SIS History Part 03

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oPDATI~ IN' EA.CH COONTRI
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ARGENTmA
SIS Facilities and Ob.1ectives
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8m coverage 1.n Argent.ina 88 1.naugurat.ed on 8epwmber 25, 1940
when the first undercover Agent RS sent to Buenos Aires. In t.he toUowing
years coverage was expanded until October, 1943 when 51 Special !gents aoo
Special F.nployees wre assigned to various parts of the Republic. By August,
1946" when 'the final reduc~on in staff was inaugurated, tJJ.ere wre 10 Agents
statioMd in that CO\Ultr)".
The Legal Attache's O1'tioe, which atter )larch, 1946, was knowm as
-The Special Research Section of the American :&nbassyll, occupied space on
the 9th floor of the Bank of Boston Buj.lding 111 Bu.enoe Aires. ~ tloor
was shared with other embassy ottice8 inclooing that ot the JI1litary Attache.
In June, 1946, the offices _re moved to the Bank of Canada Bu11diDg where
the Naval Attache's Office was also maintained. At the height ot SIS
activities, Bureau representatives also occupied space in the American
Consulates in Bahia B1&nca and Rosario. (M-4/.66)
Due to inadequate coverage, the Allied Nations knew little about
what the Germans were doing in Argentina prior to 1940. It was clear. however.
from the meager data available ~t the Argentine was important to the Nazis
1'rca an espionage standpoint. ~ a consequence of the severance of diplomatic
relations with t.be Axis powers by all ot the other countries of Latin America,
the German operational headquarters tor espionage and sallggling in t~
Western Hemisphere gravitated to Argentina and particularly to bnos Aires
as ths last possible location open for the relatively easy conduct of their
activities:1 The importance puced by the Germans on Argentina may be judged
from the Mf'icial German estimate that the Sicherheitadienst (Civil Intelligence
Service) during ~ year iDBIl8diate]y preceding June. 1944, received approx-
imately 1.000.000 Argentine pesos (appraximatel)" $250,000 u.S.) frCID the
German »Dbassy in Buenos Aires. This represented on~ the payment for one
year to OM agenC)'"" alone. (65-1DOl.-A.-33l)
. The objectives of the 8IS representatives in Argentina were
necessariq adapted to the Argentine situation. Argentina was the last
country to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis am it did not beco~ a
belligerent on the side of tm United Nations unt11lfarch, 1945. In view of
the circumtances and the studied attitme o.t non-cooperation witj} the United
Nations on the part of the Buenos Aires Gowrrrnent, the fur¥1aD8ntal objectives
of SIB coverage beca- the identUication am exposure of Axis &gents. These
measures were inter¥ied to curtail and impede thll activities o.t the enemies'
agents inaslllUch as adequate steps towards the prosecution of Axis espionage,
propaganda aM smggling agents could Dot be 8XP',cted from the Argentine
Government.
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Ka_ior A.ccoDI.Plishment~
2.
~rma.n A.ctivitie_~
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 a.
'!he principal Ge~n espionage activities conducted in Argentina
during the early days of the .-.r wre controlled b7 t.he Abwehr, (Securit.y
Division of the Geman High Canmar¥i) first under Captain Dietrich Niebuhr,
the German Naval Attache, and 1ater under General :rr1edrich Wolt' who was
nal~d German KiUtary A'tt.ache in BIlenos Aires after Niebuhr 8S declared
persona non grata by the Argentine Government. Espionage contacts with
Germany- were made wner 'the direction of 'the AbW8hr t.hrough radio stations
in Brazil Wltil that country curtailed German activities by the arrest and
incarceration of the 1sading espionage agents engaged in radio cOlDlD.un1cation
with Germany. Arter the Brazilian outlets far inforEtion 'were closed, other
outlets were developed in Buenos A1.res by the Sicherbeitsdienst (Civil
Intelligence Service) under Johannes Siegfried Becker. These services
continued to serve both Abwe}no and Sicherhei'tsdienst agents. (65-2804-1)
(1) ~nos Aires Bran$ ~t ~R g:~~ The principal
radio station serving the German espionage agents in Argent.ina prior to 1943
was the clandestine st.ation LIR which operat.ed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
This case is discussed .ore fully in the Brazilian section of this .morandum..
518 representatives were able to identity the leader of the
Argentine sub-ring as Ottomar Kuller and to tollow the activities of hiS
assistants. J4uller was originallY'in charge of German espionage activities
in securing Allied shipping information in Buenos Aires. He furnished
information to Friedrich Kempter, the bead of the LIR Station, for forwarding
to Hamburg, Geman.".. JInller was udel)1' known as a German propagandist in
Buenos Aires where he participated in the radio program 8Hora A1emana".
Due to his known pro-Geman att:itude, earl.". in 1941, orders cam from German,'
to transfer Muller's ship reporting service to Hans Napp.
Napp bad been recruited by Ottomar Muller as a Ge1'1D&n agent in Juq,
1940. He took over Muller's ship inf'ormtion service in November, 1941.
Napp submtted shipping reports to Kempter until 1942 when it was feared that
his activities bad becom knovrn to Allied agents. He then turned over his
activities to Jlartin Schneider on th8 approval of Dietrich Niebuhr, the
German Naval Attache. Sclu1eider's association nth the LIR radio ring was
terminated ~ Kempter's arrest in Brazil, after which time Schneider submitted
his reports directly to the German Bnbassy in :BI1en~ Aires.
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The LIR ring waa in a position to include sabotage in its activity
when OttCJ!l8r Mnller and Hans Napp hired Alfredo 'Walter Frei_ld to work with
the organization. Freiwald was a professional diver and he expre3sed his
wilJingMss to attach time bombs to vessels in' the Buenos Aires mtrbor.
This proposal was rejected b)" the German High Ccxnmand, however, and Friewald
continued to 8ubmi t shipping report to MUller.
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Frie.-.1d, Napp, and Schneider were arrested by the Argentine police
in November, 1942, but were released short~ thereafter. All three were
rearrested together 'With Muller on January 25, 1944, and all of. them were
sentenced to two years imprisonment.
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The 1nd1 vidual who acted as intermediary in furnishing funds from
Ketnpter in Brazil to Happ and Muller in BIlenos Aires '8S Helvecio Ortelli,
a S1dss citizen. Ie was arrested by the Argentine police in 1944, but
was cleared of complicity in the espionage activities ot Happ and Uuller.
Another 1I¥lividual who was connected with this ring as well as with
other German groups operating in Argentina was Jose Mello .A.lfageme of Buenos
Aires. Kello was the contact of both Kempter and Ottomar !.1Illler. In addition
to his involwEnt in espionage activities, Mello was engaged in sDIlggling
strategic uaterials out of Buenos Aires on Spanish and Portuguese ships.
He was also active in 'tJ1e groups et¥ieavoring to aid the escape of the interned
sailors iran the Ge~ Pocket Battleship 8QRAF SPES". He.8 arrested on
numerous occasions by the Argentine police. (64-30l2-A-2; 65-35143)
(2) The HDZ Case Follordng the closing of the German
clandestine radio stations operating in Brazil in 191.2, the Gerun agents in
Buenos Aires began operating a series of clandestine radio transmitters Which
cOlm'.1unicated nth Gennan stations ~ar Berlin, Hamburg, and Cologne. The
caterial transmitted ~ these clandestine radios was not very voluminous
until after the Argentine revolution of June 4, 1943. At that tiE a Jaw
was proJDU1gated prohibiting the transmission of coded .ssages frCD. Argentina.
This caused the volume of traffic over the clandestine stations to swell into
a semblance of that of a commercial station. This chain of clandestine
transmitters was RaIrn as the HDZ circuit.
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SIB representatives ware able to identi£y SOlIS of the most 'WideIy
known German agents as being associated with this radio system. 'n1ese
included Captain Dietrich Niebuhr, General FriedriCh Wolf, Johannes Siegfried
Becker, Gustav utzinger, Heinz Lange, and JOhannes Peter Szeraws.
The bulk of the information transmitted by the HDZ station was
obtained from periooicals originating in the United States and Latin America.
Important ti~~ material would be condensed aoo forwarded via clandestine
radio code while the entire stories would be microphotographed and sent to
Germany via an ErE courier. To a large extent, the Gennan intelligence
tranamis s ion f'acilities wre dominated by the Sicherheitsdienst which .s
also engaged in political penetration and intrigue in several Latin American
countries. As. result, a great number of' the colllnUnications sent bY'the HDZ
circuit dealt with descr1ptions of political intrigll88 in which Sicherheits-
dienst agents were involved.
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As nearly &8 can be determined, there .re nine d1.t'ferent fincas
or country places in Argentina on which radio stations of this circuit 'Were
operated at various times. As will be noted .!'rom the chart of the HDZ case,
clandestine transmitters operated at the following country places:

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1. 8Quinta Bona. in Ranelagh
2. 8Quinta M1. Capricho" at San Miguel3. A nameless ~ta at San Justo4. 8Q111nta Dora" at Tand11
5. 8Qui.nta Elvira8 at General Madariaga
6. An unnamed quinta at Paranacito
7. The 8stanoia 8El Trebo18 near San Cri8tobal8. An unnamed quinta at z. Heraa 1~7 in Vicente ~Z, and
9. An v..n_~~ed island in the Tigre Delta
Through SIS invest~ationa it was ascertained that the leading .pirit
behind 'Ule HDZ circuit and the corol1ary e8pionage rings was Johanne8 Siegfried
Becker. This individual was OM o.f the most important German j,gent8 operating
in the Western Hsr!1isphere during World War II. He was responsible tor the
establi8hment of 8everal clandestine radio stations in Argentina, Brazil
and Chile. He recruited nwneroos agents aM caoganiZed them into e8pionage
rin~s supPl11ng them with money and technical equipment.
A. .few months after the outbreak of World War n Becker returned to
Ger.nany from Argentina where he had been a representative of German canll8rcia1
interests. Within a short period he returned to South America to assist in
the establishment of an intelligence organization. At that time he was in
contact with the group which bad been organized by Heinz Lange which 1\&d been
engaged in emnggling Orat Spee sailors back to Geruany. During January-, 1941,
Becker sent Lange to Rio de Janeiro to set up an independent organisation in
Brazil. In the Fall of 1941, Becker returned to Germany 'Where he entered the
Army" aM served on the Russian Front. ~ .following Spring Becker was recalled
to Berlin f'ran the Russian theater aM sent to Buenos Aires to reorganize the
information .ervice which bad large1". broken down. His instructions were to
place the clamestine communication 8J8te1n in gooo working order am to
improve the efficiency or the intelligence orsanisation.
Ql his return to Latin America.. &cker lsamed that Heinz Lange
'W88 in Chils.. Jonny Schneiter was in Paraguay.. &1¥i that Gustav Utzinger was
setting up olaMestine radio .tacil1.ties 1.n &en~ Aires. Becker arranged
to finance the entire organisation aoo to develop contacts in Paraguay..
Bolivia aI¥i Brazil as well as in Argentina. Becker soon had a complete
organization consisting ot translators, compilers.. photograpber8.. radio
technicians.. radio operators.. couriers.. and very valuable contacts in the
Argentine GoverrDent.
In spite of the great success which Becker achieved as an espionage
agent, his real Talue to the Gel'!D8M .. i.n the fie1d of political penetration.
He developed excel1snt contacts in Argentina, Pa~1, Bolivia and Brazil.
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Practically all ot Becker's associates wre sooner or later taken 1*
custodY' bY' the authorities in tlle countrie. in which t.hey operated. When
the group ~ permanentl1" broken up by" tbe Argentix. police in 1944, Becker
beca- a very elusive fugitive. He ~ finali7 arrested by- the Argentine
police in April, 1945.
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The teclD1ical operatioDB or the HDZ circuit wvre uxner ~taT
Utzinger. 'rhi8 agent 'W88 connected with the CKL espionage ring in Brazil
but fled trOll that country when the Nazi agents wre r~ed up by the
Brazilian authorities. He proceeded to Paraguay where he made numerous
contacts with high Paragaayian Arrq officers including Major Pablo Stagni,
Colonel Benitez Vera and Colonel Villasboa. Utzinger was eventual1.)" 88de a
radio instructor in tbe Paraguayian ArJa1". Atter a short stay in that
country, h~V8r, he continued on to Argentina where he el¥ieaTored to
set up clandestine radio equipment. At that time Johannes Siegfried Becker
returned from Germany. With Becker's encooragement and mo~y, Utzinger
succeeded in opening ou.roua stations. He operated claooestine transmitters
for the group in the Ger.n &nba8sy beaded by Captain Dietrich Niebum-
and subsequently by General Friedrich Wolf. Investigation baa revealed that
during his subYersin work, Utzinger used at least seven aliases. His arrest
by the ArgentiDe police 10 August, 1945, permanent~ broke up the HDZ
radio circuit. (65-47120; German Espionage JIonograph pp 153-172)
(3) !FE Courier SYSt8P1 'nle!FE Courier System was
originall7 organized by Manuel Perez Oarcia, the FaJange Police Officer
attached to the Spanish FAnba8sy in Buenos Aires. 1'11e project had its
origin in a p1an tor a .rger ot the Trans-OCean News Service with the Editor-
ial Fa1angista Bspano1a (:!FE) in the event Argentina should break relations
with Germ&rl'3'. In Buenos Aires, however, the ErE was never called upon to
act 88 a propagaooa agency aM its principal value to the Germans lay in the
courier and sauggling ring t~st organised by Perez Garcia.
It 88 estimated that during tM m~t active period ot thi8
ring it £arwarded to Spain tour shipments a week ot espionage material
gathered b7 Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst agents. Practicalq every .hip
that new tJ1e Span18h tlag in transit from Argentina to Spain bad abroad
a courier carryiDg espionage inf'ormtion which had been smuggled out ot
the Western Hemisphere.
COOCNte evidence regarding the establishJlent ot a courier system
through the &FE was rece.ived during the British interrogation ot And~s
13lay Pigrau, Paraguayan Consul ~Mral in Barcelona, Spain, who was arrested
October 21, 1942 at Trinidad enroute to Buenos ~ires on an espionage mission
for Ge1'm.n,'. Q1 February 6, 1943, Joaquin Baticon Martinez, another Geraan
agent, was arrested by the British at Trinidad aM sent to Englarn by -y ot
New York. During b18 stopover in the United States, Baticon was interrogated
by an SIB representative regarding his knowledge or German eSp1CXl&ge in
Argentina. The infonaation furnished by these two agents torEd the basis tor
an SIS investigation wh.lch revealed the enstence of what was perhaps the
most extensive espioDagt' and smuggling ring in the Eastern Hemisphere
operating umer t.be direction ot General Friederich .oIr, the German Military
am Air A.ttache, and Jo1u\nnes Becker, the Sicberheitdienst Chief in
8I8noe Aires.
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The early investigation of this case diSclosed Manuel Perez Garcia
to be the key tigure in the BFE organization, in that he supervised the
activities of 8hip couriers serving t~ Germans in transmitting intormation
and contraband. to Europe. Garcia departed tran Buenos Aires in Ju1,y 1943
enroute to Spain to acquire a cipher _chine tar General Wolf. On the basis
of information submitted by 518 representatives regarding his espionage
activities he was arrested on AugllSt 6, 1943 by the B~tish at Trinidad arxi
taken to England for internment. The qaest1oning of Garcia revealed a wealth
of information regarding the operations and personnel of German intelligence
in Europe and South America.
The development of two dO;Uble agents greatly facilitated the
Bureau.s coverage of tJ1is case. In 1farch 1943 Jesus Agui1ar Fernandez, a
German courier aboard the "CiLBO DE BUENA ~PERANZA' deserted ship in Buenos
Aires to become chief liaison man between Jose Valles, the new Head of the
E.H'E ring who was serving as a Spanish Consular emplO)'ee assisting General
Wolf, and the com-iers aboard SpaniSh shipe. Short~ afterwards Aguilar
was recruited by 815 representatives as a double agent and tluoough him
complete data were secured regarding the smuggling and espionage activities
or the ring operatins in Buenos Aires. Through his services it was also
possible to obtain photographs of the messages and espionage information
sent by the couriers. . He likewise supplied samples or contraband collected
b~" the group arxl assisted in substituting innocent sterial for this contra-
band in several instances. Aguilar's services in this line were supplemented
in the early fall of 1943 when Ramon Quevedo, another ~mber of the espionage
rinf," was also recruited as a double agent.
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AI5 an example of" the manner in which 818 coverage ot this ring worked
the case of' Jose Olivara del Rio mi~t be cited. 01ivara, a radio operator
aboard the steamship 8Habana,," was knO1lJ1 by Bri.tish author1 ties through
a most secret source to be a German courier. 10 additionalinf'ormation
regarding his ac'tirlties .. developed" however" until he was given material
in Buenos Aires to carry- to Spain on October 1, 1943. This material included
a package ot coded .-.sages and photograpb8" and another package containing
two kilogra= of' _tal thought to be platinum. On the basis of information
furnished by 5IS" Ol1vara 'EB arrest.ed by the British on the high seas off
Gibraltar on October 19, 1943 aM taken to England. As in the case of.
other agents previously arrested in this ring, considerable information b 7
relative to Oeneral Wolf's organization was secured from Olivara.1
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In August, 1944, a developlent occurred which linked the EFE case
with the Mexican Microdot case. These two investigations had previously been
0 idered 88 involvin se ate ri s. In August 1944, hO1f8ver, one of
received from Jose Valles, a subject
, case, five envelopes of coded ISterial for delive:'7 to Gennany
via Spanish maritime courier. These envelopes were described as originating
nth the Ad~rtising Chief of _the German drug firm 8Casa *rck- in Buenos
Aires. When! IEde this uterial avai1able to the office of
th~ legal Attache before turning it over to the courier, it 'as discovered that
ors or the envelopes cont.ained a .35 ad.ll1aster negative of a sketch of a
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radiotherapy devi~. This sketch 'E8 almost identical with one which b7
had been sent several weeks previous17 from ~co Cit7 to Baenos Aires b1
in the form of a miCrodot~~n : :~:O:::~~lIicrosc ic dot letter arrived in
Buenos Aires trom Mexico, ntercepted it aM
turned it over to the office of t.he Legal Attac fore passing it on
to his superior, Jose Valles. This incident indicated that the EFE and
1'.icrcxiot cases actuall,- 1.nvolved a single close17 related group of agents
in Argentina. This connectioo betwen the two rin;r8 88 con!1r8d when
additional ~croscopic dot letters, f'r~ *xioo Cit7 wre turned over to
Jose Valles I I
After the ~ak in relations between Argentina and the Axi8 on
January 26, 1944, a JIUJIber of the principal &FE subjects, as developed
tJ1rough SIB investigation atwl the interrogation of persona arrested by
the British, were apprehended by the Argentine Police and held on charwss
of espionage. Included in tJ1i8 group -.re J~e Kela illageme, smuggling ~
chief of the group; Benito Ramon .&morin, brother of the notorious agent
Esteban Amarin; Kanuel de Yiguel Arrastia, &enos Aires Chief of the
Span1.8h Falange; Jose Santiago Vanes Crnz, espionage liaison officer in
the Spanish Consulate; ~en Juan Frank Langer, assistant in courier oper-
at1.ona; Kart1.n Muller, Assistant of General Wolf'; H1.colas Moreno Quin~
espionage and smuggling agent; Benjamin Juan Roeon, a brother-in-law and
a~8istant of Jose !MIa; Wilhelm Von Se1.dlitz, contact of General Wolf' and
super1.or of Eastern Amorin; and 'Walter Von Simons, nll-known agent of the
Gerll8n espionage and propaganda Serv1.ce. General Wolf', himself, as detained
on Februar7 10, 1944, aM placed urxier house arrest.. subsequently being
released preparatory to repatriat1.on to GermaU7.
By March 6, 1945, when the last messages were sent ~ EFE courier,
the Bureau through its double agents bad covered the delivery of over five
hul¥ired pages of coded messages, about tO1n" t.bousand photographic ~gat1ves b7C
contaiD1ns ecooomc and political data.. JD18rOUS 1atters, two k1logr&8 of b7D
ABlayan tin, and other Eterialincluding t.enty-two golf' balls purportedly
containing D8ssages. Samples .re also secured of quarts cr)'8tals.. apparentl,.
inteIxled byC: :::::..7::' lor specialized radio purposes. Through the services it .. possible to obtain copies of 8O8t
of the d~n 8 r 0 substitute materials as in the instance
wilen the ring endeavored to sm1ggle seven hundred and rift,. gram of insulin
to Europe. In that caae.. SIB representati?8s succeeded in substituting
talcum powder tor the insulin aM ~ harmless material as smuggled out of
.Argentina by the KFE agents in ~ belief that they .re carrying the insulin
requested by their European principals. (65-20393 and Monograph .~rman
Rspion&ge in IAtin Merica- pp 145-153)
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(4) -GR,AF SPKS8 Personnel Follow1.ng the 8cuttling of
the German pocket battleship -ADMIRAL fJ{AF SPEF,8 in the harbor of Montevideo
on December 1, 1939, 1,0t.6 .embers of the ship's personnel went to Argentina.
By decree dated December 19, 1939, the J.rgent1~ Oowrment inter.-d these
individuals under various comitions of deprivation of liberty.

GRAF SPEE SURVIVORS
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The crew, numbering 1046 of.
ficers and men, was interned
in the places listed below.
Due to esca~ and 2 deaths,
the total at the end of July,
1942 was reduced to 915
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SIX 0FFIaRS ~ ESCAPED W£.e
KNOWN IV TNE AR6i.NTINE GOV-
ERNMENT TO WAVE AFTERWARD
.,," IN COMMAND OF 6'AMAN
SUBMARINEs.
~ AMCNt1~ 6OYHNMENT WAS
~ T A. AR& TNA T 6ERMAN
COLo.S AND NAZI A6EHrS EN.
LISTED IV ~ _AMAH 5M8ASSY
HAD ~ T.- &$CAPS 01= IAA"T
CKW~
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6RiAT D'AL OF FR"DOM AND
&RANTiO MHf ~l56£s.
FuemYES WSRE &PORTm TO WAVE
FUD SOUTH MERICA THROU6H
TN5 PORTS OF YALPARAISO, ~TO-
~A AND 5AO PAULO.
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FROM 'J7lE GERMAN R)CDT BAm.ESHIP SCU'rrLED BY m CREW
ON ~~ 17, 1939

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Some or the D>st iq)cn-tant acti'vi ties ot leading GerllBn agents in
.Argentina centered aroupd aiding the escape of' Ya1.uable mn am sk1.lled
technicians interned as tmomer personnel of the 8(ltAF SPEE.n Such agents as
Jose ~l]a Al£age~ I Eugenio .B1ljnger Knoll aM Heinz Lange were .cU va in
aiding the escape of' these interx.es from Argentina to neighboring countries
and to Europe.
The legal Att.ache' s orfice in Buen~ .Aires kept track of the over-
whelming D&jority of these internees. Canp1ste identifying data on the
various crew .mbers were coUected by SIS and distributed to the 1nteN.sted
governmental agencies. Iuvestigations were conducted to locate some of the
escapees who were st1llin the Western Hemisphere. A. review ma4e by the
Bureau's representatives in Buenos Aires in August 1945, indicated that 155
of these ilXiividuals bad succeeded in escaping. On February 16, 1946, 850
internees wre finall)" repatriated to GermaQ1" abr»rd the 55 .HIGHIA1'm IIOllARCH."
(65-16112 anci German Espionage Monograph pp 110)
(5) Axis A28nts Removed from Key Positions in AErican
r!!:s! 8m investigatioDB of Axis activities resulted, among other things, in
r~mov1ng dangerous persons trom firms and organizations which were connected
with the 8IS program.
One such instance was the case of Freda Von Ma1tsahon Douglas, alias
Countess Douglas. Tb1s woman was the Chilean wife of the well-known Genuan
agent Alm-echt Archibald Douglas. She was of considerable interest to the
Btnoeau because of her residence in the United States, her arrest in RwIan1a
in 1940 on espionage charges I and h.- connection with the German clandestine
radio station PIL in 'Va1pari8o, Chile in late 1941 and early 19'.2. Prim- to
the arrest of the PIt subjects in Chile, Mrs. Douglas disappeared aM rlde-
spread investigations were made by 818 to locate her.
In November 1942, Mrs. Douglas W88 round by the SIS representatives
in Buen~ A.irea, Argentina. She 88 at that ti- emp1o,ed b,. Rlchard Plummer,
&1gineer-Director ot the Duperil, a sub8idiary ot the DuPont interests in
Argentina. Pl'QDBQer 1'a8 also Chairman of the Allied P1ant Pr01.ection and Anti-
Sabotage Canmi ttee. Countes8 DougJ.&a bad been acting as his Secretary- tor a
period of seven months. Her previous activities wre called to Plummer's
attention. The w~ as iJIUISdiateq removed trom her eq>loyuent with Pl1Dmer
and proper precautions wre taken in conl:.ction with the wrk ot tm Allied
Plant Protection am Anti-8abotage Colmd..ttee.
Countess Douglas R8 interviewd in Buen~ Aires and when confronted
with concrete evidence she made a partial confession regarding her activities
in connection with PIL and the Santiago espionage ring. She claimed, hawver,
that she bad coor-rated with the Germans only through threats trC8 the German
&1bassy in Chile.
AT
239

In lebruary 1944 Freda Douglas made a complete confession in
which she adIIitted hanog been recruited by the Gennan espionage chief,
Hugo Sebold, in Berlin, Germany in September 1940 whi1e her hu8band was
on an espionage 8Ssign~nt in Sofia. Sebold gave her a mail drop, a
cable address aM a llicrofila containing her individual code.
Mrs. Douglas' removal from her emplo78nt &8 secretary to the
Engineering Directcr or Duperil aM the Chairman or the Allied Plant
Protection and Anti-8abotage Committee was due entire~ to SIS investigation.
Her discharge undoubted~ was or decided benefit to tM Allied 8r erfort
in Argentina. (65-299~)
Another instance in 'i8lich 518 investigations resulted in removal
of a pro-Axis iOOiv1dual from a coD;)anY closely connected with the Bureau's
S~f;:::::~~;::~;::::~j' pro that of Hans F. Iupter. ~i.s irxiividual had been employed
b for ten 18&rs am during the early 1940's he was
1.anager 0 n Aire8 B1'anch or that company. It was known that
Kupfer was German but no information had been received by his company
reflecting upon h18 political integrity.
 b7D
It has been previously pointed out thaL .::J was
utilized by the Bureau as a cover co~ny am as such it was OYer)" iq>ortant
that tlw lo)"a1t)" of the canpan)" officials with whom the B1noeau's representa-
tives came in contact be determined. Through investigation by one of our
SIS representatives it -.s ascertained that Kupfer was strODg~ pro-Nazi
and 'hat he not only distributed Nazi propaganda but also utilized his position
with I ~ to the detriment of the United States. The information
deve1oP!I!~~=:~~~:~:~:~cCX1cernin !upfer was brought to the attention of the headquarters
of rice, in Hew York Cit)" arK! Kupfer 88 1mmediate~
discharged. 8 remova om this position, 1i:1ich was of prime importance to
the Bureau's S15 program aDd to the wltare of o~ of the Jarge _11-
established American companj,es in Argentina, was achieved before he succeeded
in doing either the SIB program or his compeD)" any particular harm.
(64-/.386-l4; 64~8~-A.)
. (6) fue .StaY-beh1oo Group. JOOannes Siegfried Becker
sucC8sstU117 eluded the Argentine police in spite of all efforts of personnel
in the Office of the lBgal Attache to be of assistance to them~ until April
of 1945 when he was taken into custodY'. At the tilE of his arrest~ he had
been a tugitift for tl1irteen months. Becker furnished several declaratioDB
about his activities during the fift years in which he had been opera tinS
H is war experiences read like an Oppenheim novel.
(
With the arrest ot Becker, allot the ~rman agents of &J1y'
importance in Argentil8 had been detaiIWd. There remained the so-called
"stay-behind group" set up b7 Generallriedrich Wolf, German K1l1tary .A.ttaChe,
prior to his repatriation to Germany in July of 1944. This group as led
by Emst Schlueter and its activitie8 had been closely followed by the IBgal
Attache's Office.
T
240

