From: Office of Tene Rod-Larsen

From: Office of Tene Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, October 14, 2013 11:24 AM Subject: October 14 update 14 October, 2013 Article 1. =1 - Monitor US Has Time, Rouhani Doesn't =enneth M. Pollack =a href="#b">Article 2. =he National Interest Syria: It Wasn't Isolationism John Mueller <http://nationalinterest.org/profilehohn-=ueller> Article 3. =1-Monitor Meshaal to Tehran: Return of the Prodigal Son? Ali Hashem for AI-Monitor chttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/=uthors/ali-hashemi.html> =a href="ftd">Article 4. =olitico President Obama's foreign policy shift =osh Gerstein Article 5. =he Washington Post Obama's bad choices on Egypt Jackson Diehl chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/jackson-die=l/2011/02/24/ABccMXN_page.html> Article 6. =tratfor EFTA_R1_00053774 EFTA01753925 The Evolution of War =eorge Friedman and Robert D. Kaplan =rticle 7. =YT A Surprising Case Against Foreign Aid =red Andrews &=bsp; &nbs=; &n=sp; Arti=le 1. Al - Monitor=/p> US Has Time, =ouhani Doesn't Kenneth M. Pollackaspan> October 13 - This w=ek, the United States and its allies will enter another round of=negotiations with Iran, this one more hopeful as a result of Hassan Rouhan='s election as Iranian president and his repeated statements that he wants a deal to end Iran's nuclear impasse. One=of the foundational assumptions of the American approach to these negotiat=ons all along has been that the West doesn't have time and the Iranians =o. As a result, the United States has insisted that the talks cannot be allowed to drag on. They need to be concluded qui=kly. The rationale behind this assumption is that the Iranians care more a=out retaining their nuclear program than they do about having sanctions li=ted, and their goal is merely to stave off worse measures by the West — either US or Israeli militar= operations, or even harsher sanctions — while they continue to enrich u=anium and draw closer and closer to acquiring a breakout capability. (A br=akout capability is the ability to quickly field a workable nuclear weapon. Although the term "quickly" is undefi=ed and has changed significantly over the years, it is often described as =eaning "faster than the West could act to prevent it.") It was not wrong or=misguided to believe this. In the past, there was good reason to believe i= was entirely correct. However, today, the evidence suggests that it is fu=damentally mistaken, and that it is the Iranians, particularly Rouhani, who face time pressures more than the =est. Let's start with =he Iranian side. Rouhani is unquestionably looking to change Iran's situ=tion both internally and externally. In particular, he is undoubtedly look=ng for a deal on the nuclear program that, at the very least, would see Iran compromise on its enrichment program in =eturn for sanctions relief. He may very well be willing to go further than=that. Certainly, he has suggested as much. The claims that Rou=ani is a "wolf in sheep's clothing," that he does not represent=a significant change in Iran's demeanor, simply do not stand up to scrut=ny. This is neither the time nor the place for a full explication of the evidence — there is too much to be presented in = short essay, and with the nuclear talks about to begin, Iran's behavior=in those talks should be allowed to stand as the best proof for either the=ry. Suffice it to say that the evidence so far available is overwhelming that Rouhani clearly wants change of some=kind, and that he is already paying a price for it at home. He 2 EFTA_R1_00053775 EFTA01753926 has been re=eatedly attacked by Iran's hard-liners, who are uninterested in a deal.&=bsp; But Rouhani has persevered, suggesting that this deal is important to him. He has twice said publicly that h= needs the deal soon — in one instance, he argued for three to six month= — because if he cannot demonstrate quickly to Iran's supreme leader, =yatollah Ali Khamenei, and his hard-line rivals that he can secure meaningful compromises from the West, they will use his=failure to curtail his room for further maneuver. In fact, it's curio=s that Rouhani chose to make resolving the nuclear impasse his first major=policy move. Most politicians would have chosen to start by tackling small=r, domestic problems related to Iran's economy or political system as a way of racking up some quick wins to bols=er their political position before turning to a major foreign policy gambi=. Moreover, this one =s focused on a foreign policy problem that has proven utterly intractable =or years; represents a core difference with Iran's powerful hard-line fa=tion; requires a deal that the supreme leader himself may oppose; and relies on Iran's repeatedly proclaimed gr=atest adversary to do the right thing for the Islamic Republic. In ma=y ways, it is a gamble of monumental proportions, which again should reinf=rce both our sense that Rouhani is serious about getting a deal and the notion that he is probably ready to make sign=ficant compromises to get it. But it also gives credence to Rouhani's ow= warning that he needs this deal soon, or else his presidency could be cri=pled by its failure. On our side, the ev=dence of the past few years gives reason to reassess our assumptions about=Iran's nuclear strategy. Of greatest importance, Iran has been deliberat=ly refraining from pursuing a nuclear weapon as quickly as it could have. At first, many feared that once =ran began large-scale enrichment activities, it would simply enrich enough=uranium for one bomb to weapons grade (90% purity or better) and then deto=ate a crude bomb. Iran achieved that capability in about 2008, yet they did not break out. Then, the fear=was that once the Iranians accumulated enough low-enriched uranium (3.5% p=rity) for one bomb they would immediately enrich that to weapons grade and=break out. Iran passed that benchmark in about 2010, and again they did not do so. Next, the fear was =hat once Iran had acquired enough uranium enriched to 19.75% purity (somet=mes called "medium- enriched uranium") for one bomb it would immediatel= convert that to weapons grade and break out. Iran passed that benchmark in 2012, and again, it chose not do =o. In