Document text
FM 3-06 (FM 90-10)
URBAN
OPERATIONS
JUNE 2003
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Field Manual
No. 3-06
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
*FM 3-06 (FM 90-10)
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 1 June 2003
Urban Operations
Contents
Page
FIGURES 20h. nen iste anid EEEO A tigi EEE EEOAE AEEA iv
HISTORICAL VIGNETTES } 4200 cia ie ccanehon denies tie ligidahins vii
PREFACE ermana etn eaten iets Getta a e Mined Gate aa Aire area te viii
URBAN QUTLOOK araea a e o aa 1-1
The Prospect of Urban Operations .0.............ecccceccececeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeesesenaeeeeeeeenseeseanees 1-2
Urban: Perspective aeii oeae a a dads ilebaoeteeehl a a 1-2
Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare ........eeeeeeeeeeeeerreeeeresrrrresrere 1-3
Modern Army Urban Operations ......eseesssesssrreeserreeiinnistennnasrsnreettnnaetenndetennnaninanaanenae 1-8
URBAN ENVIRONMENT .......000.....0c cece ceteeeeeeeneee ee taeeeeetaeeeeeseeeeetieeeertneeeeee 2-1
A Complex Environment...........::::cccccccceececccceeeeeeeseeeeaeeeeeeeeeeseenaaneeeeeeeeseeennieeeeeeeeeeees 2-2
Urban Terrain a ee e aa tania cheba aa a aa a a aa aa aa AE Git 2-3
WFD ANS SOCIOL eA TT ER 2-14
Urban`lnfrastructure -nimien niori aeeie etat ea aeda ada aaao 2-19
URBAN THREAT iieaeoe iglesia iii ENEE Ee 3-1
EEUE EE E TAE A heii aca a iene a 3-2
Weapons of Mass Destruction .............:c:ccccceceeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeceaeeeeeeesesecnueeeeeeeeeneeeeeas 3-2
Threat Operational Principles................:::ccccceceeeeeeceeceeeeeeeeeeeeceneaeeeeeeesetenneeeeeeeeeeteeeeees 3-3
Urban: Threat. Pacts cts. et ce ete a a cde cathe es vee a alae ae in 3-6
Negative Effects of Urbanization ........0..ceccecceeeeeeeeeneeeeeeenneeeeeeeeaeeeeeenaeeeeeeneeeeeeaas 3-11
CONTEMPLATING URBAN OPERATIONS .....0.0.......:::ccceeecceeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeennaeeeeeeaas 4-1
Necessity of Urban Operations issir iaa Eaa ARETE EEEE E ERAKETA AKAR EER 4-2
Characteristics of Major Urban Operations ..........ssseeeesseeesseerreserrrssrerrssrrrnsseerrssrreens 4-7
Integration into Land Operations .........eseesssseessrresesrrreerirneesrnaaarennestnnnaatinnestennaatenneani 4-10
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 90-10, 15 August 1979.
FM 3-06
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Chapter 9
Appendix A
FOUNDATIONS FOR URBAN OPERATIONG ................::::ccccceeeececceeceeeeeeeteeesnaeees 5-1
Urban Operational Framework .............:::ccccccceeeeeececeeeeeeeeeeesececeaeceeeeeeeseccacaeeeeeeeeeeees 5-1
Fundamentals of Urban Operations................cccccecccceceeeeeeeeeneeceeeeeeeseceneaeeeeeeeteeensaeas 5-12
General Effects on Operations .............c:ccccccceceeeeeeeeeencceeeeeeeeecenaaeceeeeeeesecsnnaeeeeeeeeess 5-16
URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONG .................0.:ccccceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeecenaeeeeeeeeeeeees 6-1
Purpose of Urban Offensive Operations..............:::cccccceceeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeseeenaeeeeeeeeeteees 6-1
Characteristics of Urban Offensive Operations ................:cccccccecceeceeeeeeeeeeeeenteeeeeees 6-2
Urban Offensive Operations and Battlefield Organization .............cceeeeeeeeteeeeeeenees 6-6
Forms and Types of Urban Offense 00.000... cceeceeeeeeeeene eects eeneeeeeeaeeeeesaeeeeeeaeeeeeeaas 6-9
Urban Offensive Considerations .................cccceccecceeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeseccneaeeeeeeeeesenstanenes 6-15
URBAN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ..................c:cccccceeeeeeeeeeecceeeeeeeeeeseeeneaeeeeeeeeeteees 7-1
Purpose of Urban Defensive Operations ...............:::ccececeeceeceeeeeeeeeceecaaeeeeeeeeeseesnnaees 7-1
Characteristics of Urban Defensive Operations .................:c:cccececeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeees 7-2
Urban Defensive Operations and Battlefield Organization ..........0..ccceeeeeeeteeeeees 7-5
Types of Urban Defens@sisicncc3 sc. tars core ee ae ae ee ee ee 7-5
Urban Defensive Considerations ................ccccecceccceeeeeeeeeceeceeeeeeeseecneaeeeeeeesesesniaeeees 7-10
URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ................... 8-1
Purpose of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations ...............::::00e ee 8-2
Characteristics of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations .................. 8-2
Urban Stability Operations, Support Operations, and Battlefield Organization....... 8-3
Types and Forms of Stability Operations and Support Operations ...........0......::08 8-4
Considerations of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations .................. 8-6
URBAN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ................:.::cccccccececceeceeeeeeeeeeeneaeeeeeeeeeeeees 9-1
Urban CSS- Character Sies a e a aa slateed a ae lal bidet Langecetely 9-2
Logistics Preparation of the Theater.........eseesssseesirreseerrssrirrsetsrnenrinnesrnnnaatninnsetnnneans 9-4
CSS: FUNCUONS niasin anae e einen eae ee ee en ed 9-7
Generali Engineer SUPPOM t e ade cecke abbr aa aaa aa E aE A Da 9-26
Civil-Military Operations .0..... ee adedana ee ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeseeeaeeeseeeeaeeeseeaeeeeeeaaees 9-28
SIEGE OF BEIRUT: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
URBAN OPERATIONS; nir a a ea ei ale a a r A-1
Overall Strategic Situation asian a a e A AAE EN A-1
Israeli, Military POSIUOM 2.425204 ice iskges rR RE AANE EE AEE AEEA AE DA EREET Ee AKATAA EE ERRAI A-2
PLO Military POSION enson rierinniianeetdinn eerta ee te ee inane diari EnaA e róa AEAN iar E EEEn A-2
Roe of OMAN S a a r elie he e a ae a e A-3
Information ‘Operation -sorires erie aa eaa aaea a E d aa a Gira eea as A-3
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Contents
Conduct of the Urban Operations. ...............:ccccccceeeeeeeececceceeeeetececeneaeceeeeeeesensnaeeeeees A-4
LESSONS scours Agent cect Se acters eed vel Aa ee ee eee a A-6
SUTIN ANY) AEE EE E E ety rede E E eed pet E eet A-10
URBAN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD..................... B-1
Urbanization Of IPB kreere aaiae aaae aa a vitae a a tates B-1
Significant Characteristics oeseri a A E AAA A B-4
Threat. Considerations ei aara a a ea ao tie eaa aeaaea a aa a aiaa B-11
Urban IPB Tools ANd Products .........ccccccccccccccececececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeseseseeeeeeseseeess B-16
OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA: APPLYING THE URBAN OPERATIONAL
FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT AND STABILITY .....0000......... 0. cc cccccececeeeeeeeeeteeeeeeeees C-1
General Stations. rsio iaeaea ght ia a aaa ae aaaea E chee Si C-1
SOMall OPE ratlOns sis eipesea see rn Widest atin ie dt, Mapes eae C-2
ASSOSS oes see et ee N i ee see OE ee E a Ee alee C-5
Shapes ao eei acted pe aa e e eee dd Bede a Death a Dated as a C-7
PYG ators es oe ee ce st Seen eerste i pee eee aoe vena deena een eet eed C-7
MANSION at, eres Sater ence he evade hott Pace lace A ass ithe ee ee A ET C-8
SUMIMALY Ea ntl at ae ad a ee C-9
JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL URBAN OPERATIONG ...............0:::::c:ccseeeeeteees D-0
PURPOSE 2 aede aa aa e aa ea e eaae teats a ea eaaa D-0
Service Urban Capabilities ...............cccccccecceeeceecnecaeeeeeeeeeeecaeeeeeeeeesesecaeeeeeeeeeeteseenaees D-1
Urban Functional Combatant Command Capabilities .............0sassenneeee oeeo ee enenr rene eeene D-5
Multinational Considerations eeina eaae e aa aea e aa AE E Eaa D-10
SOURCE NOTES T nae a a a ate ete Source Notes-0
GLOSSARY: 4:03.50 ise ai ee ee RAAE ERTE Glossary-0
BIBLIOGRAPHY iris se. of cee aaa od thes Sea a a a aa Bibliography-1
INDEX. Petrie dente ct ceet seantean ah da E alain atlas elie aig tal Mee Index-0
Figures
Figure Page
1-1. Full Spectrum Urban Operations .................ccccecceceeeeeeeeceeceeeeeeeeseteenieeeeeeeeteees 1-3
1-2. UO and the Army Imperatives ......... eee eeeeeeeeeeenneeeeeenaeeeseeaeeeeeeneeeeeeeaas 1-10
2-1. Keys to Understanding the Urban Environment ........0...:cccceeeeeeeeeeenteeeeeees 2-2
2-2. The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield ............0.....ccccceeeeeceeeeeeeeeeteeneneeeeeeees 2-4
2-3. Broad Urban PattemsS ....44Accs isn aie indian atean A 2-7
2-4. Basic Internal Street Patterns ...............cccccccceeseccecceeeeeeeeeeeneaeeeeeeesetecnaaeeeeeees 2-9
2-5- Am Urban Modell cscs cect eld a r a E aa kde 2-10
2-6. Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Their Industrial or Commercial Uses ........ 2-12
2-7. Key Aspects of the Urban Society...........eccceecccceeeeeeeeeeeeeieeeeetiieeeeeeneeeeeeeae 2-14
2-8. Urban Areas by Population Size «0.0.0... eecceeeeceeeeeeeneeeeeeeneeeeeeneeeeeennaeeeeeeaas 2-16
2-9. Simplified Analysis of Urban Society .....0....cccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeteeeeeeeneeeeeeeaes 2-16
2-10. UO-Society Cycle of Effects ..0... ccc eeeeeeeeeeecneeeeeenteeeeeetaeeeeeeneeeeeenaaes 2-19
2-11: Urban Infrastructure eirin eara eaa aaa eT aa E eia 2-20
3-1. Threat Operational Principles. ................cecccccccceceeeeeeeeeccceeceeeeeeeeeenneeeeeeeeesenees 3-3
3-2. Urban Threat Tactics ninii n a eaaa a ain aaar aa Daaa ine TAEAKE 3-7
3-3. Favored Threat Weapons ..........sssseseseeeseessrrnnttesttttrtnnrrnsstertrnnntnsnterttnn nennst ent 3-11
3-4. Negative Effects of Urbanization .......... ec eee eeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeteeeeeeneeeeeenaees 3-12
3-5. Worldwide Population Projections ...........eccccceeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeneeeseeneeeeeeenaees 3-13
4-1. Risk Management and the Risks Associated with Urban Operations .......... 4-2
4-2. Organization of Historic Joint Urban Operations .......... ec cceeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeee 4-8
4-3. Urban ISR Considerations ...............cccccecccceceeeeeceecaeeeeeeeeeseeceeaeeeeeeeeeeeesnaeess 4-16
4-4. lO Elements and Related Activities .....0...........cccccceecceceeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeesnaeees 4-19
425. Public: Attalts: Principles reisien anan enara aen aaa aa aaa 4-23
5-1. The Urban Operational Framework and Battle Command .................::::0 5-1
5-2. Urban Isolation ..............cccccecceeeececee cece cece eeceneaeeeeeeeeeeseccaeaeeeeeeesesecnueaeeeeeeeeeeneee 5-3
523. (PANAMA faces tale eave dev ae es a av lesa onan dee elie eae 5-8
5-4. The Fundamentals of Urban Operations. ...............:c:cccecceceeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeteees 5-11
5-5. Urban Maneuver Challenges and Means to Overcome Them ..............06 5-17
5-6. Urban Effects on Fire Support SystemS................cecceesecceeeeeeeeeeeecaeeeeeeeeeeeees 5-20
5-7. Methods to Overcome Urban Communications Challenges... 5-29
5-8. Compressed Tactical Factors ..0..........ccccccccecccceeeeeeeeeeececeeeeeeeeecenaeeeeeeeeeteees 5-31
6-1. Initial Attack in Brittany ........ ec cere ee ern reer ene eter teeeeeteeeeesieeeeeenaeeeen 6-3
6-2. Subsequent Disposition of Forces in Brittany ................c:ccceeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 6-4
Figures
6-3. Envelopment Isolates an Urban Area..............::c:cccccceeeeeeeececceeeeeeetecennieeeeeeneess 6-9
6-4. Turning MOveme ntecs...ct ce eeedetnne eect eededeeitencevetehgevehseedevehienededetinngevenneatevense 6-9
(ero MMI tAtlO Mr eke kes E acted cbacet Sobte teh he decetenl sheen E E E teeatlea Medes 6-9
6-6: 1 Pēnetration 2 seers eiteest ge setae a ea a E epee aaae et enn ce 6-10
G27... Promtal:Atlack:::227..sacces T E E E N 6-10
6-8.. Metz Envelopment ecean a eaaa a ea aas 6-11
6-9... ‘Metz Final Assault niintin anere a Re eera teen 6-12
6-10. Required Urban Reconnaissance Capabilities...................cccecceeeeeeeeeeeeteeees 6-17
6-11. Shaping Through Isolators eR 6-18
6-12. Critical Sensor-to-Shooter LiNKS................cceceececeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeeeeeeeseesnseeeeees 6-20
6-13. Reactions to Isolation ............ccccceeececececcee cece eeeeeseceeeaeceeeeeeesecenaeseeeeeeeeeeseeaees 6-20
6-14. Initial Attack to Isolate Hue .............cccccccececeeeeeececceeceeeeeeeeeceaeceeeeeeeseesnnaeeeeess 6-21
6-15. Subsequent Attack to Isolate Hue «0.00.0... .. ec eeeececcece cece eee eeceeaeeeeeeeeeteestaeeeeees 6-22
6-16. Final Attack to Isolate HUe................ccccccececeeeeeeeeeceeceeeeeeeseceneaeeeeeeeeeseesnneeeeees 6-23
6-17. Coordination of SOF and Conventional Capabilities ...........0...... ees 6-24
6-18. Inchon-Seoul Campaign, September 1950 ......0........ceceeceeeeeceeeeeteeeesteeeeees 6-31
7-1. An Urban Area Incorporated Into a Larger Mobile Defense................: 7-6
7-2. German Attacks to Seize Stalingrad... eceeceeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeneeeeeeneeeeeeeaes 7-7
7-3. German Attacks to Seize Stalingad, September 1942.00.00... eeeeeeeeeeeees 7-8
7-4. Soviet Attack Traps German 6th Army ......... eee ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeennaeeeeeenaeeeeeeaaes 7-8
7-5. Retrograde Through an Urban Area..........ccccccccseceeeeseeeeeeeenneeeeeeneeeseeneeeeeenaas 7-9
8-1. Characteristics of Stability Operations and Support Operations ................... 8-1
8-2. Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations ...............:::eeeeeeeeeeeeeees 8-4
823. Adaptability ecoa A beret bette a tecee Satta all ot 8-12
9-1... CSS ‘CharacteniSties: n sections die a Mian a a a 9-2
9-2. The Urban Environment and Essential Elements of Logistic Information .....9-5
9:3:7 CSS FUNCIONS 5222 concerts a e a a E TA 9-8
9-4. General Principles of the Law of War ..............ceccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeteeseaaees 9-25
9-5. General Engineer Support..........sssssssssnsseessrsnntresteetttntnnnsterttnnrnnsntentnnn nterne et 9-27
9-6. Civil Affairs Functional SkillS...............c.cccccceeeceeesececeeeeeeeeeenneeeeeeeeeseteneseaees 9-29
9-7. ASCOPE and the Urban Environment...............:::ccceccceeeeecceeceeeeeeeseesnnaeeeeees 9-30
Act: “TheSteps of RBar a a ths auch hea sh a aa A-1
A-2. Changing Relevance of Key Elements of the Urban Environment................ A-3
A-3. Significant Urban Terrain Characteristics ....0......ccceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeteeeeetnneeeeeeee A-5
A-4. Significant Urban Societal Characteristics ..0........ cc ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeene A-7
A-5. Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics ..........0.ceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee A-9
A-6. Civilian Threat—Friendly Continuum «0.0.0... ceeeeeeeeeeeeeteeeeeeeeneeeeetnaeeeeetneeeeees A-13
A-7. Urban IPB Tools and Products .............2::::ccccceceeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeseceneaeeeeeeeeeeeenaees A-15
FM 3-06
vi
B-1. USAF E-8 JSTARS Platform ............ececcceccccececeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeseeenaeeeeeeeeeeeeseenaeas B-1
B-2. USN MK45 Lightweight Gun System ........... cece eeeeeeeeeecneeeeeeeeeeeetnaeeeeeeaas B-4
B-3. USN MK V Special Operations Craft ...............ecececcecccceeceeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenaees B-9
B-4... USAF AG-130:GuNSHIp carieira e aaee eee antl teaepess atlas B-9
C=... The: City of Beirut, eae i tains aoe iit E A C-0
C-2. Initial Conduct of the Urban Operation. .................cceecceeeeeeeteeeeeteeeeeeeeeeeeeeees C-3
C-3. Israeli Probe of PLO Defenses. ................ccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeecnueaeeeeeeteeennaea C-3
C-4. Initial Israeli Attack «2.0.0.0... cccececce cece cece eee eeceae eset sete seceeaeeeeeeeteseessncaeeeeeeeeeteeea C-4
C-5;. Final Israeli Atta CK e eaa a a a a E a mettle! C-4
D-1. Phases of US Involvement in Somalia ................ececccceececeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeteeeeeees D-1
B=22 (Map Ot. Somalia tears eesti tesa ender a he ata eho dee D-3
Historical Vignettes
Page
Rome: A Microcosm of Urban Warfare .00......ccccceecccceeeeeneeeeeeenneeeeeetneeeeeeneeeeetnaeeeeess 1-4
Seeing the Urban Area and Its Parts........ ec ecceceeceeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeenaeeeeeenaeeeeeenaeeeeeeaas 2-26
Tempoa eni ea a a a a aa e O r aaaea a a a aaa 3-4
Identifying Soldiers from Civilians .........eeassseessrrserrrrnnnrsnnesrnnnnsrernsennnnnninnnasnannnnnnena 3-8
Information and the Meia...............cececeecceceeeeeeeeeeenaeceeeeeeeeeceeeaeceeeeeeesececenieeeeeeeenenes 3-10
Cultural and Religious Instability «2.00.00. eeceeeeeeeeeeeeeenneeeeeenaeeeeeeaeeeenenaeeeeeneaas 3-14
Food and Water Shortages- sim ea aaa A A R RE 3-14
Urban INSUPGENCICS o irereeriinnni rn iner iaia ineA naiai ANEAN ANANDE ANARAN iara NAA ATAKE Ni 3-16
Crime and Criminal Organizations 0.00.00... cece ee cnet eeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeeeenaeeeeeeneeeeeeaas 3-18
Applying the Urban Operational Framework: Panama — December 1989.............. 5-7
Example of Simple Communications Innovation: Israel’s Six-Day War — 1967....5-30
The Operational Context of Urban Operations: Brittany Ports — August to
september 1944 niiina aerie te ieee i aeaaaee a Ea 6-2
Forms of Attack in the Urban Offense: Metz — 1944 ..sseseeseerssseerrssrerrssren 6-11
Isolating the Urban Area: Hue City — January to February 1968 .......... cee 6-21
Creative Task Organization: Using Artillery in the Direct Fire Role... 6-27
Bold Operational Maneuver to Seize an Urban Area: Inchon and
Seoul, Korea — September 1950 0.2... ccccccccccccesceceseseseseseeeseeeseseeeseseaeseeaeaes 6-30
Urban Defense in a Major Operation: Stalingrad — August 1942 to
January 1943 setae Avec ag eed ive ive Tha elie eet i sag ee 7-7
Defensive Combat Power: Suez City, Egypt — October 1973.00... eee 7-13
Assessment of Security and Force Protection: Belfast, Northern Ireland............... 8-9
Support of and Coordination with Civilian Authorities: The 1992 Los
Angeles: RIGS 2.74 sac nated Antanas mained eater 8-13
Base Security: Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam and Tet 1968 .............:::::ccceceeeeeeeeeteeeeeteees 9-3
Combat Stress: Chechnya—1994 to 1996.0... ceceeeeceeeeeeeeneeeeeeneeeeeeneeeeeeaas 9-19
Analysis of an Urban Area’s Underlying Terrain: Mitrovica, KOSOVO ..........: eee A-6
Shifting Civilian Interests and Intent... eee ee ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeseeaeeeeeenaeeeeeeaas A-13
The Siege of Beirut: An Illustration of the Fundamentals of Urban Operations..... C-0
Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Framework to Stability and Support.. D-1
vii
viii
Preface
Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language,
a purpose, and unity of effort. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army opera-
tions in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain,
a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational
environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the pre-
dominant operational environment. Each urban operation will be distinct from
any other—any other urban operation as well as similar types of operations in
other environments. Each operation will differ because of the multitude of combi-
nations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of
which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geo-political
considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between
Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities.
