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Court Proceeding — Charlie Kirk Killing: Tyler Robinson Case Will Go to Trial
Court proceeding — State of Utah v. Tyler James Robinson (Case 251403576, 4th Judicial Dist. Ct., Utah County). Transcript is the YouTube auto-caption track of the Court TV feed (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtT3mLflyxk) — verbatim ASR, not a certified court transcript.
not the presence of all parties and Mr. Robinson, Miss Kirk as well. I appreciate your patience with this court. This court takes this responsibility very seriously and uh going into today's hearing. Uh, I read the briefs, looked at the evidence time and time again and came in with a basic [clears throat] format of my ruling, but I saved I felt it was important not to reach ultimate conclusions until after the oral argument. And so that's what's taken additional time to keep an open mind even up until this point. With that in mind, I I just remind the parties that uh I understand that this can affect all sides. Uh Mr. Robinson and and those associated with him, Miss Kirk and Miss those associated with her. So, I ask you to do your best as as we move forward and the court will begin reading its ruling. Before the court is states motion to bind defendant Tyler James Robinson over in trial in district court in all seven counts charged in the information. The charges include count one aggravated murder, a capital offense together with the state's victim targeting notice. Count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, a first-degree felony. Counts three and four, obstruction of justice, seconddegree felonies. Counts five and six, tampering with a witness, thirdderee felonies. And count seven, violent offense committed in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, which the state alleges is reclassified as a class A misdemeanor under 76-3-203.14. And I'm going to admit reading the citations just uh in the interest of time. I will be filing this within 24 hours. So that will be there. The court acting as a magistrate conducted a five-day preliminary hearing from July 6th to July 10th of this year. The court received testimony from several witnesses, including Utah State Bureau of Investigations agents Brian Davis and David Hull, FBI Forensic DNA Examiner Amanda Baker, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, uh, Samantha Carner. The court also provisionally admitted and reviewed extensive video and other exhibits. Following the evidentiary hearing, the court ordered post-hering briefing. The state filed its memorandum in support of a preliminary hearing bindover on July 28th, 2026. Defendant filed his preliminary hearing briefing on August 11th, 2026 and the state filed its reply memorandum on August 18th, 2026. Oral argument was heard today. Having considered the party's written submissions, the evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing, the arguments of councel and governing authorities, the court enters this ruling in order. The findings and conclus conclusions in this ruling and order are preliminary and apply only under the standards governing a Utah preliminary hearing. They do not determine defendants's guilt, the ultimate credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence, or the admissibility of evidence at trial. On September 10th, 2025, Turning Point USA hosted an event at Utah Valley University in Oram, Utah. The invent the event included public discussion of political, social, cultural, and religious issues. Charlie Kirk, the founder of Turning Point USA, was the headline speaker and was scheduled to speak to participants and answer their questions. The event took place in the campus courtyard and outdoor amphitheater located in the middle of several campus buildings. Thousands of participants gathered in the courtyard and surrounding areas, including at least two children. A white canopy tent was set up on the west side of the courtyard adjacent to the Hall of Flags, a raised walkway that runs north south through campus. Mr. Kirk entered the courtyard by walking underneath the Hall of Flags to the white tent. At approximately 12:20, Mr. Kirk was seated on the raised chair under the middle of the tent behind a U-shaped table. A man standing to the right of and behind Mr. Kirk southwest at an unknown distance from Mr. Kirk. The man was close enough that his body is positioned underneath the tent. Another man was standing to the left of and in front of Mr. Kirk and the tent northeast at an unknown distance from Mr. Kirk. Another man was standing to the right and in front of Mr. Kirk and the tent southeast. A participant was standing at the microphone positioned in front of the tent east at an unknown distance for Mr. Kirk. The front row of the crowd of participants was located east of the microphone at an unknown distance for Mr. Kirk. The participant at the microphone and the crowd were separated from Mr. Kirk's tent by a patch of grass of unknown dimensions and barriers. At approximately 12:23 that afternoon, Mr. Kirk was answering a question from a participant standing at the microphone. Officer Christopher Bailey with the Utah Valley University campus police heard a rifle shot from the east. He saw Mr. Kirk lean and fall to his left. The maning standing to Mr. Kirk's right took more than two steps to reach Mr. Kirk's side. Mr. Kirk's security team carried him out of the courtyard under the Hall of Flags and to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. Mr. Kirk died by a gunshot wound to his neck. Forensic examination of bullet fragments found in Mr. Kirk's body revealed the bullet to be a uh 30 caliber class round. The trajectory of the bullet was anatomically from front to back, slightly left to right and downward. The bullet did not exit Mr. Kirk's body, but came to rest in tissues in his upper back left of the middle line. Officer Begley served searched the roof of the Losi Center, a campus building east of but not directly adjacent to the courtyard. The top of the Losi Center is made up of two shades of gravel, a dark gray and lighter gray. It has four stories, including an atrium on the roof. There is a public outside stairway attached to the building that leads to the pathway going east. A guardrail protects the roof of the Losi Center from the pathway, but the guardrail is short enough to be jumped over. When persons stand on the southwest corner of the roof of the Losi center, there is a clear line of sight to the white canopy tent where Charlie Kirk was sitting. Officer Begley found a red and black screwdriver approximately 10 to 15 ft west of the guard rail on the roof of the Losi center. He saw disturbances in the rooftop gravel on the southwest corner of the building. The disturbances were described by Officer Begley as consistent with a sniper pad, meaning a place where a person was lying in a prone position with a line of sight to where Mr. Kirk had been seated. The distance from the perch area to the tent was approximately 415 ft angled downward. The elevation difference between the perch and the tent is approximately 68 ft. Around 6:00 p.m. that day, investigators located a rifle wrapped in black towel in a wooded area on the north side of Campus Drive, an area to the northeast of the Losi Center. The rifle was a Mouser model 98 bolt action that had been retrofitted fitted to a 300 6 barrel and was in operable condition. It contained an optical accessory. A boltaction rifle requires a user to manipulate the bolt to load it, lock it, and extract anything that is in it, including a spent shell casing. When investigators located the rifle, they found one 3006 fired cartridge casing, as well as three unfired