Document text
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
CLASSIFICATION sECRET,/SECURITY INFOR |
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT = co-x0.
NISSR DATE DISTRAG Feb 1953
Soviet Armed Forces Field Mamal NO. OF PASES 14 -.
1948-PU=48
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF IN
ewomisetis At
oe
a agenenuctiag oF
NO. OF ENCLS. 2
Wwisted BELOW (ay (3)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
tata fee le rece
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
i
1. The Soviet Armed Ferces Field Manual 1948 (Pol
Vooruzhennyks Sil 1948 eeda;
evoy Ustav
abbrevisted PU-~48) is published in two
tactios of battalions and regiments;
| volumes: volume I Seals with
volume II applies te divisions and cerps. It waa distributed to
units in 1949 in a very limited murber of copies: re ts and
separate battalions received one, divisions and higher units, two
copies.
document
officere
office.
2« PU-48 is
consists
famij ‘iar
in safes in the secret
and may be issued to
taken cut of the
Plla48 ig classified "Secret", kept
sections of tne respective units,
only upon signed receipt. It cannot be
and yet, each volume
required to be therougnly
ven for tb
written in a very concise style,
of 300-400 pages. Officers are
with t 3 al rses were
purpose in 1950 e
This inatruction, however, is Famperad by the strict security
measures applying te the handling of the manual.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Rel
(Yix| AEC.
SV EBT
-
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
ease 2011/08/03 . CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 If
f Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 [ri
‘.
SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
-2-
General Remarke
4, In order to understand correctly the real seantag. ead. importance of
the Soviet Armed Forces Field Manual - j948, it shquld be borne in
. mind that World War II has caused a drastic revision of the basic
tactical doctrines of the Soviet Army. The most important changes
appear to be as follows:
(a) Defensive Battle: Prior to World War II Soviet tactical
d@oétrine did not recognize defensive battle as an independent
tactical operation. The old manuals either completely dis-
regarded this operation, or passed over it as a very exceptional
situation, limited from the tactical point of view by the
elements employed: manpower, time, and terrain. The army was
trained end indoctrinated for offensive tactics which were over-
emphasized. Offensive tactics are an old tradition in the ;
Russian Army, at least with respect to instruction, although
the study of war nistory may prove to the contrary. The
traditions] offensive tactics harmonized well with the
_aggressiveness of the Soviet Regime and the Communist ideclogy,
not only because they corresponded to the character of the -
{deology, but because the very concept of defense was con~
sidered a recognition of weakness. Tt was considered dangerous
to give tne armed masses of the population an official basis
for the belief thet the Soviet state might be weak enough to
have to tight a defensive battle. Consequently, the offensive
doctrine dominated in the combat training of units as well as
in the military education of individuals.
(1) The Soviet point of view on prisoners of war clearly
: 4liustrates this difference between the Soviet conception
of warfare and that of other nations. According to Soviet
Army reguiutions, the term "surrender" does not exist.
No individual, therefore, has the rignt tc stop righting,
and no commander is authorized to issue such an order to
that effect, no matter how hopeless the combat situation is,
and how tenseless it is to continue the fighting. Even
when his unit is surrounded and completely cut off, each
dndividual must fight until his "last breath", A Soviet
Army man can only be taken prisoner if a severe wound makes
him unconscious und thus not responsible. This regulation
has two results:
a. After Worid War II several hundred thousand Soviet
prisoners of war were sent to forced labor camps and
resettled in Siberia because they could not prove that
they had been severely wounded or uaconscious at the
time of their capture.
b. For the same reason, the USSR has never recognized the
international Geneva Convention in regard to prisoners
of war.
(2) Although the charecter cf the Soviet Regime has not changed ¢lnce
Werid Wer "Ly the disestrous experiences of the first period
of the war induced Soviet army leaders to accept the
possibtlity of defensive hattle, provide for its definition,
give it a recognized niace in the flela marua:, and regulato
ita application. Thus, for the first time in the history of
the Soviet Army, the defensive battle has acquired ics fll
and legal place. (Other innovations concerning the .
defensive battle will be mentioned in the section dealing
with defensive tactical operations ., :
SECRET SECURITY INPROMAT ION
o
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-008094000600030543-6
cen cone eee eet ents aa ees ee ate ak bie nen Addl al Aa imi Sk ate Laie aE ans aa
: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 CIA-R
i
50X1-HUM
|
(b>) New Combat Formations. Based on the experiences of World War I,
the Civil War, and on the eventual development of armaments, the
Soviet Army field manuals (prior to Werld War II) were tullt around the
concept of mass use of infentry echeloned in depth, supported by
artillery and tanks. The combat formation of an infantry division
in attack or defense consisted of two or three echelons of
regiments placed one behind the cther. In the first months of
WW II it was proved that the massed and depth formations of the
Soviet Army were quite inadequate for modern warfare. As the
artillery support was insufficient and the air force unable to
neutralize enemy artillery and prevent aerial attacks, the units
of the second and third echelons very often suffered more
casualties than the first echelon and were disorganized even
before they could be put into action. This experience induced
the Soviet Supreme Command to reconsider the adequacy of
echeloned formations and to adapt them to vhe requirements of 2
modern warfare as imposed by the enemy. Late in 1942 the
Supreme Command of the Seviet Armed Forces issued Directive
#00306 which abolished the archaic echeloned combat formations
and prescribed. completely rew formations which, until that time,
were quite unknown in the Soviet Army. These new formations
tested during the later part of World War Ii proved their effectiveness,
and became part of Soviet battle tactics. They are fully
recognized by now and have beem taken as a basis for the "Soviet
Armed Forces Field Manual 1948", As specified by this manual
the new combat formations are: the wedge (uglem vpered); the
anvectca wedue (aglom cazad); staggered to the right (ustupom
vpravo); staggered to the left (usturnem vlevo); and the line
formation (v liniyu). /See fnaleswze (A)
{c) Artillery. More then ever before the PU-48B manual emphasizes
the importance of artillery, which 4s given the mcst distinguished
place in the arme: brarches. In the Russian, and eventually in
j the Soviet Army, artiliery was alweys 4 favorite arm, but never
to such an extent as row. PU-48 places artillery even above the
rice mechanized troops, and officially calls 16 "Queen of
Battle’.
