off or lacking in air,
armor, or artillery weapons, can consume a great deal of an attacker’s time.

(2) The ability to control military operations in highly decentralized
circumstances remains the priority for both attacker and defender. Person-
nel training and motivation continue to be as important as equipment or
force balance factors.

(3) The required size of the attacking force depends on the quality of
intelligence, degree of surprise, and degree of superior firepower the at-
tacker can achieve rather than the degree of sophistication with which the
defender has prepared the city.

(4) The degree of a defender’s resistance depends on whether or not he
is separated from the local population, is wholly or partly cut off from
external support, or has effective communication systems.

i Dana

(5) The belief that armor has no role in city fighting is wrong. Tanks and
APCs have proven vital to the attacker inside the city as long as they are
protected by dismounted infantry.

(6) If the attacker is subject to any constraints, the defender has a good
chance of winning or prolonging the battle, thus raising the cost for the
attacker.

(7) The defender has three tactical options: defense in depth, key sector
defense, and mobile defense. Defense in depth suggests an outer and inner
defense combination; key sector defense means strongpoint defense of vital
positions, mainly those controlling major avenues of approach; and mobile
defense is based on counterattacks. These are not mutually exclusive
options.

(8) Exfiltration and movement within a city by small groups are easy at
night.

(9) The prevention of the reentry of cleared buildings by the enemy will
be a significant challenge to both the attacker and defender.

(10) Mortars may be used more heavily than other artillery in MOUT
due to their immediate response and high-angle fire capabilities.

(11) The employment of snipers in urban combat can prove to be
extremely effective for both the attacker and defender. Snipers are usually
found two to three stories below the top floor in high buildings.

(12) Ammunition consumption is five to ten times greater in urban envi-
ronments than in field environments. (See Chapter 7 for more information.)

2-7. URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY, COUNTERGUERRILLA,

AND COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS
During urban counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, and counterterrorist op-
erations, threat evaluation is similar to that for low-intensity conflict. When
conducting these operations, the five low-intensity imperatives (political
dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perserverance) must
be followed. (See FM 7-98 for more information.)

a. Population status overlays are prepared for the city, showing potential
neighborhoods or districts where a hostile population could be encountered.
Overlays are also prepared showing insurgent or terrorist safe houses,
headquarters, known operating areas, contact points, and weapons supply
sources. These overlays must include buildings that are known, or could
become, explosives, ammunition, or weapons storage sites.

b. Underground routes are of primary concern when considering insur-
gent and terrorist avenues of approach and lines of communications. Sew-
ers, subways, tunnels, cisterns, and basements provide mobility,

- concealment, cover, and storage sites for insurgents and terrorists. Elevated

railways, pedestrian overpasses, rooftops, fire escapes, balconies, and access
ladders provide mobility and concealment, and can serve as relatively good
fighting or sniper positions.

c. Although doctrinal templates are not developed for urban insurgency
and terrorist operations, pattern analysis reveals how the insurgent or
terrorist group operates, and what its primary targets are. Once the group’s
method of operation is determined, insurgent situation maps can be devel-
oped. These maps pinpoint likely sabotage targets, kidnap or assassination
targets, ambush points, and bombing targets. When developing these maps,
electric power generation and transmission facilities, gas production and

FM 90-10-1

holding facilities, water and sewer pumping and treatment plants, telephone
exchanges and facilities, and radio and television stations should be consid-
ered as primary insurgent and terrorist targets.

d. Ifthe enemy has, for whatever reason, become intermingled with the
population, a greater degree of control is required for military operations.
While detection is more difficult, the enemy forces operating without uni-
forms share some common characteristics with guerrillas, insurgents, and
terrorists.

(1) As with any operation of this type, intelligence, rather than force,
plays the dominant role. Known members of the armed forces, their aux-
iliaries, and the underground must be identified and arrested and or re-
moved from the populace. Use of minimum force is critical. As a last resort,
cordon and search into suspected or known hostile areas may be used. This
is the least preferred method since it will cause moderate to severe casualties
for both the friendly forces and the local civilian population.

(2) The local population’s support to the enemy may be either forced
or given willingly. In either case, an effort must be made to separate the
enemy from the local population base. A population can be forced into
giving support by a combination of terrorism (either by coercion or intimi-
dation) and harassment. The friendly force commander must be observant
and sensitive to the local population’s concerns before the population may
be willing to help the friendly forces.

(3) Logistical support will be in smaller packages. The enemy must rely
on the local population to support the distribution of logistics so that
identification and destruction of the logistics base is more difficult. To curb
resupply operations totally, the friendly forces would have to stop all move-
ment within the built-up area. For obvious reasons, this is not an option.
Therefore, a priority for intelligence should be to identify and destroy the
enemy’s logistics base.

(4) Soldiers must remember the political and psychological impact of
their actions if they use force. The local population may be neutral or have
luke-warm support for the friendly forces, but excessive use of force will
cause the local civilians to support the enemy. Of special concern is the
media (newspapers, television, magazines, and so forth). Due to the large
numbers of journalists and amateur and or professional photographers in
built-up areas, any negative images of friendly forces will probably be
published. This negative publicity could have a serious adverse effect on
both civilian opinion and United States political interests. Conversely,
positive publicity can greatly enhance friendly operations and morale. This
also can sway the local population away from the enemy. Therefore, all
media members should be accompanied.

(5) While not officially part of doctrine, infantry forces have historically
been used as a part of the effort to separate the enemy from the local civilian
populace. Some units may be detailed to provide civil services such as law
enforcement patrols, trash pick-up, and or the restoration and maintenance
of power, telephone, and water services.

2-8. PROJECTED THREAT CAPABILITIES
The wealth of some Third World nations will be used to modernize their
armed forces through the acquisition of new technologies. Future conflicts

may be against Third World forces armed better than or equal to US weapon
systems. Projected future threat force capabilities are—
¢ New munitions such as fuel air explosives (FAE),
enhanced blast, intense light, and other improved
ballistic technologies.

e Systems with interchangeable warheads, some
designed for MOUT combat.

¢ Precision-guided munitions.

e Robotics.

e Day or night target acquisition systems.
e Elevated gun systems.

¢ Improved engineering abilities to breach or
emplace obstacles.

¢ Soft-launch hand-held AT and flame weapons.

¢ Nonlethal incapacitating chemical or biological
agents by conventional forces.

¢ Lethal chemical or biological agents by insurgent forces.
¢ Improved self-protection (body armor).
¢ Improved communications.

FM 90-10-1

CHAPTER 3
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Good cover and concealment in a built-up area gives the defender an
advantage. Attackers must fight from the outside into a well-defended
position. While a decision to attack a major built-up area usually rests
at a level higher than battalion, commanders at all levels must be
prepared to fight in such areas.

Section |. OFFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

A commander must decide if attacking a built-up area is needed to accom-
plish his mission. He should consider those issues discussed in this section.

3-1. REASONS FOR ATTACKING BUILT-UP AREAS
A commander should consider the following reasons for attacking a built-up
area.

a. Cities control key routes of commerce and provide a tactical advan-
tage to the commander who controls them. Control of features, such as
bridges, railways, and road networks, can have a significant outcome on
future operations. The requirement for a logistics base, especially for a port
or airfield, may play a pivotal role during a campaign.

b. The political importance of some built-up areas may justify the use of
time and resources to liberate it. Capturing the city could deal the threat a
_ decisive psychological blow and or lift the moral of the people within the city.

c. Though the terrain around a built-up area may facilitate its bypass,
the enemy within that urban area may be able to interdict lines of commu-
nications. Therefore, the situation may require the enemy force to be
contained. Also, the urban area itself may sit on dominating terrain that
would hinder bypassing for CS and CSS elements.

d. The results of the commander’s and staff’s estimate may preclude
bypassing as an option. The mission itself may dictate an attack of a built-up
area.

3-2. REASONS FOR NOT ATTACKING A BUILT-UP AREA
The units mission may allow it to bypass an urban area. The commander
should consider the following reasons for not attacking a built-up area.

a. The commander may decide to bypass if he determines that no
substantial threat exists in the built-up area that could interdict his unit’s
ability to accomplish its mission. Also, the commander’s intent may dictate
that speed is essential to the mission. Since combat in an urban area is time
consuming, the commander may choose to bypass the urban area to save
time.

b. During the estimate process, the commander and staff may realize
that a sufficient force is not available to seize and clear the built-up area. A
situation may exist where more than enough forces are available to accom-
plish the mission but logistically the attack cannot be supported. If the
tactical and political situation allow it, the commander should avoid attacks
on the built-up area.

c. The built-up area is declared an “open city” to prevent civilian casu-
alties or to preserve cultural or historical sites. An open city, by the law of

3-1

FM 90-10-1

land warfare, is a city that cannot be defended or attacked. The defender
must immediately evacuate the open city and cannot distribute weapons to
the city’s inhabitants. The attacker assumes administrative control of the city
and must treat its citizens as noncombatants in an occupied country.

Section Il. CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS IN A BUILT-UP AREA

Offensive operations in urban areas are based on offensive doctrine modi-
fied to conform to the area. Urban combat also imposes a number of
demands that are different from ordinary field conditions such as problems
with troop requirements, maneuver, and use of equipment. As with all
offensive operations, the commander must retain his ability to fix and
maneuver against enemy positions.

3-3. TROOP REQUIREMENTS

Due to the nature of combat in built-up areas, more troops are normally
needed than in other combat situations. This is mainly due to the require-
ment to clear buildings in a given zone or objective, refuge control, and the
possible increase in the number of friendly casualties.

a. Because of the need to clear buildings and provide security for forces
in the attack, the number of troops required to accomplish an offensive
mission will be much greater. Some forces must be left behind in a building
once it has been cleared to prevent enemy forces from repositioning on or
counterattacking friendly forces.

b. Commanders must also consider the soldiers’ fatigue. Room clearing
techniques are highly physical and will quickly tire a force. Commanders
must plan for the relief of their forces before they reach the point of

exhaustion.

c. Additional forces may be needed to control the civilians in the built-up
area. These forces must protect civilians, provide first aid, and prevent them
from interfering with the tactical plan.

d. Fighting in a built-up area normally results in a greater number of
friendly casualties than does conventional fighting. The ability to see the
enemy is fleeting and confined to very short ranges compared to ordinary
field combat. Fratricide can become a serious problem and must be ad-
dressed in detail by the commander. Evacuating casualties from the MOUT
environment also presents a problem. |

3-4. MANEUVER gsi

Combat operations in a built-up area have a slower pace and tempo, and an
increase in methodical, synchronized missions. Unlike open terrain, com-
manders cannot maneuver quickly due to the close, dense environment.
Clearing buildings and looking for antiarmor ambushes degrade speed, thus
increasing the duration of enemy contact. Due to the dense environment and
the restricted ability to use all available weapon systems, synchronization of
combat power will be one of the commander’s main challenges.

3-5. USE OF EQUIPMENT Ea
Commanders attacking a built-up area must recognize some important
limitations in the use of available assets.

a. Normally, the use of indirect fires is much more restricted in built-up
areas than in open terrain. Consideration must be given to the effects of the
indirect fire on the urban area and the civilian population. When indirect
fires are authorized, they must be fired in greater mass to achieve the desired
effect. The rubbling caused by massive preparatory indirect fires will adversely
affect a unit’s maneuvers later on in the attack.

b. Communications equipment may not function properly because of
the massive construction of buildings and the environment. More graphic
control measures and understanding of the commander’s intent at all levels
become even more important to mission accomplishment.

c. The commander and his staff must consider the effect city lights, fires,
and background illumination have on night vision devices. These elements
“white out” NVGs and make thermal imagery identification difficult.

Section Ill. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Offensive operations in a built-up area are planned and implemented based
on the factors of METT-T and established doctrine. At battalion level, the
offense takes the form of either a hasty or deliberate attack. Both the hasty
and deliberate attacks are characterized by as much planning, reconnais-
sance, and coordination as time and the situation permit.

3-6. HASTY ATTACK

Battalions and companies conduct hasty attacks as a result of a movement
to contact, a meeting engagement, or a chance contact during a movement;
after a successful defense or part of a defense; or in a situation where the
unit has the opportunity to attack vulnerable enemy forces. When contact is
made with the enemy, the commander immediately deploys; suppresses the
enemy; attacks through a gap, flank, or weak point; and reports to his higher
commander. The preparation for a hasty attack is similar to that of a
deliberate attack, but time and resources are limited to what is available.
The hasty attack in a built-up area differs from a hasty attack in open terrain
because the close nature of the terrain makes command, control, and
communications difficult. Also, massing fires to suppress the enemy may be
difficult.

a. In built-up areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may re-
quire the maneuver unit to move through, rather than around, the friendly
unit fixing the enemy in place. Control and coordination become important
to reduce congestion at the edges of the built-up area.

b. On-order missions, be-prepared missions, or fragmentary orders may
be given to a force conducting a hasty attack so it can react to a contingency
once its objective is secured.

3-7. DELIBERATE ATTACK

A deliberate attack is a fully synchronized operation that employs all avail-
able assets against the enemy’s defense. It is necessary when enemy positions
are well prepared, when the built-up area is large or severely congested, or
when the element of surprise is lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized by
precise planning based on detailed information, thorough reconnaissance,
preparation, and rehearsals.

FM 90-10-1

3-3

FM 90-10-1

Given the nature of urban terrain, the deliberate attack of a built-up area is
similar to the techniques employed in assaulting a strong point. Attacking
the enemy’s main strength is avoided and combat power is focused on the
weakest point of his defense. A deliberate attack of a built-up area is usually
conducted in the following phases:

a. Reconnoiter the Objective.

b. Move to the Objective.

c. Isolate the Objective. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain
that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply or reinforce its
defenders. This step may be taken at the same time as securing a foothold.
If isolating the objective is the first step, the following steps should be
enacted quickly so that the defender has no time to react (Figure 3-1).

` DA
ON ae hit 7, `
wA 3 aa Bade s
N s =
wr VA yt re

NO PAUSE AFTER

ISOLATION

| 3-1. Isolation of an area by a battalion task force.

d. Secure a Foothold. Securing a foothold involves seizing an interme-
diate objective that provides cover from enemy fire and a place for attacking
troops to enter the built-up area. A foothold is normally one to two city
blocks and is an intermediate objective of a company. As the company
attacks to secure the foothold, it should be supported by suppressive fire and
smoke (Figure 3-2).

FM 90-10-1

SUPPORT WITH
SUPPRESSIVE FIRE
AND SMOKE

SUPPORT BY FIRE

Figure 3-2. Battalion foothold.

e. Clear a Built-up Area. Before determining to what extent the built-up
area must be cleared, the factors of METT-T must be considered. The
commander may decide to clear only those parts necessary for the success
of his mission if—

e An objective must be seized quickly.

_¢ Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.
¢ The buildings in the area are of light construction with large open areas
between them. In that case, he would clear only those buildings along
the approach to his objective, or only those buildings necessary for
security (Figure 3-3, page 3-6).

