FM 5-102 Countermobility (1985)

Document text

Field Manual Headquarters 
No. 5-102 Department of the Army 
Washington, DC, 14 March 1985 





FM 5-102 








COUNTERMOBILITY 

















DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. This publication contains technical or operational 
information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to US Government 
agencies. Requests from outside the US Government for release of this publication under the 
Freedom of Information Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQ, 
TRADOC, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. 




















Table of Contents 








Introduction 

Chapter 1 -COUNTERMOBILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
The Battlefield 

Threat Engineers 

Countermobility Requirements 


Summary 


Chapter 2 - COUNTERMOBILITY 
FUNDAMENTALS 


Types of Obstacles 

Existing Obstacles 

Reinforcing Obstacles 

Principles of Obstacle Employment 
Summary 

Chapter 3 - COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Levels of Responsibility 

Reserve Obstacles 

Summary 

Chapter 4 - OBSTACLE PLANS 
Planning Considerations 

The Planning Process 

Offensive Planning Considerations 
Defensive Planning Considerations 


Retrograde Planning Considerations 


Summary 


Chapter 5 - MINE WARFARE 


Classification 


Minefield Employment 


Minefield Employment Authority 


Reporting, Recording, and Marking 


Summary 


Chapter 6 - OBSTACLES OTHER THAN MINEFIELDS 


Bridge Demolitions 


Non-nuclear Craters 


Antitank Ditches 


Expedient Obstacles 


Preconstructed Obstacles 


Atomic Demolition Munitions 


Summary 


Chapter 7 - DENIAL OPERATIONS 


Authority and Responsibility 


Denial Targets 


Denial Methods 


Denial Planning 


Summary 


Chapter 8 - CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS 


Supporting Light Forces 


Special Terrain Environments 


Combined Operations 


Contingency Operations 


Summary 


Appendix A - OPERATIONS ORDERS 


Appendix B - STRONGPOINTS 


Appendix C - OBSTACLE NUMBERING SYSTEM 


Appendix D - STANDARD OBSTACLES 


GLOSSARY 


REFERENCES 


AUTHORIZATION LETTER 


COUNTERMOBILITY 








The foundation for engineer doctrine in the AirLand Battle is built with combined 
mobility, countermobility, and survivability efforts. This manual provides the basic 
framework of fielded and developmental countermobility methods, planning, and 
execution. Its purpose is to integrate countermobility into the overall AirLand Battle 
structure. 


Countermobility support is divided into mine warfare and obstacle development, each 
with an ultimate goal of delaying, stopping, or channelizing the enemy. Mine warfare 
expands to include mine categories, methods and systems of delivery, employment, 
reporting, recording, and marking. Obstacle development demonstrates innovative 
techniques and conventional improvements in planning and emplacing obstacles other 
than minefields. 


Countermobility effort is not secluded; rather, it balances with the other major 
battlefield missions of mobility and survivability, as well as general engineering and 
topography. The overall teamwork and planning process are both evident and essential 
with each facet of countermobility. 


STANAG IMPLEMENTATION 


The provisions of this publication are the subject of the following international 
Standardization Agreements: STANAG 2017, Orders to the Demolition Guard 
Commanders and Demolition Firing Party Commander (Non-Nuclear); STANAG 2036, 
Land Minefield Laying, Recording, Reporting and Marking Procedures; STANAG 2096, 
Reporting Engineer Information in the Field; STANAG 2123, Non-Nuclear Demolition 
Target Folder; and STANAG 2889, Marking of Hazardous Areas and Routes Through 
Them. 


USER INFORMATION 


Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes to improve the 
manual. Comments should identify the area in which the change is recommended. 
Reasons should be provided for each comment to allow complete evaluation. Comments 


should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and 
Blank Forms) and forwarded directly to the Commandant, US Army Engineer School, 
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5291. 








When used in this publication, "he," "him," and "his" are used to represent the enemy. 


Chapter 1 


COUNTERMOBILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD 











This chapter focuses upon a modern battlefield against an enemy using Soviet style 
tactics and organizations. It discusses the modern battlefield, emphasizes threat 
operational concepts, particularly threat engineers and their capability to provide 
countermine and counterobstacle support to the offense, and covers the importance of 
friendly countermobility activities to deny the threat freedom of movement. 


THE BATTLEFIELD 
THREAT ENGINEERS 
COUNTERMOBILITY REQUIREMENTS 


SUMMARY 


THE BATTLEFIELD 


The most dangerous threat to United States' (US) national interests will most likely 
involve highly trained enemy forces using Soviet style tactics, organizations, and 
equipment. The actual battle will be intense, fast, and deadly. United States forces must 
therefore be prepared and trained to fight on a future battlefield where-- 


Highly mobile forces will use combat systems delivering firepower of 
unprecedented volume, speed, accuracy, range, and lethality. 

Airspace will be crowded with aerial combat, surveillance, transport, 
reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems. 

Communications systems will be the target of indirect fire and sophisticated 
electronic warfare operations, making command and control difficult to achieve 
and maintain. 

Scatterable mine systems will severely affect ground mobility due to rapid and 
remote delivery means. 

Employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons will create 
anew experience and add new dimensions to the environmental conditions. 


Ultimate success on the battlefield will depend on mobility and countermobility efforts, 
not only near the forward line of own troops (FLOT), but also in rear areas. Successful 
commanders will need to concentrate forces at the decisive time and place, make 
maximum use of unit versatility, exercise movement and maneuver, impede the opposing 
force's movement and maneuver, and preclude enemy reinforcement of committed units 
and their resupply. 


THREAT ENGINEERS 


Engineers play a vital role in the success of threat army combined arms operations. In the 
threat view, the greater the increase in mobile warfare, the greater the need for passable 
terrain. Therefore, stated in simple terms, the mission of the threat combat engineers is to 
keep the offense moving. Threat engineers are organized, equipped, and trained to 
accomplish this mission under fire and in all environments including NBC. 


ORGANIZATION 


All tank and motorized rifle units down through the regimental level have organic 
engineer elements. In combat, these elements form special engineer combat groups-- 
either under control of parent command or attached to subordinate commands--to 
perform direct support missions. Engineer elements are also combined with other branch 
elements in operational groupings to perform specific tasks. At higher echelons (Front or 
Combined Arms Army), considerable engineer reserves are maintained either for 
concentrated use as needed, or for attachment to subordinate formations. This reserve 
allows rapid switching of engineer effort from one area to another, affording maximum 


tactical and operational flexibility. Furthermore, it is not unusual for the senior formation 
commander to strip a unit of its engineer element when that element is required for a 
concentrated effort elsewhere on the battlefield. 


Doctrine emphasizes that commanders at all levels must strive for maximum flexibility in 
using engineer assets, inasmuch as engineer tasks are not isolated but are part of the 
overall tactical plan. 


Combat engineer units at any level are of two general types: engineer special/technical 
units or general purpose engineer units. 


Special/technical units perform the following tasks: 


Engineer reconnaissance. 

Road and route preparation. 

Field fortification construction. 
Bridge construction. 

Camouflage. 

Assault river crossing. 

Obstacle construction and/or removal. 
Minefield breaching and clearing. 
Water supply. 


General purpose engineers may perform any or several of the above tasks, but usually to 
a lesser degree than their special/technical counterparts. In either case, the threat 
envisions that most if not all of these tasks are conducted under fire or well in advance of 
main assault elements. 


Technical repair of pipelines and topographic surveying are not the responsibility of 
threat engineer units. In addition, many simple and general engineer tasks are not carried 
out by engineer soldiers, but by soldiers of other combat arms. For example, all threat 
combat soldiers are expected to be proficient at mine clearance. The operation of tank- 
mounted mine plows and rollers is a responsibility of armored forces, although engineer 
advice is available in deciding whether to employ such devices. 


The organization of threat engineer units is the result of careful study and is designed to 
accomplish specific objectives. These objectives are: 


Conducting engineer tasks necessary to support the tactical employment of other 
combat arms, especially the movement of tank and motorized rifle elements. 
Attaching additional engineer assets to subordinate elements and maintaining a 
significant engineer reserve. 

Dovetailing and expanding engineer tasks in the offense by follow-on engineer 
elements of increased capabilities. 

Providing cohesion to the defense and security in the offense by employing mines, 
obstacles, field fortifications, and antitank defenses. 


The structure of engineer units is constant at the regimental and divisional levels, but not 
at higher levels of command. The engineer units assigned to a Front or Combined Arms 
Army will vary with the level of importance of the major command in the overall 

operational or strategic plan. Generally, a Front engineer reserve is likely to be twice as 


large as that of a Combined Arms Army. 


PRINCIPLES OF THREAT ENGINEER EMPLOYMENT 


Threat military principles are observed in order of precedence. To a certain extent, threat 
military principles appear as rephrasing of Western principles of war. However, applying 
these principles is peculiar to threat military theory, and threat units are configured and 
equipped to attain them. These eight military principles, in order of priority, are: 


1 Mobility and high rates of combat operations. 


2 Concentration of main efforts and creation of superiority in forces and means over the 
enemy at the decisive time and place. 


3 Surprise and security. 

4 Combat activeness (constant combat and pressure). 

5 Preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly forces. 
6 Conformity to the goal. 

7 Coordination. 


8 Action upon the enemy to the entire depths of his employment and deep into his rear 
area. 


These principles are basic to a threat officer's approach to any combat problem, and will 
have a profound effect on any decision made. For example, achievement of high speed in 
the execution of combat missions is the first principle, and will therefore take precedence 
over the need to avoid casualties and preserve the combat effectiveness of friendly troops. 
In other words, saving time is more important than saving lives, since fewer lives would 
be lost if the threat commander is allowed to exercise battlefield initiative and dictate the 
terms of combat. While adhering to these principles, the role of combat engineers is to 
assist other elements of combat arms to follow them more closely, thereby attaining 
greater combat effectiveness. 


The threat has certain principles peculiar to combat engineers. These principles are 
binding upon the engineer commander and state that combat engineer operations must-- 


Correspond to the impending battle concept and support the commander's plan. 
Be completed in time to allow the completion of tactical activities necessary in 
implementing the plan. 

Be concealed to deprive the enemy of intelligence indicators. 

Contribute directly to the effect of the main attack in the offense or the main 
sector in the defense. 

Be capable of rapid maneuver to adapt to changing battlefield situations. 
Deceive the enemy regarding the direction or location of the main effort. 


THREAT ENGINEER SUPPORT OF THE OFFENSE 


In the offense, the chief function of engineers is to assist in maintaining high rates of 


movement, which is the premier tactical principle of threat military doctrine. Emphasis is 
placed on clearing and maintaining routes for the advance of combined arms units, to 
include breaching or removing mines and obstacles, crossing water obstacles, and 
assisting in flank protection or protection against counterattack. Engineer reconnaissance, 
independently or in collaboration with other reconnaissance means, plays a significant 
role in facilitating movement. Camouflage and protection during halts or temporary 
assumption of the defense are also basic engineer functions. 


Secondary attention is given to supporting logistic operations in rear areas. The practical 
effect of these engineer requirements is to create certain key functions which must be 
satisfied by engineer troops. These functions include: 


Engineer reconnaissance. 
Movement support. 

Mine and countermine warfare. 
Wet and dry gap crossings. 


Engineer reconnaissance 


The goal of engineer reconnaissance is to provide a comprehensive report on the 
passability of march routes. Engineer reconnaissance is conducted by engineer elements 
attached to combined arms or reconnaissance units, or by engineer officers acting as part 
of the commander's reconnaissance party which checks the validity of plans made from 
intelligence without actual prior inspection of the terrain. Engineer elements performing 
this reconnaissance must determine-- 


The degree of passability of the entire route. 

The location and nature of obstacles to be overcome and the engineer assets 
required to overcome them. 

The condition of all crossing sites, wet or dry. 

The location and quantity of material which can be used to improve the march 
route. 

The nature of the terrain and location of areas with natural concealment. 


In the conduct of engineer reconnaissance, the most commonly employed formation is 
the Soviet engineer reconnaissance patrol, Inzhenerny Razvedyvatel'ny Dozer (IRD). The 
IRD may vary in strength from a squad to a platoon. Commanded by an officer or senior 
noncommissioned officer (NCO), it is equipped with the necessary equipment for 
accomplishing its task. The IRD will almost always be vehicle-mounted, utilizing the 
reconnaissance version of the BRDM or BTR60. The commander is issued maps and 
aerial photographs of the march route and provided with the column composition 
indicating the number and types of vehicles the route must accommodate. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


The appearance of engineer reconnaissance elements serves as an important intelligence 


indicator of impending offensive action. In addition, since engineer reconnaissance is 
normally conducted one to one-and-a-half days in advance of the main force's movement, 
it provides highly valuable information regarding the timing of threat activity. Since 
threat offensive tactics are predicated upon high rates of movement and engineers are 
paramount in implementing this movement, friendly counterreconnaissance action 
directed against IRDs will deprive the threat commander of engineer intelligence vital to 
executing the tactical plan. Finally, the documents carried by the IRD commander 
provide portions of the threat commander's actual tactical plan. 


When in close proximity to enemy forces occupying prepared defensive positions, threat 
engineer reconnaissance will be conducted in a different manner than when it supports an 
approach march. In such an instance, existing intelligence concerning roads, topography, 
defenses, and the like, will be initially supplemented by aerial photography and aerial 
visual reconnaissance. Engineers will be attached to many combined arms reconnaissance 
elements. The IRDs will be employed to penetrate defenses to reconnoiter either a 
specific avenue of approach or particular defensive fortifications and obstacles. 
Additionally, reconnaissance may be conducted by establishing covert engineer 
observation posts close to, or actually within, the defensive sector. 


One engineer observation post (OP) is normally established per 2 kilometers of front in 
order to observe the entire enemy FLOT and ascertain the engineer action and equipment 
necessary to properly support the attack. As the attack progresses, these OPs continue to 
observe the effectiveness of the engineer assault and make recommendations concerning 
alteration of the operation plan or commitment of the engineer reserve. The purpose of 
engineer reconnaissance is to develop intelligence supporting the employment of first 
echelon assault elements. The value of denying engineer information through aggressive 
counterreconnaissance cannot be overemphasized. Since assault engineer tasks are a 
prerequisite to the execution of the threat commander's tactical plan, any friendly action 
which interferes with these tasks will concurrently degrade the execution of the plan. 


Movement support 


The threat army believes that, without adequate engineer preparation, the approach march 
is sometimes not possible at all. Therefore, the results of engineer reconnaissance serve 
two purposes: 


1 Selecting column routes which require the least engineer preparation. 
2 Planning the employment of engineer assets for any route clearing needed. 
Principles of movement 


Considering the results of engineer reconnaissance and the tactical requirements of the 
operation plan, the commander selects the unit's approach route. The Chief of Engineer 
Services then drafts the engineer plan for movement support. This plan is based upon two 
principles: 


1 Engineer soldiers must be equitably dispersed throughout the march column to insure 
proper engineer support to the entire formation. 


2 Engineer soldiers must work as far in advance as possible. 


Threat doctrinal texts state that movement support elements should ideally operate one- 
half day in advance of the main force. The manual task of route preparation usually falls 
to a temporary organization called a movement support detachment, Otriad 
Obespecheniya Dvizheniya (OOD). Several OODs can be formed from the engineer 
battalion of the tank and motorized rifle division, while additional OOD assets exist in 
the engineer companies of the tank and motorized rifle regiments. 


Responsibilities of the OODs 
Specific responsibilities include the following: 


Clearing and leveling areas of movement. 

Building approaches and exits at streams, ravines, or other obstacles. 
Constructing bypasses. 

Breaching and clearing mines. 

Marking routes. 


The organization of the OOD may vary depending on the scale of work undertaken and 
the assets available. In general, the faster the desired rate of advance, the stronger the 
OOD. In most if not all cases, the OOD will be reinforced with tank and motorized rifle 
elements to assist engineers in those tasks conducted under fire. Typical variations in the 
structure of OODs are shown in the following illustration. The groups are organized 
having the following missions: 


Reconnaissance and Barricade Destruction Group: Reconnoiters march route, 
clears obstructions, and selects column route. 

Road and Bridge Group: Prepares route and provides crossings. 

Route Marking Group: Marks route and provides security and traffic control 


Movement support detachment 


Variant Í an oop in support of a Motorized Rifle Battalion operating independently possibly as an advance 


guacd), 


—-_\_— a 2 + 3 -Á 


Reconnaissance 

and Barricade 
Destruction 

Group 

@ Tank with mine plow 


Group 


Road and Bridge 


®@ Truck-daunched 
scissors bridge 


@ Tracked dozer 


Route Marking 


Group 


@ Motorized Rifle 


Piatoon, APC-mounted, 
with marking equipment 


@ Combat Engineer 
Squad, APC-mounted 
Explosives 
Mine detectors 
Mine probes 
® Bridge-laying 
vehicle 


@ Carriers for bridge 
and road personnal 

@ Truck- mounted 
crane 

® Motorized Rifle 
Platoon 


‘one ad 
@ Chemical dosimetrists ' — 


Variant 2 anoop organized into four groups. In this case, a larger engineer task was met by creating 
separate road and bridge groups, esch having more equipment than in the previous variant. As seen 
from the internal organization in each case, OODs are structured to permit succeeding groups to 
@xpand upon the work performed by the preceding group. 


4— io 2 
Reconnaissance Road Group 
and Barricade ® Tractor dozer 
Destruction @ Half an Engineer Squad 
Group with explosives 
@ Tank with mine plow 


® Combat Engineer 
Squad, APC-mounted 


3 
Bridge Group 
@ Combat Engineer Squad 
@ Truck-iaunchned scissors 
bridge 
@ Carriers for bridge and 
road personnel 
@ Truck-mounted crane 


4 
Route Marking Group 
and Reserve 
@ Motorized Rifle Squad 
@ Half an Engineer Squad 
with marking equipment 


Explosives 

Mine detectors 

Mine probes 
@ Tank-launched bridge 
@ Chemical dosimetrists 


@ Motorized Rifle Platoon 
(ons squad) 





Moving into position directly behind the division's advanced guard, or sometime behind 
the advanced guard's point security patrol, the OOD normally moves about | to 2 hours 
in advance of the head of the march formation. A typical sequence of activities for an 
OOD would consist of: 


The reconnaissance and barricade destruction group reconnoiters enemy minefield 
and obstacles protecting a river crossing. Obstacles are cleared by engineers using 
explosives, while plow and roller-equipped tanks clear lanes. through the 
minefield. Using information previously obtained by an IRD, additional 
reconnaissance of the river banks is conducted to determine the exact extent of 
preparation necessary for bridging. Enemy troops in the area are engaged by tank 
and motorized rifle elements. 

Road and bridge groups improve initial lanes through minefield, prepare banks for 
bridging equipment, and emplace bridges. 

As preceding groups continue movement, the route marking group emplaces 
required route and bridge markers, establishes traffic control points, and regulates 
traffic flow until relieved by military police traffic units. 

The threat uses smoke and supporting indirect fire as necessary to assist the OOD 
in accomplishing required tasks. 


Threat doctrine for route preparation stipulates that, as an average, a divisional engineer 


battalion should be able to prepare up to 100 kilometers of route per day in open country 
where roads or tracks have not been subjected to specific enemy action to block or 
destroy them. If the route has been specifically interdicted by the enemy, then only 20 to 
40 kilometers per day can be achieved, less if the engineer tasks must be conducted under 
fire, In such cases, it is common for threat engineers to construct a rough track parallel to 
the planned route, if possible, in order to maintain the tempo of the advance. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


Threat offensive operations are predicated upon high speed execution and the sequenced 
arrival and departure of combined arms teams at specific locations at designated times. 
Thus, dependent upon an exceptionally high degree of coordination, the threat 
commander relies to a critical extent upon the movement support activities of his 
engineer troops. Action which denies the accomplishment of engineer route preparation 
activities may create a potentially disastrous situation for the threat commander. The 
delay of an advancing column by an unexpected obstacle not only disrupts coordination 
and slows the tempo of battle, but also causes succeeding units to combine with those in 
front, creating a highly rewarding target for friendly fires. 


Mine and countermine warfare 


In the threat view, the most important features of mines are speed and ease of 
emplacement on the battlefield. Emplacing a mine belt is considered much more effective 
and efficient against infantry and tanks than trenches, wire, or other fortifications. Mines 
are a much quicker means of erecting a defense. Consequently, they are widely used even 
in offensive operations. In supporting the offense, engineers employ extensive minefield 
in several situations such as-- 


When temporarily assuming the defense. 
When protecting against counterattack. 
When providing flank protection. 