cartridges. The casing and unfired cartridges had engravings on them. The towel, rifle, casing, and cartridges were sent to the FT FBI for testing. Further investigation revealed that in the early morning hours of September 10th, 2025, Mr. Robinson left his apartment in St. George, Utah, and traveled to Utah Valley campus in Oram, Utah. At 8:30 a.m., a gray or silver Dodge Charger entered the parking garage on campus. The Charger, including its distinctive wheels, is consistent with a car owned by Mr. Robinson. A person identified as Mr. Robinson exited the Charger and walked on foot out of the parking garage toward the outdoor amphitheater on campus. He was wearing a maroon short sleeved shirt, shorts, a hat, and a backpack. He spoke with representatives from Turning Point, USA, then returned to his vehicle at approximately 9:25 a.m. He drove out of the parking garage. Surveillance video surveillance captured a person identified as Mr. Robinson returning to campus on foot from the northeast just after 10:00 a.m. He ate at Chick-fil-A in the Sorenson Center, one of the buildings adjacent to the outdoor amphitheater. He then walked to the northeast of campus to a wooded area and on the north side of Campus Drive. Just prior to 11:00 a.m. he returned to campus, walked up the exterior stairway of the Losi Center building to the guard rail that if climbed over could give access to the roof of the building. He then walked back down the stairs and off campus. At 11:53 a.m., a person I identified as Mr. Robinson then returned to campus wearing the same shoes but different clothing, a dark long sleeved shirt, jeans, and a backpack. He walked with a gate or limp, his right leg stiff. He had nothing in his hands. Video surveillance just afternoon captured a person wearing a dark clothing and a backpack slowly walking and limping down the sidewalk in front of the Loi Center toward the exterior staircase that leads to the roof. At approximately 12:15 p.m., video surveillance captured a person wearing a dark long sleeve shirt and pants at the top of the exterior staircase of the Loi Center. The person climbs or rolls over the guardrail, separating the walkway from the roof of the building. At approximately 12:22 p.m., the same person is seen running toward the southwest corner of the rooftop of the Losi center. He crouches down, crawls, and stomps in a prone position for approximately 45 seconds. He then gets up and runs from the southwest corner of the roof to the northeast corner of the roof. He is holding a long skinny dark object in his hand. He lowers himself off the roof and lands on the grass. He walks towards Campus Drive, crosses the street, and enters the wooded area. At approximately 11 p.m., Mr. Lance Twigs, Mr. Robinson's roommate, whom he had been dating, received a text from Mr. Robinson's phone number. The text told Mr. twigs to look under his keyboard. Under the keyboard was a note purportedly written by Robinson explaining that he had left the house that morning on a mission. It states, "I had the opportunity to take out Charlie Cook, Kirk, and I took it." The note further states, "I wish we could have lived in a world where this did not feel necessary." Mr. Twigs took a picture of the note. Mr. Mr. Twigs responded to the text from Mr. Robinson's phone and asked, "You're joking, right?" The texter explained that he was still in ORM because he had left his rifle wrapped in a towel in a bush where he changed outfits. The texter explains, "If I am able to grab my rifle unseen, I will have left no evidence." ID K. if it had a serial number, but it wouldn't trace to me. I worry about Prince. I might have to abandon it and hope they don't find Prince. He continues, "Judging from today, I would say Grandpa's gun does just fine. IDK, I think it was a 2000 a $2,000 scope or a 2K scope." When Mr. Mr. Twigs asked, "You weren't the one who did it, right?" The texter responded, "I am. I'm sorry." When Mr. Twigs asked why he did it, the texter responded, "I had enough of his hatred. Some hate can't be negotiated out." When asked how long he had been planning this, the texter responded, "A bit over a week, I believe." The texter directed Mr. Twigs to delete this exchange. Near the end of the text exchange, the texter directs, "If any police ask you questions, ask for a lawyer and stay silent." The texter also told Mr. Twigs he was going to willingly turn himself in. At approximately 12:30 a.m. on September 11th, 2025, Mr. Robinson had an interaction with Officer Go forth while his vehicle was stopped on campus drive. Nest video obtained from a home located uh in Oram shows a car matching Mr. Robinson's J Dodge park charger parked out front at approximately 12:38 12:38 a.m. on September 11th. On the morning of September 11th, 2025, Mr. Twigs asked Mr. Robinson in person if what he had said the night before was true. Mr. Robinson responded that it was and that he had wished he had not done it. Just before 8:00 p.m. on September 11th, a message was sent from Mr. Robinson's account to his Discord group stating, "Hey guys, I have some bad news for you all. It was me at UVU yesterday. I'm sorry for all of this. I'm surrening surrendering through a sheriff friend in a few moments." At approximately 8:30 p.m., a family friend went to pick up Mr. Robinson and take him to the sheriff's office. He asked Mr. Robinson if he had any property or clothes that he used during the incident. Mr. Robinson responded that he had discarded those items. At approximately 900 p.m., Mr. Robinson arrived at the Washington County Sheriff's Office. He was wearing a maroon shirt and jeans. Investigators searched Mr. Robinson's home. They collected a Dremel tool, its bits container, two boxes of 3006 ammunition, some 300 6 cartridge cases, and a burned paper that had markings consistent with the note Mr. Robinson left for Mr. Twix. Investigators also found shooting targets in a closet with preparations in them consistent with bullet holes. The FBI performed DNA testing on the screwdriver, towel, rifle, spent casings, and three fired three unfired cartridges found near the scene. The testing provided support for the for inclusion of Mr. Robinson's DNA on each item. Turning to the evidentiary standards at the preliminary hearing stage. The primary purpose of the preliminary hearing is the fariting out of groundless and improvident prosecutions. Before a defendant may be bound over for trial in district court, the magistrate must find probable cause to believe the crime charge has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. The prosecution's burden is light and merely requires the state to produce believable evidence of all elements of the crime charged. This is the same standard that applies on review of an arrest warrant. The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. Magistrates may disregard evidence as incredible only where it is so contradictory, inconsistent, or unbelievable that it is unreasonable to base belief of an element of the prosecutor's claim on that evidence. It is not appropriate for a magistrate to weigh credibility, but conflicting evidence at a preliminary hearing because such a hearing is not a trial on the merits. Rather, magistrates must leave all the weighing of credibility but conflicting evidence to the trier of fact. Nevertheless, magistrates are free to decline bind over where the facts presented by the prosecution provide no more than a basis for speculation as opposed to providing a basis for a reasonable belief. To be sure, the line separating speculation from reasonable inference can at times be faint. An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them. On the other hand, speculation is the active practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge at hand. In short, the difference between an inference and speculation depends on whether the underlining facts support the conclusion. Turning to the constitutional and statutory validity of hearsay evidence under rule 1102. Throughout the preliminary hearing, defendant Tyler James Robinson raised and maintained a continuing objection to the state's reliance on outofc court hearsay statements. Specifically, defendant challenges the constitutional and statutory validity of admitting outofc court witness statements, medical examiner autopsies, and digital communications under Utah rule of evidence 1102. Defendant asserts the state's reliance on such hearsay evidence one violates his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. two, deprivives him of the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Three, violates his 14th amendment due process rights, and four, infringes upon the separation of powers under the Utah Constitution by delegating judicial authority to define admissible evidence to legislative or rule-based bodies. The court addresses each objection in turn. The admissibility of reliable hearsay at a pre criminal preliminary examination is governed by the plain text of the Utah Constitution and rule 1102 of the Utah rules of evidence. Uh, the 1995 victim's rights amendment to the Utah Constitution expressly provides, "Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pre-trial proceeding with respect to the release of a defendant. if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. Pursuant to this explicit constitutional authorization, Utah rule of evidence 1102A codifies that reliable hearsay is admissible at pre criminal preliminary examinations. Under rule 1102B, the law defines specific structured categories of outofc court assertions that constitute reliable hearsay, including evidence establishing the foundation for or the auenticity of any exhibit under subsection B3, medical and autopsy reports and records under subsection B5, and a declarance statement that is written, recorded, or transcribed verb. verbatim and that is made under oath or affirmation or after notification that a false statement is punishable under subsection B8 confrontation clause. Defendant argues that the state's reliance on testimonial hearsay without an opportunity for cross-examination violates the sixth amendment. The court recognizes the significance of that protection at trial under state v. Timberman. However, the federal con confrontational clause does not apply to a Utah preliminary hearing in the same manner because the proceeding determines probable cause rather than guilt. Accordingly, defendants confrontation clause objection does not provide a basis at this stage to exclude hearsay that otherwise satisfies rule 1102. Nor does Crawford v. Washington require a different result. Timberman explains that Crawford addresses the testimonial hearsay at trial and does not extend to the trial level confrontation right to a Utah preliminary examination. Assistance of counsel and due process defendant also argues that admitting out of court statements without an opportunity to cross-examine the declarance renders his right to counsel ineffective. Opposition I'm [clears throat] sorry. Uh the court is not persuaded that the right to counsel provides a broader right to cross-examination and outofc court declarant when the confrontation clause itself does not apply at the preliminary hearing. Defendant was represented by councel who challenged the state's probable cause showing and cross-examined the witnesses who testified. On this record, the C court finds no independent violation, a defendant's right to counsel arising from the consideration of hearsay that otherwise satisfies rule 1102. Defendant's due process argument likewise does not establish a constitutional violation. The admission of reliable hearsay at this stage does not violate the 14th amendment's due process clause. Gersteing VPU holds that full adversarial proceedings, including cross-examination of adverse witnesses, is not constitutionally required for a pre-trial probable cause determination. A Utah preliminary hearing likewise determines whether the state has established probable cause. It does not adjudicate guilt because defendant retains the full trial level protections applicable to the adjudication of guilt. Consideration of reliable hearsay at this preliminary stage does not independently violate due process. Separations of power and application to evidence. Finally, the court considers defendant separations of power argument and concludes it does not establish a constitutional violation. Article 1, section 12 expressly permits reliable hearsay at a preliminary examination when that hearsay is defined by statute or rule. Rule 1102 implements that constitutional authorization. The rule does not displace the magistrate's judicial function. The court remains responsible for determining whether the evidence satisfies the governing evidentiary rule and whether the state has established probable cause under rule 7b. The court therefore concludes that the application of rule 1102 in this proceeding does not violate the separation of powers. Rule 1102 does not render all hearsay admissible. Agents Davis and Hull, Examiner Baker and Examiner Carner, testified at the preliminary hearing and satisfied the witness requirement of rule 1102E and rule 7B subd. The medical examiner's report falls within rule 1102B5 and the evidence and the evidence establishing foundation or authenticity falls within subsection B3. The twig statement may be considered under subsection B8 only to the extent the record establishes that the subsections required that it establishes that subsections required predicate. Any other hearsay on which the court relies must independently satisfy subsection B9 including its reliability requirement. The court only relies the court relies only on hearsay satisfying these requirements. an analysis of charges and probable cause determinations. Having resolved the defendant's threshold, constitutional objections, the court now turns to a count bycount review of the evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing to determine whether the state has made met its burden of establishing probable cause. Count one, aggravated murder, capital felony. To bind Mr. Robinson over for trial for count one, aggravated murder, the state must first present sufficient evidence to sustain a reasonable belief that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Charlie Kirk. A person engages in conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause a result. To bind defendant over for trial on count one, aggravated murder, the state must establish probable cause that one, Mr. Robinson, two, intentionally or knowingly, three, caused the death of Charlie Kirk, four, under circumstances in which defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to another individual other than Charlie Kirk and the defendant. The state's evidence of identity is substantial, combining forensic DNA matching with statements attributed to defendant admitting responsibility for the shooting. First, the DNA profiles obtained from the Mouser 306 caliber boltaction rifle, uh, the suspected murder weapon, provide forensic evidence connecting defendant to the firearm. Defendant's DNA was identified as a major contributor on multiple key components of the firearm, including the stock, grips, butt plate, the trigger, and trigger guard. This physical evidence is cooperated by the toolmark analysis, which matches the engraving cutter recovered from defendants's residence to the cartridge causing casing and