Commanders are responsible to strike the proper balance between preparing for
future challenges and maintaining the capability to respond to current threats.
PURPOSE
This manual provides the analytical tools for evaluating an urban operation to
determine if the operation is necessary for overall mission success. It also pro-
vides the means to understanding and determining the impacts of the urban
environment on military operations and provides information on managing,
taking advantage of, and mitigating the effects of those impacts as appropriate.
As such, this manual demonstrates how to apply the doctrinal principles in
FM 3-0 to this unique environment.
SCOPE
Chapter 1 introduces theoretical and historical perspectives of urban operations
that serve as the underlying basis for the rest of the manual. Chapter 2 discusses
the characteristics of urban centers and populations as well as their impact on
operations. It is unlikely that Army forces will ever operate in a benign urban
environment; therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the varied nature of potential urban
threats. An understanding of the complexities of the urban environment and the
nature of the enemy is essential to sound decisionmaking. Chapters 4 and 5 dis-
cuss the potential costs of urban operations as well as the effects on each battle-
field operating system that the commander and his staff consider early in their
planning. These chapters also outline an urban operational framework and spe-
cific urban considerations that create the foundations necessary for successfully
applying operational doctrine to an urban environment.
The second half of the manual (Chapters 6 — 9) discusses how urban operations
are conducted and resourced. Urban operations include major offensive and de-
fensive operations in urban environments as well as stability operations and sup-
port operations ranging from peace operations and combatting terrorism to
domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. For the dif-
ferent types of operations—offense, defense, stability, and support—the purpose,
characteristics, organization, and considerations are discussed. However, com-
FM 3-06
manders consider that most urban operations will involve some aspect of all four
types of operations (although one may dominate) and plan accordingly.
APPLICABILITY
This manual is intended for commanders and their staffs at the brigade through
corps level. It addresses the range of operations (both violent and nonviolent)
throughout the spectrum of conflict that Army units will execute in urban
settings. However, users should also consult JP 3-06 for specific joint
information. Additionally, users should be familiar with FM 3-06.11, TC 90-1,
and urban operations chapters, appendices, or sections found in other infantry,
armor, combined arms, and proponent field manuals for the tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTP) and appropriate proponent information necessary to
conduct tactical urban operations at the brigade level and below.
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
Chapter 2 defines “city” according to a the population size. However, in historical
vignettes and accounts, the term “city” is applied in its common usage without
specific regard to size to maintain conformity with most other historical reports.
In this manual, the term “threat” is applied broadly to include an enemy force
(conventional or unconventional), an armed belligerent in a peace operation, an-
tagonistic or unfriendly elements of the civilian population, or some other hazar-
dous condition in the urban environment that negatively influences mission ac-
complishment. The term “hostile” is used as a subset of the threat and denotes a
particular element of the urban population (individual, group, or organization) or
one or more opposing armed factions in a peacekeeping operation. Both an enemy
and a hostile have the intent to exploit Army vulnerabilities and negatively affect
the urban operation. A hostile, however, is not engaging Army forces in
protracted combat operations.
The term military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is replaced by urban
operations (UO). MOUT is an acronym from FM 90-10 Military Operations on
Urban Terrain that is superseded by this manual.
Otherwise, the glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-06 that have joint or Army
definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the
term. Definitions for which FM 3-06 is the proponent manual (the authority) are
marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent or amplifying manual for other terms
is listed in parentheses after the definition.
The manual attempts to incorporate historical vignettes into each chapter where
the account supports the doctrinal line of reasoning. Two historical vignettes,
however, were included as appendices (A and C) because of their longer lengths.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.
This publication contains copyrighted material.
The proponent for this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recom-
mended changes directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and
Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-FD-CD,
Futures Development and Integration Center, 1 Reynolds Avenue, Fort
Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.
Chapter 1
Urban Outlook
The ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires Army
leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self-aware leaders under-
stand their operational environment, can assess their own
capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, and
actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must
first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize
change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and
learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.
FM 1
Given the prevalence of large cities throughout the world, Army forces,
division size and larger, will likely be required to conduct operations in
and around large urban areas. These operations will be in support of a
joint force commander (JFC) conducting military operations pursuant to
United States (US) national security policy. This manual is designed to
facilitate the planning and conduct of the full range and spectrum of land
operations in a complex urban environment. Each urban environment and
urban operation is unique; prescribing specific doctrinal “solutions” for
situations is impossible. Instead, this manual provides a framework to
commanders and their staffs for understanding the urban environment,
for analyzing and deciding whether urban operations (UO) are necessary
or feasible, and for applying operational doctrine to this complex environ-
ment. It also provides historical vignettes to help develop a refined analy-
tical perspective and some planning points and tactics and techniques to
assist in preparing for and conducting UO. Together, this information
provides a foundation for approaching major UO, which, combined with
other joint and Army doctrine, will help commanders and their staffs
learn to adapt and succeed in this challenging environment.
CONTENTS
The Prospect of Urban Operations ............. 1-2 | Modern Army Urban Operations................. 1-8
Urban Perspective........cccccsssececcssseeessseerenes 1-2 Major Theater War .......:csssescsssseresessereees 1-8
Historical Significance of Urban Smaller-Scale Contingencies................+. 1-9
Areas in Warfarre.........seecccseseeeeeeeseeeeeeseeeees 1-3 Peacetime Military Engagements ........... 1-9
Strategic Importance of Urban
PAV CAS ioe cs cc seen eves E E 1-4
US Army’s Experience in Urban
Operations aces a aenea aS 1-6
Preparing for Future Urban Operations. 1-9
1-1
FM 3-06
THE PROSPECT OF URBAN OPERATIONS
1-1. The world is in a period of massive urbanization. A trend of migration
from rural to urban areas is occurring throughout the globe. This trend is
especially evident in developing nations. Combined with the exponential
growth of the global population in the last quarter century, this migration
has created massive urban areas that hold the centers of population,
government, and economics in their respective regions. In Western Europe,
for example, over 50 percent of the land area is urbanized. Just over 30 years
ago, only three urban areas in Asia contained at least eight million people.
By 2015, estimates show that Asia will have 17 urban areas over ten million,
and three of those will top 20 million residents. Almost half of today’s
population resides in urban areas. Trends also indicate that less developed
nations have more centralized societies in a few urban areas. Developed
nations spread their centralized societies in several urban areas. In many
cases, rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak infrastructures,
scarce resources, and a fragile economic base. Given the global population,
Army forces will likely conduct operations in and around urban areas—not as
a matter of fate but as a deliberate choice linked to national objectives and
strategy and at a time, place, and method of the commander’s choosing.
Army forces conduct UO either as one component of a larger operation or as a
single operation focused totally on a specific urban environment. Major Army UO
are often part of a joint and multinational effort requiring interagency and civil-
military coordination that may include the full spectrum of Army operations.
Commanders of Army major operations must determine if UO are essential to
mission accomplishment. If so, commanders must carefully integrate the opera-
tions into campaign planning to support the operational objectives of the JFC.
Army leaders conducting UO must—
Army Urban Operations
Assess the urban area to determine decisive points.
Shape the operation to set the conditions for success.
Precisely mass the effects of combat power to rapidly dominate the area.
Then transition the urban area to the control of another agency or back to
legitimate civilian control.
URBAN PERSPECTIVE
1-2
1-2. As a subset of all Army operations, UO are operations focused on an
urban environment. UO include the full range of Army operations—offensive,
defensive, stability, and support—that may be executed, either sequentially
or simultaneously, during the conduct of a single urban operation. Depending
on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), urban operations may—or
may not—be conducted predominantly within the urban area (see
Figure 1-1). Furthermore, UO may be the sole mission of the commander or
one of several tasks nested in a larger operation. Regardless of the types of
operations conducted or whether the urban area is the single focus of the
operation or only one component of a larger operation, the complex urban
environment significantly affects the overall conduct of the mission.
Urban Outlook
— URBAN OPERATIONS ~>
Political Objectives and METT-TC Make All UO Unique
Control of the
Urban Area
Combat Service Support
UO May Continue Under
Civilian Control of the
Operation Urban Area
Defense
UO are often full
spectrum and
therefore NOT Stability
necessarily
focused only on
urban combat
ASSESS
Framework = SHAPE = DOMINATE = TRANSITION
Ti Duration of UO Can Be Measured in Days or
ime Years Depending on Factors of METT-TC
Figure 1-1. Full Spectrum Urban Operations
1-3. When conceptualizing urban operations, commanders understand two
important terms: urban area and urban environment. The first is a subset of
the second. An urban area is a topographical complex where man-
made construction or high population density is the dominant
feature. Focusing on urban areas means concentrating on the physical
aspects of the area and their effects on tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The urban environment includes the physical aspects of the urban
area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and
relationships between its key components—the terrain (natural and
man-made), the population, and the supporting infrastructure—as
an overlapping and interdependent system of systems. Critical
elements of the infrastructure may lie far beyond the area’s physical con-
fines. For example, the generating source providing power to the urban
energy system is part of that system but may be located well outside of the
urban area. Similarly, effects of the interaction between components of the
infrastructure, located both inside and outside the urban area, extend well
into smaller, neighboring urban areas and surrounding rural areas and often
form their political, economic, and cultural focus. Understanding the total
urban environment is essential to planning and conducting the full range of
Army urban operations across the spectrum of conflict.
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN AREAS IN WARFARE
1-4. Urban areas always have been central to, or have significantly
influenced, military operations. One of the first urban-centered battles was
the siege of Troy at the beginning of Greek history. Moreover, much of the
history of early Greece revolved around wars between its city-states or with
Persia and centered on the conquest, siege, or blockade of cities. Five
1-3
FM 3-06
hundred years later, the Roman Empire replaced Greece as the dominant
world power although urban areas remained central to Roman warfare. Even
Rome’s history can be viewed as a microcosm of urban warfare over the past
two thousand years. Though military operations within the physical confines
of many of these historic urban areas were not the norm, the focus of these
operations was their conquest or control.
Rome
A Microcosm of Urban Warfare
During two millennia, Rome has been the center of at least 12 battles. The Gauls
lay siege to Rome first in 387 BC. That first siege lasted six months and ended
after the barbarians burnt much of the city. The surviving patrician families paid a
ransom for the withdrawal of Brennus’ army. From 408 to 410 AD, the Goth
leader, Alaric, successfully besieged Rome no less than three times. The
Byzantine General Belisarius captured Rome twice from the Goths and withstood
siege inside the city once between 536 and 549. Five hundred years later in
1084, Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard captured medieval Rome and sacked
the city during a dispute between the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire. Forces
of the Holy Roman Empire again stormed and captured the city to punish the
Pope in 1527. During the Italian Revolution in 1849, a French army supporting
the Pope captured the city from the Italian revolutionary army under Garibaldi. In
1944, the last military action took place in and around Rome when the US Fifth
Army captured the city from the retreating German army. Rome’s turbulent
history—fought over ethnic and religious differences, prestige, and military
necessity—demonstrates the importance of urban areas in warfare and the
various causes and combatants within this complex environment.
1-5. Although Rome last saw combat in 1944, urban areas have been no less
prominent in warfare since that time. Beirut in Lebanon, Grozny in
Chechnya, and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been centers of conflict
in the last 50 years. Urban areas, now more pervasive than ever before, will
continue to be essential to successful operational and strategic warfighting.
Today, armies cannot execute major military operations without the
influence of surrounding urban environments (with the possible exception of
the open desert).
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF URBAN AREAS
1-4
1-6. Several reasons have attracted (and continue to attract) armies to
combat in urban areas:
e A military force chooses to position itself in an urban area to capitalize
on the perceived advantages offered by the environment. In contrast,
an opposing force, by analyzing the factors of the situation, determines
that it must enter the urban area to attack and destroy its enemy (or
devote essential combat power to their isolation).
e The urban area’s infrastructure, capabilities, or other resources have
significant operational or strategic value.
e The urban area has significant symbolic importance.
Urban Outlook
e The urban area’s geographical location dominates a region or avenue of
approach.
1-7. Russia’s 1994 experience in Chechnya illustrates an increasingly impor-
tant motivation for conducting urban operations. The Chechen rebels, after
failing to engage Russian forces outside the city, chose to turn Grozny into
the battlefield. Leaders of the defeated Chechen conventional forces recog-
nized that fighting in the urban area provided them their best chance for
success. The complexities of urban combat and the perceived advantages of
defending an urban area mitigated their numerical and technological
inferiority. The urban area provided the Chechens protection from fires,
resources, interior lines, and covered and concealed positions and movement.
Given such advantages offered by the environment, smaller or less-
sophisticated military forces have similarly chosen to fight in urban areas.
1-8. Such advantages of operating in an urban environment also prompt
forces to conduct an urban operation to facilitate a larger campaign plan and
decisive battle in another location. The urban operation can focus the enemy
on the urban area and allow other forces to conduct operations elsewhere.
From a defensive perspective, an urban defense may gain time and space to
reorganize forces in new defensive positions, to divert enemy forces from
other critical tasks, or to prepare to conduct offensive operations. To some
extent, these reasons motivated Soviet forces defending Leningrad and
Stalingrad from the Germans in World War II. The stubborn defense per-
mitted the Soviets to reorganize for later offensive operations. From an offen-
sive perspective, an attack on an urban area may be a shaping operation
used to divert resources from the decisive operation that will follow.
1-9. Armies also fight in an urban area to obtain some critical feature or
resource in the area, such as a port facility. The desire to control an
important seaport and access to the Persian Gulf largely motivated the
Iranian and Iraqi struggle for Basra in the 1980s. Earlier, in 1944, British
forces fought German units in Arnhem for control of the Rhine River Bridge.
Other infrastructure of the urban environment may have operational or
strategic significance and can compel military forces to attack or defend the
area. As urban areas account for an increasing share of a country’s national
income, often generating over 50 percent of gross national product, the stra-
tegic implications for their control or influence become even greater.
1-10. Urban areas are often located on terrain that dominates a region or an
avenue of approach. In these cases, offensive armies capture these areas to
proceed with security to another objective. Conversely, defensive forces
commonly defend the area to deny the area of operations. To illustrate,
Cassino, Italy stood astride the critical highway approach up the Liri valley
to Rome. The allies had to attack and capture the monastery to facilitate the
allied offensive north. Cassino’s location made bypassing virtually
impossible. Likewise, Israeli army urban operations in Beirut were (and have
continued to be) a result of its strategic location near the Israeli security
zone; various Arab insurgent and terrorist groups used Beirut as a base for
attacks against Israel. Beirut evolved as the major base of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, a major opponent of Israel. Beirut’s location made it
a security threat to Israel and thus compelled several major Israeli
operations in the urban area (see Appendix A).
1-5
FM 3-06
1-11. Another reason for engaging in urban operations is the symbolic—
historical, cultural, political, and even economic—importance of many urban
areas. Often, capital cities—such as Rome, Paris, Seoul, and Berlin—are
identified as the strategic centers of gravity of their respective nations.
Possessing or threatening these urban areas may impact directly on the out-
come of a conflict. The objective of Germany’s wars with France in 1870 and
1914 was ultimately Paris. Napoleon’s 1812 campaign had as its objective
Moscow, as did Hitler’s 1941 offensive into Russia. The objective of the Soviet
1945 offensive was Berlin, and the North Vietnamese 1975 offensive had as
its objective the South’s capital of Saigon. Still, history also reminds us that
commanders assess the sustainability and decisiveness of operations directed
toward these “prestige” objectives. For example, in 1812, Napoleon captured
Moscow but had to evacuate it within 30 days. He lacked supplies and
shelter, failed to destroy the Russian Army, and failed to defeat the political
will of the Czar and the people. Similarly, the North Korean occupation of
Seoul during the Korean War was equally indecisive.
US ARMY’S EXPERIENCE IN URBAN OPERATIONS
1-6
1-12. The US Army has a varied history of conducting operations to attack or
defend larger urban areas. The American Revolution saw the Army conduct
several urban operations. These operations included the unsuccessful defense
of New York, the successful attack on Trenton, and the decisive siege and
attack on British forces at Yorktown. The Mexican War also had a successful
assault on the fortified city of Monterey and the decisive siege of Mexico City.
During the American Civil War, the armies, in the tradition of Napoleonic
maneuver warfare, avoided urban areas and fought in the open. However,
the opposing armies frequently made urban areas their objective because of
their importance as railheads. Success in the siege of several key urban
areas—Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Petersburg—contributed to the Northern
victory.
1-13. Following the Civil War, the US Army faced no large-scale urban
combat for several generations. The Indian Wars, the Spanish-American
War, the Philippine Insurrection, and even World War I did not require the
Army to fight in large urban areas. Between the Civil War and World War II,
the US Army fought in several urban areas worldwide supporting US com-
mitments. These limited urban combat operations were small but essential
parts of what were urban stability operations. From 1900 to 1901, the Army
provided public security for a sector of Peking, China of around 50,000
inhabitants. The Army conducted UO and, in the course of the operation, the
9th US Infantry suffered 20-percent casualties while fighting in Tientsin.
Punitive expeditions to places such as Siberia, Cuba, Philippines, Central
America, and Mexico put the Army in various urban situations that required
using military power, notably, the occupation and security of Vera Cruz,
Mexico in 1914. In the context of these smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs),
UO became a staple of US Army employment.
1-14. World War II forced the Army to grapple with the issues of large-scale
urban combat almost immediately. In his 1941 defense of the Philippines,
General MacArthur examined how to defend Manila. Manila represented a
large, modern, friendly urban area, which was the capital city of a close US
Urban Outlook
ally. Defending the urban area posed numerous challenges. Ultimately
General MacArthur determined that he could best conduct its defense
outside the city by defeating the enemy forces in combat on the invasion
beaches or shortly after they landed. When Japanese forces defeated
MacArthur’s Philippine Army in a series of engagements, MacArthur had to
decide how best to protect the friendly populace of Manila. He had two
choices: abandoning the city or waging a costly defense that would likely
result in the city’s destruction, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and no
operational advantage. He had little choice but to declare Manila an open
city and move his forces to Bataan to wage an operational defense in the vain
hope that a counteroffensive could relieve his isolated force. On 2 January
1942, Japanese forces entered Manila unopposed.