In any future war, the threat believes there will be no distinct front line nor a clearly 
defined forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or FLOT. Rather, there will be a series of 
offensive and counteroffensive axes in the form of spurs and salients. Given the fluidity 
of combat under such conditions, a mine obstacle offers far greater flexibility in 
employment than antitank ditches, tetrahedrons, and other such relatively static obstacles. 
Minefield will be the most common means of protecting vulnerable aspects of offensive 
deployment, and mined areas may be expected to be far greater than those encountered in 
World War II. Although all threat troops are trained in the fundamentals of mine warfare, 
combat engineers are specially trained to perform this function. The primary combat 
engineer element performing mine warfare support for the offense is a temporary 
organization called a mobile obstacle detachment, Podvizhnoy Otriad Zagrazhdeniya 
(POZ), which is formed from elements of regimental and divisional combat engineers. 


In the offense, POZs are positioned on the flanks of the march column, and usually are 


closely associated with the antitank reserve. Each POZ will be equipped with up to three 
PMR-3/60 minelaying trailers with towed mine-carrying vehicles, or the newer GMZ 
tracked armored mine-laying vehicle which is rapidly replacing the older PMR-3/60. In 
certain instances, the Mi-8/HIP helicopter with removable mine racks and chute 
dispensers may be used to emplace mines from an altitude of about 5 meters. A divisional 
POZ equipped with the GMZ tractor is capable of emplacing a 1,000-meter minefield 
containing 750 to 1,000 mines at 4-or 5.5-meter intervals within 30 minutes on suitable 
ground. 


Temporary assumption of the defensive 


If the attack fails, engineers must be prepared to conduct rapid fortification and obstacle 
activity in support of the hasty defense. In this role, POZs will perform as they do in 
offensive combat and emplace mines in accordance with the overall defensive plan. 


Protection against counterattack 


In planning the offensive employment of the command, the threat commander constantly 
evaluates the battlefield for suitable enemy counterattack areas. Areas identified as 
favorable are usually those which would detract from the maneuver of the combined arms 
teams, and be considered vital for mine employment in order to deny the enemy 
commander tactical initiative. 


Flank protection 


Engaging in a battle of dispersion and maneuver necessarily creates extensive exposed 
flanks. In threat theory, preventing enemy exploitation of such a condition relies, on two 
actions: rapid execution of combat tasks before the enemy can react, and protection of 
flanks by extensive minefield. During the march to contact and during the engagement 
itself, POZs actively emplace mines on the flanks of maneuvering units to preclude being 
attacked by mobile forces of the enemy. 


In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the tendency for a POZ to create an obstacle by 
alternating minefield with other antitank obstacles along a 6- to 7-kilometer front is now 
considered ineffective, as is the practice of laying long strip minefield without covering 
them by antitank fire. Current threat teaching stresses the need for anititank guns to 
engage tanks as soon as they encounter the minefield. Thus, a short, deep mine and gun 
obstacle belt is preferred to a long, thin one, making choice of position critical. 


Because of the possible need to recover minefield as the advance progresses, 
antipersonnel mines are rarely included in an antitank minefield laid in support of 
offensive operations. Minefields left behind are clearly marked and recorded, and their 
locations are reported to the Chief of Engineer Services. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


In the offense, the commander employs mines in areas evaluated as offering the enemy a 
significant advantage to interfere with the tactical plan. Thus, the detection of minelaying 
activity offers the friendly force an indication of the manner in which the threat command 


will be employed, and highlights those areas deemed critical to success. 


The threat, in planning for the widespread employment of mines, fully expects any 
enemy to engage in extensive mine warfare. Consequently, countermine warfare is an 
extremely important task entrusted to combat engineers. Breaching lanes through enemy 
minefield is critical to the goal of keeping the attack moving. Equally important is the 
desirability of conducting mine breaching operations covertly, whenever possible, to 
preserve surprise. When attacking from the march, the location of enemy minefield is the 
responsibility of engineer reconnaissance patrols (IRDs). The IRD is equipped with 
several types of mine detectors, the most common being the DIM metallic mine detector 
mounted on the UAZ 69, 1/4-ton, 4 x 4 Light Utility Vehicle. The DIM is synchronized 
with the vehicle's ignition system and, upon detecting a metallic mine, cuts out the 
electrical system and kills the engine. The IRD reconnoiters the limits of the minefield 
and marks it for the following movement support detachment (OOD). 


In breaching the required number of lanes through the minefield, the OOD will employ 
several types of mine breaching equipment. The normal threat method of breaching 
minefield during an assault or rapid advance is to employ mine plows fitted to the lead 
tanks. Although engineers will reconnoiter the minefield, the initial breaching is not 
primarily an engineer task. The KMT-4 and KMT-6 plows are normally employed on the 
scale of one per platoon of three to four tanks. Engineers assist in fitting these and plow- 
roller combinations (KMT-5s) commonly used for minefield reconnaissance. The threat 
estimates clearing speeds of about 6 kilometers per hour (kph) for plow-fitted tanks, and 
about 10 kph for roller-fitted tanks. Combat vehicles follow these plow-equipped tanks in 
the breaching of a minefield. The threat employs a mine-clearing device mounted on the 
BTR-50 PK Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) (two to each divisional engineer 
battalion). This device fires and then detonates an explosive hose (line charge) across the 
minefield. It clears a lane about 180 meters long by 6 to 8 meters wide. This equipment is 
particularly useful during an assault river crossing when there are minefield on the far 
bank and amphibious vehicles may have to initially operate in the bridgehead without 
tank support. 


Another mine-clearing device is the explosive line charge. It consists of three separate 
linear charges, a nose section, and a detonator box. Each linear charge may be assembled 
to any desired length by connecting 2-meter sections together with threaded collars. The 
light, sheet metal, 5-centimeter-diameter, tubular sections are filled with cast 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) explosive at 9 kilograms per linear meter. This device is versatile in 
that it may be used as a single, double, or triple charge. The forward end section is fitted 
with a roller to facilitate insertion of the charge into a minefield. The device is assembled 
in a rear area, towed by tank to the minefield's edge, pushed into the minefield, and fired. 
The triple line charge will clear a 6-meter-wide path along the entire length of the charge. 
A squad can assemble a 500-meter-long triple charge in 1 to 1.5 hours. 


Bangalore torpedoes are also used. Sections, 2 meters in length, carrying 6 kilograms of 
explosive, are connected by collars. The clearance depth of a path 1 to 2 meters wide is 
limited only by the manageable weight that can be manually pushed into the minefield. 


The number of lanes to be cleared depends on the terrain and the number of columns in 
the assault echelon. For a leading battalion in the assault on a main axis, six to eight lanes 


may be required, one for each assaulting platoon. In secondary sectors, as few as two 
lanes may be sufficient. However, an average of four to six lanes can be expected with at 
least two developed into permanent lanes, 6 to 8 meters wide, for passage of artillery and 
logistic vehicles. Engineers mark minefield lanes and provide traffic control through the 
minefield. The routes leading from a start line to each lane are marked with red triangular 
metal flags and black-and-white tapes. Illuminating markers may be used at night. Routes 
through friendly minefield are marked by signs of various shapes placed not less than 20 
meters apart on both sides of the route. If possible, they are positioned so as not to be 
visible from enemy positions. 


In attacking from line of march, manual mine breaching is carried out only under certain 
conditions: 


As nuisance minefield along or on routes, especially around craters and 
demolitions, to allow the route clearing unit to work freely. 

On approaches to water obstacles and water mines. 

To maintain surprise, especially at night or when the threat wishes to make a gap 
in their own minefields. 

When other mine breaching equipment is committed. 


When conducting assault breaching operations against a defended enemy minefield, the 
usual practice is to attack with combined arms teams led by combat engineers and 
supported by artillery and tactical aviation. Such a formation is necessary if the combat 
engineers are not to suffer crippling losses to defensive fires. Artillery, in particular, plays 
a major role in suppressing defensive fires and allowing the execution of engineer tasks. 
If artillery support is not available or is too short in duration, the first wave of the attack 
is led by plow-and roller-equipped tanks, while combat engineers closely follow to widen 
lanes. Here again, the use of plow-and roller-equipped tanks is not an engineer 
responsibility, but an engineer function carried out by tank soldiers. Another means of 
lane improvement entails mine clearing tanks dragging a variable length of explosive line 
charge. The charge is detonated to clear mines not uncovered by the plow or roller. Our 
minefield should be deep enough to preclude the threat from breaching the entire depth 
with one line charge. The threat breaching capability with one line charge is curently in 
the 50-meter range. A threat squad can assemble a 500-meter-long triple charge in 1 to 
1.5 hours by coupling the 50-meter sections together. Planners should check the current 
threat capability for breaching before determining what size minefield is most effective. 


As with much of threat engineer activity, threat mine and countermine operations provide 
both intelligence and tactical values to friendly forces. Minefield breaching activity is 
indicative of impending threat offensive action, and the identification of such activity will 
greatly assist in determining times and locations of attack. However, it must be kept in 
mind that threat doctrine calls for the conduct of bogus mine clearing activity as part of 
cover and deception plans. Tactically, the denial of threat countermine actions serves to 


deprive the threat commander of the tactical initiative which his entire operation plan is 
based. 


River crossings 


Threat military doctrine dictates that, whenever possible, water obstacles along a broad 
front are crossed at multiple points without pause in the march or the advance. This tactic 
is designed to rapidly overwhelm enemy defenses and maintain the tempo of the attack. 
In the threat view, a delay at a major water obstacle can jeopardize the success of an 
entire offensive operation in conventional combat, and is certain to destroy large forces 
massed for the crossing during a nuclear war. Consequently, the threat recognizes two 
distinct forms of river crossing, hasty and deliberate. 


Hasty crossing 


The hasty crossing incorporates the features of rapid movement previously mentioned. 
The attacking force crosses the water obstacle in stride, does not stop to consolidate 
bridgeheads, and continues the advance without pausing. This is the preferred form of 
river crossing. 


Deliberate crossing 


The deliberate crossing is conducted when an attempted hasty crossing has failed, or 
when hostilities are being initiated against a well-prepared enemy occupying a river line 
defense. It is characterized by more detailed planning, extensive buildup and preparation, 
and a greater degree of centralization than the hasty crossing. 


The role of combat engineers in both types of crossing is critical. While all arms are fully 
trained in their individual roles in river crossing operations, engineer functions provide 
the margin of success. It is not the purpose of this section to examine river crossing 
operations in their entirety, but to define the role of engineers within the overall effort. 
For a complete account of the conduct of river crossing operations by all arms, see 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Publication DDI-1150-13-77. 


Engineer support to assault river crossings by threat forces occurs in the following areas: 


Engineer reconnaissance of water crossings. 
Route and site preparation. 

Crossing preparation and execution. 

Site protection. 

Support to units within the bridgehead. 


Engineer reconnaissance of water crossings 


In the threat view, the key to a successful river crossing is thorough reconnaissance to 
determine both the tactical situation and the technical characteristics of the river and its 
banks. As a general principle, reconnaissance will be carried out across a wide front to 
avoid focusing enemy attention on one area. Additionally, this activity identifies the 
numerous crossing sites needed to support the crossing of widely dispersed units. 
Engineer reconnaissance personnel will attempt to ascertain the following information at 
each site: 


River width, depth, and current. 
Entry and exit gradients. 
River bottom composition. 


Bank composition and height. 

Approach and exit routes. 

Critical terrain features dominating both banks. 

Possible fording, ferrying, bridging, and snorkeling sites. 
Information on enemy defenses. 


In obtaining this information, engineers may, as in other offensive operations, accompany 
combined arms reconnaissance teams; or, engineer patrols (IRDs) may operate 
independently. An IRD will usually operate from the BRDM engineer reconnaissance 
vehicle and will be equipped with a variety of reconnaissance equipment. In some 
instances, engineers are clandestinely dropped by parachute directly on the water 
obstacle. 


A typical reconnaissance mission for a squad-size IRD might require the reconnaissance 
of two sites in a 500- to 600-meter sector, a task usually accomplished in 4 hours. Scuba- 
equipped engineers check for water mines and test riverbed conditions. Other members of 
the IRD select and mark concealed approach routes; obtain hydrographic data by using 
depth finders and water current meters; determine river bank conditions and the presence 
of existing or military obstacles; identify enemy defenses and conduct bogus 
reconnaissance activity in other areas to avoid disclosing the main crossing sector. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


Engineer reconnaissance performed in support of water crossings has both intelligence 
and tactical value to the friendly force. Conducting engineer reconnaissance will assist in 
identifying planned crossing sites for combined arms teams and the times of attack. Such 
information is of extreme importance in planning the friendly tactical response. 
Counterreconnaissance, which prevents the accomplishment of engineer reconnaissance 
missions, deprives the threat commander of information vital to the successful execution 
of attack. 


Route and site preparation 


Route preparation of approaches to crossing points will follow the same procedures as in 
the approach march. Movement support detachments (OODs) will accompany the 
vanguard elements of advance forces to provide trafficable conditions for the types and 
numbers of vehicles in the column. A division will usually cross a river on a wide front at 
a minimum of four points (sometimes up to eight) simultaneously, seeking to find 
suitable areas for each type of crossing means. This requires the engineer staff to 
carefully plan and allocate engineer assets. 


The preparation of proper entry and exit bank gradients is crucial and depends upon the 
results of the reconnaissance effort. Earthmoving equipment and explosives are used in 
preparing bridge approaches and entry and exit points at ford, ferry, and swim sites. 

Rapid execution of these tasks is essential, since the actual crossing units follow closely 
behind and depend on suitably prepared crossing points before commencing operations. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


Site preparation is a critical phase of a threat river crossing operation. Interference with 
site preparation activity translates directly to interference with the sequence and timing of 
the engineer effort, which the entire crossing is dependent upon. If the site preparation 
effort can be denied, the following crossing units will either be unable to perform their 
function or forced to halt. The tempo of the attack will be disrupted, and the consequent 
bunching of units will create lucrative targets. For these reasons, site preparation 
represents the most vulnerable aspect of a threat river crossing. 


Crossing preparation and execution 


Following the initial site preparation, and immediately prior to actual crossing, final 
preparatory activities are executed. Previously located water mines are destroyed by 
scuba-equipped engineers using explosives. Where necessary, metal matting is emplaced 
at soft bottom fords. Engineers in amphibious APCs accompany initial assault waves and 
assist in reducing defenses on the far bank. 


During the actual crossing, the ferry operation and bridge emplacement are solely 
engineer functions. Additionally, engineers are responsible for traffic control and 
direction at all crossing sites. In the latter role, engineers insure that the crossing is 
conducted at a high rate of speed, a requirement considered to be extremely important. 
Threat doctrine establishes the desired crossing time for the division combat elements as 
3 hours during daylight and 6 to 8 hours at night. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


The primary role of engineers during this phase is providing the physical means by which 
the bulk of the division crosses. This phase of engineer operations also marks the arrival 
of major combined arms teams, and is usually supported by artillery fires. In most cases, 
it will be conducted under the protection of the air defense umbrella. 


Site protection 


Commencing with initial site preparation and continuing through the conduct of the 
crossing, engineer elements are responsible for protecting the site, equipment, and 
combined arms teams from floating mines and enemy raids. Scuba divers and power 
boats will constantly patrol both upstream and downstream approaches to the crossing 
site, and outposts will be established along likely land approaches. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


When planning raids against threat gap-crossing sites, the presence and locations of these 
security forces already established by prior reconnaissance should be considered. 


Support to units within the bridgehead 


As the threat force establishes itself on the opposite bank, elements of the engineer 
reserve accompany combined arms teams in performing engineer tasks necessary to keep 
the advance moving. In this role, engineers function in the same manner as when 
supporting the attack from the line of march or when in contact with the enemy. The 
crossing site will gradually become the responsibility of lines of communication troops, 
and the combat engineers will rejoin the division and be prepared to support the next 
crossing operation. 








Significance to Friendly Forces 


As with other threat engineer activity, the shift of engineer emphasis accompanies a shift 
in tactical emphasis. Friendly action which destroys or damages bridging and ferrying 
equipment during this phase will reduce the threat ability to conduct subsequent river 
crossings until equipment is replaced. 


COUNTERMOBILITY REQUIREMENTS 


In order for the threat to attain its primary military principle, Mobility and High Rates 
of Combat Operations, it is imperative that they preserve their ability to move and 
maneuver on the battlefield. Threat forces are designed, organized, trained, and equipped 
to accomplish this principle above all others. 


Friendly US countermobility tasks must therefore be designed and executed to slow the 
movement rate specified by the threat. The use of countermobility by friendly forces must 
be integrated into the concept of operations not only to impede threat mobility, but to 
increase the kill probability of friendly firepower. Obstacles must be sited to reinforce the 
terrain and maximize the effective firepower from friendly battle positions. 


Countermobility operations will be used along the FLOT as well as deep into the threat 
rear area. The use of scatterable minefield gives friendly forces a capability to deny threat 
mobility anywhere on the battlefield. The use of scatterable minefield should be carefully 
planned and executed so that friendly mobility during future operations is not impeded. 


Countermobility execution is primarily the responsibility of combat engineers. The 
engineer and the tactical commander must decide early in the planning process how to 
best position obstacles to increase the effectiveness of friendly fire and maneuver. 
Tactical commanders must establish countermobility priorities early in the planning 
process. Early planning will enable maximum effort to be devoted to those 
countermobility tasks deemed most critical. 


Countermobility activities are essential in order to defeat the first principle of the threat 
army; that is, delay, channel, or stop the offensive movement. An analysis of recent wars 
shows that effective and well-planned integration of countermobility activities and 
firepower can enable an outnumbered force to win. 


SUMMARY 


In supporting offensive operations, the role of threat combat engineers is to keep the 
offense moving. The extreme importance of this effort to the overall conduct of the 
offense cannot be overemphasized. As has been noted, threat offensive combat is 
predicated upon mobility, high rates of advance, surprise, and secrecy, and the close 
coordination of all arms. While first appearing to be highly fluid in nature, close 
inspection reveals threat style offensives to be predicated upon the carefully synchronized 
and sequenced interplay of rapidly moving units. 


The mission of engineers is to create conditions of movement which will allow this 
noticeably complicated activity to occur unhindered, and enable the threat commander to 
enjoy total tactical initiative while denying it to the enemy. 


Combat engineers are thus one of the key elements of the offense. Any friendly activity 
which prevents combat engineers from accomplishing their mission will seriously 
interfere with the actions of combined arms teams and create exploitable tactical 
situations for the friendly commander. 


Chapter 2 


COUNTERMOBILITY FUNDAMENTALS 











N Nam 


\\ 


This chapter provides a standard classification and a detailed discussion of existing and 
reinforcing obstacles. The principles of terrain evaluation and the employment of all of 
obstacles to reinforce existing terrain are also presented. 


TYPES OF OBSTACLES 

EXISTING OBSTACLES 

REINFORCING OBSTACLES 

PRINCIPLES OF OBSTACLE EMPLOYMENT 
SUMMARY 


TYPES OF OBSTACLES 


An obstacle is defined as any obstruction that stops, delays, or restricts movement or 
maneuver. Obstacles can exist naturally such as a river or a cliff, or can be man-made 
such as a minefield or tank ditch. 


Obstacles are grouped into two general categories, existing and reinforcing, as shown. 
Existing obstacles are already present on the battlefield and not placed there through 
military effort. They may be natural such as lakes or mountains, or they can be cultural 
such as towns or railroad embankments. Reinforcing obstacles are placed on the 
battlefield through military effort and are designed to strengthen the existing terrain to 
slow, stop, or canalize the enemy. Reinforcing obstacles are limited only by imagination, 
time, manpower, or logistic constraints. They include blowing a road crater, constructing 
a log crib, or installing a minefield. Scatterable mines are reinforcing obstacles emplaced 
by various delivery systems such as artillery or aircraft. 


Classification and examples of obstacles 


This classification fist is not meant to be inclusive, but anly to provide 
examples within each major classification. 