(a) Tanks and Mechanized Forces. PU-48 relegates tank units to a
lesser importance than before and at the neginning of Worlé War II.
But if tank units sre assigned a more modest position among the
other armed forces, their importance is still etressed, and they
ure considered capable of independently carrying out all tactical
assignments.
(e) AA Artillery. PU-48 stresses the importance cf AAA, undoubtedly as
& consequence of the rapid davelopment.of the air force. This
applies te PYO and tactical AAA units a3 well. In combat, the
latter ave now placed much closer to the front lines than before
(the small cuidber AAA units, one km, and the medium caliber
units, two km behind the firat infantry lines).
(f) Air Force. PU-48 classifies the air foree as a supporting arm.
The strategi¢ tasic of long range bombing is recognized, but no
emphasis, whatsoever, is placed upon it. Following the pattern of World
War II, the main task of the alr force 46 tactical support of
ground forces in combat.
(g) Airborne Troops. The airborne troops appear for the first time
Sn the Soviet field manual. The importance and tasks of these
troops are sufficiently emphasized to secure them an adequate
place among other arms.
SECRET /SECURITY INFORMATION
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
en Far ear owe
Sanitized
50X1-HUM
NO SAA: a
SECRET/SECURLTY INFORMATION |
2
(kh) The Encircling Battle... This operation was not mentioned in '
Soviet field manuals before PU-48. The experdence gained during wWerla
Wer IZ wWaen several successful encircling battles were fought ~
Stalingrad was the first - resulted in an entire chapter of tha
new manual. The encirclement of.enemy forces is considered the
mécessary final phase of any mer offensive which cannot te
fully exploited without such an operation.
(4) Combat in Populeted Areas. This too is a new feature of PU-48,
Regulations for this type of operation are based on numerous
experiences in #01) Was 0. oy vena supuasices ths importarae | OF
this tactical] operation, gives rules for it and points to the
Recessity of training personnel for close combat fighting.
Jombat-Formations HE Ree Gea GSN Aa es
3- The various formations used in combat are not fixed and must be
applied according to the particular situation encountered. The main
ones are the following: [See veer Cay :
(a) Wedge Formation (Ugiom Vpered)
For this formation one regiment is placed forward, and two in
the rear, to the left and right, thus forming a triangle
pointed at the enemy positions. It is used normally in an attack
on a strongly fortified position. The attack starts with the
frontal engagement of the leading regiment, with tha purpose of i
attracting enemy attention ‘o the center and thus forcing him |
to divert his troops from the flanks in order to reinforce the
endangered center. AS soon as the enemy flanks are exposed,
the second line regiments attack both enemy flanks, In the
final stage such an attack leads to the encirclement of eneny f
forcus and their vomplete annihilation.
(b) Inverted Wedge Formation (Uglom Nazad)
This i8 a reversed wedge formation, with two regiments in front
and one in the rear, making thus a triangle with its base
toward the enemy. This formation is used normally in an attaék
OR an enemy position when its center is strongly fortified,
The two first line regiments stert an attack on both enemy
flanks, forcing him to divert his forces from the center in
oréer to reinforces the endangeréd flanks, When he does this,
the centrally located second iins regiment attacks the enemy
center, Such an attack leads to the breakthrough of the enemy
position; his forces are ent lato two separate groups with no
céntraiized command, In the lest phase the attacking forces
appear in the enemy's seer and encircle the two separated
enemy groups. :
(c) Staggered to the Right Formation (Jetupom Vpravo)
(a) Staggered to the Left Formation (Ustupom Vievo)
For these formations all three regiments are depioyed in such
a way that every succeed.ag regiment is bekind and tu the- right,
or to the left, of the preceeding one. These rormations are used
in the attack on enemy flanks (no fursher information available).
(a) Line Rormation (¥_liniyu)
In this formetion all three regiments are lined up parallel to
the enemy front. There is no necond echelon in this formation.
It is frequently used for an attack on an unfortified enemy
position, against an inferior enemy, against an enemy vho is
waprapared for defanse, or moving into porition at the time of
the atteck, against demoralized enery, an ctemy in retreat, and.
always in the pursuit of the defeated eneny
SECPET /SECURTTY INFORMATION .
saerreanen rating
anitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 - CIA-RDP80
aA
“
i 50X1-HUM
SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
! —————_
j
1
6, It shouid be borne in mind, the manual states, that the above {
mentioned combat formations are in no cas@# standard patterns to be
used blindly regardless of the actual tactical situation, In the j
development of modern combat there may appear many unforeseen phases i
for which ne rules cen be given in advance. Therefore sound
dudgefient, the correct understanding of the tactical Situation, and
the ipitiative of commanders are most important elements of victory.