1-15. Had General MacArthur decided to defend Manila, his forces would
have found scant doctrine in the Army regarding how to fight in an urban
area. Doctrine for urban operations did not appear until early 1944, when
faced with the possibility of fighting through the larger urban areas of
Western Europe. At his time the US Army published FM 31-50, Attack on a
Fortified Position and Combat in Towns. This manual had the first formal
discussion of how the Army viewed urban combat. It was based on the Army’s
limited experiences in the Mediterranean theater and the study of German
and Soviet experiences on the Eastern front.
1-16. FM 31-50 emphasized a deliberate pace, individual and small unit ini-
tiative, the liberal use of direct and indirect firepower, and decentralized
command and execution. It focused on the urban area (as opposed to the envi-
ronment); however, it did include policies towards the noncombatants. The
manual was also focused at the regimental combat team level. Comple-
menting the doctrine of FM 31-50 was the 1944 operations manual, FM 100-5.
This latter manual emphasized the importance of combined arms actions and
the need for extensive reconnaissance of prepared and defended cities. The
Army successfully implemented this doctrine in several major instances of
urban combat, most notably the capture of the first German city, Aachen, and
hundreds of small-scale urban assaults on cities, towns, and villages across
France, the Benelux, and Germany. Army forces also successfully employed
this urban combat doctrine during the liberation of Manila in 1945.
1-17. The legacy of this era of Army operations was an effective tactical solu-
tion to urban offensive combat: isolate the urban area, seize a foothold, and
expand the foothold block by block until occupying the entire urban area and
destroying the enemy. The doctrine’s emphasis on firepower kept friendly
casualties to a minimum. Unfortunately, when enemy forces stoutly defended
the urban area, the emphasis on firepower resulted in its virtual destruction
and high casualties among noncombatants.
1-18. The doctrinal approach honed in World War II remained the accepted
Army approach to urban combat to the century’s end. The last successful
implementation occurred when liberating Seoul during the Korean War. The
Vietnam conflict did not offer the Army opportunities or the requirement to
practice urban combat or test and refine doctrine on a large scale. The largest
urban battle, Hue, was a chaotic tactical battle that validated most of the
historical lessons of urban combat without generating any new doctrinal
insights for large-scale urban warfare.
1-7
FM 3-06
1-19. From the mid-1950s through the 1990s, the Army conducted UO in the
United States in support of civil authorities during civil unrest and anti-
Vietnam protests. Some operations involved numerous active and reserve
component forces engaged in restoring public order. The Detroit riots of 1967
and the Los Angeles riots of 1992 required the commitments of active and
National Guard units. In 1968, the Army deployed over 35,000 troops to
Washington D.C., Chicago, and Baltimore following the death of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.
1-20. In the 1970s and 1980s, Army doctrine predominantly focused on urban
areas and successfully fighting a conventional ground war against Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The 1979 FM 90-10, Military Opera-
tions on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), described how to conduct urban opera-
tions against Soviet forces in Germany. Its concepts were never tested other
than in simulation, and its approach to urban combat was not substantially
different from that practiced by the Army since World War II. Despite
previous doctrine’s admonition to avoid cities, the Army has had to fight in
them in diverse circumstances.
MODERN ARMY URBAN OPERATIONS
1-21. Modern urban operations span the full range of possible applications of
military power. At the high end of the spectrum of conflict is major theater
war (MTW) dominated by offensive and defensive operations that, when
undertaken, will commonly include urban operations. At the lowest level are
a multitude of urban peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. These
activities foster and strengthen alliances and coalitions as well as deter
aggression on the part of potential threats. At mid-level between MTW and
PME are SSC urban operations. As a result of being mid-range, any type of
operation may potentially dominate an SSC; however, the various urban
stability operations form the majority. At higher echelons, these separations
are often viewed as levels of intensity. For the tactical units conducting
urban operations, these divisions appear indistinct, as the intensity is often
high despite where the operation falls within the level of conflict.
MAJOR THEATER WAR
1-8
1-22. While UO in a MTW can encompass the full range of Army operations,
the offense and defense will be central and decisive to success. Although
mindful of collateral damage and noncombatants, urban operations in a
MTW (compared to urban operations in SSCs or as part of PME activities)
will be the least constrained because vital national interests will be at stake.
UO in a MTW, therefore, will require a significant investment of resources of
all types. Specialized units such as psychological operations, civil affairs, and
other special operations forces (SOF) will likely be in high demand. UO in a
MTW will require an abundance of infantry and may require significant
casualty replacements and medical support. Logistics to support the distinc-
tive urban environment includes large amounts of lethal and nonlethal
specialty munitions, such as smoke, precision field artillery rounds, demoli-
tions, and hand grenades.
1-23. Of potential urban scenarios confronting the future Army, urban
offensive and defensive operations in an MTW are the most dangerous and
Urban Outlook
challenging. They will take one of two principal forms: fluid or siege. In a
fluid urban combat operation, both sides may contend for position and advan-
tage in the urban battlespace. The attacker will seek to quickly seize decisive
points before the enemy is able to establish a cohesive defense. This will
likely require the attacker to bypass enemy defensive positions whose occupa-
tion or reduction are not critical to mission success. Conversely, the defender
may use interior lines to shift forces in a fluid defense. In a siege, one side
clearly has the initiative as the attacker, and the other side has the advan-
tages of the defense. A siege situation can develop as a result of an initial
fluid urban battle, or it may be a function of previous military operations
that occurred outside the urban area. The Army doctrine’s emphasis on
initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility generally supports
the fluid form of urban combat; however, commanders also understand that
the factors of METT-TC may support a longer-term, siege approach.
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES
1-24. SSCs encompass a wide range of military operations that fall between
MTW and PME and frequently involve urban operations. SSCs are conducted
to facilitate diplomacy and support political initiatives, protect American lives
and interests, and disrupt illegal activities. Joint task forces (JTFs) typically
conduct SSCs although one service may provide the bulk of the force. During
these urban contingencies, resources are often more limited and the
restraints on applying combat power are greater as the need to maintain legi-
timacy will grow in importance. Typically, Army forces will need the assis-
tance of multinational partners, other agencies, local noncombatants, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to successfully complete the mission.
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS
1-25. UO, at the lowest level of conflict, may also take many forms. They
serve to strengthen alliances and coalitions, discourage arms races, combat
terrorism, and generally reduce the potential for instability and conflict.
Combat in PME activities is not the norm. They are least likely to involve the
use of force (when necessary, nonlethal is preferred). The presence of Army
forces performing PME activities in foreign urban areas provides a visible
sign of US commitment to peace and stability in that region. In many of these
lower-intensity UO, Army forces often support other agencies. These other
agencies actually plan and lead the operation. Army forces provide military
capabilities (to include organization and leadership), manpower, equipment,
and other resources not readily available. As with UO in SSCs, proactive and
aggressive interaction and coordination with multinational partners,
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the urban populace
will be vital to success.
PREPARING FOR FUTURE URBAN OPERATIONS
1-26. To operate successfully in a complex urban environment requires
rigorous, realistic UO training. Training is conducted by the complete
combined arms team and covers the full range of Army operations. It also
replicates—
1-9
FM 3-06
e The psychological impact of intense, close combat against a well-
trained enemy.
e The effects of noncombatants in close proximity to Army forces.
e The medical and logistic problems associated with operations in an
urban area.
It recognizes the constraints of collateral damage and, therefore, emphasizes
the development of flexible, effective, and understandable rules of engage-
ment (ROE). These ROE help preclude soldiers from randomly using deadly
force while allowing them sufficient latitude to accomplish the mission and
defend themselves. Training in ROE also includes significant and periodic
changes that test and develop flexibility in and adaptability to a fluid
environment. Additionally, force preparedness mandates integrating simula-
tions, exercises at urban training sites, and the actual use of urban terrain
into tactical- and operational-level intra- and interservice training.
Concurrent training extends from the individual soldier to the joint level.
Additionally, preparedness also includes enhancing interoperability in
regards to urban multinational and interagency operations.
1-27. Realistic UO training
(as well as the conduct of real
world operations) has the
added benefit of identifying
operational requirements and
resultant changes necessary
in our doctrine, organizations,
materiel design, leadership,
and soldier support (see Fig-
ure 1-2). While technology
(material) and organizational
changes are critical, soldiers
remain the decisive means for
success. The technology and
organizational changes will be a critical enabler to achieve the agile, simul-
taneous, and precise lethality required in urban operations. In the future,
technology may lead to a radically new operational concept and approach to
urban operations. Still, competent leaders and well-trained and disciplined
soldiers will remain the decisive means for the Army to succeed in this
complex, multidimensional, and noncontiguous urban environment.
LEADER
DEVELOPMENT
Figure 1-2. UO and the Army Imperatives
Chapter 2
Urban Environment
From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a
topographic feature but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces,
local population, and infrastructure. Planning for urban operations
requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three-
dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social struc-
ture of the population.
FM 3-0
Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban envi-
ronment confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties
rarely found elsewhere. Its distinct characteristics result from an intricate
topography and high population density. The topography’s complexity
stems from the man-made features and supporting infrastructure super-
imposed on the natural terrain. Hundreds, thousands, or millions of civil-
ians may be near or intermingled with soldiers—friendly and enemy. This
second factor, and the human dimension it represents, is potentially the
most important and perplexing for commanders and their staffs to under-
stand and evaluate. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
process remains unaffected by urban areas (see FM 34-130 and Appen-
dix B); this chapter provides information essential to the conduct of the
IPB for an urban environment.
Although urban areas possess general similarities, each environment is
distinct and will react to and affect the presence and operations of Army
forces differently. A tactical technique effective in one area may not be
effective in another area due to physical differences, such as street
CONTENTS
A Complex Environment ..........:::ceccseseereees 2-2 A Cycle of Effects ........ccssscssseeeenees 2-18
Urban Terrain: a en 2-3 | Urban Infrastructure ..........0:::cccseeseeeeeereee 2-19
Multidimensional Battlefield ................. 2-3 Interdependence.............:::::cccccceeeeeeees 2-19
Broad Urban Patterns. .............:::::cccee 2-6 Separate Parts of a Whole.................. 2-19
Lesser Street Patterns.............2::::cceee 2-8 Structures and People ..........2::::ccc10 2-20
An Urban Model...........:ccccceesseseeeeeeeeeeees 2-9 Impact on Future Operations ............. 2-20
Urban Society oeseri inenen 2-14 Resource Intensive .......:ccssseccesseeeees 2-20
Potential Center of Gravity.................. 2-14 Communications and Information..... 2-21
General Population Size ..................+ 2-15 Transportation and Distribution ........ 2-23
Group Size, Location, and AA A e reer cart roeeeeeer reece te 2-23
Composition. :-coeoan eee 2-16 Economics and Commerce.............++ 2-24
Leadership and Organization.............. 2-17 Administration and Human
Interests and Actions...............:::::::ee 2-17 SONVICOS oor cesecees A OT 2-24
Interaction, Influence, or Control........ 2-18
2-1
FM 3-06
patterns or the type of building construction. An Army policy popular with
one urban group may cause resentment and hostility in another due to
diverse cultural differences. All difficulties potentially exist, but they
increase the complexity for Army forces operating in urban areas. These
difficulties range from conventional military forces to disease and
starvation (see Chapter 3) to a pervasive media—often acutely present in
intricate combinations. Thus, commanders at all levels make extraordi-
nary efforts to assess and understand their particular urban environment
to plan, prepare for, and execute effective urban operations (UO).
A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
2-2
2-1. Urban areas vary depending on their history, the cultures of their
inhabitants, their economic development, the local climate, available building
materials, and many other factors. This variety exists not only among urban
areas but also within any particular area. The ever-changing mix of natural
and man-made features in urban areas present commanders with some of the
most difficult terrain in which to conduct military operations.
2-2. Although urban areas possess similar characteristics, no two are iden-
tical. The sprawl of Los Angeles, for example, bears little physical resem-
blance to New Delhi. Societal characteristics most significantly affect each
area’s uniqueness and complexity. While complex, information about the ter-
rain, its potential effects on operations, and how it changes over time may be
determined with some degree of certainty. However, the human dimension is
much more difficult to understand and assess, particularly its effects on mili-
tary operations. Like any environment, the side that can best understand and
exploit the effects of the urban environment has the best chance of success.
2-3. Whether a large metropolis or
a small village, each urban environ-
ment has an identifiable system of
components that constantly change
and interact. This “system of sys-
tems” consists of the terrain, the
society, and the infrastructure that
links the two (see Figure 2-1).
(These categories highlight the key
aspects to understanding the urban
environment and will be used
throughout the manual; however,
the civil-military operations (CMO)
discussion in Chapter 9 provides an alternate method for categorizing and
assessing the effects of civil considerations in any operational environment.)
Figure 2-1. Keys to Understanding
the Urban Environment
2-4. These systems are not separate and distinct categories but rather over-
lapping and interdependent. Thoroughly analyzing these elements, along
with the other factors of mission, enemy, weather, troops and support
available, time, and civil considerations—
e Contributes to commanders’ situational understanding.
e Potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat engagements.
Urban Environment
e Allows them to develop courses of action that apply appropriate
resources against decisive points.
2-5. In stability operations and support operations, this understanding
allows commanders to engage and dominate the decisive points critical to
maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban environment. Although
each system is categorized into subordinate components or subsystems, com-
manders often “step back” and visualize each system, the complex urban
environment, and their area of operations (AO). This “systems thinking” aids
commanders in uncovering key relationships and intersections that can help
reveal centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points.
2-6. To comprehend the urban environment and its components to the fullest
extent possible, commanders carefully integrate and employ special opera-
tions forces (SOF)—to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil
affairs units—and a myriad of other human intelligence (HUMINT) assets
and regional, language, and cultural experts. The societal aspects and inte-
grating infrastructure will challenge commanders’ assessment and under-
standing. These aspects will also require greater dependence on nonmilitary
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and host-nation agencies for
their information, knowledge, and expertise. This last consideration requires
commanders to develop effective techniques and procedures for coordinating
and interacting with these agencies.
URBAN TERRAIN
2-7. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the terrain is the most recogniz-
able aspect of an urban area. Truly understanding it, however, requires com-
prehending its multidimensional nature. The terrain consists of natural and
man-made features, with man-made features dominating; an analysis con-
siders both. Buildings, streets, and other infrastructure have varied patterns,
forms, and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can intertwine
make it difficult to describe a “typical” urban area. However, these elements
provide a framework for understanding the complex terrain in an urban area.
Furthermore, man-made features significantly affect military systems and
soldiers, and thus tactics and operations. General effects on urban operations
are discussed in this chapter. Specific effects on battlefield operating systems
(BOS) (see Chapters 5 and 9) and the range of operations (see Chapters 6, 7,
and 8) are interwoven throughout the manual.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD
2-8. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical,
interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural
relief, drainage, and vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on a
map by the surrounding countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban
battlespace is many times that of a similarly sized portion of natural terrain.
The sheer volume and density created by urban geometry can make UO
resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel.
2-9. Like natural disasters, UO can radically alter the physical character of
the urban terrain in ways not experienced in other environments. They may
2-3
FM 3-06
2-4
cause (either intentionally or not) uncontrollable fires or the loss of electri-
city. A power outage can cause flooding (especially in subsurface areas) by
shutting down pumping stations. Entire buildings may be destroyed, elimina-
ting reference points and leaving large piles of rubble. Additionally, buildings
and other urban structures, damaged but not destroyed, can still be effective
obstacles and possible booby traps. Their weakened construction and
unstable structure increase the risk of injury to soldiers and civilians moving
within them. (Engineers often determine whether the buildings can support
occupation by Army forces or civilians.) The likely presence of toxic industrial
materials (TIM) can create additional obstacles.
2-10. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth,
breadth, and height of their AO in terms of two areas: airspace and surface.
In an urban environment, they broaden their scope to include supersurface
and subsurface areas (see Figure 2-2). Although spatially separated, each
area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, line of com-
munications (LOC), and engagement area.
Airspace
External Space
Top:
Stories Supersurtace 4 fam
(External) :
=| Stories:
or :
Levels :
Surface
(External)
Figure 2-2. The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield
2-11. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the
urban physical environment. Commanders consider activities that occur
outside buildings and subterranean areas (the external space) as well as the
activities that occur unseen in buildings and subterranean systems (the
internal space). The internal space further challenges command, control, and
intelligence collection activities and increases the combat power required to
conduct UO. Commanders develop methods to help themselves, their staffs,
and their subordinate commanders and staffs to represent and visualize the
multiple dimensions. Such dimensions can change rapidly simply due to
continued urban growth or, as described earlier, the effects of nature and UO
themselves.
Airspace
Surface
Supersurface
Urban Environment
2-12. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid avenues of ap-
proach in urbanized areas. Forces can use aviation assets for observation and
reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and extraction of sol-
diers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles, such as rubble, do
not affect aviation assets. However, buildings of varying height and the
increased density of towers, signs, power lines, and other urban constructions
create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions (masking).
These obstacles can limit low-altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace.
Excellent cover and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an urban area
increases aviation vulnerability to small arms and man-portable air defense
systems (MANPADS), particularly when supporting ground forces.
2-13. Surface areas apply to exterior ground level areas, such as parking lots,
airfields, highways, streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. They often provide
primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance. However,
buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As
such, obstacles on urban surface areas usually have more effect than those in
open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting buildings or
radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas abut the ocean or sea,
large lakes, and major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may pro-
vide key friendly and threat avenues of approach or essential LOCs and,
therefore, may be a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such,
amphibious and river-crossing operations may be an integral part of the over-
all urban operation.
2-14. Larger open areas—such as stadiums, sports fields, school play-
grounds, and parking lots—are often critical areas during urban operations.
They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation centers, and
prisoner of war holding facilities. These areas also can afford suitable aircraft
landing and pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide
logistic support areas and aerial resupply possibilities because they are often
centrally located.
2-15. These areas include the internal floors or levels (intrasurface areas)
and external roofs or tops of buildings, stadiums, towers, or other vertical
structures. They can provide cover and concealment; limit or enhance obser-
vation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block movement. However,
forces can move within and between intrasurface areas creating additional,
though normally secondary, avenues of approach. Rooftops may offer ideal
locations for landing helicopters for small-scale air assaults and aerial resup-
ply. First, engineers analyze buildings for their structural integrity and
obstacles. Such obstacles include electrical wires, antennas, and enemy-
emplaced mines (although personnel may be inserted by jumping, rappelling,
or fast roping from a hovering helicopter and extracted by hoist mechanisms).
Some rooftops are designed as helipads. Roofs and intrasurface areas may
also provide excellent locations for snipers; lightweight, handheld antitank
weapons; and MANPADS. They enable top-down attacks against the weakest
2-5
FM 3-06
Subsurface
points of armored vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft. Overall, elevated firing
positions reduce the value of any cover in surrounding open areas and permit
engagement at close range without risk of immediate close assault. This area
(and the subsurface area) requires commanders to think, plan, and execute
ground operations vertically as well as horizontally. In this latter regard, UO
share strong similarities with mountain operations (see FM 3-97.6).
2-16. These areas are subterranean or below surface level. They may serve as
secondary and, in fewer instances, primary avenues of approach at lower
tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled, they offer
excellent covered and concealed LOCs for moving supplies and evacuating
casualties. They may also provide sites for caching and stockpiling supplies.
Subsurface areas include the subways, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems,
cellars, civil defense shelters, and other various underground utility systems.
In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug tunnels and catacombs.
Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and
maneuver against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes.
However, these areas are often the most restrictive and easiest to defend or
block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their existence
and overall design. Army commanders may need to consider potential ave-
nues of approach afforded by the subsurface areas of rivers and major bodies
of water that border urban areas. This particularly applies when operating as
part of a joint task force (JTF) task organized with SOF or when opposing a
threat with similar capabilities.