EXISTING 


NATURAL 


Drainage Features 
Lakes, rivers, streams, 
Swamps, marshes 


Soit and Rock 
Soft ground, cliffs, boulders 


Surface Features > 
Slopes, hills, cliffs, 
mountains 


Vegetation 
Jungles, forests 


Built-up Areas 


Other 


War damage, rubble, fires 
snow, ice 


CULTURAL 
Man-made lakes, ponds, 
canals, paddy fialds 


Soft farmland, quarries 


Cuts and fills on roads and 
railroads, dams 


Seeded forests, hedgerows 


Buildings, fences, towns, 
urban areas 





REINFORCING 


MILITARY EFFORT 


Blowing dams to create 
flooded areas 


Craters 


Craters, ditches, 
cuts on slopes 


Demolished buildings, 
tubble 


Minefields, wire obstacles, 
falling block, prechambered 
targets, ADM, smoke, 
contamination, rubble 


EXISTING OBSTACLES 


The terrain, as it exists, can be a significant asset to the commander who is best able to 
analyze and use it advantageously. Terrain is not just the field where the battle is fought-- 
it is very much a part of the battle itself. The commander at any level who makes the 
terrain work in a positive manner against the opponent will most likely win. 


There are many things a commander needs to know about the terrain on which US and 
enemy forces must move, maneuver, and fight. Some of the more obvious items are: 


Roads and bridges. 

Built-up areas. 

Soil and trafficability. 

Slope. 

Rivers and streams. 

Visibility, climate, weather, and their effects. 


The commander's course of action will largely depend on the characteristics of the terrain 
and intended use of it. The commander's action includes movement, maneuver, and 
weapons siting to destroy the enemy. All ground movement, friendly or enemy, will be 
dictated by existing obstacles. 


A good analysis of the terrain in the areas of influence and interest should answer the 
following questions: 


Where are the mobility corridors and avenues of approach? (Where will the 
enemy come from? Where can I go?) 

How large are the mobility corridors and avenues of approach? (What size enemy 
or friendly force will they support?) 

What is the trafficability of the avenues of approach? (How fast can the enemy or 
I travel and with what type vehicles?) 

Where is the key terrain? (What terrain will provide a significant advantage to the 
one who controls it?) 

What are the fields of fire? (With what weapons and at what ranges can I engage 
the enemy? Or be engaged?) 

Where are the choke points or extensive obstacle areas? (Where are possible 
locations to place reinforcing obstacles?) 


These questions are not inclusive, but if answered and analyzed, they will provide 
significant information on how to prepare the battlefield and allocate combat power. 


Determining existing obstacle locations is a key element in terrain analysis. The most 
critical questions are how and where do we get information concerning terrain and 
existing obstacles. The best source is an on-the-ground reconnaissance accomplished by 
the units who will fight the battle. However, this is not always possible due to lack of 
resources or enemy control of the areas about which we need information. Corps and 
division terrain teams organic to the Theater Army Topographic Battalion collect, 
analyze, and provide important topographic, hydrologic, and climatic data. Terrain 
analysts assess observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles to 
movement, key terrain, and avenues of approach. Input to the force engineer and G-3 is 
especially important for obstacle planning. Engineer terrain analysts work as a team with 
intelligence analysts to collect raw terrain information and convert it into processed 
intelligence. Topographic units provide a variety of products including cross-country 
movement maps, overprinted maps, and various scale tactical maps. Topographic support 
is invaluable in making a thorough terrain analysis. 


Analysis of terrain and existing obstacles should focus on the mobility of tanks. Tactics 
of enemy combined arms forces are designed around the mobility of tanks. The tank is 
the primary vehicle we want to restrict, delay, stop, and kill. This antitank orientation of 


terrain analysis and obstacle development narrows our focus and makes the task more 
simple. By focusing on the tank, the terrain analysis team can assist the commander in 
identifying those existing obstacles that restrict, channelize, delay, or stop the mobility of 
tanks. 


Systematic terrain analysis using all assets available reveals the existing obstacle value 
of the terrain. Conditions which should be considered when analyzing terrain include 
drainage features, slope and relief, vegetation, cultural features, and climate. The obstacle 
value of each condition is evaluated individually in conjunction with trafficability. Then, 
their combined effects become the obstacle value of the terrain. 


DRAINAGE FEATURES 


Drainage or surface water features include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, ponds, marshes, 
swamps, and bogs. Such features are obstacles whenever the water becomes deep or 
turbulent enough to threaten the safety of soldiers and the operation of vehicles. Drainage 
features are also obstacles when swamps, marshes, bogs, and the like make soil 
conditions impossible for cross-country movement. 


Large rivers 


Large, unfoldable rivers are formidable obstacles because they must be crossed by 
tactical bridging, swimming, ferrying, or special deep water fording. Ease of crossing 
these rivers is determined by the width, depth, velocity, turbulence, bank and bottom 
conditions, rapid tactical bridging available, and existing bridges. 


Small rivers, streams, and canals 


Minor fordable rivers, streams, and canals are much more numerous than major rivers 
and their tactical value as obstacles should not be overlooked. These features are variable 
in effectiveness as obstacles. Careful planning is required to integrate them into the 
obstacle system. Watercourses frequently constitute elongated obstacles in terrain which 
may otherwise be excellent for movement. Drainage also influences the orientation of the 
road net and direction of movement in an area. The destruction of a few selected bridges 
can force cross-country movement or long detours. During floods, minor rivers and 
streams can become major obstacles. They can cause conditions which extend the 
obstacle effect for a considerable period by damaging temporary and expedient bridges, 
and by deepening the original channel of the river or stream, thus making access or egress 
difficult or impossible. 


Critical drainage factors 
er ; i j ; - 





Weather effects 


Although streams are normally small and slow during periods of low precipitation, and 
large and rapid during periods of high precipitation, the relationship is not always this 
simple. Melting snow, for example, may cause high water downstream even in regions 
where rainfall is low. Continuous below-freezing weather can reduce stream flow even 
though precipitation may be high. 


In winter, ice may be strong enough to support vehicles; then, instead of being obstacles, 
water bodies may become the preferred avenues for movement. Lightly loaded 2 1⁄2-ton 
trucks can move on ice 0.3-meter (10 inches) thick. Movement on ice is risky, however, 
because of weaknesses caused by water flowing from springs and other areas of swiftly 
moving water. 


In arid regions, dry stream channels maybe preferred avenues for movement during 
periods of little or no flow. However, there may be quicksand or other soft places where 
vehicles bog down. Also, there is the danger of flash floods. 


Fording 


Fordability of a stream expresses how easily it may be crossed without the means of 
bridging or ferrying. Fordability depends on characteristics of both the vehicle and the 
stream. The significant characteristics of streams are: 


Width of channel. 

Depth and velocity of water. 

Nature of bottom. 

Height, slope, and strength of banks. 








These characteristics may vary independently so that fording of even the smallest stream 
requires selecting a site where favorable conditions coincide. A stream is a minor 
hindrance when a ford is available and usable with little or no improvement. A stream is 
a major hindrance if a suitable ford is lacking, or if fording requires considerable 
preparation of approaches, reinforcement of bottoms, or the use of special equipment on 
vehicles. 





A tank can bridge stream channels less than 3 meters wide; however, wheeled vehicles do 
not have this capability. Once the self-bridging capability of tracked vehicles is exceeded, 
streams can be crossed only by bridging, ferrying, or fording. Although the width of a 
stream is significant to bridging, it is relatively insignificant to ferrying (provided it is 
wide enough) and fording. However, the wider the stream, the greater the hazard 
involved. For fording, the permissible maximum depth of water for most tanks is between 
0.9 to 1.5 meters (3 to 5 feet); and for trucks, about 0.9 meter (3 feet). Vehicles can be 
equipped with deep water fording devices that will enable them to cross water bodies as 
deep as 5 to 6 meters (17 to 20 feet). Often, a ford may be negotiated with minor 
difficulty by the first few vehicles, but the ones remaining will be unable to cross because 
bottom conditions or approaches have deteriorated with use. 





Stream velocities should be less than 1.5 meters (5 feet) per second for reasonably safe 
fording. The bottom of stream channels must be firm enough to support vehicles. 
Bottoms made up of fine-grained material can prevent fording even though the water may 
be only a few inches deep. Suitable bottoms are restricted to those that are sandy, 
gravelly, or rocky; but even sandy bottoms may give way under the weight of vehicles, or 
boulders may prevent vehicular movement. The banks also are important. Hard, vertical 
banks will be obstacles to tanks, if bank height exceeds 1.5 meters (4 feet), and to trucks, 
if bank height exceeds 0.3 meter (1 foot). Greater heights can be tolerated if the vehicles 
can get adequate traction or if assistance such as winching is used. The type of the 
material composing the banks may be significant. Banks made up of fine-grained soils 
may fail under repeated traffic. Sandy and gravelly materials usually provide adequate 
strength and durability. 





Adequate information (river studies, special maps) is commonly available on large 
streams, but generally not for the small streams. Ground reconnaissance is always the 
best source of information; for many areas, it is the only reliable source. If on-site recon 
is not possible, then topographic and geographic maps, reports, and aerial photographs 
are often the only sources of information available. Occasionally, useful data can be 
found in publications on geology, agriculture, soils, and forestry. 


Lakes, ponds, swamps, marshes, and bogs 


Large lakes make excellent obstacles. They are usually unfordable, unable to be bridged, 
and must be bypassed. Smaller lakes and ponds in themselves are not difficult to bypass; 
however, when connected by streams, they are easily integrated as part of an obstacle 
system. Because lakes can be crossed by amphibious vehicles or boats, beach and 
underwater obstacles should be used to discourage enemy ferrying efforts. When lakes 
are frozen, they may lose their value as obstacles. Swamps, marshes, and bogs severely 
restrict mobility and force the canalization of vehicular movement onto causeways, 
greatly increasing vulnerability to air attack, artillery, or direct fire weapons. Historically, 
swamps have been avoided by attacking armies. Swamps and marshes over | meter deep 
maybe more effective obstacles than rivers, since causeways are usually more difficult to 
construct than bridges. 


Soils 


Soil trafficability, especially when considered in conjunction with climatic conditions, is 
a very important factor in evaluating cross-country movement. Obtaining the necessary 
information, however, is difficult and time-consuming; and, properly evaluating 
trafficability strength of soils is a complicated process. 





Engineer soils analysis personnel and qualified photo-interpreters are capable of 
estimating soil. strengths usually required by higher headquarters for planning purposes. 
The load-bearing capacity of fine-grained soils such as clay, loam, and silt is significantly 
affected by soil moisture due to the effects of drainage on the water table or weather. 
Artificially produced high-water tables have made obstacles of meadows or paddy fields 
which covered large areas. Further, the long-term use of manure for fertilizer adds 
organic material that reduces soil's trafficability when wet. The combination of soft or 
slippery soils, and even slight slopes, will stop many vehicles. Tanks have extremely low 


ground pressures (8 to 12 pounds per square inch (psi); 0.56 to 0.85 kilograms per square 


centimeter (kg/cm?)). They have less difficulty with most soils than other vehicles unless 
unusual wetness or repeated traffic have reduced normal trafficability. 





Snow 


Snow creates a special cross-country movement problem related to soils. Though it is 
seldom deep enough to be a serious obstacle to tracked vehicles, snow in the spring or 
fall may occur over saturated, untrafficable ground. It is considerably more of a 
hindrance and hazard to wheeled vehicles, as most will become immobilized when the 
depth of the snow reaches one third of the tire's diameter. Snow reduces slope climbing 
ability, maximum payload capacity, and maneuverability and speed of all vehicle 
operations. 


SLOPE AND RELIEF 


Slope is the inclined surface of a hill, mountain, ridge, or any other part of the earth's land 
surface. It is the inclination not only of major surface relief features (hills and 
mountains), but also of minor relief features such as ditches, small gullies, mounds, low 
escarpments, small pinnacles, and sinkholes which generally do not appear on 
topographic maps. Although some of the minor relief features might be considered a 
roughness factor rather than slope, they are included in the general slope factor because 
their obstacle value is due to the steepness of their slopes, banks, or faces. Short, vertical 
slopes or "steps" higher than 0.3 meter (1 foot), will slow wheeled vehicles, and 1.5 
meters (4 feet) will stop tanks. 





In mountainous areas, the steep slopes commonly make cross-country vehicular 
movement either difficult or impossible. Movement will be channelized by existing 
terrain. The amount of slope is usually expressed as a percentage, which is the number of 
meters of elevation difference per 100 meters of horizontal distance. Most military 
vehicles are able to climb slopes of 60 percent (about 30/35 degrees) under optimum 
conditions. This limit, however, is too great to negotiate in military operations. In 
evaluating terrain for cross-country movement, 45 percent (about 27 degrees) is 
commonly used as the reasonable upper limit for tanks, and 30 percent (about 17 degrees) 
for trucks. Wet weather, trees, unfavorable soil conditions, snow, boulders, and the 
employment of reinforcing obstacles may make gentle slopes impassable. 





The most reliable information on slopes, particularly short, steep ones, is obtained by on- 
site reconnaissance. At best, however, slope can be determined on only a small portion of 
the area by this procedure. Topographic maps are useful but some features may not be 
shown; for example, small gullies. Terrain teams are the best overall source of up-to-date 
information to determine slope and other terrain information if an on-site reconnaissance 
is not possible. 


VEGETATION 


Vegetation includes not only natural, "wild" vegetation, but also cultivated forests and 
crops. Forest vegetation is the primary concern in cross-country movement. Trees are the 
principal obstacles to movement. Although high grass and brush can obstruct vision, they 
are of relatively little significance in most cases. Nearly all forests, however, have a 
slowing effect on movement. 


The problem is to determine whether a particular forest will slow movement slightly, 
drastically, or stop it altogether. Temperate zone forests tend to canalize movement since 
the roads, trails, and firebreaks through them provide the only means for rapid movement. 
Reinforcing obstacles readily strengthen the defensive value of woods, and are placed 
both outside and inside the wooded area to delay the advance of the enemy and better 
utilize supporting fires. 





Tree size and density, soil condition, slope, and depth of forests contribute to their 
obstacle value. Forests with trees 20 to 25 centimeters (8 to 10 inches) in diameter are 
tank obstacles, and 5-centimeter (2-inch) stands will stop most wheeled vehicles. Fully 
dependable criteria pertaining to the size of trees, and the significance of species and root 
systems, have not been determined. Medium tanks, for example, have pushed over single 
trees as much as 30 centimeters (12 inches) in diameter. Overturning trees within stands 
can also create complications; for example, if several trees are pushed over, some will 
interlock with other trees to form a better obstacle to movement. The protruding root 
system and trunks of overturned trees are obstacles to vehicles. The critical average 
distance between trees in forests where the trees are too big to be pushed over is about 3 
to 5 meters (10 to 16.5 feet), depending upon whether the trees are regularly or 
irregularly planted. Although this distance may be wide enough for the vehicle to pass 


through, in most cases there is no room for turning. Reconnaissance is especially 
important as a source of vegetation information for two reasons. First, two of the 
characteristics--the size of trees and the distances between them--are seldom recorded. 
Second, the size and distances frequently are difficult to determine from aerial 
photography. Tree blowdown during nuclear attack will present significant mobility 
problems. Forested areas which have been affected by blast will be impassable to tracked 
and wheeled vehicles. 


CULTURAL FEATURES 


Cultural features are constructed works such as stone walls, hedgerows, dikes, canals, 
drainage ditches, embankments, cuts, fills, and built-up areas, as well as damaged or 
abandoned vehicles and mobile equipment. Some of these features are considered under 
the slope factor, some under streams, and some--such as built-up areas--are frequently not 
evaluated in cross-country movement studies. Cultural features are treated as a separate 
factor here to insure that they are not overlooked in evaluating terrain for cross-country 
movement. The obstacle value of a cultural feature depends on its size or extent, location, 
and construction. Large cities and towns that have many masonry buildings located 
astride principal communication routes can become obstacles of considerable importance 
because they can be reduced to rubble and restrict enemy movement. Even if gaps are 
cleared through the rubble and debris, movement is still canalized. The natural obstacle 
value of built-up areas can be readily reinforced, and those properly located to control 
approaches or key terrain can be developed into formidable strongpoints. 





Roads and railroads 


Another extremely important cultural feature is the road and railroad net. It will have a 
fundamental influence on an attacker's choice of approaches, because-- 


The anticipated rates of advance will force the attacker (except the lead elements 
of his main body) to move on roads, unless combat or imminent combat forces 
him to deploy into tactical formations. 

The road net is critical to the movement of the attacker's following echelons. 

The attacker must have a well-developed road and/or railroad net for his logistical 
support. 


Every break in this road and railroad net creates an obstacle to an attacker's rapid tactical 
movement, the movement of his following echelons, and his logistics. If the break is in 
his division rear or farther back, its effect is interdiction. Corps and division obstacle 
plans, as well as denial plans, must consider this effect. Further, a highly developed road 
and/or railroad network with its numerous cuts, fills, and embankments creates obstacles 


to transverse movement which are comparable in extent to the drainage network. The 
German autobahn system is an excellent example. 


Minor cultural features 


Minor cultural features also can act as deterrents or obstacles to movement. A stone wall 
or hedgerow is a serious obstacle, unless the sheer weight of a vehicle can push through 
it. Accordingly, the height and thickness of such walls or hedgerows, as well as the height 
of embankments and the slope on either side, determine obstacle value. Embankments 
more than 3 meters (10 feet) high with side slopes greater than 45 percent can be serious 
obstacles. Cuts have similar significance. Large gravel pits, quarries, or areas where strip 
mining has taken place may present obstacles or traps for vehicles. These, too, must be 
evaluated, particularly with respect to slope and soil characteristics. 


Streams or drainage ditches that appear insignificant on a 1:50,000 scale tactical map 
may be of significant value in canalizing or slowing enemy movement. They are easily 
reinforced and can be integrated into the overall obstacle plan with only small amounts of 
effort expended. Although most of the minor cultural features can be interpreted from air 
photos, and many may be shown on topographic maps, the features' dimensions, which 
directly affect cross-country trafficability, are difficult or impossible to determine from 
photos and maps. Thus, cultural feature information that may be most relevant to cross- 
country movement is frequently available only through over-the-ground reconnaissance 
or from terrain teams. 


CLIMATE 


Climate and weather both significantly affect cross-country movement, although their 
effects are usually indirect, and their influence is variable in duration and difficult to 
predict. Climatic influences are usually reflected in the nature of the terrain and obstacles. 
To a large extent, climate controls soil moisture, and thus soil strengths. It also 
determines basic river and stream characteristics. Some easily overlooked direct effects 
of climate are important. Fog and haze, common in some areas, significantly affect 
weapons employment and can retard or even prevent movement. Dust storms and 
snowstorms have the same effect. 





Seasonal weather patterns are important. An attacker anticipating a quick victory may 
choose to strike at any time of the year. Existing obstacles should be evaluated on the 
basis of the seasonal weather conditions to determine their obstacle value. 


The ability to evaluate terrain and properly assess its obstacle value provides a significant 
advantage to the commander who does it well. A good analysis enables the commander 
to determine avenues of approach, key terrain, and best areas for weapons employment. It 
also provides the commander a beginning for the obstacle plan. Full use of existing 


obstacles will help in conserving precious manpower and logistical effort necessary to 
emplace reinforcing obstacles. 


COMBINED EFFECTS 


The preceding paragraphs have discussed the individual principal terrain factors affecting 
existing obstacles. Usually, their combined effect is far more important and considerably 
more difficult to define. Slopes combined with vegetation and/or soil conditions limit 
vehicular mobility far more than any one of these factors alone. The obstacle effect 
becomes apparent long before any of the individual factors reach their critical values. The 
tank's weight magnifies the effect of even a slight rise by reducing its speed. For 
example, even though a tank can push over a tree 25 centimeters (10 inches) in diameter 
on level ground, the same tree will stop the tank on a slight uphill slope. Further, the 
combined effect of several less-than-critical features or factors can stop the enemy's 
armored vehicles. Closely spaced trees much smaller than 25 centimeters (10 inches) in 
diameter will stop a tank even on level ground. Even more important is recognizing that 
the critical values discussed in the preceding paragraphs are the limits for halting 
movement. Lower values of slope or smaller trees, steps, ditches, and so on, will severely 
slow the enemy's movement. A high frequency or density of features that are less than 
critical can severely reduce, although not stop, the enemy's speed. For example, a tank 
may eventually force its way through one of West Germany's densely-cultivated forests 
that has not reached full growth, but only by repeated lunges at a very slow effective rate 
of movement. To consider another example, every tanker knows how effectively a 
number of terraces or ditches, each individually crossed, can interfere with movement. It 
is not always necessary to completely stop the enemy's armored vehicles. Frequently, it is 
more desirable to slow but not stop him. If the goal is to lead enemy formations along a 
certain passage or in a particular direction--into a desired engagement area for example-- 
or to lure enemy tanks to expose their less-heavily armored flanks, then it may be 
preferable not to stop him. 