Since troops in combat are commanded and deployed sy officers, the
outcome depends greatly on the abliity of officers, Combat formations
are considered basic concepts and must be used whenever appropriate.
Since the enemy and his intentions represent an important tactical
element, however, no decision on the combat formation can be made
unless there is sufficient information on the enemy forces, their
defense positions, strength, order of battle, and presumed intentions.
This important information can be obtained caly when ald commariders
concerned correctly understand the importance of the reconnaissance
and intelligence services and use them properly. Weil organized
reconnaissance services are the "ears and eyes" of a commander. On
the other hand, since the best decision taken by a commander is of
no value unless transmitted in due time to all his subordinates
down to the iast soldier who is to carry 1t out, it is the respon-
sipility of commanders to organize an adequate signal and liaison
service and to maintain it 24 hours a day, regardless of combat
conditions. It must always be remembered that "ljaison ta the nerve
syetem of the army",
7. PU-4G also states that it is the duty of commanders to initiate,
encourage and dévelop constructive initiative of noncommissioned
officers and soldiers, Left to himself in difficult combat condi-
tions, each individual noncommissioned officer and soldier must be
able to evaluate correctly the situation and decide what is the best {
action for his unit as a whole. It is the sacred duty of every
soldier and noncomniseioned officer to strive forward, disregerding
all dangers and difficulties, and to use hia firearm, hand grenade
and bayonet to attack the enemy in order to open the way for the
advance of his unit.
Arms and Servyines
8, The USSR Armed Forces are composed of the following arms and aervioces:
infentry, artillery, air foroe, tank and mechanized units, sombat
engineers, «i virvn troops, navy, and rear Berviocas,
gnfantry
9. The infantry is the prinoipal arm of the ground forces which is
qualified to perform independently any tactical assignment. It is
the only arm able to conduct close combat,’ and to take and hold en
enemy position. Since it possesses a high degree of flexibility and
maneuverability, the infantry is easily able to regroup in combat, to
‘use various formations and to condiet a}? tact*oal assigninenta:
attack, defense, combat in the enemy rear zone, combat to break an
encirclement, combat in a forest zorie, combat in the mountains, and
combat Jn populated areas. Provided with powerful modern weapgns
and equipment, the infantry can engage and successfully conduct a
fight against any and ali enemy arms... ali the other arms are :
supporting arms and therefore ‘attached to the infantry. Under normal
conditions the senior infantry commander is in charge of the tactical :
task to be performed and al] other units couch as artillery, tanks,
air force, which may be’ nesded to accomplish the task, are attached
to the infantry unit and subordinate to its commander,
SECRET /SECURITY INFORMATION
a
| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
annem ATs
ST ee pe ane
PSanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 - CIA-RDP80-008094000600030543-6_Iiy
SECRET/SECURLTY INFORMATION
~6~
Artillery cee a ne . .
10, The artillery represents the striking power of the ground forces.
Possessing an enormous fire power and the capacity to destroy, the {
artillery can independently perform various tacticel assignments.
it can destroy enemy fortifications, concrete, wooden and earth Ra
Pill-boxes; it 1s able to oppose and destroy enemy tanks, to open F
passages in the enemy barbed wire system or in a mine field. dé
Endowed with flexibility and maneuverability, the artillery can give
fire support to the advancing units in all phases of an attack.
It is the responsibility of artillery to neutralize by its fire the
enemy gun emplacements, to destroy the enemy manpower, as well as to
keep down the enemy emplacements which may reopen fire during the
later stages of the advancing attack. It takes upon itself the
fight against the enemy tanks and repulses the counter-attacks
launched by the enemy,
11. With its long range fire, the artillery can take under fire the
enemy rear zone and destroy ammunition dumps, warehouses, bridges,
railroad facilities, command posts and other targets located deep
behind the enemy positions. In combat, as a rule, the artillery
units within a division are organized into "divisional artillery
groups" (divizionnyye artilleriyskiy gruppy - DAG}; in regiments
they form "regimental artillery roups"(PAG), and in battalions,
"battalion artillery Groups"(BAG). In larger strategic units, the
artillery is organized into corps and army artillery groups. Each
group is assigned a commander, who ia normally the senior artillery
officer within such a group, and who ig referred to as group
commander. Depending on the tasks assigned, the regimental and :
battalion artillery groups are called either “infantry support
roups" (podderzhki pekhoty - PP) or “infantry close support groups" {
Meposredstvennoy podde:'zhkt pekhoty - NPP). The latter are
normally organized in the zone of the main effort.