BROAD URBAN PATTERNS
Satellite Pattern
2-6
2-17. Four major urban patterns can influence UO (see Figure 2-3). Central
to two of the patterns (satellite and network) is the hub or dominant urban
area or pattern around which outlying urban areas or patterns radiate. (A
segmented urban area, because it tends to be a larger urban area, can often
be a hub.) In offensive and defensive operations, the hub serves as a pivot or
strong point; as such, it often becomes a major obstacle to an attacker. If the
attacker chooses to bypass the urban area (hub) located along his axis of
advance without first isolating the area, he may expose his flank to attack
from the hub as well as dependent urban areas or subordinate satellite
patterns. Because the focus of stability operations and support operations is
on people, commanders understand the value and influence of the hub to the
economic, political, or cultural well being of the surrounding area. Whether
or not a hub, commanders must remember that urban areas are not islands;
all are connected to the surrounding rural (and other urban) areas through
fluid and permeable boundaries and LOCs.
2-18. This common pattern consists of a central hub surrounded by smaller,
dependent urban areas. LOCs tend to converge on the hub. The natural ter-
rain throughout this pattern is relatively homogenous. Outlying areas often
support the principal urban area at the hub with means of reinforcement,
resupply, and evacuation. In some instances, they may serve as mutually
Dependent
Network Pattern
Linear Pattern
Urban Environment
supporting battle positions. Commanders should consider the effects of the
outlying urban areas on operations within the hub, and, conversely, the
effects of operations within the hub on outlying urban areas. Information
operations (IO), for example, targeted primarily at the hub of a satellite
pattern may subsequently influence outlying urban areas and achieve neces-
sary effects without having to commit specific resources to these areas.
Satellite [N ~ Subordinate
Pattern zl Satellite
and Hub Patterns
for the
Network Network
Linear Segment
Figure 2-3. Broad Urban Patterns
2-19. The network pattern represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of
subordinate satellite patterns. Its elements are more self-sufficient and less
supportive of each other, although a dominant hub may exist. Major LOCs in
a network extend more than in a satellite pattern and take more of a rec-
tangular rather than a convergent form. Its natural terrain may vary more
than in a single satellite array. Operations in one area may or may not easily
influence, or be influenced by, other urban areas in the pattern.
2-20. Potentially a subelement of the previous two patterns, the linear
pattern may form one ray of the satellite pattern or be found along
connecting links between the hubs of a network. Most frequently, this
pattern results from the stringing of minor urban areas along a confined
natural terrain corridor, such as an elongated valley, a body of water, or a
man-made communications route. In offensive and defensive operations, this
latter form of the linear pattern facilitates developing a series of strong
defensive positions in depth, effectively blocking or delaying an attacking
force moving along the canalized terrain.
2-7
FM 3-06
Segment Pattern
2-21. When dominant natural terrain, such as a river or man-made features
(canals, major highways, or railways), divides an urban area, it creates a seg-
mented pattern. This pattern often makes it easier for commanders to assign
areas of operations to subordinate commanders. However, this pattern may
fragment operations and increase risk to an operation requiring mutual
support between subordinate units. Still, the segmented urban areas may
allow commanders to isolate threats more easily in these areas and focus
operations within segments that contain their decisive points. Although an
integral part of the whole (the urban area), each segment may develop
distinct social, economic, cultural, and political characteristics. This social
segmenting may benefit commanders faced with limited assets to influence or
control the urban populace. After thoroughly analyzing the society, they may
be able to focus IO and populace and resources control measures against only
specific segments that affect decisive operations. Commanders may need only
to isolate other segments or may need to just monitor for any significant
changes in the attitudes, beliefs, or actions of the civilians located there.
LESSER STREET PATTERNS
2-22. Lesser patterns in the urban area result from the layout of the streets,
roads, highways, and other thoroughfares. They evolve from influences of
natural terrain, the original designer’s personal prejudices, and the changing
needs of the inhabitants. Street patterns (and widths) influence all BOS;
however, they greatly affect maneuver, command and control, and combat
service support. (In some portions of older Middle Eastern urban areas, the
labyrinths of streets were designed only to allow two loaded donkeys to pass
each other; tanks are too wide.) Urban areas can display any of three basic
patterns and their combinations: radial, grid, and irregular (see Figure 2-4).
Radial
2-8
Irregular
Figure 2-4. Basic Internal Street Patterns
2-23. Societies of highly concentrated religious or secular power often con-
struct urban areas with a radial design: all primary thoroughfares radiating
out from the center of power. Cities with this design may signal an important
historical aspect in the overall analysis of the urban society. Terrain per-
mitting, these streets may extend outward in a complete circle or may form a
semicircle or arc when a focal point abuts a natural barrier, such as a coast-
line or mountain. To increase mobility and traffic flow, societies often add
Grid
Irregular
Urban Environment
concentric loops or rings to larger radial patterns. Unless commanders
carefully plan boundaries, routes, and axes of advance, their subordinate
units’ movement or maneuver may be inadvertently funneled toward the
center of urban areas with this pattern resulting in congestion, loss of
momentum, and an increased potential for ambush or fratricide.
2-24. The most adaptable and universal form for urban areas is the grid
pattern: lines of streets at right angles to one another forming blocks similar
to the pattern of a chessboard. A grid pattern can fill in and eventually take
over an original radial pattern. Grid patterns often appear to ease the assign-
ment of boundaries for subordinates units. However, commanders also con-
sider how the natural terrain influences operations and the establishment of
control measures. They also consider the influence of the buildings and other
structures lining these streets, such as their height and construction, before
assigning boundaries and developing other control measures.
2-25. Describing boundaries and phase lines by easily recognizable features
is as important in urban areas as elsewhere. If available, natural features
are a better descriptor than man-made features that may be altered or
unrecognizable. When Army forces work closely with local law enforcement
agencies, commanders may not need to assess the effect of street patterns on
the assignment of boundaries. Instead, commanders may assign boundaries
overlaid on existing administrative boundaries used by local law enforcement
agencies to increase interoperability and aid in unity of effort.
2-26. In most urban areas, regardless of the original intent, plan, or vision,
existing street patterns emerge from successive plans overlaid one on
another. Some are well planned to fit with previous plans while others a hap-
hazard response to explosive urban growth. The result may mix patterns.
Urban engineers and planners may specifically design irregular patterns for
aesthetic reasons (as in many suburban housing developments) or to conform
to marked terrain relief. Irregular street patterns may alert commanders and
analysts that the underlying natural terrain may exert greater influence over
operations than in other portions of the urban area. Finally, irregular street
patterns make the movement and maneuver of forces less predictable.
AN URBAN MODEL
2-27. Throughout the world, urban areas have similar form and function. In
form, urban areas contain like characteristics, readily divisible into distinct
sections or areas. Functionally, they tend to be the centers of population,
finance, politics, transportation, industry, and culture. While urban areas
may be modeled by several different means, Figure 2-5 on page 2-10 illus-
trates the general forms and internal functions. Some forms and functions
may overlap. For example, high-rise buildings are located in core areas as
well as in outlying areas and may be used for residential purposes. With the
rapid urbanization associated with developing nations, the areas displayed in
this urban model often manifest themselves less clearly there than in
developed nations.
2-9
FM 3-06
Core
2-10
RESIDENTIAL
AREA CORE
PERIPHERY
INDUSTRIAL AREA
COMMERCIAL
OUTLYING HIGH- RIBBON AREA
RISE AREA
Figure 2-5. An Urban Model
2-28. This analysis helps to determine, in general terms, potential advan-
tages and disadvantages each portion of the urban area may have toward
accomplishing the urban operation. However, construction materials and
methods can vary drastically. Commanders identify specific building types
and construction and understand weapons effects on them. If a commander
desires precise effects, the chosen munitions or weapons system must be
sufficiently accurate, capable of penetrating the target structure (without
exiting the other side), and achieve effects within. Often noncombatants,
critical infrastructure, or protected targets are in the vicinity. Commanders
may need to determine if the surrounding walls or structures will sufficiently
absorb or negate the blast or thermal effects of the weapon. Regardless,
understanding the structure of buildings in the urban AO allows
commanders to determine the best means to accomplish the mission.
2-29. The core is the heart of the urban area, the downtown or central
business district. Relatively small and compact, it contains a large
percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices, and public institutions. Often, it
houses the headquarters for commercial and financial activities and contains
important cultural, historical, and governmental buildings. These activities
prefer the core because of its accessibility. As the focal point of the
transportation network, residents find the core the easiest part of the urban
area to reach. It normally has the densest concentration of multistory
buildings and subterranean features (underground parking garages, under-
ground shopping centers, and basements).
2-30. High-rise buildings, varying greatly in height (possibly 50 stories above
ground and four stories below ground), make up the cores of today’s urban
areas. Buildings routinely abut one another, with little or no setback from the
sidewalks. Building height and density (except in outlying high-rise areas)
often decreases from the core to the edge of the residential areas, while the
amount of open areas frequently increases. Modern urban planning allows for
more open spaces between buildings than found in the cores of older urban
Industrial Area
Urban Environment
areas. Most core areas have undergone constant redevelopment resulting in
various types of construction. Commonly, brick buildings abound in the
oldest part of the core; framed, heavy-clad structures in the next oldest part;
and a concentration of framed, light-clad buildings in the newest part. The
outer edge of the core, the core periphery, has ordinarily undergone less
change than the core resulting in buildings of uniform height (commonly two
to three stories in towns and five to ten stories in larger urban areas).
2-31. Generally, offensive operations focused in core areas (even when effec-
tively isolated) will require greater resources—particularly manpower, time,
and information—than in many other parts of the urban area. Mounted
maneuver often proves more difficult in core areas because of fewer open
areas, buildings closer to the streets, and more civilian vehicles. Rubbled
buildings in central core areas (especially high-rise buildings) become greater
obstacles to mobility as they can collapse on and easily block thoroughfares.
Rubble piles can afford excellent covered and concealed positions for
dismounted threat forces. Consequently, commanders use more dismounted
forces as part of their combined arms operations. Conversely, the core may be
critical to urban defensive operations, particularly older areas of heavier
construction that afford greater protection. Despite potential difficulties, the
core area may be key to accomplishing many stability or support missions
since it houses much of the human activity that occurs in the urban area.
2-32. Industrial areas often develop on the outskirts of the urban areas
where commercial transportation is easiest (along airfields and major sea,
river, rail, and highway routes). These areas will likely displace farther from
the core and residential areas as urban planners recognize the potential
threat of TIM. The dispersed pattern of the buildings provides sufficient
space for large cargoes, trucks, and materiel handling equipment. These
areas may provide ideal sites for logistic bases and maintenance sites. While
older, heavier-clad structures may be found, new construction consists of low,
large, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings with large parking areas
and work yards. These structures generally have steel frame and lightweight
exterior walls. Multistory structures usually have reinforced concrete floors
and ceilings.
2-33. Toxic industrial chemicals and other TIM may be transported through
an urban area (by rail, barge, truck, or pipeline) or found stored throughout.
However, larger concentrations will exist in industrial areas, and their
presence should concern Army forces operating near them.
2-34. Each year, over 70,000 different chemicals are produced, processed, or
consumed globally. An estimated 25,000 commercial facilities around the
world produce, process, or store chemicals that have a legitimate industrial
use yet are also classified as chemical warfare agents. Many other chemicals
(not classified as weapons) may still be sufficiently hazardous to pose a con-
siderable threat to Army forces and civilians in urban areas as choking
agents or asphyxiates, flammables or incendiaries, water contaminants, low-
grade blister or nerve agents, or debilitating irritants. These chemicals can
be released either accidentally or deliberately. On 2 December 1984, nearly
40 tons of methylisocyanate used to produce pesticides leaked from a storage
FM 3-06
tank at Bhopal, India, killing thousands and injuring hundreds of thousands.
Figure 2-6 contains a small sampling of other toxic industrial chemicals
along with their industrial or commercial usage that commanders may
encounter in an urban area. The most common chemicals that pose a risk to
Army forces are highly toxic irritant gases such as ammonia, chlorine,
hydrogen chloride, and sulfur dioxide.
Toxic Industrial
Chemical
Industrial/Commercial Uses
Semiconductor Industry
Boron Trifluoride Chemical Catalyst, Aluminum Refining
A : Commercial Refrigerant, Fertilizer and Food Production, Petroleum,
mmonia
Explosives, Other Chemicals
Boron Trichloride Organic Catalyst, Soldering Magnesium
Potable Water, Disinfectants, Metal Treatment, Plastics & Rubber
Plastics and Rubber
Ethylene Oxide Industrial Alcohols, Fumigant, Industrial Sterilant
Carbon Disulfide Industrial Solvent, Dry-Cleaning, Agriculture, Petroleum, Electroplating
Uranium Processing, Rocket Fuel
Plastics, Fertilizers, Preservative/ Corrosion Inhibitor, Fungicide and
Formaldehyde aoe WD :
Germicide, Pesticide, Pharmaceuticals
Fuming Nitric Acid Fertilizers, Explosives, Metal Processing, Pesticides, Rocket Fuel
Hydrogen Bromide Chemical Industry, Pharmaceuticals
Hydrogen Chloride Fabrics, Semiconductors
Hydrogen Fluoride Glass Production, Chemical Catalyst
Hydrogen Sulfide Metallurgy, Agricultural Disinfectant
Phosphorus Trichloride Metallurgy, Pesticides and Germicides, Gasoline Additive
Hydrogen Cyanide Pesticides, Other Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Electroplating
Sulfur Dioxide Paper, Food Processing, Ice Production, Disinfectant, Leather Processing
Sulfuric Acid Fertilizers, Petroleum, Iron and Steel Production, Battery Electrolyte
Dyes, Pharmaceuticals, Herbicides & Insecticides
Electronics, Other Chemicals
Figure 2-6.
Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Their Industrial or Commercial Uses
2-35. Standard chemical defense equipment may not protect against (and
chemical detection devices may fail to detect) many toxic industrial chemi-
cals. Therefore, the risk to soldiers operating near the chemicals may
increase. Commanders vigilantly identify these potential hazards, carefully
consider them as part of their overall vulnerability analysis, factor the anal-
ysis into their risk assessment, and execute necessary contamination avoid-
ance measures. Any assessment includes the chance that toxic industrial
chemicals may be deliberately released by a threat to gain advantage or
accidentally released by friendly actions (see FM 3-21 and FM 3-14).
Outlying High-Rise Area
2-12
2-36. High-rise areas consist of multistoried apartments, commercial offices,
and businesses separated by large open areas, such as parking lots, parks,
and individual one-story buildings. High-rise buildings are framed, light-clad
construction with thin walls of brick, lightweight concrete, or glass. The
automobile, mass transit systems, and improved road networks encourage
these areas to grow and function further from the urban core.
Urban Environment
2-37. Similar to the urban core, units given the mission to clear these areas,
or even portions therein, will need more resources—most notably personnel
and time—to accomplish their mission. Commanders should consider courses
of action that isolate these entire areas, multiple sections within these areas,
or even individual buildings before assigning tasks. The tasks could rapidly
drain a unit’s resources or unhinge other portions of the major operation.
When defending, commanders who can integrate these areas in the defense
will present the attacker with similar resource problems and may be appro-
priate in a defense to delay. However, defending commanders ensure that the
defense is arranged so that this portion cannot be easily isolated and
bypassed. Defensive positions in structures may require extensive reinforce-
ment due to light-clad construction.
Residential Area
2-38. Residential areas can be found dispersed throughout the urban area;
however, large suburban areas (or sprawl) normally form on the outskirts.
Residential areas often consist of row houses or single-family dwellings set in
a grid or ringed pattern in a planned development project. Yards, gardens,
trees, and fences usually separate the buildings in a residential area. Modern
residential construction is often of light-clad, framed wood construction, or
brick. The combined population of surrounding suburban areas often far out-
numbers that of the urban area proper. Specific suburbs tend toward homo-
geneity based on ethnicity, religion, economics, or some other social aspect.
Commanders locate and analyze these areas to determine their impact on
operations—often the most critical importance is the people located there
(see the subsequent discussion in this chapter on the urban society).
2-39. In offensive and defensive operations, commanders determine whether
operations pose an unacceptable physical risk to civilians. If so, they may
have to relocate civilians to a safer area, perhaps another residential area. If
not, commanders may implement a “stay-put” policy for that area and
attempt to isolate the effects of the operation from them. During support
operations, residential locations may be the initial focal point for operations
since most of the permanent population is located there.
2-40. This area also contains a relatively recent urban phenomenon known
as shantytowns. These areas are commonly on unoccupied, low-value land in
and around many urban areas in underdeveloped countries. Shantytowns
may contain over 50 percent of the total urban population. They usually lack
streets and public utilities. The lean-to structures tend to be irregularly laid
out, connected by walking paths, and made of any scrap material available:
lumber, brick, sheet metal, cardboard, cloth, or vegetation. The random
arrangement of structures, the absence of formal street naming and num-
bering, and often the lack of easily identifiable buildings and terrain create
challenges. These challenges include navigating, coordinating, and transmit-
ting accurate information and intelligence. Depending on the operation, the
temporary nature of the structures can also mean that mobility can be either
more or less restricted than other sections of the urban area. A military force
may easily knock down and traverse structures without affecting mobility at
all. However, their destruction may cause unacceptable civilian casualties, in
which case mobility becomes more restrictive as the narrow paths often do
2-13
FM 3-06
not accommodate vehicular traffic. Similarly, the makeshift materials inhibit
weapons effects less than many other parts of the urban area built more
solidly. A tank round, for example, may go much farther and injure many
more noncombatants than in an area where the primary building material is
stone. Regardless, commanders consider the effects of their operations in this
area, to include vehicles and weapons, as the weak structures increase the
risk of fratricide, civilian casualties, and large, rapidly spreading fires.
Commercial Ribbon Area
2-41. Commercial ribbon areas are rows of stores, shops, and restaurants
built along both sides of major streets that run through and between urban
areas. These same types of areas often develop along the roads that connect
one urban area to another (strip areas). The buildings uniformly stand two to
three stories tall (about one story taller than the dwellings on the streets
behind them).
URBAN SOCIETY
2-42. Although intricate, KEY ASPECTS OF THE
understanding the urban URBAN SOCIETY
terrain is relatively
straightforward in com- Governme f
parison to compre- and Politic 2
hending the multifaceted
nt
Ss
nature of urban society. QS
UO often require Army ae}
forces to operate in close V=
proximity to a high den-
a /
sity of civilians. Even Ethnicity and
evacuated areas can have Culture
a stay-behind population
: Leadership and
in the tens of thousands. Prominent
This population’s pres- Personalities
ence, attitudes, actions, Figure 2-7. Key Aspects of the Urban Society
communications with the
media, and needs may affect the conduct of operations. Homogeneity de-
creases drastically as the size of the urban area increases. Commanders take
into account the characteristics of a population whose beliefs and interests
vary based on factors. Figure 2-7 lists the factors. Civilian populations con-
tinually influence, to varying degrees, operations conducted in an urban area.
Thoroughly understanding these societal aspects and avoiding “mirror-
imaging”’—overlaying one’s own values and thought processes on top of the
person or group one is trying to assess—will help to accurately anticipate
civilian actions and response.
POTENTIAL CENTER OF GRAVITY
2-43. A COG during an urban operation, particularly in stability operations
and support operations, may be the civilian inhabitants themselves—specifi-
cally their behavior. However, supportive behavior is generally an advantage
in any type of operation. Correspondingly, neutral behavior toward friendly
2-14
Urban Environment
forces is an advantage over hostile behavior. To influence or control their
behavior, commanders first understand the society's complex nature and
character. Second, they understand and accept that every military action (or
inaction) may influence the relationship between the urban population and
Army forces, and, by extension, mission success. Lastly, they understand that
Army forces may play only a supporting (but essential) role as part of an inte-
grated and synchronized multiagency effort focusing all aspects of national
power. With this awareness, commanders can take one or more actions:
e Coordinate and plan operations.
e Implement effective programs.
e Take the immediate action necessary to maintain support of a friendly
populace, neutralize or gain the support of hostile or neutral factions,
or do any combination of these activities to achieve precise effects and
accomplish the mission.