Other effects, although not necessarily obstacle effects, also must be considered. The 
effect of slopes, in conjunction with limited depression and elevation of the tank's main 
gun, is important in siting both antitank weapons and obstacles. A steep cross-slope also 
makes it more difficult for the gunner to rapidly deliver accurate fire, thus giving the 
defender a relative advantage. 


Finally, terrain factors are evaluated in light of the movement of a combined arms 
formation, and not of one tank. Threat forces attack in relatively fixed formations. 
Natural or cultural obstacles that stop or slow a part of the formation will thus affect the 
movement of the entire formation, either to slow it or change its direction. This effect 
emphasizes the slowing ability of less-than-critical terrain factors or features. It also 
provides the basis for siting many of the defender's reinforcing obstacles. The effect of 


combinations and variations of natural or cultural obstacles makes their evaluation a 
complex skill, one that requires experience and practice to develop its full potential. 


dee TECTA 


Consider the effect of terrain 
on a combined arms formation — 
not on individual tanks 





REINFORCING OBSTACLES 


The previous section developed the concept of existing obstacles as a part of the terrain, 
and discussed their characteristics, identification, and analysis. This section considers the 
use and types of reinforcing obstacles that the commander can use to knit together, 
strengthen, and extend existing obstacles in support of his tactical plan. Reinforcing 
obstacles are those obstacles specifically constructed, emplaced, or detonated to extend or 
improve the effectivess of existing obstacles. They are placed for the purpose of 
anticipated military action or action already in progress. 





Many existing obstacles tend to be lengthy (rivers, canals) or broad in extent (forests, 
swamps). They can often more accurately be described as obstacle areas rather than a 
single obstacle. Existing obstacles are highly variable in effectiveness from place to place 
and have frequent gaps or openings between, and lanes (roads, bridges) through or over 
them. 





After thoroughly examining existing obstacles and obstacle areas, and then determining 
their relative stopping power, the commander has a much better feel for the use of 
reinforcing obstacles. Given the general tactical plan, time, logistic support, and 
manpower, the commander is able to add reinforcing obstacles to strengthen the terrain. 
Reinforcing obstacles normally are used to close gaps and block or close the lanes in the 
existing obstacle areas, or to enhance the obstacle value of the terrain. In some cases, they 
are used to extend natural obstacles or create obstacles or obstacle systems in open 
country. 


The nature and extent of reinforcing obstacles is limited only by the imagination of the 
commanders or engineers who design them and the soldiers who emplace them. They are 
also limited by the logistic effort required. Reinforcing obstacles can range from massive 
systems such as the beach defenses constructed on the French coastline during World 
War II, or the extensive antitank obstacles in the 1973 Middle East War, to a road crater 
emplaced by an engineer squad. Reinforcing obstacles can vary greatly in type, method 
of emplacement, and logistic and manpower requirements. Reinforcing obstacles can be 
broadly categorized by the following types: 


Demolition. 
Constructed. 
Land mines. 
Contamination. 
Expedient. 


These categories are not mutually exclusive--some obstacles appear in more than one 
category and some (such as mines) are commonly used to strengthen others. 


DEMOLITION 


Demolition obstacles are created by the detonation of explosives, including nuclear 
explosives. Demolitions are commonly used to create reinforcing obstacles. There are 
two types of demolition obstacles, preliminary and reserved. Preliminary demolition 
obstacles are not absolutely critical to the tactical commander's plan, and do not require a 
formal written demolition order. They can be detonated as soon as they are prepared or as 


the tactical situation dictates. Reserved demolition obstacles are critical to the tactical 
commander's plan, and require a formal written demolition order. They are detonated 
according to the instructions in the order. Chapter 4 provides complete details on re 
served demolition obstacles. Some typical uses of demolition obstacles are: 


Blowing craters in roads, airfield runways, taxiways or parking areas, and 
railroads. 

Destroying bridges or tunnels. 

Demolishing buildings to create rubble. 

Flooding areas by destruction of dams or locks. 

Creating abatis by tree blowdown. 

Blowing ditches using solid or liquid explosive. 

Detonating prechambered roads and bridges. 


CONSTRUCTED 


Constructed obstacles are those reinforcing obstacles that are built by soldiers and 
machinery, generally without the use of explosives. Typical examples are: 


Wire. 

Tank ditches. 

Log cribs. 

Steel "H" beam post obstacles. 

Falling or tumble blocks. 

Dragon's teeth, hedgehogs, and tetrahedrons. 
Nonexplosive abatis. 


Constructed obstacles generally require extensive amounts of one or all of the following: 


Manpower. 
Equipment. 
Material. 
Time. 


Soldiers and construction equipment can be exposed to all types of enemy fire when 
emplacing constructed obstacles. Constructed obstacles should be emplaced prior to the 
start of the battle, or a terrain feature away from direct engagement areas, so that 
observed fire cannot disrupt the emplacement process. 


LAND MINES 


Reinforcing obstacles other than minefield are primarily designed to enhance the fires 
and kill ratio of antitank weapons. Mines and minefield perform this function as well as 
killing or destroying enemy vehicles and personnel. 


Mine warfare is undergoing a tremendous evolutionary process. Significant 
improvements have been made in mines and mine delivery systems. We have the 
capability to quickly emplace mines anywhere on the battlefield using various delivery 


systems. Mines have changed to the point where we now have to discuss them in two 
separate categories, conventional and scatterable mines. This categorization is required 
due to the different capabilities, employment techniques, and delivery means of each. 
Both categories of mines have a distinct place on the battlefield and complement each 
other. 


Conventional mines are those mines not designed to self-destruct. Conventional mines 
are designed to be directly emplaced by hand or by mechanical mine planting equipment. 
They can be buried or surface-laid. Conventional mines can be emplaced in a classical 
pattern or without regard to pattern as the tactical situation dictates. 


Scatterable mines are those mines which are designed to self-destruct after a set period 
of time. With the exception of the Wide Angle Side Penetrating Mining System 
(WASPMS) which is directly emplaced, scatterable mines are remotely delivered by 
ground systems, artillery, helicopters, and high-performance aircraft. The term 
"scatterable" refers to selfdestructing mines. It should not be used to describe 
conventional mines which have been laid without regard to pattern. 


Scatterable mines have added a new dimension to mine warfare and the battlefield. The 
traditional concept of large linear minefield across contested areas between two forces is 
no longer viable, except possibly in desert warfare. Future battlefields will contain many 
smaller mined areas placed in response to enemy dispositions and movement. Scatterable 
mines will be employed against enemy units anywhere on the battlefield. Scatterable 
mines can be emplaced by a variety of delivery systems ranging from mechanical and 
explosive ground systems to artillery, helicopters, and high-performance aircraft. 
Scatterable mines significantly reduce manpower requirements associated with mine 
warfare. Scatterable mines are also smaller, lighter, and more lethal. They offer a 
reduction in logistical requirements due to reduced bulk and weight. 


NOTE: The reader should beware of the terms "scatterable" and "Family of 
Scatterable Mines (FASCAM)" when referring to specific systems and their 
employment. Those generic terms are only applicable in the most general 
sense when discussing doctrine. Whenever possible, refer to the specific 
delivery system and the characteristics of that system, rather than the generic 
term. 


HAND EMPLACED 
Uses 


@ In friendly terrain to support the main 
battle area (MBA). 


è Is usually emplaced before battle begins. 
Characteristics 

è Is labor, time, and logistic intensive. 

@ Requires no special delivery means. 


@ is most commonly used. 


MECHANICAL MINE PLANTER 
Uses 
@ is quicker than hand emplacement. 


@ Can surtace lay or bury mines. 


@ For large linear minefields. 


Characteristics 


@ Has logistical requirements similar to 
hand emplaced. 


@ Is restricted by terrain conditions. 


Delay or disrupt 
attacking forces 





Scatterable mines can be emplaced by a 
variety of air, fire support, and ground 
delivery systems. We have the capability to 
rapidly employ both antitank and anti- 
personnel mines anywhere on the bat- 
tlefield. The self-destructing nature of 
scatterable mines provides us the capability 
to emplace mines in an area and then 
maneuver through that area after the 


MECHANICAL DISPENSER 


Minefields will be emplaced only in areas 
where the enemy is expected to move or 
attack, Scatterable mines are a limited 
resource and should only be employed in 
areas where the cost to the enemy is 
greatest, Probability that the enemy willbe 
surprised by the minefields is greater due 
to the rapid delivery capability. Freedom of 
maneuver will be maintained as long as 
possible. 


Uses 


@ For emplacing large minefields in 
Support of front line battle positions. 


è For rapid mining in support of strong- 
points or blocking positions. 


è For flank protection. 
@ For airborne drop zones. 
@ For airmobile landing and pickup zones, 


@ For river crossing sites. 


mines have done their job and self- 
destructed. 


Previously, minefield emplacement re- 
quired extensive manpower and time. The 
use of remote and more rapid ground 
emplacement systems has and will con- 
tinue to reduce the manpower re- 
quirements in mine warfare. 


Characteristics 


@ Is much faster than hand or mechani- 
cally emplaced conventional mines. 


@ Reduces manpower exposed to threat 
of advancing enemy. 


@ Reduces logistic effort required to 
Support extensive mining. 


@ Terrain must permit a ground dispenser. 





EXPLOSIVELY SCATTERED 
GROUND SYSTEMS 


Uses 


@ For emplacing rapid protective mine- 
fields. 


@ For preparing front line battle positions. 
@ For closing gaps and lanes in minefields. 


@ For increasing effectiveness of rein- 
forcing obstacles, 


@ For supporting strongpoints or blocking 
positions. 


© An economy of force measure on flanks. 
è For airborne drop zones. 

@ For airmobile landing and pickup zones. 
è For closing breached minefields. 

®@ At river crossing sites. 


è During ambushes. 


Reinforce 
SMa obstacles 


G 


a 
re, 


Characteristics 


@ is much faster than hand placement, 
mine planter, and mechanical scattering 
systems. 


è Can be emplaced by all arms; specially 
trained troops are not needed. 


è Must be positioned by troops. 


@ No delivery error. 


@ Permits emplacement of mines under 
fire from advancing enemy forces. 





FIRE SUPPORT DELIVERED 
Uses 
®@ To delay or disrupt attacking forces. 


@ Todisrupt enemy command and control, 
logistics, and staging areas. 


@ To suppress enemy indirect fire and air 
defense elements. 


@ To develop engagement areas for long 
range antiarmor weapons. 


è To disrupt and delay enemy river 
crossings. 


@ To supplement flank security. 


è To isolate objectives. 


è To reseed breached minefields, 


Characteristics 


@ Employed directly on top of, in front of, 
or behind enemy forces. 


è Used after hostilities have begun. 
@ Emplaced upon short notice. 
@ Can be used in counterbattery fire. 


@ is dependent on delivery means which 
may have other priorities. 


è Location is limited by the range of the 
firing battery. 


@ Self-destruct mines must be prestocked 
at firing battery- 


Artillery 
suppression 


Hasty or deliberate 


attack 





AIRCRAFT DELIVERED 


Uses Characteristics 


@ To interdict movement and commitment è Used after the battle has begun. 
of enemy follow-on forces. 


® Employed directly on top of, in front of, 
@ To delay or disrupt attacking forces. or behind enemy forces. 


@ Todisrupt enemy command and control, @ Emplaced on short notice. 
logistics, and staging areas. 
@ Employed deep behind enemy lines. 
@ To isolate objectives, 
®@ Location is limited only by the operating 
@ To supplement flank security. range of the delivery aircraft. 


è Dependent on aircraft for delivery 
means; aircraft may have other priorities 
when mining is required, 


è Delivery systems are vulnerable to 
enemy air defense. 


Disrupt movement 
and commitment of 
follow-up forces 





Mines are used extensively where the existing obstacle structure is weak or nonexistent. 
They should also be used with other reinforcing obstacles, such as tank ditches, to make 
breaching and clearing more costly and time-consuming to the enemy. 


Since all scatterable minefield systems provide great flexibility to maneuver 
commanders, there will be extensive demands for them. Commanders and engineers 
should plan and carefully assign priorities. Available systems must be used for the most 
critical needs. Employment must be closely coordinated with obstacle plans, fires, and 
the scheme of maneuver. Coordination with fire support planners, aviation staff officers, 


and air liaison officers is essential to insure prior planning to execute minefield 
emplacement missions on short notice. Planning and employment of scatterable mines, as 
well as conventional mines, are discussed in depth in chapter 5. 


CONTAMINATION 


Contamination can be either nuclear or chemical in nature. Both types are difficult to 
predict and control because they depend on winds for placement, and are subject to 
weather and other environmental factors. The United States has renounced the first use of 
chemical weapons. Further, the most predictable source of nuclear contamination, 
Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM), is subject to the same restrictions as all nuclear 
weapons and may not be available for use when needed. If an ADM is used for cratering, 
there will be both close-in radiation and fallout, each effectively contaminating an area of 
reasonably predictable extent. Threat doctrine considers the use of both nuclear and 
chemical weapons, and threat forces train for operations in contaminated areas. The 
presence of contamination and its effects on the battlefield must be anticipated. 


EXPEDIENT 


The potential of expedient obstacles is almost unlimited. They place a great premium on 
imagination and ingenuity in the use of available materials and other resources, thus 
avoiding the logistic burden associated with all other types of obstacles. All sorts of 
nonstandard log obstacles can be built. Their complexity depends upon the time and 
personnel available. Junked or destroyed cars and trucks or other debris can be spread to 
block an open area or, if the region is rocky, earthmoving equipment can be used to 
distribute boulders to block tanks. Selected trees can be pushed over to make an abatis or 
to strengthen a wooded area where tree spacing might otherwise allow armored vehicles 
to pass. Short ditches can be cut in lieu of craters. Material can be pushed up to form a 
road block. Equipment can steepen or deepen stream banks, gullies, or other breaks in the 
terrain to make expedient tank ditches. Trees can be cut or broken with a variety of 
vehicles or pieces of equipment. They can also be pushed or pulled down by winches to 
form expedient abatis or strengthen wooded areas. The M9 Armored Combat Earthmover 
(ACE), dozers, loaders, and many other pieces of equipment can also be used. 


The wreckage of destroyed towns, cities, or industrial areas offers a source of materials to 
be used in making expedient obstacles. If permitted, limited controlled flooding can be 
used, not only to inundate areas, but also to create soft or slippery areas where soil 
conditions would make this possible. Timber bridges can be burned, and controlled fires 
can be used to create obstacles in other ways. For example, igniting the brush in a brush- 
filled ditch, at the proper time, can make an effective obstacle. If available, ice and snow 
can be exploited to create effective obstacles. 


By their nature, expedient obstacles substitute locally available materials and soldier 
labor for a logistical requirement. All that is needed is the imagination to recognize the 
potential of available materials. 


Expedient tank obstacles 


Triangular 
dozer cut 


Triangular 
dozer cut 


Reinforcing a roadway cut 





PRINCIPLES OF OBSTACLE EMPLOYMENT 


AirLand Battle doctrine gives the commander fighting the battle a complete range of 
defensive and offensive options. A static type defense can be used to focus upon terrain 
retention using firepower from fixed positions to deny terrain. The commander can also 
defend using a dynamic defense that focuses upon maneuver to destroy enemy forces 
rather than retain specific terrain. 


The static and dynamic defensive frameworks are the extremes of the spectrum. 
Typically, the commander may choose to combine both the static and dynamic forms in 
organizing the defense based upon the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, 
time, and troops (METT-T). 


Whatever the concept, organizing the defense must be carefully matched to the terrain. 
The engineer is the principal element in reinforcing the terrain to best complement the 
maneuver commander's plan. The engineer and the maneuver commander must 
coordinate throughout the planning and battlefield preparation sequence to insure unity of 
effort and maximum effectiveness of obstacle employment. 


Terrain reinforcement techniques must be employed along the depth of the enemy's 
formation and avenues of approach where existing terrain places him at the greatest 
disadvantage. Use of reinforcing obstacles is the principal method of terrain 
reinforcement. Reinforcing obstacles must be used in conjunction with the existing 
obstacles and the commander's plan. Reinforcing obstacles have three primary purposes: 


1 Enhance the effectiveness of friendly antitank fires. 


2 Delay the enemy's advance, upset his timing, disrupt and channelize his formations, and 
delay or destroy follow-on echelons. 


3 Enhance friendly economy of force measures. 


Obstacles must be covered by fire if at all possible. They should be located within the 
effective range of friendly direct fire antitank weapons. Their locations must be carefully 
coordinated with the location of battle positions and direct and indirect weapons. We 
want to engage the enemy at the maximum effective range of our antitank weapons, and 
force him to breach and fight his way through a series of obstacles while under intense 
fire. Each obstacle delays some part of the enemy's leading elements. 





The coordinated use of obstacles can delay and disrupt enemy formations, and also force 
them into the primary fields of fire of our tanks and other antitank weapon systems, or 
prevent escape from such an engagement area. The enemy is forced to move on the 
battlefield in conformance with the friendly commander's plan. 





The skillful use of obstacles to channelize the enemy is a vital factor. Once the enemy 
force maneuvers into the engagement area, it is held there by other groups of obstacles, 
and still others may be used to close the trap behind it. (Scatterable mines are ideal for the 
latter purpose.) Other obstacles are used to separate the enemy's leading elements from 
reserves or following echelons, thus precluding reinforcement. 


Mutually supporting obstacles serve other important purposes. They can be used in the 
economy of force role to strengthen a naturally strong existing obstacle area so that it 
need only be lightly defended, thus freeing forces to be concentrated elsewhere. 
Similarity, obstacles can be used in conjunction with mobile forces to protect flanks and 
other lightly defended areas. This is a particularly important role in view of the threat 
doctrine of penetration and envelopment, and the overall dispersion of forces on the 
battlefield. 


Regardless of the type defense employed by the tactical commander, there are five basic 
employment principles for reinforcing obstacles: 


1 Reinforcing obstacles support the maneuver commander's plan. 
2 Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with observed fires. 


3 Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with existing obstacles and with other reinforcing 
obstacles. 


4 Reinforcing obstacles are employed in depth. 


5 Reinforcing obstacles are employed for surprise. 


1 Reinforcing obstacles support the maneuver commander's plan. Reinforcing 
obstacles must be planned and emplaced to support the tactical plan. Obstacles other than 
mines emplaced outside the range of friendly weapons are of little use. Reinforcing 
obstacles that do not accomplish one or more of the basic purposes of reinforcing 
obstacles are also of little value. Engineers must be completely familiar with the tactical 
plan, the existing terrain, and the maneuver commander's intentions. Only then can full 
advantage of the multiplier value of integrating obstacles and fires be realized. 


2 Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with observed fires. Obstacles are used to 
develop engagement areas in which enemy maneuver is restricted and slowed, thereby 
increasing the hit probability of friendly direct and indirect fires. The tactical commander 
and the engineer site the weapons and obstacles which offer the best relative advantage, 
and consider terrain configuration and the effective weapons range. Special attention 
must be given to locating obstacles to complement the fires of Dragon, tanks, and tube- 
launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles (TOWs). Since TOWs have a greater 
maximum effective range than Threat tanks, it is to our distinct advantage to site part of 
the tactical obstacle system to capitalize on that difference. Generally, the greatest 
relative advantage accrues when the obstacle is at the maximum range possible and 
consistent with visibility conditions and the tactical plan. Observed indirect fires are also 
used in conjunction with obstacles against enemy vehicles and infantry out in the open. 
Observation and adjustment of fires are essential if the full advantage is to be developed. 
At the same time, fires serve to protect the obstacle by making it costly to breach or 
bypass. With rare exceptions, obstacles that are not covered by fire are little more than a 
nuisance to the enemy's leading elements. 


Keep in mind, however, that the principal purpose of integrating obstacle locations with 
fire is to enhance the effectiveness of those fires--a significant combat multiplier effect of 
obstacle use. 


3 Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with existing obstacles and with other 
reinforcing obstacles. Reinforcing obstacles are sited to take the maximum advantage of 
existing obstacles. They are placed where they can close the gaps or openings between 
existing obstacles and/or close any passages through them. The road network must be 
destroyed and the inherent natural pattern of cross-country movement should be 
disrupted. The first obstacles planned are bridge demolitions, road craters, abatis, and 
point or small minefield that tie together the existing obstacle areas and close the 
passages through them. Other reinforcing obstacles are then located to strengthen and 
extend the existing obstacle areas and block major corridors. Taking advantage of the 
existing obstacles reduces the resources required to quickly obtain an effective obstacle 
system. Effective reinforcement of existing obstacles also enhances economy of force 
operations by permitting friendly forces to concentrate on more trafficable terrain 
approaches. 