fact, instead, Iran has regularly converted some of its "medi=m- enriched uranium" to plates for the Tehran Research Reactor (which mak= them difficult to further enrich for weapons), and it has done so to ensure that it has less than a bomb's worth of med=um-enriched uranium on hand at any time. This behavior is im=ortant because it demonstrates that whatever Iran does ultimately intend f=r its nuclear program — and there should be no doubt that its current nurlear program is a military program meant to produce weapons, not a civilian program meant to produce electricity =97 Tehran has consciously decided not to break out and race for an arsenal=and has held to that policy for at least five years. Israel's form=r chief of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, and Israeli nuclear expert Yoel Guzansky have called attention to this imp=rtant pattern, noting that "Iran is not advancing toward the bomb at as =apid a pace as it could. It appears to realize that such progress would br=ng with it negative strategic repercussions." Just why Iran has c=osen not to go ahead and weaponize remains a mystery, but there are at lea=t four powerful factors that, taken together, probably have convinced Tehr=n not to do so for now. These include the threat of an Israeli or (more likely) American military attack; fear t=at the United States would greatly ramp up its covert action and cyberwarf=re campaigns against Iran if it decided to weaponize; fear that the Saudis=would obtain nuclear weapons of their own if Iran did; and, of greatest importance to my mind, fear that t=e Chinese and Indians would join the Western sanctions against Iran becaus= Beijing and New Delhi have made it clear to Tehran that while they do not=support a war against Iran, they are dead-set against an Iranian nuclear arsenal. What's important =bout these factors is that all remain firmly in place. If they have =een adequate to dissuade Iran from exercising its breakout capability for =he past five years, it is likely that they will continue to do so for some time to come. Indeed, in spring 2013= both President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Ben=amin Netanyahu publicly stated that it would take Iran a year or more=to field a workable nuclear weapon from a decision to do so (a decision 3 EFTA_R1_00053776 EFTA01753927 that has not been given). That is a pretty wide break=ut window, and it will take some time — probably several years — for l=an to narrow it significantly. Thus, even if we continue to fear that=Tehran's game is to play for time until it has narrowed that breakout window — a claim inconsistent with Rouhani's cu=rent behavior, but perhaps what Iran's hard- liners have in mind — we d= not need to fear that Iran will be in that position for some time to come= This is neither an =rgument for complacency nor for lowballing the Iranians on the assumption =hat we are now in a more advantageous bargaining position than they are. W= simply do not know what Rouhani will ultimately be willing or able to put on the table as part of a nuclear dea=. We also don't know if he can sell any nuclear deal that we would accep= to Iran's supreme leader and the hard-liners back in Tehran. But he rep=esents the best opportunity we have had to get a negotiated settlement to one of the most dangerous problems i= the world today. If he makes us a decent offer, we should take it =97 and hope to build on it to deal with other problematic aspects of Irani=n behavior like its support for terrorist groups. And we should try to move quickly because he needs to, not because=we need to. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/=uthors/kenneth-m-pollack.htm I> Kenneth M. Polla=k is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author most rece=tly of Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb and American Strategy.<=p> gspan> Arti=Ie 2. The National Intere=t Syria: It Was='t Isolationism John Mueller <http://nationalinterest.org/profile/john-=ueller> October 14, 2013 --=One popular explanation for the American public's palpable unwillingness=to countenance military involvement in the Syrian civil war was that the c=untry has slumped into a deep isolationist mood. But the reaction scarcely represents a "new=isolationism <http://w.w.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/opinion/keller-our-new- isolationism.html?pagewant=drall&_r=0> [3J" or a "growing isolationism chttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/opinion=global/cohen-an-anchorless-world.html?hp& _r=0> [41" or a "new noninterventionist fad <http://www.washingtonp=st.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/09/08/rubio-and-others-run-from- internatio=alism-when-it-matters/?hpid=z3> (5)."=Rather, there has always been a deep reluctance to lose American lives or =o put them at risk overseas for humanitarian purposes. In Bosnia, for exam=le, the United States held off intervention on the ground until hostilitie= had ceased, and, even then, the public was anything but enthusiastic when=American peacekeeping soldiers were sent in. Bombs, not boots, were sent to Kosovo. In Somalia, the United Sta=es abruptly withdrew its troops when eighteen of them were killed in a cha=tic firefight in 1993. The United States, like other developed nations, ha= mostly stood aloof in many other humanitarian disasters such as those in Congo, Rwanda and Sudan. The count=y did get involved in Libya, but the operation was strained and hesitant, =nd there was little subsequent enthusiasm to do much of anything about the=conflict in neighboring Mali. 4 EFTA_R1_00053777 EFTA01753928 This perspective is-seen most clearly, perhaps, when pollsters presented Americans in 1993 wit= the statement, "Nothing the U.S. could accomplish in Somalia is worth t=e death of even one more U.S. soldier." Fully 60 percent expressed agreement. This is not such an unusual position=for humanitarian ventures. If Red Cross or other workers are killed while =arrying out humanitarian missions, their organizations frequently threaten=to withdraw, no matter how much good they may be doing. Some commentators, =ncluding such unlikely soulmates as Andrew Bacevich, Robert Kagan, John Me=rsheimer, Rachel Maddow and Vladimir Putin, have variously maintained that=we have seen the rise of a new American militarism in the last decades or that Americans hail from Mars. But that perspectiv= extrapolates far too much from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In these=cases, opinion was impelled not by a propensity toward militarism, but, as=with entry into World War II, by the reaction to a direct attack on the United States. These ventures—the 9/1= wars—have proved to be aberrations from usual patterns, not portents of=the future. Although they demonstrate that Americans remain willing to str=ke back hard if attacked, they do not indicate a change in the public's reticence about becoming militarily in=olved in other kinds of missions, particularly humanitarian ones.