live ammunition found within the Mouser rifle. Furthermore, the FBI DNA analysis places defendants's DNA on a screwdriver recovered at the crime scene with a likelihood ratio exceeding 30 quintilion. Second, the surveillance tracking evidence provides additional cooperation. Agent Hull's review of this campus surveillance footage tracked a suspect matching defendant's physical attributes, clothing, shoes, and distinct gate from the parking structure to the rooftop on the lowility associated with the shooting and then fleeing the scene immediately following the shooting. This physical tracking is reinforced by Miss Noble's Ring doorbell camera footage, which captured defendants's vehicle identified by its unique wheels and custom styling parking near the location shortly after midnight on September 11th, 2025. Third, defendant's own statements provide direct evidence of his alleged responsibility for the shooting. In text messages sent to his roommate Lance Twix shortly after the shooting, defendant allegedly stated, "I had the opportunity to take out Charlie Kirk and I took it." He followed this with a second text message addressing why he acted. Why did I do it? I had enough of his hatred. Some hate can't be negotiated out. These electronic statements are further cooperated by the alleged in-person confirmation to twigs following the morning the following morning and subsequent message from defendants's discord account stating it was me at UVU yesterday. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. This evidence is sufficient at this stage to support a reasonable belief that defendant is the individual who shot and killed Charlie Kirk. Accordingly, the state has demonstrated probable cause as to the identity and homicide elements of count one. Turning to the legal framework uh uh aggravating circumstances under state vosa herto the central legal dispute concerning the aggravating circumstance alleged under Utah code 76-5-202 sub2 I which requires probable cause that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to another individual other than the deceased indiv individual and defendant in that uh this case provides the controlling Utah Supreme Court analysis. The court explained that the relevant circumstances are not necessarily confined to the precise act causing death. A risk-creating act occurring within a brief span of time may qualify when it forms part of a sufficient connected series of events surrounding the murder. The court identified several non-exclusive considerations bearing on that inquiry, including the temporal relationship between uh the the act and conduct endangering a third party, the spatial relationship among the defendant, victim, and third party, and whether and to what extent the third party was actually threatened. Those considerations guide the statutory inquiry. they do not replace it. The ultimate question remains whether the circumstances support a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to another individual within the relevant zone of danger, one involving a likelihood or high probability rather than a mere possibility. Unlike Sosa Huerto, the state does not allege here that the defendant filed fired a separate shot at a third party immediately before or during the killing. The alleged a aggravator therefore depends principally on whether the circumstances of a single shot directed at Mr. Kirk placed at least one other individual within a zone of danger and whether the defendant knew of the circumstances creating that risk. That factual distinction does not make Sosa Huerto inapplicable, but it requires the application of its governing principles to the evidence presented here rather than treatment of its particular facts as dispositive. Defendant emphasizes that Sosa Huerto involved conduct materially different from conduct alleged here. There the defendant fired at a third party shortly before firing the shots that killed the murder victim. Here, by [snorts] contrast, the state alleges a single shot fired from approximately 415 feet away that struck the intended victim. Defendant argues that because the shot struck Mr. Kirk and no additional shot was fired, the the evidence establishes only a theoretical possibility rather than a high probability of death to another person. This is the distinction is material but not dispositive. Sosa Huerto does not require a separate shot directed at a third party in every case. At the same time, the statute requires more than the abstract possibility that any discharge of a firearm might injure a bystander. Nor does the court conclude that firing toward a crowded event without more sub 2AI. The court therefore considers the actual spatial circumstances surrounding the shot, the proximity of other individuals to Mr. Kirk, and the evidence bearing on defendants's knowledge of those circumstances. First, the record places several individuals in positions around Mr. Kirk in the canopy. When the shot was fired, Mr. Kirk was seated beneath the canopy. One member of his security team was sufficiently close that his body was beneath the tent. Another was positioned to the left and in front of Mr. Kirk and another to the right and in front, although the record does not establish their precise distance from him. A participant stood at a microphone east of and in front of Mr. Kirk. Although the precise distance between the participant and Mr. Kirk was likewise not established, the Losi center was east of the courtyard and the southwest southwest rooftop area provided a clear line of sight to the canopy where Mr. Kirk was seated. The court relies on those documented positions rather than assuming measurements not established by the record. Second, the physical evidence established the shot was fired from an elevated position approximately 415 ft from the canopy and approximately 68 ft above it and that the bullet traveled anatomically from front to back and downward after striking Mr. Kirk. The projectile did not exit his body. The court therefore does not assign a quantitative probability to ricochet over penetration or a hypothetical hypothetical deviation in aim that the evidence does not itself quantify. Rather, the relevant evidence is the defendant allegedly discharged a 306 rifle toward a seated victim while several other individuals occupied positions in and around the canopy area. viewed favorably to the state. Their documented positions in relation to the intended target considered together with the elevated location and downward direction of the shot permit a reasonable inference at the probable at the preliminary hearing stage that at least onethird party was within the relevant zone of danger and that the risk was more than an abstract possibility. Third, the state has presented evidence supporting probable cause as to the defendant's knowledge of those circumstances. Defendant was present in and around the event before the shooting. Earlier that morning, he walked through the amphitheater area and interacted with Turning Point representatives. He later approached the Losi Center rooftop area before returning before returning shortly before the shooting. The evidence therefore supports an inference that defendant had opportunities to observe the event area, its configuration, and the gathering attendees. From the southwest roof area, there was a clear line of sight to Mr. Kirk's canopy. The rifle also contained an op optical accessory. without making findings of fact about the degree of magnification or precisely what the defendant saw through the optic. These circumstances support a reasonable inference that defendant was aware that other individuals were positioned near Mr. Kirk when he fired. The court distinguishes