© a Delay 


4 
PA l aae 
Weapon only Obstacle only Obstacle plus weapon 


Hit... maybe Delay Probable hit plus delay 





Individual obstacles must be sited and designed to tie in with existing obstacles or with 
each other. An obstacle that can be bypassed immediately is worthless. Each individual 
obstacle must be carefully designed for the exact location it will occupy, and must 
overlap on each side with the existing obstacle it will complete. The critical design width 
of an obstacle is the distance from an existing obstacle to another existing obstacle (or to 
another reinforcing obstacle), and not the width of a road or highway through the existing 


obstacle. 


Another major design consideration is that the reinforcing obstacle does not need to be 
stronger than the integrated existing obstacle. The obstacle should be no more difficult to 
breach than it is to get around. If the enemy could force his way through the existing 
obstacle in the immediate vicinity in 10 minutes, it would be wasteful to construct a 
reinforcing obstacle requiring 40 minutes to breach. The effort and resources used to 
obtain the last 30 minutes of breaching time are desperately needed elsewhere. Although 
the delay or breaching time associated with a particular obstacle may be difficult to 
determine, this principle must nevertheless be kept in mind to obtain the most use of 
available resources. 






Integrating reinforcing obstacles 


Bypass must also 








z” ~G 
a hes ee ~ a be blocked 
—— — = \ 
aene E 
TE ge 40 minutes > \\ 
TE to overcome 
\N\ 
\\ 

Do not waste yS 

effort making the s i \\ 

reinforcing obstacle 10 minutes ke 


stronger than to bypass 
the natural obstacle 


Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with each other to assure that probable bypass routes 
are closed. For example, destruction of a major highway through a wooded area is largely 
ineffective if any nearby road or opening that offers a ready bypass route is left open. 
(Such destruction could be highly effective, however, if friendly forces were seeking to 
divert the enemy along that bypass route.) Reinforcing obstacles can also be used to close 
gaps and lanes in other reinforcing obstacles. For example, a crater can be used to close a 
road left open through a minefield when all friendly troops have cleared. 


4 Reinforcing obstacles are employed in depth. A series of simple obstacles arranged 
one behind the other along a probable axis of enemy advance is far more effective than 
one large, elaborate obstacle. Restricting the design of obstacles to correspond with the 
strength of the existing obstacle (as previously discussed) helps to conserve effort and 
direct it toward executing obstacles in depth. Obstacles must not be located too close 
together so only a single enemy response is required. They must be far enough apart that 


each will require a new deployment of the enemy's counterobstacle forces and/or 
equipment. The distance between obstacles will depend on the terrain and the obstacle 
effort available. Proper use of obstacles in depth wears the enemy down and significantly 
increases the overall delay. At each new obstacle, he incurs losses and is forced to stop 
and react. This wearing down effect is psychologically significant. The desired effect is 
to degrade the enemy soldier's will and induce a feeling of hopelessness. This can be 
done by convincing him that, beyond each new obstacle (with its attendant loss of 
personnel and equipment), there awaits another obstacle with a similar cost; and, beyond 
that one, yet another, and so on. Another reason for using a greater number of less 
elaborate obstacles is that each one forces the enemy to expose his limited 
counterobstacle equipment and troops to loss. When the counterobstacle resources 
initially allotted to the leading elements have been destroyed, the enemy's movement will 
be severely slowed until new counterobstacle units can be brought forward. 


5 Reinforcing obstacles are employed for surprise. Using obstacles so as to obtain 
surprise is one means available to the commander to retain a degree of initiative even 
when defending. Scatterable mines permit rapid mining anywhere in the battle area, 
confronting the attacker with a completely new situation almost instantly. The self- 
destruct feature of the scatterable mine also provides surprise--a friendly counterattack 
may be launched through an area that was mined prior to the attack but where the mines 
have just self-destructed. 


More conventional ways to obtain surprise are also available and should be used. They 
include the sudden detonation of concealed obstacles in front of the attacking enemy or 
within his formations. Conventional ways also include the use of phony obstacles to 
mislead the enemy as to the pattern and extent of the friendly obstacle system. An 
obvious pattern of obstacles would divulge locations of units and weapons. Friendly 
forces must avoid readily discernible, repetitive patterns. By varying the type, design, and 
location, the enemy's understanding and breaching of our obstacle system is made more 
difficult. Extensive use of obstacles can make a major contribution to this effort. 


Reinforcing obstacles which complement the existing obstacle value of the terrain, and 
are designed and emplaced to support the maneuver plan, are an effective "combat 
multiplier." Tactical commanders and engineers must exploit the full value of obstacles. 


SUMMARY 


Obstacles are classified as either existing or reinforcing. Existing obstacles are those 
natural and cultural restrictions to movement that are a part of the terrain when battle 
planning begins. The ability to recognize and evaluate the obstacle potential of the terrain 
is critical to planning the battle. Reinforcing obstacles are constructed, emplaced, or 
detonated to knit together, strengthen, and extend exisiting obstacles. 


Reinforcing obstacles must be integrated with friendly observed fires, the friendly 
commander's maneuver plan for both the enemy and friendly forces, and existing and 
reinforcing obstacles. Reinforcing obstacles must also be arrayed in depth and employed 
for surprise. 


Mines are generally the most effective type of obstacle because they also inflict losses on 
the enemy, and their use is highly flexible. The Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) 
vastly increases this flexibility, making the creation of rapid minefield possible. 


Obstacles are also used to delay and disrupt an attacking force, upset the enemy's timing 
and plans, and divert him into engagement areas and be destroyed. Obstacles can delay or 
destroy follow-on echelons. 


Obstacles can significantly enhance the effectiveness of our fires and thus our ability to 
win the battle. 


Chapter 3 


COMMAND AND CONTROL 











Countermobility activities are planned and executed to defeat the enemy's ability to 
maneuver. This chapter addresses the coordinated development of obstacle plans at 
various levels of responsibility. Procedures for positive control of reserve obstacles and 
preparation of demolition orders are also included. 


LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
RESERVE OBSTACLES 
SUMMARY 


LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY 


An effective command and control system is a must for countermobility activities. The 
primary goal is to make the enemy go where we want, when we want, at speeds we 
dictate. We want to accomplish that goal with little or no effect on the ability of friendly 


forces to move and maneuver. To do so requires a command and control system that 
emphasizes long-range planning, centralized control, and decentralized execution. 
Centralized control is necessary in the planning of countermobility activities to insure 
that the obstacle plan is integrated with and supports the overall tactical plan. Senior 
command levels must dictate obstacle zones, obstacle-free areas, and reserve obstacles in 
the planning process. The specific type and placement of those ground obstacles are best 
accomplished by the level that can actually conduct a ground reconnaissance. 


CORPS OBSTACLE PLAN 


Centralized control of countermobility activities normally begins at the corps level with 
the corps obstacle plan. The corps obstacle plan is general in nature and concerned with 
the employment of obstacles as a part of a specific tactical operation. The obstacle plan 
supports the corps commander's concept of the operation and integrates the terrain 
aspects of the operation with the tactical plan. Through the allocation of engineer support 
and logistics, the corps commander shapes the countermobility efforts of the division by 
weighting those areas viewed as most critical. The corps obstacle plan provides a 
framework for the division plans. The corps obstacle plan can and will normally include 
the following items: 


Assignment of areas of responsibility. 

Designation of any specific obstacles vital to the corps as a whole. 

Completion times for all or any portion of the obstacle plan when deemed 
necessary; however, completion times can be specified later. 

Gaps, lanes, and important routes to be kept open and areas important to the 
commander for tactical and combat service support operations, as well as for 
future operations. Gaps and lanes are specifically designated at the lowest level 
practicable in consonance with the mission of the command. 

Allocation of engineer support, materials, transportation, and equipment. 
Reporting instructions to insure all headquarters in the chain of command keep 
abreast of the obstacle situation and plan their operation accordingly. As a 
minimum, reports to division level must include target or obstacle identification, 
location, and status. 

Coordination required between adjacent units to insure critical points (such as 
common boundaries) are effectively covered, gaps and lanes are properly located, 
sufficient in number, and not closed for passage before the time required. 
Procedures for employment of scatterable mines to include provisions for air and 
artillery delivery, if not specified by standing operating procedure (SOP). 
Limitations or restrictions on the employment of certain reinforcing obstacles 
such as minefield and booby traps, chemical contamination, and ADM. To guard 
against premature execution, restrictions may be placed on the employment of 
reinforcing obstacles. The corps may accomplish this by requiring subordinate 
units to request approval for the closure of specific gaps and lanes. The corps may 
also retain approval authority for clearance or release of control over specific 
routes prior to the destruction of bridges and other transportation facilities. The 
corps commander maintains surveillance over tactical operations and removes any 


restrictions imposed on the execution of obstacles as early as possible to give 
subordinate units maximum freedom in operations. 

Limitations or restrictions on the emplacement of obstacles in a specific area. 
Corps may designate areas to remain obstacle-free, assuring the corps commander 
freedom of maneuver for counterattacks and reinforcing movements. 

Limitations on, and conditions for, the destruction of facilities of strategic 
importance such as locks, dams, major bridges, and tunnels. 

Instructions regarding the submission of detailed obstacle plans for approval. 





The corps obstacle plan is a command and control means for the corps commander to 
communicate the countermobility concept to subordinates. Corps obstacle plans must be 
provided to the Army Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) which is the land forces 
coordinating agency with the Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). This 
coordinating and sharing of information is accomplished for several reasons: 


Assist USAF targeting efforts. Knowing the location of land force emplaced 
obstacles will assist the Air Force in attacking concentrated enemy elements 
created by obstacle employment. 

Prevent duplication of effort by air and land forces. 

Assist ground movement by USAF elements such as radar and logistic elements. 
As the corps obstacle plan is modified or executed, continuous information will be 
provided by the corps to the BCE which will have the information available for 
TACC planning. Known locations of enemy obstacles will be included. 


DIVISION OBSTACLE PLAN 


The corps plan/order is received at division and analyzed for specified and implied tasks. 
Once this is accomplished, the division obstacle plan is developed in two stages, initial 


and final. 


Initial plan 


An initial plan, based on the corps obstacle plan, division tactical plan, fire plans, maps, 
terrain analysis, and reconnaissance, is disseminated to the brigades and other 
subordinate units as quickly as possible to allow time for obstacle selection on the 
ground. This must be done in conjunction with selecting fighting positions and locating 
weapons systems. The initial plan will include an overlay showing, as a minimum, targets 
directed by corps or higher headquarters and obstacles of such importance as to be 
specified by division. The plan may also specify obstacle zones to be developed by 
designated unit(s). In addition, the plan will assign responsibilities and, where necessary, 
priorities; allocate obstacle materials to include scatterable mines; and generally include 
as much of the information described for the corps plan in whatever available detail as 
appropriate. 























Final plan 


After the brigades develop their obstacle plans in detail, and other units develop assigned 
portions of the division obstacle plan by selecting individual obstacles, these subordinate 
plans are then incorporated by division with the initial plan to produce the final plan. The 
plan will normally be issued as an annex to the division operations order. 


When time is extremely limited, the division plan may never develop beyond the initial 
concept plan. Conversely, when adequate time is available, the division plan will be 
submitted to corps and may be incorporated into a republished corps obstacle plan. The 
complete division obstacle plan should hot be carried forward of division headquarters 
because of the danger of compromise. Division provides each brigade with extracts of the 
detailed plan to include pertinent portions of the plans of adjacent brigades. 


BRIGADE OBSTACLE PLAN 


Brigades and comparable units develop a detailed obstacle plan, within the guidance 
provided by division, based on their tactical plans and detailed terrain reconnaissance. To 
be effective, obstacle plans must be integrated at maneuver unit level. This process is 
described in chapter 4. If combat is imminent, preparation of obstacles begins 
immediately without waiting for approval of the obstacle plan. Obstacle construction and 
obstacle plan development continue con-currently. Final brigade obstacle plans include: 


Location and type of each obstacle, including those specified by higher 
headquarters. 

A timetable and priority of construction for obstacles. 

Specific orders stating under what conditions and by whose authority reserve 
obstacles are to be executed. 

Routes to be kept open in accordance with the tactical and logistical plan, 
including those specified by higher headquarters. 

Exact location and extent of gaps and lanes, including those specified by higher 
headquarters. 


RESERVE OBSTACLES 


Reserve obstacles (non-nuclear) are those obstacles or demolition targets the commander 
deems critical to the tactical plan. The authority to execute the obstacle is reserved by the 


authorizing commander through a formal order known as a demolition order. Reserve 
obstacles must be carefully selected. Their proper execution requires a manpower 
allocation that could be used elsewhere if it is not required to guard and execute a reserve 
obstacle. If not executed timely and properly, reserve obstacles could be catastrophic to 
the tactical plan or operation. An excellent example of a failure to execute a reserve 
obstacle is the Remagen bridge in World War II. 


REMAGEN BRIDGE 











Some obviously glaring errors which proved extremely costly to the German Army 
included: 


Insufficient guard force. 
Inadequate communication. 
Confused instruction on when and on whose order the bridge was to be blown. 


EXECUTION OF RESERVE OBSTACLES 


A reserve obstacle must have positive written information and instruction on the 
following items: 


Who is the authorizing commander? 

Who, if anyone, is to guard the obstacle until it is executed? 
Who prepares and executes the obstacle? 

Under what circumstances is the obstacle to be executed? 


There are three primary players involved in the proper and timely execution of reserve 
obstacles; namely, the authorizing commander, the demolition guard commander, and the 
demolition firing party commander. 


Authorizing commander 


The authorizing commander has overall responsibility. The authorizing commander may 
be a corps, division, brigade, or any other commander who deems that a particular target 
or obstacle is so critical to the tactical plan that its preparation, protection, and execution 
upon order are insured. 


Demolition guard commander 


The demolition guard commander is the onsite commander who takes orders from the 
authorizing commander and who is responsible for the successful execution of the reserve 
obstacle. The demolition guard commander is also responsible for security, preparing the 
obstacle, and giving the order to arm and execute the obstacle once the authority to 
execute has been received. 


Demolition firing party commander 


The demolition firing party commander receives orders from the demolition guard 
commander and is in technical charge of the preparation and firing of the reserve 
obstacle. The demolition firing party is normally comprised of engineers. 


The demolition guard and the demolition firing party can, in some circumstances, be one 
and the same. The demolition guard must be of sufficient strength and size to protect the 
obstacle and prevent enemy capture prior to execution. Both the demolition guard and 
demolition firing party must keep the target in sight at all times. Positive communications 
must be maintained between the demolition guard commander, the firing party 
commander, and the authorizing commander. 


TYPICAL RESERVE OBSTACLE SCENARIO 


1. Demolition Target : 
<a 9... POAC. eases 
b. Location (grid cor-ordinates) WB. 5DOSSR3.... asinos 


e iain EATERS EAT SEARO 


d. Technical instructions . OQA S-... 


a A DrAvo. TE EITAEMAR 
b. Demolition Firing Party. \/ A23... Engr. B e 


AE s magsih an oainnt 
a. The demolition target is to be prepared to State of Readiness DO FS.. yOSOYOO oT). 


ELENERI oe e ae Record their receipt 


en jon Guard. Vou are to act as instructed in para 5, 6, and 7, recording the 
cosets feet be crossed) 
4. Orders to the Demolition Guard Commander 


Your responsibilities aze detailed in para IV. You are to act as instructed in para 5, 6, and 7, recording 


5. Demolition is to be fired: 
a. O immediately upon being prepared. 
_ b. Xfüpon receipt of codeword in para 8c by radio. 
~-e, CUpon receipt of the order from the Authorized Commander or his Liaison Officer personally. 
Ae TIONED W's yoke HA ons ah koe Meee eee coe as P ENNE 
6. Emergency Firing Orders 
a. MYou will NOT fire the demolition except as ordered in para 5. 
b. boy Agta poun aan A E ao a ir A GE ta inches 


7. Orders other than for firing will be given: 
a. C By the Authorized Commander personally. 
b. CBy the Authorized Commander's Liaison Officer personally. 
c. RÉy radio. 


C n nra EE a S T AAA TEE OE TETEE n, AA (other means) 


Senet mS 


Sectet For tra ining 
(Security Classification) 


a. Change trom State 1 (SAFE) to State 2 (ARMED) Pisa: ie er ii i 


apra 
erm | yf 


















9. Authorized Commander 


semure foe Narna Rank/ Name MR. Harman... 
Appointment CGA 3A i CAA Date/Time Group DIOSBOAQ... Qt 


PART II 


10. Changing State of Readiness: 


à. Time estimated by Firi nder to change from State of Readiness | (SAFE) to State of 
Readiness 2 (AR Co ay RS minutes. P 


b. 
Date/Time Group of- 
e 
Readiness Ordered Originator Receipt of Order Change Completed 


AF a nr = > | nate ie al > 63/2: D| D4O oS o OF ace 






COO O Oo mea Signature Date/Time Group | 





Secret for te ns 
(Security Classification) : 9 


(Security Classification) pe 
ORDERS FOR THE DEMOLITION 
STANAG 2017 


INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING THIS FORM 
i. Paragraphs 1-9 are to be completed, placing a cross in each box where applicable. 
No. 1 is to be issued to the Demolition Guard Commander and No. 2 to the Fir Commander. Copy No. 3 is retained by the 
m deal Gonmaman Oar t ther is no Demolition Guard, Copy No. p etree previa the tiring party. a ¥ 


iii. If the Demolition Guard Changes, a new form should be issued. 


ORDERS TO THE DEMOLITION GUARD COMMANDER 
iv, You are responsible for: 
a. Command of the Demolition Guard and Demolition Firing Party. 
ri b. The security of the demolition site from enemy attack or sabotage, and the control of traffic and refugees at the demolition site. 
c. Giving the order to the Demolition Firing Party Commander in writing (para 10 of Copy No. 2) to change the State of Readiness. 
d. Giving the order to the Demolition Firing Party Commander in writing (para 13 of Copy No. 2) to fire the demolition. 
e. Keeping the Authorizing Commander informed of the operational situation at the demolition site. 
v. The Demolition Firing Party Commander is in technical control of the demolition but you must ensure that he keeps you informed of all 
action he takes, Your command post should be co-located with the firing point if possible. 
"Sof tes ah pans M Party Commander the time required to change the demolition from State of Readiness 1 (SAFE) 
to State of pes eR caren postage E =e 10a. 
vii. You are to nominate a my poy aa. Wa ap a DEE a aa a an 
oe We duis and nos wher to iat for tis frm a casualty or are unavoidably absent, The seniority roster must be 
wi One State o eines 2 ARMED) bas ben ordered ite yov or your deputy must ay beat your command pos so that orders canbe 
P ao EE a N 
E Myan oriole AI t oana an a eaan tho Bans of saw ere, 11is to be completed and the form handed 
new Demolition Guard Commander, A receipt is to be issued and retained by you. If a new form has been issued para 11 is to be 
AET cn tat ahd tore MADA yee was MAA, 
ereire entrees nea maar roe a aA and 
xii. If you receive orders to fire the demolitions other than those given in para 5, you should refer to the Authorized Commander. 
ORDER TO THE DEMOLITION FIRING PARTY COMMANDER 
xiii, You are in technical charge of the preparation, charging. and firing of the demolition. 
xiv. The Demolition Guard Commander (if one is provided) is responsible for: 
a. Tactical command of all troops at the demolition site; you are therefore, under his command, 
b. Giving you in writing (para 10) the order to change the State of Readiness. 
c. Giving you in writing (para 13) the order to fire the demolition, 
xv. You are to consult with the Demolition Guard See aes Sar ee which is to be co-located with his command 
post whenever practicable. copra target. 


xvi. Yow are to nominate a deputy forthwith, and ere TON ee ee ee. 
his . where to find Hormit a casualty or are unavoidably absent. The seniority roster is to be 
made known to the Demolition Guard Commander 


xvii. You are to lete 1000 of the form and to report this information to the Demolition Guard Commender, it provided, otherwise to the 


xviii. Once State of Readiness 2 (ARMED) has been ordered, either you or your deputy must remain at the Firing Point. 
Si, Pes thera a no Domoltilon Dead net pas racbive ordei te Fire tha demolition othar thes those given in para S, you should refer to the 
Authorized Commander or to your immediate superior. 
xx. If you are ordered to hand over the demolition to another unit without the issue of a new form, para 11 is to be completed and the form 
the new Demolition Fi cl depen [receipt is So be senad end retained by you. ah sgh sng ates balk fn 


handed to iring 

A a AEE 

CIE TOA ang ge cider pane alge peter thy) shear eng weed a eee 
2 to him with id completed. iF there's 0 Demon Guard the Unt Commande w 


aa bn must pass the results and 
one ‘opy Mo. 1 to the Aut If mines are laid, they are to be reported and mcordod.on a wactisidrecord ISTAMAS 


(Security Classification) à ar, 


SUMMARY 


The obstacle plans and updates are the principal command and control vehicles for 


obstacles planned and emplaced before the battle begins and during its early stages, 
Further employment of obstacles will be based on enemy movement and designed to fit a 
particular tactical situation. Responsive communication, timely intelligence, and rapid 
decision making are keys to successful obstacle employment after the battle has begun. 