FM 90-10-1

A ee AY {
ele aH Sa
asii ti a)
WM :
i
TAn

Figure 3-3. Clearing buildings along the route of an attack.

A unit may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy.
Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that he will be
opposed by a strong, organized resistance or will be in areas having strongly
constructed buildings close together. Therefore, one or two companies may
attack on a narrow front against the enemy’s weakest sector. They move
slowly through the area, clearing systematically from room to room and
building to building. The other company supports the clearing units and is
prepared to assume their mission (Figure 3-4).

COMPANY

$Ñ CLEARANCE
ZONES

Figure 3-4. Systematic clearance within assigned sectors.

Section IV. METT-T FACTORS

The planning, preparation, and conduct of offensive operations in an urban
area are the same as any other offensive operation. An attack plan against
a well-defended built-up area must be based on METT-T factors. Com-
manders must focus on the synchronization of maneuver forces and the fire
support plan to accomplish the assigned mission. Combat support and
combat service support will play a critical role in the offense. (See Chapters
6 and 7 for further details on CS and CSS.)

3-8. MISSION

When conducting the estimate, commanders and staffs must consider the
overall intent of the operation in regard to the requirement for clearance of
the urban area. The commander must determine if clearance means every
building, block by block, or the seizure of a key objective, which may only
require clearing along the axis of advance.

FM 90-10-1

3-9, ENEMY

The enemy is analyzed in detail using the IPB process (FM 34-130). The
unique factor the commander must decide on to complete the IPB process
is the type threat he is attacking. He must determine if the threat forces are
conventional or unconventional. This determines how the battalion or com-
pany will task-organize and how combat power will be synchronized to
accomplish the mission. |

a. Conventional Forces. Most third world countries have adopted tech-
niques of urban combat from either the United States or the Commonwealth
of Independent States. Therefore, the future threat will consider the motor-
ized or mechanized rifle battalion the most effective unit for urban combat
because of its inherent mobility, armor protection, and ability to quickly
adapt buildings and other structures for defense.

(1) Threat defenses are organized into two echelons to provide greater
depth and reserves. Company strongpoints are prepared for perimeter
defense and form the basis for the battalion defensive position. The reserve
is located in a separate strongpoint. Ambush locations are established in the
gaps of the strongpoints, and dummy strongpoints are constructed to deceive
the attacker. Positions for securing and defending the entrances to and exits
from underground structures and routes are established. Security positions
are prepared forward of first echelon defensive positions.

(2) Within a built-up area, a motorized/mechanized rifle company may
defend several buildings with mutually supporting fires. or a single large
building. Each platoon defends one or two buildings, or one or two floors of
a single building.

b. Unconventional Forces. Enemy analysis is similar to that for LIC
during urban counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, and counterterrorist op-
erations. (See FMs 34-130 and 7-98 for details of IPB in counterinsurgency
operations. )

3-10. TERRAIN

Offensive operations must be tailored to the urban environment based on a
detailed analysis of each urban terrain setting, its types of built-up areas, and
existing structural form. (See FM 34-130 for details of urban terrain analy-
sis.) Commanders and subordinate leaders must incorporate the following

_ special planning considerations for an urban environment when conducting

an offensive operation:

e Military maps that do not provide enough detail for urban terrain
analysis or reflect the underground sewer system, subways, under-
ground water system, mass transit routes, and utility generation.

e Natural terrain surrounding the built-up area.

* Key and decisive terrain (stadiums, parks, sports fields, school play
grounds, public buildings, and industrial facilities).

¢ Confined spaces that limit observation, fields of fire, and maneuver,
which also prevents the concentration of fires at critical points.

¢ Covered and concealed routes to the urban area.
¢ Covered and concealed routes within the built-up area.

° Limited ability to employ maximum combat power due to the need to
minimize damage and rubbling effects.

e A greater demand for ammunition and rations, thus imposing unusual

strains on logistics elements.

e Problems with conducting effective reconnaissance during conven-
tional operations. (Reconnaissance by force becomes the most effec-
tive reconnaissance means. This method involves probing a defense
with successively larger units until the enemy positions are disclosed
and can be successfully attacked. During unconventional operations,

the opposite is true. Reconnaisance and security are easily accom-
plished by both sides and may be unstoppable.)

3-11. TROOPS

In an attack on a large built-up area, a battalion would probably participate
as part of an attacking brigade. In that case, the battalion may have to isolate
the objective or seize a foothold. If the objective is a smaller built-up area,
a battalion or company may accomplish the entire mission independently,
assigning subordinate tasks to its companies or platoons. In either case, the
maneuver platoons accomplish their entry and clearance tasks as explained
in Appendix F.

a. When attacking to seize a foothold, the battalion normally assigns a
forward company the first block of buildings as its first objective. When an
objective extends to a street, only the near side of the street is included. The
company’s final objective may be buildings at the far edge of the built-up
area or key terrain on the far side. Key buildings or groups of buildings also
may be assigned as intermediate objectives. Buildings along the route of
attack should be identified by numbers to simplify assigning objectives and
reporting (Figure 3-5).

INTERMEDIATE
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE

ADVANCE

INTERMEDIATE
OBJECTIVE

Figure 3-5. Control measures and example of numbering system

FM 90-10-1

3-10

b. When the unit is involved in clearing, bypassing buildings increases kag

the risk of attack from the rear or flank. Thus, the clearing unit must enter,
search, and clear each building in its zone of action. A single building may
be an objective for a rifle squad, or if the building is large, for a rifle platoon
or even a company. When the commander’s concept is based on speed or
when conducting a hasty attack, a battalion may be directed not to clear its
entire zone.

c. Phase lines can be used to report progress or to control the advance
of attacking units. Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable
phase lines, which should be on the near side of the street or open area. In
systematic clearing, a unit may have the mission to clear its zone of action
up to a phase line. In that case, the unit commander chooses his own
objectives when assigning missions to his subunits.

d. Battalion and company boundaries are usually set within blocks so
that a street is included in a company zone. Boundaries must be placed to
ensure that both sides of a street are included in the zone of one unit
(Figure 3-6).

INTERMEDIATE
OBJECTIVE
>»

*LIMIT OF ADVANCE

Figure 3-6. Zone and boundaries.

e. Checkpoints and contact points are planned at street corners, build-
ings, railway crossings, bridges, or any other easily identifiable feature.
Checkpoints aid in reporting locations and controlling movement. Contact
points are used to designate specific points where units make physical
contact.

f. An attack position may be occupied by forward units for last-minute
preparation and coordination. The attack position is often behind or inside
the last large building before crossing the LD. The LD should be the near
side of either a street or rail line.

g. A unit’s assigned frontage for the attack of a built-up area depends
on the size of buildings and the resistance anticipated. A company normally
attacks on a one- to two-block front, and a battalion on a two- to four-block
front, based on city blocks averaging 175 meters in width.

h. The first phase of the attack should be conducted when visibility is
poor. Troops should exploit poor visibility to cross open areas, to gain access
to rooftops, to infiltrate enemy areas, and to gain a foothold. If the attack
must be made when visibility is good, units should use smoke to conceal
movement. .

i. The formation used in an attack depends on the width and depth of
the zone to be cleared, the character of the area, enemy resistance, and the
formation adopted by the next higher command.

j. The reserve should be mobile and prepared for commitment. Because
of the available cover in built-up areas, the reserve can stay close to forward
units. Battalion reserves normally follow one to two blocks to the rear of the
lead company. If a company reserve is available, it follows within the same

‘block so that it can immediately influence the attack. A unit with a reserve

mission may be called upon to perform one or more of the following tasks:

e Attacking from another direction.

¢ Exploiting an enemy weakness or friendly success.

e Clearing bypassed enemy positions.

¢ Securing the rear or a flank.

e Maintaining contact with adjacent units.

e Supporting or counterattacking by fire.

k. The reconnaissance platoon is normally employed to reconnoiter the
battalion’s flanks and rear. Its capability for reconnaissance and security is
somewhat reduced in built-up areas. The reconnaissnce platoon can also
help isolate a village or small town. They must be prepared to dismount and
enter buildings for reconnaissance or for setting up OPs. Infantry platoons
and squads conduct reconnaissance patrols and man OPs to supplement the
reconnaissance platoon effort.

l. Leading companies may have engineers attached for providing imme-
diate support. Engineers equipped with the M728 combat engineer vehicle
(CEV) can quickly clear rubble and other obstructions using the blade or
the 165-mm demolition gun. Other tasks given the engineers include:

¢ Preparing and using explosives to breach walls and obstacles.

¢ Finding and exploding mines in place or helping to remove them.

e Destroying fortifications to a maximum range of 925 meters with the
CEV (165-mm demolition gun).

e Clearing barricades and rubble to ease movement.
e Cratering roads and other countermobility measures.

FM 90-10-1

3-11

FM 90-10-1

m. Security in a built-up area presents special problems. All troops must `
be alert to an enemy that may appear from the flanks, from above, or from
underground passages (Figure 3-7).

o Ñ

mee at dst

igure 3-7. Enemy firing from flank.

n. The fire support plan may require extensive air and artillery bom-
bardment to precede the ground attack on a built-up area. This supporting
fire suppresses the defender’s fire, restricts his movement, and possibly
destroys his position. However, use of indirect fire in built-up areas with
heavily clad construction creates rubble. This can be used effectively for
cover but may also restrict the movements of attacking troops. For that
reason, an artillery preparation should be short and violent. Assaulting
troops must closely follow the artillery fire to exploit its effect on the
defenders. While the enemy is suppressed by the supporting fire, maneuver
units move near the FCL. As the attacking force assaults the objective, fires
are lifted or shifted to block enemy withdrawal or to prevent the enemy from
reinforcing their position.

o. Prior coordination is made to determine the techniques and proce-
dures to use for communication, target identification, and shifting of fires.
Additional consideration must be given to the civilian population, houses of

3-12

worship, medical centers, schools, public services, and historical monu-
ments. The fire support plan can include the integration of tanks, infantry
weapons, artillery, CEVs, and dismounted fires. Fire support can be catego-
rized into indirect and direct fires.

(1) Indirect fire is employed in its normal role of support to the maneu-
ver units.

= (a) Indirect artillery fire is planned to isolate objectives, to prevent
reinforcement and resupply, to neutralize known and suspected command
and observation posts, and to suppress enemy defenders. Due to the
restricted nature of urban terrain, most indirect artillery fires will be
high-angle.

(b) Mortars are the most responsive indirect fire that can hit targets of
opportunity at the close ranges typical of combat in built-up areas. Forward
observers move with the forward units to adjust fire on targets as requested
by the supported troops.

(2) The direct-fire system is the most effective fire support in built-up
areas. Once a target can be located in a building, one or two direct-fire
rounds can accomplish what entire salvos of indirect-fire artillery cannot.
Direct fire support is key to success in fighting in built-up areas. The best
direct fire support is provided by BF'Vs, but it can also be provided by tanks,
howitzers, and or CEVs. (See Chapter 8 for specific weapons effects.) Tanks,
howitzers, and CEVs may create rubble and building and street damage that
could restrict movement for the attacking force.

a) Tanks may support by fire when lead units are seizing a foothold.
During the attack of a built-up area, tanks overwatch the infantry’s initial
assault until an entry into the area has been secured. Tanks must be sup-
ported by infantry organic weapons to suppress enemy strongpoints and by
ATGMs while they move into overwatch positions. The commander must
employ tanks to take advantage of the long range of their main armament.
This can usually be achieved with tanks employed outside the built-up area,
where they remain for the duration of the attack to cover high-speed armor
avenues of approach. This is especially true during the isolation phase.

(b) In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks and or BF Vs move down
the streets protected by the infantry, which clears the area of enemy ATGM
weapons. Tanks and BFVs in turn support the infantry by firing their main
guns and machine guns from a safe stand-off range to destroy enemy
positions. Tanks are the most effective weapon for heavy fire against structures
and may be used to clear rubble with dozer blades (Figure 3-8, page 3-14). The
BFV can provide sustained, accurate suppressive fires with its 25-mm gun.

(c) Large-caliber artillery rounds that are shot by direct fire are effective
for destroying targets in buildings. If available, self-propelled 155-mm how-
itzers can use direct fire to destroy or neutralize bunkers, heavy fortifications,
or enemy positions in reinforced concrete buildings (Figure 3-9, page 3-14).
The self-propelled 155-mm can also be used to clear or create avenues of
approach. The 105-mm and 203-mm artillery can also be used in this role.
However, due to the exposed positions of the gun crew, these are not the
preferred artillery pieces used in MOUT operations. In any case, whenever
artillery is used in the direct fire role, it must be close to the infantry who will
provide security against enemy ground attack. Prior coordination must be
accomplished so the bulk of the field artillery unit’s shells are switched to

FM 90-10-1

3-13

FM 90-10-1

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3-14

(d) Tanks, self-propelled artillery, and BFVs are vulnerable in built-up
areas where streets and alleys provide ready-made fire lanes for defenders.
Motorized traffic is greatly restricted, canalized, and vulnerable to ambush
and close-range fire. Tanks are at a further disadvantage because their main
guns cannot be depressed sufficiently to fire into basements or be elevated
to fire into upper floors of buildings at close range (Figure 3-10).

TANK CANNOT SEE

DEAD SPACE TANK CANNOT SEE

Figure 3-10. Tank dead space.

(e) In movement down narrow streets, or down wider streets with
narrow paths through the debris, infantry should move ahead of the tanks,
clearing the buildings on each side. The movement of personnel across open
areas must be planned with a specific destination in mind. Suppression of
enemy positions and smoke to cover infantry movement should also be
included in the plan. When needed, tanks move up to places secured by the
infantry to hit suitable targets. When that area is cleared, the infantry again
moves forward to clear the next area. Due to the restricted movement and
limited observation of buttoned-up tanks, the infantry must clear the route
in advance of the tanks. The tanks and infantry should use the traveling
overwatch movement technique. Infantrymen can communicate with the
tank crews by using arm-and-hand signals and radio.

(f) For movement down wider streets, infantry platoons normally have

a section of attached tanks with one tank on each side of the street—tankgee=:

FM 90-10-1

3-15

FM 90-10-1

3-16

should not be employed singly. Other tanks of the attached tank platoon .
should move behind the infantry and fire at targets in the upper stories of
buildings. In wide boulevards, commanders may employ a tank platoon
secured by one or more infantry platoons. The infantry can secure the
forward movement of the lead tanks, while the rearward tanks overwatch
the movement of the lead units. |

(g) Ifan infantry unit must travel streets that are too narrow for this type
of tank support, it uses tanks in single file for support. The tanks move and
fire to cover each other’s approach while the infantry provides ATGM fire
from buildings.