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241

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Ernst Schlueter was originally an employee ot the Banco Germanico in
Santiago, Chile. At the time of the disclosures of the PIt espionage case in
Chile, Schlueter tled to Ar,entina. He had been in touch with General Wo1.f
when the latter was assigned to the German Embassy in Santiago. According~,
in Buenos Aires he again contacted Wolf' who uOOertook to train him to t..ke
over the activities ot the Geman Intelligence Service a.t'ter the inevitable
repatriation of the diplomatic personnel of the German FAbassy in &18noa
Aires. Schlueter and his principal assistant, Horst Busse, _re trained in
the German Flnbass,. in Buenos Aires b,. Lieutenant Jlartin Yuller aM Franz
;!.a.I!1I"!en. The training began in mid-191.3 and continued until Karch or April,
1944, at which time Wolf' turned over his organisation to Schlueter and made
arrangemBnts for the financing at Schlueter's activities. Schlueter's
principal assistants, in addition to Busse, were Ro1.f Waehling, Hans
Ynomas, Kurt Linne, Franz Holzmann, Hans Grotewo1d, Alberto iJirkin, Ar_ooo
Cosani, and Arnold Starck.
The extensiveness and expensiveness of this organisation was out of
aU proportion to its effectiveness. It may be said that no information what-
ever of any value W88 ever farwarded bY' this group to Germany. 'n1e manner
in which the organisation was financed, however, is OM or its most interest-
ing phases.
Shortly betore the departure ot .olt and the Embassy group, Wolf
distributed sum of money among various Igoodl Germans. To LOOng Freude,
a very prominent German businessman in Argentina, Wolt delivered the sum
of 80,000 pesos. Like SUIDa wre turMd over to Dr. Com-ad Riedel arxi Hans
IA1eters. Forty thousaoo pe808 were turned over to Friedrich Frehwe1n,
and a like sum was delivered to Alberto Mezger, who was an earq associate
of Franz Buchenau, principal _mber or the Microdot Case in JMxico City.
All of these depositories were given the same instructions concerning the
delivery ot .t'w¥i8. They -.re told that they would be approached by an
individual gf. ring the password -Die Dogge Diana.. On the 1'8 oeipt ot this
password, the depositories were to surreooer any alDO\lDt of money requested
by the user of the password. Actually, it appeared that only Schlueter
and Busse ever withdrew twxis from any- of the depositories. The)'" withdrew
approximtely l00,<XX> pesos bet-en July" ot 1941. and *-rch of 191.5.
Infonnation concerning Schlueter and bis group was furnished to the
Argentines on a confidential basia by both the British and Americans.
Numerous members of the organization, 1ncludin~ the financiers, were
detained by tm Argenti.w police bet_en April, the last date ot an)"
activity on the part of. Schlueter aoo h18 group, aoo September, 1945.
However, by September the police bad not succeeded in locating Horst Busse,
Hans Thauas, or the ringleader, Ernest Schlueter. The legal Attache _s
approached by tm Argentine tor &8sistance. Through particular~ creditable
wm-k on the part of one of the SIS representatives, an inform.n1i of the Legal
Attache .set up' Th~. Schlueter and Busse for t1WJ Argentine ;'01108. 'l'hi8
entire organization, with the exception ot Rolf Waehling. as repatriated to
f
243

Germany on the SS 8HICJaAND }AO~ on February 16, 1946. The group was
interrogated in GenAany by an Agent at tlw Bureau at the urgent request
ot t~ State Department.
-
One of Schlueter's assistants, Arnold Starck, was responsible tor
tbe operation of what is thought to }an been the last Ge~n clandestine
station in the western hemisphere. At the cost ot some 7,000 pesos, Starck
had constructed a clandestine tranamitter for Schlueter who -.8 moot anxious
to reeotabl18h radio contact with Ge~ny. Ulxler the nose of the .A.rgent1~
police, Starck aoo Schlueter _naged to secure .troa Gustav Utzinger, who
was in jail, in Buenos .Aires, lull details about hours ot transmission, call
letters and Eve lengths tor llaintaining contact with the Germn stations.
The calls heard in January of 1945 were ~ver answered and Starck and
Schlueter subsequently &8eerted that they ~re coq>letely W1&b1e to .tablish
a contact with a German station. There is no informtion avai1able trom
Europe to contradict this testimony ot Starck and Schlueter. (64-24547;
64-566~; 6it-.3804-A)
b.
Japanese Activities
Japanese subversive activities in Argentina followed closely tbe
pattern ot procedure carried out by t18 Japanese in other Latin .American
countries. Because at their DUmber and relative~ prosperous business
connections, their efforts to aid Japan in Argentina were greater than
in other countries. These efforta, however, were not highly successful.
 ,
Japanese propagalKia activities -re carried on through the three
Japanese Janguage newpapers arxi 'tm Japan Touris't Bureau. In October 19/.3
this Bureau .s amalgamated with the Toa Travel Bureau to form a new agency
known as the 1'oa CQIIImlnica'tiODS CtXnpany (Toa Kotsu 8ha). 'nle agency"
however" ceased to be active after }larch 1944 following the rupture or
diplostic re]a.tions between Argent.iD& aM Japan.
Japanese intelligence operations in Argentina wre fostered by t!8
Japanese :lDbassy which served &8 the guiding hand tor the collection of'
intorm.tion relEltive to the United States. While these espionage rings were
not as active or as iBportant as their German counterparts, their dissolution
removed an active .nace to the United Nations war effort troa the Westem
He::1isphere. The foll~ng were t~ principal espionage cases centering
in Argentina which were developed and toll~d by ~ Bureau's representatives
in Latin AErica.
~
(1) I~.va K2§eld. and Shozo Kurai Directed E8pioD828
ActiVitie!. S15 representatives in Buenos jires, Argentina, de?8loped an
informant in a Japanese espionage case centered principally in Buenos Aires
am Santiago, Chile. '!his case involved the use ot couriers between these two
cities tm- the transmission or messages. During the investigation or thi8
case, a widespread plan tor the sabotage or British and American vessels
was uncovered. Before the case wa closed, a Chilean D8.t~.onal who was one or
the principal subjects also 1nvol'Ved tJ1e or1giD8.11n.torDlS1t and it was develop-
-:~~:R.E:r:-
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ed that tJJe information furnished by this latter individual was supplied
because his services to the Japanese had been terminated under conditions
which made hi. resentful.
l
 This espionage ring was directed by Tomiya Koseki, a Secretary J
and Shozo 1fura1, t~ Ci'ril Attache, both 88sigMd to the Japanese Embaas,.
in Buenos Aires. Investigation disclosed the connection between Murai
aoo Chilean aoo Argenti~ nationalist ele_nts in Argentina. Q1e 0.1' these
Chilean nationalists, CarlC8 Santa Cruz (Problete), was emplo]8d by Ilurai
as an espionage agent at the salary or five hundred Argentine pesos per
month.
Before going to Buenos Aires in March 191.2, Santa Cruz had been
an active _mber of the Chilean Union Nacionallita aoo left Chile as a
correapoooent tm- tm Union Nacional1sta publication -Ve1nte Nacio11es"
and 88 contributor to the JapaMse propaganda D8gazine -Mirando al Oeste.-
These two periCKlicals were edited. by Santa CnlZ I cousin in Santiago,
Alberto Veloz (Santa Crus). On arrival in Dlenos Aires, Carlos Santa Cruz
obtained eilplo7Dl8nt with the nationalist newspaper "Crisol" and became trieoo-
~ nth Embers ot Argentine na~onal1st organizations.
Alberto Veloz (Santa Cruz), an older man reportedly born in Toyko
and res1dent there for eight years, M1ntained contact with the Japanese in
Chile. C~iderable correspondence between Veloz in Santiago aM Carlos
Santa Cruz in late 1942 and a large part of 1943 shows that these two acted
as mil 1nterll8d1ar1es tor the Japanese. W Poblete Ortega de Santa Crus,
the ~ther of Carlos santa Cruz, as also reported to have acted as a .-11
intermediary tor the 8~ group.
,
The espionage work perfm-lMd by Carlos SaQta Cruz f"or the Japanese
appears to have centered arow1d tbe gathering of information on allied
shipping, particuJar],y the m_s.. characteriBtics.. arma.nt, cargo and
destination or tbe ships in Buenos Aires harbor.
According 'to intorma.'tion received d\no1ng the early stages ot this
case, the Japanese claimed to have a contact in nearly every American Embassy
in Sou'th America. The investigation did not bear out 'this allegation, but
on August 8.. 1943 Carlos Santa Cruz received a package sent tr~ Chile
'Which was de3ignated for 8Javier8, the cover name of Shozo l!ura1, at the
Japanese Embassy. fhis package contained one hundred eight sheets of
otficial United States Embassy document paper. One ot the sheets was
obtaiMd and torwarded to the FBI Laboratory where it R8 determined through
c~on to be genuine United States Embassy document paper, embossed
with the same master seal 88 that used on the s~~ooA-!"d &nba8s)" paper.
,
During the course ot the investigation of th18 case it W88 ascertain-
ed by SIS representatives that the group functioning umer Tcaiya Ioseki and
Sh~o Ja1rai inteooed to embark upon a program ot sabotage ot American am
British shipe. This program involved presenting AMrican am British
sea~n with _lEntos ot their visits to Buenos Aires in the tom ot stat~s
ot th~ Virgin de Lujan. 'lhese statues wre described as being .t1.l1sd witll
incendiary chemicals which, alter a ]apse ot su.ctioient time, wou1d cause
tire aboard the vessel%i. 'I'his plan, however, did not mater1alize.
2 t. £"

On lJay 5, 1944, Carlos Santa Cruz was arrested by the Argentine
Federal POli~~;~::~~~::~~:~es ionage. He sUbs~ ~ ~t~t::::5ntlY returned where he
was contactedr 1 This project did no eve op, however, as n a ruz
-to £et~in touch with active Axis .Agents.
b7C
b1C
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It 18 ot interest to note tba t,~;:::~~;~~~ advised the Bureau's representatives that 0
furnished the Bureau's representatives the or regarding8 M bad supplied a great deal of false informtion regarding
and his mother's activities on behalf ot the Japanese, bad
0 2ir3 himself been oyed by the Japanese in Buenos Aires. According
to however, lost his position with the Japanese when,
prior to be g sent to ~rta. he appeared at the Japanese Embassy in
an intoxicated condition. His dismissal by the Japanese appare~tly mader ,
bitter ~be turne~1n ~o Bureau representatives a great deal of infarma~trOn~
regardingL ~ sane ot which turMd out to be reliable. (64-2l2~)
(2) Henri Catherin Gravet. This imividua1 first becall1c
a figure of interest when information was received from Bureau source that he
was traveling f'rom Spain to Buenos Aires aboard the SS wCAOO DE OOmlOS" in
iJay 1943. At that time it was indicated that Grant '88 to act as an Axis
espionage agent in the Western Hemisphere.
Gravet was a Frenchman who f~rly held a minor diplaoatic position
in the Guatemalan Consulate in Spain. Information -..s received that he 'ES
to act as a Japanese agent in the United States using the cover of a
Guatemalan diplomatic official. ~e plan '88 .for him to continue on tr~
i3uenO8 Aires to Guatemala City where the cover wou1d be arranged and thence
to so. city in the United States, probab~ San Francisco, Cali£ornia.
Gravet arrived in Buenos Aires on March 11, 1943 and ~ kept under
sUr'geillance by the Bureau' & representaUves until the date of his departure
in November of the sa- year. The coammicat1ons to his principals in Spain
were intercepted and it beca- evident that Gravet no longer w1shed to
contin~ the original plan and desired to return to Spain. Permission was
given him by his principals and after leaving Buenos Aires en route to Spain
he was apprebeOOed by the British at Trin1dad, B.,~.T.
He admitted having been recruited fm- espionage wm-k by the head of
the Spanish Intelligence Service in *drid but denied having known that be 88
in fact to work fm- the Japane8e Government until be was cont.B.cted as
previousq arranged by an iMividual na- Elias Jof're in Buenos Aires. At
that tiE he 88 ad'riaed b7 Jof're of' bia e%pected participation in Japanese ~=:~ ~ -- ..~ n R...gjL~ ~"P h4. ~"n"od eeD1_K" ,
144-23401.) ~
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247

!hi8 interrogation bore out information preTioU8l1 deTeloped
regarding Ellaa Jofre. Attention vas firat directed to this 1Ddividual
vhen it became known to SIS representatives in Buenos Aires that he va.
receiTlng trade com8Unlcatlon8 from the united States and furnishing them
to the Japane8e Embassy. It was then ascertained that Jotre Va8 in clo8e
con\act with 1ndiT1dual8 in the Japane8e Embassy, principallY SholO Mural,
the CiT11 Attache. SurTei1lances also had lhown his association with
Henri Catherin GraTet. Jofre vas arrested on February 15. 1944, by the
Argentine Police. (64-23401; 64-28146)
,
(3) Ja'D8! l!t!2rk. !his caae involved a Japaneae
e~1ODage r1Dg which operated principally in Argent ina. B~1l and Chile.
but which in it, entirety amounted to a Western Hemisphere intelligence
ring and vas known to bave operated in Bolivia. Peru. Chile. .r~ntiDa
and Bra£il. with ramifications in Dallas. Tezaa and Nev York City. Prior
to January. 1944. the information gathered b~ this ring was funneled into
the Japanese Imbas8~ in Buenos Aires by diplomatic means. ~rom there the
information vas .ent by cable. radio or telephone &8 vell a8 by diplomatic
pouch to Tok7o. On January 28. 1944. communications with Japan vere ~t
off by the Argentine GoTernment aDd Japanese tntelligence activitie. were
8~ly curtailed. Thi. riDg operated princi~ll7 through Japanese co.aercial
firms and repre&entatives. The corre.pondence vas .ent in Tarious Japanese
codes. Some of the communication8 8bowed that aalary payments for two of
the agents emanated from the United States.
1
In September 1942. two letters were intercepted from Buenos Airel.
Argentina. one addressed to Dr. Alberto Telles and the other to Dr. Ary
Figueira, both in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil. Both letters were subsequently
determined to have been written by the same individual. Each letter had
an enclosure which was ultimately destiD84 tor one Bayao, a former .ecretary
in the Japanese Imbas8Y at Rio de Janeiro who after the severence of relations
represented Japanese intere.t. in the Spanish Emba8SY in that city.
b;C
One of e Japanese coded messages in
Buenos ~ires was was formerly associated
with Ja es and agreed to forward communication for
variou with tt~ proviso that he ahou1d be a11owed to
e~1ne thoae OD~ication to make eure that they pertained to legit1m&te
and did not involve espioDage. V}..enl Idi8covered
that some of the communications being forwarded through him were in code
he refused to forward the letters to tr~ addressees and eYentual17 turned
the~ over to t~~ Bureau's repre8entative..
!he ~eaul8 representatiTes tn Santiago. ChiLe also obtained
photographs of correspondence fro. the files of Japanese named! bf the Compania ChileDa Oriental, a Mitsui 8Ub8idtary. Included in th11 .
correspondence vas a letter written on the aame typewriter as the Telles
and Jigueria Letter.. This communication va~ from one S. Mirna of the
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248