Reserve obstacles can be vital to an operation. They must be planned and executed 
carefully. The number of reserve obstacles should be held to the absolute minumum due 
to the assets required to insure that they are guarded and executed properly. 


Chapter 4 


OBSTACLE PLANS 











Effective employment of obstacles is a key element in any tactical plan. Obstacles that 
are sited properly provide the commander a significant advantage in both the offense and 
defense. Planning and emplacing obstacles cannot be approached haphazardly. The 
obstacle planning process must be systematic, coordinated, and fully integrated with the 
tactical plan. The logistic demands of obstacle employment must also be planned for and 
available at the proper place and time. All elements of the combined arms team must be 
involved in the obstacle planning and employment process in order to extract the greatest 
cost from the enemy. This chapter outlines the sequence and basic considerations for 
planning and coordinating countermobility activities in various operations. 


PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
THE PLANNING PROCESS 
OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
RETROGRADE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
SUMMARY 





PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 


Obstacle planning is serious business, and involves all elements of the combined arms 
team. Obstacles must support present and future tactical plans, be logistically 
supportable, and fully coordinated. Some important factors to be considered are listed 
below. 


MISSION 


The mission is the primary consideration in obstacle planning. The employment of 
obstacles in support of a DEFEND mission would be significantly different from obstacle 
employment in support of a DELAY or an offensive mission. The obstacle plan should be 
tailored to support the mission of the organization and accomplish the objectives of the 
command. 


DIRECTED AND RESERVE OBSTACLES 


Directed and reserve obstacles are of prime importance to the overall mission and should 
be planned first. Authority and time of execution must be known. 


FUTURE PLANS 


While obstacle employment is supporting the current mission, it should not impede future 
plans or missions. This may not be completely possible in every instance. Emplacing an 
artillery delivered minefield upon an attacking enemy may be the right thing to do, even 
though an attack through the area was planned prior to self-destruction of the minefield. 
Pros and cons must both be considered. 


ENEMY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 


The obstacle plan should exploit the weaknesses of the enemy. If the enemy is short of 
rapid bridging capability, a tank ditch may be a more effective obstacle than a minefield. 
If the enemy is low on diesel fuel or ammunition, attacking their trains and supply lines 
may be the most effective use of obstacles such as scatterable mines. 


TERRAIN AND WEATHER 


These factors and their effects are critical in answering the following questions: Where 
are good existing obstacles? Are they within the enemy's avenue of approach? Are they 
effective when tied in with reinforcing obstacles? Are they within range and fields of fire 
of friendly weapons? What are the anticipated weather conditions? Is the soil frozen? Is 
digging possible? Can mines be buried? 


AVAILABLE TIME, MATERIALS, MANPOWER, AND EQUIPMENT 


Answers to these questions will dictate to a large degree the type and extent of the 
obstacle system, and also provide information on additional resources required and task 
organization. How much time is available to spend on battlefield preparation? Have the 
required materials been ordered? Are they on hand? Is the manpower available for labor- 
intensive obstacles? Is earthmoving equipment available for tank ditches and other 
equipment-intensive obstacles? Has the high diesel fuel consumption rate been planned 
for? 


EFFECTS ON THE LOCAL POPULATION 


Cultural features are not destroyed unless the mission makes it absolutely necessary. 
These considerations are not inclusive. There may be many other important factors. Each 
mission, operation, or battle phase will pose distinct requirements that must be considered 
and planned for. Obstacles can be the difference between winning and losing. Their 
employment must be carefully planned and fully coordinated. 


Obstacles should be emplaced according to these general guidelines: 


Obstacles should support weapon systems by slowing the enemy at the maximum 
effective ranges of our weapons systems, as limited by fields of fire available. 
Obstacles should not impede our own mobility; or, if they do, they should be 
reserved targets or scatterable mines with a self-destruct time coordinated to 
future maneuver plans. 

Obstacles must hinder enemy movement as we move from battle positions. 
Obstacles are emplaced in as much depth as is feasible after considering the time, 
manpower, and logistical constraints. These in-depth obstacles are integrated into 
the battle position fire support plans, assist the commander in stopping the enemy 
within the MBA, and then assume the offense. 


THE PLANNING PROCESS 


Developing an obstacle plan that is effective and supports the tactical plan requires 
coordinated sequential planning. The following sequence should be used to develop such 
an obstacle plan. This sequence is equally effective in both offensive and defensive 
operations. 


1 Analyze the mission. 

2 Analyze avenues of approach. 

3 Analyze engagement areas, battle positions, and locations of weapon systems. 

4 Determine possible obstacle locations and types. 

5 Determine the commander's obstacle priorities. 

6 Determine resources. 

7 Determine actual work sequence. 

8 Determine task organization required. 

9 Determine coordination required. 

1 Analyze the mission. The mission is a clear, concise statement and purpose of the task 
to be accomplished by the command. It tells the command the "who," "what," "where," 
and "when" of an operation. Analysis of the mission is a critical item in planning 
obstacles. The "who" portion and accompanying task organization allocates resources to 


do the job. The "what" specifies the type operation such as "defend," "attack," or "delay." 
"Where" outlines the area of operations, and "when" specifies the time available and 


essentially establishes deadlines. During the planning phase, much or all of this 
information will be verbal based upon commander and staff analysis of the mission 
received from higher headquarters. The estimate, eventual plan, and execution are based 
upon tasks contained in the mission. 


2 Analyze avenues of approach. Once the mission has been received and analyzed and 
the basic objectives are known, the next step in obstacle planning is to determine avenues 
of approach. Terrain analysis techniques and existing obstacle evaluation, as described in 
chapter 2, are performed. The commander must visualize the avenues of approach under 
all conditions, and determine the size of friendly or enemy forces those avenues can 
support. 


3 Analyze engagement areas, battle positions, and locations of weapon systems. A 
good terrain analysis will show where the best areas are for friendly weapons to engage 
the enemy. In offensive planning, the most likely areas where friendly forces could 
expect to be engaged by enemy direct fire weapons can also be ascertained. The analysis 
process is essentially the same in both the defense and the offense. Analysis of existing 
obstacle areas, fields of fire, and natural cover and concealment are key factors in 
determining where to best engage the enemy or expect to be engaged. 


4 Determine possible obstacle locations and types. Selection of engagement areas and 
battle positions must be accomplished prior to planning reinforcing obstacles. Once the 
commander has selected engagement areas and battle positions, then the commander and 
the engineer select those reinforcing obstacles that accomplish the basic principles. This 
selection process is unconstrained, meaning that the commander and engineer will select 
and site all the reinforcing obstacles necessary without regard for manpower, time, and 
logistics. This selection process will determine what "needs" to be done in order for the 
obstacle system to be most effective. What "needs" to be done will usually require more 
effort than resources available. The process provides the commander and the engineer 
with a method to establish priorities if resources are constrained. 


5 Determine the commander's obstacle priorities. Once the unconstrained obstacle 
estimate has been accomplished, the commander can establish priorities for obstacles. By 
seeing what "needs" to be done, the commander can choose those obstacles that must be 
emplaced. Through this process, the engineer is given direction to employ resources 
knowing the effort is expended on those obstacles most critical for accomplishing the 
command's objectives. The type, proposed location, and purpose of the obstacles will 
depend on an offensive or defensive plan. However, the basic thought process remains 
constant. 


6 Determine resources. The commander and the engineer consider the assets available 
to construct, guard, and execute the obstacle plan. Engineer assets are limited, and the 
priority of work maybe given to only a portion of the planned area of operations. The 
engineer takes the commander's priorities and makes an estimate based upon time, 
manpower, equipment, and logistics. The engineer must know how much of each 
resource is required to emplace and execute a given obstacle. This estimate is based upon 
type of obstacle, soldier experience, state of training, and condition of equipment. 


Standard obstacles (appendix D) may be used to assist in the estimating process. They are 
only a guide and should be altered according to existing conditions at the time of the 
estimate. 


Another factor in the engineer estimate is the commander's decision on who will guard 
and detonate preliminary demolition obstacles not detonated immediately after 
emplacement. Essentially, the commander has two choices--either use engineer soldiers, 
or soldiers from maneuver units. If engineers are used, then engineer assets are used up 
quickly, thus limiting the number of obstacles that can be emplaced as the battle 
progresses. The same can be said for using maneuver units to guard and detonate 
obstacles. This difficult decision must be made early enough for the engineers and 
maneuver units to properly plan. In any case, the target turnover process must be trained 
and rehearsed during combined arms training so the commander has some latitude in 
decision making. 


The time available to accomplish the obstacle mission is an important consideration. 
Lead time is required to gain sufficient obstacle density to obtain tangible benefits from 
the obstacle plan. Emplacement time will vary with the types of obstacles. For example, 
it may take more manhours to emplace a conventional tactical minefield than to emplace 
a road crater or prepare a bridge for demolition. Emplacement lead time is divided into 
two parts: time required to actually construct the obstacle, and time required to get 
materials to the obstacle location. The latter may require twice as much time as actual 
obstacle construction. The loss in productivity due to logistics time can be reduced by 
allocating additional transportation support to engineer units. In most cases, the engineer 
squad's truck or APC must serve as both personnel carrier (mobility) and cargo carrier 
(resupply). Another way to increase production is to work maximum hours, but this pace 
can be maintained for only a few days before soldiers and equipment begin to fail. 


Finally, logistical matters must be considered. The commander must set priorities for the 
delivery of munitions and material, and must allocate the available haul assets among 
ammunition, obstacle materials, and other critical supplies. Among obstacle materials, 
difficult choices must be made. A conventional tactical minefield can take up to a 
hundred times the haul assets of a point obstacle, yet the minefield may be the only 
effective obstacle in the situation. To minimize the haul requirements, the engineer must 
make imaginative use of locally available material. Alternative obstacles should also be 
considered. Frequently, tank ditches can be substituted for a minefield, using engineer 
equipment that is available and not in use, instead of placing an additional demand on an 
overloaded transportation system. 


7 Determine actual work sequence. The commander and the engineer now must 
reconsider the possible obstacles identified earlier. Considering the time available, work 
force, and logistical assets, they identify those obstacles which can realistically be 
completed within the allotted time. They also identify obstacle work which may continue 
during the battle. 


The commander's obstacle plan will usually develop through the answers to such 
questions as: 


Does the unit have 4 hours, 2 days, or 2 weeks before the battle is expected? 


What are the limits of obstacle logistic assets available? 

Is the divisional engineer unit by itself or is it supplemented by corps engineers? 
To what extent is the tactical commander able to augment engineer units with 
other members of the combined arms team? 


8 Determine task organization required. The tactical commander and the engineer 
must balance the comprehensiveness of the obstacle plan with the realities of limited 
assets. For example, a task force commander's sector may be critical and in need of 
intensive engineer work in order to complete the plan. The brigade commander, on the 
other hand, may anticipate that the primary threat will develop in another task force 
sector. Accordingly, the brigade commander may allocate fewer engineers than desired 
by the task force commander. The engineer recommends the allocation of engineer units 
to best support the brigade commander's coordinated obstacle plan. Additional engineer 
units, if available, may be obtained by coordination with the division engineer and the 
division commander. These units may come from the organic engineer battalion or corps 
assets. 


9 Determine coordination required. Obstacle planning and employment requires 
extensive coordination to accomplish its purpose. The G-4/S-4 must receive a materials 
estimate as early as possible in order to plan logistic support of the obstacle system. 


The artillery fire support coordinator, aviation officer, and air liaison officer must also be 
consulted to integrate scatterable mines with the obstacle system. Missions which require 
scatterable mines are planned in detail to include the location, the unit delivering the 
mines, and necessary logistic support. Coordination and responsibilities for scatterable 
mine employment are outlined in chapter 5. 


Obstacles must also be coordinated with follow-on and adjacent units to insure that the 
location and extent of the obstacle system are known. This coordination will preclude the 
obstacle impeding movement and maneuver of friendly forces. If followed, this planning 
sequence is a workable, realistic, and coordinated approach to planning obstacle 
employment. It will insure that the result is a coordinated and executable plan that 
extracts the greatest cost from the enemy. 


OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 


In the offense, the priority of the engineer effort is to maintain friendly force mobility. 
Countermobility activities are also important to halt or slow the enemy's counterattack 
capability and isolate the battlefield. Such operations assist friendly forces in defeating 
the enemy in detail. Countermobility operations can be employed in all types of offensive 
operations. Obstacles and mine warfare in offensive operations have three main purposes: 


1 Prevent enemy enforcement. 
2 Facilitate economy of force. 


3 Provide security. 


1 Prevent enemy reinforcement. Offensive operations are conducted to exploit enemy 


weaknesses. To prevent the enemy from reinforcing weak areas under friendly attack, 
critical routes should be interdicted to hinder movement of reserves and logistics. Speed 
and deep interdiction capabilities are vital, Air-delivered scatterable mines are ideally 
suited for this mission. 


2 Facilitate economy of force. Obstacles and mines can be utilized in selected sectors to 
allow defense by reduced forces. Relieved maneuver units can then be concentrated in 
other sectors for the attack. Under other circumstances, easily defended terrain which is 
reinforced with obstacles and on-call scatterable mines may permit major sectors to be 
held by a relatively small force. Operations of this type are conducted by armored cavalry 
units with a screen or a protection mission. 


3 Provide security. In offensive operations, mines and obstacles may be emplaced along 
the flanks of advancing forces in critical areas to halt or slow enemy counterattacks. In 
planning offensive operations, avenues of approach offering natural flank protection-- 
such as a river or a ridge line--should be carefully evaluated. During the advance, it may 
be possible to protect a flank by destroying all bridges crossing a river, or by interdicting 
all roads and trails crossing a ridge line. Swamps, canals, lakes, forests, and escarpments 
are natural terrain features that can be quickly reinforced for flank security. 


During offensive operations, engineer countermobility plans must permit rapid 
emplacement and flexibility. Time and resources will not permit development of the 
terrain's total defensive potential. Based upon likely enemy reaction, the most probable 
counterattack avenues should be closed off with obstacles. Plans should be developed for 
other possibilities and resources committed when the enemy response becomes apparent. 
Scatterable mines are excellent for this purpose. Aircraft and artillery delivered 
scatterable mines could be preplanned on each of several available routes. The mines 
should be delivered in front of, on top of, or on the flanks of the lead elements of an 
enemy counterattack after the enemy has committed itself to one of the routes. Rapid 
cratering devices are another excellent capability. 


Speed of countermobility operations is vital and cannot be overemphasized. Engineer 
support must keep up the pace and emplace obstacles and mines along with advancing 
maneuver forces. Effort for countermobility during offensive operations must be 
carefully weighed against the mobility requirements to support the advance. Resources 
must be planned and used wisely. Under ideal circumstances, plans should be flexible for 
engineer forces to perform both mobility and countermobility operations as the tactical 
battlefield situation requires. 


Control of mines and obstacles, and accurate reporting to all units are vital. An obstacle 
or mine in place will hinder either friendly or enemy maneuver. Positive command and 
control is necessary to insure that minefield and obstacles are not executed until desired. 
Once executed, they must be reported by the executing unit through operation channels 
and posted to operational and intelligence maps. Information on obstacles and minefield 
in place is disseminated with tactical intelligence. The recording and reporting procedures 
for scatterable mines must be rigidly followed. These procedures are discussed in chapter 
5. Key factors for countermobility activities during offensive operations are: 


Enemy situation and capabilities. 


A good terrain analysis to determine where friendly forces are vulnerable to 
counterattack. 

Speed of obstacle emplacement. 

Preplanning and coordination. 

Information flow to inform friendly forces of friendly and enemy obstacle 
locations. 


DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 


PURPOSES OF THE DEFENSE 


Defensive operations achieve one or more of the following: 


Cause an enemy attack to fail. 

Gain time. 

Concentrate forces elsewhere. 

Wear down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations. 
Control essential terrain. 

Retain tactical, strategic, or political objectives. 


The immediate purpose of any defense is to cause an enemy attack to fail. The other 
reasons listed contribute to purposes beyond the immediate defense. 


It may be necessary to gain time for reinforcements to arrive or to economize forces in 
one sector while concentrating forces for attack in another. In either case, a defense or a 
delay may achieve these purposes. 


In some cases, a force may be defending because it cannot attack. The defender then 
takes advantage of position and superior knowledge of the terrain. Once the enemy has 
been committed to the defense and weakened by losses, friendly forces maneuver to 
destroy the enemy with fires or counterattacks. In other cases, portions of a force may be 
required to retain key terrain or essential tactical, strategic, or political objectives. 


In some instances, these must be first seized by airmobile or airborne forces, and then 
held until a larger force can link with the defender. An underlying purpose of all 
defensive operations is to create the opportunity to change to the offensive. All activities 
of the defense must contribute to that aim. 


The defense has been called the stronger form of war because denying success to the 
enemy is easier than forcing the enemy to do our will. The defender has significant 
advantages over the attacker. In most cases, the ground is better known, and the defender 
occupies first and therefore becomes stronger as positions improve and forces mass. Once 
the battle begins, the defender fights from cover against a more exposed enemy, and uses 
the terrain to mask movements as forces gather to block and attack the enemy. Finally, 
the defender can postpone commitment of major forces until the attack has developed, 
and then strike the extended enemy over carefully selected and prepared terrain within 
the defensive area. The effects of obstacles, airpower, and conventional weapons on 
exposed troops, and certain aspects of nuclear, chemical, and electronic warfare, also 


favor the defender. 


Balanced against the defender's advantages, however, is the attacker's single greatest 
asset--possession of the initiative. The attacker takes advantage of the opportunities to 
concentrate first and surprise the defender by chosing ground, direction of approach, and 
time of attack. Also, this initial advantage is used to mislead or distract the defender, slow 
recognition of the main attack, and delay implementation of countermeasures. The 
defender's ultimate task is to overcome the attacker's initial advantages and quickly 
regain the initiative. 


Napoleon summarized the requirements of defensive campaigns when he said in his 
Memoirs: "The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect 
defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack." 


The key terms of AirLand Battle doctrine--initiative, depth, agility, and 
sychronization--also outline the requirements for a successful defense at any level. 


Initiative 
Seize the tactical initiative locally, then generally, as the battle progresses. 


Depth 


Fight the enemy throughout the depth of its formations to delay and disorganize, and to 
create opportunities for offensive action. The defender must organize forces and 
resources in depth to gain the time and space required for flexibility and responsive 
maneuver. 


Agility 


Set the terms of battle through flexible use of fire, maneuver, and electronic warfare. Just 
as the attacker is committed to an action, the defender changes the situation and thereby 
forces a different countermove. This overloads the enemy's command and control system 
and renders his reaction uncoordinated and indecisive. Effective use of agility can lead to 
the enemy's piecemeal destruction. 


Synchronization 


Synchronize all available tools of battle in. well coordinated combat actions. Violent 
execution of plans and aggressive exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities can halt the 
attacking force's momentum. 


Initially, the defender will be outnumbered. In the early stages of the battle, the defender 
must capitalize on the advantage of fighting from stationary, protected positions to halt 
the enemy. Deep attack on the enemy, the actions of security forces, and detailed fire and 
obstacle plans facilitate containment of the attack. 


Once the attacker has been controlled and the defender has concentrated forces in the area 


of the main attack, the defender can then operate against exposed and precisely located 
segments of the attacking force. Then, by being under the cover of his own field artillery, 
air defense, and on ground he has reconnoitered and prepared, the defender has the 
advantage. Once the attacker has extended into the defended area, he is vulnerable to fires 
from all sides, surprise attacks on flanks and rear, and loss of the initiative. 