(h) Where feasible, tanks may drive inside buildings or behind walls for
protection from enemy antitank missile fire. Buildings should first be cleared
by the infantry. Ground floors should be checked to ensure they will support
the tank or that there is no basement into which the tank could fall and
become trapped. When moving, all bridges and overpasses should be
checked for mines and booby traps, and for load capacity. Specific infantry
elements should be assigned to protect specific tanks.

(i) Direct-fire systems organic to infantry battalions—mainly ATGMs,
recoilless rifles (in some units), and LAWs—are initially employed to sup-
port the seizure of a foothold. Then, if necessary, they are brought forward
to fight enemy armor within the town. Positioning of antitank weapons in
buildings must allow for enough space for backblasts. Antitank weapons are
not as effective as tank rounds for neutralizing targets behind walls. They
neutralize a target only if that target is located directly behind the point of
impact. ATGMs are at a greater disadvantage because of their 65-meter
arming distance and the possibility of their guiding wires becomming caught
on the ground clutter. These factors limit employment in close engagements
like those in built-up areas.

p. Snipers are a valuable asset during MOUT operations. In situations
where the ROE permit the use of destructive force, snipers can be used as
part of the security element to provide accurate, long-range fires. Depending
on the commander’s concept, snipers can be dedicated to the counter-sniper
role or assigned priority targets. If a restrictive ROE is in effect, the sniper
may be the best asset the battalion or company commander has to prevent
collateral damage. Snipers can also overwatch breaching operations and call
for indirect artillery fires. Regardless of the mission, snipers must be
equipped with effective observation devices and placed in a key area to be
effective. (For more information on the offensive employment of snipers,
see Change 1 to FM 71-2, FM 7-20, and TC 23-14.)

3-12. TIME
Offensive operations in built-up areas have a slower pace and tempo of
operation. The following issues must be considered when analyzing time
available for an attack in urban terrain.

a. Due to the dense environment of urban terrain, more time is required
for clearing buildings, blocks, or axes of advance.

b. Troops tire quicker because of stress and additional physical exertion
related to clearing.

c. More time must be allowed for thorough reconnaissance and rehears-
als. This saves time in the execution of the commander’s plan.

‘Section V. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Units fight separated and isolated from one another in built-up areas.
Planning is centralized but execution is decentralized.

3-13. COMMAND

Soldiers and units require mission-type orders that are restrictive in nature.
They use detailed control measures to ease decentralized execution. In-
creased difficulties in command, control, and communications from higher
headquarters demand increased responsibility and initiative from junior
leaders.

3-14. CONTROL

In built-up areas, radio communications are less effective than field tele-
phones and messengers. Units often fight without continuous communica-
tions from higher headquarters, since dependable communications above
company level are uncertain. Pyrotechnic signals are hard to see because of
buildings and smoke. Voice commands are degraded by the high noise level
of battles within and around buildings.

Section VI. BATTALION TASK FORCE ATTACK
ON A BUILT-UP AREA

The following are techniques that might be employed by a battalion. These
may be independent operations but are normally part of a brigade operation.

3-15. CONDUCT OF DELIBERATE ATTACK
Because companies or company teams may become isolated during the
attack, the task force commander should attach some support elements to
ensure the success of his plan. Mechanized vehicles (tanks, self-propelled
artillery, BF Vs, or ITVs) attached to light units must have their own logistics
packages. Tanks, BFVs, and ITVs can be used to clear or isolate hardened
targets protected by buildings or rubble. Engineers can neutralize obstacles
hindering the attack. All of these actions could be modified for use by any
type of infantry. The TF commander plans to conduct a deliberate attack by
per ormie t the followin actions.
i tiye. The commander conducts a thorough
reconnaissance of the pbjective with subordinate leaders to complete the
attack plan.
b. Moverto the: Ob

V th >. The TF moves to the objective using covered
and concealed routes to approach gaps or lightly held areas or the enemy’s
flanks and rear. Reconnaissance elements and security elements detect
enemy forces, positions, and obstacles to prevent them from interfering with
the attack plan. Obstacles encountered are either breached or bypassed.
Enemy elements encountered en route are defeated by subordinate ele-
ments.

c. I e: The TF commander positions direct and indi-
rect fire elements where they can best support the attack. OPSEC is em-
ployed to deceive the enemy as to the time, location, and strength of the
attack. The battalion support element provides support to the assault ele-
ment. The TF commander uses direct and indirect fire support to suppress

FM 90-10-1

3-17

FM 90-10-1

and kill the enemy, screen the assault element, protect breaching actions,. _
and isolate the enemy by blocking reinforcements and counterattacks. See
d.,. Secure,a,Foothold. The TF assault element kills, captures, destroys,
or forces the withdrawal of all enemy on objectives as required by the
commander’s intent.
e. Glearthe Built-up,Areg. The assault force or other designated forces
clear the built-up area using the appropriate technique based on com-

mander’s intent.

3-16. SEIZURE OF KEY OBJECTIVE

Many built-up areas are built around key features such as road junctions or
bridges. The key feature could be a bridge over a river. A normal deliberate -
attack would not succeed because it might allow the enemy time to destroy l
the bridge. Instead, the commander must plan a rapid advance through the
built-up area, leaving the task of clearing to following units (Figure 3-11). :

AVOID ENEMY
‘DEFENCES

Figure 3-11. Seizure of a key objective.

a. This type of operation has the highest chance of success when the
enemy has not had time to set up a well-established defense. Because of the ;
importance of the objective, the prime considerations are to get through the
area fast before the enemy can react and to seize the objective while it is still
intact.

b. The TF should avoid contact with the enemy. If enemy resistance is
encountered, it should be bypassed. Time-consuming combat must be
avoided so that the TF can arrive at the bridge as quickly as possible.

c. The TF commander organizes his TF for movement on two axes to
allow for more flexibility in reacting to enemy contact. The lead unit on each

3-18

axis reconnoiters as it moves. Lead units must find enemy positions, fix them
by fire, and quickly bypass them.

d. The units move mounted toward the built-up area. On reaching the
edge of the built-up area, troops stay mounted until they meet enemy
resistance so as not to slow the advance. Platoons are dropped off to assume
blocking positions and to secure the TF advance.

e. Once the objective is seized, the TF establishes a perimeter defense.
The companies clear buildings and expand the size of the perimeter until it
is large enough to secure the bridge against enemy action. Attached engi-
neers examine the bridge and clear it of any explosives (Figure 3-11).

3-17. INFILTRATION

The following is an example that describes the actions of a light infantry
battalion conducting an infiltration with engineers attached. With some
modification, it could also apply to a dismounted mechanized infantry
battalion.

a. The outskirts of a town may not be strongly defended. Its defenders
may have only a series of antiarmor positions, security elements on the
principal approach, or positions blocking the approaches to key features in
the town. The strongpoints and reserves are deeper in the city.

b. A battalion may be able to seize a part of the town by infiltrating
platoons and companies between those enemy positions on the outskirts.
Moving by stealth on secondary streets by using the cover and concealment
of back alleys and buildings, the battalion may be able to seize key street
junctions or terrain features, to isolate enemy positions, and to help follow-
ing units pass into the built-up area. Such an infiltration should be performed
when visibility is poor and no civilians are in the area.

c. The light infantry battalion is best organized into infiltration compa-
nies with engineers attached to each company in platoon strength and a
reserve consistent with METT-T. Each company should have an infiltration
lane based on the commander’s estimate of the situation. Depending on the
construction of the built-up areas and streets, the infiltration lane may be
500 to 1,500 meters wide.

d. The infiltrating companies advance on foot, with stealth, using avail-
able cover and concealment. Mortar and artillery fire can be used to divert
the enemy’s attention and cover the sound of infiltrating troops.

e. BFVs or TOWS are positioned to cover likely avenues of approach
for enemy armored vehicles. The battalion commander may position his
antiarmor platoon (light) or company (airborne, air assault) to cover the
likely avenues of approach if no BFVs or tanks area available. The recon-
naissance platoon and antiarmor company screen the battalion’s more
vulnerable flanks. Also, the antiarmor company can support by fire if the
situation provides an adequate position.

f. As the companies move into the built-up area, they secure their own
flanks. Security elements may be dropped off along the route to warn of a
flank attack. Engineers assist in breaching or bypassing minefields or obsta-
cles encountered. Enemy positions are avoided but reported.

g. The infiltrating companies proceed until they reach their objective.
At that time, they consolidate and reorganize and arrange for mutual
support. They patrol to their front and flanks, and establish contact with each

FM 90-10-1

other. The company commander may establish a limit of advance to reduce
chances of enemy contact or to ensure safety from friendly forces.

h. If the infiltration places the enemy in an untenable position and he
must withdraw, the rest of the battalion is brought forward for the next phase
of the operation. If the enemy does not withdraw, the battalion must clear
the built-up area before the next phase of the operation (Figure 3-12).

Figure 3-12. Infiltration.

3-18. ROUTE SECURITY

An infantry battalion may have to clear buildings to secure a route through
a city. How quickly the battalion can clear the buildings depends on the
enemy resistance and the size and number of the buildings. In the outlying
area, the forward units proceed by bounds from road junction to road
junction. Other platoons provide flank security by moving down parallel
streets and by probing to the flanks.

a. Depending on the required speed and enemy situation, the infantry
may either move mounted or dismounted. The platoons move down the
widest streets, avoiding narrow streets. Each section overwatches the squad
to its front keeping watch on the opposite side of the street. Sections provide
their wingman with mutual support. Combat vehicles providing overwatch
should be secured by dismounted troops. The rest of the infantry should stay
mounted to maximize speed and shock effect until required to dismount due
to the enemy situation or upon reaching the objective.

3-20

FM 90-10-1

b. When contact with the enemy is made, tanks support as usual. Sup-
porting fire fixes and isolates enemy positions, which dismounted troops
maneuver to attack.

c. Phase lines can be used to control the rate of the company’s advance
and other action. For example, at each phase line, the forward companies
might reestablish contact, reorganize, and continue clearing (Figure 3-13).

"PL BLUE

Figure 3-13. Clearing along a route.

Section VII. COMPANY TEAM ATTACK OF A BUILT-UP AREA

The following are techniques that might be employed by a company. These
may be independent operations but are normally part of a battalion opera-
tion and apply to any type of infantry.

3-19. ATTACK OF A BLOCK
To attack a block in a built-up area, a company should be reinforced with
tanks and engineers.

a. This operation is characterized by platoon attacks supported by both
direct and indirect fires. Success depends on isolating the enemy positions
(which often become platoon objectives), suppressing enemy weapons,
seizing a foothold in the block, and clearing the block’s buildings room by
room.

3-21

FM 90-10-1

3-22

(1) Task organization of the company team varies because of the nature
of the built-up area. For example, a nonmechanized infantry company
fighting in the outskirts of a city might organize as follows:

e Two rifle platoons reinforced with engineers—to assault.

e One rifle platoon—reserve.
e One tank platoon—in support of the assaulting rifle platoons.

(2) In a core or core penpnely area, that same company might be

organized as follows:

e Two rifle platoons, each with engineers and tanks under the platoon
leader’s operational control (OPCON)—to assault. (The engineers
and tanks are placed under the platoon leader’s OPCON due to the
independent, isolated combat that can be ee in those areas.)

e One platoon—in reserve.

e All available direct and indirect fire weapons should be used to isolate
objective buildings. Direct fire down streets and indirect fire in open
areas between buildings helps in the objective isolation.

b. Tanks, machine guns, and other direct fire support weapons fire on
the objective from covered positions. These weapons should not be fired for
prolonged periods from one position. The gunners should use a series of
positions and displace from one to another to gain better fields of fire and

to avoid being targeted by the enemy. Direct fire support tasks are assigned

as follows:
e Machine guns fire alie streets and into windows, doors, and so forth.

* BFVs, tanks, TOWs, and Dragons fire at enemy tanks and other
armored vehicles.

Tanks fire at targets protected by walls, make entrances in buildings,
and provide backup against enemy tanks, as required.

° Riflemen engage targets of opportunity.

c. Before an assault, the company commander should employ smoke to
conceal the assaulting platoons. He secures their flanks with direct fire
weapons and by employment of the reserve, if necessary.

(1) Concealed by smoke and supported by direct fire weapons, an
assaulting platoon attacks the first isolated building. The platoon must close
on the building quickly while the enemy is still stunned by supporting fire.
The company commander must closely coordinate the assault with its sup-
porting fire so that the fire is shifted at the last possible moment.

(2) The squads and platoons clear each building as described in Appen-
dix E. After seizing the block, the company consolidates and reorganizes to
repel a counterattack or to continue the attack.

(3) Amechanized infantry company team would be organized on similar
lines. The assault platoons should be dismounted. The BFV and tanks can
provide direct fire support (Figure 3-14).

(4) The company commander may or may not use the technique of
numbering the buildings in the area of the attack. In the assault of a
strongpoint, the strongpoint itself may have the corners lettered to identify
enemy forces.

Figure 3-14. Company attack ofa strongpoint.

3-20. ATTACK OF AN ENEMY OUTPOST

The following discussion provides a technique for conduct of a hasty attack
on an enemy outpost. The company team commander makes a quick assess-
ment of the factors of METT-T and reacts appropriately to support the
commander’s intent.

a. The company team commander uses a form of fire and movement.
His tanks, BFVs, MK 19s or M2HBs mounted on HMMWV s, and TOWs
assume support-by-fire positions from which they can fire on the outpost,
keep the enemy from escaping, and destroy any reinforcements.

b. The rifle platoons then move into the area. They do not attack head
on, but from a covered route so as to hit the outpost at a vulnerable point.
As the platoons approach the outpost, smoke is employed to screen their
movement and supporting fires are shifted. Once the platoons close on the
outpost, they clear the buildings quickly and consolidate. The company is
then ready to continue operations (Figure 3-15, page 3-24).

FM 90-10-1

3-23

FM 90-10-1

var

Li (EN

3-24

iy TA JA è
s i ‘my 4
~d ` =! ag yo, La
rs —

Figure 3-15. Hasty attack of an outpost.

3-21. SEIZURE OF A TRAFFIC CIRCLE
A company may have to seize a traffic circle either to secure it for friendly
use or to deny it to the enemy (Figure 3-16). This operation consists of seizing
and clearing the buildings that control the traffic circle bringing direct-fire
weapons into position to cover it. Routes to overwatch positions for direct
fire weapons may have to first be cleared of mines. Enemy avenues of
approach into the flanks of the position may have to be mined to prevent
enemy use.

a. After gathering all available intelligence on the terrain, enemy, and
population, the commander plans for the following steps:

e Isolate the objectives.

e Seize and clear the buildings along the traffic circle under cover of
tanks, ATGMs, and machine guns.
* Consolidate and prepare for counterattack.

b. Friendly troops should not venture into the traffic circle until it is
under friendly control. A traffic circle is a natural kill zone.