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THE JAPSA FSPIONAGE CASE
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Buenos Aires branch of. the South American Cotton COIIlpany to his agent
Tanaka in Santiago, Chi1s, and pertained to the correct manner in which
intelligence reports should be submitted. Other communicatioQS t.urnished
correct new cover naDe8 and addresses which 'Were to be used by the ring.
 ,
Additional correspondence from the Takana tiles sh~d that atter
June 1941 the salaries tor Osasa and Nakayana, two employees of the South
American Cotton C~pany in Santiago, Chile, were to co~ from the New York
Office of the Company in accordance with instructions from the Hane Office
in Japan.
Other material in this correspondence covered the procurement of
diversified economic intelligence information regarding tJ'le United States
through br-anch offices of the company at points all over Latin America
and through the use of Japanese coumercial firms D8.squerading uDder
Spanish cover na~s. It is of interest to note that one ot the ite.
obtained by Ulis espionage group was a detailed write-up of the Office of
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs with a chart of the officials aM
their duties.
On February lO~ 1943 another letter containing a secret .-ssage
was sent trom Buenos .ures to a maim espionage drop box in Santiago~ Chile.
This letter reJAted to the exp1anation arMi confirm.tion of messages sent by
the Japanese armT and commercial radios, and further concerned the financing
of espionage agents. It also mentioned several Japanese agents and can~rcial
companies who were already the subjects ot SIS investigation. The delivery
of the letter was covered by SIS representatives and it ~ determined that
communications were picked up by a previously reported espionage agent, one
I..1otozo Hattoi, a representative of the Japanese KKK in Chile and a 010S8
associate or the starr or tm Japanese Isgation.
..,
In .Argentina the IB"incipal subjects were two Japanese named I8ana
Kobayashi and Suekazu ltlura. The first was Managing Director of Nambei"
J/itsui Argentina in .Argentina. lfiura was the Argentine representative of the
Japanese Cotton PO1'Q *mka KaiBha, which was closeJ,y associated with 1fitsui.
During 1944 the activities of tJlis ring 'were broken up by the
repatriation program in Peru, Chile and Colom.bia, am the severance or
dip1oJ-. tic relations between Argentina and Japan which eliminated th3 last
espionage footho1d the Japanese maintained in the Western Hem1.sphere.
(64-20032)
Italian Activities
 c.
\
That the espionage ef'farts of' the Italians in Argentina wre
re1atively .tI1t1le, in spite of' the tact that a large percentage ot Argentina's
population can trace ita origin to Italy, is perbaps a cO8l18ntary on the
inetticiency of. the Italians as organizers and collectors ot intelligence.
The espionage ettorts _de by tbe ItalianO' in Argentina were teeble and
Jarge1.)'" ine.ftectual. Due to the racial ties bet_en Ita1y and Argentina,
S~~:Rt!250

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Bonassi obtained a radio transmitter for Bidone and established
him at the address of the perfume shop at Calle Rivadia 5695, Buenos Aires,
with the assistance of Mario Gocez, and Bruno Perpetuo Bigotti. Both of these
indivi6uals worked with Bonassi in the cover firm of Luis Bonassj and
Company and assisted him in his espionage activities. The shop 1tmoe Bidone
operated was run ~ Bigotti's wife. (64-20251)
b7C
b7D
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Another Italian espionage ring was fornsd in Argentina, by Andres
Angel Bonzo, 'Who )sit Rome, Italy, after a period of training in May, 1942.
He went to Argentina accompanied qy his radio opera tor, also a non-commissioned
officer in the Engineers Corps, nailed Jose Carlos Trotti, whose true name is
~farel1a. Bonzo is a native Argentine, having been born in Chivilchoy,
Argentina. He was also a member of the Italian .Army Reserve and was called
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to active duty upon the entry of Ita1-v into the war. At his own request6
he was assigned to Argentina far the purpose ot establishing an intelligence
service. Bonzo was instrUDent.al in obtaining the necessary documnts tor
Bonassi6 Trotti and Bidone from the Argentine Consulate officials in Rome
for their travel to the Western Hemisphere.
{
During the time that Bonzo was in Buenos Aires, he enlisted the
services of Louis Ismael Romero to travel to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to act
as an espionage sub-agent. This individual reported to Bonzo a considerable
amount of inforlE.tion concerning Allied ship movements out of Brazil, but
because of the tact tba.t the inforJaation was received by Bonzo and turned
over to Captain Ricardo Prati, his superior in the Ita1.i.an FAnbassy, too late
to be of any value, Romero WB8 recalled to Argentina.
Mter the death of Canuander 1'orriani of the Italian &nbassy,
through whom Bonzo had obtaiMd financial assistance.. he was severe1y re-
etricted in the amount or money made available to him for carrying espionage
activities. As a result.. he decided to return to Ita~ to have his
position mre c1ear~ defined. Bonzo sailed from Buen~ Aires on August 14,
1943.. aboard the SS 8MOrlTE ALBERTIA8 for Spain.. but was appreheMed en route
b~' the British authorities at Trinidad, B.W.I. He _8 su~equently taken
to Lomon where he was interrogated and furnished the complete detaj.ls as to
his recruitment and training in espionage work.. as well as his activities
in the Western Hemisphere. His 8tate~nts confirmed the information obtained
by 515 representatives relative to his activities in Argentina. (64-20251)
b7C
b7J)
Another important Italian espionage agent whose activities .re
covert3d by 5I5 representatives was Angelo Pozzi" 'Who was active in
Brazil and Argentina. This irdividual had been a ~mber of the Italian
Annist1ce Canmission in *rseil1e, hanas" prior to his arrival in the
Western Hemisphere ion the SUllJl8r of" 191.2. After his arrival in Buenos
Aires he was in contact with both Ardres Angel Bonzo and !Alia BonaBsi. SIS
'l'hU pJ.a.n .
"railed, homver, and Pozzi remained in South ~rica. The information develop,
by 5IS regarding Pozzi was used to assist the British in clarifying his
statements and determining his dupli
first reason for questioning Pozzi'sI I his failure to voluii er ormat on regar ng 80- 01' .
"8DpJ.onage act.J.V:1.ties alxi the incompleteness of his pretended complete confess-
ion which was not in accordance with all or the ract5 as developed bY SI5.
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b1c
Following the capitulation of Ita1.v in August 1943 the Ita1.1an b7D
Embassy officials in Buenos .Aires p1sdged their allegiance to the MW'q
for~d Baioglio Govern-nt in Ita1.v.~~~~=1 Attache Buen~ .&.ires ~:~::~~::=:::irRrd8 established contact with the
in the Italian Fiuba8s1'. 0 0 e since he
s ontaot for Italian espionage agents operating in
South America and was in a position to furnish iQ!ormation regarding
clandestine Italian activities. Once [:::Jbecame convinced ot the need
for cooperation be furn18hed the x.gal Attache a great deal of important
information concerning the operation of Italian espionage in Latin America.
and eventuali1' convinced Wis Bonassi that he could f'urniS ~ au' s
representative8 an account of his activities al~ contacts. also
furnished SIS inf'ormation available to h1a refgarding German esp onage activitiesand contacts. (64~025l) .
d.
The Canlmlnist )(o:!!ment
(1) Local Ccmununist .A.cti!!t1e!- During the first five
~'ears of SIS coverage, tJ)8 CaDinunist Kovement in Argentina was 01' secondary
importance due to the Blch more extensive and vital activitie8 on the part
of the Axis, as well 88 the fact that the .A.rgent1M Government had placed
severe restrictions on the local Communists.
Prim- to JW18 1943, when the Ferrell revolutionary Gover~nt drove
the Cannmnists 1mdergrown, srs c0Y8rage bad succeeded in ident1f)"ing the
important C~~uni8t8 active in Argentina.
Fr(XD June 194.3 to August 1945, t1Mt principal objective ot CCXDrJUl1ist
coverage was to locate the COEUniSt Party leaders aoo terret out the
undergrowxl activities of the Party. Argentine C~1st headquarters W8re
maintained in Montevideo, Uruguay under the leadership ot Rodolto OhioIdi,
a foruer official of the C~tern £rom Montevideo. He directed the
publ1cation ot c]aooestiDe --npapers and paiq)hlets, tiw holding 01' secret
meetings, the raising of public dist\U"bances, and the calling ot strikes
against the Ferrell Government. The Party was also actively engaged in
infiltrating and dominating Eureopean r8.t\1g8e groups in Ar~ntina. During
part of this period, -D)'" ot the principal CaDJmmist leaders W8r8 either
in Argentine prisons or in exile. Victorio Codovilla, master mind ot the
Party, 'DB in Q1ile writing Caumunist directives, while Rubens Iscaro,
ArgentiM Coanun18t labor leader was traveling tluoOUghout South America.
Tile youth leader, Cesar Cascallar, was aJao organizing youth 8ocietie8
throughout the continent, but in the 8~r ot 1945, _naged to slip unnoticed
into lIorgentina.
(
 CaImIln1st activities in Argentina increased greatly in importance
after August 1945. The tel'llination of the -.r centered attention (Xl peace
problems, both dOMstic arxl international. In the solution of these
problelDf.:, the CQJIIIIlDists endeavored to take an active part. In addition to
the extra opportunities for CaDmun~t agitation offered by these proble_, the
254

!~:e:B'{--
(
Party was also revitali.zed in its revolutionary efforts by the doctrine
espoused b.y Jacques Duclos, the French CQIlmunist who criticized the .class-
collaborationist policy" of the United States Caumunist Party and
precipitated the ouster of Karl Browder. In this ccmbination of circuuatances,
the Argentine Caumunists .re also encouraged by the renewal of perlK1.ssion
by the ArgentiM Government to COlE out fr~ under cover and to .tunotion
openly and legall.Y.
(
Augnst 1, 1945, brought a Government decree reo~ing all
political parties which would agree to support the Argentine Gover~nt.
The CanDlmist Party- was included and immediately came out of hiding.
Daily and weekly newspapers began open publication, am prominent exiles
returned from surrourKii.ng countries. ~ September 1.. 1945.. a huge ralq
including SOll8 3°..000 C~unists 88 held in Wna Park, Buenos .&.ires.
This new-fouIx1 freedtD was interrupted briefly- during the state of 8iege
imposed September 26th at the ti~ Juan Peron was temporarily removed from
the GovernlDent. Several Cmmunists were arrested.. including CodoviUa.. who
had just arrived from Chile. All were released within a -.tter of days.
During the fall of' 1945.. the Argentine Canmunists .far~d a coalition with
the Socialist and Progressive Democratic parties in an effort to defeat
Juan Peron in Ute December 2.. 1945.. Presidential e 1e ction. A national
conference of the Party from December 22 to 25th drew up resolutions con-
delmling Peron and advocating a -national unity-n govemment. Jose Tamborini..
in spite ot the coalition's support, suffered an overwhelming deteat to
Peron and no Communist candidates were elected to of.fice. Realizing that
their future would be determined in large Jleasure by Peron.. Argentine
Communists gradually changed their attitude of opposition toward him and
give indications that they might support many points in his labor program.
They also telt that support of Per~ would assist in their fight against
U.S. .imperialism- and the foreign policy championed by Assistant Secretary
of State.. Spruille Braden.
SIB coverage ot Argentine Comanm1at mtters indicated that their
greatest success was in the European refugee field. An excellent informant
among the Polish Communists was developed. Through hiD'. it 'AS learned that
a separate section of. the Argentine Canmuniat Party had been formed among
the Poles in Argentine aM exercised considerable authority over Poles in
surrounding countries. Strong Canmuniat sections were a1so organize;d among
the Slavs, the Balkan groups, the Greeks and the Spaniards. ).1any of. these
groups organized their ~ C'*IInunist newspapers. The Spanish CCRntnWliBts,
especially, under Jlanuel Delicado and Colonel Francisco calan, arranged for
the transportation ot nUEroua Embers from Latin America to France am Spain
to join in opposing the Franco (})verment.
(
 From August 14" to 18" the Canmunist Party of Argentina he1D. its
nth National Congress in Buen~ Aires, attended by fraternal delegates trom
Cononmist Parties throughout Iatin America.. SIS cowrage 1ooicated that the
pE'oceedings were domna.ted by the important Cuban Communist" Juan brlnello"
am that Ccmln1mist poUc,. for the entire continent 'WaS discussed there.

By January, 1947, when the Party celebrated its 29th anniversary, it could
draW' croms in Buenos Aires of 60,000 people am 40,000 persona in the
Interior. <6it-2804-D; 64-28OS-D; 64-28<1>-D; 64-200-201.)
(2) Soviet Diplomatic Activitieo. During the spring of
1946, orricial Soviet agents began to appear in Argentina. Through SIScoverage, it 8S possible to follow these agents I travels throughout
the Hemisphere. Pavel Kalkov, Commercial Attache of the Soviet Embassy in
Bogota, Colanbia, arrived first in Argentina to attempt negotiations
ror Soviet purchase or vegatable oils and essential products. He was
.followed on April U, 1946, by a Soviet trade delegation direct !'rOOt Russia
which carried on fUrther negotiations ror the exchange or products or tl~
two countries. Irdications were that &aide !'rom the comercial aspects or
these negotiations the principal intent was to cause an increase in Soviet
prestige in Latin America and release Argentina trom the Decessi ty or seeking
a United States outlet ror her JU'oducts. With the ar~ival of the trade
de legation, yurt Dashkerlch, )(exj;can representative of the Soviet news
agency "Tass- 'W8S traM£erred to Argentina. SIS coverage 1.n Mexico had
shown th&;.t ~sbkerlch was OM or the most :i:mpQrtant Soviet agents operating
in the Western Haniapbere and the Bureau's representatives in .Argentina
.followed his activities closely. (lOo-l8386)
,
It was a foregone conclusion that the Argentine Gove.r1'Ul18nt would es-
tablish diploEtic relations with the Soviet Union following the inauguration
of Peron. It was no surprise, then, ~n on June 5, 1946, the establishment
of such ties was announced. This procedure was in line with Soviet efforts
to uaintain representatives in as man)" Latin American countries as possible.
On August 31, 1946, the statf of a ~W Soviet &Dbassy arrived and
short~ thereafter Bureau coverage revealed that the Soviet Union was
intensely interested in developing influence in Argentinal which it con-
sidered one of the most important posts in the Western Held.8IX1ere tor
counteracting ~ited States power. It was also tour¥! that the &nbaasY'8e
closely associated with foreign C<XDDIUni5t act1rlties aM otfered fun
assistance to the SJav Union in ArgentiM.. Although sane purchases were
made, no trade agree_nt was consummated bet_en Argentina am the Soviet
t'nion, however, and the Trade Delegation returned to MoscOW' in Afarch, 1947.
t
The increase in Soviet d1pl~tic am cOJlDnercial activity a1so
brought about increased suspicion ot intelligence activities. ~e ot the
persona suspected ot such activities .a Ursula "sermn, who bad been a
contact arrl lnterawdiary ot several Soviet agents involved in the transad.ssion
ot secret U.S. Governntent data to the Soviet Union (Nathan Gregory Silver-
master Case). She arrived in Argentina in )(arch 1946 am sm representatives
took over coverage ot her activities after her departure tr~ ~ United
States. (65-56402)
._-~::;;E~:C:R!E~:~::~ -
2!,6