| 12. On the basis of fire power, and for the particular missicn which is
to be accomplished, the ground force artillery is divided into a
series of ground target artillery groups and AA artillery. Groups
are ae follows: the battalion, regimental, divisional, corps, army,
and heavy artillery groups (artilierya bol'shoy moshcohaosti - BM),
ac well as the artillery groups at the disposai of the Supreme
Command (Rezerva Glavnogo Komandovaniya). Provided with multiplicity
of calibers, variety of guns and ammunition which charasterise
modern artillery, eka d units oan partioipate in combat under
any terrain conditicns. Thenks to ita valuable co. ‘racteristiog and
because it has a splendid record of achievements - rombat, artillery
enjoys the highest respect emong the other arma as..¢l1 as their
undivided sympathy. It 4s with full Justification that in the Soviet
army, artillery is considered and referred to as the "Queen of Battle",
Anti-Airorats Arviliery
13. APA is @ special type of artillery which provides cover against
evemy air attacks. According to the assigned tusks the anti-
airoraft artillery is divided into: Army .Actiatrozert Artillery
and Territorial Adr Defense © -+‘a:ngrat Artillery (Zen2tnaya
Artilleriya Territorii PVO Strany!. In combat the cérps and
Givieion AAA is organized into AA eub-grovys; corps AA sub-groups,
and divisional AA sub-groups (korpusnaye i divistonnaya seat tnsye
artillertyskaya sodgruppa - KZAP and DZAF). These groups are ‘
composed of organs: AAA wiits of the raspeotive ocrps and divisions,
and nave the tactical task of providing the .. axtiaivare®s defense
for all corpe and divisional unity in any tactical situations.
SECRET, “SkoURTIY TVPORMEEION
=< arena seamen aera ete a rapeenacemacan
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
SECHET/SECURITY INFOMATION 50X1-HUM
of -
groups (Armeyskiye Zenitnyye Artilleriyskiye Pedgruppy - AZAP) and
have the task of anti-aircraft protection of the army headquarters,
storage areas, bridges, railroad facllities, ete located in the
rear zone. Each AAA group is assigned a commander who is normally
the senior officer within this group. The plan of AAA defense within
a division is prepared by the commander of divisional artillery; in
corps and armies these plans are prepared by the respeotive deputy
commanders artilierv for 4A defenee. fn combat the AAA untt:
‘probestrmge oe: “~: enemy air attack take pori tions asi triiows:
(a) Small caliber AAA (Malokalibernaya Zenitnaya Artilleriya - MZA) -
one thousand m behind the first infantry line.
{b) Medium caliber AAA (Srednekalibernaya Zenitnaya Artilleriya - SZA) -
two thousand m behind the first enemy line.
At a river crossing the small caliber AAA units take positione right
on the river's bank and constitute the forward zone of troop air
defense. These AAA units cross the river together with troops
assigned to the bridgehead and give them constant protection against
enemy air attacks. At the same time the medium caliber AAA units
organize the second zone of tactical air defense, taking positions two
to three km behind the river in order to protect the concentration of
troops assigned for the river crossing. These artillery units are
responeible for the air defense of crossing points and bridges until
the entire ope>ation of river crossing is completed.
f
i
Air Force
14. the Air Force is the arm which gives aerial support to the ground
" forces in combut. Its characteristics are high speed, excellent
maneuverability, and a large radius of action. The Air Force is able
te conduct aeriel bombardmente of enemy troop concentrations, ;
fortifications, and various communication targets in the enemy rear
zone. Tie Alr'Force is aiso able to fight the enemy air force in the
air. According to its tactical tasks the entire Air Force is broken
duwn into the following basic groupe: strategic aviation (dal'nege
deystviya), tactical aviation (blizhnego deystviya), combat support |
]
/
j
4
1
| =
: : .: The AAS units belonging tc an army are organized into army AAA sub-
aviation, and diving aviation. The Air Force is able to perform its
, @trategio and tactical tasks either independently, or in cooperation
with the ground forses. In the latter case it 1s usually attached
to the ground force unit with which it cooperates and subordinate to
the respective ground force wnit commander. The strength of the Air
Force lies in its mass attack and destructive power. The largest
Air Porce tactical unit is an air army (Vozdushnaya Armiya}.
Zenke
15, Tank units represent the shock and fire power of the ground forces.
They have a high degree cf maneuverability on the battlefield
combined with large fire power and considerable radius of action. |
Tanks car: carry out a variety of offensive and defensive tactical
“assignments in cocperation with other arms and, under favorable i
eonditicus, even insepenéert -y. Deatruction of enemy manpower and |
fortifications are the wain tesksa of tank units. Due to their
abliity to cross tranches, climb steop grades, and ford rivers, - tanks
oan be used on any terrain and under any ci! matio conditions.
Their main taska are as follows: es, .
SECRET . SESCHILY INE CRMALTON
pe ee om ee
‘Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
——
7 eens seme A A Va =
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 - CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 [il
50X1-HUM
SECRET/SECURLTY INFORMATION
Q
“Ge
(a) The most valuable use of tank units is, in the exploitation of
the breakthrough, to carry the combat into the depth of the
enemy's defense positions. Their task in such cases is to get
into the enemy rear zone as soon as possible in order to neutralize
remaining centers of resistance, destroy communications and
supply facilities. at the same time avoiding any serious engage-
ment with enemy forces which may delay the advance of the tanks.
Tank units cannot be assigned the task of taking over and holding
enemy positions and areas.
(b) Tank units can be used successfully only in @ mass attack.
Distributing tank forces and attaching them to the attacking
columns is to be considered an exceptional case and should be
resorted to only to repel a counterattack. Used independentiy,
without infantry support, tanks cannot achieve a breakthrough
of enemy positions. Therefore large tank units must normally be
used in the direction of the main effort, and not before the
enemy resistance system has been shaken. Their task is not the
breakthrough, but its exploitaticn. A tank division is the
largest tactical tank unit.
Mechanized Troops
16.
17.