Without this understanding, commanders increase the risk that their actions,
particularly concerning the urban population, may not have the intended and
necessary effects.
2-44, Although the factor of civil considerations takes on added significance
in UO, it is just one that commanders evaluate. Sometimes it may be the
most important factor to consider as a COG. At other times it may be the
least important as to be almost negligible. Its importance is not constant; it
changes over time (like all factors). At the beginning of the operation, civil
considerations may not be essential to mission accomplishment, but as the
operation progresses this factor’s importance to success may increase. In
other circumstances, the opposite may be true. Overall, commanders consider
three objectives regarding the civilians of the urban area:
e Minimize their interference with urban operations. In offensive and
defensive operations this means moving them away from combat
operations. In all operations, it often requires centralizing them in one
or more locations.
e Maximize their support of Army, joint, and multinational forces and
government agencies.
e Observe the necessary legal, moral, and humanitarian obligations.
GENERAL POPULATION SIZE
2-45. Urban areas are com- Category Population
monly classified according Village 3,000 or less.
to the general size of their Town Over 3,000 to 100,000.
population instead of land- City Over 100,000 to 1 million.
mass. Figure 2-8 lists cate- Metropolis Over 1 million to 10 million.
gories of urban areas with Megalopolis Over 10 million.
their defining population. Figure 2-8. Urban Areas by Population Size
2-46. These categories are useful to establish commonality and standardize
terms that shape ideas, discussion, and concepts. Smaller populations usually
suggest homogeneity among the inhabitants. Homogeneity can make consen-
sus or compromise easier to achieve because fewer opposing viewpoints exist.
Given this homogeneity, effects of change are more certain and often easier to
determine. However, homogenous does not mean identical. If major social
2-15
FM 3-06
divisions do exist (either physical or ideological), commanders can more
easily determine those divisions and their fundamental causes with smaller
populations.
2-47. As urban areas expand, the urban patterns begin to blur and the social
complexity increases. For example, as satellite patterns continue to grow, the
LOCs between a central hub and outlying urban areas may develop and
begin to assume a linear urban pattern. Simultaneously, a hub and outlying
urban areas may continue to expand until they merge into a single, large
metropolis. On a larger scale, a network pattern can grow and unite as a
single megalopolis. This growth physically unites smaller urban areas but
cannot force conformity of needs and beliefs. It also increases the physical
and social complexity of an urban area.
GROUP SIZE, LOCATION, AND COMPOSITION
2-16
2-48. Understanding | who Does What to Whom? And Why?
how specific elements
: L Interests
of the urban society Composition |
affect operations (and : Beliefs
z Size
vice versa) normally & Pee
begins with analyzing Le ensi TEE ee
their size, location, | fi i &
and composition (see Tiie —
Figure 2-9). Because With What
commanders must | Interact | Effects?
minimize civilian cas- - infi
ualties, size and loca- ! euence
tion (without regard Control
to composition) are
important — initial Necessitating What
demographic consid- Changes?
erations. After deter-
mining the presence
and numbers of civilians relative to decisive points, commanders can then
decide whether civilian proximity and density represent a significant risk to
their mission—refugees clogging LOCs, for example. If civilians are the
primary focus of the operation, as in many stability operations and support
operations, this same analysis may help to determine decisive points. In this
analysis, commanders consider that urban areas, on many levels, are in
constant motion. The densities of circulating people and other traffic often
vary according to the time of day, such as rush hours and market times. In
planning urban operations, commanders may need to consider the timing or
rhythms of population and vehicular movements in the urban area.
Figure 2-9. Simplified Analysis of Urban Society
2-49. Commanders determine the composition of, or the identifiable groups
or organizations within, the civilian urban population. Groups may be cate-
gorized by race, religion, national origin, tribe, clan, economic or social class,
party affiliation, education level, union memberships, age, gender, occupa-
tion, or any other significant social grouping. Physical and ideological over-
laps (and divisions) often exist between groups. Overlaps may provide early
focus for analysis and suggest ways to affect more than one group
Urban Environment
simultaneously. In some cases, groups may have radically different ideologies
but are (or can be) united by a single characteristic. Commanders understand
the intricacies of “who does what to whom.” Such understanding furthers
identifying the urban society’s sources of power, influence (both formal and
informal), and decisive points that hold the keys to controlling or protecting
this potential COG. (See also the discussion of competing power structures in
Chapter 3.) Commanders have expert, detailed, and current knowledge and
information to avoid developing simple formulas of social interaction that
may actively mislead and add to a flawed course of action.
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION
2-50. Commanders also understand how authority and responsibility is held
or shared within and between each of the identified groups. For groups to
exert meaningful influence, leadership provides vision, direction, and
organized coherence. This leadership can be a function of personality as well
as organization. Some groups depend on a charismatic leader to provide cohe-
sion. Others de-emphasize individual leadership and provide redundancy and
replacement in decisionmaking. Others combine elements of both these types
of leadership and organization. Based solely on personality, a leader may cen-
tralize power or, while still being in ultimate control, decentralize decision-
making and execution to subordinates. In contrast, a single person may head
a group while a ruling council actually makes and executes policy. Groups
centered on one leader (which may or may not be the officially designated
leader) can often produce decisions and initiate actions rapidly but are
vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed or co-opted.
Groups with shared or redundant leadership take longer to make decisions
yet are more resistant to change and outside influence.
INTERESTS AND ACTIONS
2-51. Identifying and analyzing
groups also helps commanders
focus on specific segments of the
urban society to determine their
beliefs, needs, and agendas. It also
helps commanders determine how
those interests motivate groups to Somali Proverb
future action (or inaction)—
previous patterns of activity are critical in this regard. This analysis seeks to
determine why groups (and their leaders) act as they do. Commanders con-
sider political, economic, cultural, and religious factors in this analysis. These
factors affect all groups to some extent and often provide the basis for their
beliefs, needs (actual or perceived), and subsequent behavior. Size and loca-
tion considerations also apply to each group to help determine to what extent
its beliefs or ideologies, needs, and actions may impact the urban operation.
However, size and proximity may not accurately indicate actual or potential
capabilities. Individuals, small groups, and groups located some distance
from the actual conduct of the urban operation may be able to influence large
portions of the population. These individuals or groups may have a capability
disproportionate to their size and proximity—especially against objectives
that are not terrain oriented (as in the case of many stability operations).
Me and Somalia against the world,
me and my clan against Somalia,
me and my family against the clan,
me and my brother against my
family, me against my brother.
2-17
FM 3-06
INTERACTION, INFLUENCE, OR CONTROL
2-52. As shown above, commanders cultivate an understanding of a group’s—
e Size, location (and proximity to operations), and composition (to
include leadership and organization).
e Interests.
e Capabilities.
e Potential actions (intent) and their effects—if any—on operations.
Then they can develop or modify courses of action as appropriate. Certain
courses of action may be needed to improve the interaction between Army
forces and civilians (and between other agencies) to accomplish common
goals. Others may be needed to influence favorable support, stabilize neutral
groups, or neutralize hostile groups. Still others may require more forceful
means to control and protect civilians. The latter can include establishing
buffer zones and restricted areas; setting up checkpoints and roadblocks with
other travel restrictions, controlling rations; enforcing curfews; inspecting
facilities; conducting internment and resettlement operations; or maintaining
a “stay-put” policy.
2-53. Commanders remember that many measures will require significant
resources that may initially be beyond the capabilities of the Army force to
impose and enforce. (Where possible, commanders should attempt to use local
law enforcement to accomplish controlling activities.) The other elements of the
environment, terrain and infrastructure, may fragment efforts and make it
difficult to consistently impose controls throughout the urban area. A careful
assessment of the urban society’s interests (beliefs, needs, and agendas) is
essential before implementing any populace and resources control measures.
Otherwise, inappropriate controls may only aggravate the situation. Finally,
an appropriate course of action may require no specific action towards the
urban society. In most cases, training and discipline, grounded in cultural
understanding and sensitivity, will help mitigate many potential adverse
effects resulting from military-civilian interaction. Soldier training should
also include learning basic commands or phrases in the most common
language to their AO. (Commanders should review FM 3-15 and FM 3-19.40
for additional civilian control measures and considerations.)
A CYCLE OF EFFECTS
2-18
2-54. Since the urban society is so dynamic and the relationship between
various elements of the society so complex, commanders continually assess
how their operations will affect the society’s interests and intent and vice
versa. Specifically, they assess how effectively their measures improve
interaction with, influence of, and control over civilians’ (see Figure 2-10).
There is always a difference between intended and actual effects of a specific
course of action. Nowhere is this more prominent than dealing with the urban
society. This cycle of effects frustrates assessment during UO. Therefore,
commanders continuously monitor these effects to make decisions and modi-
fications while planning, preparing, executing, and transitioning UO.
Initially certain aspects of the society, such as religion, may not affect the
operation. However if the threat successfully shapes the perceptions of the
urban populace that Army forces are biased against them (or at least critical
segments are affected by propaganda), this element may become extremely
Urban Environment
important. In this instance, the
urban commander may need to
adjust his IO (to include PSYOP),
public affairs (PA) activities, and
CMO to counter this propaganda
while diverting other combat
power to control the populace.
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
2-55. Urban infrastructures are
those systems that support urban
inhabitants and their economy.
They link the physical terrain to
the urban society. Destroying,
controlling, or protecting vital
parts of the infrastructure can
isolate a threat from potential
sources of support. A threat force
operating in an urban area may
rely on the area’s water, electricity, and sources of bulk fuel to support his
forces. This is true particularly when his bases or facilities are physically
located in or near the area. Isolating this threat from these sources may
require him to generate his own electricity and transport his own water and
fuel from outside the urban area. To transport supplies, the threat may rely
on roads, airfields, sea- or river lanes, and rail lines. Controlling these
critical transportation nodes may prevent the threat from resupplying his
forces. The control of key radio, television, and newspaper facilities may
isolate him from the urban populace (another potential source of support).
Figure 2-10. UO-Society Cycle of Effects
INTERDEPENDENCE
2-56. Commanders understand that destroying or disrupting any portion of
the urban infrastructure can have a cascading effect (either intentional or
unintentional) on the other elements of the infrastructure. Yet, they may be
able to gain an operational advantage while minimizing unwanted effects.
Commanders can seize or secure an essential facility or structure by using
precision munitions, electronic disruption of communications, or SOF and
conventional ground forces. To gain this advantage, commanders will rely
more on the expertise of engineer and civil affairs units, local urban engi-
neers and planners, and others with infrastructure-specific expertise. After
understanding the technical aspects of the area’s systems, they can develop
the best course of action.
SEPARATE PARTS OF A WHOLE
2-57. Hundreds of systems may exist. Each system has a critical role in the
smooth functioning of the urban area. Simple or complex, all systems fit into
five broad categories (see Figure 2-11 on page 2-20). Commanders analyze
key facilities in each category and determine their role and importance
throughout all phases of the urban operation. This analysis considers each
2-19
FM 3-06
infrastructure system individually and
in relation to others to determine an Communications
appropriate course of action toward it. and
Information
STRUCTURES AND PEOPLE
2-58. As depicted in Figure 2-1, each Administration
element of the infrastructure consists and Human
of both a terrain (physical) and human
component. For example, the physical
ONAA of the electrical segment of copes Transportation
e energy infrastructure consists of and
power stations, substations, a distri- Distribution
bution network of lines and wires, and
necessary vehicles and repair supplies Figure 2-11. Urban Infrastructure
and equipment. The human compo-
nent of this same segment consists of the supervisors, engineers, linemen,
and electricians who operate the system. Commanders understand and recog-
nize the physical and human components in their assessments.
IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS
2-59. Destroying or incapacitating of any of these elements may impact
future operations and inhabitants of the urban area. Destroying urban infra-
structure during initial phases of an operation may require commanders to
assume responsibility for repair, maintenance and clean up, and operation of
those same facilities later. Although exceptions will exist, commanders
cannot destroy or significantly damage the infrastructure of a foreign urban
center during operations and expect the population to remain friendly to US
or allied forces. Still, support from the urban society (albeit of increased
importance in UO) is only one factor that commanders weigh while develop-
ing appropriate courses of action.
RESOURCE INTENSIVE
2-60. Requirements to protect, restore, or maintain critical infrastructure
may divert substantial amounts of resources and manpower needed else-
where and place additional constraints on subordinate commanders. Civilian
infrastructure is often more difficult to secure and defend than military infra-
structure. The potentially large and sprawling nature of many systems (such
as water, power, transportation, communications, and government) make
their protection a challenge. Yet, the infrastructure of an urban area can
provide commanders with essential logistics and combat service support.
Therefore, the initial expenditure of time and other resources may be
necessary to support concurrent or future operations. Legal considerations,
however, may affect using the infrastructure and acquiring the urban area’s
goods and services. Commanders, their staffs, and subordinates (often down
to the individual soldier) know their limits concerning Army authority to
commandeer civilian supplies or equipment to facilitate mission accom-
plishment (see the legal support discussion in Chapter 9). In stability opera-
tions and support operations, the safeguard or restoration of critical urban
infrastructure for military or civilian use may be a decisive point in the
overall operation.
2-20
Urban Environment
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
2-61. This system is comprised of the facilities and means to transmit infor-
mation from place to place. It includes—
e Telecommunications, such as telephones (to include wireless), tele-
graphs, radios, televisions, and computers.
e Police, fire, and rescue communications systems.
e The postal system.
e Newspapers, magazines, and other forms of print media.
e The human interaction that conveys information.
Perhaps more than any other element of the infrastructure, communications
and information link all the other elements in an interdependent “system of
systems.”
2-62. Urban communications and information systems can serve as an alter-
nate for both friendly and threat forces and can be easily secured with
civilian, off-the-shelf technologies. Threats may make use of commercial sys-
tems intertwined with legitimate civilian users, making it unpalatable to
prevent use of these assets. Forces can also use these systems to influence
public opinion, gain intelligence information, support deception efforts, or
otherwise support IO.
Increasing Impact of Computers
2-63. In many urban areas, computers link other elements of the urban infra-
structure. They link functions and systems in the urban area and connect the
area to other parts of the world. This latter aspect creates important implica-
tions for commanders of a major operation. Operations involving this cyber-
netic function may produce undesirable effects on a greater scale than ini-
tially intended. For example, commanders may be able to close or obstruct an
urban area’s banking system; however, this system may impact the interna-
tional monetary exchange with unwanted or even unknown effects. The auth-
ority to conduct these types of IO will often be retained at the strategic level.
Whoever coined the phrase ‘The Theatre of Operations’ was very prescient. We are
conducting operations now as though we are on a stage, in an amphitheatre, or
Roman arena; there are at least two producers and directors working in opposition to
each other, the players, each with their own idea of the script, are more often than not
mixed up with the stage hands, ticket collectors and ice cream vendors, while a fac-
tional audience, its attention focused on that part of the auditorium where it is noisiest,
views and gains an understanding of events by peering down the drinking straws of
their soft drink packs.
General Sir Rupert Smith
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Pervasive Media
2-64. The media is central to the communications and information infrastruc-
ture and a critical operational concern. Compared to other operational environ-
ments (jungles, deserts, mountains, and cold weather areas), it has more
access to urban operations. This is due largely to airports, sea- and river
2-21
FM 3-06
2-22
ports, and major road networks; ready access to power sources and
telecommunications facilities; as well as access to existing local media struc-
tures. Hence, media presence may be pervasive and IO even more critical to
success in UO than operations in many other environments.
2-65. A Complex Relationship. A complex relationship exists among infor-
mation, the public, and policy formulation. Although the degree and manner
in which public opinion shapes government policy are uncertain, negative
visual images of military operations presented by the media can change polit-
ical objectives and, subsequently, military objectives. As important, media
reporting can influence civilian activity in an urban AO to either the advan-
tage or disadvantage of the commander.
2-66. Induce Cooperation Through Credibility. Commanders do not con-
trol the media; however, they monitor the flow of information that the news
media receives and subsequently reports. Consequently, commanders plan
and execute PA operations that will induce cooperation between the media
and Army forces. Successful relations between urban Army forces and the
news media evolve from regular interaction based on credibility and trust.
More information is usually better than less, except when the release of such
information may jeopardize security and the success of the operations and
threaten the safety of soldiers. However, commanders cannot simply withhold
information to protect the command from embarrassment. They consider
media interests as part of the normal planning process and work to ensure
that information presented to the news media is accurate, timely, and consis-
tent with operations security. Since the media will likely arrive in the urban
area before the conduct of operations, early deployment of PA assets may be
critical. Commanders synchronize PA activities with CMO and PSYOP. Such
action eliminates duplicated effort and ensures a unity of purpose consistent
with the IO concept of support (see Chapter 4 for more details involving IO
and PA during UO).
2-67. Failure to provide sufficient information can hamper a commander’s
ability to conduct the mission. Poor relationships with the media can result
in inaccurate and even biased reporting. Such reporting can cause a public
reaction that influences the ability to achieve operational objectives. During
the Russian 1994-95 battle against Chechen separatists in Grozny, for
example, the Russian military refused to communicate with reporters. The
media reported primarily from the perspective of the Chechen rebels. This
encouraged both local and international support for the rebels. It also allowed
the Chechens, who lacked sophisticated information systems, to use the
media to broadcast operational guidance to their forces. (During their second
Chechnya campaign of 1999-2000, Russia learned this lesson well and the
Russian view of the war dominated domestic public opinion.) On the other
hand, successfully engaging the media can serve as a force multiplier. The
Army’s open and responsive interaction with the media during peacekeeping
operations in Bosnian urban areas helped to explain the challenges and
successes of Army forces in the Balkans to the public. This helped maintain
domestic, international, and local political support for NATO operations and,
with a successful command information program, helped maintain soldiers’
morale.
Urban Environment
TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION
ENERGY
2-68. This element of the infrastructure consists of—
e Cableways and tramways.
e Networked highways and railways to include bridges, subways and
tunnels, underpasses and overpasses, ferries, and fords.
e Ports, harbors, and inland waterways.
e Airports, seaplane stations, and heliports.
e Mass transit.
e Trucking companies and delivery services that facilitate the movement
of supplies, equipment, and people.
Similar to communications and information, this facet provides the physical
link to all other elements of the infrastructure.
2-69. Army forces deploying into a theater of operations depend on ports and
airfields; seizure of these assets may impact the projection of combat power.
Once in theater, transportation and distribution systems in the urban area
can contribute greatly to the movement of forces, maneuver, and logistic
operations throughout the entire AO. Control of decisive points in this infra-
structure may be important to the military operation and to the normal func-
tioning of the urban area (and surrounding rural areas). Supplies traveling
through the transportation and distribution system may be military-specific
supplies (such as ammunition and repair parts) and supplies for both the
military and urban population (such as food, medicine, oil, and gas). The
system may also support the movement of military forces and the urban
area’s population (for which it was designed). Therefore, commanders of a
major operation may have to develop innovative methods that limit the
transit of threat supplies and reinforcements while facilitating the movement
of their own resources and those of civilians’. This last consideration
attempts to minimize hardship and promote normalcy in the urban area and
will increase in significance as the need for legitimacy increases.
2-70. Most urban areas (particularly in developing countries) have two forms
of transportation systems that exist simultaneously: a formal system and an
informal or paratransit system. Large organizations, bureaucracy, imported
technology, scheduled services, and fixed fares or rates characterize formal
systems. Low barriers to entry; family and individual entrepreneur organiza-
tions; adapted technology; flexible routes, destinations, and times of service;
and negotiated prices characterize the informal system. The informal system
is more decentralized and covers a much greater portion of the urban area
than the formal system. The informal transportation and distribution system
often includes a waterborne element, is more likely to function through
turbulence and conflict, and can extend hundreds of kilometers beyond the
urban area. Accordingly, commanders assess both systems to establish
effective movement control.