..
In June, another such subject" Bernard Redmont of. the D81I8 magazine
awor1d Report" 8 arrived in Argentina. Redmont was also involved in the
Gregory Case and r8DBined in Argentina during 1946 am'1947 urJder Bureau
observation. Dl1ring thc.t tius he precipitated a severe disagree~nt with
American Ambassador Kessersmith when allegations were printed that lessersmi.th
believed war between Russia and the United States to be inevitable. SIS ~
called on to check the origin ot this star,- and investigation iooicated that
Redmont bad released this iJ1!oraetion to damage the position ot JlEssersmith
and the United States in laUn America. (65-564CX2)
The Russian picture in Argentina 'W88 turther co~licated by the
appearance or Polish aM Bulgarian C<XI1118rcia1. Missions in )ate 1946 and
in earq 1947, am by attempt8 to set up Yuogoslav and other Soviet-dominated
Buropean II1.8sions in Buenos Aires. Added information concerning these
activities was secured when in September, 1946, President Peron proposed
to AIilbassador 1.8ssersmith that C<XnDDm1.st and Soviet inforution be exchanged
bet_en hie countryalxl om- &b8ssy. In accordance with th.iB agree~nt, a
~mber or the SIS Buenos Aires ortice R8 designated. to receive data from
Argentine police sources. 1hen SIB operations closed in Buenos Aires on
February 10" 1947" Cooumnist and Soviet coverage was at a high point or
completeness am reliability. (64-211-201)
e. Uses Made of SIS Information
(1) Blacklist aoo Econ~c Da~. SIB representatives in
Argentina -,. be credited with obtaining am submitting considerable informa-
tion about coJDnercial fir- which subsequently appeared on the United States
Proclaia8d List or Certain Blocked Nationals. It may be stated that this
infor~tion.. which was turnished to the proper United States econoaL1..c
authorities, was either responsible for or ins~nt.al in placing numrous
fir- on the Proclaimed List.
The .foll~ are a few examples of instances in which repm-is
subad.tted by 515 representat1ves were instrUlEntal in placing specific
firms on the Proclaimed List:
Between January, 1942 aDd April, 1942, several SIS reports were
sulXllitted conceming Diego Ke)'9r am C1a..~ CalIs Corrientes 330, Buenos
Aires, and A.venida San Yartin 222, Behia B1anca, with m-anch properties in
Puerto ]i1.dryn, T1'9lew, and other southern Argentine towns. This.fim dealt
primarily in hardware and paints, and prior to the submission or SIS reports
it ftS the British-Alnerican Duperial Paint Canpany representa'tive in SO\1thern
Argentina. 'ftlese reports coq>letely revealed the organization, capitalizatio
and activities or the Diego lIeyer .firm members in Bah1a BJanca, Argentina,
where, from a reliable source" it _8 ascertained that ~1 had financed the
publication 01' the pro-J.xia n81I8p8per tIEl Censor- to t.be extent of 800 pesos
monthly until tbe Jatter part of 1941. It 1188 also ascertained tJ18t this
firm, or its officer" Raul Me~r, heJd a mortgage in the amun't of be'tiw8en
20,000 and 25,,000 pesos on the ~r~n School in Bahia Blanca. 'Dlis l1ortgage
was cancelled earl)" in 1942 as a gift to the iMtitution. Reports obtained
(
i[C'RE~ 25-'

by the SIS representative in hia t.rave18 between Bahia Blanca aoo Cauooore
Rivadavia in southern Argentina revealed that the firm had openly d18pJa)'8d
Nazi propaganda in its Du.rOUS branch offices and that the managers ot
these offices were well known 88 Nazis. On *112, 1942, tb18 firm was
placed (It the United States List of Blocked Nationals. (64-2811-67)
(
Other SIS intormation was subDitt.ed on N0'98mber 5" 1941" relating
that the tirm ot ](arcos Jose Fontan" Calle Bl Hernera 265, atenos Aires,
was assisting firDII in Argentina in evading the sanctions imposed by the
Proclaimed List. It was stated that schinery had been purchased by
Rcxlolfo iYendell, Bernardo de Irogoyen 440" Buen~ Aires" from an Al!1erican
firm and the shipnent had been transferred to the Fontan firm which in turn
passed the ~rchand1se to the tirm ot Branberg and Cia." Calle Moreno 970
which was already on the Proclaimed List. Both the firms collaborating
in this manner appeared on the Proclaimed List ot February 28, 1942. C64-2Sll-
11.-20)
As early as ~rch 18, 194~, SIS report8 were received concerning the
Ger.nan firm of Staudt and Cia., Calle Bernardo de lrigoyen 330, Buen~
Aires, which is associated with the Bromberg tirm at the 8ame address. S18
reports showed that Staudt and Cia, bad oontribu'ted 83,,000 to 'the German
l1inter Help Fund and that the owner _8 one Richard Staudt, a Ge~n-born
naturalized J.rgentirKt ~ose mother and sisters resided in GerIDArty'. 'D1e firm
'E.B reported to transact busines8 with a firm of the sa. name in German)".
Prior to the recent war, Richard Staudt waa reported to be one ot the Qhiet
wool buyers tor Germany and was afterwards alleged to be operating through
several cover firms. He as reported as a proad.nent Nazi leader who
attended a Nazi meeting in Buenos Aires on March 1, 1941, when Ambassador
Edmund van Thermann reported the results ot his short trip to Ge~I11'. This
firm was p1aoed on the Proclaimed List during July 1941. (64-2SOS-a-23;
64-28~A-l2 J 64-280o-A.-lS)
The cooperation between personnel of' t.}., Of'f'ice of' t.he Legal
Attache aoo the Economic Branch of the Embassy in bn~ Aires as always very
close. ~ example or th18 oollabarat.ion was t.he 390 page cOllq'rehensive
sUJ!IDary report on totalitarian firms in Argentina 1dl1ch was furnislMld to
Mr. Merwin Bohan, t,be Econanic Counsellor the Bnbassy on April 6, 1943.
Mr. Bohan subsequently advised the representatives or the Legal
Attache's Office that one of the iDli18diate results ot this ccxnpilation was
that within a few hours after its receipt he was able to use the inform.Uon
as a basis tor p1'8ftnting a transter ot over 1500,000 by one of' the Axis
firms in Argentina. (64-2811-281.)
l
After the arrival of Spruille Braden as Ambassador, re:.'..ationa between
the Isgal Attache and the Econ~c Counselor were intensified. Kumerous
projects wre undertaken by the Legal AttaclMt at the request of the Ambassador.
sEk~T
Y--258

(
These 1ncltKied the exall1.nat1on or codes and accounts of the Banco A1Bman
Transatlantico and the Banco Germanico; a review of the books of the most
extensive Bemberg interests in Argentina; tJ1e books ot Fritz ~ndl, a t~
Austrian mum tiOD8 manufacturer; certain of the work ot the Argentine
Canm1ttee Intervening Axis F1ms and a very thorough study arn review of
the archives ot the .ro~r German aM Japarwse J.:1ba8s1es in aJsnos Aires.
(64-2802; 64-2804-Aj 64-28~-B)
(
(2) Efforts to Force Action J.Rainst Axis uents by
Arv.entina. Atter a speech by Under-8ecretary of State S\m1ner Wells in
October, 1942, in which be alleged that both Argentina and Chile 'Ere
be1n~ used as a base of espionage operations against the other American
nations, the Argentine Government formal~ protested his speech. Tnat
Goverrment asked that an)'" in.toration in possession of the United States
Government relating to Axis espionage activities be ade available to them.
On l~ovember 2, 1942, and November 3, 19/.2, memoranda incarporating the
information acCWllllated bt tJie S15 Division wre delivered to the ArgentiM
Government by the American Ambassador at Buenos Aires. Addi tional memoranda
we~e delivered on Hove~ber 11th. These memoranda included information
relating to the opera Gennan a nts and also covered Japanese am
Italian activities. who
was! ISIS Agents and
! I advised on November 3, 1942, that po ce en req b7C
to investigate the allegations set forth. The police 1mmediate~ took into b7D
custody e1ghteen persons. Confidentialinfaraation, ho.-wr, indicated
that they wre -Jdng little progress aM that tJ1e true !acts as set forth in
the Emoranda had not been tumished to them. Information was obtained that
one of the principal agents, Ha~ Happ, bad not been taken into custody
because tl. police wre unable to locate him. I )and
I lof the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (as contraste~ to the
City Police who had been har¥lling the investigation) who had been acting as
in.torJlBnts for tJ1e 818 Agents, 'Ere furn1shed With the in.f'ormation in the
Isgal Attache's custody, aoo removed him to the Provincial Capital, La
Plata, Argentina, where they obtained a coq>1ste confession £rom him within
a period of two da)'B. The prisoners aid confessions were then turned over
to the national authorities. (64-2804-1-2977)
The confession :Bade by Knapp was exactly in accordance with the
allegations set forth in the BIB memoranda, name~, that he had been running
a ship-reporting service regalod1ng Allied .hipping aM bad turn18hed
reports, at first, to a claooestiM radio transll1tter Lm. in Rio de Janeiro
and 8ubsequent~ to Captain Dietrich Niebu1no, the Naval Attache ot the German
&nbass)" in Buen~ Aires, Argentina. IE a1ao naMd his &CO08l)11088 who
included Ottcxoar Mlller, Walter Fr1~ld, aM ~ von Reichenbach. .
further stated that he was under the direction of Captain Niebuhr and that
he had DOt expected to be arrested due to & promise that he had recei Ted
troll t~ BuenoS Aires police.
,
~,:e~i~,
259

(
4
With r.f.r~c. to the other 1DdiT1duals Oharged. Ortelli and Ton
Reiohenbach wer. acquitted or ..piouag. Obarge.. !he otber toar were giT8n
relati~e11 .hort pri.on ~er88. (64-2~O4~)
On =e preT1ou. ocouion the Ars-nt.1De GoTe~nt took awilUng
aoti-. acaiDrl a Ger8n ac~t. CDe .alt.r G1e.. 1dEtitied bJ' SIS
repre.eutatiTe. .. being . k~ B.zi agent in Eoaador. Gie.e .ent bi.
report. to the cland8rliDe radio trlD.imtter LIB. in Rio d8 Janeiro. ~8Dtually
he upelled fro. Bouador -.hen hi. operat.iona beoame mown. and in April,
1942. he arrind in ArgctiDa. ai..e d8cided to .ta,. in South A8rioa and had
a pe~8Dt Til. tor re.idaDoe in Paragu«3. Which Tila was oanoelled al a
result of the iDtorl8tion concerning hi- ade &Tailable 'to the Paraguayan
Go~erD88ut by 'the "'er1can ABabas.ador. 'the intora~iOD relating to Gi..e
-.. al.o -.de aTailable to the Jr&ctiDe GoTerDMDt thl'wgh diplo-.t.ic
ohazmel., and he i_dia~17 1D~rD8d CD. hi. arriTal in Ar&8Dtiue
Arter .ate o-.&aot had bec obtained fro. both the American. and t.he Brit.i.h.
he wal repa~r1.ted ~o ~7 b7 'the J.rgctine GoTerD8nt on a Spanilh lhip.(64-28M-A.-'44) .
On January %6. 1944. a. the relUl t of veat pre..ve broQEht b,. 'the
United 8'ta'te. aDd Qreat. Brit.in. the &rcen'tine Co~Dt of GGera1 Pedro P.
Ramirez broke 4ip108tic re1at10D1 w1th the Axil rower.. cm 'tha't a..,.
SIS 'turned o...er 'to the ~te Dep&r't8Dt a ~randalt O0n'4:.a1ftiftC tull data ..
81xty-ti of the kBo8I. important Axi. ageu't. ia &rcentiu-.. The...
~randua... .8n't to our At'taoh. 1n ~eo. .11re. to be ad8 aTl.i1ab1. to
the American Db dor 'ther.. ~ January 29. and OD. .1aAr18.ry Sl. 1944 'the
Legal £.ttaohe pr..en'ted to the .., dor up-to-date .aorcda oonoerning the
.tatua of thirty-eight other aer8U agct. 'Who.e aoti...i tie. had bee preTiou.-
ly broupt to the ..t'tention of the &rCentine ao rD.Mn't in IOYaber. 19.2 ~
but againlt e08 D.O pro.eouti ao'tion had been taka.. (64-2804-£.-2977 J
M-28M-493.'9')
,
Argentina alllO.t 18I18d1ately rearre.ted the latter gr~p ot acet.
and ch1ring the follGWiDg two web arre'~ an addit1.OD.al c't'y-ei&ht
boa or 8u.pected ~. &gent. ot ae~. Japan... and ItaliD utioul1ty.
*n'1 oth.r ind1'Y1dua18 wr. detained for qu..tion1D.g and 8UbaeqU8ntl'1
relea..d. ~g th- be~ the 0er8D. til1tary and.Air Attache. OeD.eral
rriedrioh Wolf and the Japane.e I~:s~i~~~.i.tant .a'W8.1 &."ach... (~28M-509
260