FM 90-10-41

c. The company should be organized as follows:
e A security element (charged with isolating the traffic circle).
e An assault element reinforced with engineers.

e A support element (providing direct fire support for the assault ele-
ment) made up of the company’s BF Vs, TOWs, MK 19s or M2HBs
mounted on HMMWVS, and attached tanks occupying an attack-by-
fire position.

e A reserve.

L SECURITY
J — THE COMPANY

ORGANIZED AS
ELEMENTS

yY SUPPORT -
o RESERVES CAN BE

COMMITTED TO
|| ASSAULT

Figure 3-16. Seizure of a traffic circle.

3-25

FM 90-10-1

3-26

d. At various stages in this operation, those roles may change. For
example, the assault element may clear buildings until the support element
can no longer support it. Then the reserve can be committed to the assault.
It may also happen that one of the assault elements is in a better position to
isolate the traffic circle. At that time, the isolating element would become
part of the assault element.

3-22. SEIZURE OF KEY TERRAIN
Key terrain dominates an avenue of approach or is a location which, if held
by either friendly forces or the enemy, will directly affect the operation. A
bridge or overpass that spans a canal, a building complex, or, in some cases,
the population itself are examples of key terrain in a city. Therefore, seizing
such a crossing point intact and securing it for friendly use is a likely mission
for an infantry company.

a. For this mission, an infantry company should—

e Clear the buildings on the near bank that permit a clear view of the

bridge and provide good fields of fire for supporting weapons.

e Quickly suppress enemy weapons on the far bank with direct fire.

e Use screening smoke to limit enemy observation and reduce interfer-
ence with friendly direct fires.

e Seize a bridgehead (buildings that dominate the bridge) on the far
bank by an assault across the bridge.

e Secure a perimeter around the bridge so that the engineers can clear
any obstacle and remove demolitions on the bridge.

b. The first step in seizing a bridge is to clear the buildings on the near
bank. The commander must find out which buildings dominate the ap-
proaches to the bridge. Buildings that permit him to employ LAWs, Drag-
ons, machine guns, and riflemen are cleared while supporting fire prevents
the enemy from reinforcing his troops on the far bank and keeps enemy
demolition parties away from the bridge.

c. In suppressing the enemy’s positions on the far bank, priority is given
to those positions from which the enemy can fire directly down the bridge.
Tanks, BF Vs, TOWs, and machine guns mounted on HMMWV s in the light
infantry antiarmor platoon or the airborne or air assault antiarmor company
are effective in this role. TOWs, Dragons, and, in some cases, LAWs can be
used against enemy tanks covering the bridge. The company FSO should
plan artillery and mortar fires to suppress infantry and antitank weapons.

d. The objectives of the assaulting platoons are buildings that dominate
the approaches to the bridge. One or two platoons assault across the bridge
using all available cover while concealed by smoke. They are supported by
the rest of the company and attached tanks. Once on the other side, they call
for the shift of supporting fire and start clearing buildings. When the first
buildings are cleared, supporting fire is shifted again and the assault contin-
ues until all the buildings in the objective area are cleared.

e. At this point, the engineers clear the bridge and its approaches of all
mines, demolitions, and obstacles. The company commander may expand
his perimeter to prepare for counterattack. Once the bridge is cleared,
the tanks and other support vehicles are brought across to the far bank
(Figure 3-17).

g ra" a ine “S e
aS : mee we ca

ORS

BUILDINGS THAT
S DOMINATE APPROACHES K
ane OBJECTIVES.
cai ena pit ea :

Figure 3-17. Seizure of a bridge.

3-23. RECONNAISSANCE

In a fast-moving situation, a company may have a movement to contact
through a built-up area along a highway. Similarly, a company may have to
reconnoiter such a route to prepare for a battalion task force attack. This
type of mission can be accomplished by an infantry company of any type with
an attached tank platoon, if available.

a. This operation is characterized by alternating periods of rapid move-
ment to quickly cover distances and much slower movement for security. The
speed of movement selected depends on the terrain and enemy situation.

b. In open areas where rapid movement is possible, a tank section
should lead. In closer terrain, the infantry should lead while overwatched by
the tanks. Another infantry platoon and the other tank section should move

on a parallel street. Artillery fire should be planned along the route. Engi- -
neers accompany the lead platoon on the main route to help clear obstacles _

and mines.

FM 90-10-1

3-27

FM 90-10-1

c. The team should seize the key points on the highway (crossroads,
bridges, and overpasses, and so forth) by a combination of actions:
¢ Between key points, the team moves with the infantry mounted when
contact is not likely.

e At key points or when enemy contact is likely, the team moves dis-
mounted to clear enemy positions or to secure the key point. Tanks
and other combat vehicles support the dismounted troops.

d. In peripheral or strip areas, this advance should be on one axis with
the lead unit well forward and security elements checking side streets as they
are reached. In the city core, this operation is conducted as a coordinated
movement on two or three axes for more flank security.

e. Enemy positions can be either destroyed by the team itself or, if the
need for speed is great, bypassed, reported, and left to following units.

f. The subunits of the team must coordinate their action. The company
commander reports all information collected to the battalion task force
(Figure 3-18).

SAS ASS

Figure 3-18. Route reconnaissance for a movement to
contact along a highway through a city (commercial ribbon).

3-28

Section VIII. PLATOON ATTACK OF A BUILT-UP AREA

Platoons seldom perform independent operations in combat in built-up
areas, but because of the type of combat to be expected, they can become
isolated and seem to be alone. This section discusses techniques that might
be employed by a platoon under such conditions. These operations are
conducted as part of a company operation.

3-24. ATTACK OF A BUILDING
The most common platoon offensive mission in a built-up area is the attack
of a building. The platoon must kill the defenders and secure the building.

a. The attack involves isolating the building to prevent the escape or
reinforcement of its defenders (normally coordinated at company level);
suppressing the defenders with BFV 25-mm main gun, tank, machine gun,
and mortar fire; entering the building at the least-defended point or through
a hole breached by tank fire; and clearing the building. To clear it, troops
normally go quickly to the top floor and clear from the top down. There must
be close coordination between the assault and support elements of the
platoon using radios, telephones, arm-and-hand signals, or pyrotechnics.

(1) If a platoon is attacking a building independently, it should be
organized with an assault element, support element, and security element
` to cover its flanks and rear. In addition to its own support element, the
platoon can be supported by BFVs or tanks and other elements of the
company.

(2) If one platoon i is attacking, supported by the rest of the company,
security may be provided by the other rifle platoons. The assault has three
steps:

STEP 1: Isolate the building.

STEP 2: Enter the building (secure a foothold).

STEP 3: Clear the building methodically room >

by room and floor by floor.

(3) The clearing is performed by the rifle squads, which pass successively
through each other (leapfrogging) as rooms and floors are secured. Platoons
that clear buildings should be reinforced with engineers to help with demo-
lition clearing (Figure 3-19, page 3-30).

3-25. MOVEMENT DOWN A STREET

When moving in built-up areas, a platoon follows the same principles of
movement as in other areas. However, some movement techniques must be
modified to adjust to a built-up area. This discussion focuses on the move-
ment down the street of the lead platoon of a rifle company, either mecha-
nized or nonmechanized.

a. The platoon members must be prepared to return fire immediately.
They must also be alert for any signs of the enemy and report this information
promptly.

b. The speed of movement depends on the type of operation, terrain,
and degree of enemy resistance. In outlying or lightly defended areas, a
mechanized infantry platoon proceeds along the street mounted, but sends
dismounted men forward to reconnoiter key points (crossroads, bridges). In
the center of a built-up area or in situations when there is heavy fighting, the
platoon moves on foot with two squads leading—one on each side of the

FM 90-10-1

3-29

FM 90-10-1

3-30

road, using all cover. They move through the buildings, if feasible, to avoid
exposure on the streets. The squads give each other mutual support.

SN i,
Po VAM i
Figure 3-19. Attack of a pala

c. Enemy action against the platoon might consist of an ambush on the
street, enfilade fire down the streets, sniper fire from rooftops, or artillery
or mortar fire.

d. For protection from those dangers, the platoon should move through
buildings and along walls, use tanks for fire support and station men on the
roofs or upper stairs for overwatch, and search for defenders in all three
dimensions.

e. The platoon should move in two elements: a maneuver element (one
squad on narrow streets, two squads on wide streets), which moves forward,
scouts danger areas, and closes with the enemy; and an overwatch element
(the rest of the platoon and its supporting weapons), which moves behind
the maneuver element, secures the flanks and rear, and provides fire sup-

_ port. These two elements, or parts of them, can exchange roles (Figure 3-20).

FM 90-10-1

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OVERWATCH ELEMENT
MOVES BEHIND THE
LEAD ELEMENT

Figure 3-20. Movement down a street.

=~ 3-26. COUNTERATTACKS |
A platoon may be given the mission of counterattacking for one of two
reasons: to recapture a defensive position or a key point, destroying or
ejecting an enemy foothold; or to stop an enemy attack by striking his flank,
forcing him to stop and adopt a hasty defense.

a. Platoon counterattacks are planned at company level to meet each
probable enemy penetration. They must be well coordinated and executed
violently. Preferably, counterattacks should be directed at an enemy flank
and supported with direct and indirect fire.
= b. In outlying areas, where the terrain is relatively open, a mechanized
infantry platoon accompanied by tanks can approach the counterattack
objective mounted for speed. The tanks destroy the enemy’s tanks and heavy

3 weapons while the infantry dismounts to clear the objective. In central or
: more congested areas, the tanks progress deliberately, from point to point,
providing close support to the dismounted troops. Counterattacks require
y the following:
e An analysis of the probable avenues of enemy approach.

e Reconnaissance and rehearsal along each counterattack route and of
each proposed overwatch position.

e Construction of obstacles and fighting positions to canalize or block
the enemy. :

e Gaps or lanes through these obstacles if the counterattacks are to be
quick enough to affect the action. |

3-31

FM 90-10-1

e Rapid and aggressive execution—leaders must set the example.
e Flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances.

e An analysis of the probable counter-counterattack routes by the en-
emy. |
¢ Afire support plan for the counterattack and possible counter-counterattack.

3-32

CHAPTER 4
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Of the two patterns of defense, area and mobile, the area defense is the
pattern most used since most of the reasons for defending a city are
focused on retaining terrain. The mobile defense pattern is more focused

` on the enemy and the commander may decide to use it based on his
estimate of the situation. In a built-up area, the defender must take
advantage of the abundant cover and concealment. He must also
consider restrictions to the attacker’s ability to maneuver and observe.
By using the terrain and fighting from well-prepared and mutually
supporting positions, a defending force can inflict heavy losses on, delay,
block, or fix a much larger attacking force.

Section |. DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

A commander must decide whether defending a built-up area is needed to
successfully complete his mission. Before making his decision, the com-
mander should consider the issues discussed herein.

4-1. REASONS FOR DEFENDING BUILT-UP AREAS
A commander should consider the following reasons for defending built-up
areas.

a. Certain built-up areas contain strategic industrial, transportation, or
economic complexes that must be defended. Capitals and cultural centers
can be defended for strictly psychological or national morale purposes even
if they do not offer a tactical advantage to the defender. Because of the
sprawl of such areas, significant combat power is required for their defense.
Thus, the decision to defend these complexes is made by political authorities
or the theater commander.

b. The defender’s need to shift and concentrate combat power, and to
move large amounts of supplies over a wide battle area require that he retain
vital transportation centers. Since most transportation centers serve large
areas, the commander must defend all of the built-up area to control such
centers.

c. The worldwide increase in sprawling built-up areas has made it im-
possible for forces conducting combat operations to avoid cities and towns.
Most avenues of approach are straddled by small towns every few kilometers
and must be controlled by defending forces. These areas can be used as
battle positions or strongpoints. Blocked streets covered by mortar and or
artillery fire can canalize attacking armor into mined areas or zones covered
by antiarmor fire. If an attacker tries to bypass a built-up area, he may
encounter an array of tank-killing weapons. To clear such an area, the
attacker must sacrifice speed and momentum, and expend many resources.
A city or town can easily become a major obstacle.

d. Forces can be concentrated in critical areas. Due to the tactical
advantages to the defender, a well-trained force defending a built-up area
can inflict major losses on a numerically superior attacker. The defender can
conserve the bulk of his combat power so that it is available for use in open
terrain. The defenders remaining in built-up areas perform an economy-of-
force role. |

e. Forces can be well concealed in built-up areas. Aerial photography,
imagery, and sensory devices cannot detect forces deployed in cities. CPs,

4-1

FM 90-10-1_

4-2

reserves, CSS complexes, and combat forces emplaced well in built-up areas
make them hard to detect.

4-2. REASONS FOR NOT DEFENDING BUILT-UP AREAS
The commander should consider the following reasons for not defending
built-up areas.

a. The location of the built-up area does not support the overall defen-
sive plan. If the built-up area is too far forward or back in a unit’s defensive
sector, is isolated, or is not astride an enemy’s expected avenue of approach,
the commander may choose not to defend it.

b. Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass on covered or concealed
routes. Some built-up areas, mainly smaller ones, are bypassed by main road
and highway systems. A built-up area that can be easily bypassed normally
will be.

c. Structures within the built-up area do not adequately protect the
defenders. Extensive areas of lightly built or flammable structures offer little
protection to the defender. Built-up areas near flammable or hazardous
industrial areas, such as refineries or chemical plants, may not be defended.

d. Dominating terrain is close to the built-up area. If the built-up area
can be dominated by an enemy force occupying close terrain, the com-
mander may choose to defend from there rather than the built-up area. This
applies mainly to small built-up areas such as a village.

e. Better fields of fire exist outside the built-up area. The commander
may choose to base all or part of his defense on the long-range fields of fire
that exist outside a built-up area. This applies mainly to armor-heavy forces
defending sectors with multiple, small, built-up areas surrounded by farm
areas.

f. The built-up area has cultural, religious, or historical significance. The
area may have been declared an “open city,” in which case, by international
law, it is demilitarized and must be neither defended nor attacked. The
attacking force must assume civil administrative control and treat the civil-
ians as noncombatants in an occupied country. The defender must immedi-
ately evacuate and cannot arm the civilian population. A city can be declared
open only before it is attacked. The presence of large numbers of noncom-
batants, hospitals, or wounded personnel may also affect the commander’s
decision not to defend a built-up area.

Section il. CHARACTERISTICS OF BUILT-UP AREAS

The defense of a built-up area should be organized around key terrain
features, buildings, and areas that preserve the integrity of the defense and
that provide the defender ease of movement. The defender must organize
and plan his defense by considering obstacles, avenues of approach, key

‘terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, fire hazards,

and communications restrictions.

4-3. OBSTACLES
A city itself is an obstacle since it canalizes and impedes an attack. Likely
avenues of approach should be blocked by obstacles and covered by fire.
Barriers and obstacles should be emplaced in three belts.

a. The first obstacle belt is at the nearest buildings across from and
parallel to the main defensive position (MDP). This belt consists of wire and
improvised barriers (to include inside buildings, in subterranean avenues of

FM 90-10-1

approach, and outside in open areas), danger areas, and dead space. These
barriers and obstacles should be heavily booby trapped and covered by
long-range fires as appropriate. This belt impedes enemy movement, breaks
up and disorganizes attack formations, and inflicts casualties.