Mechanized troops are composed of motorized infantry and all other
fully mechanized: arms attached in sufficient strength to the motorized
infantry (the backbone of any mechanized unit). Possessing a high
degree of maneuverabilit;, the mechanized units are able to indepen-
dently perform all tactical assignments. Mechanized unite can cover
100-120 km in a day, which gives them a great advantage over the
infantry.
In combat, mechanized units are held in the second echelon, and are
not put in action before the infantry takes over the first lines of
enemy positions. In general, their task is the exploitation of a —
successful attack, When they reauh the line of enemy regimental
reserves, mechanized units have completed the first passe of tactical
exploitation. The following phase is penetration through the second
zone of defense and destruction of enemy divisional reserve groups.
The largest mechanized unit is a mechanized army. :
Combat Engineers
18.
19.
The task of the engineer units is to assist the ground forces by
nmlearing the way for their advance in an attack on enemy positions,
for a breakthrough, for combat in the fortified zone, end the
protection of ground forces in defensive operations.
Conditions of modern warfare, characterized as they are by mass use
of technical equipment, provide ample opportunity for the use of
engineer units in combat. These units have therefore an important
position among other arms.and are asaigned the following tasks:
(a) Opening of passages through a fortified defense zone for .
. anfantry, tanks and artillery in an attack. .This requires
solid training and technical ekill.
(b} Prsparatious for river-crossings and otaer operationa
. . requiring construction of technical facilities to overcome
obstacles.
(c} Organization of defense positions, with the application of ali
.,. echnical means to render them impregnable.
SECRET /SrURITY INPORMAI TON.
| Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 :
28 Re See 9 een me
Sanitized Copy
a a
pproved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 |]
La. ‘
f |
50X1-HUM
SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION |
-3-
‘Airborne Troops == , _-. hs ce a |
20, Airborne troops represent a tiew arm which 1s assigned the task of
combat in the enemy rear. The airborne units are transported to the
zone of action by planes or gliders. Once landed or parachuted, they -
immediately expand the area of control, perform the assigned tasks,
and-.organize defense positions in order to hold the captured area .
until reinforcements arrive. The warfare of airborne troops is
characterized by many unusual and changeable tactical situations
which eannot be foreseen. Their units are usually fighting in
encirclement, very often in forests and populated localities; they
have to force river crossings amd to overceme various other obstacles.
bi thie requires e solid training, initdative end ekiti in vaing, the
imited technical equipment and weapons that can be taken on a
{
50X1-HUM
21. Naval units indenendently perform various operations on the high sea
as well as ashore (landing operations, naval infantry, ete). Their
main task is defense of Soviet seas, In addition, naval units perform
{he following tabke:
(a) In cooperation with the ground forces, the navy participates in
lazaing operations of troops. As naval units have a high degree
of maneuverability and speed they take upon themselves the task
of attacking and destroyirg enemy naval units on the high sea,
and vessels and naval installations in enemy ports and harbors.
\ (b) To protect Soviet territory, the navy has the task of inter-
ceptiag approaching cnemy vessels on the high sea and destroyliug
them prior to their landing or shelling the shores.
Rear Services of the Soviet Army
22. The .+as20f the rear services is to provide for, and bo ensure, an
uninterrupted flow of all necessary supplies from the rear gone to the
fighting units. They provide clothing, food, medical supplies, and
finance. Unless provided with sufficient supplies the line units are
unable to perform the assigned tactical tasks.
50X1-HUM
Duties and Responsibilities of Commanders and StaZf Personnel
23. All the commanders and staff personnel, PU-48 states, must organize
and coordinate their activities in such a way that they can function
as a team for the achievement of the common goal, ie, vickory. In
this respect, constant close cooperation and madiitenance of communi-
cations among the individuals concerned is the best guarantee of
success. It is the task of the commanding officer tc train his staff
personnel and to familiarize them with thei> tasxs im wartime. Any
decision taken by tne commanding officers must be communicated in
proper time to the chief of staff, who must immediately inform the
personnel of his staff to prepare the necessary orders and transmit
ar to the respective units. In detail the functions am az
ollows:
SECRET /SecURITY - INFORMLTIZON
DONE a as : ah ig @ oe als wer
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
rae sereerarveimacvory
ss ma ei an eran ee le came ;
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA O9A0
a a ry ae
50X1-H
| SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION UM
-10-
(a) Commanding officer. The commanding offacer of a wnit has |
uwidivided authority over his entire pergonnel. This authority
is vested in him by military jurisdiction; consequently, every
direct order of the CO is at the game time an order cf the.
"Fatherland". The CO ip also responsible for the combat~
readiness of his unit, and through his staff persormel directs
his unit in combat, assigning tasks and targets, dirseting
movenents and dislocation of the entire uait or parts thereof.
It is the --°:-:. duty of the CO in any situation to serve as an
example to his subordinates, showing endurance, combat discipline
and self-sacrifice in she performance of the assigned tacks. The
GO 18 directly responsible for the individual and collective
actions of his subordinates, for maintenance of weapons and
equipment, and for tratning of the personnel under him. In
combat, Keeping always in mind the task assigned to his wit and
the actual tactical situation, the CO has the right, and duty,
to make decisions and to carry them through. The CO is
responsible for his acticns solely to his dmmediate superior.