As tJie result of an &na17'Sis undertaken by the Office of the Legal
Attache in Buenos A.1.res, 1,046 individuals of the crew of the 8QRAF SfEE8
were located, identified and in'V8stigated in such a manner that the Office
of the Lecal Attache obtained complete info1'lD&t.ion. The entire dB.ta were
compiled and set torth in ODe comprehensi VB report. In this report J the
United states Ck)vemment bad ~re cC8Plete and informative facts than the
Argentine authori ties regarding the ~bers of the IGRAF SPES" crew. The
report was .tumished to the Aaerican .Aabassador in Buenos Aires in order
to equip him with tJie forcef'ul ~tail8 regarding the lax manner in which
the Arcentizm Ck)V81'DMnt was handling enemies of the United Nations. .it a
subsequent ti8, when Argentina severed relations with tJie j.xi.s nations, it
was noted that one of the first steps taken for internal security was the
formulating of a definite prograa to be followed tor safeguarding Argentina
from aD7 acts of 'Yiolence by the indindual crew aembers of the 8GBAF SPEE.-
(64-16112-71)
c
'ft1e ta-vorable impression t.b8 Argentine OOve11l8nt might have created
by its ettectift poUce action against the AxLs during 1944 was considerably
d1.m1nished by the tact that '8AD1' ot 'tile agents arrested were subeequentl7
placed at l1ber~. Notable among tbese were Jose V~les, principal subject
of the EP'E case, Georg Bucker, kmwn poBi ti vel,- to 818 as a high-ranking
operative ot ~e Air Branch or the A.bwehr, and Wolf Freu~nberg Y Hallier,
a principal subject in the Microdot Case. Despite these and other releases,
however, it can be said that German espionage in Argen'tLna surtered during
191.4 as a result ot the action ~e Argenti~ (k)vemEnt felt forced to take.
Furtheraore, the repatriation or U8)st the ..tire German Diplomatic Mission
in July ot the S888 year placed the GeJ'8n espionage BY8tem umer a further
handicap.
It 8Ust be pointed "ut, however, that the Argentine <k>'Verrant was
s1JlUltaneouslJ' conducting a caapaign against the intelligence activities of
Allied countries as nll, and at OM tiae, during May of 1944, there were at
least fi1'teen 1n.tonanta ot t.he Legal .1ttacbe in Buenos .Aires in the cU8~
of the Police. NIlmroua informants ot the Military .1ttache and ot British
Intelligence likewise were placed under arrest Wring that 78ar. As in tl8
case of the arrested Ans agents, 8&D7' of tM .1ll1ed informants were later
S~:t:REt ~
281
,

relea8ed with 8harp warnings to abandon the kind of' activities that had
brought on their detct1ona. A8 111ustratiT. of'the painetak1Dg 8Dner in
'Which A.rgen'tina a'ttempted to preseM'. the appearance of i8Part1a1 Bwtra1i ty,
it i8 pointed out that on December 19, 1944, eleven German 8uapecte and .leTen
Allied au.pecte were 8imultaneouel7 relea.ed from prilan. (64-4123-201)
(
Daring the latter part of 1~4. the Argentine Government foral1y
requested a conference of Pan A..rioan DAtions in order to have ita position
in international at'tair. definitely clarified aDd uaderltood. The Office of
the Legal Attache in Bueno. j!re. cooperated very clo8ely with ~assy
ofticials b)'" _king available extenaiTe data on the nature ot current Axil
activities in that oountry and by providing an eati-.te of' the ae.eures taken
by the Argentine GOTern.ent e.g~in8t 8uOh aotiTities. Thi. information proved
of great Talue to the State Depart.nt in d.eteraining ita policy toward
Argentina and in juatityiDg that policy in the 818. or the other ~rioan
natiOnl. (64-2804-.A.)
It was not until March 27, 1945. h0W8Ter. that Argentina tinally
joined the other nations or 'the oontinent and declared war on Gerany and Japan.
This action 0" lub.eq1mDt to 'the Inter-AMrioan Conference in .:rlco
City and was oppo.ed by the J¥~t1ne rationali8ts as undigDitied and an
indication of 8ub.ervienoe to the un! ted Stat... (64-2801-2232)
I,
Arter the fir8t of 1945, wi tb the rapid deterioration of the Ger~
and Japane8e m11i~ary p08itions. Axis espiODage aotiTities came practically
to a Itandstill. In the lull proTided by thi8 C818ation of ao~lTities. it
was possible to oonduc~ inTeatigations in Argentina and to a oertain extent.
in Europe in order to bring to a logioal oonolu8ion the numerous. Tery active
and, in eo.. waY8, 8uoce88fUl eepionage ac~lTitie8 ot the Ge~ in the
Argentine Republic. The BDZ. DE and Kex1oan ~orodot Cues were brought to
a logical oonclualon and the over8b8lm1ng majority of the perlonnel ot ~he8e
oue8 wre incarcerated in j&11 in A.rsen~ina. 'the s.. was true ot the
relm1aDts ot the .&.bwhr group orgallised b,- Cap~a1A Dietrich 5iebuhr and handled
8ub8equently by General Friedrich Wolt. Ger8n .aT&l and Kil! tary Attache8.
re.peotiTe1y. Into~tion furnished b7 the Otfioe of the Legal Attache to
Argentina authorities directly. or in 1088 instance. through cooperation
wi th the Bri tieh. re.ul~ed in the arre8t of ringleader8. Capable iDYe.tigation
and interrogation by- Argentine authorities or subjeots detained on Allied
information re8ulted in the arrest ot a 8a%i.w. DUmber ot 1088 140 perlOD8.
all quite directly related ~o the G8~ Iatelligenoe Servioe in Argentina.
In October or 19~. the empbaaia or SIS in Argentina ahined from
pure intellig8DOe aotiTit1e. to the politioal i8plioat1ona or th... intellicenceactiviti...
2&1
In that ~th, £a-i_tent Secretary of Stat. Spruill. Brad8D reqme.ted
that 8oMone from. the Derar't8nt of .JQ.atioe and 8oMone tro. the Bureau be
deliguated to repre.ent thole ag~oie. in the participation or the preparation

of a ca.e showing .Argentine cO8pUcity with the a.ranl throughout the
war. The objeotiYes or this projeo~ was to show tba~ Argentina, under
the then existing gO?8rDm8Dt, was not to be trusted in the 11gDing ot .
.utual ..siatano. peot with the other oountries or Latin A8erioa beo.us.
of the totalitarian iDtluence left in the o~try by the deteated Axil
powers. (64-2801-2873)
(
A Bureau AgC1t ... aaaed to repr..ent both the Bureau aDd 'the
Department and a lar~e ~1mt or hi. tiM _8 .pent in the State Departaent
prepariDg e.plonage aDd political intel11genoe 8&terial ~ thi. proj.ot.
the anal,.i. or clandestine radio 88.8age. decoded by the Bureau Laboratory
formed the baokbone of' the State Depart8ent'. -Cu. .igain.t Argentina- which
appeared ia February of 1946 under the title .Conaultation ~g the AmerioanRepublica lath Re.peot to the £rS8DtiDe 81 tu&tion.. ~i8 Tolume i. .ore I
co18>nly mO81 as 8'!'he Blue Book- and repre.en.ted a departure by the tb11 ted
state. state Department 1D i~. dealing. ~th Latin A..rioaD Countrie..
Thi. 8Blue Book8 deToted nu.eroUi page. to 8Dd, in tact, the perluaaiTe char-
acter of' the book re.ted upon: £rg8Dtine-.azi o~11ci t7, £rgentine-.ac1
effort. to .ubTert rPT8rDm8Dt. or neighboring countriel, 1rgentine-Ger88D
negotiation8 ~or mill tary a..i.tance ~o Argen~lDa, Argentine pre.erYation
of Ger8n economic power and the totalitarian aharacter ot the
Argentine regi... In addi~1OD to 'the iatel11g8DC8 and ..pionage ..tarial
contributed by the Bureau tor thi. project. a yery e%baustiT8 memorandum
on Ger..n school. and orsaniaationa in Arg8Dtina was prepared on the bu1.
of ..terial forwarded by the Le~l Attache in Buenos Airel. (s.-2804-A-S158)
!he 8Blue Book,8 which wa. frankly de.i~ed to result in the defeatof ~ Domingo Peron (pr...nt Pr..ldent or Argentina) in the election.
which were held in JrgentiDa on February 24, 1946, aotually baoktired badly
and in the opinion of' 8DY ob8er-..er., the book contributed heavily to the
election of Peron.
Another re.ult ot the -Slue Book. .. the publication by Pre.ldent
Peron on February 20, ei~t da1- alter the publication ot the -Blue Book,.
of a .Blue~ te Book8 in WhiGh he revealed the alleged act! Ti tie. ot
American in'tel1igeuoe ascoie. in .&rC8D't1aa tJ1r~hou't tlle war. !hie book,
..hile it did renect a certain liaited 8ao\mt ot intor8tion about the
act1 T1 tie. of Bureau per.ODD.1 in 'their invel'tiga'tion8 of Azia aoti T1 tie. in
Argentina, di8played a lack ot real kDowledge at the Bureau'. act! Ti ti... In
can'trut 'to thi., a oarefull,. doouacted exposure ot ~e ot 'the intOr8nt.
of the Kili'tary .A.'t'taGhe .s .et out. !hil -- the lo-oalled ~1que W1tten-
berg Ca.e which purportedly .hawed effort- on the part of 'the ~rican Hi1i'tary
J.t'taohe 'to obtain certain intoratioD abou't the dilpo.i tion ot .A.rc_'tiDe &r8
and troop.. (84-2801-5069,3115)
,
 :r. J.otiT1ti.. 4ri.iDg :troa £JOg_tin. Pol1tioal 81tua'ti~
The aooogpll.h88nt. of the Bureau'. repr..8B'tat1Te. in Ar£8DtiDa were
1J1peded by the poor relati0D.8 erl.ting betwen the Un! ted State. a.ud the
Argentine Republio. Due 'to thi. .ituation the SIS &gent. :round it neoe..ary
to become actiTe in other ti.ld. or endeaTor be.id.. counter-espionage work
and related 1nTe8'tipt1one. j,~~~E( 263

(
~e ot the lIS repre.8Dta~1T88 bad deTeloped Dr. Calatayud as a
olose triend ad thr~gh hi. -.s abl. to obtain 'th. details ot this _mor8Ddum
8Dd a oo.plete r.port ot Ca.~illo'. ~.wur wbioh explained in det81l the
reasons tor his polioy of n.atrality and hie oOD~tDued non-oooperatiT8a~t1tude toward the UJ11'ted fta~... !brough Con'tac't8 ot 'thi. nature. it _s
pos8ible tor the Bareau'a repreaent..t1T.' to turDilh the ~rioan ~...eador
with 1Dtor..tion regarding b8h1Dd.th8.808D8. poll~ioe 1D Argentina ~Ch would
hav. noraally 8acaped bit atteDtion. (~-Z801-629)
f
Through other oontaotl the Bure.u'l repre'8DtatiTe, ..re able to t.ep
the .-oassador adTi8~ of ra8dfioatian. in the political life of ArgentiDa and
the ~lopmsnt8 of the 8o-Galled Peron 11 Te-Year Plan. In add! tion, the
Legal Attaohe was &1.0 able to tarDilh ~or8atian regardinl Argentine effort.
to conclude oo...roial treatie. with Chile, BoliTia and Peru, ~reatle.
which had for their purpole the "a4Qal eltablilh88nt of Argeutine hegemony
OT8r the .outhern part or La~iD Amerioa. (64-2801; &i-280Z)
J'rom 'tiae 'to 'ti- the otfice or 'the I.pl .&.'t'tache "'8 oall.d ~ 'to
ass1.'t in cuardiD~ 'the per.on ot the Aab...ador and 'tb8 property or the
Bmb y. Beoau.e or the .1 tuat1on preT8iltBg in Argentina, the pro'tec~ion
of the per.on or the ~ dor, on oooa.ion, bec... . tull-~i.. project.
b
b1D
Tha~ the tbrea~8 to 4aDage the ~rioan Embassy or injure it, per.ann.:
were not di;.i;-ine was dr~tiaa11T nrOT8D in JanuarY. 1944. At that
l
adrl8ed 'the la'tt.er and 'the t.gal A't'taohe I bad been iD8'truot.ed 'to
place a bo8b in 'the ~t. roos ot 'the Bmba88Y on 'the 8OrniDg ot January 16,
1944. By prearrange8D.tI I-. interoep'ted .t the 1 Gtrance
in po.ae..ion ot . liTe bomb and he was taken immedi.tely to & Buenol Aire.
.uWrb 'where the bO8b ... rendered barale.1 by an e:xp10.i Tel expert. !he
~K8Dtine 'oreiKU Ottice ... notified ot thi. incident on J.aDary 18, 1~44
at 'which ti- the il1fora'tiaa. and the exhib1't. prepared by the t.ga1 Attache
were deliT8red ~o the Argentine Polioe.
~EC~£l T

I IClaimed tha't he bad ac-ted \Jnder 'the in8'truc'tions of'
Cipriano Pons Le~ca. an Illeged nationalist and terrorist. Pons Lezioa.
however. was no't arres'ted by the police but another;~:::~:~~on8 ira'tor. Wolfgang
Wallner. alias He~an Schiller. who was implicated b was arrested.
!he Argen'tine police disoo\Jn'ted 'the possibility 'tha't z ca was involved
in t.he plo't. Bureau investigation. however. indics.ted that the information
furnished by! lwas probably true and the bombing 8:ttempt had been
inspired by the Argentine nationalists. ( 65-51979)
c
Perscalnel
3.
!be following Special Agents and Special Employees were assigned
to SIS work in Argentinas
ASSIGNJAENT
12-43 Undercover
5-44 tm.dercover
6-46 Undercover
4-46 Undercover
11-43 Undercover
2-46 Official
6-46 Official
11-42. Underoover
11-43 Undercover
11-43 UndercoTer
7-45 Undercover
11-43 Underoover
10-44. Official
4-46 Official
1-44 Official
2-46 Official
11-43 tkldercover
8-46 Official
2-44 Undercover
5-44 Undercover
12-42 Undercover
1-46 01"f1c1&1
5-45 Official
11-43 tbder cove r
2-46 Undercover
1-46 Undercover
3-44. Undercover
DATE
.,:043'
2-43
5-44
12-45
8-~
3-44
7-44
8-41
9-43
10-43
4-45
8-43
6-44
8-45
9-43
8-45
11-42
7-045
11-42
2..44
9-41
8-46
6-43
10-43
6-45
3-45
10-42
b~
:wm SIS:/J: CITY
I Bu.enos- Ai re s
Bueno8 Aire8
Buenos Aire8
Bueno8 Aires
Bu.enos Aire8
Bu.enos Aires
Buenos Aires
Rosario
Bucos Aires
BuenO8 Aires
Buenos Aires
BueD. 0 s Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aire s
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
La Plata.
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Bueno8 Aires
Buenos Aires
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
b1c
(
I
265
~LL