_ b. The second obstacle belt is placed between the first belt and the MDP
buildings, but out of hand grenade range from defensive positions. It im-
pedes movement, channelizes the enemy into the best fields of fire, breaks
up attack formations, and inflicts casualties. This belt is not meant to stop
enemy soldiers permanently. It should be constructed efficiently to give the
most benefit—not to be an impenetrable wall. It consists mainly of wire
obstacles, improvised barriers, road craters, and mine fields. It should be
booby trapped heavily (including trip-wire-activated Claymores). Triple-
strand concertina is placed along the machine-gun FPL (as designated
earlier with engineer tape) to slow the enemy on the FPL and allow the
machine gun to be used effectively.

c. The third obstacle belt is the defensive positions denial belt. It consists
of wire obstacles placed around, through, and in the defensive buildings and
close-in mine fields as well as in subterranean accesses. It impedes and
complicates the enemy’s ability to gain a foothold in the defensive area. It
should be booby trapped, and Claymores should be used extensively, both
trip wire activated and command detonated. The booby traps and Claymores
should be placed where they will not cause friendly casualties.

d. All avenues of approach (surface and subsurface) must be denied.
Units must not overlook the use of field-expedient obstacles such as cars,
light poles, and so on (Figure 4-1), or the emplacement of antipersonnel and
antitank mines. |

—

mS |\ CONCEALED ~ ui i STEEL HEDGEHOG
EXPLOSIVES ag ‘a, Must be covered by fire

\ Ld
EZAT in `d a N E

Explosives concealed in building

NA V ‘4
SJELEN
KEK 4

Explosives concealed in sewer ~~

_, CRIB ROADBLOCK CRATERED ROAD

=> : Size of crater must be large enough

p Cribs filled with rubble to prevent bypass

Glas) a. >
SS LT Pi |

AT/AP mines are concealed ‘7-2

. í er 4
in rubble around crater te oot wwe, Dea

—

Figure 4-1. Example of field-expedient obstacles.

aha az ee E l A i $ si 1 =
_ Te Ses Bey] Meee * =- This obstacle will require
ay ose E i engineer assistance

FM 90-10-1

4-4

4-4. AVENUES OF APPROACH

The defender must not only consider the conventional avenues of approach
into and out of the city but also the avenues within built-up areas that are
above and below ground level. The defender normally has the advantage.
He knows the city and can move rapidly from position to position through
buildings and underground passages.

4-5. KEY TERRAIN

Key terrain is any place where seizure, retention, or control affords a marked
advantage to either enemy or friendly forces. Primary examples of key
terrain are bridges over canals or rivers, building complexes, public utilities
or services, or parks. Built-up areas are unusual in that the population of the
area itself may be considered key terrain. The identification of key terrain
allows the defender to select his defensive positions and assists in determin-
ing the enemy’s objectives.

4-6. OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE

The defender must position weapons to obtain maximum effect and mutual
supporting fire. This allows for long-range engagements out to the maximum
effective ranges. Artillery FOs should be well above street level to adjust
fires on the enemy at maximum range. Fires and FPFs should be preregis-
tered on the most likely approaches to allow for their rapid shifting to
threatened areas.

4-7. COVER AND CONCEALMENT
The defender should prepare positions using the protective cover of walls,
floors, and ceilings. Soldiers should always improve positions using materials
at hand. When the defender must move, he can reduce his exposure by—
e Using prepared breaches through buildings.
e Moving through reconnoitered and
marked underground systems.

e Using trenches and sewage systems.

e Using the concealment offered by smoke
anddarkness to cross open areas.

To accomplish his mission, the attacker must advance by crossing streets and

open areas between buildings where he is exposed to fires from concealed
weapons positions. |

4-8. FIRE HAZARDS

The defender’s detailed knowledge of the terrain permits him to avoid areas
that are likely to be fire hazards. All cities are vulnerable to fire, especially
those with many wooden buildings. The defender can deliberately set fires—

¢ To disrupt and disorganize the attackers.

e To canalize the attackers into more favorable engagement areas.

¢ To obscure the attacker’s observation.
4-9. COMMUNICATIONS RESTRICTIONS
Wire is the primary means of communication for controlling the defense of
a city and for enforcing security. However, wire can be compromised if

interdicted by the enemy. Radio communication in built-up areas is normally
degraded by structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines.

The new family of radios may correct this problem, but all units within the
built-up area may not have these radios. Therefore, radio is an alternate
means of communication. Messengers can be used well as another means of
communication. Visual signals may also be used but are often not effective
because of the screening effects of buildings, walls, and so forth. Signals must
be planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned and at-
tached units. Increased noise makes the effective use of sound signals
difficult.

Section Ill. FACTORS OF METT-T

Procedures and principles for planning and organizing the defense of a
built-up area are the same as for other defensive operations. In developing
a defensive plan, the defender considers METT-T factors with emphasis on
fire support, preparation time, work priorities, and control measures. Plan-
ning for the defense of a city must be detailed and centralized.

4-10. MISSION

The commander must receive, analyze, and understand the mission before
he begins planning. He may receive the mission as a FRAGO or formal
OPORD, and must analyze all specified and implied tasks.

4-11. ENEMY

The commander must also analyze the type of enemy he may encounter. If
the attacker is mostly dismounted infantry, the greatest danger is allowing
him to gain a foothold. If the attacker is mostly armor or mounted motorized

infantry, the greatest danger is that he will mass direct fire and destroy the —

defender’s positions.

Intelligence gathering for defensive operations is not limited to only studying
the enemy. Commanders must emphasize obtaining and using all intelli-
gence. The items of intelligence peculiar to combat in built-up areas are
discussed in Chapter 2. They include:

° Street, water, and sewer plans.

e Key installations and facilities.

e Key civilians.

e Civilian police and paramilitary forces.

e Sources of food.

e Communications facilities and plans.

e Power stations.
4-12. TERRAIN
Terrain in built-up areas is three-dimensional: ground level (streets and
parks), above ground (buildings), and below ground (subways and sewers).
Analysis of all man-made and natural terrain features is critica] when plan-

ning to defend on built-up terrain. The commander’s defensive plan is affected
by the type of built-up area he will be operating in. (See Chapter 1.)

a. Villages.

(1) Villages are often on chokepoints in valleys, dominating the only
high-speed avenue of approach through the terrain. If the buildings in such
a village are well constructed and provide good protection against both

FM 90-10-1

4-5

FM 90-10-1

direct and indirect fires, a formidable defense can be mounted by placing a
company in the town, while controlling close and dominating terrain with
other battalion elements. » |

(2) If the terrain allows easy bypass and there are no other villages on
defendable terrain within a mutually supporting distance, units may be
unwise to defend it. This would allow friendly forces to be easily bypassed
and cut off (Figure 4-2). |

Se i

l ai Ws

2 -b he ‘
memi Ta,
EEEE
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eh É Pe

ate

Las

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eae pid

illage

levee BE,

Figure 4-2. S.

(3) Villages on the approaches to large towns or cities may be used by
commanders to add depth to the defense or to secure the flanks. These
villages are often characterized by clusters of stone, brick, or concrete houses
and buildings. Company-sized battle positions can be established in these
small villages to block approaches into the main defensive positions.

b. Strip Areas.

(1) Strip areas consist of houses, stores, and factories and are built along
roads or down valleys between towns and villages. They afford the defender
the same advantages as villages.

(2) If visibility is good and enough effective fields of fire are available, a
unit acting as a security force need occupy only a few strong positions spread
out within the strip. This will deceive the enemy, when engaged at long
ranges, into thinking the strip is an extensive defensive line. Strip areas often
afford covered avenues of withdrawal to the flanks once the attacking
force is deployed and before the security force becomes decisively en-
gaged (Figure 4-3). | :

4-6

FM 90-10-1

Figure 4-3. Strip areas.

c. Towns and Cities. |

(1) A small force can gain combat power advantage when defending a
small city or town that is a chokepoint if it places tanks, BFVs, TOWs, and
Dragons on positions dominating critical approaches. To deny the enemy
the ability to bypass the town or city, the defending force must control key
terrain and coordinate with adjacent forces. Reserve forces should be placed
where they can quickly reinforce critical areas. Obstacles and minefields
assist in slowing and canalizing the attacker.

(2) Finding positions in towns and cities that provide both good fields of
fire and cover is often difficult. The forward edges of a town usually offer the
best fields of fire but can be easily targeted by enemy overwatch and
supporting fire. These areas often contain residential buildings constructed
of light material. Factories, civic buildings, and other heavy structures, which
provide adequate cover and are more suitable for a defense, are more likely
to be found deeper in the town and have limited fields of fire on likely
avenues of approach.

(3) Since the forward edge of a town is the obvious position for the
defender, it should be avoided. However, the defender can set up his position
there if the terrain limits the enemy’s ability for engagement or it contains
strongly constructed buildings that give defending units adequate protection.

(4) A force may initially be assigned battle positions on the forward edge
of the town. Its mission is to provide early warning of the enemy’s advance,
to engage the enemy at long range, and to deceive the enemy as to the true
location of the defense. This force should withdraw in time to avoid decisive
engagement. If there is limited observation from the forward edge, a force
should be positioned on more favorable terrain forward or to the flanks of
the town to gain better observation and to engage the enemy at long range.

4-7

FM 90-10-17

(5) To prevent airmobile or airborne landings within the city or town,
the commander must cover probable LZs and DZs, such as parks, stadiums,
or large rooftops and heliports with obstacles or fire (Figure 4-4).

Figure 4.4, Towns and cities.

d. Large Built-Up Areas.

(1) Inlarge built-up areas the commander must consider that the terrain
is restrictive due to large buildings that are normally close together. This
requires a higher density of troops and smaller defensive sectors than in
natural open terrain. Units occupy defensive frontages about one-third the
size of those in open areas. An infantry company, which might occupy 1,500
to 2,000 meters in open terrain, is usually restricted to a frontage of 300 to
800 meters in built-up areas. The density of buildings and rubble and street
patterns will dictate the frontage of the unit (Table 4-1).

NOTE: An average city block has a frontage of about 175 meters. These minimum
figures apply in areas of dense, block-type construction; multistory buildings;
and underground passages.

Table 4-1. Approximate frontages and depths in large
built-up areas.

Sc eee

Nie

(2) In a large built-up area, a battalion is given a sector to defend and
normally establishes a series of defensive positions. Unlike villages or towns,
natural terrain close to the built-up area is not usually available for the
commander to integrate into his plan. Although mutual support between
positions should be maintained, built-up terrain often allows for infiltration

routes that the enemy may use to pass between positions. Therefore, the —

defender must identify the following:
e Positions that enable him to place surprise fires
on the infiltrating enemy.

¢ Covered and concealed routes for friendly elements
to move between positions (subways and sewers).

¢ Structures that dominate large areas.

e Areas such as parks, boulevards, rivers, highways, and
railroads where antiarmor weapons have fields of fire.

¢ Firing positions for mortars.

* Command locations that offer cover, concealment,
and ease of command and control.

¢ Protected storage areas for supplies. .

(3) Buildings that add most to the general plan of defense are chosen for

occupation. Mutual support between these positions is vital to prevent the
attacker from maneuvering and outflanking the defensive position, making
it untenable. Buildings chosen for occupation as defensive positions
should—

° Offer good protection.

* Have strong floors to keep the structure from collapsing
under the weight of debris.

e Have thick walls.
* Be constructed of nonflammable materials (avoid wood).

° Be strategically located (corner buildings and
prominent structures).

* Be adjacent to streets, alleys, vacant lots, and park sites.
(These buildings usually provide better fields of fire and
are more easily tied in with other buildings.)

4-13. TROOPS AVAILABLE
Employment of troops in built-up areas depends on many factors governed
by METT-T and on the mission.

a. Employment of Squads. Squads are usually employed abreast so that
they all can fire toward the expected direction of attack. In a built-up area,
squads may be separated by rooms within buildings or be deployed in
different buildings. Squad positions must be mutually supporting and allow
for overlapping sectors of fire, even if buildings or walls separate the posi-
tions (Figure 4-5, page 4-10).

b. Employment of Platoons. Once the commander has decided where
to defend, he should select platoon battle positions or sectors that block or
restrict the enemy’s ability to maneuver and control key areas. The frontage

FM 90-10-1

4-9

FM 90-10-1

for a platoon is about one to two city blocks long. Along with his primary and
alternate positions, the platoon leader normally selects one supplementary
position to reorient his defense to meet enemy threats from another direction.

Figure 4-5. Sectors of fire.

c. Employment of Companies. Battalion commanders employ their
companies in battle positions or sectors. The frontage of a company or
company team defending in a built-up area is normally two to four city blocks
long (300 to 800 meters). Depending on the type of built-up area, a company
may be employed on the forward edge of the flanks of the area. This forces
the enemy to deploy early without decisive engagement since it deceives the
enemy as to the true location of the main defense. Other companies may
then be employed in a series of strongpoints in the center of the city or town.
In all cases, mutual support between positions is vital. Companies should
also have designated alternate and supplementary positions.

d. Employment of the Reserve. The commander’s defensive plan must
always consider the employment of a reserve. The reserve force should be
prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy penetra-
tions, to protect the flanks, or to assist by fire in the disengagement and
withdrawal of endangered positions. For combat in a built-up area, a reserve
force—

e Normally consists of infantry.
e Must be as mobile as possible.

e May be a platoon or squad at company
level or one platoon at battalion level.

¢ May be supported by tanks.

e. Employment of Tanks and BFVs. The commander should employ
tanks and BF'Vs to take advantage of their long-range fires and mobility.
Built-up areas restrict the mobility of tanks and BFVs and make them
vulnerable to the antiarmor weapons of the enemy infantry.

(1) When tanks and BFVs are employed in the defense ofa city, infantry
should be positioned to provide security against close antitank fires and to

4-10

ATEN

FM 90-10-1

detect targets for the armored vehicles. Tanks and BFVs should be assigned
primary, alternate, and supplementary positions, as well as primary and
alternate oe BFVs and antitank TES shoul k fires.

ikel proach to

y3 Positioned on the a of the city in mutually

supporting positions.

e Positioned on key terrain on the flanks of
towns and villages.

° Used to cover barricades and obstacles by fire.
weve Part of the reserve.

(3) Tanks and BFVs are normally employed as a platoon. However,
sections and individual tanks and BF Vs may be employed with infantry
platoons or squads. This provides tanks and BFVs with the close security of
the infantry. Tanks and BFVs provide the commander with a mobile force
to respond quickly to enemy threats on different avenues of approach.

f. Employment of Fire Support. Fire planning must be comprehensive
due to the proximity of buildings to targets, minimum range restrictions, and
repositioning requirements. Mortar and artillery fires are planned on top of
and immediately around defensive positions for close support.

