Document text
REDACTION KEY
A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE
ORDER 14040.
C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT
THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT
PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.
C-2 INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT
THAT GOVERNMENT’’S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS
REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR
HANDLING INFORMATION.
G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY
THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TE RRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50
U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DI SCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT
(BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE
PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT
OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.)
PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT
CASE.
P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND
OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.
NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted
without a code throughout the release.
EO14040-003443
EO14040-003444
(Rev. 01 31 2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 10/31/2006
To:Washington Field Attn:
From: Washington Field
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:
Synopsis: on 10/19/2006.
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EO14040-003445
EO14040-003446
EO14040-003447
To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: , 10/31/2006
and look important. Al-Hamoud chatting with Khalid
Nabhani on several occasions for long periods of time in Nabhani’s
office. for the two
of them to speak about EKSA related topics since Nabhani is a part of
the GIP and Al-Hamoud is in the Protocol office.
they are talking because they are friends,
.
EKSA’s debt continues to build, and as of August
25, 2006 totaled $9,863,648.70 for 2006. different
companies with large sums owed to them are suffering as a result of
unpaid bills, and that it has become difficult for EKSA employees to
make bookings because they have been refused by some companies until
the overdue bills are paid. the
Saudi’s do not pay their bills and the issue is back in
Saudi Arabia, but Prince Turki has not been aggressive enough in
obtaining the funds from Saudi Arabia.
outstanding bills detailing what amounts were owed to which payees,
but indicated that these are only the bills that are overdue. A
summary of the bills is provided below (Writer’s note: amounts listed
on the summary do not add up to the above total):
Air Transportation $304,976.71
(Elite Jet Limited, Monarch Travel)
Ground Transportation $ 37,697.25
(ABS Limousine, PRS Transportation, Smith Limousine)
Hotel Stays $ 93,309.68
(Four Seasons, Fairmont Olympic, Hilton, Windsor, Aspen)
Allied Organizations $220,000.00
(C & O Resources, Foreign Reports)
Consulting Services $669,349.50
(Argus Int’l Group, Safeer Publications)
Government Relations $675,000.00
( [ ])
Nawaf Obaid $ 46,750.00
(Iran Project, Salary)
Qorvis Communication s $7,548,518.93
4
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EO14040-003448
To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: , 10/31/2006
Office Account Refunds $268,046.63
C & O
Resources, Foreign Reports, Argus International Group and Safeer
Publications . Foreign
Reports is the company name. is in
and together. on intelligence reports and
periodically brings in heavily taped packages
. calls
in to help out when he needs him, but he does not work
there full-time. is a “scumbag” because he
the Ambassador.
is the for the above
captioned Iran project is headed by.
met with Prince Turki on
and warned him that the has received
complaints regarding debts that have not been paid by EKSA. EKSA
owes C & O Resources $120,000.00 for 2006.
her unhappiness about the outstanding debt
.
Abdullah Al Ajroush is still here
. not
aware of any contact Al Ajroush has had with the FBI.
Musaid Al-Jarrah is in the Islamic Affairs
department,
.
Adel Al-Tahini has permanently departed the
United States.
Colonel Ali Al Rakof, Military Attache, is not
returning to Saudi Arabia .
since Al Rakof has only been Military Attache here in the United
States for one year it would not make sense for him to be replaced so
soon.
5
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(O-1)
EO14040-003449
EO14040-003450
EO14040-003451
EO14040-003452
EO14040-003453
(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Details: The above referenced communications document
various interviews of several material witnesses involved in the PENTTBOM Investigation.
Two of the , Isamu Dyson
(DYSON) and Mohdar M. Abdullah (MOHDAR), have given detailed accounts of their involvement with American Airlines Flight #77 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf AlHazmi, while they were in Los Angeles and San Diego. Portions of Dyson and Mohdar's interviews are listed below to support the opening of a Full Investigation on Fahad Althumairy, captioned subject.
During October 2001, Dyson was interviewed several
times by Boston, Portland Maine RA agents, San Diego agents, and
.
During the interviews, it was learned that Dyson
knew Mr. OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, subject of San Diego investigation, during late 1999 and early 2000. Dyson indicated he once took a trip to Los Angeles with Omar Al-Bayoumi during this time frame. They went to the Saudi Arabian consulate in Los Angeles and then to a small Mediterranean café/restaurant in the Culver City area. It was at this restaurant that Omar Al-Bayoumi met American Airline Flight #77 hijacker's Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.
After this meeting (exact date unknown), the
hijackers moved to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi played a major role in getting them established in the community. This included finding them an apartment and providing them with financial assistance. As receiving offices are aware, Al-Bayoumi is being actively investigated, by San Diego, for his role of supporting the hijackers. He is currently in England. He was detained and questioned in September related to the terrorist attacks, but had to be released.
Investigators brought Dyson to the Saudi Arabian
Consulate in Los Angeles. Dyson indicated that Al-Bayoumi dealt with a representative of the Consulate described as a Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'8" in height, in his 40s, with a black/grey beard down to his chest, wearing a suit. It appeared obvious to Dyson that Al-Bayoumi and the Saudi official knew each other and had met before. Their conversation was in Arabic however, and Dyson did not comprehend it. Al-Bayoumi and this man then went behind closed doors to take care of their "business". They spend up to one hour at the Consulate.
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EO14040-003454
To: es geles
Re: 09/04/2002
After leaving the consulate, Al-Bayoumi
suggested that he and Dyson travel to a local restaurant to have
lunch. The two first entered the Mediterranean Café. Al-Bayoumi had informed Dyson that he and his family had dined at this restaurant before. Once Al-Bayoumi and Dyson entered the Mediterranean Café, they were informed that the Mediterranean Café did not serve food. Al-Bayoumi asked if this was the Mediterranean Café on Venice Blvd. Al-Bayoumi was informed that another Mediterranean restaurant was located a few yards away. Al
-Bayoumi and Dyson walked a short distance
west on Venice Boulevard and into the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET Restaurant, located at 10863 Venice Boulevard, phone number (310)842-8291.
While at the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET, Al-Bayoumi
and Dyson met with hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Alhazmi. It is unknown at this time whether this meeting between Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers, in LA, was a planned event or a "chance meeting." meeting is believed to have occurred on 02/01/2000, based on
and toll record analysis. San Diego
investigation has indicated that Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi government. He was being supported in the U.S. with a stipend from his employer, the Saudi Arabian Civil Air Administration, and/or
the Saudi government. There is speculation that Al-Bayoumi could be a Saudi intelligence officer based on numerous factors and circumstances. Therefore, there remains the possibility that the meeting was planned or Al-Bayoumi was directed by someone at the Saudi Consulate to meet the two hijackers at the restaurant in LA.
During the conversation, Dyson learned via
Al-Bayoumi that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had an apartment in LA and have only been there and in the United States for a short time. They stated that they did not like Los Angeles. They were having a difficult time and didn't know anyone. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were in the U.S. to learn English. Al-Bayoumi invited them to come to San Diego and check it out. Al-Bayoumi told them they would probably like it in San Diego. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar indicated they were interested. Al-Bayoumi gave his phone number to Al-Hazmi. It is also possible that Al-Bayoumi got their phone number as well, but Dyson was unsure. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson left the restaurant/café and went to the Culver City Mosque, also know as the King Fahad Mosque.
The next time Dyson met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar
was when they were in the Parkwood Apartments on Mt. Ada Road in San Diego. This was at the welcome/housewarming party Al-Bayoumi had thrown for the hijackers. It was a matter of a few weeks to a month between the meeting at the LA restaurant and the time of the welcoming party for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. During this interim period, Al-Bayoumi did mention that he had been in contact with the
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EO14040-003455
EO14040-003456
To: Los Angeles ngeles
Re: , 09/04/2002
. Los Angeles notes that
according to the US Department of State records, Al-Thumairy is listed
as an Administrative Officer and does not carry any special religious status within the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. ACS further indicated that in ,
A review of Al-Bayoumi's home telephone records
and cellular telephone records has revealed that Al
-Bayoumi had (16)
telephonic contacts with AlThumairy. In addition, Al-Bayoumi had (24) telephonic contacts with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles prior to the events of 09/11/2001.
Various reliable sources of the Los Angeles have
reported that AlThumairy returned to Saudi Arabia in mid-August 2001 and did not return to Los Angeles until 12/24/2001. Los Angeles notes that Al-Bayoumi also left the United States, for England, prior to the events of 09/11/2001. Sources have also reported that AlThumairy's sermons at the King Fahad mosque have a militant, anti-West tone to them. Al-Thumairy is also reported to be anti-United States and Israel.
According to Mohdar, the hijackers and Mohdar
took a trip to Los Angeles in order for Khalid Al-Mihdhar to return to Saudi Arabia for the birth of his daughter. Mohdar stated that they stayed at a hotel close to the mosque. Mohdar also reported that the hijackers met several people a the King Fahad mosque including a person identified as "Khallam". According to Mohdar, Khallam visited the hijackers at the hotel that evening. Upon Khallam's arrival, the hijackers asked Mohdar to wait outside. FBI investigation has determined that Mohdar and the hijackers stayed at Deno's Motel on 06/09/2000. Information from FBI New York has revealed that , SAID SALEH BIN ATTASH, aka "KHALLAD"
. Bin Attash is the alleged
mastermind behind the bombing of USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. New York indicated that
. New York opined that certain
diplomatic arrangements exist at various airports which allow diplomats to meet incoming foreign nationals at the baggage
. Los Angeles can not confirm whether
"Khallad" and "Khallam" are identical.
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EO14040-003457
To: es From: Los Angeles
Re: 09/04/2002
On 03/07/2002, Los Angeles interviewed Mr.
Qualid Moncef Benomrane, while in INS custody. Benomrane is a Tunisian
national that regularly attended the King Fahad Mosque.
Benomrane reported that he had heard that two
Saudi Arabian men had arrived at LAX and were met by a person unknown to Benomrane. This unknown person then took the two Saudis to an apartment complex that had already been rented for them. Benomrane stated he could not remember the address, but that it was a large white building located
on Sepulveda Blvd. between Venice Blvd. and
Palm St. FBI Los Angeles Comment: This is the apartment complex whose
records were recently search by Los Angeles.
One or two days after the arrival of the Saudis,
Benomrane was at the King Fahad Mosque. While at the mosque Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy introduced Benomrane to the two Saudis and asked Benomrane if he could help them during their time in Los Angeles because they did not speak English. Benomrane agreed and gave the Saudis his taxi cab business card.
The next day the Saudis called Benomrane and
asked him to pick them up and drive them around Los Angeles. Benomrane picked them up at their apartment complex and then drove them around. They then ate at the Mediterranean Restaurant located on Venice Blvd. At the end of the day Benomrane took them back to their apartment complex.
Two to three days later the Saudis called
Benomrane again. This time they wanted to go to Sea world in San Diego. Benomrane agreed and picked them up at their apartment where he was given $100 and told he would get the remainder after the trip. Benomrane stated they drove straight to San Diego and the only stop that they made was at a San Diego gas station. Benomrane could not remember the gas stations location in San Diego. One or two days after they returned to Los Angeles Benomrane called them to receive the remainder of his money. The Saudis told him that Sheik Fahad AlThumairy would give him the rest of the money.