</=> An examination of t=e trends in a poll question designed to tap "isolationism" does not su=gest a surge of militarism. Instead, it documents something of a rise in p=blic wariness regarding military intervention beginning with the Vietnam War and, thereafter, a fair amount of steadines= punctured by spike-like ups and downs in response to current events, incl=ding 9/11 and its ensuing wars. Since 1945, pollste=s have periodically asked, "Do you think it will be best for the future 4 this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stayed=out of world affairs?" The question seems to have been framed to generate an "internationalist" response. In 194=, after all, the United States possessed something like half of the wealth=of the world and therefore scarcely had an option about "taking an activ= part in world affairs," as it was so blandly and unthreateningly presented. And, so queried, only 19 percent=span style="font-size:18.0pt"> [61 of poll respondents in 1945 picked the "stay out" or "isolationist" o=tion. The authors of the poll question got the number they probably wanted= (Actually, to gener=te high levels of this quality, the query can be reformulated to "We sho=ldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own=national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home." In that rendering, measured "is=lationism" registers <http://www.gallup.com/poll/22489/little-change- isolationi=t-sentiment-among-americans.aspx> 17130 to =0 percentage points higher.) In the post-war yea=s the "stay out" percentage rose <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/public- perspective/ppsca./43/43095.pdf> 161 a bit to around 25 percent, bu= it had descended to 16 percent in 1965 in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and as the war in Vietna= was about to begin. The experience of that war pushed it much higher—to=31 to 36 percent—as part of what has been called the "Vietnam syndrome=" It has stayed at ar=und that level ever since. There was a temporary downward dip during the G=lf War of 1991 and interesting spikes upward at the time of the Kosovo con=lict in 1999 even though no American troops were lost and even though it was deemed successful at the time. And= in this century, the "stay out" percentage dropped to 14, its lowest =ecorded level, in the aftermath of 9/11. It rose the next year, and then p=unged downward again in 2003 and 2004, the first two years of the Iraq War. By 2006, however, it had risen again =o post-Vietnam levels where it has remained through 2012 <http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Task%20Fo=ce%20Reports/2012_CCS_Report.pdf> (8], th= last time the question was asked. Given the bland att=activeness of the "take an active part in world affairs" option, it is=impressive that around a third or more of the public since Vietnam has gen=rally rejected it to embrace the "stay our option. However, this is likely to be more nearly an expression of =ariness about costly and frustrating military entanglements than a serious=yearning for 5 EFTA_R1_00053778 EFTA01753929 full withdrawal. There is, for example, no real indication th=t Americans want to erect steely trade barriers. And polls chttp://www.alternet.org/story/20030/=mericans_say_no_to_unilateralism> [9], including ones on Syria <http://www.people-press.org/2013/09/03/public-opinion-run=-against-syrian-airstrikes/> [10], conti=ually show that the public is far more likely to approve foreign ventures if they are approved and supported by a=lies and international organizations. Real isolationism should be made of =terner stuff. The public response=to intervention in Syria also suggests that people, contrary to a large li=erature, are not readily manipulable by "opinion elites." The Obama ad=inistration dramatically proposed military action in response to chemical weapons use in Syria, and leaders of both p=rties in Congress rather quickly fell into line. Moreover, these bipartisa= "leadership cues" were accompanied by disturbing photographs of the c=rpses of Syrian children apparently killed in the attack. Nonetheless, the Am=rican public has been decidedly unwilling <http://www.people-press.org/2013/09/03/public- opinion-run=-against-syrian-airstrikesh [10] =ven to support the punitive bombing of Syria—a venture likely to risk few if any American lives—out of concer= that it would lead to further involvement in the conflict there. And the =.S. public has remained suspicious of, and therefore immune to, repeated a=surances from President Barack Obama that he has categorically ruled out putting "boots on the ground <http://ww=.cnn.com/2013/05/04/world/meast/us-syria- obama/index.html> (11]" in Syria. Leaders may propose=acting abroad, but that doesn't mean public opinion will move in concert, =hat people will necessarily buy the message. And on the occasions when the= do, it is probably best to conclude that the message has struck a responsive chord, rather than that the publi= has been manipulated. Ideas are like comm=rcial products. Some become embraced by the customers while most, no matte= how well packaged or promoted, fail to ignite acceptance or even passing =nterest. It is a process that is extremely difficult to predict and even more difficult to manipulate. John Mueller is = political scientist at Ohio State University and a senior fellow at the C=to Institute. Among his books are War, Presidents and Public Opinion, Poli=y and Opinion in the Gulf War, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to AI-Qaeda, and War and Ideas.