(1) Artillery fire support may be used in the direct or indirect fire role.
Artillery fire should be used—

* To suppress and blind enemy overwatch elements.
o To disrupt or destroy an assault. —
«To provide counterbattery fire.

* To support counterattacks.

* To provide direct fire when necessary.

(2) Mortars. at battalion and company level are employed to maximize
the effect of their high-angle fires. They should be used to engage—

¢ Enemy overwatch positions.

¢ Enemy infantry before they seize a foothold.
e Targets on rooftops.

¢ Enemy reinforcements within range.

(3) Final protective fires are planned to stop dismounted assaults in
front of the defensive positions. Fires within the city are planned along likely
routes of advance to destroy the enemy as he attempts to deepen a penetra-
tion.

(4) At battalion level, the commander should establish priorities of fire
based on enemy avenues of approach and threat systems that present the
greatest danger to the defense. For example, during the attacker’s initial
advance, tanks, BMPs, and overwatching elements are the greatest threat to
the defense. ATGMs should concentrate on destroying tanks first, then
BMPs. Artillery and mortar fires should suppress and destroy enemy AT-
GMs and overwatch positions and or elements. If enemy formations secure
a foothold, priority is shifted to the destruction of enemy forces within the
penetration.

4-11

FM 90-10-1

4-12

(5) As the enemy attack progresses in the city, fires are increased to
separate infantry from supporting tanks and fighting vehicles. During this
phase, friendly artillery concentrates on attacking infantry, counterfire mis-
sions, and the destruction of reinforcements that are approaching the city.

(6) When initiated, counterattacks are given priority of supporting fires.
When artillery is firing the missions as mentioned above, it must remain
mobile and be prepared to displace to preplanned positions to avoid enemy
counterbattery fire. |

(7) The battalion mortar platoon may be initially positioned forward in _
support of the reconnaissance platoon. After withdrawal of the reconnais-
sance platoon, the mortar platoon is positioned where it can support the
whole battalion.

(8) At company and platoon level, fire plans include fires of organic,
attached, and supporting weapons. The company commander also plans his
own mortar and artillery fires on top of and immediately around his battle
positions for close support.

(9) Based on the location of platoon positions in relation to the most
likely avenues of advance, the company commander should assign FPFs to
platoon leaders. Each rifle platoon leader then assigns his machine guns
sectors of fire and FPLs. These positions should be selected to provide
interlocking grazing fire and mutual support between adjacent units. FPLs
are fired on planned signals from the platoon forward observers. Proposed
FPLs must be “walked out” to determine the extent of grazing fire available
and to locate dead space, which can be covered by—

° Sniper fire.

e Grenade launchers.

e Mines and booby traps.

¢ Indirect fires.

(10) Air defense assets available to the commander, such as Stinger and
Vulcan, are normally employed to ensure all-round air defense. The lack of
good firing positions for long-range air defense missile systems in the built-up
area may limit the number of deployed weapons. In the defense, weapons
systems may have to be winched or airlifted into positions. Rooftops and
parking garages are good firing positions because they normally offer a
better line-of-sight. Stingers and Vulcans can be assigned the missions of
protecting specific positions or in general] support of the battalion.

g. Employment of Engineers. Engineers are employed under battalion
control or attached to companies and platoons. Normally, one engineer
platoon or company supports a battalion or battalion task force. Command-
ers must consider engineer tasks that enhance survivability, mobility, and
countermobility. Tasks that engineers can accomplish in the defense of a
built-up area include:

e Constructing obstacles and rubbling.
e Clearing fields of fire.

e Laying mines.

° Preparing routes to the rear.

° Preparing fighting positions.

K eto

FM 90-10-1

h. Employment of the Antiarmor Company. The antiarmor company
normally supports the battalion security force, providing long-range antiar-
mor fires forward of the main defense. Separate antiarmor sections may be
attached to companies to cover likely armor approaches. Once the security

force withdraws, the antiarmor company is normally employed in GS of the ~

battalion. If the threat is not armored, or if the terrain prevents the use of
the TOW weapons system, antiarmor platoons and companies in light
airborne and air assault units can mount MK 19 grenade launchers and .50

caliber machine guns to support the defending units.
i. Employment of the Reconnaissance Platoon. Depending on the situ- ~

ation and terrain, the battalion reconnaissance platoon may provide a
security force forward of the built-up area to give the commander early
warning of enemy activity. Upon withdrawal of the security force, the
reconnaissance platoon may be given the mission to ensure flank or rear
security, to occupy a defensive sector (or battle position), or to stay in
reserve.

j. Employment of Ground Surveillance Radar. If attached, GSR is best
employed on the outskirts of built-up areas because of the line-of-sight
problems within the area. During limited visibility, if suitable avenues exist,
GSR can be placed to monitor sectors. Because of the normal ranges found
in built-up areas and the likely narrowness of the sector ranges, GSR can be
vulnerable to detection and direct fire. Cross vectoring is important in this
environment. |

4-14. TIME AVAILABLE |

The commander must organize and establish priorities of work, depending
upon the time available. Many tasks can be accomplished at the same time,
but priorities for preparation should be according to the commander’s order.
In defensive operations, an example priority of work sequence follows.

a. Establish Security. The unit should quickly establish all-round secu-
rity by placing forces on likely approaches. Troop positions should have at
least one soldier to provide security during all preparations. The reconnais-
sance and counterreconnaissance plan should be emphasized.

b. Assign Sectors of Responsibility. Boundaries define sectors of re-
sponsibility. They include areas where units may fire and maneuver without
interference or coordination with other units. Responsibility for primary
avenues of approach should never be split. In areas of semidetached con-
struction, where observation and movement are less restricted, boundaries
should be established along alleys or streets to include both sides of a street
in a single sector. Where buildings present a solid front along streets, bounda-
ries may have to extend to one side of the street (Figure 4-6, page 4-14).

c. Clear Fields of Fire. In built-up areas, commanders may need to
rubble certain buildings and structures to provide greater protection and
fields of fire to the defender. If the ceiling of a lower-story room can support
the weight of the rubble, collapsing the top floor of a building before the
battle starts may afford better protection against indirect fires. Rubbling an
entire building can increase the fields of fire and create an obstacle to enemy
movement. Defenders must be careful, however. Rubbling buildings too
soon (or too many) may give exact locations and destroy the cover from
direct fire. Rubbled buildings may also interfere with planned routes of
withdrawal or counterattack. |

ae
`,

emamaa

4-13

FM 90-10-1

4-14

BOUNDARIES

SEMI-DETACHED CONSTRUCTION

Figure 4-6. Boundaries in built-up areas.

d. Select and Prepare Initial Fighting Positions. The commander
should select positions in depth. The unit should prepare positions as soon
as troops arrive and continue preparing as long as positions are occupied.
Enemy infiltration or movement sometimes occurs between and behind
friendly positions. Therefore, each position must be organized for all-round
defense. The defender should also—

(1) Make minimum changes to the outside appearance of buildings
where positions are located.

(2) Screen or block windows and other openings to keep the enemy from

seeing in and tossing in hand grenades. This must be done so that the enemy
cannot tell which openings the defenders are behind.

(3) Remove combustible material to limit the danger of fire. Fires are
dangerous to defenders and create smoke that could conceal attacking
troops. For these reasons, defenders should remove all flammable materials
and stockpile firefighting equipment (water, sand, and so forth). The danger
of fire also influences the type of ammunition used in the defense. Tracers
or incendiary rounds should not be used extensively if threat of fire exists.

(4) Turn off electricity and gas. Both propane and natural gas are
explosive. Natural gas is also poisonous and is not filtered by a protective
mask. Propane gas, although not poisonous, is heavier than air. If it leaks
into an enclosed area, it displaces the oxygen and causes suffocation. Gas
mains and electricity should be shut off at the facility that serves the city.

(

(5) Locate positions so as not to establish a pattern. The unit should

avoid obvious firing locations like church steeples.
7} Camouflage positions.

7) Reinforce positions with materials available such as beds, furniture,
and so forth.

(8) Block stairwells and doors with wire or other material to prevent
enemy movement. Create holes between floors and rooms to allow covered
movement within a building.

(9) Prepare range cards, fire plans, and sector sketches.

(10) Emplace machine guns in basements. When basements are not
used, they should be sealed to prevent enemy entry.

(11) Establish an extra supply of Class V and medical supplies.

e. Establish Communications. Commanders should consider the ef- “>>

fects of built-up areas on communications when they allocate time to estab-
lish communications. Line-of-sight limitations affect both visual and radio
communications. Wire laid at street level is easily damaged by rubble and
vehicle traffic. Also, the noise of built-up area combat is much louder than
in other areas, making sound signals difficult to hear. Therefore, the time
needed to establish an effective communications system may be greater than
in more conventional terrain. Commanders should consider the following
techniques when planning for communications:

3} If possible, lay wire through buildings for maximum protection.

2) Use existing telephone systems. Telephones are not always secure
even though many telephone cables are underground.

(3) Emplace radios and retransmission sites on the second or third floor
of a building.

(4) Use messengers at all levels since they are the most secure means of
communications.

f. Emplace Obstacles and Mines. To save time and resources in prepar-
ing the defense, commanders must emphasize using all available materials
(automobiles, railcars, rubble) to create obstacles. Civilian construction
equipment and materials must be located and inventoried. This equipment
can be used with engineer assets or in place of damaged equipment. Coor-
dination must be made with proper civilian officials before use. Engineers
must be able to provide advice and resources as to the employment of
obstacles and mines. The principles for employing mines and obstacles do
not change in the defense of a built-up area; however, techniques do change.
For example, burying and concealing mines in streets are hard due to
concrete and asphalt. Obstacles must be tied in to buildings and rubble areas
to increase effectiveness and to canalize the enemy. FASCAM may be
effective on the outskirts of a city or in parks; however, in a city core, areas
may be too restrictive (see Appendix G).

g. Improve Fighting Positions. When time permits, all positions, to
include supplementary and alternate positions, should be reinforced with
sandbags and provide overhead cover. Timely and accurate support from
attached engineers helps in this effort (see Appendix E).

h. Establish and Mark Routes Between Positions. Reconnaissance by all
defending elements should help select routes for use by defenders moving
between positions. Movement is crucial in fighting in built-up areas. Early
selection and marking of routes adds to the defender’s advantages.

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Section IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL

In all defensive situations, the commander should position himself well
forward so that he can control the action. In a built-up environment, this is
even more critical due to obstacles, poor visibility, difficulty i in communica-
tion, and intense fighting.

Graphic control measures common to other tactical environments are also
used in combat in built-up areas. Streets are ideal for phase lines. These and
other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of com-
mand.

4-15. COMMAND POST FACILITIES

Command post facilities should be located underground. Their vulnerability
requires all-round security. Since each facility may have to secure itself, it
should be near the reserve unit for added security. When collocated with
another unit, command post facilities may not need to provide their own
security. Also, a simplified organization for command posts is required for
ease of movement. Since rubble often hinders movement of tracked and
wheeled vehicles, battalion and company headquarters must be prepared to
backpack communications and other needed equipment for operations.

4-16. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE |

The battlefield is divided into three operational areas—deep, close, and
rear. At the battalion level, operations are conducted in the close opera-
tional area. The defense is ‘organized into three areas—the security force
area, main battle area, and rear area. A battalion defending in built-up areas
may ‘have missions in any one of these areas, depending on the mission of
the brigade or division (Figure 4-7).

SECURITY FORCE |
AREA

DEEP AREA

MAIN BATTLE
AREA

REAR AREA

Figure 4-7. Organization of the battlefield.

f
T

a. Security Operations. The defensive battle begins with a combined
arms force conducting security operations well forward of the main body.
Security operations include screening operations, guard operations, and
when, augmented with additional CS and CSS assets, covering force opera-
tions. The commander decides which operation is appropriate based on the
factors of METT-T. The designated force uses all available combat power
to destroy the enemy and slow his momentum. Artillery, tactical air, and
attack helicopters are employed to fight the initial battle.

(1) Security operations add to the defense by—

e Alerting the defense to the strength, location, and general
direction of the enemy’s main and supporting attacks.

¢ Delaying enemy first-echelon detachments.
° Initiating early engagement of enemy forces.

e Deceiving the enemy as to the true location of the
main defense force.

(2) The withdrawal of the security forces must not result in an easing of
pressure on the enemy. The built-up area environment may complicate
battle handover from the security force to the main battle area force.
However, this transition must be accomplished smoothly to prevent the
enemy from gaining momentum.

b. Main Battle Area. The decisive battle is fought in the MBA. Depend-
eat, t he battalion, ) ay deploy companies on the
sof the city € nsan b, In either case, the

tron g forces*th €e defending on close
terrain on the flanks into the defensive scheme. The battalion commander
normally employs a security force to the front to provide early warning and
to deny the enemy intelligence on the battalion’s defensive dispositions
(counterreconnaissance) (Figure 4-8).

POSITIONS

m
IN
DEPH

Figure 4-8. Main battle area.

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(1) The size and location of battle positions within the battalion’s area
of operations depends mainly on the type of enemy encountered and the
ability to move between positions to block threatened areas. It may be
desirable to place small antiarmor elements, secured by infantry, on the
forward edges while the main defense is deployed in depth.

(2) A force assigned battle positions on the forward edge of a city or
town should—

* Provide early warning of the enemy’s advance.
° Engage the enemy at long range. |

° Deceive the enemy as to the true location of the defense.

(3) When enemy forces enter and maneuver to seize initial objectives,
the defender should employ all available fires to destroy and suppress the
direct-fire weapons that support the ground attack. Tanks and BMPs should
be engaged as soon as they come within the effective range of antiarmor
weapons.

(4) As the enemy attack develops, the actions of small-unit leaders
assume increased importance. Squad and platoon leaders are often respon-
sible for fighting independent battles. Thus, it is important that all leaders
understand their commander’s concept of the defense.

cR ea. The rear area is behind the MBA. It is the area from which

‘suppl ancesupportis:sent{orward. At battalion level, the rear
area f ‘the MBA. They are not organized as combat elements

but are critical to the overall defense. Protection of these elements is vital.

4-17. COUNTERATTACK |

Small infantry-heavy reserves supported by BFVs and or tanks (if present)
should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy
penetrations, to provide flank protection, and to assist by fire the disengage-
ment and withdrawal of endangered positions. When the reserves are com-
mitted to counterattack to reinforce a unit, they may be attached to the unit
in whose sector the counterattack is taking place. Otherwise, the counterat-
tack becomes the main effort. This makes coordination easier, especially if
the counterattack goes through the unit’s positions.

4-18. DEFENSE DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY

The TF and TM commander can expect the attacker to use limited visibility
conditions to conduct necessary operations to sustain or gain daylight mo-
mentum. (See Appendix I for more information.) —

a. Commanders should employ the following measures to defend
against night attacks.