When asked by investigators who else knew about
the two Saudis, Benomrane replied that no one at the Kind Fahad Mosque knew about them and that he was told by Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy to keep the presence of the two Saudis to himself. Benomrane did say that the Saudi Consulate knew about the two Saudis because it was the consulate that told Sheik Fahad to take care of the Saudis. Benomrane was told by Sheik Fahad that the Saudis were
here to see their sick father who was in a local hospital. Benomrane
said that the Saudis stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one month and then they returned to Saudi Arabia. When asked if Benomrane
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EO14040-003458
EO14040-003459
To: Los Angeles ngeles
Re: , 09/04/2002
States and may have assisted them. Based on the above, Los Angeles
has initiated a Full Field investigation on Al-Thumairy in order to determine his association with the tragic events of 09/11/2001 and to disrupt any future terrorist operations that may be planned
by Al-Qaeda or its support network in the United States.
♦♦
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EO14040-003460
EO14040-003461
EO14040-003462
EO14040-003463
EO14040-003464
(Rev. 08-28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 09/02/2003
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Dallas
Los Angeles
From: Los Angeles
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY;
Synopsis: Source reporting on various Los Angeles subjects
and the SOROORI/SURURI movement.
Full Field Investigation Instituted: (Non-USPER)
Adminstrative: This communication was produced
by FBI Los Angeles and will be reported through
channels.
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EO14040-003465
EO14040-003466
EO14040-003467
EO14040-003468
To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: , 09/02/2003
subgroup called "Jamia" based out of Medina that is more secretive
and elite than the Riyadh group. Both these groups are violent
jihadists involved in the recent terrorist attacks inside Saudi
Arabia including the May 2003 bombings of western targets. The
Suroori group may have members of the Saudi religious police
(Al-Muttawwa) who are sympathetic to their cause.
the leadership of the Suroori network tightly controls their
clandestine network inside Saudi Arabia by strictly adhering to
guidelines on what their young members and recruits can read, watch
and hear. Young recruits are isolated from mainstream religious
society and their families and indoctrinated into the radical Suroori
ideology.
Suroori have
independent cells and structures in different countries in order
to maintain compartmentalization and ensure the organization's
survival in the face of law enforcement and military actions against
the group. The majority of funding for Suroori are obtained from
private donations taken in mosques inside Saudi Arabia, the United
Kingdom, and Europe.
. There
is a large Suroori presence in the United Kingdom because the group
feels relatively secure and comfortable there and can engage in
significant fund-raising operations. Suroori in the United Kingdom
are recruiting and training British, American and European converts
to Islam and then sending them back to their native countries as
part of the Al-Qaida linked Suroori clandestine network in each
country.
Al-Thumairy was part of the Al-Qaida linked extremist Suroori network
in Saudi Arabia.
the Al-Qaida linked
Suroori extremist network will continue to grow inside Saudi Arabia
and carry out terrorist attacks. Even though the network does not
have a large amount of members, they are well-trained and highly
motivated. The extremist Suroori network has many small covert
paramilitary training camps in the northern desert regions of Saudi
Arabia that are used for military and terrorist training.
as of August
2003, the Islamic bookstore run by the leadership of the Sunni Salafi
extremist at overland mosque had been closed in its location and
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EO14040-003469
To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: , 09/02/2003
enforcement scrutiny. They also will use the mosques to raise money
for their activities, and identify and recruit new members into their
network.
At the "underground" mosques in Southern
California, religious training is being conducted to indoctrinate
and teach young members the extremist form of the Sunni Salafi
ideology. These newly indoctrinated members are then sent out from
the small storefront mosques to larger, mainstream, moderate Islamic
mosques in the Southern California area and the rest of the U.S.
Their objectives are to form an information reporting network within
moderate Islamic institutions, to select and carefully recruit and
convert moderate Muslims into their extremist ideology, and to carry
out influence activities by trying to guide and influence imams at
moderate, mainstream mosques to propagate a more radical message
to their mosque members.
The information provided by the source was
obtained through various sources, as well as personal knowledge.
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EO14040-003471
To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: , 09/02/2003
Lead :
Set lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
For informational purposes only.
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EO14040-003472
EO14040-003473
EO14040-003474
b. The investigation was opened on 11/30/2007.
c. The investigation was initially opened as a Full
Field Investigation.
d. There is no recent LHM because the case is being closed
within a year of opening. The closing LHM is attached.
e. The subject is a Non-USPER.
f. The extent to which the subject is aware of the terrorist
aims of the foreign power is unknown due to his location in Saudi
Arabia and the inability to conduct a subject interview.
g. A sensitive national security matter exists as FAHAD AL-
THUMARY may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian
government.
h. Known Identifiers
(U) The following identifiers are being provided for
the captioned subject:
a) Name: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY; FAHD IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
ALTHUMAIRY
b) DOB:
c) Non-USPER
d) Religious affiliation: Sunni
Descriptive Data:
(U) Main Subject
Name -
Last: ALTHUMAIRY
First: FAHAD
Middle:
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB:
POB:
ARN: Alien Registration #
DLN: None
PNO:
SOC:
Alias(es) -
Last: ALTHUMAIRY
First: FAHD
Middle: IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
Address(es) -
House #: Unknown
Street Name:
Street Suffix:
Unit:
City:
State:
Postal Code:
Country: Saudi Arabia
3
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EO14040-003475
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
i. Subject has resided in Saudi Arabia since he was refused
re-entry into the U.S. on 05/08/2003. LEGAT is aware
of ALTHUMAIRY's presence in Saudi Arabia.
j. Subject is classified as possible direct associate.
4
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EO14040-003476
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Request concurrence to
close captioned investigation. Provide the enclosed LHM,
making notification of the closing of this investigation, to
DOJ.
Set Lead 2: (Info)
AT
LEGAT: Read and clear.
ËË
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EO14040-003477
EO14040-003478
Synopsis: To file. To provide summary and historical information
for subsequent agents of
Administrative Notes: Attached to this EC is a document summarizing
the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated
with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S.
Thos replaces Serial which was intended as a draft for review but was serialized. Serial will be removed at a later date.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. Saudi 9/11 Connections
Details:
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and
entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia(EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks /PENTTBOMB ). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understandthe origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part ofor closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only notedif related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intendedas such.
Title: Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: 07/23/2021
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EO14040-003479
An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation
regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by theKSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officialsand intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, theirinvolvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have theknowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG isrelated to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creationof a larger network for such activities.
In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi
Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terroristattacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much availableinformation from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission’s Report. Inaddition, the classified “28 pages” was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shedadditional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 aspart of the original Commission Report.
there was located within the EKSA the offices of the
Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and
their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the SaudiArabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on theseoffices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the fundingand creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US– many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly toPrince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As thepropagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker’ssupport network – these organizations will also be listed below ( below is not an all-inclusive list as thiswould be too large.)
Administration:
was originally formed as in 2002 as a result of the
PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network andindividuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from SaudiArabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined atGuantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of there was
a few investigations of some Saudi ArabianTitle: Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: 07/23/2021
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EO14040-003480
government personnel and organizations had been previously established. was quickly
transferred to the new and changed to and then subsequently During a
portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the
and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the
AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After
approximately ten years in the program was again transferred to
before returning to
of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were
captioned under the classification. Later this designation was changed to investigations
prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under and These
were later combined under and then classifications. For the most part, serials noted within thisdocument utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.
As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi
Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is
not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack ofresources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied thatinformation directly within this communication. The language, spelling, source symbol numbers,
grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.
As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is
necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for
dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number
replaced by a non-standard designation that was created entirely by the writing agent.
Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period,
♦♦Title: Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: 07/23/2021
4
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EO14040-003481
The Saud i Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support
network for the a ttacks of September 11, 2001 ; and the SAG creation of and support and
direction for a network of o ffices and personnel involved with m ilitan t Salafi Islamic
activities and proselytization within the United States.
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information
related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the
Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United St ates with the
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB ). Such an
analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to
understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted,
this document only discusses enti ties that are part of or closely tied
to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001
investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report
should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not
intended as such.
An additional purpose of this communication is to document
investigations and supporting documentation regarding the
Saudi(Wahhabi) /Salafi/militant network that was created, funded,
directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and
diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials
and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the
entities involved with this network, their involvement with the
activities of these organizations/individuals would logicall y be
supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government.
This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11
investigation not only be the direct involvement of s ome personnel but
also via the creation of a larger network for such activities .
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EO14040-003482
In addition, the below analysis will update information available on
the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence
services. Much of the publically known information regarding the
9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was do cumented in the 9/11 Commission
Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information
from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the
Commission’s Report. In addition, the classified “28 pages” was
subsequently de -classified and investigations since 2004 shed
additional light on the information that was contained within these 28
pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission
Report.
there was located
within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the
office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers
and their support networks identified significant connections to these
offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los
Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus
on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition,
the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a
multitude of Islamic organization s, offices, imams and other religious
figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant
ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince
Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of inform ation on US
based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would
naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker’s
support network – these organization s will also be listed below (
below is not an all -inclusive list as this would be too large.)
Administration :
was originally formed as
in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation
identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support
network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15
of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible
20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and
confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter
the US. At the time of creation of there was
a few inve stigations of some
Saudi Arabian government personnel and organizations had been
previously established. Squad was quickly transferred to the new
and changed to and then subsequently
During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was
within the and much of
the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian
charities in the AOR as well as individual subjects with
established or alleged AQ or mil itant connections. After
approximately ten years in the program was again transferred to
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EO14040-003483
EO14040-003484
Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and
recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through
2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to
enter the U.S. and the “muscle hijackers”, although r ecruited in 2000,
were the last – not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information ,
Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd
in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers in volved
in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior
entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an
operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation
and the 9/11 C ommission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the
U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission
Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the
operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appear ed
to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although
the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been
pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both
had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihda r’s difficulties may have
resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was
possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi
alone in California except for elements of his support network.
Almihdar would not return to the US as a “muscle hijacker” until July
2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having
attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks
that were held in Kuala Lumpur.
It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ
operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to
Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in
late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning
meeting in Kuala Lumpur in De cember 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly
personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a
prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ
connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S.
intelligence as being AQ members . After Almihdar departed the U.S.
Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000.
The second primary group of hijackers were the “Hamburg Group”
EO14040-003485
(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi
Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to
be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these
four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their
need for a support network would be minimal.
Due to the la ck of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the
operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the
existence of a support network would make operational sense.
Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network
assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the
KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King
Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these
locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government .
EO14040-003486
Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO)
(Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi
Arabian Intelligence
Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
(as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located
an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means
proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Ara bian
diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The
Islamic Affairs Offi ces worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in
supporting the Saudi Arabian Government’s objective to be perceived as
the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi
Arabia’s religious and political competition with Shia Iran.
, the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office
and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs
Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to
provide cover for the movement of
. Saudi Arabian “non -governmental organizations” (NGO), ie.