02
P!-C
CITY-
DATE2-~ - 9-42
8-42 - 5-43
6-46 - 3-47
6-42 - 10-43
5-46 - 7-46
10-43 - 12-43
10-42 - 2-44
9-43 - 1~45~ .3-42 - 7-44
1-42 - 11-425-42 - 9-42
2-43 - 12-43
7-43 - 12-43
1-45 - 2-464-43 - 5-44
5=42 - 8-43
2-43 - 4-44-
6-43 - 12-43
10-42 - 10-43
12 -41 - 10-42
9-44 - 6-45
3-41 - 12-411-43 - 9-43
2-46 - 3-47
11-41 - 5-42
8-42 - 2-43
9-43 - 4-46
4-44 - 8-44
11-41 - 5-42
2-43 - 3-44
4-43 - 10-43
1-44 - 10-446-42 - 8-43
5-44 - 7-46
8-43 - 12-43
12-43 - 5-44
11-42 - 11-43
8-41 - 12-41
11-42 - 2-432-43 - 5-43
8-43 - 12-43
5-46 - 2-47
12-42 - 11-43
Buenos Aires
Bahia Blenca
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Santa Fe
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
(
Buenos Aires
Bueno8 Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Tucuman
TuCum8n
Buenos Aires
Bueno8 Aires
Mar Del Plata
Bueno8 Aires
La Plata
Bueno s Ai re s
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Bucoa Aire8
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Bucos Aires
Buenos Aires
ASS I~ ! t)ldercover -
thdercover
Lega.l Atta.che
Undercover I
Officia.l
Undercover
t)ldercover
Legal Attaohe
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
UIldercover
tmdercover
Legal Attaohe/
Undercover
thdercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Official
Undercover
undercover
Official
Underco-ver
Undercover
Undercover
Official
Of.f'1ci8.l
Official
Official
orficia.l
Official
Undercover
Undercover
undercover
~dercover
~dercover
Official
~dercover
Mendola
Roaa1ro
Buenos Aires
Bahia. Blanca
Cordoba
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
(
S~T
2S6

b7C
b2
ASSIG}.T},lEIIT
1-45 - 3-46 Legal At:tache
9-41 - 4-42 Undercover
9-45 - 2-47 Official
12-44 - 6-45 Undercover
10-43 - 11-43 Undercover
11-4.1 . - 9-42 Official
9-42 - 2-45 Official
10-43 - 3-44 Undercover
8-43 - 11-43 Undercover
4-44 - 10-44 Undercover
8-45 - 6-46 Official
5-42 - 7-42 Undercover
5-42 - 3-43 Undercover
3-42 - 2-44 Undercover
8-42 - 12-43 Official
DATE-
(
CITY
BuenOi'"I'ires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Dumos Aires
Cordoba
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Rosario
Official
Undercover
OfficiI.!
Undercover
- 8-45
- 11-42
- 7-46
- 11-43
6-45
3-42
3-45
11-42
Buenos Aires
Mendoza
Buenos Aires
Bu~os Aires
4-43
5-46
6-45
4-42
5-44
11-44
5-43
2-46
8-42
6-45
8-42
7-44
1-42
5-43
6-43
5-44
11-44
8-43
1-42
- 11-43 Undercover
- 2-47 Official- 5-46 Official
- 9-42 Undercover
- 11-45 Undercover
- 10-46 Undercover
- 2-44 Official
- 1-47 Official- 5-44 Undercover
- 3-47 Official
- 7-45 Official
-ll-~ Undercover
- 11-43 Undercover
- 6-43 Official
- 5-44 Official
- 6-45 Official
- 4-45 Undercover
- 3-44 Undercover
- 12-43 Undercover
t
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Rosario
Buenos Aires
Bahia Blanca.
Buenos Aire s
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires
c
SrXET
261

\
b~
b~
C,..
crry DATE ASSIGmm"l'
i118iios Jires ~ - 5/.S Pl8nt survsy
Buenos .&.irss 6/43 - J2/~3 Underconr
Buenos Aire. 8/42 - Ut 45 Official
Mendoza 11/'2-li/43 UndercOTer
Buenos Aires 8/4S-l1/4.S Undercover
Buenos Aires 7/'3 - 1/.' UDdercoTer
Buenos Airel 12/42 - 6/43 Offioial
Buenos Aires 7/43 - 5/44 Official
Buenos Jires 4/46 - 3/46 Official
Bahia Blanca 5/42 - a/48 UDdercOTer
Buenos Aires S/43 - 4/44 undercaver
Buenos .Aires 12/,2 - 7/44 'Undercaver
Bahia Blanoa 8/42 -11/43 Official
Buenos Airel 5/42 - 8/42 UndercOTer
Buenos Aires 7/41.- 3/42 Underoover
Buenos Aires 6/42 - 4/43 underooTer
Travel 4/43 - 6/43 Undercover
Buenol Aire8 4/4s - 5/43 Plant Survey
Buenos .&ires" 7/'6 - 3/47 'Undercover
Bueno8 Airss S/46 - li/46 Official
Buenos Aire8 10/43 -uV43 UDdercover
Buenos Airss 3/46 - a/46. Offioial
Buenos Aires 6/45 - 4/46 Undercover
Bueno8 Airel ./43 - 5/4s Plant. Survey
Buenos Aires S/~ - 3/46 Official
(
(
.. B!bliography
a. Principal In""ltigati Pil.~
General ~.o.llan.oul Fil. on £rgentina
 64-2800
~8c.118D80u8 Fil. on German AQtiTiti.. in ArgentiDA
64-2800-.6.
Blcellmecul File on Japanese Aotivi'ti.8 in Argentina
64-2800-B
Mi8cellaneous Pile on Itali.n Activitie8 in Arg~t1na
64-2800-0:
64-2800-D M18cellaneous File on Communist Activities in Argentina
Mi8oellaneoul File on Spani8h ActiTitie8 in Argentina
 64-2800-:1
84-2800-F Miaoel1aa8oua File on French Ao'tivi't1e8 in .&rgentina
(
Hiucellaneous File on Briti.h Activities in Argentina
64-2800-G
64-2eOO-H m."e11aneou8 Pi1. on I.-rice -'o'ti'ri'tie. in .argentina
~8csllaneou8 rile on H1mgarian AotiTitie. in Argen'tiua
64-2800-1

64-2800-J Ml8o.11~.oU8 File on RoU88ni~ AotiTitie. in Ar,eDtina
64-2800-1 U1lc.llaneou. Fil. on Swill jetiTitlel in ArcentiDa
m,oell8Deoua File on Sndilh Jct1T1t1e. h ArgatiDA
64-2800-L
f
64-280o-~ Milo8llaneoUi Pile on portuge'8 ActlTitiel in Jr~entlDa
MilcellaD8ou, File on ju.trian .cti~ tie. in Argentina
 64-2800-1'
General rile COT8r1Dg Poli tioal Matter. in Argentiua
 64-2801
Genera.! nle conring Bconomic .tterl in Argentina
 64-2802
General File oaTering 800ial Mattera in Argen~1Da
 64-28~
GeD8ral Pile oover1nc Foreign .&gent. in ArC-.tiDa
 04-2804
a.run "cent. in' Argentina
 M-2804-A
Japane8e Agent8 in .Argentina
 64-2804-B
Italian Agent. in Argentina
 64-2804-C
C~i It Agcts in Arg8D.tina
 64-28~-D
64-28~-E SP8ni.h .&gent. in J.rE81tiDA
Prench -,&entl in Argenti-
 64-2804-"
Sri tieh Agente in .&rgeat1D&
 64-2804-G
M-2804-H .&aerican Agents in &r~8Dtina
SwiIS .&gat. in Arse:ntiDa
 64-2804-1
M-2804-L Swedi8h Agent. in Argentina
General 711e Govering Foreign PropagaD4a in Argentina.
 64-2805
German Propa~anda in Ar~entiDa
 64-2805-J.
Japanele Propaganda in ArgatiDa
 64-2805-B
Italian Propaganda in Jr~8D.tlD&
 M-280S-C
64-2805-D Co18mi.t Propaganda in Arcentina
Spani8h Prop&£8ILda in Argentina
 &4-2805-1
French Prop&cmda in .Ar~_t1D&
 64-2805-"
Brl tl.h Propaganda in ArgentiDa
 64-2805-G
z~s

64-2805-:8 .erioan Propaganda in Argentina
Hungarian Propaganda in Argentina
64-2805-1
64-2805-M Portugue.e Propaganda 1D Argentina
(
64-2806
64-2806-A. Geraan Penetra.'tion in Argentina.
64-2806-B Japane.e Penetration in Argentina
04-2806-C ItaliUL Pcetration in Argentina
M-2806-D Co.-mi8t Pene-tration in Argen'tiD&
64-2806-E SpaDilh PeD8tration in ArgeDtiD&
64-2806-' French Penetration in Argentina
64-2806-G Briti8h Penetration in Jrgen'tiDA
64-2806-M Portugue8e Penetration in Argentina
General File covering Sabotage in Argentina
64-2807
(
 German Sabotage in Argentina
 M-280?-A.
Japane8e Sabotage in Argentina
64.2807.B
Conmunist Sabotage in ArgctiDa
64-2807-D
64-2807 -G Bri ti.h Sabotage in Argentina
General File regerding Foreign Re.ident. in Argentina
64-2808
64-2808-A German Re.ident. in Argentina
Japane8e Residents in ArgentiDa
 64-2808-B
Italian Resident, in ~gentiD&
 64-28OS-C
COlmNnist Residents in Argentina
 M-2808-D
64-2808-1 Spanish R8.1datl in Argentina
64-Z808-F ~ R..ident, in Argenti8
(
Britiah Residents in Argentina
64-2808-G
64-2808-R ~rican Re8ident8 in Argenttaa
H\1Ugarian Re.iden1i1 1D ArgeJrtina
64-2808-1
RO\8&Dian Resident' in j,J'gctiDa
s~r 2 C
64:-ZeO8-J

Swill iel1deutl in ArgentiDa
 64-2808-1:
64-2808-~ Portugue8e Re8ident- in Ar,en~iD&
(
AU8trian Relidcta in .Argmtina
 64-2808-1
Jli11't&ry md 'l'aTal Mat'terl in J.rg_tina
 64-2810
Gmeral File coy.ring ForeilD F1r8 iu .A.rseutiDa.
 64-2811
Geran Firu 1A ArgatiD&
 64c-2811-4
Japanese F1%'88 1A Ar~ent1Da
 64-2811-B
Italian !'1r88 in Argctina
 64-2811-C
C~i.t Fir8 in Jrgentina
 6422811-D
Spanish Firml in Argentina
 M-2811-B
French I'ir8 in Argentina
 64-2811-'
Briti.h Firas in Argentina
 64-2811-6
t
 M-2811-R .&DIIrioan FinDS in Argentina
6-'-2811-1
 Bangarian Fir.- in Argentina
64-28l1-J RowaDian Fir88 in Argentina
64-2811-1: Swill Fir- in Argent1D&
64-2812 General File RelatiT8 to Radio Stations in Argentina
64-2812-£ Geran Radio 8ta't1onl in ArgentiDa
Japan818 Radio StaU.. 111 Argen'tiDa
 64-2812-B
Ita11m Radio Stations in Arcentina
 64-2812-C
Gt-2812-D C~.t Radio Station. in Argentina
Spw.h Radio Station. in Argentina
 64-2812-B
Sri tilh Radio Station. in .l.rgctina
 64-2812-G
«
General File cOTering atoter. relatiTe to the An'ti-Argentina
Activitie. IDYe8tigattng committe. whiOh was ..tabli8hed in Bueno.
.Air..
64.-2813
Thi.
64-2814.-.1.
 General File ooyeriDg SUb8rine .&.ctiT1tie. 1D Argentina.
~~-'ET
;~J(2 71

,
1ntorat1oD. pertain. principally to the .urrend.er ot the 17-550
af-ter the t.rm1D&ti OD. or 'til. war.
(
a.neral File ooTer~ Ger88n '.lephone SurTell1auce. 1D Jrc.ntina
64-2815-A
Plant 8fJrre'Y Progr.. 1D Arcen-tiJla
 64-2818
64-20S9S-EFE Courier C...
65-4712O-BDZ Radio RiDS
64-2Tl16-B.18uth S8p10D&g8 C...
65~51D-LIR bdio Ring
FUgh't of .&xi. Cap! 'tal 'to .A.rgen'tiDa
 112-1-201
The 8GRj.F anEW Cae.
 65-18112-102
!'he Jape. Eepinage Cu.
 64-200s2
64-21209 Cas. iuYolTtD& !omiJO Io..k1 and ~.oci.ted Japan... Espionag.
.&get..
.
 Revolutionary Pl.. tor IAtin _erica sponlored by ArSentina
 64-2M98
SDIIggling AotiTitie. in Argenti.
 64-309-201
C~i.t ~T~t in ArgctiDA
 64-200-201
SOT1et Diplo_tio ActiTit1e8 in .Argetina
 64-211-201
t.bor Condi'ti.. in ArS-tiDa
 loo-sf1661-201
£.S1Di8'trati T. F11..
 b.
6~-4489 Ottioo ~d8ifti.tra~1T. Fil. ror Legal £~tach.'. otria.. Bu8DOI
.&.ir...
~Jrt-J11,. Report. Pil. tor Legal Attache'. Ottice, Buenos .&.ire.
64-4984-201
LiTiDg Cond1ti~ in J.rgentiDa
 64-4693
67~836S8
Ottloe Per.aanel File tor Legal A~taohe'. Ottloe tiled UDder
oap~lOD 8Imba.IY Buenol Aire., Jrg8n~tDa.. The In.peo~lOD Reports
8Ubmitted relative ~o thia ottlce are tiled in a ..par.~. folder.
 ,
Polio. *tter8 in ArceutiDa
 64-29833-201
Intor8Dt rile tor .&rgatina
S~T
212
6."'123-201

0 . MaIlographs
,
8Ifotalitarian ,Acti'ritiel in Jrgeiltina TOdaya General aonograph
covering yarious phase. ot the Bureau'. work in Argentina. Printed JUne,
1943; 695 page.. '
 c
8SIS Ottice (Bueno. Aire.) - contains photograph. of Legal Attache'.Offices and Facil1 tie. in Buenos Aire.. .
.co..uDilm in ~tin "'rica. - publi8hed January 1946. GeDeral
monograph oovering CQ~8m on a Hemi8phere ba,i,. Page. 22 and 24 cover
the Coumnmiat Part)" in Argctina in particular.
8German IlpiODage in Latin ~rica. - printed JUne 1946. pagel
137 ~o 184. cover German w.pionage Aotivi~iel in Argentina.
8Japane8e In ta~in A..rica8 - priDt8d lo.ember 1945, pages 118 to
1:55 refer 'to Ars:c'tiD&.
.Clandestine Radio Stations Utilised by the German .8p1onage
System- - printed February 142. Contains charts ot Geran Espionage rings
operating in c~jtmction with the Genan Radio Stations. The LIR
Organization ftich ,bad rudtioations in Jrcentina is ohart.d.::in"'thi8 aonograph.
213
i