(1) Defensive positions and crew-served weapons should be shifted just
before dark to deceive the enemy as to their exact location. (A squad or fire
team can often be shifted to an adjacent building and cover the same avenue
of approach.)

(2) Unoccupied areas between units, which can be covered by observed
fire during daylight, may have to be occupied or patrolled at night.

(3) Radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices should be
emplaced on streets and open areas.

(4) Nuisance mines, noise-making devices, tanglefoot tactical wire, and
OPs should be positioned on secondary avenues of approach for early
warning.

(5) Observation posts, planned indirect fires, patrols, and anti-intrusion
devices should be used to prevent infiltration.

(6) Artificial illumination should be planned, to include the use of street
Jamps, stadium lights, and so forth.

(7) Indirect fire weapons, grenade launchers, and hand grenades should
be used when defenses are probed to avoid disclosure of defensive positions.

b. When the enemy begins his night assault, FPFs should be initiated by
a planned signal. Crew-served weapons, tank-mounted weapons, and indi-
vidual riflemen fire within their assigned sectors. Grenades and command
detonated mines should be used to supplement other fires as the
enemy approaches the positions.

c. Defenders should move to daylight positions before the BMNT.
During attacks in fog, rain, or snowstorms, many of the techniques described
for night defense apply. Commanders must rely on OPs and patrolling in
these situations.

Section V. DEFENSIVE PLAN AT BATTALION LEVEL

The built-up area defensive plan at battalion level depends on the size and
location of the area. Many factors must be considered before instituting such
a plan.

4-19. DEFENSE OF A VILLAGE | |
A battalion TF assigned a defensive sector that includes a village may
incorporate the village as a strongpoint in its defense. This use of a built-up
area is most common where the village stands astride a highspeed avenue
of approach or where it lies between two difficult obstacles. To incorporate
such an area into its defense, the battalion TF must control the high ground
on either side of the village to prevent the enemy from firing from those areas
into the village.

a. The majority of the TF tanks and BFVs should be employed where
the maneuver room is the greatest (on the key terrain to the flanks of the
village). This is also where the TF antiarmor vehicles (BF Vs and or ITVs)
should be employed. As the security force withdraws and companies and or
teams assume the fight, BF Vs and IT Vs can assume support by fire positions
in depth. |

b. Although the battalion TFs disposition should prevent large enemy
forces from threatening the rear and flanks of the village, the danger of
small-unit enemy infiltration means that the village must be prepared for
all-round defense.

c. Engineers required for team mobility operations should stay with the
company or company team in the town to provide continuous engineer
support if that company or company team becomes isolated. Engineer
support for the rest of the TF should be centrally controlled by the TF
commander. Engineer assets may be in DS of the other companies or
company teams. The priority of barrier materials, demolitions, and mines
should go to the company or company team in the village.

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d. The TF commander should use the key terrain on the village’s flanks
for maneuver to prevent the village’s defense from becoming isolated. The
strongpoints in the town should provide a firm location where the enemy can
be stopped, around which counterattacks can be launched (Figure 4-9).

Figure 4-9. Battalion defense of a village.

4-20. DEFENSE IN SECTOR

Along with defending a village, a battalion TF may be given the mission of
defending a sector in a city (Figure 4-10). The battalion should take advan-
tage of the outlying structures to provide early warning and to delay the
enemy, and of the tougher interior buildings to provide fixed defense. This
defense should cover an area about 4 to 12 blocks square.

Figure 4-10. Defense of a built-up sector.

a. The battalion TF deployment begins with the reconnaissance platoon
reconnoitering the built-up area to provide an area reconnaissance and
location of the enemy. At the edge of the area, where fields of fire are the
greatest, the battalion TF should deploy BFVs and ITVs and other antiar-
mor weapon systems to provide long-range antiarmor defense.

= b. The FEBA should include the most formidable buildings in the sector.
Forward of the FEBA, the battalion TF should organize a guard force, which
could be a reinforced company. The guard force should concentrate on
causing the enemy to deploy without engaging the enemy in decisive combat.
This can be done through maximum use of ambushes and obstacles, and of
covered and concealed routes through buildings for disengagement. The
guard force inflicts casualties and delays the enemy but avoids decisive
engagement since buildings beyond the FEBA do not favor the defense. As
the action nears the FEBA, the guard force detects the location of the
enemy’s main attack. Upon reaching the FEBA, the guard force can be used

as a reserve and reinforce other elements of the battalion, or it can counter-

attack to destroy an enemy strongpoint.

c. The defense along the FEBA consists of a series of positions set up
similar to that described in the company defense of the village (see para-
graph 4-18). Key terrain features, such as strong buildings, road junctions,
and good firing positions, should be the center of the strongpoint defense.
Based on METT-T considerations, the defense in sector may consist of
either strongpoints or battle positions. Strongpoints located on or covering
decisive terrain are extremely effective in the defense. Buildings should be
prepared for defense as outlined in Appendix D.

d. BFVs should be used to engage BMPs, BTRs, and BRDMs; to cover
obstacles with fire; and to engage in counterattacks with tanks. They can also
be used to transport.casualties.an nd.supplies.to.and.from., the fight

e. Thet

9. They should k
employed in platoons where possible, but in congested areas they may be
employed in sections.

f. Artillery and mortar fire should be used to suppress and blind enemy
overwatch elements, to engage enemy infantry on the approaches to the
door, to provide counterbattery fire, and to support counterattacks using
both indirect and direct fire.

g. Engineers should be attached to the delaying force to help in laying
mines and constructing obstacles, clearing fields of fire, and preparing routes
to the rear. These routes should also have obstacles. Engineers should be in
support of the force in the strongpoints to help prepare fighting positions.

4-21. DELAY IN A BUILT-UP AREA
The purpose of a delay is to slow. the enemy, cause enemy casualties, and
stop the enemy (where possible) without becoming decisively engaged or
being outmaneuvered. The delay can either be oriented on the enemy or on
specified terrain such as a key building or manufacturing complex.

a. A delay in a built-up area consists of a succession of ambushes and
battle positions (Figure 4-11, page 4-22).

(1) Ambushes are planned on overwatching obstacles and are closely
coordinated but decentrally executed. The deployment of the battalion TF
is realigned at important cross streets. The ambushes can be combined with

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FM 90-10-1

4-22

limited objective attacks on the enemy’s flanks. These are usually effective
in the edge of open spaces, parks, wide streets, and so on. These should be
executed by tanks and BFVs along with dismounted infantry.

(2) Battle positions should be placed where heavy weapons, such as
tanks, BF Vs, TOWs, antiarmor weapons, and machine guns, will have the
best fields of fire. Such locations are normally found at major street inter-
sections, parks, and at the edge of open residential areas. Battle positions
should be carefully and deliberately prepared, reinforced by obstacles and
demolished buildings, and supported by artillery and mortars. They should
inflict maximum losses on the enemy and cause him to deploy for a deliberate
attack.

b. Tanks, BF Vs, and antiarmor weapons should have prepared primary
and alternate positions to reduce their vulnerability. Coordination must be
ongoing with withdrawing ambushes until they are safely within the battle

Osition.

j c. The battalion TF is most effective when deployed in two delaying
echelons, alternating between conducting ambushes and fighting from battle
positions. As the enemy threatens to overrun a battle position, the company
disengages and delays back toward the next battle position. As the company
passes through the company to the rear, it establishes another battle posi-
tion. Smoke and demolitions are used to aid in the disengagement. Security
elements on the flank can be employed to prevent the enemy from out-flank-
ing the delay. A small reserve can be used to react to unexpected enemy
action and to conduct continued attacks on the enemy’s flank.

d. The direction of the engineer effort should be centralized to support
the preparation of battle positions. It should be decentralized to support the
force committed to ambush.

e. The width of the TF zone depends upon the nature of the buildings
and obstacles along the street and the time that the enemy must be delayed.

Figure 4-11. Battalion delay in a built-up area.

Section VI. DEFENSIVE PLAN AT COMPANY LEVEL

The defensive plan in built-up areas at company level depends on the size
and location of the area. Many factors must be considered before instituting
such a plan.

4-22. DEFENSE OF A VILLAGE

Once the company commander has completed his reconnaissance of the
village, he scouts the surrounding terrain and, with the information assem-
bled, develops his plan for the defense (Figure 4-12). One of his first
decisions is whether to defend with his infantry on the leading edge of the
village or farther back within the village.

Figure 4-12. Company defense of a village.

-= ‘a, Several factors influence the commander’s decision. First, he must
know the type of enemy that his company will defend against. If the threat
is mainly dismounted infantry, the greater danger is allowing them to gain a
foothold in the town. If the threat is armor or motorized infantry, the greatest
danger is that massive direct fire will destroy the company’s defensive
positions. The company commander must also consider the terrain forward
and to the flanks of the village from which the enemy can direct fires against
his positions. | | |

b. Platoons are given a small group of buildings in which to prepare their
defense, permitting the platoon leader to establish mutually supporting
squad-sized positions. This increases the area that the platoon can control
and hampers the enemy’s ability to isolate or bypass a platoon. A platoon is
responsible for the road through the village. The rest of the company is
positioned to provide all-round security and defense in depth.

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FM 90-10-1

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c. A position for the company mortars must be chosen that protects
mortars from direct fire and allows for overhead clearance. The company’s
BFVs or APCs are placed in positions to the rear of the buildings and interior
courtyards where their weapon systems can provide added rear and flank
security. Combat vehicles are assigned primary, alternate, and supplemen-
tary positions as well as primary and secondary sectors of fire. They should
be positioned in defilade behind rubble and walls, or inside buildings for
movement into and out of the area. Control of the platoon’ s BFVs or APCs
by the platoon leader is required for resupply, MEDEVAC, and rapid
repositioning during the battle.

d. The company commander locates a forward area where he can
position his company trains. A location is chosen near the highway to ease
recovery and maintenance operations. A company OP is established where
the fields of observation are best.

e. The company commander must also decide which buildings must be
rubbled. To defeat the enemy he must have good fields of fire, but rubbling
the buildings too soon or rubbling too many may disclose his exact locations
and destroy cover from direct fire. The company’s TOWS are positioned on
high ground in and around the town to attain good fields of fire to the front
and flanks.

f. If a tank platoon is available from the TF, the company commander
could place the tanks along the leading edge where rapid fire would comple-
ment the TOWs and Dragons. The tank platoon leader should select exact
firing positions and assign sectors of fire. Iffaced by enemy infantry, the tanks
move to alternate positions with the protection of the infantry. These
alternate positions allow the tanks to engage to the front as well as the flanks
with as little movement as possible. After they are withdrawn from the
leading edge of the town, the tanks could provide a mobile reserve for the
team.

g. FPFs are planned to address the biggest threat to the platoon—the
enemy’s infantry. When firing an FPF inside a built-up area is required,
mortars are more effective than artillery. This is due to their higher angle of
fall which gives them a greater chance of impacting on the street.

h. Obstacles, mainly antivehicle obstacles, are easily constructed in a
built-up area. The company commander must stop enemy vehicles without
interfering with his own movement in the village. Therefore, he executes the
emplacement of cratering charges at key street locations on order. Mines
are laid on the outskirts of the town and along routes the company will not
use.

i. The supporting engineers use C4 and other explosives to make firing
ports, mouseholes, and demolition obstacles. Based upon his priority of
work, the commander tells the engineer squad leader to assist each of the
infantry platoons preparing the village for defense and to execute the team’s
obstacle plan. The squad leader’s mission is to tell the infantrymen exactly
where to place the demolitions and how much is needed for the desired
effect. He also assists in the emplacement and recording of the minefields
as well as the preparation of fighting positions.

j. Ammunition expenditure is usually high when fighting in a built-up
area. To avoid moving around the village with ammunition resupply during
the battle, the commander directs that more ammunition be stockpiled in
each occupied platoon and squad position. He also orders the platoons to

stockpile firefighting equipment, drinking water, food, and first-aid supplies
at each squad position. Other factors the company commander must con-
sider are:

e Resupply.

e Medical evacuation.

e Communications.

° Firefighting.

e Sleep and alert plans.

e Security.

e Limited visibility.

e Civilian control.

k. To ensure adequate communications, the company installs a wire net
and develops a plan for pyrotechnic signals. Backup wire should be laid in

case primary lines are cut by vehicles, fires, or the enemy. The commander
also plans for the use of messengers throughout the village.

4-23. DEFENSE OF A CITY BLOCK
A company in a built-up area may have to defend a city block in a core
periphery or residential area. It conducts this operation according to the
defensive scheme of the battalion. The operation should be coordinated with
the action of security forces charged with delaying to the front of the
company’s. position. The defense should take advantage of the Pea penon of
buildings that dominate the roads.

a. A well-organized company defense—

° Stops the attack of the enemy on the roads

by using obstacles and enfilade fire.

e Destroys the enemy by ambush and direct
fire from prepared positions. |

¢ Bjects the enemy from footholds or remains
in place for a counterattack conducted by battalion.

b. The operation of the company is more effective if it has time to
reconnoiter the terrain, and to prepare obstacles and fire lanes. Vehicles not
needed for the defense should be grouped in the combat trains at battalion.
The OPs should be supplemented by patrols, mainly at night, and commu-
nications should be wire. The company should be organized to provide a
series of OPs, a defense, and a reserve that is tasked with counterattacks.

c. The defensive forces should ambush on the avenues of approach, cover
the obstacles by fire, and prepare a strong defense inside the buildings
(Appendix D). The reserve can be tasked—

e To reinforce the fires of the defense.
* To react to a danger on the flank...
* To counterattack to throw the enemy from a foothold.

d. Engineers should be controlled at company level. They construct
obstacles, prepare access routes, and assist in preparing defensive positions.

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A company or section of tanks attached to the company should provide
heavy direct-fire support, engage enemy tanks, and support counterattack.

4-24. COMPANY DELAY

A company delay can be part of a battalion’s defense (Figure 4- 13). Its
operations destroy enemy reconnaisance elements forward of the outskirts
of the town, prevent their penetration of the built-up areas, and gain and
maintain contact with the enemy to determine the strength and location of
the main attack.

Figure 4-13. Company delay in a built-up area.

a. The company’s sector should be prepared with obstacles to increase
the effect of the delay. Engineers prepare obstacles on main routes but avoid
some covered and concealed routes that are known by the friendly troops
for reinforcement, displacement, and resupply. These routes are destroyed
when no longer needed.

b. Antiarmor weapon systems are positioned on | the outskirts of the
town to destroy the enemy at maximum range. They should be located in
defilade positions or in prepared shelters. They fire at visible targets and
then fall back or proceed to alternate positions. Platoons should be assigned
sectors from 500 to 700 meters (one to two blocks) wide. They should be
reinforced with sensors or GSRs, which can be emplaced on the outskirts or
on higher ground. Platoons delay by using patrols, OPs, and ambushes and
by taking advantage of all obstacles. Each action is followed by a disengage-
ment and withdrawal. By day, the defense is dispersed; at night, it is more
concentrated. Close coordination is vital.

c. Tanks support the platoon by engaging enemy tanks, providing rein-
forcing fires, aiding the disengagement of the platoons, and covering obsta-
cles by fire.