To succeed, the attacker must shatter the defense quickly and maintain a high pace of 
operations to prevent its reconstitution. To defeat the attacker, the defender must protract 
operations, keep the tempo slow enough to allow reaction, and, ultimately, isolate and 
destroy attacking forces. 


The attacker cannot be allowed to focus full strength at one time and place on the 
battlefield before defensive countermeasures have been prepared. This can be 
accomplished through skillful use of terrain and by interdiction of following forces 
through deep attack. The attacker's ability to sustain the momentum of the attack and set 
the pace of battle must be broken. This will occur if it is difficult to employ fire support 
assets, reinforce, resupply, and direct attacking echelons. 


The attacker must be required to divert energies and efforts into nonproductive ventures 
and to strike at nonexistent targets through deception, operations security, and maneuver. 
This dissipates strength and uses resources. 


Karl von Clausewitz characterized the ideal defense as a "shield of blows." At the onset, 
the defender yields the initiative to the attacker. However, the defender has the 
advantages of prepared positioning and better ground knowledge, and uses them to slow 
the momentum of the attack and repeatedly strike the enemy. In defeating the attackers' 
combined arms coordination, strength, and concentration, the defender destroys the 
attacking force with effective maneuver supported by flexible firepower. It is not 
necessary to kill every enemy tank, squad, or combat system, but only to destroy the 
ability to continue fighting. 


United States Army defensive doctrine is designed to be applicable anywhere in the 
world. The form of defense the commander chooses will depend on the mission, nature of 
the enemy, terrain possibilities, and capabilities of available units. The commander may 
elect to defend well forward or in considerable depth, if not required to hold a specified 
area or position. The commander may even choose to preempt the enemy with spoiling 
attacks if conditions favor such tactics. Depending on the depth available, forces at hand, 
and the mission, the commander may defend by striking the enemy as it approaches. The 
commander fights the decisive battle within the main battle area, or draws the enemy 
deep into the area of operations, and then strikes along enemy flanks and rear. All three 
methods have been used in the past with decisive results. 


DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK 


Corps and divisions fight a unified defensive AirLand Battle within an organizational 
framework consisting of five elements: 


1 The deep battle. 


2 Covering force. 


3 Main battle area. 
4 Rear battle. 
5 Reserve operations. 


The deep battle, the covering force battle, and the main battle area (MBA) battle are 
planned as complementary actions which support a unified battle plan. The overall 
commander delineates areas of interest and influence, the covering force area (CFA), the 
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), the rear line of the MBA, and the rear area. The 
forward line of own troops (FLOT) is initially defined by elements of the covering force. 
After contact with the enemy, FLOT generally defines the line of contact throughout the 
battle. The commander also establishes an initial ilre support coordination line (FSCL) 
and any blocking positions, strongpoints, stay-behind forces, or phase lines necessary for 
executing the plan. The commander decides whether to fight a forward defense or a 
defense in depth. The commander organizes the overall defensive effort on the basis of 
the mission, the nature of the enemy force, the terrain, the troops assigned, and the time 
available. The commander allocates forces and resources within the elements of the 
organizational framework to support the overall scheme. 


Organization of the defense 


FLOT-— -— 
COVERING FORCE AREA 
FEBA— + — 

MAIN BATTLE AREA 


REAR AREA 
RESERVE | 
x xX 


1 The deep battle. The deep battle component of the AirLand Battle is designed to 
support the commander's basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. 
Its goal is to create opportunities for offensive action against committed enemy forces by 
delaying the arrival of enemy reserves or follow-on forces, or by destroying key enemy, 
organizations. Surveillance operations are conducted to identify significant enemy forces 
in the area of interest while electronic warfare, long-range fire, and maneuver in depth are 
used to attack enemy forces whose delay or disruption is important to the success of the 
commander's plan. In the defense, the deep battle aims to prevent the enemy from 





concentrating overwhelming combat power. Main objectives are the separation and 
disruption of attacking echelons, protection of friendly maneuver and degradation of the 
enemy's fire support, command and control systems, combat and combat service support. 


Engineer plans in support of the deep battle will resemble the support given any other 
offensive operation. Emphasis will be upon speed for ground forces. First priority of 
engineer effort will be mobility of the maneuver force. Countermobility, in terms of flank 
security and prevention of counterattack, is the second priority for engineers. Obstacles 
will, of necessity, be those that can be installed rapidly, such as scatterable mines and 
road craters. Scatterable mines will be a significant contributor to success of the deep 
battle. Targets and delivery means must be carefully chosen. 


Deep battle 





2 Covering force. The covering force generally has three basic tasks to accomplish: 


Gain and maintain contact with attacking enemy forces. 
Develop the situation. 
Delay or defeat the enemy's leading fighting forces. 


In the covering force area (CFA), countermobility activities are primarily designed to 
disorganize enemy movement and enhance friendly fires. The density of obstacles in the 
CFA will be less than the MBA due to lack of time, depth of the area, and smaller 
numbers of engaged friendly forces. Siting obstacles will be extremely important. 
Manpower and equipment-intensive obstacles will not generally be emplaced in the CFA. 
The commander must make decisions on the amount of limited resources able to be 
committed to the CFA. Emplacement of obstacles in the CFA and the MBA will be 
occurring at the same time and competing for the same resources. 


Time is a critical factor to consider in planning the battlefield preparation of the CFA. 
There will be little time for obstacle employment once the enemy attacks. Scatterable 
mines and quick demolition point targets, such as prechambered road craters, are ideal for 
use in the CFA. Obstacles should assist the covering force commander by accomplishing 
the following: 


Enable CFA units to fire and maneuver without becoming decisively engaged. 
Inflict casualties and force the enemy to deploy repeatedly, thus gaining time for 
MBA preparation. 

Force the enemy to expend breaching and bridging assets that he will need later 
when encountering the MBA. 

Deceive the enemy as to our MBA locations and intentions. 


The majority of the engineer effort in the CFA will be accomplished by divisional and 
corps combat battalions. Selection of the proper command or support relationships will 
be critical due to the rapidity of the battle. 


3 Main battle area. The main battle area (MBA) is bounded by corps-designated 
coordination points that establish the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and 
division-designated rear boundaries of the forward defending brigades. It is anticipated 
that the decisive battle will be fought by the forward committed brigades in this area. 
Therefore, the bulk of the defending force is deployed in the MBA. They are prepared to 
concentrate where necessary to defeat the enemy's main thrust. For control purposes, the 
MBA is subdivided by division, brigade, and task force boundaries. It contains a 
multitude of predetermined (and in some cases, prepared) battle positions from which the 
battle will be fought. The use of battle positions facilitates control of the combat elements 
during the flow of battle. They allow the commander to concentrate forces in critical 
areas with minimal confusion. The use of obstacles in the MBA is the key to gaining time 
for the commander to concentrate forces by slowing the enemy rate of advance. Existing 
obstacles will place certain restrictions on enemy maneuver and speed. To complement 
this, reinforcing obstacles are sited to-- 


Take advantage of existing obstacles. 

Slow and destroy tanks and BMPs. 

Hold the target in the firing window of direct fire weapons. 

Gain time for the defender. 

Disrupt the integrity of the enemy formations. 

Channelize the enemy into other areas where we want him to go. 


Most of the obstacle effort is concentrated in the MBA. In addition to the divisional units, 
corps combat engineer battalions will be available to work in the MBA. Elements of 
corps combat heavy engineer battalions will be employed in MBA on a task basis. 


4 Rear battle. The rear area is organized to provide for efficient combat service 
activities. Because most combat forces are forward, support elements must be trained and 
prepared for self-defense. Obstacles in the rear area are usually limited to protective 
minefield and command priority point obstacles. These obstacles will normally be 
concentrated in areas that could be used by the enemy as helicopter landing zones or drop 


zones for airborne forces. Scatterable mines, especially antipersonnel mines, could be 
used on targets of opportunity in the rear area. The rear battle commander will be 
competing with maneuver forces for scarce countermobility resources. The overall 
commander will establish priorities for effort and expenditure of materials throughout the 
depth of the battlefield. 


5 Reserve operations. The reserve force, regardless of size, will require engineer 
support in order to accomplish its mission of counterattack, defensive reinforcement, or 
reaction to a rear area threat. If the reserve force is primarily made up of aviation assets, 
then the engineer support required will be significantly reduced. Engineers supporting the 
reserve force can possibly be employed in the MBA with anon-order mission to support 
the reserve force. This method requires timing and mobility if the engineer unit is to join 
up and deploy with the reserve force. Engineer forces can also be located with the reserve 
force to provide survivability and countermobility support. This insures the unit will 
remain intact and capable of performing its mission. 


RETROGRADE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 


A retrograde operation is an organized movement toward the rear or away from the 
enemy. It may be forced or voluntary, but must be approved by the appropriate higher 
commander. Forces conduct retrograde operations to harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and 
damage the enemy. Such operations gain time, avoid combat under unfavorable 
conditions, or draw the enemy into unfavorable positions. They are also useful in 
maneuver to reposition forces, shorten lines of communications, or permit the use of a 
force elsewhere. 


TYPES OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS 


The three types of retrograde actions are delays, withdrawals, and retirements. In 
delays, units give up space to gain time. They do not lose freedom to maneuver, and they 
inflict the greatest possible punishment on the enemy. In withdrawals, all or part of a 
deployed force voluntarily disengages from the enemy to free itself for a new mission. 
Withdrawals may occur with or without enemy pressure and assistance by other units. 


In retirements, a force not in contact with the enemy conducts an administrative 
movement to the rear. 


All retrograde operations are difficult, and delays and withdrawals are inherently risky. 
To succeed, they must be well organized and executed. 


DELAYING OPERATIONS 


Delaying operations occur when forces are insufficient to attack or defend, and when the 
defensive plan calls for drawing the attacker into an unfavorable situation. These 
operations normally gain time to-- 


Reestablish the defense. 


Cover a defending or withdrawing unit. 
Protect a friendly unit's flank. 
Participate in an economy of force effort. 


Delays gain time by forcing the enemy to concentrate repeatedly against successive battle 
positions. As enemy units begin to deploy for the attack, the delaying force withdraws to 
new battle positions. The enemy must repeat the same time-consuming deployment at the 
next position. At the same time, deep attack slows the enemy's advance and prevents him 
from massing overwhelming combat power against the delaying force. A delaying force 
must-- 


Maintain contact with the enemy to avoid being outmaneuvered. 
Cause the enemy to plan and conduct successive attacks. 
Preserve its freedom to maneuver. 

Maintain operational coherence. 

Preserve the force. 


A delaying force can-- 


Harass, exhaust, weaken, and delay enemy forces. 

Expose or discover enemy weaknesses. 

Avoid undesirable combat. 

Gain time for the remainder of the force. 

Conform to movements of other friendly troops or shorten lines of 
communications. 

Cover the deployment, movement, retirement, or withdrawal of friendly units. 


Although the delaying force will likely be outnumbered, it must seize the initiative 
whenever possible to conceal a weakness or disrupt enemy plans. To provide the required 
time, units with a delay mission may attack, defend, screen, ambush, raid, or feint. A 
commander who is delaying may defend initially and then shift to the delay only after the 
enemy has concentrated overwhelming combat power against initial positions. The 
commander then gains time by occupying succeeding battle positions and conducting 
short counterattacks until space runs out. If space is limited, the commander may have to 
accept greater risks to accomplish the mission. A commander's orders may require 
delaying the enemy forward of a certain line until a certain time. To do so, the 
commander would have to accept a decisive engagement. 


Cavalry units train and organize especially for delaying operations. When available, they 
should execute the delay. 


Delay from successive positions 


Delay from successive positions occurs when the sector is so wide that available forces 
cannot occupy more than a single tier of positions. Maneuver units continuously delay on 
and between positions throughout their sectors. This method is simple to control. Delay 
from successive positions is useful in less dangerous sectors, but is easier to penetrate 
than a delay from alternate positions because the force has less depth and time to prepare. 


Delay from alternate positions 


Delay from alternate positions involves two maneuver units in a single sector. While the 
first is fighting, the second occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume 
responsibility for the operation. The first force disengages and passes through or around 
the second force. It then prepares to resume the delay from a position in greater depth, 
while the second force takes up the fight. Delay from alternate positions is useful in 
particularly dangerous avenues. This method offers greater security than delay from 
successive positions, but requires more forces, continuous coordination of fire and 
manuever, and is less certain to maintain contact with the enemy. 


Delay from successive positions 


a 
DELAY 
POSITION 


POSITION 


STEP 1 Elements of the STEP 2 Elements remain- STEP 3 Elements rejoin 
delaying force disengage and ing in contact fight to the rear parent organizations at the 
move to the rear to organize while maintaining continuous next delay position and 
the next position. contact, continue the delay. 





As the enemy's main effort becomes clear, commanders may add forces to threatened 
sectors and withdraw them from uncontested areas. But any delay maneuver must be alert 
for opportunities to damage the enemy with short, sharp offensive actions. Such actions 
keep the enemy on guard and lengthen the delay. 


Delay Preparations 


Orders 


The time available determines the extent of preparations. It is not always possible to 
complete preparations before the delay starts. Consequently, commanders prepare 
continuously and adapt plans as situations develop. 


Delay from alternate positions 


POSITION 


POSITION k; 
STEP 1 Elements of the STEP 2 Elements from the STEP 3 Elements at the 
brigade organize the initial initial position delay back second position pick up the 
and second delay positions. through the second position delay, The third delay position 
to the third delay position. is occupied. 





The order for the delay outlines the entire operation and describes its initial phase in 
detail. The commander issues supplementary orders during the battle to adjust and 
coordinate the delay. Missions assigned to subordinate elements and their sequence of 
execution are often more restrictive than other types of operations. Sufficient initial 
guidance will permit a subordinate commander to fight effectively even if contact is lost 
with the commander. Each subordinate commander, however, needs enough freedom to 
exploit any advantage which may develop. 


Planning 


The delaying force commander usually organizes the operation by identifying delay 
positions in depth throughout the area of responsibility. These positions normally follow 


natural lines of defensible terrain across the sector. Times may be assigned to delay 
positions indicating the minimum acceptable delay in each area. Commanders must 
carefully weigh the implied risks when imposing time limits on the delay. 


Because sectors in a delay are usually wide, commanders must organize maneuver forces 
for independent operations. Every subordinate delaying force commander must 
understand the tasks and restrictions. Artillery and engineer support will usually be 
provided to the battalion or squadron level. Attack helicopter units are also valuable 
reserves in a delay because they are fast and effective against tanks. 


The commander plans for offensive action as part of the basic delaying maneuver, and 
assigns responsibility to specific units for contemplated counterattacks. Unless reserves 
are prepared to strike, and preliminary plans for air, artillery, and engineer support are 
ready, the delaying force will miss opportunities. 


Delay command and control 


The dynamic nature of the delay places a premium on the commander's ability to stay 
abreast of the situation and understand the options as the operation progresses. Each 
commander must be aggressive in obtaining and reporting information. Even during 
active combat, staffs must actively seek information and immediately report essential 
information to the commander. Division and corps commanders must pass gathered 
information to the delaying unit. 


Commanders must know the status and location of their own units, flanking units, and 
enemy units. To enhance coordination, each commander will use prominent terrain 
features, redundant communications, rehearsals, simple maneuver schemes, and liaison 
parties. Wide frontages and multiple attacks will make it impossible for the commander 
to be present at every significant action. The intensity of combat will limit mobility, the 
condition of forces, and logistic posture. The obstacle plan must be known well enough to 
control the operation. Commanders must closely monitor and control radio 
communications during the delay. They should use wire communications between 
command posts, to reserves, and to delay positions that are particularly important. They 
should also set up dummy stations to deceive the enemy regarding strength and missions. 


Delay execution 


Divisions and smaller units delay from successive positions, delay from alternate 
positions, or a combination of both. At least a portion of the delaying force maintains 
constant contact with the enemy. Long-range fire, maneuver, and direct fire cause the 
enemy to deploy, reconnoiter, maneuver, or even halt. Nuclear or chemical fires, and 
short, violent counterattacks or ambushes disorganize and inflict casualties on him. 
Spoiling attacks as the enemy prepares to attack can also substantially delay his advance. 


Effective use of obstacles will be a key element in executing a successful delay. 
Regardless of the type delay tactics used, obstacles enable the commander to effectively 
trade space for time. Obstacles which can be rapidly emplaced such as scatterable mines, 
bridge destruction, and road craters, are ideal to support the delay. Timely and proper 


placement of obstacles enable a commander to break contact, utilize economy of force, 
and provide valuable time to forces preparing the primary defensive area. Obstacles also 
weaken the enemy and his use of breaching assets, and cause him to be more vulnerable 
when encountering the main defensive area. 


Beginning the delay 


If no enemy contact occurs, reconnaissance forces will aggressively seek it on a wide 
front. They will repel enemy reconnaissance forces and determine the direction of enemy 
movement. At this point the delay begins. 


A delaying force maintains continuous contact with the enemy, but avoids a decisive 
engagement unless the mission demands it. The delaying operation, which requires 
careful planning, should resemble a dynamic defense, yet it must be flexible enough to 
adjust to enemy maneuver. When the enemy discovers he is facing a delay, he will 
normally attempt to close and to penetrate. Early intelligence of enemy movements 
permits the defense to adjust, and also minimizes enemy success. 


Maintaining control and coherence 


Control and security during a delay derives from planning. The commander must insure 
continued coherence by-- 


Using well-planned and coordinated obstacles. 

Minimizing gaps between forces. 

Maintaining surveillance of gaps. 

Insuring that displacing forces occupy intended positions. 

Maintaining unit integrity, especially of smaller units. 

Properly executing all elements of the obstacle plan. 

Insuring that reports are timely and accurate. 

Maintaining contact with the enemy. 

Continuously and aggressively acquiring intelligence about the area of interest. 
Maintaining a reserve. 


Contesting the initiative 


A successful delay requires commanders to take the initiative whenever possible, 
throwing the enemy off stride and disorganizing him with-- 


Timely and effective use of obstacles. 

Direct and indirect fires which are violent and coordinated. 
Counterattacks and spoiling attacks. 

Timely nuclear and chemical fires. 

Skillful deception. 

Aggressiveness. 

Effective offensive air support. 


Concluding the delay 


The delay can be concluded under several conditions, most probably when enemy forces 
have halted the attack or when the delaying force has achieved its mission and passed 
through another force. If the attacking force has halted because of attrition or logistic 


considerations, the commander of a delaying force can withdraw for another mission or 
maintain contact. The higher commander may choose to attack through a delaying force. 
In this kind of operation, timing for such an attack is usually critical. To facilitate it, the 
delaying force must assist in the forward passage of lines and provide knowledge of the 
enemy and terrain. 


Passing lines under pressure 


If the delaying force withdraws through a defending force, it must pass through lines to 
the rear and hand off the battle to the defending force. The success of the delay's final 
stage requires-- 


Using obstacles to assist in breaking contact. 
Planning routes. 

Coordinating passage points. 

Recognizing signals. 

Exchanging liaison parties. 

Supporting with fires. 


Passage of lines is especially difficult in limited visibility. Transition should therefore 
occur just forward of the new defense in such a way that location and organization are not 
revealed. 


In many instances, it will be preferable to pass delaying units to the rear in sectors not 
under direct attack. Commanders may do so by maneuvering delay forces away from the 
enemy's front just before it reaches the main defense. If the delaying force can lead an 
aggressive enemy into the defense, it can cause heavy damage. 


WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS 


When the commander finds it necessary to reposition all or a part of the force, a 
withdrawal is conducted. The deployed force voluntarily disengages from the enemy. The 
operation may occur with or without enemy pressure and assistance by other units. 


Without enemy pressure, withdrawing requires effective security and depends primarily 
on speed and deception. Stealth or a nuclear or ground attack may be necessary to divert 
the enemy's attention. Commanders must have contingency plans in case the enemy 
detects the withdrawal and attacks. Successful withdrawals normally occur at night or 
during poor visibility conditions. They also occur in difficult terrain under friendly air 
superiority, even though poor visibility and difficult terrain complicate friendly control. 
Smoke and concealed routes can reduce the enemy's ability to observe friendly 
movements, but commanders must anticipate enemy interference by fires and maneuver 
in depth. 


Under enemy pressure, withdrawing depends on maneuver, firepower, and control. All 
available fires, perhaps even nuclear fires, support the withdrawal of closely engaged 
friendly forces. Forward elements move to the rear by aggressive small-unit delaying 
tactics. Rearward movement must be tightly coordinated and controlled. 