2-71. The energy system provides the power to run the urban area. It
consists of the industries and facilities that produce, store, and distribute
electricity, coal, oil, and natural gas. This area also encompasses alternate
energy sources, such as nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal power.
2-23
FM 3-06
2-72. Sources of energy may be tens or hundreds of miles away from the
urban area itself. Therefore, commanders may exert control without applying
combat power directly to the urban area itself by controlling or destroying
the source (power generation or refinement plant) or the method of
distribution (pipe- or power lines). With electrical energy that cannot be
stored in any sizable amount, the latter may be the best means as most major
urban areas receive this energy from more than one source in a network of
power grids. However, control may be as simple as securing a power station
or plant and turning off switches or removing a vital component that could
later be restored. On the other hand, lengthy pipe- and power lines may
compound security and protection of this element of the infrastructure.
2-73. The number of nations that have invested in nuclear power and
nuclear research is increasing. With this increase, the potential for Army
forces to operate in urban areas that include (or are near) these facilities also
increases. Damage to one of these facilities and potential radiation hazards
will present special challenges to commanders of a major operation. To
safeguard friendly forces and civilians, commanders will need to employ a
blend of peacetime and tactical nuclear contamination avoidance principles
(see FM 3-14).
ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE
2-74. This system encompasses—
e Business and financial centers to include stores, shops, restaurants,
hotels, marketplaces, banks, trading centers, and business offices.
e Outlying industrial and agricultural features to include strip malls,
farms, food storage centers, manufacturing plants, and mills.
The latter elements also consist of the production and storage of toxic indus-
trial chemicals used in agriculture (insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers),
manufacturing, cleaning, and research (to include biological agents). (See
concerns of TIM previously discussed under Industrial Areas.) Recreational
facilities such as amusement parks, golf courses, and stadiums are also part
of this element of the infrastructure. In their overall assessment of this area
of the infrastructure, commanders consider the activities and influence of
criminal organizations or elements.
2-75. A critical aspect of this area during operations may be the political
sensitivity of US or allied industries investing and operating in a foreign
country, particularly during stability operations and support operations. An
enemy or a disgruntled civilian population may attack or disrupt commercial
activities as a political statement against the US or our allies. Food produc-
tion facilities also may assist commanders in Army food services and may be
of critical concern during relief operations.
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN SERVICES
2-24
2-76. This broad system covers urban administrative organizations
concerned with urban area’s public health, safety, and welfare. It also
includes many organizations and structures that provide the urban populace
with its social identity. Together, it encompasses—
Urban Environment
e Governmental services that include embassies and diplomatic organi-
zations.
e Activities that manage vital records, such as birth certificates and
deeds.
e The judicial system.
e Welfare systems.
e Schools and universities.
e Religious organizations and their churches and shrines.
Historic monuments and other cultural resources.
Hospitals and other medical services.
e Water supply systems.
e Waste and hazardous material storage and processing facilities.
e Emergency services, such as police, fire, and rescue.
2-77. Losing many of these services often has an immediate, destabilizing,
and life-threatening impact on the inhabitants of the urban area. In stability
operations and support operations, numerous administrative and human ser-
vices often rise to critical importance before all other elements. However, res-
toration of these services is often a lengthy civil-military operation.
Seeing the Urban Area and Its Parts
The summer of 1944 confronted German General Dietrich von Choltitz with a
dilemma. As military commander of greater Paris, he was to eliminate French
Resistance internal to the city while defending against approaching Allied units,
missions for which he had insufficient forces. Choltitz’s situation was further
complicated by Hitler's demand that he destroy the city, an action the general
saw as needlessly destructive (and infeasible given his scant resources).
Choltitz’s seniors directed the preparation, and later the destruction, of Paris’s
45 Seine River bridges. They were the only remaining crossing points over that
waterway given Allied bombing of others outside the French capital. Premature
destruction would trap German forces defending to their north, a second-order
effect that Choltitz used to justify his disobedience of orders demanding the
bridges’ demolition.
The German general also recognized that some mission-critical elements were
part of Paris’s social rather than physical infrastructure: the leadership of the
various resistance groups and the relationships between them. Choltitz under-
stood that he lacked resources to defeat the many separate factions; he
therefore chose the unorthodox (asymmetric) approach of accepting an inter-
mediary’s offer of a truce with these groups. Such an agreement provided some
measure of the stability needed while Choltitz awaited promised reinforcements.
Further, he realized that the resistance factions were by no means united in
their goals. Communist elements sought a much different end than those
looking toward a de Gaulle-led postwar government. A truce thus set the French
Communists (who sought an uprising so as to legitimize their claims to power)
against others trying to buy time until Allied forces arrived, forces that included
Free French units supportive of de Gaulle.
2-25
FM 3-06
Although his defense of the capital failed, Choltitz succeeded in harboring his
available resources, reducing the effectiveness of the resistance organizations
fighting his soldiers, and maintaining withdrawal routes for units north of the
Seine. The German commander's analysis in support of these efforts was
effective in part because of his insightful (1) identification of critical points that
included elements of terrain, citizenry, and infrastructure; (2) understanding of
the relationships between these parts; and (3) use of an asymmetric approach
to address his lack of sufficient force to otherwise handle the densities that
challenged him.
2-26
Chapter 3
Urban Threat
... [T]he United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected
crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities. Moreover,
these interventions may take place in distant regions where urban
environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic conditions
present major operational challenges.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001
As the strategic environment has become less stable, more uncertain, and
more dangerous, Army forces are trained and ready to address urban
threats. These threats range from regional conventional military forces,
paramilitary forces, guerrillas, and insurgents to terrorists, criminal
groups, and angry crowds. Although uncertain about events, Army forces
can be clear about trends. Increasingly, the Army will face threats that
severely differ in doctrine, organization, and equipment, yet can fully in-
teract with the three other components of the urban battlefield—terrain,
society, and infrastructure. In stability operations and support operations,
commanders broaden their concept of the threat to include natural
disasters, hunger and starvation, and rampant disease. Further, com-
manders plan to contend with many passive urban threats, such as
psychological illnesses and toxic industrial materials (TIM). These threats
may be found in isolation, but most likely commanders will encounter
them in various combinations. Moreover, each new threat will pose a
different combination and likely have new capabilities that previous oppo-
nents lacked.
CONTENTS
ASVON EIV fetes E ere eeceecreene ere rene 3-2 Use the Population to Advantage ........... 3-6
Weapons of Mass Destruction....................+ 3-2 Win the Information Wat ...........:0.:0c00 3-9
Threat Operational Principles ................0 3-3 Manipulate Key Facilities ..................... 3-10
Deny ACCOSS iaoe sccegcevsstcteccestststessstire 3-3 Use All Dimensions ..........::ccseseecseeeeees 3-10
Neutralize Technology Overmatch ......... 3-4 Employ Urban-Oriented Weapons ........ 3-10
Control the TEMP0.........::ccccessseeeesseteeeeees 3-4 Engage Entire Enemy Force............:00 3-11
Change the Nature of the Conflict .......... 3-5 Focus Attacks on Support Areas,
Cause Politically Unacceptable Isolated Groups, and Individuals ......... 3-11
Casualties ooe an a A cess RER 3-5 | Negative Effects of Urbanization .............. 3-11
Allow No Sanctuary ......cccssseeccssseeeeseeeeees 3-5| General Instability.............:cccseeseeseeeeees 3-12
Conduct Dispersed and Decentralized Food and Water Shortages ...........::000+ 3-13
Operations. 2) een ee eee 3-6 Disease and Pollution .............cccccceeeeee 3-14
Urban Threat Tactics.........::cccsssceessereeeeees 3-6 | Competing Power Structures................ 3-15
3-1
FM 3-06
ASYMMETRY
3-1. An emphasis on asymmetric means to offset United States (US) military
capability has emerged as a significant trend among potential threats and
become an integral part of the threat principles and tactics discussed below.
Asymmetry results when one opponent has dissimilar capabilities—values,
organization, training, or equipment—that the other cannot counter. It is not
a new concept. It naturally evolves from a sound mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
(METT-TC) analysis by an intelligent, freethinking, and adaptive threat.
These asymmetric approaches will include the most advanced, commercially-
available technology innovatively applied and mixed with crude, simple, and
unsophisticated weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
3-2
3-2. A chief asymmetric means of engaging the national power of the US is to
employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US or its allies.
These weapons can be used against military forces by military forces and
include high-yield explosives as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons. Operations in urban areas may require concentrating forces and
may create a lucrative target for a threat that possesses fewer numbers and
less equipment.
3-3. A threat’s WMD use will adversely affect the Army’s abilities to conduct
urban operations (UO) to various degrees. For example, the intervening
structures and the effects of urban microclimates complicate the ability to
detect and identify radiological, chemical, or biological attacks from a
standoff distance. Also, the individual soldier’s ability to recognize his
leaders, understand oral and visual commands, and operate increasingly
sophisticated equipment is difficult when wearing protective clothing and
equipment—particularly if his training proficiency is low. Despite the
increased challenges and complexity, Army forces have the training and
equipment necessary to respond to such an attack compared to most armies
around the world, but certainly when compared to the civilian sector.
3-4. Although initial casualties could be high, the public can accept military
casualties before those of civilians. Therefore, threats may gain an initial tac-
tical advantage but would achieve less asymmetric benefit by directly at-
tacking Army forces. They may attempt to achieve an extraordinary asym-
metric strategic advantage by employing WMD against US or allied civilian
populations. In doing so, threats hope to use political sensitivity to high
civilian casualties to reduce popular support for the US or its allies. The
chance of these attacks occurring in an urban area increases because—
e The area facilitates weapons’ effects and camouflages delivery means.
e The dense civilian population ensures a high casualty rate.
e The attack (or even the threat of attack) often will receive more
publicity and public attention.
e The urban area’s infrastructure is especially vulnerable to WMD, par-
ticularly the systems of the economics and commerce infrastructure
located in large urban areas, and may have far-reaching national and
global effects.
Urban Threat
THREAT OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES
DENY ACCESS
3-5. The threat may apply
several key operational prin-
ciples to oppose Army forces
operating in an urban envi-
ronment (see Figure 3-1). Neutralize Technology
These principles focus more
on how a threat might fight
in an urban area rather than Conduct Dispersed
specifically whom the threat and Decentralized
might be or in what region of
; i = <a
the world the conflict might Control the Tempo Allow No Sanctuary
occur. They are more effec-
tive in an urban environment Change the Nature Cause Politically
due to— of the Conflict Unacceptable
Casualties
e The high costs in time,
material, and man-
power involved in UO. Figure 3-1. Threat Operational Principles
e The limiting effects of
urban areas on many technological advantages.
e The proximity of airfields and ports to urban areas.
e The potential moral dilemmas created by exposing numerous civilians
to harm or injury.
These principles complement and overlap each other; however, at their core
is the need to defeat an enemy of superior numbers, technology, or both.
3-6. The Army may not be located where future conflicts are fought. Thus,
the Army maintains the ability to rapidly project and sustain combat power
over long distances and time spans. This capability demands that Army forces
quickly gain and maintain control of seaports or aerial ports of embarkation or
debarkation, particularly where the density of US basing and en route
infrastructure is low. Commanders gain control of these ports by unopposed
(assisted or unassisted) or forcible entry operations. In either case, these
phased-entry operations may present potential vulnerabilities, particularly—
e Unsuitable composition of initial or early entry forces lacking
necessary combat power for immediate decisive operations.
e Initial command and control difficulties and an immature situational
understanding.
e Lack of developed theater support.
3-7. Consequently, threats may attack during initial force projection opera-
tions to oppose, disrupt, or prevent the build-up of essential combat power
into a theater of operations. These attacks may occur anywhere deploying
Army forces are located, at overseas bases, at home stations, and even in
military communities. Increasingly, deployment facilities such as airfields
and ports exist as integral components of urban areas. Threats will invariably
use the complex and concealing nature of these urban areas, coupled with the
vulnerabilities, to create favorable conditions for their attacks.
3-3
FM 3-06
NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGY OVERMATCH
3-8. Threats will always strive to force engagements at a time and place
most advantageous to them. They may locate military forces and vital
military capabilities in urban areas to achieve sanctuary from the effects of
Army capabilities and make Army forces and systems more vulnerable to
less-sophisticated weapons.
3-9. The clutter of the physical structures, electromagnetic radiation, and
population diminishes Army capabilities. This clutter makes it difficult for
Army forces to acquire and effectively engage targets at long ranges. In
urban areas, the terrain often allows a threat to operate in closer proximity
to friendly forces. Therefore, the threat may “hug” friendly forces to avoid the
effects of high-firepower standoff weapon systems and degrade their ability
to gain or maintain a thorough common operational picture. Additionally,
this threat tactic attempts to inhibit friendly commanders from employing
some weapon systems and munitions for fear of fratricide.
CONTROL THE TEMPO
3-10. Threats will try to achieve a decisive advantage by setting and con-
trolling the tempo necessary to achieve their objectives. To prevent the
Army’s entry into theater, threats may try to create a high operational tempo
to take advantage of the inherent weaknesses in power projection operations
outlined earlier. As other efforts deny entry, threats may seize the initiative,
achieve surprise, and exploit the tempo differential by attacking with heavy
conventional forces potentially possessing greater firepower and more rapid
ground mobility than the Army’s initial-entry forces.
3-11. If they cannot deny entry or end the conflict quickly, threats may use
any preparations made in the initial high-tempo period to prolong the event,
aiming to degrade US or allied commitment. The complex nature of the urban
environment slows operations conducted in and around these areas. Threats
may maximize this characteristic by fighting for key urban complexes and
infrastructure, forcing friendly forces to operate within these areas. If Army
operations focus on one or more urban areas, the overall campaign slows.
However, even when UO make up only one component of a much larger
campaign, they may consume valuable resources needed for other operations
and delay the entire campaign.
Tempo
The battle for Aachen, Germany, in the fall of 1944, developed during the US
First Army’s offensive to breach the Westwall fortifications. Aachen, the ancient
capital of Charlemagne, had symbolic political and psychological significance for
the Germans and Americans. Furthermore, it was the first city on German soil to
face an assault by the Allies. Consequently, the symbolic importance of this first
major battle in Germany ensured bitter resistance against American attackers.
The Germans surrendered only after the city was destroyed. Expected to take a
few days, instead, the battle took weeks. Although the Army had achieved a
clear tactical victory, the German defense of Aachen cost the First Army valuable
time and resources, and delayed the planned attack to the Rhine River.
3-4
Urban Threat
CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
3-12. Threats may attempt to change the fundamental nature of the urban
conflict to exploit ambiguous or tenuous political-military objectives. Many
nations gain and maintain domestic popular support to use their armies for
political objectives. The threat may attempt to change the nature of the con-
flict by modifying its strategy and tactics, the environment, or any combina-
tion, ultimately hoping to reduce friendly popular support. For example,
introducing an urban terrorist threat to US civilians or soldiers not directly
engaged in operations changes the nature of the conflict. This type of threat
may not have been an initial consideration, and this change may reverse pub-
lic support for the operation. Another example, growing US coalition combat
power may cause the threat to switch from open maneuver warfare to UO to
avoid decisive combat with superior forces and achieve a stalemate. Origi-
nally expecting a quick solution or victory, the political leadership may now
envision a longer deployment with less chance of lasting success.
CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES
3-13. Threat forces may gain an advantage against superior friendly forces
by capitalizing on a perceived weakness of many Western nations: the
inability to endure continuous losses or casualties for other than vital
national interests or losses for which they are psychologically unprepared. A
secondary US interest may equate to national survival on the part of a
threat. Therefore, the threat (particularly with fanatical leadership) may
willingly sacrifice excessive amounts of money, equipment, and people
(soldiers and civilians) to achieve victory. Threats may attempt to weaken US
resolve and national will to sustain the deployment or conflict by inflicting
highly visible, embarrassing, and if possible, large losses on Army forces,
even at the cost of similar losses to themselves. Many threat forces will use
UO to inflict mass casualties and destroy premier Army weapon and
information systems. The physical characteristics of the urban environment
support these ambush techniques. Light infantry or insurgents with readily
obtainable, hand-held antiarmor weapons can effectively attack armored
vehicles and helicopters, no matter how sophisticated, in an urban area.
ALLOW NO SANCTUARY
3-14. Threats will attempt to deny Army forces safe haven anytime and any-
where. Terrorism may be one of the tactics used to deny sanctuary to Army
forces. They will attack Army forces anywhere, particularly while operating
in urban areas where the fear from being attacked from any quarter is often
greater. Threats may be or employ state-sponsored or independent terrorists,
well equipped and motivated to accomplish their assigned missions.
3-15. Military buildings, facilities, and installations in urban areas are par-
ticularly vulnerable to high-yield explosive munitions as well as other clever
means to create large explosions. The close-in nature of urban areas, large
populations, and high volume of vehicle traffic provide a good environment
for target reconnaissance, explosives positioning (conventional or high-yield),
and cover for an attack. These attacks will likely be preceded by extensive,
careful reconnaissance, necessitating a solid friendly counterterrorism and
counterintelligence effort.
3-5
FM 3-06
CONDUCT DISPERSED AND DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
3-16. To a certain extent, dispersed and decentralized operations are an
integral part of all threat principles. However, this concept warrants separate
emphasis as a principle since threat forces will likely place great significance
on it on future urban battlefields. Both dispersed and decentralized
approaches seek to reduce threat vulnerabilities to air power and precision-
guided munitions (PGM) while increasing their agility, flexibility, and overall
maneuverability in an urban environment.
3-17. Urban terrain tends to fragment and separate forces that operate in it.
Threat forces recognize this characteristic, accept it, and make it work to
their advantage. They conduct operations from dispersed urban locations to
reduce their vulnerability to friendly decisive operations and massed fire-
power. Although separated, threat forces will attempt to retain the ability to
assemble and mass quickly so to strike as opportunities present themselves.
Once threat forces complete the operation, they will return to separate loca-
tions to avoid potential counterattack. The fluidity and seemingly disjointed
appearance of these threat UO will challenge friendly efforts to conduct
templating and pattern analysis. Ambushes (air and ground) will be used to
deny friendly ground and air reconnaissance of their dispersed locations.
3-18. Dispersed operations normally depend on good command and control to
achieve synchronization and massed effects. Threat forces also understand
the debilitating effects of the urban terrain on communications and the exe-
cution of operations. When they cannot mass their forces or effects, they will
depend on decentralized operations to achieve their objectives. They will op-
erate autonomously, guided only by a higher authority’s purpose and intent.
These operations make them even less vulnerable to massed attacks and
PGM as smaller threat forces do not present an objective or target that will
allow friendly decisive operations. Again, pattern analysis and templating
will be extremely difficult. Using this principle often prolongs the conflict but
is central to implementing the other threat principles.
URBAN THREAT TACTICS
3-19. Urban areas provide a casualty-producing and stress-inducing environ-
ment ideally suited for using specific urban threat tactics. Moreover, urban
areas provide threats with an unmatched degree of cover and concealment
from friendly information and firepower systems. While active urban threats
may vary widely, many techniques will be common to all. Figure 3-2 outlines
a set of threat tactics available to potential threats opposing mission accom-
plishment in urban areas. Army forces may use many of the threat tactics,
except those that violate the law, ethics, and morals, to defeat urban threats.
Moreover, using asymmetric means is not the sole domain of the threat.
Army commanders can also leverage capabilities, create conditions, and plan
operations to develop asymmetric advantages to accomplish the mission.
USE THE POPULATION TO ADVANTAGE
3-20. Many urban areas may be too large to evacuate completely (if at all).
Even if desirable, a military force may have no place to safeguard and secure
the inhabitants. Therefore, future UO may see large segment of the populace
3-6
Urban Threat
remain. Offensive and defensive operations may be constrained not only by
the terrain and by the presence of many civilians. Army forces involved in
urban stability operations and support operations will certainly conduct
missions in and amongst the residents. These residents may restrict
operations and, when gathered in large numbers, may (even without initial
hostile intent) present a critical force protection issue for the commander.