FM 90-10-1

d. BFVs support the platoon in the same manner as tanks except they
engage BTRs, BMPs, and BRDMs.

4-25. DEFENSE OF A TRAFFIC CIRCLE

A rifle company or company team may be assigned the mission of defending
a key traffic circle in a built-up area to prevent the enemy from seizing it
(Figure 4-14).

OS di

mii Sy xy
Bay) penn Ms
= wr A
ZA

es: oe

Figure 4-14. Defense of a traffic circle.

a. The company commander with this mission should analyze enemy
avenues of approach and buildings that dominate those avenues. He should
plan all possible fire power on the traffic circle itself and on the approaches
to it. He should also plan for all-round defense of the buildings that dominate
the traffic circle to prevent encirclement. The commander should prepare
as many covered and concealed routes between these buildings as possible.
This makes it easier to mass or shift fires, and to execute counterattacks.

b. Obstacles can also deny the enemy the use of the traffic circle. Obstacle
planning in this case must consider if friendly forces are supposed to use the
traffic circle. TOWs and Dragons can fire across the traffic circle if fields of
fire are long enough. Tanks should engage enemy tanks and provide heavy
direct-fire support for counterattacks. BF Vs should engage BTRs, BMPs,
and BRDMs and provide direct fire to protect obstacles.

Section Vil. DEFENSIVE PLAN AT PLATOON LEVEL

The defensive plan in built-up areas at platoon level is METT-T and ROE
dependent.

4-27

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4-28

4-26. DEFENSE OF A STRONGPOINT

One of the most common defensive tasks a platoon will be given is the
strongpoint defense of a building, part of a building, or a group of small
buildings (Figure 4-15). The platoon’s defense is normally integrated into
the company’s mission (defense of a traffic circle, and so forth). The platoon
must keep the enemy from gaining a foothold in buildings. It makes the best
use of its weapons and supporting fires, organizes all-round defense, and
counterattacks or calls for a company counterattack to eject an enemy that
has a foothold. The platoon leader analyzes his defensive sector to recom-
mend to the company commander the best use of obstacles and supporting
fires.

Figure 4-15. Defense of a strongpoint.

a. The platoon should be organized into a series of firing positions
located to cover avenues of approach, to cover obstacles, and to provide
mutual support. Snipers may be located on the upper floors of the buildings.
Unengaged elements should be ready to counterattack, fight fires, or rein-
force other elements of the platoon.

b. Depending on the length of the mission, the platoon should stockpile
the following:

e Pioneer equipment (axes, shovels, hammers, picket pounders).
e Barrier material (barbed wire, sandbags).

e Munitions (especially grenades).

¢ Food and water.

e Medical supplies.

* Firefighting equipment.

4-27. DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR

The terrain common to built-up areas is well-suited to an infantry’s defense
against mechanized infantry and armored forces. Mechanized infantry and
armored forces try to avoid built-up areas but may be forced to pass through
them. A well-trained infantry can inflict heavy casualties on such forces.

a. Built-up areas have certain traits that favor infantry antiarmor opera-
tions.

(1) Rubble in the streets can be used to block enemy vehicles, conceal
mines, and cover and conceal defending infantry.

(2) The streets restrict armor maneuver, fields of fire, and communica-
tions, thereby reducing the enemy’s ability to reinforce.

3) Buildings provide cover and concealment for defending infantry.

4) Rooftops, alleys, and upper floors provide good firing positions.

5) Sewers, storm drains, and subways provide underground routes for
infantry forces.

b. Antiarmor operations in built-up areas involve the following planning
steps:

STEP 1: Choose a good engagement area. Enemy tanks should be
engaged where most restricted in their ability to support each other. The
best way for infantrymen to engage tanks is one at a time, so that they can
destroy one tank without being open to the fires of another. Typical locations
include narrow streets, turns in the road, “T” intersections, bridges, tunnels,
split-level roads, and rubbled areas. Less obvious locations can also be used
by using demolitions or mines to create obstacles.

STEP 2: Select good weapons positions. The best weapons positions are
places where the tank is weakest and the infantry is most protected. A tank’s
ability to see and fire are limited, mainly to the rear and flanks, if the tanks
_ are buttoned up. Figure 4-16 shows the weapons and visual dead space of a
buttoned-up tank against targets located at ground level. Similar dead space
exists against targets located overhead.

TANK CANNOT SEE

©! 1 Ve ERO

DEADSPACE
~~ Udell | J|
—<_- R
Ea NOOO

DEADSPACE TANK CANNOT SEE

Figure 4-16. Tanks cannot fire at close-range,
street-level, and overhead targets.

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4-29

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4-30

STEP 3: Assign target reference points and select method of engagement.
After selecting the weapons positions, assign target reference points (TRPs)
to ensure coverage of the areas and as a tool in controlling fires. The TRPs
should be clearly visible through the gunner’s sights and should be resistant to
battle damage (for example, large buildings or bridge abatements, but not trees
or cars). The leader of the antiarmor operation should specify what type of
engagement should be used, such as frontal, cross-fire, or depth. Frontal fire
is the least preferred since it exposes the gunner to the greatest probability
of detection and it is where the armor is the thickest. (For more information
on target engagement techniques, see FM 7-91 and or FM 23-1.)

(a) To the infantry force, the best places to fire on tanks are at the flanks
and rear at ground level or at the top of tanks if the force is in an elevated
position in a building (see Appendix H for minimum arming distance). A
suitable antiarmor defense might be set up as shown in Figure 4-17.

Figure 4-17. A platoon’s antiarmor defense.

(b) The best place to engage a tank from a flank is over the second road
wheel at close range. This can be done using a corner so that the tank cannot
traverse the turret to counterattack.

(c) For a safe engagement from an elevated position, infantrymen
should allow the tank to approach to a range three times the elevation of the
weapons.

(d) To engage at a longer range is to risk counterfire, since the weapon’s
position will not be in the tank’s overhead dead space. However, overhead
fire at the rear or flank of the tank is even more effective. Alternate and
supplementary positions should be selected to enforce all-round security and
to increase flexibility.

STEP 4: Coordinate target engagement. Tanks are most vulnerable
when buttoned up. The first task of the tank-killing force is to force the tanks

to button up, using all available direct and indirect fire. The proper use of —

fire control measures and graphics will greatly diminish the probability of

‘NY
Mee

FM 90-10-1

fratricide. The next task is to coordinate the fires of the antitank weapons so
that if there is more than one target in the engagement area, all targets are
engaged at the same time.

<c. Armored vehicles are often accompanied by infantry in built-up
areas. Antiarmor weapons must be supported by an effective all-round
antipersonnel defense (Figure 4-18).

d. Ata planned signal (for example, the detonation of a mine) all targets
are engaged at the same time. If targets cannot, they are engaged in the order
of the most dangerous first. Although tanks present the greatest threat,
BMPs are also dangerous because their infantry can dismount and destroy
friendly antiarmor positions. If the friendly force is not secured by several
infantrymen, priority of engagement might be given to enemy APCs. Rubble
and mines should be used to reduce target mobility to present more targets
to engage. |

ijt

MAN

Figure 4-18. Coordinated antiarmor ambush.

re = HA
KY a

à Al
F LAN eg

g
oe, me

t Cg
1

4-31

FM 90-10-1

4-32

4-28. CONDUCT OF ARMORED AMBUSH

A rifle company can use an attached tank platoon to conduct an armored
ambush in a built-up area (Figure 4-19). To do so, the tank platoon should
be reinforced with a BFV or APC and one or two squads from the rifle
company. The ambush can be effective against enemy armor if it is con-
ducted in an area cleared and reconnoitered by friendly forces.

Figure 4-19. Armored ambush.

a. The operation involves maneuver on a road network that is free of
obstacles. Obstacles outside the ambush area can be used to canalize and
delay the enemy. The ambushing tank platoon must know the area.

b. The ambushing tanks should be located in a hide position situated
about 1,000 meters from the expected enemy avenue of approach. A security
post, located at a choke point, observes and reports the approach, speed,
security posture, and activity of the enemy. This role is assigned to a scout
who uses the BFV, ITV, or APC to move from OP to OP. When the enemy
is reported at a trigger point or TRP, the tank platoon leader knows how

_ much he must move his tanks to execute the ambush.

c. The tanks move quickly from their hide positions to firing positions,
taking advantage of all available concealment. They try for flank shots on
the approaching enemy—the average range is 300 to 400 meters. Such long
ranges do not expose tanks to the enemy infantry. Once the enemy is
engaged, tanks break contact and move to a rally point with close security
provided by an infantry squad. They then move to a new ambush site.

CHAPTER 5

~ FUNDAMENTAL COMBAT SKILLS

Successful combat operations in built-up areas depend on the proper
employment of the rifle squad. Each member must be skilled in the
techniques of combat in built-up areas: moving, entering buildings,
clearing buildings, employing hand grenades, selecting and using firing
positions, navigating in built-up areas, and camouflaging. Soldiers must
remember to remain in buddy teams when moving through a MOUT
environment.

Section |. MOVEMENT

Movement in built-up areas is the first fundamental skill the soldier must
master. Movement techniques must be practiced until they become habitual.
To reduce exposure to enemy fire, the soldier avoids silhouetting himself,
avoids open areas, and selects his next covered position before movement.

5-1. CROSSING OF A WALL |

Each soldier must learn the correct method of crossing a wall (Figure 5-1).
After he has reconnoitered the other side, he quickly rolls over the wall,
keeping a low silhouette. The speed of his move and a low silhouette deny
the enemy a good target.

i» Ky
P \ L
(4

Figure 5-1. Soldier crossing a wall.

5-2. MOVEMENT AROUND CORNERS

The area around a corner must be observed before the soldier moves beyond
it. The most common mistake a soldier makes at a corner is allowing his
weapon to extend beyond the corner, exposing his position. He should show
his head below the height an enemy soldier would expect to see it. When

FM 90-10-1

using the correct techniques for looking around a corner (Figure 5-2), the
soldier lies flat on the ground and does not extend his weapon beyond the
corner of the building. He wears his kevlar helmet, and exposes his head (at
ground level) only enough to permit observation. |

1
y
w
-f

d
A

Figure 5-2. Correct technique for looking around a corner.

5-3. MOVEMENT PAST WINDOWS

_ Windows present another hazard to the soldier and small-unit leader. The

most common mistake in passing a window is exposing the head. If the
soldier shows his head (Figure 5-3), an enemy gunner inside the building

: could engage him through the window without exposing himself to friendly
covering fires.

{<>

| Figure 5-3. Soldier moving past windows.

iz Taa

a. When using the correct technique for passing a window, the soldier
stays below the window level. He makes sure he does not silhouette himself
in the window; he “hugs” the side of the building. An enemy gunner inside
the building would have to expose himself to covering fires if he tried to
engage the soldier.

b. The same techniques used in passing first-floor windows are used

when passing basement windows (Figure 5-4); however, the most common

mistake in passing a basement window is not being aware of it. A soldier
should not walk or run past a basement window, since he presents a good
target to an enemy gunner inside the building. When using the correct
procedure for negotiating a basement window, the soldier stays close to the
wall of the building and steps or jumps past the window without exposing his
legs.

Soy

ESS

AWS

Ws
,

N-
Runs.
ROAN
Saa

Á o A
oy)
of

TN em

Figure 5-4. Soldier passing basement windows.

5-4. USE OF DOORWAYS

Doorways should not be used as entrances or exits since they are normally
covered by enemy fire. If a soldier must use a doorway as an exit, he should
move quickly through it to his next position, staying as low as possible to
avoid silhouetting himself (Figure 5-5, page 5-4). Preselection of positions,
speed, a low silhouette, and the use of covering fires must be emphasized in
exiting doorways.

FM 90-10-1

CG) J BA i, | - | ae
fi l
NEXT COVERED
= POSITION -

Ee mke

<<
=

COVERING FIRE

TAE = t
“WA Y2 Ss :
5-5. MOVEMENT PARALLEL TO BUILDINGS

Soldiers and small units may not always be able to use the inside of buildings
as a route of advance. Therefore, they must move on the outside of the
buildings (Figure 5-6). Smoke and covering fires, and cover and concealment
should be used to hide movement. In correctly moving on the outside of a
building, the soldier “hugs” the side of the building, stays in the shadow,

presents a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to his next position (Figure 5- -7).

If an enemy gunner inside the building fires on a soldier, he exposes himself
to fire from other squad members. Furthermore, an enemy gunner farther
down the street would have difficulty detecting and engaging the soldier.

Figure 5-5. Soldier exiting a doorway.

eee NEXT COVERED
E POSITION
1ST COVERED
POSITION

OTHER PLATOON MEMBERS
PROVIDE COVER

Figure 5-7. Selection of the next position.

FM 90-10-1

5-5

FM 90-10-1

5-6

5-6. CROSSING OF OPEN AREAS
Open areas, such as streets, alleys, and parks, should be avoided. They are
natural kill zones for enemy crew-served weapons. They can be crossed
safely if certain fundamentals are applied by the individual or small-unit
leader.

= a. When using the correct procedure for crossing an open area, the
soldier develops a plan for his own movement. (Smoke from hand grenades
or smoke pots should be used to conceal the movement of all soldiers.) He
runs the shortest distance between the buildings and moves along the far
building to the next position. By doing so, he reduces the time he is exposed
to enemy fire.

b. Before moving to another position, the soldier should make a visual
reconnaissance and select the position for the best cover and concealment.
At the same time, he should select the route that he will take to get to that-
position.

5-7. FIRE TEAM EMPLOYMENT

Moving as a fire team, from building to building € or between buildings,
presents a problem because a fire team presents a large target to enemy fire
(Figure 5-8). When moving from the corner of one building to another, the
fire team should move across the open area in a group. Moving from the ‘side
of one building to the side of another presents a similar problem, and the
technique of movement employed is the same. The fire team should use the
building as cover. In moving to the adjacent building (Figure 5-9), team
members should keep a distance of 3 to 5 meters between themselves and,
using a planned signal, make an abrupt flanking movement (on line) across |
the open area to the next building.

Figure 5-8. Fire team movement.

FM 90-10-1

Figure 5-9. Movement to adjacent building.

5-8. MOVEMENT BETWEEN POSITIONS

When moving from position to position, each soldier must be careful not to
mask his supporting fires. When he reaches his next position, he must be
prepared to cover the movement of other members of his fire team or squad.
He must use his new position effectively, and fire his weapon from either
shoulder.

a. The most common errors a soldier can make when firing from a
position are firing over the top of his cover and silhouetting himself against
the building to his rear, providing the enemy with an easy target. The correct
technique for firing from a covered position i
…[truncated]

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