“charities”, supplemented this activity with large funding streams as
well as cover for personnel.
One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB
investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had
prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11,
2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office
personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of
possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to
Saudi Arabian intelligence.
Relevant Serials:
FBI Serial
) reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the
largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with
approximately 50 MIA officers.
Many Saudi
Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section,
Majid Aljashaihan (SA NOTE: This would be Majed Alghesheyan ),
was either a GIP officer or had some type of special connection to the
GIP. The same opinions were held about Khalil Khalil, the deputy
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EO14040-003487
EO14040-003488
EO14040-003489
The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within
the MIA offices. and
Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence
officer . This is significant considering the
MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the
support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation,
funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing
network that extended throughout the U.S.
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EO14040-003490
EO14040-003491
EO14040-003492
EO14040-003493
EO14040-003494
EO14040-003495
Musaed A Al Jarrah ( Musaed Aljrarrah )
DOB:
Occupation: Accountant
Address: McLean, Va
Telephone: (home) (cell)
Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a
high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was
and was heavily
involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network
within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support
network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numer ous contacts with
terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely
associated with Bandar bin Sultan.
Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the
9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government
involvemen t. Per in vestigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had
a “controlling, guiding and directing in fluence on all aspects of
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EO14040-003496
EO14040-003497
EO14040-003498
EO14040-003499
Southern California Based Investigations
A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support
network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this
was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation
Encore. During the
as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be
involved. The individuals in these locations were known to h ave
contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the
EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi
Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the
EKSA Dawa office. The following additional person s of interest were
working at the Consulate:
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EO14040-003500
Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
Fahad I A Al Thumairy ( Fahad Althumairy )
DOB:
Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: , believed to be Althumairy’s
son, was initially to visit California (google was
listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.
Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to
EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles.
Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and
FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi
government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers
support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or
arranged for their meeting key members of the support network.
Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.
Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under
.
This investigation was originally predicated on
information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who
had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.
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EO14040-003501
EO14040-003502
On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents
interviewed regarding any knowledge that he
may have regarding the relationship between
and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al -Mihdhar (Al -Mihdhar) and
Nawaf Al -Hazmi (Al -Hazmi). stated that he was told
by that Fahad Al -Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad
Mosque, had asked him to look after tw o very "significant"
people. did not inquire into the word "significant" or
why he referred to them this way, other then to say, that if
Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they
were important. did request to meet the two men,
(Al-Mihdhar and Al -Hazmi), whenever they came across each other
at the mosque. would see with the two men at the
mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al -
Thumairy in the library of the mosque.
states he was told by that the two
men were living at his house on . stated to
that he had asked his sister, who was living there at
the time, to move out and stay with other sister for a
couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and
needed the space in the house. was unaware when
had requested that of his sister.
recalls a conversation that he had with
shortly after the Al -Mihdhar and Al -Hazmi arrived in L.A.
regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states
that told that he needed to take the two men to
the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. asked why
he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not
very good, and the service was poor. stated to
that he just needed to take them there. did not
question him any further about this topic, but advised the
interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to
have private mee tings. [See Bayoumi]
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EO14040-003503
Mohammed S Almuhanna ( Mohammed Almuhanna / Mohammed Almohanna )
DOB:
Phone #: , ,
Summary: Almuhanna was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi
Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanna was known to be a leader and
spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King
Fahd Mosque. Almuhanna was a close associate of Althumairy.
Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED
ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL -THUMAIRY, a Sunni
Salafi extremist with
ties to 9/11 (subject of ).
ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi
Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with
ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque.
"ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist
associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a
graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh"
.
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EO14040-003504
Almuhanna is t he son of prominent Saudi judge – Sulaiman Almuhanna
(DOB: .
A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB:
).
Relevant Serials :
[ dated 11/13/2003]
that Almuhanna had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque
on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.
Per interview of Mohammed
Alqudhaieen (see herein) Almuhannad was invited by Alqudhaieen to
provide sermons while in Tucson.
Interviewee stated that al -Muhanna was a virulent critic of
America and American society. According to al-Muhanna
was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non -Muslims
and Muslims who did not meet al -Muhannas religious standards.
stated that many people in the Muslim community were
surprised when al -Thumairy was not allowed to re -enter the United
States, but no one was surprised that al -Muhanna was excluded.
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EO14040-003505
EO14040-003506
EO14040-003507
EO14040-003508
EO14040-003509
EO14040-003510
Adel Alsadhan
DOB:
Relevant Serials:
Captioned investigation was opened based on
AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject
MUSAED AL-JARRAH ) at the Islamic Affairs Section of
the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL -JARRAH
coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially
supported by the Saudi
government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL -
JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN
a believer in a radical form of Sunni
Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.
[ Serial dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor
Abdussattar Shaikh: Omar Albayoumi introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab
Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia.
They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking
for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to
stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven
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EO14040-003511
EO14040-003512
DOB:
SSN:
Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: (LA) /
Possible present address:
Anaheim, CA
May be USPER of origin
Summary: was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi
Arabian Consulate in LA. was a close associate of Alhtumairy and
may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with
Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with l ater had contact
with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.
Relevant Serials :
Listed employees of the Saudi
Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed as a translator with
a US arrival date of 10/23/ 1991 although the biographical section
noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from
1979-1983.
In February of 2000, Omar Al-Bayoumi and Kaysan
Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi
Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for
his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards
they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they
met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al -Mihdhar and Nawaf Al -Hamzi. When
later interviewed, Al -Bayoumi and Bindon characterized
this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon
identified a photograph of as the person at the Consulate
who gave religious materials to Al -Bayoumi.
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EO14040-003513
EO14040-003514
EO14040-003515
Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close
and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11
Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi
intelligence; however, could not locate any evidence and
Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on
a chance meeting. Information contained herein ,
This is
significant as Al bayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately
available to Hazmi and Mihdar up on entry into the U.S. during a time
period that both of these ill -prepared operatives were most vulnerable
to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a “ghost employee”
of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of
Albayoumi’s boss within this company would later move in to the same
apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar’s departure.
The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by
writer were from 1998.
[ Serial ] On 1998,
new
property has been purchased for a mosque, located at
in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish
people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar
Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is ,
Bayoumi's residential number is and his cellular
phone is . The property cost $580,000.00 and is going to
be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the
property was bo ught and renovated.
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EO14040-003516
Date 04/01/1999 ] In this communication
an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of
had delivered $400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El
Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money
originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a
foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob ,
address San Diego, CA (Villa
Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone ,
may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"
[ ] An interview of an employee of
Dallah Al Baraka in S audi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared
to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services
dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation
(PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was
forced to pay for under the contract. The employee stated that the
Director General of PCA at that time, (DOB ,
had "side deals" regarding some of the ghost employees with
AVCO whereby AVCO paid the expenses relat ed to these
individuals . Omar Albayoumi was one of the ghost employees. The
interviewee estimated that there were approximately 50 such
individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for
AVCO). When the contract was moved to ERCAN assured the
interviewee that he wanted to Albayoumi to stay in the US
and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The
interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the
program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed
additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear
which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was
already approved by . These purchase orders were controlled by
Mohammed Basharil ( Mohamed Basharahil ) (PCA). Basharil and a Hamid
Alrashid (PCA) would take the payment and wire transfer the money to
Albayoumi's account.
[9/11 Commission Report] Saudi student Yazeed Alsalmi moved into
the home in which Alhazmi resided after the previously noted departure
of Almihdar. Yazeed Alsalmi (Yazeed S A Alsalmi ) DOB:
was the
.
]Anwar AULAQI and BAYOUMI clearly knew each
other, as would be expected since each was a well -known member of the
local Muslim community. While they may not have liked each other, they
appear to have had an instrumental relationship in regard to the
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EO14040-003517
hijackers, with phone calls between them becoming necessary for
the support network's functioning and effectiveness. [Anwar Aulaqi,
Yemeni-American AQ operative, was associated wi th the hijackers while
in San D iego and later moved to Northern Virginia (Dar Alhijra mosque )
at the time that the hijackers were in Northern Virginia. Aulaqi
allegedly later met with several hijackers to include Alhazmi while
working at the Dar Alhijra. Aulaqi was later killed by U.S. forces in
Yemen while a part of AQAP.]
[ Serial dated 10/03/2001 Interview of
] noted that Khadib has a "tight" connection to
Omad Ahmed Albayoumi. Albayoumi is a braggart from a low status
Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Albayoumi
has access to Saudi money, more than $800,000, to build Mosques and
Islamic schools. Albayoumi is considered by many in the Muslim
community to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer, as he would
come to the Mosque and video tape everything. noted that
Albayoumi is described as a social animal who has connections
everywhere including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi
Consulate and even with known crooks.
[ Dated 04/2016 ] Operation Encore analysis:
described Bayoumi as a Saudi citizen with great respect inside the
Saudi Consulate, well regarded by Consulate personnel who held a “very
high status” when he entered the building. Bayoumi’s status was
higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate.
[ ] On September 27, 2001, execution of a
federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a
room utilized by Al -Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community
Islamic Center (Masjid Al -Madina Al -Munawara), located at 511 S.
Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that
search a copy of Al -Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000
was seized.
Listed in Al -Bayoumi's phone book were the
following n ames and telephone numbers:
Dr. Jameel Alshami ; Saudi Embassy WA.
, AbdulAziz Assaleh
and F Khalid Asswailem
and C . Saudi Consulate F
, Islamic Affairs Abdullah Awaad Sami
Assadhan and Saad Al Jebreen , LA, CA
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(F)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(P)
(P)
EO14040-003518
EO14040-003519
Osama Basnan ( Osama Bassnan / Osama Yousef Bassnan / Usama Basnan )
DOB:
SSN:
Summary: Osama Basnan was also a known associate of the hijackers in
Southern California. A prior Saudi Arabian employee, Basnan was also
known to have connections to the “Blind Sheikh.” Basnan and his wife
were close friends of Bayoumi. Basnan’s wife, who was known to have
sympathy for Hamas, was paid money by Saudi Ambassador Bandar’s wife.
Relevant Serials :
This serial noted
[ ] This investigation was predicated based on
interviews conducted during the PENTTBOMB investigation.
Information was developed that identified Osama Basnan as havin g
a very close relationship with Omar Al-Bayoumi, who provided
support to hijackers Nawaf Al -Hazmi and Khalid Al -Mihdhar in San
Diego. Basnan was also reported to be the "Omad," or informal
(F)
(F)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(J-3)
EO14040-003520
EO14040-003521
EO14040-003522
about 1991 he met OSAMA BASSNAN. ALTURKI established numerous
contacts at the Embassy which led him to his current professional
status. ALTURKI 's relationship with the Saudi government is very
strong. ALTURKI is friendly with Saudi government officials and
members of the Royal Family, particularly PRINCE BANDAR. ALTURKI
travels to Houston, Texas where
In Augus t 2001, ALTURKI departed the United States
somewhat hastily, but because of pressure from work. ALTURKI did
make stops in Washington DC and Boston on his return trip to
Saudi Arabia, visiting friends in the Saudi Embassy. ALTURKI
stated he has not provided money to BASSNAN. [ ,
Serial and , Serial
On May 14, 1992,
For financial activity: Serial . For
summary see Serial
[ Serial ] On 2002,
,
BASNAN recently obtained a large
unspecific amount of money during his recent travel to Houston,
Texas. BASNAN's f riend, ABDULRAZAQ ALTURKI introduced BASNAN to
MOHAMMED TURKI AL SAUD, a member of the Saudi Royal Family and
part of the Saudi Arabian government delegation that was in
Houston for a summit meeting with President Bush. AL SAUD was
the person who gave BASNAN a large sum of money.