between the objective circumstances creating the alleged risk and the defendant's knowledge of those circumstances. The state need not establish at this stage that the defendant calculated a particular ballistic probability. It must however present evidence permitting a reasonable inference both that another person was exposed to the statutoily required degree of risk and that the defendant was aware of the circumstances giving rise to that risk. The evidence described above is sufficient under the preliminary hearing standard as to both inquiries. Defendant's contrary argument is substantial. Unlike Sosa Huerto, the evidence described here does not include a separate shot directed at the alleged endangered third party. The court therefore does not treat Sosa Huerto as factually equivalent to this case. The question at this stage, however, is not whether the state proved the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt or whether defendants competing interpretation is ultimately more persuasive. It is whether believable evidence and reasonable inferences support probable cause as to each element. Under that limited standard, the state has met its burden. The court's determination does not rest on crowd size alone or an assumption assumed probability of wind ricochet over penetration or bullet deflection. It rests on the evidence concerning the location and manner of the shot, the documented position of several individuals in and around the canopy area, defendants's opportunity to observe those circumstances, and the preliminary hearing requirement that reasonable inferences be drawn in the state's favor. Whether the state can prove the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt remains for trial. Count one is bound over for trial. This conclusion is limited to the circumstances reflected in this record and does not establish a categorical rule that a shooting committed in a populated location necessarily satisfies 76-5-202 sub2. The state also alleges that the defendant intentionally selected Mr. Kirk because of Mr. Kirk's political expression under Utah code 76-6 defendant disputes whether the evidence establishes the required motive for the reasons set forth below in the court's analysis of the sentencing enhancements. The court concludes that the state has established probable cause as to the victim targeting allegation. The court does not rely on defendants political associations, beliefs, or personal relationships standing alone. The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence reasonably supports an inference that defendant selected Mr. Kirk because of defendants's perception of Mr. Kirk's protected political expression. As does not expressly identify an additional penalty consequence for the capital felony conviction. The court therefore preserves the state's notice without deciding that the allegation independently alters the penalty applicable to count one. Count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, firstdegree felony to bind defendant over on count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury. a firstdegree felony under Utah code 76-11-210 sub 2 and sub3C the state must establish probable cause that defendant one discharged the firearm two in the direction of Charlie Kirk three knowing or having reason to believe that Charlie Kirk may be endangered by the discharge and four that the act caused serious serious bodily injury to Charlie Kirk perk. The evidence described above supports a reasonable belief that defendant positioned himself on the roof of the Losi building and discharged a Mouser 306 rifle in the direction of Charlie Kirk. The medical examiner determined that Mr. Kirk died from a gunshot wound to the neck and classified the manner of death as homicide. The fatal gunshot wound constitutes serious bodily injury. Accordingly, count two is bound over for trial. Count three, obstruction of justice, seconddegree felony. to bind, defend over on count three, obstruction of justice, a secondderee felony under Utah code 76-8-306 sub 2. The state must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant one acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person. two, regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense, and three, conduct concealed or removed the firearm allegedly used in the shooting. Under the statute, the offense is a secondderee felony if the underlining conduct constitutes a capital or firstdegree felony. The underlying charged homicide constitutes a capital or firstdegree felony for purposes of 76-8-306 sub 2C. Following the shooting, the Ma 306 rifle was concealed in a dense wooded area on UVU's campus wrapped inside a dark towel. Defendant's alleged intent to hinder the investigation is supported by text messages attributed to him in which he stated he had concealed his rifle by leaving it in a bush where he changed outfits. The alleged concealment of the rifle in a wooded area after the shooting, together with the attributed messages concerning its concealment and possible recovery, supports a reasonable inference that defendant acted with intent to conceal physical evidence and hinder his apprehension. Count three is bound over for trial. Count four, obstruction of justice, a secondderee felony. to bind defend over to bind defendant over on count four obstruction of justice a seconddegree felony under Utah code 76-8-306 sub 2 the state must establish probable cause that defendant one acted with the intent to hinder delay or prevent the investigation apprehension prosecution conviction or punishment of any person to regarding conduct that constitutes utes a criminal offense and three destroyed, concealed or removed the clothing allegedly worn during the shooting. The state has presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause as to count four. The UVU surveillance video depicts the shooter wearing a specific outfit as he moved toward the rooftop of the Losi building. The communications attributed to defendants state that he had changed outfits in the wooded area where the rifle was left. The clothing depicted on the alleged shooter was not recovered. Those circumstance those circumstances viewed together support a reasonable inference for the purposes of this preliminary hearing that defendant concealed or destroyed the clothing with the intent required by the statute. Count four is bound over for trial. Count five, tampering with a witness, a thirdderee felony. to bind defendant over on count five tampering with a witness a thirdderee felony under Utah code 76-8-508. The state must demonstrate probable cause that defendant one believing an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted or intended to prevent an official proceeding or investigation. and two attempted to induce or otherwise cause another individual to withhold testimony, information, a document, or an item. An instruction to An instruction to delete communications may constitute an attempt to cause another person to withhold information or a document when made with the intent required by Utah Code 76-8-508. After the shooting, defendant allegedly sent Twigs text messages in which he stated he had shot the victim and concealed the rifle. At the end of this text exchange, defendant texted Twigs, "Delete this exchange." The surrounding circumstances support an inference that defendant knew law enforcement was investigating the shooting and searching for the person responsible. The instruction to delete this exchange, considered in context, supports a reasonable inference that defendant attempted to cause twigs to withhold those communications from investigators by deleting them. Count five is bound over for trial. Count