(bv) Chief of staff. The chief of staff (executive officer in
regiments and battalions) is the ftret deputy of the CO, and as
such, he takes upon himseif the responsibility for combat in the
CO's absence. Through his staff personnel, the chief of staff
enforces the decisions of the CO, putting them into the form of
written orders, and then tranamitving them to the units and
individuals concerned. I+ 1s a direct responsibility of the
chief of staff to see te it that ail directives and orders of the
CO are strictly executed, and within the proper time, ‘The chief
of staff must be thoroughly familiar with the battle situation
at all times and be able to brief his CO, 48 well as make
suggestions for further @ispositions and decisions required by
the changing battle situation. The chtef of staff is the only {
\ persor in the unit who has the authority to issue ordert and
directives in the name of the CO. Such ordera are signed,
"By Order of the Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff" this name
and rarnk).
(c) Chief of operations (Nachal'nik Operativnogo Otdela)}. The
chief of operations is the immediate assiatant to the chief of
b staff and his first deputy. In compliance with instractions
received from the ehief of steff, the chief of operations
prepares all battle orders, putting the verbal decisions and
directives of the CO into proper written form. It is his
responsibility to see that the orders given by the CO are
strictly complies with and properly carried out. The chief of
operations reports directly to the chief of staff and makes
suggestions pertaining to the field cf operations. In peace-
time the chief of operations is responsible for the combat
training and‘Bembat readiness of the unit, and in this respect
exercises supervision over all subordinate units.
(4) Reconnaissance officer (Nachal'nik Razvedyvate} 'nogo Otdela).
fhe RO is the assistant of the chief of staff for reconnaissance.
His responsibility ia to maintain constant communication with
subordinate units and to be familiar at any time with the combat
situation. The RO immediately reports all changes affecting the
combat situation to the CO and makes suggestions to counteract
enemy moves. He also maintains the eperation reconmalasante BAp
compiled from information received through reconnaissence service
which he organizes. He carefully studies enemy moves, trying to
anticipate and to offset enemy plans. He prepares end transmits
to avbordinate units daily reconnaissance bulletins which contain
all new information on the enemy, a8 reported by the reconnaissance
service. As a rule, in combat the RO. is close to the CO and
belongs to the forward echelon of the unit's headquarters.
SECRET ‘S80 URTTY SNE ORMAT ION
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
5 Ara ne sr rT ee “Ei
oes
ats eaticieeiaaaadee © O%1-HUM
(e)
(f)
ssiclaluracs Copy Approved for Release 201 1/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000800080543-6
50X1-HUM
SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
-il-
Communication Officer. The commumication officer is the
assistant of the chief of staff for cormunisations. His
responsibility is to organize and to meintain wire, radio and
other means of communications with subordinate and neighboring
wits. He prepares a chart of the organization of the comaunica-
tion service within his unit, assigns ¢ode-nemes for units and
individuel efficers, determines the length of waves and
emergency waves, and the periods of wave shifts. He is
responsible for the organization of a wire-tapping service to
insure security in telephone sonversations, and checks radio
service, The commmications officer is personally responsible
for a permanent and wrinterrputed communications network between
the commanding officer and his subordinate units. He aszistes the
chief of staff in the preparation of battle crders insofar as |
they pertain to the organization of the communication service.
Artillery commander. The artillery commander is deputy
commanding officer for artillery. The artillery commander's
staff serves as command organ for all artillery units. The
artillery staff is composed cf the chief of staff (executive
officer), two operations offirzers, the reconnaissance officer,
and a communications officer; all these persons are assistants
to the chief of staff. On the basis of directives received from
the artillery commarder, whe artillery staff prepares battle
orders for the artillery units, determining their tasks, fire
plans, plan of displacement of arsillery positions in combat
and plan of artiliery support fire in various phases of battle.
The artillery ataff is an executive organ, and at the same time
a controlling crgan of the commanding officer and the artillery
commander, respectively, which supervises artillery units with’
respect to Pulfiilment cf assigned tasks. The place of the
artillery commander is with the commanding officer in the
forward echelon cf the unit's headquarte7s. Usually one other
artillery officer from the arstliery staff is attached to this
forward echelor:.
Types of Battle
oh, In Py-48 the various types of basties are catalogued as follows:
(a)
| Sanitized Copy Approved
Offensive battles. Offensive battle is the normal type of
combat. Success of an offensive pattie depends very much cn the
synchronized cooperation between all participating arms and
branches, on adequate leadership, thorough preparation of
necessary means and equipmer:s, solid training of personnel, and
properly organized intelligence and reconnaissance services.
The mission given to units participating in an offensive battle
‘munt be simple, clear ard definite. A successful offensive
battle must lead to the encirclement of the enemy, zomplete
annihilation, and the gaining of the enemy's rear zone for the
further exploitation ‘of victory. A successful offeasive battle
presupposes superiority of Soviet Sorces over the enon, 4g. one,
or several, tactical elements: manpower, equipment, terrain,
time or morale. Offensive battle is used to break threugh She
enemy's defensive positions protecting their retreating forces
against an inferior enemy, and always when there is an
opportunity,to destroy the enemy completely. Having accepted
rather reluctantly the conception of defensive battle, the
pu-48 emphasizes that the offensive battle is the normal type
of combat. Emphasis is now placed on this point in all Soviet
Army instructions, end le also s¢ressed: in maneuvers and -during
all high command inspections +n Germany.