BASNAN received money in excess of $10,000. BASNAN
gave a large portion of the money to his wife
to give to her family who lives in the West Bank area of Israel.
, Serial . [SA note:
Mohammed Alsaud may have
been Turki bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Alsaud (NFI).]
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(F)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003523
EO14040-003524
Abdullah A S Al Jraithen ( Abdullah Aljraithen )
DOB:
Relevant Serials :
As outlined by writer in referenced
serial,
ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in
Culver City, California with OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI on
12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little
additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the
time referenced seri al was written.
After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks,
ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his
apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent
review by NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS)
of documents obtained by NYO -JTTF from NSY yielded
further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is
also described on ALBAYOUMI's
telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN,
with the numbers and C (cell) . (Analyst
note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the
second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given
the code "5" followed by a 7 -digit number; neither number was
found in the Telephone Application.)
ECF searches on and
both yielded a hit on
, which describes reporting from a foreign
government service regarding "names and telephone numbers
(O-1)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(S)
(F)
(F)
(S)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(F)
EO14040-003525
appearing on a laminated card retrie ved from the villa in
Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD
ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were
arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The
relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI
AL-J'AYTHAN and cell An IDW search on
yielded additional other government service
information : "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL -JUHAYN
" was found on a confiscated hard -drive from an October
6, 2001 raid on the Al -Haramayn offices in
According to a report on
ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: Intelligence Assessment:
Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter
(Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons,
passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL -ISLAM operations in
Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.
Also according to the report, a 22 -page
Arabic language document containing instructions for making a
variety of i mprovised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a
hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical
clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL -
KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the
document closely paral lels that in an explosives manual
handwritten by Abu Khabab AL -MASRI, the former explosives and
poisons trainer at the AL -QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING
CAMP in Afghanistan. (Source:
AITHREAT@00001 NON -RELEASAB LE)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
EO14040-003526
EO14040-003527
EO14040-003528
EO14040-003529
EO14040-003530
EO14040-003531
EO14040-003532
Muslim World League (MWL)
134 West 26th Street
New York, NY
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
4516 Old Columbia Pike
PO Box 8096
Falls Church, Va
Telephone:
The Islamic Center
2551 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC
Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)
8500 Hilltop Road
Fairfax, Va
(P)
EO14040-003533
Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)
Summary: Per above, the IIASA, located at 8500 Hilltop Road,
Fairfax, Va., was affiliated with the EKSA. The school was a U.S.
subsidiary of the Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia.
The EKSA was known to finance the IIASA and its primar y administrators
and teachers were Saudi Arabian diplomats. The IIASA was one of the
many pieces of Saudi proselytizing activity in the U.S.
Mohammed Alsaud is believed to be on left. Bandar Bin Sultan Alsaud
on right (seated).
Seated in front row of the above noted opening ceremony (left to
right): Abdullah Alsaif (Saudi as hating
(F)
(
(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)
EO14040-003534
EO14040-003535
EO14040-003536
EO14040-003537
EO14040-003538
EO14040-003539
EO14040-003540
Muslim World League ( MWL )
Abdullah Alnoshan ( Abdullah Alnushan / Alnoashan)
(Director)
The Muslim World League (MWL) was created by the
Saudi Arabian government in 1962 in order to combat the influence
of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalist influence in the
Arab world. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread
the Wahhabist faith throughout the Islamic world as well as
spread Islam in areas that were not known to be heavily Islamic.
Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and
other Non -Governmental Organizations (N GO's) in order to gain
leadership over the Islamic community. Many of these charities were
known to have supported AQ and related groups both financially and
operationally throughout the world. MWL was the organization under
which the International Islam ic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other
such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) operated at an
international level.
Relevant Serials:
The US based office(s) of MWL and its director, Abdullah Alnoshan,
were extensively connected to See
(F)
(F)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003541
for connections to - the
connections being too extensive to summarize herein. Alnoshan was
known to have been a “purchasing agent” for the EKSA (see
Alnoshan was an asso ciate of Musaed Aljarrah.
The address listed for MWL within the phone roster noted above,
the New York address, was formed into a sub -office by the time of the
creation of . The main office had been moved to 360
South Washington Street, Suite 300, Falls Church, Va. This address is
listed as the office of IIRO on the phone roster – however, by this
same time IIRO had relocated to another office (see below). The South
Washington address was owned by Sanabal Alkheir (a “Herndon Cha rity”)
and was also, subsequent to 9/11, the location of the Dar Al Arqum
mosque which hosted many of the convicted “Northern Virginia Jihad
Group.” (see more below)
During the search of MWL's office space
in New York in
2005 the FBI found a document titled "First Annual Ijtima of
Mujahideen and Jihaad Conference" dated 1991. This document was
from Tehreek -E-Jihaad, Sherpur House, Karachi, Pakistan, and
included sign -up sheets. The conference was: "To publicize Jihad
on an int ernational and inter -Islamic level."
The connections with MWL are extensive and are best viewed
within
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003542
World Assembly of Muslim Youth ( WAMY )
Abdullah Bin Laden
Related:
Relevant Serials :
[ Serial ]: Analysis revealed that the WORLD
ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH, aka al -Nadwa al -'Alamiyya lil Shabab
al-Islami, is headquartered out of Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
WAMY's U.S. headquarters is located at POB 8096, Falls
Church, VA 22041, telephone number
WAMY's U.S. business address is 4300 Evergreen Lane,
Annadale, Virginia 22003. Further analysis revealed
that WAMY presents itself as an individual and family
services organization and youth center. Additional
analysis revealed that WAMY's U.S. director is a member
of the BIN LADIN family, nfi.
Also, analysis has revealed that
(F)
(F)
(G)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)
(P)
(G)
EO14040-003543
EO14040-003544
EO14040-003545
EO14040-003546
International Islamic Relief Organization ( IIRO )
Summary: The IIRO office morphed into an
into the Success Foundation (Mohammed Salem Omeish)
which did not note a confirmed tie to the EKSA. It is believed that
this organization w as originally created as IIRO within the same
offices of MWL but then some of the personnel moved and created a
separate organization. Listed herein as it was originally listed as
an office of the EKSA . The
history of IIRO related to the purpose of this document focuses more
on the time period prior to the 9/11 attacks.
IIRO was established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in
1978. The IIRO has been identified as the "social arm" or
"operating arm" of the Muslim World L eague. The Secretary
General of the Muslim World League said it provides "humanitarian
assistance" through the IIRO. (FTAT -G)
As noted above (see under MWL), the IIRO was originally listed as
being located at the address which was later
assumed by MWL. Although listed herein, the relevance of the IIRO
office to the 9/11 investigation would most likely be from the 1990s
and prior to its move to the address
Mohamed Salem Omeish appeared to alter IIRO into the
Success Foundation . Thereafter it appeared to be
primarily associated with HAMAS/MB support. Its alienation away from
Saudi Arabia is highlighted by the fact that Omeish shared offic e
space with Abdulrahman Alam oudi who was convicted of attempting to
assassinate then Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in
coordination with Libya. Prior to the Omeish, the director of the
IIRO office appeared to be Kuwaiti Tariq Alsuwaidan.
Tareq AlSuwaidan - per Wikipedia, Tareq Al-Suwaidan is a Kuwaiti
writer, historian , businessman, and Muslim scholar. Al-Suwaidan is
believed to be the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and has "extremist
inclinations." Al-Suwaidan was banned from the US in 2000 following
his comments "Palestine will not be liberated but through
Jihad. Nothing can be achieved without sacrificing blood. The Jews
(P)
(P)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-003547
will meet their end at our hands." In 2007, Al -Suwaidan was listed by
the U.S. federal prosecutors, along with a group of U.S. Muslim
Brotherhood members, as an unindicted co -conspirator in the terrorism
financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development which was convicted along with its leaders of
financing Hamas. Al-Suwaidan is known for his anti -Semitic remarks,
hate for Jews, and push for electronic Jihad among youth.
AlSuwaidan is listed in Public Records as the
Secretary/Treasurer for the International Relief Organization'
(IRO) located in Falls Church, VA, (with the
President listed as Sulaiman AlAli and the Vice President as
Abdullah M. AlMahdi). Chicago provided information in
(an ec dated 11/7/96 to OKC) that
AlSuwaidan is known to have received at least $11,000 from the
IRO and that ABRAR Investments, of which AlSuwaidan was once an
officer, provided $60,000 to the IRO.
Finally, indicates
potential ties by AlSuwaidan to Mohammed Saleh
incarcerated in Leavenworth, KS for his part in the TERRSTOP case
which involved plans to bomb the United Nations building and
other targets in New York. "Umar Al -Utaibah / Tariq Suwaidan"
(believed to be a reference to Tareq AlSuwaidan) was found
(during the period March 14 - May 8, 1997) on a docu ment in
Saleh's cell written in Arabic with telephone number
beside the entry. Saleh also had ABRAR Investment Inc.', (for
which AlSuwaidan was alleged to be an officer) listed in the
documents with telephone number .
Tareq Mohammad AlSuwaidan, aka Tariq Mohamed
AlSuwaidain; Tariq Swidan; DOB is of Kuwaitian
nationality and is a non -US person. His SSAN is .
According to the address book of Marzook, AlSuwaidan "heads a
group of gulf companies that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood."
He was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Relief Organization
(IRO), Falls Church, VA; Abrar Investments; and Solidarity
International for Kuwait. He allegedly has a cousin who was the
Deputy Head of the Kuwaiti Air Force in 1990. AlSuwaidan is
credited with providing the money for the land purchase on which
the Tulsa mosque and school now stand.
AlSuwaidan currently provides $50,000 per
month to the Tulsa mosque, 20% of which is ta ken off the top for
the benefit of HAMAS.
(P)
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(G)
(F)
(G)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003548
It is known from that
IIRO was located for a period of time at
Washington, D.C. During this time it was co -located with
the organization Solidarity Int ernational for Kuwait that was
started by Tareq Al -Suwaidan.
1. Incorporation Records:
A 1992 Annual Report for IRO listed the
following:
Sulaiman Al Ali President Falls
Church, Va.
Abdullah M. Al -Mahdi VP Falls
Church, Va.
Tareq M. Al -Swaidan S/T Alex,
Va.
Principal Address: Falls Church, Va.
A 1993 Annual Report for IRO listed the
following:
Sulaiman Al-Ali President Falls
Church, Va.
Abdullah M. Al -Mahdi Vice President Falls
Church, Va.
Tareq M. Al -Swaiden S/T Alex,
Va.
Abdul Al -Moslah Officer
Falls Church, Va.