=This article expands on, and much more fully develops, commentaryq=pan> <http://m.indianexpress.com/news/caution-syria-ahead/1=62441/> [12] presented earlier in=the year in the Indian Express. Links: [1] http://www.addthis.com/book=ark.php?v=250&amp;username=nationalinterest [2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/john-mueller [3] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/opinion/keller-our-new-isolationism.h=ml?pagewantedrall&amp;_r=0 [4] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/opinion/global/cohen-an-anchorless-wo=ld.html?hp&amp;_r=0 [5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/09/08/rubio-and-=thers-run-from-internationalism- when-it-matters/?hpid=z3 [6] http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/43/43095.pdf=br> [7] http://www.gallup.com/poll/22489/little-change-isolationist-sentiment-a=ong-americans.aspx [8] http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Task%20Force%20Reports/=012_CCS_Report.pdf [9] http://www.alternet.org/story/20030/americans_say_no_to_unilateralism [10] http://www.people- press.org/2013/09/03/public-opinion-runs-against-syr=an-airstrikes/ (11] http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/04/world/meast/us-syria-obama/index.html [13] https://secure.flickr.com/photos/victoriapeckham/164175205/in/set-7215=602263959625/ 6 EFTA_R1_00053779 EFTA01753930 [141 http://nationalinterest.org/topic/politics/public-opinion [151 http://nationalinterest.org/topic/politics [161 http://nationalinterest.org/region/middle-east/levant/syria =/span> Arti=le 3. Al-Monitor</=> Meshaal to Te=ran: Return of the Prodigal Son? Ali Hashem for AI-Monitor <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/=uthors/ali-hashemi.html> October 13 -- Khale= Meshaal will visit Iran. This has been confirmed by Al-Monitor's source= in Tehran, but still unconfirmed — to us and Meshaal — is the timing.=/span> It was obvious that=relations between Hamas, the strong Palestinian resistance faction, a=d Iran, its regional backer, deteriorated due to conflicting interests in =yria. Iran backed its ally Bashar al-Assad while Hamas decided it was time to ally with its ideological mother, the M=slim Brotherhood, which was already gaining ground in Tunisia, Egypt and w=s a favorite to rule Syria, in case the revolution succeeded in toppling t=e regime. But out of the blue=the situation changed. The Brotherhood in Egypt was toppled, and Hamas fou=d itself up a blind alley. A previous piece I wrote for Al-Monitor on Aug.=12 explains how llamas =nd Iran began this new chapter and who were=the main players. In Tehran, there wa= still a wing that thought the revival of relations with Hamas needed a co=fidence-building process, an Iranian source close to this wing told Al-Mon=tor, adding, "What happened during two years of crisis in Syria raised concerns over the benefit of supportin= a group that, at the first serious junction, turned around and placed its=lf in the camp of our enemies." The source stated, "Since there =s a consensus on closin= the old chapter completely= we don't mind, but it's better to frame the relation." A well-informed sou=ce in Tehran told Al-Monitor that one month ago, at the funeral of Quds Fo=ce commander Qasem Soleimani's mother, Hamas official Mohammad Nasr visite= Tehran to pay condolences to the man who is believed to oversee and manage Iran's influence in the Middle Eas=. The source revealed that there was a suggestion that Meshaal himself lea= a delegation to the funeral, but the Iranians thought it too early to bro=ch this stage. "Khaled Meshaal personally is responsible for the old chapter. There were historical leaders in Hamas=who opposed his anti-Iran policies, therefore Iran was waiting a real chan=e. Here, the problem is with Meshaal himself and not with Hamas anymore.=94 Nasr's move was a= icebreaker with respect to direct contact between Meshaal and the Iranian=leadership, with an agreement settled to take the relations further. In th=s regard, days ago, Nasr visited Tehran once again carrying a message from Meshaal, who at almost the same time wa= delivering a speech from Istanbul via videolink to a gathering in Beirut =egarding Jerusalem. In his speech, Meshaal stated that he's with the&nbs=;peop=e's right to protest peacefully=and not raise weapons, calling on those fighting to direct their arms towa=d Israel and seek to liberate Jerusalem from Israeli occupation. Meshaal's stances=were seen as positive in Tehran, and from here, it is believed that the se=ond stage will start. The second stage means an official visit by Hamas=92 leader to the Iranian ca=ital. A Palestinian source in Tehran told Al- 7 EFTA_R1_00053780 EFTA01753931 Monitor that Meshaal expresse= his willingness to visit Tehran and the Iranians welcomed the move, but the only thing pending is the timing. Sour=es believe there are few hurdles blocking Meshaal's way, but this doesn=92t mean the relation with Hamas isn't improving: "Hamas is regarded a= part of the bloc, and Iran is assisting them. As far as they are resisting Israel, then they can bet on us." It's important to=mention that despite the ups and downs of Iran and Hamas' relationship, th= group's office in Tehran didn't close, its representative never left an= visits from several of the group's military and political officials didn't stop. On a final note, an=Iranian official said, "If Meshaal is to visit Tehran at any time, for s=re, you're not going to know the timing from media outlets. He'll come=to Tehran and then people will know, Abu al-Walid (Meshaal] is a resistance leader and there are security measures =o be taken to keep him safe." Arti=le 4. Politico President Oba=a's foreign policy shift Josh Gerstein October 13 - Presid=nt Barack Obama's decision to slash aid to Egypt's military government=is the latest sign of a course correction shifting the U.S. foreign and na=ional security policies back to the idealistic themes central to his 2008 campaign. On issue after issu=, Obama's recent moves seem aimed at recapturing principles he articulat=d five years ago as a candidate crusading