SECRET ¢SECUELIY INF ORMST TON
aeth iad CS
for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
—_ —
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 201 1/08/03 - CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 I
i
i
i
i
50X1-HUM
| SECPRT/SKCURTTY INFORMATION
Ravel foal
-12-
—_—
1
fant tA
(b} Defensive battie. A aafersive pattle is resorted to when time
3s needed for regrouping Soviet forces, or to allow unhampered
concentration if the enemy forces are considerably stronger;
also when there is a need to complete Soviet forces with
replacements, equipment, ammunition end other supplies; er da
order to attract enemy )ttention and strength to one asetor,
when an offensive is contemplated in another, Whatever the
dameddate purpose of a defensive -:-1.:, 71+ At should be
porne in mind that this type of combat™Is alWays of a temporary !
character and cannot bring about decisive results. Every
defensive battle should become an offensive battle when the
ymoment 4s favorable and thus lead to the destruction of the
enemy forces. i
(c) Encircling battle. The basic aim of the encircling battle,
which is the normal continuation of a successful offensive
battle, 18 to keep enemy forces tightly surrounded and to
prevent all attempts at help from the outside, or breaking out
from the inside. The encircling battle may be used either to
surround the enemy forces in order to annihilate ‘ts, or to
hold the enemy in encirclement and force them to capitulate by
preventing the arrival either of reinforcements and ground or
aerfai supplies. In the latter case, the forces not required
for containing the encircled enemy are used to expicit the -
tattle in the enemy rear zone. A predominant role in the
_encircling:.:: battle is assigned the artillery which holds the
enemy under constant or periodical fire and brings destruction
and disorganization into his ranks.
(ad) Combat in populated areas. Combat in populated areas may be part
of an offensive or a defensive battle. It is characterized by
the close proximity of the contending forces, and individual
close combat fighting. One of the most important protbiems, and f
! one *:,-- which the succese of such combat depends to a great
extent, is the organization of command in the individual small
units which are often left unsupported and dependent upon the
initiative of their imnediate commanders. Intemsive training,
experfenee, ard initiative of lower commanders, including
platoon aud section leaders, are prerequisites, and the best
guarentee for successful combat in populated areas. Leadership
4s more important in this type of battle because the combat is
full of unexpected turns; these sudden enemy moves require
{mmediave and energetic countermeasures, and there is no time
to ask for instructions. Very often combat in a populated
center takes the form of a series of fights in encirclement;
in these circumetances, every building or blook of houses,
representsa fortress. Under such conditions the combat becomes
decentralized anc dapenis almost entirely upon the experienve,
bravery, endurance, and initiative of the individual. ‘The
ypes of battle described above do not represent anything .
Yérmanent and unchangeable. ‘The very definitions. provided by
this manual should not be interpreted in 8 stir? and inflexible
wey, PU-48.states; on the sontrary, the offensive battle may
temporarily become a defensive one, or vice versa. Both
battles may take the form of an encircling battle, or of a
pattle in the encirclement, etc. Under such variable oomtitions,
therefore, every. commander must use his ow judgment, expsrience
and initiative to evaluate properly all changes in che existing
situation, and to talre the neceasary steps neaded to athieve
the final goal, regardless of the type of combat required.
Attack end Defense
25, The rifle division 1s the highest tactical unit; rifle corps is the
lowest strategic (operativnaya) unit,
SECRET Sf°U8I77 TNPOSMAT i0e
—
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 . CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6_
26.
27.
feecrom Amerie tere wercea pes pcrasse
MEV SAORI IS LAPUA Ln
Pu-48 gives the following inatructions for the attack:
(a} Rifle tmits are assigned attack zones (polosa dantanionisns as
follows;
(1) Rifle corps up to 12 ia.
(2) Rifle divisions up to six km.
(3) Rifte regiments up to three ka,
(4) Rifle battalions up to 14 ka.
(bo) Tie breakthrough a division is assigned a xone of two to four ke,
, Tie first objeative of the division, in this case, is the zone of
enény ariillefy groups; the sscond objective, the zone of enemy
regimental reserves.
(sc) In the dtsposition of troops for an attack, mechanized divisions
are pleoed as ‘a:sasond echelon, with the task of taking the a sees
frou the a aeene: Qivisions as secon as the first enemy lines
broken, Maohgiiged divisions have to carry the battle into the
Gepth of enemy positions.
(4) Every unit, regardless of ita size, must have @ reserve in order:
to ommtetast. possible enemy movea and for the reinforcement
during the attaok, Normally reserves do not exceed one third ef.
the unit's strength snd are of the following sizer
(1) Rifle @4viaion reserve -- cne rogimen't
(2) Rifle regiment roserve -- one battalion
(3) Rivle battalion reserve -- one company
(4) Rifle company reserve <~ one platoon.
(e) The battle dispoattion of a rifle division in attack ie deternined
by the divisional commanding officer; hie decision is based om
the task assigned to the division and on his evaluation of ali
tactical elements influencing the bavtie situation, aploynan’s
of a reinforced rifle division in attack on a fortified position
ia lt ohstecbet in Brolesure (2), om an overlay map of Gentrel
1:100,000, Sheet R5, First Edition ~ ANS 1, G8@3 Wo 4416
(ane abAL) 7
or roreren the following instructions on defense:
(s) Rifle corps and rifle divisions are assigned defense zones
{posove r ) as follows: rifle cerps are ancigned defense
aveas (rayon obo ) wp to 20-25 km, rifle divisions ee
12-18 my vifle re te ave assigned defense sectors (uchastek
oberemy) up to six km, and rifle battciions up to three ka.
