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- Subscribe - Contact Us - Rate Card - Place an Ad Archives Revels Classifieds Real Estate Menu Guide Wedding Weather Subscribe Contact Us February 20, 2006 Case In Point: Headline: Nuclear report reveals how misled we are By Chris Honoré Tidings Reviewer As time passes and more and more information is forthcoming, the rationale for going to war with Iraq becomes ever more suspect and stunningly inadequate. Why was the Bush administration so intent on presenting Iraq as the foremost threat to the security, not only of the region but, of the world when clearly they were in possession of information that suggested a far more lethal operation regarding weapons of mass destruction was in play, and had been for years? In the article, he quotes extensively Mark Hibbs, who he describes as �one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today.� He goes on to say that Hibbs is a legend within the secretive realm of nuclear power, working for such esoteric publications as �Nucleonics Week� and �Nuclear Fuel.� Kahn was engaged in the nuclear arms for sale business for close to two decades prior to the invasion of Iraq. If there was any one entity that presented a clear and present danger to America and the world, it was Khan and his network of nuclear materiel dealers. �It is,� Langewiesche points out, �an ongoing story of great consequence to the international political order, and perhaps even to the survival of mankind.� Some background: Despite the existence of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, with its parallel protocols, which restricted the export of materials necessary for the construction of nuclear bombs, regulation was lax and companies, especially in Germany, were doing business with a number of nations eager to join the nuclear club. For reasons that today seem all but inexplicable, policing of the protocols was soft, despite the gravity of the technologies being sold. Large-package technology was provided to the Middle East as a way of currying favor and gaining influence in the region. But no procurement network equaled that of Khan�s. The West wasn�t was unaware of the network. However, as Langewiesche writes, �Those aware of Khan�s growing proclivity to export his nuclear wares � to Iraq, Iran, North Korea � were paralyzed as long as their own governments were more interested in propping up various Pakistani regimes.� Langewiesche goes on to say, �Proliferation is a ratcheting affair that moves in fits and starts and often slips backward, but gradually and incrementally progresses. Diplomatic efforts to suppress it are weakened by national jealousies, UN-style dithering, higher geopolitical priorities, the sheer volume of international trade, and, at the most fundamental level, the inability of the Great Powers themselves to disarm. In a world where perhaps ten countries have already acquired the bomb, and another thirty have the capacity to build one relatively fast, rational reasons for choosing that path will now and then arise. If even Pakistan can go nuclear, almost any other nation can as well.� The ongoing international confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program is in reality blowback from years of America and the international community�s lack of will to establish strict enforcement guidelines for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Khan and his associates, recognizing this lack of will, operated openly for years and Iran was one of their best customers. Khan set up virtual nuclear-weapons markets in which nations could purchase the �entire package, from the necessary machine shops and centrifuges to the blue prints for the bombs.� Langewiesche calls these �turn key� sales, such as the one that took place with Libya. �By the end of the 1990s,� Langewiesche writes, �the Khan Research Laboratory was sending salesmen to international arms shows � in Malaysia, Indonesia, Abu Dhabi and back home in Karachi � where they set up booths and passed out A.Q. Khan buttons and brochures advertising their nuclear and conventional products.� These bazaars, which took place over 15 years, were so blatant that for the United States intelligence community to claim ignorance defies understanding. Khan and Pakistan�s leadership were peddling nuclear wares openly; however, post 9/11, the enemy of our enemy (al-Qaeda) was suddenly our friend. And though we knew that Pakistan was complicit in one of the largest and most lucrative networks of nuclear proliferation, we insisted that Pakistan was of critical importance in the war on terror, while we ignored the real terror that was being exported to the world. This was a policy failure of staggering proportions and will be the gift that keeps on giving. Korea has already gone nuclear and we watch as Iran defiantly remains committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. Keep in mind that Iran is a supporter of terror, deeply involved in Iraq, and a supporter of Hezbollah and Hamas, both purveyors of terror. As it turns out, the weapons of mass destruction that we were so intent on finding in Iraq were actually in Korea and Iran and, post-9/11, on the way to Libya (for the price of $100 million). But, of course, we knew that all along. Well before 9/11. Which brings us back to the question posed initially: why did the Bush administration invade Iraq when it knew with absolute certainty, based on hard intelligence, about this global proliferation? It is, in a sense, the equivalent of looking for a quarter under a street lamp, not because that is where it was lost, but because the light is better. How else to explain it? The solution? Langewiesche suggests that all countries should disarm, eliminating the argument proffered by some nuclear wannabes that it is inherently unfair that some countries possess nuclear arms and not others. But it is more likely that pigs will fly. What to do? Not much. Which is why Langewiesche titles his article, �The Point of No Return.� The world community, for reasons that produce only wonderment, allowed the nuclear genie to slip out of the bottle. Meanwhile, the U.S. has paid dearly in life and treasure, distracted from the real threat nuclear proliferation poses to our survival. Case in Point is a weekly editorial column designed to provide in-depth commentary on current events. Responses should be less than 250 words and sent to [email protected] The Tidings gives priority to letters on local and regional topics of current interest. It seeks to encourage thoughtful, well-reasoned letters and to discourage personal attacks, repetitive messages and personal disputes. Form letters are not published in the Tidings, nor are letters identified as having been published in other publications. Contributions to the Opinion page should be e-mailed in text-only format to [email protected]. 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