against what he portrayed as Pre=ident George W. Bush's overreliance on executive power and failure to uphold American values like human rights. =93I'll turn the page on the imperial presidency," Obama declared in 20=7. "We'll be the country that credibly tells the dissidents in the pri=on camps around the world that America is your voice, America is your dream, America is your light of justice." In his first term, =arious events pushed Obama into a pragmatic realpolitik as he dramatically=escalated the use of armed drones, acquiesced in crackdowns on dissent in =ountries like Bahrain and bypassed Congress to maintain a military operation in Libya. Now, Obama is chang=ng course. U.S. military raids=in Libya and Somalia last weekend seemed squarely aimed at capturing suspe=ts rather than killing them with drones. Obama is again taking modest step= to move prisoners out of Guantanamo Bay. And when he decided in August that military action was needed to resp=nd to Syria's alleged use of chemical weapons, he surprised many on his =wn staff by insisting that the action be taken to Congress for approval.</=pan> Obama hasn't admi=ted to major mistakes on national security policy in his first term, but h= has acknowledged dangers in some of his own policies and called for Ameri=a to open a new chapter in the fight against terrorism. 8 EFTA_R1_00053781 EFTA01753932 "With a decade of-experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard ques=ions — about the nature of today's threats and how we should confront =hem," he said in May. "America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will defi=e us." Obama also seemed t= be confessing to a degree of overreliance on tools like drones, when he d=clared: 'The very precision of drone strikes and the necessary secrecy o=ten involved in such actions.... can also lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terr=rism." Some analysts see O=ama recalibrating in part out of concern that his foreign policy and natio=al security legacy was at risk of being defined in shorthand as "drones =nd surveillance." "In every adminis=ration, the first term is about the election and the second term is about =egacy," said former State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley. "At the m=dway point, the White House did look at what was promised in 2008, what we will be judged on in 2017 and what still rem=ins on the to-do list." The recent shifts may have been inspired by or a= least fueled by a reshuffle in senior national security positions that sa= Susan Rice replace Tom Donilon to National Security Adviser and installed Samantha Power as the U.S. Ambassa=or at the United Nations. 'The playbook has='t changed, but when you change the coaching staff, you do change the fi=st instinct," Crowley said. "It's possible that over time we'll se= a different play selection." Rice and Power are =oth seen as more activist and willing to take action in humanitarian crise=, such as Libya and Syria. They may also be more inclined to incur the wra=h of authoritarian regimes like Egypt's military government in order to signal U.S. support for democracy and huma= rights. When the U.S. annou=ced Wednesday that Obama had decided suspending delivery of cash assistanc= and major weapons systems to Egypt's government, officials acknowledged=that more conciliatory efforts to coax military leaders into returning to democracy had failed. "I =on't think anyone would claim there's going to be any direct line betw=en decisions that we're announcing on assistance and immediate changes o= the ground in Egypt exactly in line with what we are urging the Egyptians to do," said a senior administration official w=o spoke on condition of anonymity. "But at the same time, the president =ade clear how important these things are to us and this decision just unde=scores that the United States will not support actions that run contrary to our interest and our principles. =nd it's important to be clear about those things." M=ny national security experts sense that a shift is underway on various fro=ts, but say it's hard to divine with certainty since the foreign policy and national security sphere involves responding to cri=es as they arise. "It's like clim=te change," said Ben Wittes of the Brookings Institution. "You have we=ther events and some sort of aggregate change, but to what extent should y=u attribute any weather event to climate change?" The pair of U.S. military operations in Libya and Somalia last weekend cau=ht the eye of many experts because the raids seemed squarely aimed at capt=ring terrorism suspects rather than killing them with drones, as the admin=stration sought to do on hundreds of occasions during Obama's first term. Josh Gerstein is=a White House reporter for POLITICO, specializing in legal and national se=urity issues. gspan> Arti=le 5. The Washington Post= 9 EFTA_R1_00053782 EFTA01753933 Obama's bad=choices on Egypt Jackson Diehl <http://www.washingtonpost.com/jackson-die=l/2011/02/24/ABccMXN_page.html> <1=> 13 October -- Presi=ent Obama tends to describe Egypt <http://www.whitehouse.govithe-press- office/2013/09/24/rem=rks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly> as a distasteful conflict betwe=n an autocratic military and its secular supporters and the Islamist Musli= Brotherhood, which won democratic elections but is intolerant and anti-We=tern. That view is aggressively reinforced by Cairo's de facto authorities, who have flooded Washington in recent w=eks with a parade of English-speaking spin doctors, all arguing that Gen. =bdel Fatah al-Sissi, leader of July's coup, saved Egypt from a theocrati= dictatorship. How, then, to expla=n people like Ayman Nour? A secular, pro-democracy dissident for a decade =efore the 2011 revolution, Nour mounted a quixotic campaign for president <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2005=04/24/AR2005042400890.html> against strongman Hosni Mubarak=in 2005 — and chttp://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/06/01/69224/egyptians-wor=y-that-obama-will.html> fo= his trouble. Now Nour is in exil=, in Lebanon, having been warned to leave the country or face arrest and p=osecution. He's not alone: Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel-winning former n=clear inspector once adopted by the pro-democracy movement as its leader, has retired to his home in Vienna <http://www.middleeastmonitor=com/news/africa/6973-el-baradei- leaves-egypt-for-austria> =span style="font-size:18.0pt"> rather than answer prosecutorial summons. At least two other prominent figures in=Egypt's 2011 revolution, who asked not to be named, have quietly left th= country since the July 3 coup <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions=jackson-diehl-egypts-misguided-coup/2013/07/04/64bd121c-e4b4- 11e2-alle-c2e=876a8f30_story.html> . A third, <= href="http://asmamahfouz.com/" target="_blank">Asmaa Mafouz, was re=ently expelled from Kuwait <http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96=smid/414/ArticlelD/200180/reftab/36/t/Kuwait-deports- Egypt-activist-Mahfou=/Default.aspx> .