(») avery organised defense in modern warfare most be ora ee ea = :
, Ce een Temey ne ea eanbaae aay et 207 SF SS
following attacks:
(1) Attacks from any dire ition.
(2) Tank attecks. ‘
$3) Aertel. atieaka.
(ay ALveune astaeks by paraghuve landing forees. “
SEORRT /SESUSITY INFGRMATICN
50X1-HUM
|
|
|
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-008094000600030543-6
SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
-y4-
. (c) qhe responsibility for organization of defense rests with the
respective commanding officer. ;
(4) he défense position of a rifle division is composed of two
defense zones (oboronitel 'nykh polos):
(1) A first defenses zone with a high density of machine gun fire,
KE artillery placed on the flanks and joints, and switch
aptillery positions (otsechnykh artillerlyskikh positaiy) |
composed of groups of divisional-towed and self-propelled
artillery. In exceptional cases tanks buried in the ground
can be used as artillery pleces. |
(2) & second defenze zone composed of two or three lines of
infantry trenenes, barbed wire entanglements, mine-fields
and AT trenches. ;
(3) he depth between the firs+ and the second defense zone
for a division 4s about 10-12 km. ‘wo rifle regiments are
normally located in the first, and one rifle regiment,
representing the divisional reserve, in tke secend zone.
(e) A successful defense depends considerably on fortification of
positions, proper organization of a centralized command leader—-
snip, developed reconnaissance network, and the combas readiness
of all fire-arns. ; 5
28, The PU-48 manual gives the following details in regard to situation
maps:
(a) Regardless of his rank and position, every commander must paintain
a situation map. ,
(bo) Oxder of battle information on such maps . made in the
; following way.
(1) All enemy units sre presented in blue; Soviet units, except
artillery and CW units, in red; black is used for the Soviet
artillery waits. CW units are-marked in black with a
yellow frame or yellow hatches, All writinge on the map .
are done from left to right. .
fe} Im addition te working maps, reference maps (otchetnaya karta)
have to be maijatained in every headquarters. On those maps ail
changes occurring in the battle situation are recorded.
(4) Mapes containing inforartion on the order of battle are classified
secret; they must be registereé end handled as any other gevret
military document. ae
~end-
FNCLOSURE . (a: Seton Showing FUe,2 Geabat Fermations Wit and
CB}. owwSlay Map ef Centhal “Ruvepe, 25 100,900,
L. en wetoh is ehown the deployment of a rein~-
PeSget Sie ALvivinn by avmck om a fortified position.
SECRRP /SEVRITY INPUMATION
.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
|
50X1-HUM
4
|
!
|
|
50X1-HUM
d
4
1)
x
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
| ENCLOSURE (A) SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
fo ce wee egy mage ey
iS aim 2 AN ci cate
(pb) ~y" Feage a4
1 i , . a
a) Staggered fo the C) Staguered ® the Rig
: !
AN | A
AL fA
AN
e) tine Formation — ee a
\
nese es,
U~-48 Conbat Pormatione :
is 7 capes: SECRET /SECURITY INFORMATION
: |
~ s
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 ff
ie Sentara
ed
wena ey aay phe eee ee Ee,
py Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809
~ 50X1-HUM
ENMOLOSURE (B). or 4. SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
Page ~ 2 - :
» 2,3. “Intentry regiments | -
REFIHSital Artillery Group; 555th Abb Reginent
Regimefitel artillery Growp, 128 Art Regiment
17th: -Meavy Tank and SelP-propelled Regiment
93nd Separats AAA Battalion
Divisional Artillery Group, 39th Field Art Brigade
6hth Separate AT Battalion
8 1 battalion
498th Corps AAA Regiment
57th Gds Rifle Division
39th Gds Rifle Div, 28th dds Rifle Corps and 3ist Gds Rifle Div,
19th Gde Rifle Corps
2ist Mece Division
Field art maintenance shop and field automotive maintenance shop
Rear services
First objective
Second cbhjestive
Bemy art battalion, 105 mm
Enemy art battalion, 155 ma
Bueny tanke
Enemy infantry up to regimental strength
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
50X1-HUM
~&
V4
Pod
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
Seay
1:2 80
EET RS
ak.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
OT SE SE a 7”
ten = tn
‘
[ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 - CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 [ills
ae
wae
—_ : eedne eae
E ee
NeiGges Uy ts Ls
A a ee eee seen Aaa Ry AEs Erie
iGepe 2.
: Sol A
ERFURT. G
3
V fee ie ++ PARAL
50X1-HUM
gee ciel
tenses Pig ns ‘ope fh”
: : ry 3
a . ~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 ja
A-RDP80
ee my ze
a
CURIT? (4 ORMATIONBECRET SECURITY INFORMA TiO
*
B Sanitized Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6 [aa
Q
wes
‘
PA
= -
'
nee
1
o
4
a Pe
‘
6
M
e
oy
* ’
4 ’
=
iweodls
~a- Rivers
. Cer fours
Roads ;
: . ers
Railroads
2
Sanitized
Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030543-6
Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03 : CIA-RDP80-008094000600030543-6
re. 2 ( * fi + em : %
is bE
i ee
appre ft Bas
eee eae eines Us
fj NY “Bo-7 > ae as peal aes i:
ne a eo ee
Sak
bo Bar aen epee ee ees
ae
N
ay
‘“
ee
N
s