six, tampering with a witness, a thirdderee felony. To bind defendant over on count six, tampering with a witness, a thirdderee felony under Utah code 76-8-508. The state must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant one believed an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted or intended to prevent an official proceeding or investigation and two attempted to induce or otherwise cause another individual to withhold testimony, information, a document or an item. The state alleges that the defendant committed this offense by directing his roommate to stay silent if police questioned him. The evidence shows that on September 11th, 2025, defendant sent a text message to Lance Twigs stating, "If any police ask you questions, ask for a lawyer and stay silent." Defendant argues that count six must be stricken as a matter of law. He contends that this message was merely advising a loved one to exercise constitutional rights to remain silent and seek counsel which cannot standing alone constitute a criminal offense. Defendant therefore argues that the record does not support the required obstructive intent. The court considers this a meaningful distinction because the words ask for a lawyer and stay silent viewed in isolation describe a lawful advice concerning constitutional rights and do not themselves establish criminal intent. Standing alone advising another person to request counsel or remain sil silent is lawful and does not establish witness tampering. The state relies, however, on the context of the communication, including defendants's earlier alleged instruction to delete this exchange. Viewed together in the light most favorable to the state, those communications permit a reasonable inference that defendant intended to cause Twigs to withhold information from investigators. The court does not determine at this stage whether that inference is ultimately more persuasive than defendants's lawful advice explanation and it does not treat the exercise of legal rights or advice concerning those rights as criminal conduct standing alone. Although defendants lawful advice interpretation remains a reasonable competing interpretation, the surrounding communications permit the state's proposed inferences as well. Because the court may not choose between reasonable competing inferences at this preliminary stage, probable cause supports count six. Count six is bound over for trial. Count seven, violent offense committed in the presence of child. Class B misdemeanor reclassified as a class A misdemeanor. To bind defendant over on count seven, violent offense committed in the presence of a child. A class B misdemeanor under Utah sub 2 and3. The state must demonstrate probable cause that defendant one committed criminal homicide. two, in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years old, and three, with knowledge that the child was present and may have seen or heard the commission of the criminal homicide. The state further alleges that the offense is reclassified as a class A misdemeanor under 76-3-203.14 sub3AI because of the victim targeting allegation. The first two elements are supported by the evidence of the charged homicide and evidence that children younger than 14 were physically present at the event. The disputed and closer issue is knowledge. Defendant argues that state has not shown that from a distance of approximately uh 415 ft he knew a child younger than 14 was present and might see or hear the offense. Knowledge may be esta may be established circumstantially but it cannot rest solely on the general proposition that children sometimes attend public events. The relevant question is whether the circumstances described in this record permit a reasonable inference that defendant knew a child was present. The state relies on several circumstances specific to this event. Defendant allegedly had planned the shooting for more than a week. He visited the event area twice before shooting the shooting and had an opportunity to observe the venue in preparations. The state's evidence places him at an elevated location with a clear line of sight toward the event area where thousands of participants were present and the rifle contained an optical scope. The events the event videos also depict young children and infants within the event area. The court recognizes the force of defendants's argument that an opportunity to observe a large crowd does not necessarily establish knowledge that a child younger than 14 was present. The court therefore does not infer knowledge from crowd size alone. The combined circumstances permit but do not compel an inference that defendant knew a child was present and might see or hear the shooting. The court does not equate familiarity with the venue, an opportunity to observe the crowd, or the presence of an optical scope with actual knowledge. Rather, the court considers the circumstances collectively and under the preliminary hearing requirement that reasonable inferences be drawn in the state's favor. Taken together, these circumstances are sufficient at this stage to establish probable cause as to the knowledge element. Whether defendant actually observed a child and whether the state's inference is ultimately persuasive remains a question for the tri of fact. Count seven is bound over for trial. Analysis of murder double jeopardy objections. Defendant argues that count two must merge with count one because both arise from a single gunshot directed at a single victim. Utah code 76-1-42 limits multiple convictions when one offense is included within another. But merger ordinarily concerns convictions and punishment and a fact dependent merger determination may be premature before the charges have been presented to the trior of fact. At this stage, the court determines only whether probable cause independently supports the charged offendant offenses. The court does not decide whether either offenses ultimately a lesser included offense of the other. If convictions are returned on both counts, the murder issue may be Analysis of the sentencing enhancements. The information presents three related but legally distinct matters. The separate offense charged in count seven The presence of a child sentencing and the victim targeting allegation Because these provisions have different legal effects, the court addresses them separately. Because a victim targeting allegation would classify count 7 from a class B to a class A misdemeanor under Utah code 76-3-203.14 sub3 AI. That allegation is subject to the probable cause determination. The court also considers whether the remaining sentencing allegations have factual support without deciding that each constitute a separate element of an offense. As it relates to presence of a child allegations for reasons stated in the analysis of count 7, the records provide probable cause for the factual allegation that the charged conduct occurred in the presence of children. Under 76-3-203.9, that circumstance operates as a sentencing consideration rather than a reclassification of the underlying felony. Victim targeting allegation under Utah rule of evidence 417 limits the use of defendants expressions or associations in providing a victim targeting allegation. The evidence must otherwise be admissible and must specifically relate to the defendant's selection of the victim. Pastor Engelhart's statement may establish the nature of Mr. Kirk's public expression but does not independently establish defendant's motive, knowledge, or state of mind. Defendant argues that the state has not established probable cause that he selected Mr. Kirk because of a qualifying personal attribute identified here as political expression. The court therefore considers