Freed Qurash Officer
Falls Church, Va.
Salah Badahdh Officer
Falls Church, Va.
A 1994 Annual report for IRO was similar to the 1993
report except listing all addresses as
, Falls Church, Va.
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003549
A 1995 Annual Report for I RO listed the
following:
Sulaiman Al-Ali President
Falls Church, Va.
Abdullah M. Al -Mahdi Vice President
Tareq M. Al -Mahdi S/T
Abdul Al -Moslah Director
Salah Badahdh Director
Freed Qurashdi Director
Principal Address: Falls Church, Va.
In 1998, IRO offices were searched in relation to
Chicago FBI's with which IRO had
invested. Shortly afterward, Sulaiman Al-Ali suddenly returned
to Saudi Arabia in August 1998.
The IRO was ordered dissolved on 08/19/1998. All asset
and liabilities were transferred to the Success Foundation, Inc.
On 03/23/1999, IRO (corporate ID , primary
address Falls Church, Va., was ordered re -instated.
The new officers were listed as follows:
Sulaiman Al Ali Removed
Falls Church, Va.
Mohamed S. Omeish President
Alexandria, Va.
Abdullah M. Al -Mahdi Vice President
Falls Church,
Va.
Tareq M. Al -Suwaiden S/T
Abdul Al -Moslah Director
Salah Badahdah Director
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(G)
(P-1)
(P-1)
EO14040-003550
A filing dated 07/22/2000 for IRO listed
the primary address as and the only officer as
Mohamed S. Omeish, .
(P)
(P)
(P-1)
EO14040-003551
Sulaiman Alali ( Soliman Ali Elay / Sulaiman Ali Alali / Sulaiman
Kabbala / Sulaiman Kabrara / Soliman Elay )
DOB:
Va ID and two SSNs.
Per PPT entered the US as Elay on 09/03/1998 on Saudi Airlines and
last departed as Elay on 08/08/1999 on Malaysian Airlines.
Va Drivers license was issued in 1995 under Sulaiman Alali
Associated with Sanabell, IIRO, Global Chemical and Albayoumi.
Summary: Sulaiman Alali was associated with IIRO and other “charities”
and global investment entities such as Global Chemical
. Alali was paid by Sanabell and had a physical and
financial connection to Omar Albayoumi. Alali ret urned to Saudi
(F)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(J-3)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-003552
Arabia prior to 9/11 but has at least one son, Amro, who joined
Alqaeda. According to open source, Alali was the president of IRO and
a major shareholder of Global Chemical. Alali’s son Amro is a known
AQAP member.
[ dated 05/23/1997 ] Reference Butel
advised of the possible location of Suleiman Al -Ali, who is the
Director of the International
Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) in the United States. Al -
Ali is believed to be a friend of Al -Gama al-Islamiyya supporter
Zahir 'Abd Al -'Aziz, who reportedly has ties to Islamic extremist
circles throughout the Balkans. Al -Ali reportedly maintains a
telephone number of , which is subscribed to by the
"International Relief Organization," Falls
Church, VA 22046 -4417.
[ ] A corporate record for INTERNATIONAL
RELIEF
ORGANIZATION INC., at Falls Church, VA 22041 with
(Alali) listed as President. Incorporated 7/22/91 in Virginia,
status is a ctive. Enclosed is a D & B report for INTERNATIONAL
RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., Falls
Church, VA 22046, Telephone number This
organization provides humanitarian aid.
[ Serial Dated 11/02/2001 ] Alali used an
address associated with Albayoumi on banking information in 1998. At
a business in La Jolla, CA Alali listed Albayoumi ( Omar Baymi ) as
his emergency POC. While residing in California at one address
Albayoumi was listed on Alali’s r ental application as a co -
tenant/friend. During this time Albayoumi and Alali listed their
employment with Dalla Company, Saudi Arabia.
[ Serial dated 11/21/2002 as well as above serial ]
Banking records from 10/21/1998 to 08/05/1999 noted that Alali
deposited 32 checks from Sanabell totaling over $128 ,000. Sanabell
also directly paid rent and other expenses. During same period Alali
paid Albayoumi almost $7000.
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(F)
(F)
(G)
EO14040-003553
Alali has multiple children who were Alali’s
son Amro Syliman Alali ( Amro Alali ) was a known AQAP member (see
). After a short incarceration, Amro Aalali was
released by Saudi authorities.
Amro Alali – AQAP Member / Son of Sulaiman Alali
(F)
(J-3)
(J-3)
EO14040-003554
U.S. Based Clerics Paid by Saudi Arabia
Summary: As part of Saudi proselytizing efforts, Saudi Arabia
supported many U.S. based clerics either directly via training and
funding (via the EKSA) or via charities and schools (IIAS A).
[ Serial ]
[ dated 2003] The original list
provided the following names:
Names Salary
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003555
At the time this list was provided had
Abuelgasim Osman
Ramadan , KHALED I. Al -SOWEILEM
Abdel-Moniem M. El -Hillali ,
Abdullah Arafa , Nasser F.
Almogbel , and Fareed S. Ajlan
were identified as employees at the EKSAB in the
Islamic Affairs Office. Preliminary Inquiries were conducted on
to better identify their function at the EKSAB.
All were confirmed as employees at the SAEMB by the United State
Department of State list of Embassy employees. has
will continue with
The list of individuals were all queried through
ACS revealing
. The following are possible matches with
individuals : Ali Sulaiman
Ali , Jamal Mohammad Abdellatif
, Tajuddin Bin Shu'aib
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-003556
EO14040-003557
Name:
Aliases:
SSN:
DOB:
POB:
INS Status: USPER since 1991
Case #:
IFTA funds: $533.33 (2002)
ADEL M. AL -SADHAN departed the USA on
10/25/01. While in the USA, AL -SADHAN resided at
LAWRENCE, KS; and shared a post office box
address with MUTAIB AL -SUDAIRY, Columbia, MO.
AL-SADHAN was employed at the EKSA until
Choicepoint now shows a possible new address, as of 1/1/05, as
JERSEY CITY, NJ.
Name: ADEL M. AL -SADHAN
SSN:
DOB:
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: Departed USA (?)
Case #
IFTA funds: $100.55 (2002)
MUTAIB A. AL -SUDAIRY resided at
Fairfax, VA, and was employed as an
Administrative Officer for EKSA until
AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 5/1/01 and re -entered on
6/6/01. AL -SUDAIRY was detained and charged as an immigrant
without documents subject to deportation. AL -SUDAIRY departed
the USA on 10/25/01.
and has since been linked to suspected Al -Qaeda
operatives in Saudi Arabia.
Name: Mutaib A. Al -Sudairy
Alias: Mutaib A. Al -Sudairi
Muteb Al -Sudairy
Moteb Al -Sudairy
Motaib Alsudairy
SSN:
DOB:
(F)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(F)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(P-1)
EO14040-003558
EO14040-003559
Northern VA area. The school subsequently relocated and began
to rent a space located at 6606 Electronic Dri ve, Springfield,
VA 22151. This building was later purchased by the EKSA for
$6,000,000 and taken over by ZAM ZAM INTERNATIONAL INC. which
is synonymous with the IFA. Source further
reported that the IFA had routinely received funding from the
EKSA.
The IFA was operated by Ibrahim Almogherah (aka Ibrahim Binkulaib
) who also operated alongside of
Saudi Naval Attache Abdullah Alkhwyter. Alkhwyter was known to be
associated with the address of Alelm ( Al Elm Research and
Development) in Norfolk, Virginia –
. [NOTE: Alajroush (herein) was also
listed as an officer o f Alelm. (The uses may
be similar to Albayoumi’s use of a for his
expenses/payments during his time in California.)
IBRAHIM A. ALMOGHERAH, DOB: , was
listed under the Administrative and Technical Staff as an
Administrative Officer of th e Embassy of the Government of
Saudi Arabia (EKSA), who assumed his duties on 05/13/1991, but
was named (by the names of AL -KULAIB, BINKULAIB and AL -
MOGHERAH) was
Relevant Serials :
the
primary Saudi based financier of the IFA was Abdulaziz bin Fahad
Alsaud. Abdulaziz bin Fah ad was known
to support the funding of students at the IIASA.
In March, 2006, BINKULAIB and AL
SAWY are still in negotiations regarding the future of IFA,
however, AL -SAWY is losing faith in the possibility that it will
work out. iIn the meantime, the IFA is being run by GAMAL HELMY
and MOHAMED AFIFI (aka HUSSEIN AFEEFY). SAUD AL -SUWELIM, head of
Islamic:Affairs at the EKSA,
who runs Friday
(P-1)
(F)
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(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
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(J-3)
(J-3)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003560
prayers, was in Sudan caring for his sick father, MOHAMED IBRAHIM
was still teaching the small kids Quranic Studies, and SAEED AL
HURAISHI (aka SAID AL -HURCHI) was active behind the scenes during
prayers. AL -HURAISHI is Syrian and owns an Islamic publishing
company on Edsall Road in Springfield, VA.: A -HURAISHI is a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
[ ] On 01/08/2013
weets for Alsaud (using account) in which he spoke
with Sulaiman Ahmed Aldweesh during which Alsaud stated that the death
penalty should be applied to the arrested Saudi writer Turki
Alhamad. In another tweet Alsaud stated that jihad was the greatest
pinnacle of Islam. Ayed Alqarni is a personal
sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud.
(F)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003561
American Open University ( AOU )
Jaafar Sheikh Idris
Jaafar Sheikh Idris ( Jaafar Idris / Gafar Idris )
DOB:
Under Gafar Idris and Jaafar Idris, Idris had
Sons Yousef Idris and Abdulrahman Idris and
Abdulmoneim Idris.
Associated with MWL and Ali A ltimimi.
Jaafar Idris is the father of Yousef Idris (an associate of the
Northern Virginia Jihad group) and Abdulrahman and Abdulmoneim Idris.
Abdulrahman was utilized to teach Arabic culture/language to US
Special Forces in Limerick, Maine. Jaafar Idris,
was a close associate of jihadi groups
operating within the U.S. such as Ali Altamimi and the “Northern
Virginia Jihad Group.”
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-003562
EO14040-003563
well versed on the rules, and new members were requir ed to acknowledge
their acceptance of such rules. Weekly jihad training
sessions were organized and conducted on private land owned by the
uncle of Abdullah Zikria, one of the jihad training group members. The
weekly training consisted of physical para -military training using
paint-ball as a means of instruction and religious instruction on the
topics of jihad, typically through the readings of certain hadith
related to jihad. The jihad training sessions were led primarily by
those with prior United States military experience, such as Idris
Surratt (USMC), Saif Chapman (USMC), and Hammad Abdur -Raheem
(U.S. Army), and those with prior jihad military training, such as
Ismail Royer and Ibrahim Hamdi. In addition to the weekly jihad
training sessions, many of t he group's members purchased AK -47 type
rifles, the primary weapon used by mujahideen throughout the world,
and began to practice their firearms proficiency and marksmanship. The
group also kept abreast of the current events related to
ongoing jihad, in ar eas such as Chechnya or Kashmir, and discussed
these events during their weekly
training sessions.
