SIREN v. City of San Jose (Santa Clara County Superior Court — filed Nov 2025)
EFF + ACLU of Northern California suit under the California Constitution, alleging 261,711 warrantless database searches in one year (~692/day).
Primary sources on smart-city surveillance — WEF publications, municipal vendor contracts, FOIA'd procurement records, and the ALPR / Flock Safety source record (EFF, ACLU, 404 Media, court filings, state laws — filter to case alpr-flock). Mirrored locally so the record survives link rot. For the live camera map and explainer, see the License-Plate Surveillance page.
Get an AI answer drawn only from the Smart Cities & Surveillance — WEF, Contracts, FOIA documents indexed here — every claim cited back to the filing or proceeding it came from. It will tell you plainly when the record doesn't cover your question, rather than guessing.
EFF + ACLU of Northern California suit under the California Constitution, alleging 261,711 warrantless database searches in one year (~692/day).
Class action against Flock itself under California's ALPR Privacy Act (SB 34), seeking statutory damages of at least $2,500 per violation; alleges out-of-state agencies searched SFPD's Flock data over 1.6M times in seven months.
A geofence-warrant case (not ALPR), but the Court held such a search implicates the Fourth Amendment and rejected the government's 'small slice of a big database' argument — reasoning that undercuts the Norfolk district-court rationale and strengthens Schmidt's appeal.
ACLU suit under Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The 2022 settlement permanently bars Clearview, nationwide, from selling or giving its faceprint database to most private entities, bars access to any Illinois state/local government body (including police) for five years, and requires an opt-out for Illinois residents. A separate $51.75M federal class-action settlement giving class members a ~23% equity stake in Clearview was approved in 2025.
The Fourth Circuit, en banc, ruled Baltimore's 'Aerial Investigation Research' program — run by private contractor Persistent Surveillance Systems, whose camera planes captured ~12 hours/day of movement across ~90% of the city — an unconstitutional warrantless search under Carpenter v. U.S., likening it to putting 'an ankle monitor on every person in the city.' A settlement bars Baltimore from running a similar program.
The first U.S. appellate ruling that using a cell-site simulator is a Fourth Amendment search ordinarily requiring a warrant. Baltimore Police used a 'Hailstorm' device without a warrant to force Andrews's phone to reveal its location inside a private home; the courts upheld suppression of the resulting evidence.
Let its Flock pilot lapse June 30, 2025 over ICE/data-sharing risk (an audit had found 20%+ of searches with no case number).
Unanimously terminated Sept 9, 2025 (11 cameras removed) after Flock admitted CBP access days after saying there was none.
Both terminated (Aug 2025) after Illinois audits found immigration-tagged out-of-state searches; Evanston issued a cease-and-desist when Flock re-installed removed cameras.
Unanimously terminated Feb 24, 2026 (30 cameras) after an audit found 'National/Statewide Lookup' on from the start and ATF + an Air Force base had accessed its data.
Let its contract expire March 31, 2026 (~110 cameras removed) over federal-immigration sharing; switched vendors. Mayor: 'We've heard the community loud and clear.'
A wave of 2026 cancellations, mostly over unauthorized federal/ICE access. Trackers count anywhere from ~30 (NPR, Feb 2026) to 53–82 (mid-2026) localities — the number keeps climbing.
Bars sharing ALPR data to enforce abortion or immigration law and requires a written declaration from any out-of-state agency before sharing (effective Jan 1, 2024). The Secretary of State used it to order CBP access shut off in 2025.
Bars public agencies from selling/sharing ALPR data except with other public agencies; creates a private right of action with $2,500 minimum damages. AG Bonta's 2023 bulletin declared out-of-state/federal sharing unlawful.
Virginia's first comprehensive ALPR statute (effective July 1, 2025): a 21-day retention limit, enumerated permitted uses, and annual reporting. The Governor's proposed 30-day extension was rejected.
Signed March 30, 2026: 21-day retention, prohibits ALPR use for immigration enforcement and reproductive/gender-affirming-care investigations, and bars collection near sensitive locations; willful violations are gross misdemeanors.
Flock Safety says its cameras help solve 'over 700,000 crimes each year' and supported 'more than 1 million criminal investigations' in 2025. Its headline 'share of crime solved' figure, though, is not a stable or comparable number: it moved from 2.5% (2022) to 10% (2024) to 20% (2026), and the base quietly shifted from 'reported crime' to 'solved/cleared cases.' Both the 700,000 and the 10% figures come from Flock-commissioned surveys, not government data — treat them as the company's own claims. Source: Flock Safety (2025 Impact Census).
Beyond the vendor claims are specific, independently-reported cases. Boulder (CO) police credited a Flock camera with locating a 16-year-old AMBER-alert victim within minutes ('without this technology, we would send this information out statewide'); a kidnapped 1-year-old was recovered across state lines in Arizona after a Flock hit; and departments in Whiteville NC, Virginia Beach VA, El Cajon CA and Bluffton SC have credited ALPR hits with homicide arrests within hours. Source: Denver7 / AZFamily / local police.
In Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (Jan 27, 2026) a federal judge granted summary judgment for the city, holding Norfolk's ALPR system does not 'track the whole of a person's movements' — but expressly hedged, 'at least in Norfolk, Virginia, the answer is: not today,' warning it could become too intrusive as coverage grows; it is on appeal at the Fourth Circuit. Other rulings agree a plate 'in plain view' carries no reasonable expectation of privacy (Commonwealth v. Church, VA; Bednarz v. Illinois State Police; U.S. v. Yang, 9th Cir.). Source: WHRO / court opinions.
Flock argues ALPRs 'observe vehicles, not people,' that 'license plates are public by design,' and that its cameras create 'discrete, point-in-time observations… rather than an always-on dossier,' with 30-day default retention, hard deletion, encryption, and an audit trail of every search reason. Police groups like the IACP treat ALPR as legitimate when queries are tied to a case number, run by trained users, and audited. Source: Flock Safety / IACP.