Inglehart's statement only for the limited purpose described above and looks to other evidence to determine defendants's alleged reason for selecting Mr. Kirk. When asked why he shot Mr. Kirk, defendant allegedly responded, "I had enough of his hatred. Some hate can't be negotiated out." The word hatred standing alone is ambiguous and does not establish the statutory motive. The state also presented evidence that the defendant identified Mr. Kirk by name and communications concerning the planned shooting, allegedly planned shooting, allegedly planned the shooting in advance and carried it out during a public event associated with Mr. Kirk's political expression. Viewed together in the light most favorable to the state, those circumstances support a reasonable, though not compelled, inference that defendant selected Mr. Kirk because of his perception of Mr. Kirk's political expression. The court does not determine whether that inference will ultimately prove more persuasive than other interpretations of defendant's statement. At this stage, the targeting allegation satisfies the probable cause standard. Its legal consequence differs by count. for count seven uh 76-3-203.14 sub3 reclassifies the expense from a class B to a class A misdemeanor for count two a firstdegree felony. The statute makes the victim selection an aggravating sentencing consideration rather than reclassifying the offense. Section 76-3-203.14 does not expressly identify a penalty consequence for a capital felony. The court therefore does not decide that the statute authorizes an additional penalty for count one. The state's notice remains preserved, but any asserted consequence for capital felony convictions must rest on a separately identified legal authority. This ruling does not affect the targeting allegation as applied to counts two and seven. For the foregoing reasons and based off the record and parties submissions, it is hereby ordered that the defendant Tyler James Round Robinson is bound over for trial in the fourth judicial district court on the following counts in sentencing allegations. Count one, aggravated murder, a capital felony in violation of Utah code annotated 76-5-202, including the capital aggravating Count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, a firstdegree felony in violation of Utah sub 2 and sub3c, including the victim targeting allegation under 76-3-203.14 sub2 subject to the sentencing treatment and the presence of a child aggravating Count three, obstruction of justice, a secondderee felony in violation of Utah code annotated 76-8-306 sub2. Count four, obstruction of justice, a secondderee felony in violation of Utah code annotated 76-8-306 sub2. Count five, tampering with a witness, a thirdderee felony in violation of Utah code annotated 76-8-508. Count six, tampering with a witness, a thirdderee felony in violation of Utah code annotated 76-8-508. Count seven, violent offense committed in the presence of a child, a class A misdemeanor under Utah code annotated 76-3-203.10 10 reclassified as a class A misdemeanor sub3I based on the victim targeting targeting sub 2. All evidentiary determinations in this order are limited to the preliminary hearing and do not determine admissibility or the ultimate weight of evidence at trial. Nothing in this order constitutes a final determination of defendants's guilt or witness credibility. Defendant remains presumed innocent and the state bears the burden at trial of proving each charge offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is so ordered and that concludes the ruling of this court. does Mr. Robinson wish to enter into please today? Yes, your honor. We'll proceed with the arraignment. >> All right. And uh what please does he wish to enter into the record? >> And at this point, we would wave reading of the indictment. Um I'm sorry, wave reading of the information and um interpleas of not guilty on Mr. Robinson's behalf to all counts. >> All right. The court finds that that is knowingly and voluntarily made and uh that addresses that issue and we will set this for a pre-trial conference I'm sorry a pre-trial conference and council uh given that we have bind over and the arraignment has been accomplished uh at the next hearing I would like to set trial dates so as whatever time that we need, I ask that both parties look, and I know you're very busy and you have a lot going on, but the constitutional rights of Mr. Robinson are important, as are the constitutional rights afforded to Miss Erica Kirk. And so, when would the parties like to come back for pre-trial conference? Judge, we have uh I've had a brief discussion with defense council today about potential trial settings and so we've started that conversation. Uh we will um have that conversation within our office and try and map out how how much time we'll need. So we we'll be prepared when we appear next to the pre-trial conference to ask for a trial setting and give the the court an idea of how long we think we'll need. Um we would like to come back as soon as possible for the next setting, as soon as two weeks if the court can accommodate that. All right, Miss Nester, your honor, this is obviously a complex case that is um going to involve some lengthy discussions with the state um that involve pre-trial motion litigation that involve expert litigation that involve discovery litigation that involve u many many phases of trial before we even get to the trial. Um so I'm just not sure two weeks is enough to allow us to have that level of conversation with the state. Um so I would recommend maybe 30 days and that'll give us time to communicate, check our schedules. Um we have been looking at models in other cases of pre-trial scheduling orders um to recommend to the court in terms of mapping out the phases of the the case and giving us sufficient time to do each phase. um we've been gathering those and we e expect to propose a similar model to the state um and see if we can how much of it we can agree on and how much of it we can't um and so I just think we do need a little bit of time to do that um and I don't think two weeks is going to be sufficient so maybe 30 days would be sufficient your honor >> judge we can do our best to be ready from our perspective in two weeks but we'll submit it to the court >> all right uh councel >> your honor, on behalf of the the Kirk family, I want to briefly address the family speedy trial rights. Um Charlie devoted his life to building a community of over a million young people rooted in faith and freedom. He had hard conversations others were too afraid to have. Charlie was the opposite of hate. Charlie was the opposite of hate. Firing a bullet into a crowd and assassinating him, that is hate. And the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants many rights. The right to delay is not among them. The defendant is entitled to a fair trial and he must be given one, but nothing more is owed. We have no doubt this court will give the defendant a fair trial. We ask that it do so swiftly. Delay creates a vacuum and vacuums fill with speculation that distorts public understanding and erodess confidence in the courts. and that serves nobody, not the defendant, not the state, and not the public. So, the Kirk family respectfully asked this court to set the status conference promptly and to set this trial as soon as practically possible. >> Thank you. >> All right. Uh, can I >> say something? Well, this is not so under the Utah Constitution, Article One, Section 8, and other uh statutory provisions as it relates to victims of crime, they can weigh in on uh uh timing in setting of of of a trial. And so I have considered what was stated only to that extent, but I'm