<1=> Many who remain in =airo are under mounting pressure. The offices of the April 6 movement, a g=oup of pro-democracy youth that organized the Jan. 25, 2011, demonstration=triggering the revolution, were raided by police chttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/81354/Egypti=olitics-/April--condemns-police-raid-on-Cairo- offices.aspx> last month. Several of its members have been arrested without charge. So have the leader and deputy leader of the Wasat party <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/77678/Egypt/Polirics-/ProMorsi-Wasat- Party-leaders-arrested.aspx> , a m=derate Islamist faction established during Mubarak's rule as a centrist =lternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. In short, the Sissi=government is targeting the same liberal and secular activists who waged a=lonely battle against the Mubarak regime. Moreover, their Western supporte=s are not exempt: The state-run newspaper al-Ahram, a quasi- official government mouthpiece, recently published a six=part series vilifying groups such as the National Democratic Institute for=funding a dangerous "fifth column" bent on destabilizing Egypt — eve= as the regime's envoys were assuring Congressional sponsors of those nongovernmental organizations that a democ=atic transition was on the way. Not all Egyptians w=o fought for democracy before 2011 are under siege: Some hav= joined the Sissi movement <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jackson-diehl-egyp=s-democrats-abandon- democracy/2013/07/21/58beace0-efc8-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea=0d_story.html> . But those who opposed the July 3 coup, or who have since had second though=s and turned against the military, are feeling more threatened and isolate= than they ever did in the Mubarak era. "Back then we thought it was dif=icult. But it wasn't as difficult as it is now," one exiled activist told me last week. He asked that his =ame be withheld because his family is still in Cairo — a request he neve= made when Mubarak was in power. 10 EFTA_R1_00053783 EFTA01753934 "Back then we cou=d get maybe 300 or 400 people out on the street, and we had an aggressive =egime targeting us," the activist said. "But at least we knew that the=majority of the people, though afraid to join us, supported us. I'm here [outside Egypt] now because I know that =f I was arrested or gunned down in Tahrir Square no one would care. The re=ime has succeeded in persuading people that the only alternative is chaos.=94 The democrats being=singled out have been relentless opponents of military rule and the Mubara=-era civilian establishment. Nour's Ghad party briefly joined with anoth=r secular party in an electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in the hope of bridging the secular-religious =ivide. Most of the April 6 movement chose to support Brotherhood candidate=Mohamed Morsi in a 2012 presidential runoff against a military-backed cand=date out of the belief that that would offer a better chance to consolidate democracy. These activists broke with Morsi a year ago, a=ter he suspended the rule of law in order to force through a constitution.=They joined anti-government demonstrations, but they didn't support the =oup. Their argument was that those opposed to the Brotherhood should work to defeat the party in the parliame=tary elections that were to be held next year — something that polls sho=ed was more than possible. Part of the persecu=ion of these democrats is payback by the generals and the state intelligen=e service, which blames them for the 2011 revolution and for trying to wor= with Morsi. But the repression also marks a return to a l=ng- standing military strategy chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio=s/egypts-democratic-pioneers-still-facing-official- persecution/2011/12/01/=IQAdtmGO_story.html> , honed to perfection under Mubarak: Offer Egyptians — and the West — a =tark choice between an autocratic, military-backed government and unrecons=ructed Islamists. That means making s=re that moderate Islamists and secular liberals who oppose military rule a=e suppressed above all. Left behind are the militant Islamists — the reg=me has not touched the extremist Nour party, even while crushing the Brotherhood and more moderate forces — an= those civilians content to serve under military tutelage. In the end, Preside=t Obama is not necessarily wrong to see a stark political choice in Egypt.=He just chooses to ignore why that choice has come about, and so fails to =upport its victims. =/span> Arti=le 6. Stratfor The Evolution=of War George Friedman and=Robert D. Kaplan October 11 (Video T=anscript): George Friedman<=span>: My name's George Friedman. I'm=here with my colleague Robert Kaplan. And we want to talk about one of the=most ubiquitous things in the human condition: war. War is not a subject people like to think of as insoluble, they don't=like to think of it as natural. But the fact of the matter is there's very=few things -- family, economics -- as commonplace as war. We don't want to=talk so much about why there's war -- that is a long and endless discussion -- we want to talk about what=s happening to war. Where we're going today. Everybody's talking about rev=lutions in warfare, the end of peer-to-peer conflict, a whole range of thi=gs. So what we'd like to do today is talk about what's happening to war, and what the future of war looks li=e. Robert? 