Interviews have revealed that the core group of participants in the
jihad training group had aspirations of eventually fighting in actual
jihad and dying shaheed (a martyr). The lectures at Dar al
Arqam became a common meeting place for those participating in the
jihad training. Members of the group would meet at the Dar al Arqam on
Friday night and would discuss their plans for meeting the
next morning and traveling to the jihad training. Members of the jihad
training group would often meet at members ’ homes and watch video
tapes depicting jihad in regions such as Kashmir and Chechnya.
Soon after Sheikh Al -Timimi's lectures moved to the Dar al Arqam, many
member's of the core group became acquainted with an individual named
Ismail Royer (aka Randall Todd Royer). Royer would attend Al -Timimi's
lectures and would sometimes stay for the closed discussions with Al -
Timimi. Royer became well known for his experie nces fighting jihad in
Bosnia. In April 2000, believed to be
prior to the initiation of the weekly jihad training activities, R oyer
traveled to Pakistan to attend an Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) training camp.
As of the current date, it is unclear who facilitated Royer's
travel to the LET camp. Investigation indicates that Royer may have
used his own contacts, possibly developed through his past experiences
in Bosnia; may have used contacts provided by Shiekh Al -
Timimi; or may have used others, yet unknown, to fa cilitate his
travels. Sometime around July 2001, Saif Chapman embarked on his own
trip to the same LET training camp that Royer had attended. It is
unclear at this time who facilitated Chapman's travel to the camp.
Chapman is believed to have been at the LET camp on September 11,
2001. Travel records indicate
that Chapman returned to the United States on September 19, 2001. Upon
his return to the United States, Chapman discussed his travels with
EO14040-003564
EO14040-003565
EO14040-003566
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation ( Alharamain )
Suliman Al Buthe (aka Soliman Albuthe / Suliman Albuthe / Soliman
Albutti )
DOB:
Related:
herein)
Summary: Alharamain foundation is a Saudi Arabian Islamic “NGO” or
“charity” who had multiple offices worldwide designated as terrorist
supporting entities by the United States for their support of AQ
related groups. Within the U.S. the Alharamain office was located in
Portlan, Oregon and was later specifically designated along with its
primary operator Suliman Albouthe.
The Al Haramayn or Al Haram ain
Islamic Foundation(AIF) has been reported as a Saudi Arabian funded
Islamic charitable organization that distributes books, video/cassette
tapes and leaflets which espouse radical Islamic thoughts. AIF has
been utilized as a front organization for supp orting and facilitating
(G)
(F)
(F)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(G)
(J-3)
EO14040-003567
EO14040-003568
Arabia and in daily telephonic contact with Based on source
information, it is believed that Albut'he is utilizing Saudi Arabia
cellular telephone number and is associated with
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It is further believed that Albut'he is
the money supply for the Al Haramain Foundation,
Albut'he is further believed to
be involved with an ISP with access to a hi gh speed
data line. Albut'he has been identified with website
Reportedly, Albut'he is the source of income related to
which was co -owned by and Ferhad Erdogan. Erdogan
indicated in a recent interview that is now in complete control
of .
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
EO14040-003569
EO14040-003570
EO14040-003571
Of interest is that Saleh Alhussayen is the
a Saudi student living in the U.S.
Sami Alhussayen
DOB:
Related: islamtoday
FBI Seattle identifies Sami Al -Hussayen as a citizen of
Saudi Arabia and a non -USPER currently enrolled in the College of
Graduate Studies, Department of Computer Science at the
University of Idaho (U of I) in Moscow, Idaho.
(J-3)
(P-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003572
EO14040-003573
EO14040-003574
Salah Alrashood
Name: Salah Alrashood
SSN:
DOB:
Phone:
Summary: Per above, Alrashood is a Saudi Arabian diplomat and paid
cleric who operated in the Pittsburgh area.
Relevant Serials :
SALAH AL -RASHOOD,
dob , the
Executive Manager of the ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION (AF), revealed his
association with many individuals who have been the subjects of
FBI full field terrorism investigations in the US including
After t he September 11, 2001, attacks,
(J-3)
(J-3)
(G)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(J-3)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003575
EO14040-003576
EO14040-003577
EO14040-003578
EO14040-003579
Hassan Noor
Malim Kumbi was involved sometime around 09/10/1998 with planning
a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Kampala. Kumbi was
arrested after KENBOMB and had explosive residue at his
residence.
According to a Ali
Humeid, brother in law of 2002 bombing suspect Hassan Said Oma r,
is a teacher at Kisauni Islamic Institute.
According to a Shaykh
Siraj Rahman Nadwi Al -Qadhi - a principal at the Kisauni Islamic
Institute - helped facilitate the movement of students to
Afghanistan.
According to Shaykh
Rahman Nadwi Al -Qadhi assisted in the placement of a member of
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - Shaykh Ahmad
LNU - as the director of the Tawhid Islamic Center. Prior to his
arrival, Ahmad reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan.
Based on recommendations from Saudi financiers of the Al -Haramain
organization.
The above is deemed important as it shows a direct
transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi
Arabia, through the E KSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a
foreign entity associated with terrorism. It should also be
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(C-1)
(C-1)
(C-1)
(C-1)
(D)
EO14040-003580
noted that the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has been
associated with the financing of other "charities" such as MWL
and IIRO (see which provides
more evidence against the Saudi claim that these organizations
are NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
(F)
EO14040-003581
EO14040-003582
EO14040-003583
Possible Pre 9/11 Test of Airline Security
Muhammmad Alqudhieen
DOB:
Hamdan Alshalawi
DOB:
Summary: Mohammed Alqudhaieen and Hamdan Alshalawi were Saudi
nationals and who conducted activities on a U.S. based
flight that were deemed by FBI Phoenix as being potential case
activity for the 9/11 attacks. Alshalawi is a known AQ operative.
[ Muhammad Abdullah Ibrahim Al -
Qudhaieen, DOB:
, Tucson, Arizona;
Al-Qudhaieen at that time utilized a slightly different DOB of
. Al-Qudhaieen is
on
11/19/1999, Al -Qudhaieen and his associate Ha mdan Ghareeb
Al-Shalawi, address Tempe, Arizona
(J-3)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(J-3)
(F)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003584
85283, telephone , were aboard America West
Airlines flight #90 from Phoenix to Washington D.C. with one stop
in Port Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al -Qudhaieen,
according to the flight crew, acted agitated, spoke very loudly
in Arabic and asked repeated specific questions about flight
times, stop times on the flight and the plane causing the flight
crew to become suspicious of him. Flight Attendant
advised Al -Qudhaieen tried to open the cockpit door "on
two occasions." The pilot, Captain ordered
an emergency runway evacuation, notifying ground personnel of two
suspicious men on board, before they reached the Columbus
airport. In a ccordance with the pilot's wishes, security teams
and the local police removed the two men in handcuffs from the
plane and swept the plane with bomb sniffing dogs. Both men were
interviewed separately by Cincinnati FBI. Al -Qudhaieen said he
believed he nev er touched the pilot's cockpit door but that he
was searching for a bathroom and he might have inadvertently
touched the pilot's cockpit door. In a separate interview, Al -
Shalawi advised Cincinnati FBI that Al -Qudhaieen did ask him
where the bathroom was and Al-Shalawi related that he told Al -
Qudhaieen to go to the rear of the aircraft to use the bathroom.
However, Al -Qudhaieen disappeared from Al -Shalawi's view toward
the front of the plane and was gone for several minutes.
U.S. District Court trans cripts revealed the
following information: Al -Qudhaieen and Al -Shalawi were
traveling to Washington D.C. to a reception being hosted by the
President of Imam University in Ridyadh, Saudi Arabia. Both men
are alumni of Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic Univers ity,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, telephone:
. Al-Qudhaieen graduated with a B.A. in English
and then spent several years on staff there as a teacher's
assistant.
On 10/22/2001, the
following information: In late 2000, Hamdan Bin Ghareeb Abdullah
Al-Shalawi, DOB , POB Saudi Arabia, married
with five children; was traveling to Saudi Arabia through
Pakistan. Al-Shalawi is known to have received training in
Afghan terrori st camps and intended to conduct Al -Khobar type
bombings. No further specifics were available
Al-Shalawi left the U.S. to return to Saudi Arabia in August
2001.
Based upon this information
received on Al -Shalawi, he was designated
In light of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001,
this incident is being re -examined to determine whether Al -
Shalawi and Al -Qudhaieen were conducting a dry run and/or test of
(J-3)
(P-1)
(P)
(P-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(O-1)
(G)
(G)
(J-3)
(O-1)
EO14040-003585
America West Airlines in -flight security procedures.
Based on
analysis of reporting that AL -QAEDA operatives do extensive
research and testing prior to actual terrorist attacks, and Al -
Shalawi's terrorist training, Phoenix believes this represented a
test or trial run in preparation for 09/11/2001.
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003586
Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of
individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the
existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian
government personnel continued post 9/11.
identified extremist Saudi
clerics attempting to or having entered the U.S. and were involved
with Saudi Arabian student gatherings in the United States. Despite
open social media posts advocating jihadi activity
were forwarded to
- thus eliminating
the threat posed by these individuals to the U.S.
Mohammed Mousa
DOB:
WFO identified Mousa based and subsequent
review of open source social media information identifying Mousa as a
pro-AQ Saudi Airlines pilot. Mousa also appeared to be entering the
U.S. for training and to visit Saudi Arabian students. WFO
and forwarded requests for information to various foreign
governments.
(J-3)
(P-1)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
EO14040-003587
EO14040-003588
ATTACKS IN THE U.S. AND A CERTAIN MOHAMED MOUSSA . MOUSSA, AGE
35-38, DOB , A SAUDI, DOCTOR OF ISLAMIC RELIGION AND IMAM
OF A MOSQUE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO COMPLETED HIS STUDIES
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RIYADH, WAS A PILOT INSTRUCTOR WITH SAUDIA
AIRLINES. MOUSSA WAS A CONVINCED FUNDAMENTALIST WHO PARTICIPATED IN
2000 IN A SAUDI TELEVISION PROGRAM ON WHICH HE HOSTED DEBATES (A
SORT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE/DEBATE). HE REFU SED TO FLY HEAVY
AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON AIRBUS TYPES. THIS ALLOWED HIM TO
REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AVOID CONTACT WITH "IMPIOUS"
WESTERNERS. AT THE SAME TIME THIS ALLOWED HIM TO DEVOTE HIMSELF
TO HIS RELIGION AND TO THE MOSQUE OF WHICH HE WAS THE IMAM.
PROBABLY IN THE MONTH OF JULY 2000, MOUSSA WAS AN
INSTRUCTOR ON FLIGHT SIMULATORS IN JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. SEVERAL
MONTHS LATER, (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000),
MOUSSA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING ON HEAVY AIRCRAFT
(747-400) AT BOEING IN SEATTLE.
A review of travel noted that Mousa was reportedly
encountered entering the U.S. as airline crew from 1998 to 2001 with
the last encounter as inbound on 08/27/2001.