not opening this up to all parties to respond um just because I'm dealing with scheduling right now. >> I did not want to respond. I wanted to explain to the court why the state's suggestion of two weeks doesn't work for council. But if I don't need to do that, then I'll sit down. >> No, Mr. Novak, I appreciate you. it part of the statute does state if there is a delay that it be put on the record and and it looks like you are you're satisfying that requirement. So I appreciate that and if you'd like to put that on the record >> just very briefly because I know the hour is late. Um I am not personally available to meet and confer with the state or even with my own colleagues concerning what we view as a complicated um uh litigation schedule going forward. I am not available over the next 16 days. I don't need to explain why. And so we need time to discuss what we will propose to the state. The state will need time to consider our suggestions and we may need to file something with the court before the status conference so the court knows the views of of the of the parties. Okay. >> Thank you, Mr. Novak. >> Thank you. Also, I note that uh the defense filed a motion as it relates to discovery and are are you is are you going to just are we I'm going to look for a notice to submit to schedule if it's set for oral argument or what what's the intent? >> What we filed actually, your honor, in document 728 was a status report that doesn't actually ask the court >> for any particular relief. It was um and I know that it was filed um late last week and the court's been focused of course on the preliminary hearing record. So if the court has an opportunity to look at it before the next status conference that's sufficient for us. We wanted to alert the court to our view about the status of discovery. Okay. from the defense perspective. However, it does identify what we refuse what we refer to as forensic discovery disputes and a forthcoming motion concerning that. So maybe at the status conference that would be the first motion that the court would consider um setting a briefing schedule for. >> Thank you for that heads. >> Obviously there's more than that. >> Okay. Thank you, Mr. Nevak. What date do we have? Approximately 30 days out. The court finds it is reasonable for the parties to confer. Especially what I don't want to do is set a hearing in two weeks just for the parties to say we're not ready. Mr. Novak has put on the record that he's not available. He's a necessary party to that scheduling as well as is all the attorneys involved in this case. And so I want to take that uh into account when scheduling it. What >> All right. September 24th or October 23rd. Uh looks like October 23rd is pretty open. Um, what do the parties think about time and date? >> Your honor, September 24th in the afternoon is definitely a problem for me because um, the next morning at 9:00 a.m. I have to be in a federal courtroom in San Francisco. Um, and Mr. Bert whispered to me that he's also not available on the 24th of September. Okay. So, we understand that late October is more than the 30 days, but I think it actually gives council for Mr. Robinson and Council for the State the opportunity to really do our best to find uh common ground on on a comprehensive what I'm going to call pre-trial litigation schedule with proposed deadlines for disclosures um and the different um litigation of the various issues. Whether we can actually meaningfully identify a trial date at the end of that I think is to be determined. I heard Mr. Um, I heard the state say they want to have trial next week. Um, so they may have a trial date in mind, but we're just going to have to see what we can agree to and what we have to agree to disagree about. >> I appreciate that heads up. >> Okay. So, I made a mistake. Mr. Bert's unavailability is October 23rd because the Ninth Circuit has ordered him to appear for an oral argument. So, do we have a date? if I may, shortly after that. >> Well, let's see that. And and I'm happy to accomplish it via a virtual setting if that's easier for the parties as well. >> Understood. >> So, I want to accommodate all parties while trying to stay within that >> And I'm happy to accommodate your schedule, Mr. Bird. I I know being in different courts at the same time is difficult. Uh, is there a setting that >> 23rd to argue. Not sure when the argument is going to take place. >> I see. All right. >> Any other date, but the 23rd. >> All right. Well, >> and to the state just uh it may it may be moot given that but uh was did >> I was just wondering if we're doing this for scheduling purposes. I wonder if the defense could we have three of the four attorneys available looking at scheduling the defense could accommodate that. And while that's happening, does the state have a motion as it relates to the electronic and physical exhibits that were admitted into evidence at the preliminary hearing? I'll take that as a encouragement from the court possibly to move to withdraw those those exhibits, take them back into states custody. >> All right, >> I'll make that motion. >> I the I'm assuming defense doesn't object to that. The exhibit >> ex object to what, your honor? >> The removal of exhibits from the preliminary hearing into the state to take custody of them. >> No, not at all. And we're going to go back to um the date proposed by the court in October. >> All right. October 23rd. >> Yes. >> All right. What time? And is there a preference for virtual or in person? >> I think if it's going to be um that far out, we should do it in person. I think that it would be great if Mr. Bert's available if it could be hybrid so that he could participate. Um, and since we have no idea when the Ninth Circuit will schedule his oral argument, my guess is it'll be in the morning. Mr. B, could we do the afternoon of the 23rd? >> Absolutely. 1:00. >> That's okay with the state. >> All right. October 23rd at 1:00 here in person. And uh, defense, is it your request to have Mr. Robinson brought to court uh appear here in court on that. >> Yes, your honor. >> All right. We'll have and Mr. Robinson, you'll join us on that date, October 23rd at 1 p.m. Does any of the parties need the benefit of the record before we adjourn? >> All right. And does defense wish to withdraw your exhibits that were submitted? >> Well, yes. All right. Thank you, your honor. >> That's been grounded. And we appreciate the court's time this this afternoon and this evening. >> I understand your >> honor. Just very briefly like the the two weeks has turned into seven weeks or six and a half weeks, whatever it is. We've just asked that on the 23rd a trial date be set so that way at least the family knows that we have a trial date which we can gear towards. We understand there's a lot that the court needs to consider, but we would ask the court if if possible to please set the trial date on the 23rd of October so that we at least know when we're going when this matters proceeding to trial. Thank you, council. I appreciate you communicating your thoughts on behalf of >> Okay. And uh we'll go ahead and open up a window in case there is a motion and the the the filing is accomplished. So, that is an option. Again, I just if you don't need it, that's fine. But I always if I have extra time, I I want to make that available to the parties. All right. council anything further >> that would be a window on the 23rd judge >> right >> of October. Okay. >> So we can open up uh the [clears throat] rest of the day essentially. >> So >> all right anything further? >> No judge. >> All right. Thank you to the parties. I note your professionalism, your preparation uh throughout these proceedings and it is appreciated. Court