11 EFTA_R1_00053784 EFTA01753935 Robert D. Kaplan=/span>: Yes, I think one of the notic=able changes over the last few decades -- its gradual, it shifts back and =orth but it's certainly a change -- is like, whereas in the past you had a relatively confined space with a lot o= troops and equipment inside it, which is conventional, industrial war lik= tank battles in the Sinai in 1973, or in North Africa during World War 11= We're going from a small space with a lot of combatants inside it to vast spaces that include immense Thi=d World cities and deserts with small numbers of combatants hidden inside =hem. So whereas killing the enemy is easy, finding him is what's difficult= It's locating him that constitutes the real weapon of war, whereas in industrial war it was just a matter of =illing the enemy at his chief point of concentration. This new century, we=may still have major interstate industrial wars or naval battles, we don't=know that yet. But at least for the past few decades, what most people define as unconventional war or gue=rilla war or irregular war means a vast battle space with small numbers of=combatants hiding inside that space. George: I think one of the things that led to t=at transformation, is the transformation of mathematics in war, which was =he introduction of precision-guided munitions, which actually was introduced in the 1970s -- first by the United States w=en they destroyed a critical bridge in Vietnam that they hadn't been abl= to destroy for years, and then by the Egyptians and the Soviets, who sank=the Israeli destroyer Eilat with a single precision-guided munition. It used to take thousands of bombs to =nock out a target. That meant hundreds of planes at least, that meant larg= numbers of crews, steel factories, aluminum factories and so on and so fo=th. The industrial nature of war that you refer to really had a great deal to do with the imprecision of th= rifle. It's said -- and I'm not sure it's true -- it's said that in the F=rst World War it took 10,000 rounds of ammunition to kill one man. Perhaps= But it certainly was true that you had to have large numbers of weapons. With the introduction of precisi=n-guided munitions, you began with 50 percent hit/kill ratios and it rose =nd rose until one plane with one piece of munition would be able to destro= the enemy. And therefore, you had the same lethality with one aircraft and with hundreds. Robert: And we are seeing this especially in ai= war, because one of the things they say in the Air Force is "The les= obtrusive we are, the less number of planes we have overhead, the more lethal we can actually be." Because with p=ecision-guided munitions, guided by satellites or whatever they're guided =y, you don't have to drop a lot of ordnance to do damage. A single drone f=ring a medium or small-sized projectile can do the same amount of damage as decades ago would take a whole wing of=an air force to drop. But we haven't seen it yet in naval war only becau=e we haven't had a real naval war. But if we do, we're going to see that=repeat itself, perhaps. George: Well, I think the next step is infantry=war. But you know, it's interesting to me that during World War II, we had=a thousand bomb raids over Germany, and it was morally complex but nobody objected to bombing Germany, or very few=people -- of course, the Germans did. We now have this idea of the drone a= somehow a singularly unique moral weapon, particularly evil. It strikes m= as an ambiguous argument: Is it better to have World War II-style, thousand-bomber raids killing tens of t=ousands of people in order to destroy one factory, or to have an unmanned =ircraft striking it? Precision has on the one hand offended people with an=apparent callousness, which certainly is in the nature of war, but at the same time has the virtue that collater=l damage -- which will always be part of war, you will always make massive=mistakes -- have been reduced. Robert: And precision implies the death penalty=because the precision means that your chances of killing the target are 90=percent, 80 percent, rather than 5 or 10 percent. So you're essentially carrying out a death sentence on someone= George: So there's a paradox. Massive raids tha= killed thousands of innocent people are seen as somehow less morally repr=hensible than the certainty of the death of one person, that has been targeted for that. It's a transformation of w=r. Now, the question really is, Is this war or something else? Robert: Or is it police actions? Carrying out a=sassinations? Because one of the natures of the post-9/11 world is we're h=nting down individuals as much as we're hunting down groups. And if you're hunting down individuals, and you have = revolution in precision-guided weapons, and the battlefield is vast, and =he individual is hiding in an apartment building in a slum in Peshawar, Pa=istan. This is a whole different world than the Korean War or World War II. 12 EFTA_R1_00053785 EFTA01753936 George: But there's still, then, the question. =e have and have always had in the world what we'll call policing. The Brit=sh did it in India, the United States did it in Nicaragua and the Philippines. Most major countries and many min=r countries did it. To me, the interesting argument that's underway, and t=e one that's least tenable, is the argument that this is the way war will =lways be from now on. We heard that all wars will be nuclear wars, we've heard that all wars will be coun=erinsurgencies, all wars will be small. To me, I don't accept the idea tha= the peer-to-peer war has been abolished, that the 21st century will be th= first century that will have no major systemic war between two great powers. Robert: Well, look, every century before, going=back thousands of years, has had the equivalent of interstate war. So to c=aim that this century automatically won't doesn't stand up statistically, in any sense of the word. I mean, the Iran=lraq war, which I covered firsthand as a journalist, was like World War I.=You would see hundreds of bodies piled up, killed by poison gas, on the Ir=qi side. They were Iranian bodies. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons left, right and center. And this was =nly 25.30 years ago. So to think that we're not going to have interstate w=rs, given the tensions in the Middle East, given the buildup of weapons in=the Far East, I mean we haven't even talked about the growth of various naval platforms throughout the Pac=fic, not just in China. It seems to me very questionable. George: I want to apply the new math, which we =ave seen obviously in Afghanistan, for example, to peer-to-peer conflict. =o for example, it strikes me as questionable whether surface vessels are survivable. We know that in the Arab- Israeli W=r of 1973, tanks facing wire-guided Soviet-built anti-tank systems, were b=ing destroyed by infantrymen. And we learned that there was an entirely ne= matrix to the war. One of the things that it seems to me is that we're going to see interstate war, but =ith the same sparseness of forces. Robert: And without even journalists able to co=er it, because you mentioned that surface warships are more and more vulne=able. What that means is that the face of naval warfare is going under water. It's going under sea. George: Assuming that submarines are survivable= Robert: Yes. Well, there's a saying in the Paci=ic: The submarines are like the new bling; everybody wants one. George: But, I mean, the question to really ask=is, we have anti-submarine rockets. We have anti-submarine torpedoes. We h=ve an entirely new generation of weapons. A submarine can run at 30 or 40 knots; a surface vessel can do 20, 30 knot=. You have missiles coming out that are hypersonic, doing certainly Mach 3= Mach 4. You can't run from it, you can't hide from it. There were three g=eat platforms that emerged from World War II: the main battle tank, the aircraft carrier and the manned bo=ber. It's very hard to imagine how a manned bomber survives in an environm=nt of surface- to-air missiles, or how a tank survives, or how a ship survi=es. And I include in that submarines because as much as you are hidden under water to my eyes, there are many t=chnologies that can find you. So it really becomes an interesting question=of how war is framed, what sea-lane control means, and so on and so forth,=that's evolving. Robert: We haven't had a test yet of these thin=s. The 21st century so far, as violent as it has been in the Greater Middl= East, in Afghanistan and Iraq, presently in Syria, has not had the kind of test that you're pointing at. George: World War II. Many of these systems hav= appeared in World War I and afterwards. But in many ways people were surp=ised at the emergence of the aircraft carrier, at the criticality of the tank, certainly by the massed manned bo=ber. There was speculation about it, and then it emerged. So I would argue=that first, we've had a revolution in warfare. Two, we've seen it applied =n Afghanistan, in that morally difficult and ambiguous state. When it's supplied in the state-to-state co=flict, which I expect to happen whether we want it or not -- I mean, it's =ot that everybody said, "Let's have a war"; wars seem to happen =or their own reasons -- we're going to see emerging, exactly as you said, an entirely new structure. Robert: This is why what's going on in the East=China Sea and the South China Sea is very interesting in this sense. Becau=e you see a buildup of naval platforms in a part of the world of vibrant states that are not united by an allianc= in 13 EFTA_R1_00053786 EFTA01753937 any sense of the word, have historical disputes and where essentially =he peace has been kept by the U.S. Navy since World War II. It's been esse=tially a unipolar atmosphere at seas. Will that change? Is it changing? George: Well that's the crucial thing. The Unit=d States has dominated the global oceans since World War II. It has been t=e only navy that is able to be global and bring overwhelming power locally. It bases itself on a triad of surfac=, air and submarine. How survivable is that? What can power on land do? Robert: And will we see asymmetric naval war th= way we've seen asymmetric, low-tech war in Iraq and Afghanistan with suic=de bombers? Will we see the technological equivalent taking on the U.S. Navy like Iranian swarm boats, for instance,=in the Persian Gulf? George Friedman is the Chairman =f Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996 that is now a leader in the field=of global intelligence. Robert D. Kaplan is Chief Geopolitical Analyst for=Stratfor, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C., and has bee= a foreign correspondent for The Atlantic for over 25 years. =/span> Arti=le 7. NYT A Surprising =ase Against Foreign Aid Fred Andrews=/p> October 12, 2013 --=IN his new book, Angus Deaton, an expert's expert on global poverty and =oreign aid, puts his considerable reputation on the line and declares that=foreign aid does more harm than good. It corrupts governments and rarely reaches the poor, he argues, and it is =igh time for the paternalistic West to step away and allow the developing =orld to solve its own problems. It is a provocative=and cogently argued claim. The only odd part is how it is made. It is tack=d on as the concluding section of "The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality" <http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10054.html> (Princeton University Press, 360 pages), an illuminating and inspiring history of how=mankind's longevity and prosperity have soared to breathtaking heights i= modern times. Mr. Deaton is the E=senhower Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton. He=has spent decades working with the World Bank in creating basic yardsticks=for measuring global poverty and with the Gallup Organization in creating survey-based measures of well-being. <=span> The "great escape=94 of the title, he writes, is "the story of mankind's escaping from d=privation and early death." His book gives a stirring overview of the ec=nomic progress and medical milestones that, starting with the Industrial Revolution and accelerating after World War II, have c=used life expectancies to soar. Professor Deaton is=a fluent writer, but his book is a demanding read. Its guts are his statis=ical comparisons, region by region and country by co