(P-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
EO14040-003589
EO14040-003590
is the same as the Ayid
Abdullah Alqarni who is noted in the videos calling for jihad against
American soldiers in Iraq and the “slitting of throats”. In addition,
the confirmed telephone numbers of Alqarni are described as having
Alqaeda connections and have contacts with multiple FBI terrorism
investigations.
According to Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince
Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud. [Noted herein]
(G)
(J-3)
EO14040-003591
Other Saudi Arabian Government Officials – Known or Suspected AQ
Members
Summary: The influence of militant AQ ideology within Saudi
government personnel can also be demonstrated by the identification of
AQ members within Saudi Arabian military members who entered the U.S.
for military training. Among these are Faisal Alshehri, Mohammad
Alkahtani, Naif Alfallaj and the recent student Mohammed Alshamrani (
Pensacola ). [This is in addition to the known 120 or more Saudi
Arabian who departed the U.S. to join ISIS.] Saudi naval
officers lafi Alharbi (DOB: ) and Osama Nooh (possible DOB:
)( ) were in contact were in contact with
Alhazmi and Almihdar.
Mustafa Alshehri
(aka Mustafa Mohammed Mubarak Alshehri / aka Mustafa Aljubairi )
DOB:
Entered US on July 2001
Summary: Mustafa Alshehri was a Saudi Arabian national and
government official in the Saudi Ministry of Interior passport office.
Alshehri entered
the U.S. just prior to the 9/11 attacks and visited New York along
with other individuals of the Saudi Embassy.
(G)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(F)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(C-1)
(C-1)
(J-3)
(J-3)
EO14040-003592
EO14040-003593
EO14040-003594
EO14040-003595
to include telephone bills, bank statements, shipping receipts,
hotel receipts, airline receipts, and many handwritten notes. [
noted some secondary connections between phone
numbers within this case and phone numbers in contact with Al bayoumi.]
(F)
(F)
EO14040-003596
Mohammad Alkahtani
DOB:
that AL-KAHTANI indicated he has
friends in Saudi Arabia with connections to AL -QAEDA.
Furthermore AL -KAHTANI has indicated he has TALIBAN contacts in
Saudi Arabia who came from Afghanistan. In private settings, AL -
KAHTANI has expressed his support of violent jihad for the
propagation of Islam.
Virginia home, AL -KAHTANI has b een vocal about his support for
AL-QAEDA and UBL.
(J-3)
(F)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003597
Investigation has revealed Al -Kahtani, a citizen
of Saudi Arabia, is in the United States and is
working on his PhD in Information Technology at George Mason
University (GMU). He teaches a Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence)
class at GMU and is a prominent lecturer and leader at the Center
For Islamic Information and Education (CIIE), aka Dar al Arqam
Islamic Center, in Annandale, Virginia.
Al-Kahtani has indicated he is planning on returning
to Saudi Arabia as soon as he completes his PhD, probably
sometime before the end of this year.
Several regular attendees of Dar al Arqam
conducted paintball training in Northern Virginia in preparation
for participation i n jihad and/or jihad training overseas.
Several members of the group traveled to Pakistan prior to, and
after 09/11/2001, to attend Lashkar -E Taiba jihad training camp.
Among those involved in the jihad group are
Ali Al-Timimi,
a former lecturer at Dar al Arqa m, has been a spiritual advisor
to many in this group and has publically advocated violent jihad.
The activities of
.
two of Al -Kahtani's sons attended the paintball
training, however they were not part of the core jihad group.
Additionally, after 09/11/2001 Al -Timimi was asked to leave Dar
al Arqam by the Dar al Arqam leadership (Haythem Abu Hantash,
Jaf'far Idris and AL -Kahtani) because A l-Timimi openly supported
the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As a result,
Al-Kahtani took a greater leadership/lecturer role at Dar al
Arqam.
Alkahtani despite the above
information. Alkahtani not ed that he was traveling with a “prince”
and was working for Saudi Military Industries. Saudi Arabian Military
Industries ( SAMI ) is a state owned
defense company launched in May 2017 by Saudi Arabia's
Public Investment Fund (PIF). SAMI is lead by Ahmed Alkhateeb and
Walid Abukhaled. Its subsidiaries is Advanced Electronics Company and
Military Industries Corporation ( MIC ) per Wiki which is lead by
Mohamed Almady. .
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)
EO14040-003598
Abdullah Moham ed Alshehri
DOB:
Alshehri is mentioned herein due to the
officer being affiliated with Islamic militants and also being
utilized as a local POC for the Saudi population. Alshehri was
conducting this business while a student.
ALSHEHRI was favorable toward USAMA BIN LADEN and upon his
documented connection to MULHIM ELTAYEB
. While in Pittsburgh, ALSHEHRI
apparently acted as liaison between the Saudi Arabian embassy and
the Saudi community in Pittsburgh.
On 03/18/2002,
a young Yemeni immigrant to
Pittsburgh had recently been invited to an apartment with a group
of Saudi Arabians. The immigrant had been invited by "ABO NORA"
(or ABU NORA )(determined to be
ABDULLAH ALSHEHRI). While at this gathering,
the Saudis were speaking favorably about USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL).
When the Yemeni immigrant voiced his opinion that the events of
September 11t h were murder, "ABO NORA" indicated to the group to
(J-3)
(G)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-003599
change the subject and not speak further about it in front of the
Yemeni.
Investigation at the CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS determined that
MULHIM ELTAYEB, a Sudanese national, departed Pittsburgh in
January 1999, allegedly to return to the Sudan. On his exit
papers with CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS , ELTAYEB gave a forwarding
address of Pittsburgh, telephone
. Follow -up investigation at the GREENBRIAR
APARTMENTS determined that, at the time of ELTAYEB's departure,
was leased by ABDULLAH MOHAM MED ALSHEHRI,
with the same telephone number. ELTAYEB was obviously using
ALSHEHRI's address as a mail forwarding point. MULHIM ELTAYEB
re-surfaced on 09/09/2001 at Timber, OR, where he was found
engaged in paramilitary training with other Arab males. Port land
believes that ELTAYEB is part of a suspected Al Qaeda cell
operating in the Portland area.
(P)
(P)
(P)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-003600
Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA)
King Abdullah Academy
The Islamic Saudi Academy, now known as the King Abdullah Academy,
is a K-12 school located in Northern Virginia that provides education
for the children of Saudi Arabian diplomats as well as other
individuals. The school is supported by the Saudi Ara bian government
and the Embassy and the SACM Director and Saudi Ambassador are known
to sit on the board of directors. The school has faced charges of
teaching hatred within its Islamic education department and one of its
students, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, was convicted of being an AQ operative
planning to assassinate President George Bush. was a
teacher at the Islamic education department.
Since 2001 there have been many
independent analysis conducted of the teaching
curriculum in Saudi Arabia and at the ISA. These reports include the
Freedom House report and the
recent report from the United States Commission of International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In
addition, reports have been written on similar school s in foreign
nations such as a report in Britain on
the King Fahd Academy in London (a school similar to the ISA) titled
"The Hijacking of British Islam".
All of the reports by independent scholars and linguists have
arrived at similar
conclusions. Th e specific statements listed in these reports have been
well documented in the press and
need not be mentioned in this memorandum. However, these
multiple and independent analysis have
been confirmed via translations done by the FBI. Many of the passages
in question were Saudi
interpretations of Koranic passages or of the Hadith and were similar
to the interpretation provided by
Elyacoubi mentioned above.
According to open source reporting, in 2002, Saudi Foreign
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EO14040-003601
Minister Prince Saud
Al-Faisal stated t hat "our schools and our faith teach
peace and tolerance." In March 2006, Prince
Turki Al -Faisal stated that the Saudis had removed all of the
inflammatory content in their school
textbooks but quickly backed off and stated they needed more time
after the Freedom House report.
Recent open source reporting noted that Saudi Embassy officials have
denied the existence of
derogatory material in the ISA's present curriculum.
The 2007/2008 USCIRF study revealed that the changes have not been
completed. An FB I review of the 2007 curriculum textbooks also
revealed the continuing use of
passages that are considered to be defamatory to other
religions and that could be construed to
encourage violence.
EO14040-003602
Saudi Arabian Student Population
Serials with LHMs to USDS:
(2014/2017/2018)
Summary: The effect of the Saudi Arabian education system is evident
within high number of terrorism investigations related to the Saudi
Arabian student population. This population has fluctuated over the
years but increased greatly after 2005 but has rec ently sharply
declined. Various AQ related terrorism investigation was opened prior
to and following the 9/11 attacks such as (
and . Following the creation and
growth of ISIS there were at least 120 Saudi students who traveled to
Syria from the U.S. to join AQ and/or ISIS forces.
Homaidan Alturki Saudi
As is known, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 individuals -
15 of them being of Saudi nationality (the possible 20th - Alqahtani
who is held in GTMO - is also of Saudi origin). Saudi Arabian
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EO14040-003603
perception management campaigns have worked to convinc e Americans that
UBL used the 15 Saudis in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia - thus presenting the case for closer bonds and more lax
requirements for entry into the U.S. Per the 9/11 Commission Report,
the interrogations of Khaled S heikh Mohammed revealed that the true
reason for the use of so many young Saudi males for the 9/11 attacks
was due to the large numbers of willing participants amongst the Saudi
population as well as the easy visa requirements then in place for
Saudi Arabi an citizens to obtain visas to travel to the U.S. Prior to
9/11 it was much harder for a citizen of Yemen or Sudan to obtain a
visa whereas citizens of Saudi Arabia were not viewed as a "security
risk" and obtained their visas under the Visa Express progra m. (See
9/11 Commission Report - Pages 232 -233 and 9/11 and Terrorist Travel
Pages 116 -130.)
Shortly after 9/11 a spotlight was shown on the teaching material
utilized in Saudi K -
12 schooling as well as within Saudi schools and Saudi funded and run
mosques in the U.S. and elsewhere. Facing strong criticism the Saudis
launched various public relations campaigns to discredit these
reports. Despite repeated promises and claims to the contrary, within
the U.S. the teaching material at the Saudi funded I slamic Saudi
Academy (ISA) was not altered until approximately eight years after
9/11. An unclassified report regarding Saudi education
and textbooks utilized within Saudi Arabia (elementary and middle
school curriculum 2009 -2010) revealed t hat - despite claims to the
contrary - that the Saudi Arabian Government had not removed or
altered the offensive material found in previous editions. According
to the CIA report "the monotheism texts teach hatred as part of the
doctrine of disavowal which promotes hostility toward non -Muslims.
This doctrine, which jihadists often advocate, is included throughout
many other books in the curriculum." The report continues: "The
monotheism textbooks for all five grades also stress the theme of
religious violen ce". The report concludes "Even if the Saudis moderate
some of the offending passages in the higher -grade textbooks, the
youngest and most impressionable segment of Saudi society will still
have been exposed to this incitement to religious hatred and viole nce,
and many will have already internalized these teachings." This
analysis as well as more recent open source reports regarding the
Saudi clerical establishment highlight that the extremist nature of
Saudi society is still prevalent. For example, in D ecember 2013 a
large group of Saudi clerics publicly endorsed the Islamist Front in
Syria. These clerics are increasingly using social media to reach out
to Saudi society – in Saudi Arabia or overseas. The recent edict by
King Abdullah to criminalize the participation of Saudi citizens in
fighting with the jihadi groups in Syria is believed to have little
effect on those individuals who are motivated by the AQ element within
these clerical establishments.