¢ Use the Population to ¢ Employ Urban-Oriented
Advantage Weapons
¢ Win the Information War ° Engage Entire Enemy Force
¢ Manipulate Key Facilities e Focus Attacks on Support
Areas, Isolated Groups, and
¢ Use All Dimensions individuals
Figure 3-2. Urban Threat Tactics
Use as Key Terrain and Concealment
3-21. From the threat stand-
point, the populace is similar to
key terrain: the side that man-
ages it best has an advantage.
Threat forces may gain this ad-
vantage by using civilians as
camouflage, concealment, and
a means of deception. Guerrilla
and terrorist elements may ; Olga Oliker
look no different from any Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000
other member of the commu-
nity. Many foreign conventional and paramilitary troops often have a
“civilian” look. Western military forces originally adopted the clean-shaven
and close-cut hair standards to combat disease and infection, but future oppo-
nents may not adhere to those standards. They may adopt grooming
standards, civilian-looking clothing, and other “nonmilitary” characteristics
to make themselves indistinguishable from the civilians.
Chechen fighters sometimes disguised
themselves as Red Cross workers,
donning the identifying armbands.
They also passed themselves off as
civilians and offered to guide Russian
forces through the city, instead
leading them into ambushes.
3-7
FM 3-06
Identifying Soldiers from Civilians
During Russia’s 1994-95 conflict with Chechnya, Russian forces had difficulty
identifying Chechen guerrilla forces from Grozny’s noncombatant population.
Because their appearance was identical to that of the urban populace, Chechen
soldiers could freely walk around the city, suddenly disappear, and then abruptly
reappear firing their weapons from basements, windows, or dark alleyways. To
distinguish fighters from peaceful city dwellers, Russian forces began looking at
men’s shoulders to see if they were bruised (from firing weapons) and their
forearms to see if there was burned hair or flesh (from the extraction of
cartridges). They closely examined their clothing and smelled for gunpowder
residue. To identify a Chechen artilleryman, Russian soldiers checked for glossy
spots left by artillery and mortar rounds on the bends and cuffs of sleeves. They
also turned pockets inside out to check for a shiny, silvery-leaden hue indicating
the former presence of small arms ammunition. Russian forces also recognized a
grenade launcher operator or mortar man from fibers and crumpled pieces of gun
cotton on their clothing. US Army commanders may need to develop similar,
imaginative means to identify the threat.
Gain Cover, Protection, and Increased Mobility
3-22. Threat forces may attempt to gain cover by using the urban inhabitants
as human shields. With this increase in protection, they simultaneously
increase their mobility. They recognize the Army’s focus on developing and
applying rules of engagement (ROE). They will take advantage of the
restraining effects of international law and the Army ethical values to
enhance their mobility in proximity to friendly positions. Knowing the
Army’s reluctance to cause noncombatant casualties and collateral damage,
threats may operate in areas containing civilians and essential facilities to
restrict the Army’s use of massed or nonprecision firepower. They may also
employ “rent-a-crowds’—civilians paid to demonstrate against military
forces—armed only with sticks, stones, and Molotov cocktails (a potential
asymmetric challenge).
Make Moral Responsibilities a Weakness
3-23. Depending on their successes, threats may use these tactics and skillful
information operations that attack national will and coalition sensitivities in
an attempt to force the Army to establish more restrictive ROE. Threat forces
may also take advantage of the Army’s moral responsibilities. By herding
refugees into friendly controlled areas, threat forces try to make the civilians
a burden on the Army’s logistic and security resources. Threat forces, on the
other hand, may not abide by international agreements, such as the Geneva
conventions. They may not take prisoners unless they can be ransomed or
made part of a local prisoner exchange. They may even execute friendly
prisoners in front of the media to show their “strength” and, more impor-
tantly, to cause friendly forces to overreact and lose their legitimacy. Threat
forces can then use such an overreaction to unite others with their cause.
Acquire Intelligence and Logistic Support
3-8
3-24. Indigenous threat forces can normally use the local population for intel-
ligence and logistic support far more effectively than can an alien army.
Urban Threat
Threat forces may manipulate local hires serving among US soldiers, such as
those contracted by the Army for base operation purposes or translator
duties. In addition, refugees moving through friendly controlled sectors may
provide the threat with information on friendly dispositions, readiness, and
intent. Even friendly residents may become unwitting or unwilling inform-
ants, providing an enemy or a hostile with vital information on friendly
activities, dispositions, and capabilities. However, a threat employing
particularly cruel, abusive, or repressive measures may easily turn certain
groups in the urban area against them, even when they share a common
history, culture, and ethnicity with the civilians. This is more likely in those
areas with high population densities.
3-25. Threat forces may also seek to use some nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). They may try to obtain relief supplies either through the
organizations’ legitimate relief operations or as a target for theft. Some
organizations may even be fronts for weapons, food, ammunition, money, and
fighters. For example, during Russia’s second conflict in Chechnya (1999-
2000), documents purportedly found in Grozny by the Russians listed nations
such as Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, and Ivory Coast as sending fighters to
Chechnya under the guise of the International Islamic Relief Organization.
(Chechen fighters also disguised themselves as Red Cross workers.) This
deception increases the need for strict security and force protection
measures, close coordination with NGOs operating in urban areas, and closer
monitoring of suspect organizations’ activities by civil affairs personnel.
WIN THE INFORMATION WAR
3-26. Threat forces will try to win the information war as much as they will
directly oppose Army UO. Threat urban campaigns need not be tactical mili-
tary successes. They need only to weaken legitimacy and make the opposi-
tion’s campaign appear unpalatable to domestic and world support. As a
critical part of their overall information operations, threats will use the ever-
present media to tell their story. Portable video cameras, commercial radios,
and cellular telephones, available and easily concealed, will be as important
to many threat actors as weapons and ammunition. Internet access, already
firmly established in many urban areas, provides the means to easily
disseminate threat propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation through
web sites and electronic mail. Hackers, covered and concealed in the interior
spaces of the urban area, may gain access to US sites to manipulate infor-
mation to the threat’s advantage.
Information and the Media
The media coverage of the urban battle for Hue, South Vietnam, although only
one of hundreds of different attacks of the Tet Offensive, affected the will of both
the American people and their political leadership. On January 31, 1968, two
North Vietnamese Army (NVA)/Vietcong (VC) regiments and two sapper
battalions, moving rapidly and with the element of surprise, attacked and seized
part of the walled city (Citadel) of Hue. It was the third largest city in South
Vietnam, the former capital of a united Vietnam, the capital of Thua Thien
province, and a spiritual and cultural center. Initially intending to hold the city for
3-9
FM 3-06
seven days, the NVA/VC retained portions of the city for approximately three
weeks against determined US and South Vietnamese attempts to retake it.
Hue marked a revolution in the coverage of war by modern media. It was the first
time Americans could sit at home and watch an ongoing battle on the evening
news. One of the most intense and savage battles of the Vietnam conflict, it was
televised every evening for almost a month. Although the battle for Hue was a
tactical victory for the US, the North Vietnamese clearly achieved strategic
success by searing the American consciousness with the high costs of urban
warfare. Had US leaders made winning the information war a central part of the
overall campaign plan—for example, exposing the American people to the NVA’s
brutality by publicizing the civilian executions in Hue—civilian support for the war
may have been bolstered and a different outcome achieved. See Chapter 6 for a
more detailed account of the battle for Hue.
MANIPULATE KEY FACILITIES
3-27. Threat forces will attempt to identify and quickly seize control of criti-
cal components of the urban area to help shape the battlespace. Urban tele-
phone exchanges, for example, provide simple and reliable communications
that can be easily secured with off-the-shelf technologies. Sewage treatment
plants and flood control machinery can be used to implement WMD
strategies or to make sections of the urban area uninhabitable. Media
stations significantly improve the information operations abilities of the
controlling force. Power generation and transmission sites provide means to
control significant aspects of civilian society over a large area.
USE ALL DIMENSIONS
3-28. Threats will think and operate throughout the depth, breadth, and
height (including supersurface and subsurface areas) of the urban environ-
ment. Conventional lateral boundaries will often not apply as threat forces
control some stories of the same building while friendly forces control others.
3-29. Intrasurface areas and roofs provide urban threats with excellent
observation points and battle positions above the maximum elevation of
many weapons. Shots from upper floors strike armored vehicles in vulnerable
points. Basements and other subsurface areas also provide firing points
below many weapons’ minimum depressions and strike at another weakness
in most armor. Sewers and subways may provide covered and concealed
access throughout the area of operations.
EMPLOY URBAN-ORIENTED WEAPONS
3-30. Whether purpose-built or adapted, many weapons are more useful in
an urban environment while others may have significant disadvantages.
Urban threat weapons are much like the nature of urbanization and the ur-
ban environment: inventive and varied. Many threats will integrate widely
available off-the-shelf technologies into their weapon systems and armed
forces. However, sniper rifles and small, man-portable, fire-and-forget
weapons and demolitions and other improvised explosive devices will likely
dominate the urban environment. Figure 3-3 lists examples of threat
weapons favored in UO.
Urban Threat
ENGAGE ENTIRE ENEMY FORCE
3-31. Threats may
Weapons With No Minimum Mortars
attempt to keep all or Depression or Maximum
significant portions of Elevation Machine
i Grenades Guns
Army forces engaged in Salor Rie
continuous operations to zi j T JERE
p 2 ame, Incendiary, and Blas
increase their suscepti- Grenade Launchers Weapons (Thermobaric and Fuel-
bility to stress-induced Sts ie ae nne AitExplosives)
ounte
illnesses. UO, by their
z Riot Control and
nature, produce an RPGs and Other Shoulder-Fired Tranquilizer Gases
Antiarmor Weapons
inordinate number of
combat-stress casual- KE aaka aE
Weapons With Little or No Backblast and Other
ties. Continuous opera- (Gas-Metered, Soft Launch, or Improvised
: : Recoilless) Explosive Devices
tions exacerbate this
problem. Threat forces Figure 3-3. Favored Threat Weapons
that employ this tactic
will often maintain a large reserve to minimize the psychological impacts on
their own forces.
3-32. To accomplish this, threat UO will likely involve decentralized maneu-
ver, precision fires, and simultaneous operations involving unconventional
and special purpose forces. Threat forces will take advantage of any exposed
weakness and engage in battles as opportunities present themselves.
FOCUS ATTACKS ON SUPPORT AREAS, ISOLATED GROUPS, AND INDIVIDUALS
3-33. To supplement the previous tactic, threat forces will seek to target sup-
port areas, small groups, leaders and their headquarters, and individual
soldiers. Their focus on resupply, casualty evacuation, and other sustainment
activities, coupled with the compartmented terrain, navigational challenges,
and multiple three-dimensional avenues of approach often makes these
locations and soldiers more susceptible to surprise raids and ambushes.
Attacks on these areas and groups are conducted to erode the Army’s ability
to sustain UO, to inflict maximum casualties, and to induce psychological
stress. These attacks can be mitigated by careful, regular evaluation of choke
points and other restrictive terrain, regular awareness training for units and
individuals operating in or transiting through potential incident-prone areas,
and thorough after-action analysis of incidents.
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION
3-34. Many urban areas are the engines for increased industrialism and eco-
nomic growth as an expanding population provides the labor for manufac-
turing and service needs. However, rapid and inadequately planned growth
can result in undesirable consequences. Uncontrolled urbanization may
result in an infrastructure and economic base unable to support the growing
population. A large transient, ill-housed, and idle population in a close geo-
graphic space may produce strife. Classes, cultures, ethnic groups, and races
that might otherwise peacefully coexist can clash under the stress of sur-
vival. Uncontrolled urban growth has resulted in the negative effects listed in
Figure 3-4 on page 3-12. In many urban stability operations and support
operations, these may be the primary “threats” to mission accomplishment.
FM 3-06
3-35. Not all urban
areas prevail as inher-
ently unstable or hot-
General
Instability
beds for unrest. Urban
growth due to migration
may remove sources of
conflict, or it may
provide the catalyst for
violence. Commanders
Competing Negative
Power Effects of Boed 6 ater
Structures (rbanization Shortages
recognize the possible Disease &
effects of uncontrolled Pollution
urbanization. During
their intelligence prepa-
ration of the battlefield
(IPB), they determine if
these conditions exist. Throughout mission analysis and the development of
courses of action, commanders consider the impact (if any) on their opera-
tions. At the same time, they recognize that UO may create similar problems
that may affect the current operation as well as the overall campaign.
Figure 3-4. Negative Effects of Urbanization
GENERAL INSTABILITY
3-36. Urbanization can enhance stability by generating industrialization and
economic growth resulting in more jobs, a higher overall standard of living,
and an educated, relatively satisfied populace. However, the population dy-
namics associated with urbanization can also have an opposite, destabilizing
effect. Radical population growth may create overcrowding and generate or
aggravate resource and quality of life issues. Intense and destructive compe-
tition for employment, housing, and social status may develop in this climate
of economic deprivation. The inability of some governments to handle these
problems—
e Makes their urban areas potential sources of unrest.
e Increases the likelihood of the Army’s involvement in stability
operations and support operations.
e Complicates operations conducted in such an urban environment.
Weak civil administrations have difficulty controlling their society, safe-
guarding their military armaments, and preventing their urban areas from
serving as sanctuaries to terrorists and criminal organizations.
3-37. Urbanization in developing countries warrants more concern. Their re-
sources necessary for urban growth are scarce and the rate of urbanization
disproportionately large. Between 1970 and 1998, the urban population of
developed countries grew by 208 million compared to 910 million in the de-
veloping countries of the world. Over the next two decades, developing coun-
tries are projected to gain another 1.6 billion inhabitants, 72 percent more
than in the previous two decades. Figure 3-5 graphically portrays the
widening demographic differences between the developed and developing
regions. Each day, over 160,000 people in these developing nations migrate to
urban areas. By 2015, 24 of the 30 largest urban areas may exist in the
developing world. Intense migration and growth, coupled with the forced
closeness of people once separated by the rural countryside, may stress
3-12
Urban Threat
already struggling
institutions, hasten
conflict, and lead to
overall instability.
Commanders under-
stand that UO,
depending on the op-
eration, may either
cause massive popu-
lation movement out
ot or. into uban 1996 2010 2030 2050
Developed
Regions
E Developing
Regions
~
a
=
©
=
2
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z
R
=
=
a
©
a"
areas. Source: UN Department for Economic and
Social Information and Policy Analysis
3-38. Urban areas
aae ar daa south Figure 3-5. Worldwide Population Projections
population may also help to generate conditions for instability. Rural-to-
urban migrants tend to be relatively young. In 1999, Cairo, for example, had
more than 40 percent of its population younger than 15 years. Young urban
populations generate enormous demands for social resources, primarily
education and jobs. Even a strong urban economy may fold under the
economic expectations of a tremendous influx of young migrants. Disorder
and violence may result as hostiles (many nonstate actors) easily mobilize
and manipulate the idle young to act politically and criminally. Urbanization
and population growth are more dangerous when they combine to produce a
cohort of young urban dwellers separated from traditional social controls,
such as village elders and clan leaders.
3-39. Ethnic, religious, and other social issues may become the vents for
anger and frustration produced by the high tension of urban life. Major acts
of violence and destruction, such as occurred in 1992 in India, can directly
threaten a nation’s security. Army forces may have to conduct large-scale,
stability operations and support operations to promote peace and protect
national interests. In these cases, all levels of command will be particularly
concerned with maintaining impartiality and perceived legitimacy.
Cultural and Religious Instability
The 1992 bombing of the Babri Masid Mosque in Ayodya, India, enflamed an
already intense cultural and religious rivalry between Hindus and Muslims and
led to rioting throughout many Indian urban areas. Of the 1,500 who died in
conflicts and riots, almost 95 percent died in urban areas. The violence struck
Ahmedabab and Bombay most seriously, with acts of murder, gang rapes, and
arson occurring months after the destruction of the mosque.
FOOD AND WATER SHORTAGES
3-40. Rapid urbanization, primarily in developing nations, may lead to
severe food shortages that could influence Army forces (or lead to their use).
Such shortages may cause instability, massive migration, revolts, or
increased support of armed opposition groups. Armed factions may target
NGOs that supply aid as a means of furthering dissatisfaction among the
populace. In effect, food may become a weapon. Deployed troops may need to
3-13
FM 3-06
provide or support humanitarian food aid networks to keep the humanitarian
situation from escalating.
3-41. Normally, commanders should use centralized feeding centers as a last
resort. Instead, Army forces should bring the food closest to the population to
encourage civilians to stay in their homes. If safe areas or camps are created,
they should be designed for use over as short a time as is feasible. The
general rule should be to return the urban population to their homes as soon
as possible. Army forces conducting domestic support or foreign humani-
tarian assistance operations that cannot maintain the safe food supplies may
find the frustrations and hostility of the local population focused on them.
3-42. Water shortages (and quality) are becoming a serious problem in many
regions. Commanders operating in an urban environment need to know the
water supply origins and its treatment, purification, distribution, and vul-
nerabilities. Before beginning operations, commanders must know if they are
providing water for the noncombatants as well as their own forces. Across the
range of operations, controlling and protecting a limited water supply is, or
may become, an essential operational consideration during UO.
Food and Water Shortages
Countries as varied as Indonesia and Algeria exported their food surpluses only
two generations ago but now import up to two-thirds of their basic staples. This
cycle has resulted in many countries, which once exported agricultural products,
facing the growing cost of imports to feed their urban populations. Estimates
predict that by the 2010, at least 65 countries (including 30 of Africa’s 51 coun-
tries) may depend completely on food imports. For some countries, it is even
worse. Congo (Zaire), once a net food exporter, now faces mass starvation.
Over the last four decades in China, irrigated farmland has tripled and urban
populations have quintupled. In Indonesia, urban areas such as Jakarta may use
six times more water in 2005 as it did in 1990, and Indonesia currently has
limited capability to meet this increased demand.
DISEASE AND POLLUTION
3-14
3-43. Urban areas frequently spawn epidemics; therefore, widespread
disease may pose a significant threat to Army forces that operate there. In
many developing nations, rapid urbanization has occurred without a
corresponding upgrade, expansion, or even development of adequate sewage
and water systems. Some urban areas have only one toilet for every 750
people or more. In these areas, hundreds of thousands live much as they
would in poor villages, yet so confined as to ensure high transmission rates
for airborne, waterborne, sexually transmitted, and contact-transmitted
microbes.
3-44. In urban areas lacking adequate trash and waste management infra-
structure, insect-spread diseases proliferate. Mosquitoes that breed in pol-
luted water, open water tanks, and irrigated urban gardens carry malaria
and dengue fever—the leading causes of sickness and death from infectious
disease in Latin America and Africa. The problem compounds with growing
numbers of bacteria resistant to various antibiotics, a shortage of trained
Urban Threat
medical personnel, inadequate or insufficient medical facilities and supplies,
and unclean agricultural and food-processing practices.
3-45. Pollution also creates critical health problems in developing areas and
a potential health risk for intervening Army forces. Urban areas in China
have recorded five to ten times the levels of sulfur dioxide found in the air of
urban areas in the developed world. In parts of Poland, toxic waste has so
polluted the land and water that ten percent of the babies have birth defects.
Pollution may cause immediate health problems but more often, the insidious
effects appear months or years after exposure. As discussed earlier, UO may
contribute, either intentionally or unintentionally, to an increase in
pollution. Destruction of industrial complexes that use, produce, and store
hazardous material may produce toxic gas and smoke pollutants that
contributed to significant health concerns to exposed soldiers.
