POLIO AFGHANISTAN
POLIO AFGHANISTAN
BACKGROUND BRIEFS FOR BMGF SECURITY AND ACCESS
STRATEGY SESSION: AFGHANISTAN
1. Drivers of insecurity and conflict
NB: Because of the sensitive nature of
the subject matter, information
denoted with an asterisk (*) is
confidential and can be elaborated
upon in oral briefings with IPI.
It should be noted at the start that as
of now, the polio eradication
programme in Afghanistan is
achieving far better results than its
far larger, more expensive
counterpart in Pakistan. Leaving
aside the disparity in scale (landmass
and population), a major factor
responsible for Afghanistan's
success is the following:
The Afghan Taliban,
under the authority of
Mullah Omar, have issued
explicit approval of and
support for the polio
eradication programme,
with the following
conditions:
(i) each anti-polio
campaign in areas
under Taliban control
or influence should be
coordinated by the Afghan
authorities with the "shadow"
Taliban authorities in advance; (ii) a "safe passage letter" issued by
the Afghan Taliban should be
obtained; and
(iii) no foreigners should be part of
the health team.
So far all sides have kept to this
bargain.
It is equally clear that there is
misreporting on anti-polio coverage in
Afghanistan, though on a smaller
scale than in its neighbor to the south
and east, including corruption and
poor accounting.*
CONFIDENTIAL- DO NOT CIRCULATE !PI INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
INSTITUTE
HIGHLIGHTS
• The explicit Afghan Taliban
approval of the polio eradication
programme is a major reason for
the success of polio eradication in
country.
• The upcoming elections, changing
political alliances and withdrawal
of NATO troops, will worsen the
situation.
• The unpredictability in the
intensity, scope and magnitude of
expected developments will lead to
deterioration in a well-functioning
polio eradication programme.
• A further challenge will be the
military situation, in particular the
withdrawal of the NATO/ISAF
forces.
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POLIO AFGHANISTAN
Trends
IPI is of the view that the elections,
scheduled to be held in early April,
and the outcome (or postponement
of the elections) will lead to
increasing insecurity and turbulence,
already in
evidence.
Political and
health
authorities, at
the center but
especially at
the provincial,
district and
lower levels,
will be far too
preoccupied
with the elections, political alliances
of convenience, switching of
loyalties, and deals being made and
broken all the time, to pay the
sustained attention that polio
eradication requires.*
The Afghan Taliban see their
patience paying off. Their
spokesperson has declared that
anyone who is a candidate, or who
votes, will be a target.
Impact
With unpredictability in the
intensity, scope and magnitude of
the developments identified above,
it is expected that the present, fairly
well-functioning polio eradication
programme will suffer massively.
This negative impact will not only be
the result of insecurity and fighting
within Afghanistan, but also of an
interruption in the regular anti-polio
campaigns, as families flee across
porous borders. Prospects for 2014 & 2015
Afghan Pashtun families in the
southern and eastern Afghan
provinces which border on Pakistan,
will flee into Pakistan's tribal and
adjacent areas, if (as is likely) there
are clashes
between Afghan
security forces
and militias and
the Afghan
Taliban and other
militant and
jihadi groups, as
well as Pakistani
militants and
jihadis supporting
the latter.
Since the withdrawal of NATO forces
will not take place overnight, it is
likely that NATO/ISAF bases and
pockets of control will see combat
and attacks.
The withdrawal date of US troops is
still up in the air, with President
Karzai refusing to sign a Bilateral
Security Agreement with the US
unless certain conditions are met
(not those reported in the media).*
Hence while the US wished to have
this signed prior to troop withdrawal,
this will probably not happen.
The US withdrawal, the largest
contingent in Afghanistan, will be
staggered over time. It is certain
that between io,000 and 30,000 US
troops (as trainers, counter-
terrorism and counter-insurgency
personnel) will stay on beyond the
withdrawal, in 6 to 8 US bases.
CONFIDENTIAL- DO NOT CIRCULATE Recommendations
• BMGF should work closely with its
national and international
interlocutors to prepare scenarios
for continued delivery of anti-polio
drops, especially in the areas
bordering Pakistan.
• BMGF should request the Afghan
central authorities to coordinate
emergency plans (this will have to
be broached very delicately as
Kabul's position on everything is
that "it's not a problem!").
• BMGF should ask its interlocutors
in both Pakistan and Afghanistan
to strengthen anti-polio drops
delivery at all border crossings (as
many people cross both ways via
unofficial crossings as via official
ones).
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