(O-1)
EO14040-003604
EO14040-003605
Homaidan Alturki is noted above due to his operating an
Islamic bookstore ( Albasheer Publications ) while on status;
his connections to Anwar Aulaqi (aka Abu Attiq )( (see
(see herein)’ Mohammed Alah mari ( IANA
)(see herein); and the EKSA’s/SAG’s attempts to obtain his release
from prison despite his being convicted of abuse of an holder.
is noted herein due to the centering on
a group of Saudi Arabian students who were committing
fraud. During a search of their apartment photocopies of what
appeared to be valid passports assigned to
many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi
Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight
training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and
fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the
World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and
overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One
of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another
was entitled "Major Water Disasters".
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EO14040-003606
EO14040-003607
and is believed by Phoenix to be
an operative of Al Qaeda. Al -Shalawi obtain ed a PhD in
Linguistics from Arizona State University (ASU).
Al-Shalawi and Muhammad Al -Qudhaieen
were involved in an incident aboard an America West
airlines flight on November 19, 1999. Al -Shalawi and Al -
Qudhaieen were traveling fro m Phoenix to Washington, DC via
Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al -Qudhaieen was observed by
the flight crew attempting to access the cockpit. When the
flight landed in Columbus, Al -Shalawi and Al -Qudhaieen were
detained by FBI Cincinnati and interviewe d . No
charges were filed against Al -Shalawi and Al -Qudhaieen.
Based on regarding the
association of Al -Shalawi and Al -Qudhaieen with Al Qaeda subjects
and the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, Phoenix has develo ped an
investigative theory that this incident was an intelligence
gathering mission for use in future terrorist operations.
Al-Shalawi obtained
training at an Afghanistan terror camp in late 2000.
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EO14040-003610
FD 302a (Rev. 10 6 95)
Continuation of FD 302 of , On , Page, ,
03/07/2012 3
relative to the air, taking into consideration head-winds and
tail-winds which can be significant at high altitudes). At an
altitude of 8,000 to 10,000 feet, one would be able to see for
approximately 100 miles on a clear day and even be able to
identify various landmarks.
As a pilot, had access to maps that had the
mileage listed on the legs between various waypoints along
flight paths. These waypoints typically had a latitude and
longitude associated with them. If one wanted to get the
mileage (in nautical miles (nm)) along a flight path, one could
either add the mileage of the legs between the waypoints or
measure by hand the distance of the flight path. If he were to
calculate the distance along a flight path by hand using these
waypoints, he would have started from the beginning and not
worked backwards starting from the destination. When measuring
a distance by hand between waypoints on these maps, one could be
accurate within 0.5 nm or better.
In a case where a pilot would have to change a plane's
course, such as on 9/11, the pilot would not necessarily need to
disable the autopilot for this type of course redirection, and
could even utilize autopilot after the change in course.
could not think of any other reason for the
equation given the parameters set forth on the document than to
calculate a decent rate from a given altitude.___
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EO14040-003611
EO14040-003612
EO14040-003613
EO14040-003614
EO14040-003615
EO14040-003616
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
In Reply, Please Ref er to
File No.
Newark, N.J. 07102
April 21, 2008
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -
Full Investigation Initiated:
Annual Letterhead Memorandum
This document is classified in its entirety.
Office of Origin:
Newark, New Jersey
Date Investigative Summary Prepared: 04/21/2008
Basis of Investigation:
Captioned investigation is based upon specific
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that
is engaged in international terrorism, or activities
in preparation therefor, pursuant to FCIG, Section
III.C.1.b.6. AL-QAEDA is considered a "foreign power" as it
engages in "international terrorism" or activities in
preparation thereof.
was the subject of a Preliminary
Investigation by the Newark Division opened on or about
subsequent investigation under the PENTTBOM case
which revealed some of involvement with several of
the known hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001.
is believed to have had contact with HANI HANJOUR,
NAWAF ALHAZMI, MAJED MOQED, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. The former
Preliminary Investigation expired on and was
subsequently closed.
A Preliminary Investigation was opened on or
about due to the belief that had provided
false information to United
States (U.S.) authorities and had not cooperated with the U.S.
government concerning his relationship with the aforementioned
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
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EO14040-003617
EO14040-003618
EO14040-003619
EO14040-003620
EO14040-003621
EO14040-003622
subsequent the events of 09/11/2001. As stated above,
was questioned about his contact with a number of the
19 hijackers.
On 06/19/2001, at approximately 11:03 pm, HANI
HANJOUR conducted a transaction at the aforementioned PNC Bank
ATM. A review of all transactions conducted 30 minutes prior
and 30 minutes after HANJOUR's transaction, revealed four
individuals who were believed to possibly be associated with
HANJOUR. The individuals were , DOB , FAYEZ
I.A. ABUTALEB, aka FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DOB ,
, aka , DOB , and , DOB
.
, ABUTALEB, , and all
lived together at one time. was interviewed by the
FBI because of the aforementioned automatic teller machine
(ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank in Paterson, New Jersey.
was present at the time of interview with the
FBI, but portrayed himself as an associate that was present to
assist with interpretation, if needed. speaks
sufficient English and did not need an interpreter at the
aforementioned interview.
On 05/29/2005, was stopped by U.S. Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP) while attempting to cross the border
into Canada. was denied entry by the Canadian
authorities and subsequently interviewed by SA
from the Seattle Division and CBP agents. advised the
interviewers that he was on his way to Alaska to fly and he
had a number of flight training materials in his possession.
On 10/12/2005, was interviewed by SA
and Port Authority Police Detective
from the New York Division at his parent's home
in , New York. advised the interviewers
that he had worked on a commercial fishing boat in Alaska
fishing for salmon. had advised the interviewers that
he had gone to Alaska to fish and did not reiterate his
previous reason for his travel to Alaska.
On 11/02/2005, was interviewed by SA
, FBI Language Specialist (LS) , SA
from the Department of Homeland Security
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Detective
at residence,
, , New York. During the interview,
7
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EO14040-003623
advised the interviewers that he had traveled to Alaska to
fish. After being reminded that he was detained en route to
Canada with flight materials, advised that he has always
wanted to fly and threw away the flight materials after being
detained.
did not have a consistent or logical story
concerning his travel to Alaska and the purpose for the trip.
was also not cooperative when discussing his past
activities and appeared to have had a selective memory for
things he was willing to discuss. Subsequent investigation
revealed that also had computer disks and satellite
installation equipment with him when he was detained at the
Canadian border.
Additionally, investigation revealed that
utilized a laptop computer while on board the fishing boat,
expressed interest in and studied the nautical charts on the
boat, and attempted to steer the boat on at least 1 occasion.
, by his own admission, has no prior fishing experience
and was apparently out of his element. Additionally, the
boats that worked on utilized routes frequented by a
number of cruise ship lines.
had a pamphlet from the HOLLAND AMERICA
CRUISE LINE in his possession when he was detained at the
Canadian border. When questioned as to why he possessed the
HOLLAND AMERICA pamphlet, advised that he contacted the
cruise line to ask questions about Alaska.
In the past, has made his living selling
ice cream in New Jersey with and others.
aforementioned trip took place at a time when he would have
been in the middle of the season for selling ice cream. In
fact, was interviewed just prior to his departure for
Alaska and he was selling ice cream at the time. did
not appear to make any profit from the aforementioned trip
which appears significant in that he supports his family that
resides in .
At the present time, it is not known why
took the aforementioned trip. However, considering the fact
that was a close associate of at the time
interacted with the hijackers and that has not
been cooperative with law enforcement when questioned about
the aforementioned trip necessitated further investigation of
.
8
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EO14040-003624
Further investigation of has revealed
strange behavior and has not revealed a logical reason for his
trip to Alaska. During the 11/02/2005 interview,
advised that he lived with after his return from the
Falls Church area of Virginia and before the attacks on
09/11/2001. also advised that 2 unknown men arrived at
the residence one day and that there was discussion of
moving out so that the 2 men could stay at the residence.
discussion of the 2 men was in response to questions
associated with the 19 hijackers responsible for the attacks
on 09/11/2001.
7.
, DOB , is an
that formerly worked for at
in New York, New York. represented
pro bono during the BIA appeal process concerning his
possible deportation .
was interviewed by the FBI on 06/19/2006
and he advised that he was contacted by a number of
times at his office at . advised that
his office number was the only contact number had for
him and this was the only way he contacted him. also
advised that the only outside contact he had with was
he had dinner with one night and he brought
to the hospital on several occasions.
was asked if he traveled to the Syrian
Consulate in New York with in the past.
advised that he could not recall if he had done that.
was advised that had told the FBI that they had both
gone to the Syrian consulate to renew Syrian
passport. again advised that "he could not recall" if
he had gone to the Syrian consulate with .
Subsequent investigation revealed that
had been in contact with via work telephone
number, cellular telephone number, and home telephone.
was re-interviewed on 03/26/2008 regarding
. advised that he now worked at the
located at Street, New York, NY 10021,
telephone . described the
as a "think tank" type of organization.
9
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EO14040-003625
EO14040-003626
EO14040-003627
Current and future investigative objectives seek to
further characterize the United States based AL-QAEDA support
network. Investigative targets include, but are not limited to, the
United States based AL-QAEDA core leadership and membership
structure, AL-QAEDA logistical and financial networks, and overseas
connections with AL-QAEDA political/military elements. The captioned
investigation will continue to further identify role
in the identified United States based AL-QAEDA support network as
well as his role in other international terrorist organizations.
12
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EO14040-003628
(Rev. 06 04 2007)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 12/08/2010
To: Attn:
International Operations Attn:
Counterterrorism Attn:
New York Attn:
Oklahoma Attn:
San Diego Attn:
From: Counterterrorism
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: ADEL AL SADHAN
MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY
OPERATION ENCORE
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EO14040-003634
EO14040-003635
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Form Classification:
Source Id:
Date: 2010 -12-08
Case Agent Name:
Field Office: San Diego
Squad:
Date of Contact: 2010
Participants/Witnesses:
SA , SA (ICE),
Type of Contact: In Person
Location
Country: UNITED STATES
City: San Diego
State: California
Date of Report 2010 -12-08
Substantive Case File Number:
Reporting:
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and did not know AL -SUDAIRY or the older Egyptian personally never actually
met AL -SUDAIRY, but saw him at the Masjid Al -Ribat recalled that AL -SUDAIRY
always prayed on the front row and that AL -SUDAIRY knew and
always prayed on the front row.AL -SUDAIRY seemed racist to and only
associated with Arabs.AL -SUDAIRY was between 5'8" and 5'10" tall.
PHOTOS NOT RECOGNIZED
was shown photographs of the following individuals, but did not
recognize the photographs:
ADEL M. AL -SADHAN,
ABDULLAH AL -JRAITHEN,
,
,
RAMEZ NOAMAN,
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EO14040-003644
EO14040-003645
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