3-46. Commanders initiate combat health support (CHS) planning early, in-
cluding analysis of the medical threat and other critical medical information
requirements during the IPB process. A medical surveillance system monitors
the daily status of Army personnel throughout the operation. In preparation,
all personnel receive a predeployment medical examination. This exam estab-
lishes an accurate baseline health status of the force and ensures that Army
forces do not introduce new diseases to an urban area, possibly exacerbating
the situation. Conversely, soldiers not immune to native viruses or
possessing a weakened immune system due to continuous operations and the
stress associated with UO may put Army forces at a significant disadvantage.
An outbreak of plague during an operation would have an effect similar to a
chemical or biological attack. The closer that Army forces operate to civilians
(the humanitarian assistance operations conducted in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
and Mogadishu, Somalia, for example), the more probable that these
situations may occur. See Chapter 9 for further CHS considerations.
COMPETING POWER STRUCTURES
3-47. Many groups can exist that become strong enough to rival the power of
the governing officials and eventually turn the urban area into a system of
divergent and competing power structures. These groups can consist of insur-
gent forces, a merchant class or an economic elite, criminal organizations, or
some other significant source of power such as religious organizations, clans,
or tribes. In the absence of a legitimate authority, armed factions headed by
“warlords” may vie to fill the power void. Sometimes these groups or organi-
zations, normally at odds with each other, may form alliances to achieve spe-
cific goals. Commanders recognize, identify, and understand these alternate
urban power bases and, if necessary, develop engagement strategies to
neutralize or harness them to accomplish the Army mission.
Urban Insurgencies
3-48. As urban migration increases in the developing world, rural guerrillas
appear to follow. This transition of insurgencies from rural to urban areas oc-
curs because urban areas offer a rich field of targets for insurgent attacks.
People immediately notice any disruption of urban infrastructure, thus
having great propaganda value. A concentrated urban population is often
more susceptible to propaganda and political organization. Insurgents can
3-15
FM 3-06
easily arrange mass demonstrations using available communications facili-
ties, both overt and covert. Travel is effortless and large urban populations
provide cover and concealment. On the whole, urban areas may provide a
fertile environment for guerrillas to apply their rural insurgent strategies.
However, even with a rural-based insurgency, operations in urban areas offer
distinct opportunities to disrupt, discredit, and demoralize the government
(see FM 3-05.20 and FM 3-07).
In Africa, a strategy of capturing urban areas, while trapping government forces
within others, has become a common tactic of insurgent forces. Similarly, insur-
gents in Liberia concentrated their efforts in the capital city of Monrovia while
guerrillas in Sierra Leone have battled the government repeatedly for the urban
diamond mining hubs. Even Shiite rebels in Afghanistan took their conflict with
the government into the heart of Kabul, the capital.
Urban Insurgencies
Merchant Class
3-49. Urban areas normally possess a merchant class or an economic elite as
part of their social structure. In some urban areas, they may carry more
power than the local or central state government. They may isolate them-
selves physically and socially from the sprawling poor yet wield enormous
power over the country’s political and economic activities. The degree of eco-
nomic separation between the merchant class and the poor may be small but
still socially or politically significant.
3-50. In a vastly impoverished area where the economy of the urban area is
severely disrupted, the merchant class will often continue to operate and
function and, as a result, achieve a measure of influence. To continue to
operate under acute economic turmoil, they may form alliances in criminal
organizations and secure loyalties within the government. Outside resources
introduced into a crisis area (such as food, water, fuel, and pharmaceuticals)
take on increased value, may replace currency as the medium for exchange,
and often become the means to amass and hold wealth. One of the primary
ways to obtain wealth may be to steal it.
3-51. In some turbulent situations that lead to the need for stability opera-
tions or support operations, commanders may harness the power of the
merchant class as a force for peace and stability instead of one that uses
crime to achieve economic goals. For example, in a relief situation, instead of
competing with the merchant class by distributing food directly to the needy
and possibly creating an environment of looting and black marketeering, it
may be possible to monetize food. Food assistance from donor governments
could be sold to merchants at an attractive price so they have a reliable
source of supply. This could, in turn, create a healthy economic system and
separate merchants from criminals and gangs.
Criminal Organizations
3-16
3-52. Organized criminal groups have grown common in urban areas; have
also become an important part of the urban social structure (gangs for ex-
ample); and can exert considerable influence on governments, people, and
Urban Threat
military forces conducting UO. Some large criminal organizations relying on
international connections often have better resources and equipment than
their insurgent counterparts. Their large financial resources, long-reaching
connections, and ruthlessness provide them the means to corrupt or intimi-
date local officials and government institutions. In any operation, but
especially support operations, they may violently confront and oppose Army
forces during mission execution.
3-53. The tactics of urban criminal groups parallel those of insurgents. They
have developed an intuitive cultural understanding of slum neighborhoods
and the ability to lure civilians into criminal activities. They have also
mastered the management of mobs. They recruit teenagers and young adults
in their efforts against rivals and authorities, just as insurgents muster
armies from the youth of rural villages. In many developing nations, there
exists an alliance between insurgents and organized criminal groups. In
these alliances, the insurgents defend the criminals and the criminals fund
the insurgents. During many UO, particularly during or following combat,
civil disturbances, or large natural disasters, looting (organized or
unorganized) may become of critical concern. Therefore, UO may often
require a combined law enforcement and military response.
Crime and poverty plague urban areas such as Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's second
largest urban area and would affect military operations conducted in their limits.
Rio has some of the nation’s highest negative urban indicators: the largest num-
ber of slum dwellers (1 million), the highest murder rate (1 of 700 residents per
year), and the highest kidnapping rate (4 per week). In 1989, the homicide rate of
the urban area was three times higher than New York City’s and the rate of
urban violence continues to rise. Therefore, law enforcement management may
be a critical issue for Army forces operating in urban environments similar to that
of Rio de Janeiro.
However, criminal elements or organizations may not always work against Army
commanders. They can be co-opted or influenced to serve friendly objectives.
For example, during World War II the US Navy worked covertly with the Mafia in
New York City to secure the New York harbor from German U-boats believed to
be torpedoing ships there. The Mafia controlled most dock activities New York
harbor and was perfectly positioned to monitor other subversive waterfront
activity. This capability provided needed information to the Navy for its
counterintelligence and security tasks. New York civil authorities therefore
agreed to permit a Navy-Mafia alliance to operate at the port for the greater good
of the country. Although the Mafia was not the preferred ally of the Navy, it had
the capability to protect US ships and the interest (patriotism) to help in the war
effort. In those circumstances, the temporary alliance worked (see also the
civilian threat discussion in Appendix B).
Crime and Criminal Organizations
Warlords
3-54. A characteristic of many recent stability operations and support opera-
tions has been the deterioration or complete collapse of political authority in
the country or urban area in crisis. In some cases, warlords have attempted
FM 3-06
3-18
to fill the power vacuum (see Appendix C for an example). These individuals
often have no particular claim to legitimacy. Their power issues from their
weapons, not necessarily from their political skills, human services provided,
or popular consent (although they have some popular support to remain in
their relative position of authority). In dealing with these urban warlords
during support operations or stability operations, it may appear that there
are two options: either ignore them completely or work with them visibly or
regularly. Commanders may reduce some of the greater risks involved in
these extremes by adopting a middle-ground approach. Nevertheless, the
technique chosen must clearly support political and military objectives.
3-55. Refusal to acknowledge warlords may increase the threat to Army
forces and NGOs. Their militias may attack Army forces to achieve recogni-
tion or simply due to misunderstanding or inherent friction between armed
forces. On the other hand, dealing with them may provide legitimacy to the
exclusion of other elements of the urban population such as professional
groups (for example, doctors or teachers), religious groups, and traditional
clan or tribal chiefs—which may have a greater claim to legitimacy and
better form the foundation for a reconstituted urban society.
3-56. A compromise between these two extremes may offer the best chance
for success. Commanders generally recognize these warlords or they risk
incidents; however, this recognition can be kept at staff levels to avoid be-
stowing any legitimacy on them. Instead, commanders themselves visibly
meet the other elements of society that have a more legitimate claim to politi-
cal, social, or economic leadership. Inevitably, commanders may need to meet
with warlords. In those circumstances, clan or tribal elders, and others who
represent traditional authority should attend and commanders should ask
for, and give deliberate consideration to, their opinions.
Chapter 4
Contemplating Urban Operations
We based all our further calculations on the most unfavorable
assumptions: the inevitability of heavy and prolonged fighting in the
streets of Berlin, the possibility of German counter-attacks from
outside the ring of encirclement from the west and south-west,
restoration of the enemy’s defence to the west of Berlin and the
consequent need to continue the offensive.
General of the Army, S. M. Shtemenko
describing the operational level planning for taking Berlin
The Soviet General Staff at War
In any potential situation and in
any area, Army commanders will
likely need to assess the rele-
vance and impact of one or more
urban areas on their operations.
They will also need to determine
whether full spectrum urban
operations (UO) will be essential
to mission accomplishment. UO
A major operation is a series of
tactical actions (battles, en-
gagements, strikes) conducted
by various combat forces of a
single or several services, co-
ordinated in time and place, to
accomplish operational, and
sometimes strategic objectives
in an operational area.
may be the commander’s sole
focus or only one of several tasks nested in an even larger operation.
Although UO potentially can be conducted as a single battle, engagement,
or strike, they will more often be conducted as a major operation
requiring joint resources. Such actions result from the increasing sizes of
urban areas. Army commanders of a major urban operation then ensure
that UO clearly support the operational objectives of the joint force
CONTENTS
Necessity of Urban Operations..................: r EAEE Col [a E E E TE A TEE ene eer 4-7
Force Sre e ae Ee aana 4-2 Full Spectrum Operations. ...........::::cse 4-7
MY DO of Ores Ee eea AaS EAE ea LELEA TEn 4-2 | Integration into Land Operations.............. 4-10
Casualities si see a 4-3} Concept of the Operation.................+ 4-10
Munitions and Equipment............::sss 4-4 Rules of Engagement .........:csscccccsesseeee 4-10
Collateral Damage .........:::ccssssceceseereeeeeees 4-4 Resource Allocation .........:cccssseecesseeeeees 4-12
Time and Momentum..............:::::::eeeeeeeeees 4-4 Urban: ISR2 sae ere See 4-13
Vulnerabilities ir. ccccrecesecsssce-cortsceseeesscseceree 4-5 Information Operations ..............:::0cc 4-18
Esel OM E E etree 4-5 Integration of Conventional and
Consider Alternatives and Risk Special Operations Forces „s.s.s. 4-24
Reduction Measures..........:eccseseeesseseeres 4-6| Coordination with Other Agencies ....... 4-25
Characteristics of Major Urban
Operations -meeen eeaeee ieena Enae 4-7
4-1
FM 3-06
commander (JFC), requesting and appropriately integrating critical joint
resources. Whether the urban operation is the major operation itself or
one of many tasks in a larger operation, Army commanders assess and
thoroughly shape the conditions so subordinate tactical commanders can
dominate in the complex urban environment.
NECESSITY OF URBAN OPERATIONS
4-1. Early in plan-
ning, commanders of
a major operation
address the necessity
of conducting opera-
tions in urban areas
located throughout
Risk management is the
process of identifying,
assessing, and controlling
risk arising from operational
their areas of opera- factors, and making an
tions (AOs). Chap- informed decision that
ter 1 discussed stra- balances risk cost with
tegic and operational mission benefits.
considerations that :
compel forces to
operate in urban
areas. These reasons
include the location of
the threat force; cri-
tical infrastructure or
capabilities that are operationally or strategically valuable; the geographic
location of an urban area; and the area’s political, economic, or cultural signi-
ficance. Several considerations exist, that may make UO unnecessary, unwar-
ranted, or inefficient. When determining whether to operate in an urban
environment, commanders consider the operational (and accidental) risks and
balance them with mission benefits. The factors shown in Figure 4-1 high-
light some measures to evaluate the risks associated with UO.
Figure 4-1. Risk Management and the Risks
Associated With Urban Operations
FORCE STRENGTH
4-2. When facing prospective UO, commanders consider if they have troops
available to conduct the operation properly and with acceptable risk. Under
normal circumstances, large urban areas require many forces merely to
establish control. New York City police department has over thirty thousand
officers simply to conduct peacetime law enforcement. Major UO, particularly
those that are opposed, will often require a significant number of forces. If
commanders lack sufficient force to conduct effective operations, they may
postpone or consider not initiating those operations until they have the
necessary strength. Commanders add to their analysis the requirements for
troop strength elsewhere in the AO.
TYPE OF FORCES
4-3. Along with force strength, commanders consider the type of forces
available. This consideration includes an assessment of their level of training
4-2
CASUALTIES
Contemplating Urban Operations
in urban operations. All UO put a premium on well-trained, dismounted
infantry units. Therefore, Army forces conducting UO should be force tailored
to include a large infantry component. In addition, special operations forces
(SOF) are invaluable in UO. SOF include psychological operations (PSYOP)
and civil affairs (CA) forces. They should always be considered as part of the
task organization.
4-4. UO include combined arms to ensure tactical success in combat.
Although masses of heavy forces are not normally required, successful UO
require all the combined arms capabilities of all Army forces. Even if an
urban operation is unlikely to involve offensive and defensive operations,
field artillery may be essential to force protection. In urban stability opera-
tions and support operations, successful mission accomplishment requires
more robust CA organizations. They are also valuable in urban offensive and
defensive operations. While commanders may have sufficient combat and
combat support forces, they may lack enough combat service support forces to
provide the logistic support to maintain the tempo. Commanders without
balanced types of forces, to include their proficiency in operating in urban
environments, should consider alternatives to UO or delaying UO until
proper force types are trained and available in sufficient numbers.
4-5. Casualties in UO are more likely than in operations in other
environments. In urban offense and defense, friendly and threat forces often
engage at close range with little space to maneuver. The urban terrain
provides numerous advantages to the urban defender; higher casualties occur
among troops on the offensive, where frontal assaults may be the only tac-
tical option. Conversely, defenders with limited ability to withdraw can also
suffer high casualties when isolated and attacked. Casualties can be more
difficult to prevent in urban stability operations and support operations
because of the dense complex terrain, the close proximity of the urban popu-
lation, and the possible difficulty in distinguishing friend from foe. The
potential for high casualties and the subsequent need for casualty evacuation
under difficult circumstances make the positioning and availability of
adequate medical resources another important consideration.
4-6. Though casualties occur in all operations, commanders recognize the
likelihood of more casualties during large-scale or high-intensity UO. During
the battle for Hue in 1968, for example, many company-size units suffered
more than 60 percent casualties in only a few days of offensive operations.
Commanders conducting urban stability operations and support operations
know the casualty risk and how it relates to national and strategic objectives.
While a lower risk normally exists in stability operations and support
operations than in offensive and defensive operations, just one casualty may
adversely impact the success of the stability or support mission. A realistic
understanding of the risk and the nature of casualties resulting from UO
critically affect the decisionmaking process. If commanders assess the
casualty risk as high, they ensure that their higher headquarters under-
stands their assessment and that the objectives sought within the urban area
are commensurate with the anticipated risk.
4-3
FM 3-06
MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT
4-7. Offensive and defensive operations in an urban environment put a pre-
mium on certain types of munitions and equipment. Forces may want to use
vast amounts of precision munitions in the urban environment. At the tac-
tical level, they will likely use more munitions than during operations in
other environments. These munitions include—
e Grenades (fragmentation, concussion, stun, riot control, and smoke).
e Mortar ammunition (due to its rate of fire, responsiveness, and high-
angle fire characteristic).
e Explosives.
e Small arms.
Soldiers need access to special equipment necessary to execute small-unit
tactics effectively. In urban stability operations and support operations, this
equipment may include antiriot gear, such as batons, protective clothing, and
other nonlethal crowd control devices. In urban offensive and defensive
operations, special equipment can include sniper rifles, scaling ladders, knee
and elbow pads, and door busters. Soldiers can conduct UO with standard
clothing and military equipment. However, failure to equip them with the
right types and quantities of munitions and special equipment will make
mission success more difficult and costly. When commanders consider
whether to conduct UO, they evaluate the ability of combat service support to
provide the resources (see Chapter 9).
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
4-8. UO require an expanded view of risk assessment. When considering risk
to Army, joint, and multinational forces, commanders analyze the risk to the
area’s population and infrastructure. This comprehensive analysis includes
the second- and third-order effects of significant civil casualties and infra-
structure damage. Collateral damage can influence world and domestic
opinion of military operations and thus directly affect ongoing operations. It
also influences the postconflict physical environment and attitudes of the
population. Negative impressions of the civilian population caused by col-
lateral damage can take generations to overcome. Destroying an urban area
to save it is not a viable course of action for Army commanders. The density
of civilian populations in urban areas and the multidimensional nature of the
environment make it more likely that even accurate attacks with precision
weapons will injure noncombatants. Unavoidable collateral damage of suffi-
cient magnitude may justify avoiding UO, which, though it may be tactically
successful, may run counter to national and strategic objectives.
TIME AND MOMENTUM
4-4
4-9. Commanders conducting major operations analyze the time required to
conduct UO successfully. UO can be time consuming and can require large
quantities of resources. The density of the environment, the need for addi-
tional time to conduct a thorough reconnaissance, and the additional stress
and physical exertion imposed on Army forces operating in urban areas con-
sume time and slow momentum. Commanders cannot permit UO conducted
as a shaping operation to divert resources from the decisive operation. Nor
can they allow UO to interrupt critical time lines, unnecessarily slow tempo,
Contemplating Urban Operations
or delay the overall operation. Threat forces may conduct UO with the pri-
mary purpose of causing these effects. Commanders should avoid or minimize
UO that might delay or disrupt a larger operation to an unacceptable degree.
VULNERABILITIES
ESCALATION
4-10. Commanders weigh the potential for increased vulnerabilities when
executing UO. The density of the environment makes protection (safety, field
discipline, force protection, and especially fratricide avoidance) much more
difficult. Forces operating in a large urban area increase their risk of
isolation and defeat in detail. Joint capabilities, such as air power, work less
effectively to support a close urban battle than in some other environments.
Thus, responding to unexpected situations or augmenting disadvantageous
force ratios when applying joint capabilities is significantly more difficult.
Although organized, trained, and equipped for success in any environment,
the Army vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increases
when forces concentrate to conduct UO. Commanders may consider not
committing forces or limiting the size of a force committed to an urban area
because of increased vulnerability to (and likelihood of) attack by WMD.
4-11. Fratricide avoidance is a matter of concern for commanders in all
operations. The complex urban terrain and density of participating forces
coupled with typical battlefield effects—smoke, dust, burning fires—and
weather effects—fog, snow, rain, and clouds—immensely increase the poten-
tial for urban fratricide. Therefore, commanders increase emphasis on fratri-
cide prevention measures during UO. Causes can be procedural, technical, or
a combination of the two and include—
e Combat identification failures due to poor situational understanding,
lack of communication, and short engagement ranges coupled with the
need for quick reaction.
e Location errors involving either the target or enemy forces due to poor
situational understanding.
e Inappropriate command and control and fire support coordinating mea-
sures; a failure to receive, understand, or adhere to these measures.
e Imprecise weapons and munitions effects such as, an antitank round
that penetrates several walls before exploding near friendly forces.
4-12. The effects of fratricide can be devastating to UO and spread deeply
within the Army force. Critical effects include—
e Needless loss of combat power.
e Decreased confidence in leadership, weapons, and equipment. These
lead to a loss in initiative and aggressiveness, failure to use supporting
combat systems, and hesitation to conduct limited visibility operations.
e Disrupted operations and decreased tempo.
e General degradation of cohesion and morale.
4-13. In the urban environment, Army forces cannot avoid close contact with
enemy forces and civilians that may potentially become hostiles. In urban
stability operations and support operations, commanders consider the chance
of this contact escalating into confrontation and violence, which may become
4-5
FM 3-06
destabilizing. This consideration may limit or altogether preclude UO using
Army forces.
CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES AND RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
4-6
4-14. Since UO are often high risk, commanders should consider courses of
action that provide alternatives. When the objective of an urban operation is
a facility, commanders should consider replicating that facility outside of the
…[truncated]