When simultaneous withdrawal is not practicable, the commander must determine an 


order of withdrawal. If the most heavily engaged units are withdrawn from the areas of 
greatest enemy pressure first, the enemy may encircle or destroy major elements of the 
command. If the least heavily engaged units are withdrawn first, all or a major portion of 
the most heavily engaged units may be lost. Commanders must decide what action best 


preserves force integrity while accomplishing the mission. 


Withdrawal operations a sz 


USING MULTIPLE ROUTES UNDER ENEMY PAESSURE 


PLANS AND ORDERS FOR A WITHDRAWAL SHOULD INCLUDE: 


@ New positions to be atcupiad @ Plans for fire support. 
and new missions, 


® Provisions for breaking 


® Organization for combat. contact when the withdrawal 
is under anemy pressure. 


@ Zones or routes of withdrawal. 

@ Deception meesures. 
® Provisions for security. 

® Times and priorities far 
@ Comprehensive obstacle plan. withdrawing units, 





DIVISION 
COVERING 
FORCE 


INITIAL 
DELAY 
POSITION 


SECOND 
DELAY 
POSITION 


NEW 
DEFENSIVE 
POSITION 


Reserves deploy well forward to assist withdrawing units by fire or ground attack. While 
units are withdrawing under pressure, reserves can launch spoiling attacks to disorganize, 


disrupt, and delay the enemy. Reserves may also cover the withdrawal or extricate 
encircled or heavily engaged forces. Army aviation units secure flanks, delay enemy 
armor, maintain command and control, and transport troops and materiel. 


RETIREMENT OPERATIONS 


A retirement is a rearward movement by a force not in contact with the enemy. It is 
administrative in nature and execution, but commanders should have contingency plans if 
there is any chance of a meeting engagement. 


EMPLOYMENT OF OBSTACLES IN RETROGRADE OPERATIONS 


The use of obstacles in retrograde operations varies widely depending upon the nature of 
the operation. In the delay, planning and executing obstacles is much the same as in the 
defense. At the other end of the scale, obstacles will rarely be employed to support 
retirements, except for those that are part of denial operations. Obstacle use in the 
withdrawal falls between these extremes. 


Obstacles are used in both the defense and retrograde, but some significant differences 
are: 


Friendly forces will be even less numerous relative to the attacker, and will be 
more widely dispersed. With both time and troops to emplace obstacles at a 
premium, there will be fewer obstacles. Because of this and the greater need for 
them by friendly forces, each obstacle assumes greater importance. 

Extensive obstacle systems will be rare in retrograde operations. Single or small 
groups of mutually supporting obstacles will be sited at the most critical locations. 
Obstacles coordinated with antitank fires will be located in depth on likely 
avenues of approach and along each delay position. 

Thorough knowledge of the terrain is even more important in retrograde than in 
other operations. It is essential to find the most suitable locations for reinforcing 
obstacles, and to take the greatest advantage of the pattern of existing obstacles 
because of the severely limited time and effort available. 


These considerations lead to emphasis upon reinforcing obstacles that can be emplaced 
and executed rapidly, and offer the greatest delay effect for the preparation effort such as 
bridge demolitions, point obstacles (including point minefield), and scatterable mines. In 
the delay, obstacles are used primarily to enhance antiarmor direct fire weapons. They 
also are placed in depth to assist delaying forces in breaking contact. 


The delay provided by the second set of obstacles is vital if our forces are to succeed in 
breaking away to move to the next delay positions. In the withdrawal, obstacles are 
placed to slow the enemy's pursuit and disrupt his plans, and also to assist friendly forces 
in avoiding decisive engagement. 


Because the attacker seeks rapidity of movement, he will attempt to use the road net. The 
first priority for obstacles is to those that block key avenues of approach, especially at 
major choke points (including bridges) and sites suitable for hasty river crossings. The 
next consideration is developing obstacles directly assisting planned withdrawals to 


successive delay positions, generally along the delay positions. 


Because uncertainty is a large factor in the retrograde, obstacles that assist in preventing 
surprise to the friendly force are important. They give the delay force commander time to 
shift fires and move reserves to threatened areas. Special attention must be paid to 
obstacles that cover the flanks, and to lightly-held areas to counter the Threat doctrine of 
outdistancing and enveloping withdrawing forces. Potential airlanding or air drop zones 
also rate special attention in planning obstacles. Because the enemy can readily identify 
key choke points from maps, nearby landing or drop zone sites are especially important, 
and are best covered by planned scatterable mines. 


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Shaded areas show general location of existing and position. Execution is delegated to lowest possible 
reinforcing obstacles, They are organized in depth command level (axcept for reserved demolitions). 
along principal avenues of approach and each delay 





Major choke point obstacles 





In retrograde operations, engineers normally accompany all units. Security forces 
normally have engineers attached. The basic load of obstacle materials carried by 
engineers will provide a limited capability to create obstacles. In addition, the retrograde 
facilitates stockpiling of obstacle materiel to support rapid placement of planned 
obstacles. 


Obstacles in retrograde operations 


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Distributing engineer units throughout the force also places counterobstacle equipment 
and facilities where they will be able to immediately breach interdictory obstacles (those 
the attacker might place behind withdrawing forces). 


To the maximum extent possible, obstacles are sited to enhance the kill probabilities of 
antitank weapons. However, if necessary, the general principle that obstacles must be 
covered by direct fire or observed indirect fire can be relaxed in retrograde operations. 
Remote electronic sensors or other devices can be used to trigger planned artillery fire or 
mines, and make breaching very costly if observed fire is not possible. 


Obstacle planning 


In retrograde operations, obstacle planning must be done in as much detail as time will 
allow, but execution is closely controlled to assure that the effort is invested where it is 
most needed as the situation develops. Scatterable mines are particularly well-suited for 
use in retrograde operations because they can be placed where, when, and as needed. 


Their use is carefully planned to reduce delivery time. Planned sites include choke points 
not readily closed by demolitions, likely routes of advance, areas suitable for enemy 
artillery positions, likely landing or drop zones, and river crossing sites. Where 
availability of force permits, selected engineer units can be specially trained, reinforced, 
and employed under centralized control to emplace obstacles rapidly after the enemy's 
main effort is identified, or to respond to sudden changes in the situation. 


Reserved demolitions 


Common in the retrograde, reserved demolitions must be tightly controlled by the lowest 
commander responsible for all units involved in passage of the obstacle. Other critical 
demolitions, such as bridges, should be executed as soon as prepared to preclude the 
possibility of capture and the requirement for demolition guards. 


Deception 


Deception is important in all retrograde operations and critical to withdrawal. Friendly 
forces must keep the attacker confused--uncertain of our plans and the location and 
disposition of our forces. Obstacles must be so planned that their execution will not 
inadvertently reveal friendly plans or positions. Concealed obstacles, use of dummy 
obstacles, and varied, expedient obstacles will assist in deception. Obstacle emplacement 
will frequently have to be carried out at night and under cover of smoke. 


Denial targets 


Denial targets are common in retrograde operations. In addition to those assigned by 
higher headquarters, division and brigade will frequently wish to add to their own 
"tactical" denial targets, such as those designed to destroy the usefulness of the road net. 
Disabled equipment and supplies, or other materials that cannot be evacuated, will also 
have to be destroyed. 


Coordination 


Coordinating obstacle planning and preparation takes on the greatest importance in 
retrograde operations. Corps or theater army engineer units may be tasked to construct 
positions and obstacle systems well to the rear of the forces who will eventually fight 
there. In this instance, coordination arrangements between the preparing and final using 
units becomes vital. 


SUMMARY 


Planning considerations 
Mission. 


Directed and reserve obstacles. 


Future plans. 

Enemy strengths and weaknesses. 
Terrain and weather. 

Available resources. 

Effects on local population. 


Obstacles should support weapon systems, not impede future mobility, support 
movement from battle position to battle position, and be placed in depth. 


Retrograde operations 


Retrograde operations include the delay (to trade space for time), the withdrawal (to 
disengage from enemy contact), and the retirement (to move away without contact). 


Retrograde operations are planned by corps and division, but may be carried out by 
brigade. They feature centralized planning and decentralized execution. 


Threat forces seek to penetrate, bypass, and cut off friendly forces in the retrograde. 


The best possible use must be made of existing obstacles; reinforcing obstacles must 
offer the best return for the effort invested. 


Obstacles priorities are to key choke points, delay positions (with priority to the most 
forward delay position), and flanks. Among positions, priority is always to the initial 
delay position. 


In the delay, obstacles assist in inflicting losses and breaking contact. In the withdrawal, 
obstacles assist in slowing the attacker, disrupting his plans, and avoiding decisive 
engagement. In the retirement, obstacles may be planned for security. 


Scatterable mines are ideal for retrograde use. 


Careful planning and tight control of reserved demolitions is necessary to preclude 
premature demolition or capture by the enemy before detonation. 


Chapter 5 


MINE WARFARE 











Mines destroy, delay, disrupt, and channel enemy forces. They provide a very effective 
means of terrain control and casualty infliction on the enemy. Mine warfare systems are 
flexible. Compared with the costs of other weapon systems, mines are efficient and 
effective. However, their success and timely employment are factors of their availability 
and transporation assets to haul them. 


This chapter discusses the classification and employment of various types of minefields 
which can be emplaced in the AirLand Battle; command and control of both conventional 
and scatterable mines to include employment authority; and the reporting, recording, 
marking, and warning procedures for conventional and scatterable mines. 


CLASSIFICATION 

MINEFIELD EMPLOYMENT 

MINEFIELD EMPLOYMENT AUTHORITY 
REPORTING, RECORDING, AND MARKING 
SUMMARY 


CLASSIFICATION 


Minefields are classified by the purpose they serve. Types of minefields include 
protective, tactical, point, interdiction, and phony. 


PROTECTIVE MINEFIELDS 


Protective minefields aid units in local, close-in protection. There are two types of 
protective minefields, hasty and deliberate. 


Hasty protective minefields 


Hasty protective minefields are used as part of a unit's defensive perimeter. They are 
usually laid by units using mines (conventional or scatterable) from their basic loads. 


If conventional mines are used, they are laid on top of the ground in a random pattern. No 
antihandling devices will be used. They are employed outside hand grenade range but 
within small arms range. All mines are picked up by the emplacing unit upon leaving the 
area, unless enemy pressure prevents mine retrieval. 


If scatterable mines are used for the purpose of hasty protective mining, the system most 
likely to be used is the Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS). This system is man- 
portable and can be employed rapidly. The MOPMS container has both antitank and 
antipersonnel mines and is placed and aimed in the desired direction. If the unit 
determines that the mines should be employed due to enemy action, the box is 
explosively command-detonated and the mines scattered. Once employed, the mines 
cannot be retrieved. If the minefield is not required, the unit simply picks up the 
unexploded box and moves to a new location. 


Deliberate protective minefields 


Deliberate protective minefields are used to protect static installations such as depots, 
airfields, and missile sites. Conventional mines are always used and are emplaced in 
standard patterns, usually by engineers. The field is always fenced, marked, and covered 
by fire. These minefields are usually emplaced for long periods. When these minefields 
are to be removed, engineers clear them. 


TACTICAL MINEFIELDS 


Tactical minefields are emplaced as part of the obstacle plan. These minefields-- 


Channelize, delay, and disrupt enemy attacks. 
Reduce enemy mobility. 

Block enemy penetrations. 

Increase effectiveness of friendly fire. 

Deny enemy withdrawal. 

Prevent enemy reinforcement. 

Protect friendly flanks. 

Destroy or disable enemy vehicles and personnel. 


Tactical minefields are emplaced using conventional or scatterable mines. Density and 
depth of the minefield depend on the tactical situation. All types of mines and 


antihandling devices can be used. 


POINT MINEFIELDS 


Point minefields disorganize enemy forces and hinder their use of key areas. Point 
minefields are of irregular size and shape, and include all types of antitank and 
antipersonnel mines, and antihandling devices. They should be used to add to the effect 
of existing and reinforcing obstacles, or to rapidly block an enemy counterattack along a 
flank avenue of approach. 


INTERDICTION MINEFIELDS 


Interdiction minefields are placed on the enemy or in his rear areas to kill, disorganize, 
disrupt lines of communication and command and control facilities. Interdiction 
minefields are used to separate enemy forces and delay or destroy enemy follow-on 
echelons. Interdiction minefields are emplaced using air or fire support delivered 
scatterable mines. 


PHONY MINEFIELDS 


Phony minefields, used to degrade enemy mobility and preserve our own, are areas of 
ground used to simulate live minefields and deceive the enemy. They are used when lack 
of time, personnel, or material prevents employment of actual mines. Phony minefield 
can supplement or extend live minefields, and may be used as gaps in live minefields. To 
be effective, a phony minefield must look like a live minefield by either burying metallic 
objects or making the ground look as though objects are buried. Phony minefields are of 
no value until the enemy has become sensitive to mine warfare. 


MINE DELIVERY METHODS 


The table below (Mine delivery methods and characteristics) relates mines to their 
methods of delivery, self-destruct features, and emplacement characteristics. It also 
identifies those mines which may or may not be placed in a classical pattern. This table 
provides a basis by which mines can be categorized as scatterable or conventional 
according to their self-destruct feature. The table below (Mine categories and 
characteristics) lists mines by category, and also provides additional characteristics of 
each mine. 


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Mine categories and characteristics 
















Sensing Antk Self Explosive Mine 
á Mines Arming Fuzing Warhead Width Handling De- Weight Weight 
wt Device struct 
Dd ANTITANK 
E O Mi5  Mənval Pressure Blast Track Fuze Wall No 22 Ib 30 tb 
= MiS Manual Pressure Blast Track Fuze Well No 21 Ib 28 Ib 
= 2a Manual  TiltRọd Shape Full None No 11 Ib 17 Ib 
= Charge Vehicle . 
> M24 Manual Tape Strip 3.5 in 10 m None No — 18 ib 
am Rocket 
= ANTIPERSONNEI 
~ M14 Manual Pressure Blast Point None No 1o 3.3 oz 
nT) M16 Manual = Pressure/ Bounding Point Nona Nor 1 Ib g Ib 
> Tripwire 
2 M1BA1 Manual Command Direc- NA Nons No 1.5 |b 3.5 tb 
© (Clay- tional 
Q mare) Fragmen- 
l tation 
s ANTITANK 
M56 Helicap- Pressure Blast Track Yes Yes 3.2 Ib 5.9 b 
ter Drop 
RAAMS 1.G-Force Magnetic M-S Pate Vehicle Yes Yes 1.3 Ib 3.8 Ib 
ey 2. Spin 
GEMSS 1. Spin Magnetic M-S Plate Vehicle Yes Yes 1.3 Ib 3-8 Ib 
AT (M75} 2. Elec 
Impulse 
GATOR 1. Bore Magnetic M-S Plate Vehicle Yas Yes 1.3 Ib 3.8 Ib 
AT(BLU- Rider Pin 
91/B) 2. Elec 
Impulse 
MOPMS 1. Bore Magnetic M-S Plate Vehicle Yes Yes 1.3 |b 8.8 tb 
AT {XM Rider Pin 
78) 2, Elec 
iw Impulse 
aT WASPMS Manual Acoustic’ Solf-Forging SO m Yes Yes 12 lb 35 Ib 
z (XM 84) IR Fragmant 
x VOLCANO 1. Bore Magnetic M-S Plata Vehicle Yes Yes 1.3 lb _ 3.6 Ib 
Rider Pin 
zy 2. Elec 
in Impulse 
< ERAM Acoustic’ Self-Farging 30 m Yes Yes — — 
x IR Fragment 
TT PERSU E 
-e ADAM  1.G-Force Tripwire Bounding? 6 m Yes Yes - 0.9 |b 
a Man, 2. Spin Frag 
t ) 
S  GEMSS 1.Spin Tripwire Blast/Frag 12m Yəs Yes 1.2 1b 3.2 Ib 
AP (M74) 2. Elec 
Impulse 
MOPMS 1. Bore Tripwire Blest/Frag 12 m Yes Yes 1.2 ib 3.1 Ib 
AP Rider Pin 
{XM77) 2. Elec 
Impulse 
GATOR 1, Bora Tripwire = Blast/Frag) 6m Yes Yes 1.2 Ib 3.2 Ib 
AP(BLU- Rider Pin 
92/8) 2. Elec 
Impulse 
VOLCANO 1. Bore Tripwire Blast/Frag 6m Yes Yes 1.2 Ib 3.2 Ib 
Rider Pin 
2. Elec 


Impulse 


MINEFIELD EMPLOYMENT 


Mines are a significant combat weapon. Minefields are the most effective means of 
reinforcing the terrain to stop, slow, or channelize the enemy into areas where he can be 
killed. Minefields can and should be emplaced wherever and whenever the tactical 
situation dictates. The commander's flexibility in minefield employment has been 
expanded extensively with the fielding of multiple mine delivery systems. We can expect 
both conventional and scatterable minefields to be the principal countermobility asset. 


Conventional and scatterable minefields should be employed using the terrain analysis 
and obstacle planning sequence previously outlined. Conventional and scatterable 
minefield locations should be preplanned prior to the beginning of the battle, and 
emplaced when the tactical situation requires. 


Mine warfare operations must complement the commander's plan for defense, avoid 
impeding friendly mobility, and facilitate future operations. The engineer is the 
commander's principal advisor in insuring that these objectives are met. To achieve 
success in mine warfare, both the commander and the engineer must carefully control 
mine employment. Commanders and staffs throughout the force must know and follow 
authorizations and requirements to emplace mines and report, record, mark, and 
coordinate minefields. 


Detailed and integrated staff coordination is necessary to develop plans for mine warfare 
operations. Coordination begins with the development of a recommended obstacle plan to 
support the commander's scheme of maneuver and plan for fire support. Minefield are 
incorporated into the obstacle plan as necessary. 


Preplanned conventional and scatterable minefields will be part of the obstacle plan 
developed for the commander by the engineer. The operations officer, fire support 
coordinator, aviation officer, and air liaison officer (ALO) will assist the engineer. 
Preplanning will consist of identifying areas for minefields to respond to possible enemy 
courses of action. Preplanning will facilitate rapid emplacement, especially for mines 
delivered by artillery, helicopter, and high-performance aircraft. In all cases, execution is 
a command decision of the responsible maneuver commander, who must select the 
delivery system that best fits the tactical situation and presents the least risk to friendly 
troops. Employment will be coordinated with higher, lower, and adjacent units prior to 
execution, and reported and recorded afterwards. 


Conventional minefields will normally be emplaced prior to the beginning of hostilities 
due to the exposure of manpower and equipment, and due to the length of time necessary 
to emplace them. Once the battle begins, conventional minefields could still be emplaced 
but would have to be emplaced out of direct fire and, preferably, indirect fire range. 
Restriction to friendly maneuver or a rapidly changing battlefield is another very 
important factor to consider. Conventional minefields would rarely, if ever, be emplaced 
forward of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). 


Scatterable minefields can and should be planned and emplaced throughout the battle- 
field as the tactical situation requires and assets allow. Some scatterable systems are 
better suited for specific areas of the battlefield than others. Ground scattering systems 
are best utilized for emplacing larger tactical minefields and rapid, small, point, or hasty 
minefields. These type minefields are usually emplaced in friendly controlled territory. 
Other scatterable systems such as Artillery, Gator, M56, and Volcano can be employed 
throughout the battlefield. Emplacing helicopter delivered mines in enemy territory does 
involve a great degree of risk to the aircraft and crew. Artillery and high-performance 
aircraft delivery systems can be employed anywhere, but are ideally suited to deliver 
mines into enemy controlled areas. 


Typical minefield employment 


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Employment of minefields must be carefully planned and emplaced in areas where the 
cost to the enemy would be greatest. The engineer must recommend, and the tactical 
commander must select, the type minefield and delivery system to accomplish that task. 
In recent wars, mines have accounted for a substantial portion of equipment and 
personnel losses. Current and future developments in mines and mine delivery systems 
are extensive, insuring that mines will be one of the most formidable assets on the 
battlefield. 


MINEFIELD EMPLOYMENT AUTHORITY 


LEVELS OF AUTHORITY 


The restrictions that minefields impose on friendly mobility, as well as enemy mobility, 
dictate the need for positive and effective command and control of mine employment. 
The echelon of command vested with the authority to emplace mines varies with the 
purpose of the minefield and type of mines (conventional or scatterable). Minefields that 
restrict maneuver to a greater degree require a higher echel
…[truncated]