"'::g!=SRt! ,.
Am'mn -
 B.
~ Facilities am ~jectiv~
 1.
(
In bot1l Sa1.zb1rg and Vienna, the Bureau 'e representatives occupied
space furDiahed by ~e ~ and closely connected nUl the offices of CIC
tJlr~gh whom liaison was m1.iJltained.
,
The ~inci~ ~pose 0.1' the assignment 0.1' tbe agents was to
tollow the Aus'tzoian leads in pending case:IJ and to secure tram CIa sources
material 0.1' interest to tbe D.lreau. These duties included the interrogation
of subjects of Bureau investigation, or the associates of such subjects, as
well as tbe obtaining .1'r<8 CIa 0.1' pertinent 1nformation developed by that
organization which 08 releTant to cases in whicll the ~eau was interested.
The li&i8on post in Austria functioned .1'or only aboot 'tl1ree montlls,
and tbe atreau representatives were withdrawn on October 25, 1945. At
tbat time the Vienna Office was closed along nUl tlle other ~ liaison
posts due to the intolerable conditions imposed by" ~ Intelligence
au tllor1 ties with regard to such arrangements. These difficul tiee were over-
all in nawe and did not pertain speci1"ioally to tJ1e Army'representatives
with whom our Agents dealt in V1mma. The cooperation bet1reen the Bureau's
representatives and ~ Intelligence 0.t.f'1c8rs in Aust.ria 1faS excellent at
all times. (66-16.327)
2. »ajor AocomplisbJ!1ents
Most of' the work perf'ormed by tl'1e Bureau's representaU'V'es in
Austl-ia consisted of' f'ollowing leads .£urnished by the Bureau on cases
developed in the thited States. The liaison prouam in Austria folded up
before it was possible to ccm1p1ete tbe in'V'estigaUon of all the targets
suggested for the .A.ustzian ~nte by the D.1reau 's other S18 offices.
~e liaison _n in Vienna interrlewed individuals located b7 the
ATDO'" who were or intere8t to tbe ~eau on such .. tters &8 the Treason Case
of C0n8tance Drexel. (65-19224)
One or tJ1e most ~t8tand1ng 8TA~'es or the value or having Bureau
repreSeI\tatives witb the American Occupation Forces was in 'Ute case or Dr.
Ignaz Theodor Griebl. This iMividual had been connected witb tl1e Johanna
Horfman Espionage Case in New York CitY' in 1938. 'Ck1e of tlle Bur-.u's
liaison A.gente had worked on this case and tbrOUgh his Imawledge or tlle
matter ft.' able to &8s1at tl1e ArDQr in ident1f7ing Griebl 1n Austzoia. Griebl
'WaS intensivelY' interrogated on his activities prior to his deparU1re .tr~
the thit.ed States and on his exact work in German)" during tile war.
C 6 5-748-186 6 ) .':S2G~J:-
214
'(

Along with the ot~r work the SIS representatives wre able to
do "during the short tiE they wre in Austria, they collected information
to round out the Bureau IS knowledge or Communist and Soviet tactic8 through-
out the world. 'lbese Agents not onlY' furnished copies of the Canmunist
and Soviet publications printed in Austria, but also wre able to obserw
at rir8tham we tactics of the Soviet re}n'8sentatives in occupied countries.
(64-175-2;2-144)
(
PersQnne).
3.
§l§.
£!!!
 .aA.'m ASSIGm(E~JT
8/45 - 10/45 Army
8/45 - 10/45 Army
~
Vienna
Vienna
 b2
b7C
B1bliop;raphY
4.
Investi~ative Files.
 a.
64-175-252-11?J12?Jl44.
 Information furnished by Bureau's representatives
regarding Commw118m in Austria and the results of
their personal observations.
(
65-748-1866 J 1871.
Investigation and interrogation by Liaison ~nents of
Dr. Ignaz 'n1eodor Gr1ebl.
lOO-l8U-.280.
 Free Austrian Movement tile with intorrnation secured ~
liaison iran CIC covering lists of offices and officers of
the various Austrian mnments.
~ini8tra~ive Fi!!s.
 b.
66-16327.
 O:tfice Adm.inistrative~ file .tmo Liaison Office, Vienna, Austria.
64-31800. I.i.v1ng Coodi tions in Austria.
.
~pfT- -", 215

BBR)IJnA.
c.
(
1. !!S Facil1tie. and Objective.-
Fram September 1941, to March 1944, the Bureau aa1ntained a 1ia1.on
repre.entative at Ba.1lton. Bermuda, to establish 0108e coordination with
the Britilh Cenaorlh1p ottice at that station. !bi8 repre8entatiTe was
as8igDed ofticiallT a. Special A8118tant to the Consulate Geaeral and
ottioe apace waa secured near the Britiah Imperial Cenaorahip DepartmeDt.
.c
While the Bureau'l representatiTe in Ber'lIIld& turnilhed 8011e aterial
regarding the po 11 tioal. eoonomic .nd 8001al condi t1ona OD those Islands.
his pri'aarJ purpose was the _intenanoe ot appropriate contact with the
censorship officiall as well al with the local branch or the Britilh
Security SerTio8 and the Bermuda Polioe. During 1941 and 1942 Be~da
was an important censorship control point. !he post also handled traTel
and oontrab.nd o~tro1. Added iaportanoe _I giTen by the ~ and leVY'
base8 which were ~der conltruction on the Isl.nda during the S888
period. By lummer 1943. how8Ter. the i8pOrtanoe ot the o~~rol point at
Bermuda declined as the .A.ra)T and .aTY bues were cOJlpleted and upon the
recommendat!an of the UD1 ted States WaTal author! tiel. neutral shipi were
stopped trom oalliDg at BerlaUda. 1'hi1 el1a1nated the traTel and contraband
control work Which was rerouted to other Britilh oantrol points. British
c8D8orship aotiTitie8 a180 declined due to the transfer of additional
mail to the oantrol point at TriD1dad. and the improved organization ot
American o.nsorsh1p in ... York. ~ a re8ult of these o1rcumetanoe.. the
importance of Bermuda decreased unti lit was DO lODger neoes8ary for the
Bureau to ~1ntain a 11a18on repre88Dtat1Te on the I8lands. The Bureau' 8
representative was. therefore. recalled in March l~ and the 1181100
post was abandODed. (84-4689)
2. .jor Acc~li8hm8D't&
MO8't of 'the work of 'the BureaD' 8 liai8an agent OOD8i8ted of
forwarding oen8or8h1p ..'ter1al obtained by the Dri tiah in Oa8e& in Whioh
'the Bureau had an in'tere8't. During 'the early par't of the war. thi8 lid8on
was highly produotiTe in aecuring .at.rial of Ta1a. to our inv.stigat1T.
work.
(
Probably tile .o.t i8PQrtut o..e in t.he sIB field which had it.
origin in the Bermu Cenlor.hip 1181.= Was the .rloan mcroaoopic Dot
case. l't was 'through 'the _diu.a of the Bureau'. r.pre.en'tative in BerDlda,
working in OODneo'tion wi'tb. 'the .x..1na'tion of oel18or.h1p .terial, tha't 'the
micro-dot employed br Oerman e.pioDage 'Cent. .a. originally dilcoTered.
A!'ter these dots were iden'tit1.d aDd cODDeoted with the Wast e.pionage
ay.'t.., they wwre la'ter deTeloped ~ 'the taoiliti88 ot the Bureau'.
Laboratory in Washington. !he discovery of these do't. and the r8Telat1on
of nuaerou. agen't. ooaneo'ted wioth tJ1. Oerman e.pioDage .ys'tea ~lo,-tDg thi.
aethod of o~oa'tion re.ul'ted ~ the iDve.'tiEation of ..pionage oa.e.

whioh ..re 1'aoili't.ted b,. the knowledge caiDed through thi8 8~oe. !he
diaooT.ry of the firlt "It-bound 8doro-dot in the Mexican micro-dot o..eopened up a broad field of inTe.t1Eation in ... York aDd Mexioo. . (65-18273 J
65-S7793-40)
(
Perlonnel
 b2
 3.
b7q
 AS S I GIJABNT
Off1o18.1
Offioial
Offio1al
SIS 10.
cm-
Haa11'tcm
Bam1ltoD
Hamil ton
JAJ8
 DI.tB-
9/41 - SitS
2!tS - S!'S
10/4:3 - ~/"
4. Bibliography
a. ID'Ye.'tiga'ti T8 File.
64-6000 MiloellaDeOUI General File on Bermuda
64-6001
 Pol1tical Matter. in Ber8Uda
64-6002 :IoOD.ca1c Ka.tter. in BerJ81da
A&D.iD18tratiT8 Pil..
 b.
64-4689 ottic. Adm1n1.~ratlT8 111. tor Lia18QR Ottic. Bermuda
1.1 T1D.g C=.di t1ona in Beraada
 64-4630
(
217

BOLIVIA
D.
SIB Facilities and Objectives
 1.
sm coverage in Bolivia was attempted briefly in January- 1941
when the first Agent was sent to that country- to assist in organizing
a unit of the Bolivian Army to combat Firth Column actiVities. Due to
disagreement among the Army eff1cials over the need for such a unit, however,the Bureau t s representative was withdrawn.
(
Permanent coverage was inaugurated in Ju1y 1.91..1. when, at the request
of the State Department, another Agent was assirned to Bolivia as a manber
of the American Embassy. A short whi1.e 1.ater an undercover man was assigned
to assist the Agent accredited to the FlIbassy. From that time on the
Bureau's coverage of Bolivia was constant up until the office was finally
closed on March :3, 1947.
Following the d~rture of the Agent assigned to the Embass7,
coverage was maintained on an um.ercover basis until the ear17 part of 1942
when another representative was sent to La paz to corxiuct a police school.
With the establishment of this school and the foxmation of the Legal Attache
systsn the Bureau obtained both undercover and open coverage in Bolivia.
By- Jul7 1943, nineteen Special Agents and Special nnploy-ees were on
assignment in Bolivia. In August 1946, when the final reduction in, staff
was begun, there were three representatives stationed there.
«
Arter the es'tab1ishment of 'the Legal At'tache' 8 Office, t.he Bureau
representatives were assigned space in the same building which hotS ed the
other Embassy offices. In 1943 a Bureau radio station was installed which
was later to prove of immense value to the entire :&abassy staff.
SIB objectives in Bolivia centered around the importance of
Bolivia to the war effort, principal~ through its resources of tin ore. In
order to protect these resources, therefore, the Bureau's represmltatives
were engaged not only" in identifying Axis Agents aDd assisting in rsnoving
them from Bolivia, but it .as 81so necessary for them to follow closely" the
turbulent political situation and endeavor to ascertain the extent to which
other powers, principal~ Germany am Argentina, ...ere erxieavoring to gain
control of Bali via through revolution.
2.
Major Acccmplis1lDents
Axis Agen~
a.
SIS investigations identified the import.ant Axis Agents operating in
Bolivia. The information regarding these Agents and the dangerous Axis
Nationals resident in Bolivia was utilized by the American Ambassador in
bringing pressure on the Boll viall Govenlnent for the deportation of the
(
278

~-::~~E~i~t::-
individuals involved. On the basis ot the investigations up to July 1,
1944, one hundred sixty-two Axis Nationals were deported trom Bolivia.
(64-24184-357)
c
 Based on the data accumulated b7 SIS repreaentati 'Yes, twent7-nine
Japanese aDd f'1.f't,y-two Germans were 81181ar117 expelled trC8 Bolivia on Ma,y
18, 1944 8Ixi taken to Panama tor 1nte~ent. The Legal Attache at La Paz,
at the r~est of the American Ambassador, handled all the details ot the
expulsion with the Bolivian GoVenlDent inasmuch as the United States at
that time did not. maintain fomal diplc-.atic relations with the Boll vian
authorities. With the rsoval of these AJd.! Nationals the expulsion progra
as developed b)'" Bureau representati TeS was Tirtually completed since other
irxiividuals kmwn to be dangerous to the _ltare of the United Hations hadbeSt raoved frcil Doli '9ia on preVious occasions. The Bureau I 8 representa ti vas
also acted on behaU of the American ~assY' during the previous deportation
proceedings ar¥i had accompanied the Axis Nationals b7 train f~ La Pas to
Arica, making certain that all of ths boarded the ships which were assigned
to rSiove them trom the Western Heudsphere. (66-2)62-204-) am 64-2CX)4)
b.
~ggl1ng A.ati'ri. 'ties
During the war, Bolivia was umer agre~ent to sell the Un1 ted
States all of its locally produced robber with the exception of a small
quantity which was to be retained for commercial use in Bolivia. Due to the
urgent need for rubber it became'vitally necessary to control the SftIUgg1i~
of "bber trom Bolivia to the lucrative market in Argentina.
 .
Throughout the war, members of the Legal Attache' 8 Offices in
Bueoos Aires am La Paz assisted the United States arki Bolivian Govenments in
the detection and recovery- of contrabam nbber shiJXDents. Late in 1945 am
early in 1946, largelY' &8 a result of pressure exerted bY' the American
FJDbB88'1' in La Paz and based on information obtained bY' the Legal Attache's
Office am b7 the Rubber DeTelol81ent Group Inspectors, the Bolivian
Govenaent issued decrees establishing a special rubber police thereby
tightening 'the control of 'the Argen'tim-Bolivian border. (61.-.309-204-32)
An example of the Sllluggllng actinties uncovered was the case of
four tnmks containing 876 pouJds of ~ber which were seised by Bolivian
Cust<88 Authorities on April 17, 1945. These trwK8 were the property
of a Boll vian Senator who was en route to Argentina on a diplauatic mission.
Investigation by SIB representatives showed that the S8&tor had used
bribery- 8Ixi threats in an effort to secure clearance tor the rubber. As a
result of this incident the Bolivian GoverrlDent wnertook a clean-up of
their Customs Department. ( 64- ~9-204- 32)
~~=~ti ation disclosed that thJ- ~
in Bolivia had been 1nstru~ to ai<1 loft "fine mllUggJ..;l,~
of rubber, medical, &In her source coumodities into Argentina. The Bureau'
"
b1~
219

! I b7C
representatives ascertained that! I had admitted. being given the
responsibility ot filling a minimum quota ot tifty tons ot rubber per
year. It was also ascertained that he was f'1rn1shed. $250,000 through the
Argentina diplanatic pouch for the purpose of financing and shipping rubber
purchased in Bolivia. (64-309-204-24,29)
{
The Legal Attache's Office in La paz compiled a canprehens1ve
summary report. on rubber smuggling from Bolivia to Argentina between 1942 and
1946. This report. identified more t.han @ known smugglers aoo included
rnmerous Bolivian citizens and police officials as well as several cabinet.
manbers and Congressmen. (64-~9-204-32)
c. Plant Surveys
At the specific request or the united States Ambassador, three
Special Agents were ~ent to Bolivia in July, 1942 to survey the essential
industrial installations in that country.
Due to the fact that the Bolivian tin d eposi ts were the principal
sources of tin rcaining available to the United ~ations a1'ter the Japanese
took possession of the ~ayan deposits, it was considered vitally important
that protective measures be taken against possible sabotage. Surveys were
made of the Hochschild SAMI interests and the Patino Mines and Enterprises
Consolidated, Incorporated, two of the largest tin mining interests in the
vlorld. Recommendations regarding protective measures to be undertaken
were furnished to the respective managers of these enterprises who were
highly enthusiastic and complimentary as to the thorough a nd efficient
manner in which the BUrV818 were conducted and the intelli~ent recommendations
vlhich were offered.
Surveys were also made of the Bolivian Power Company, Limited and
the Campania Uinera y Agricola Opoca de Bolivia. The Bureau' 8 Agents likewis e
surveyed the airline route which consisted of the Pan American-Grace Airways,
and the Lloyd Bolivian Airlines.
It was sign1.£icant that no act of sabotage subsequently occurred to
intenupt the flow of materials vital to the war effort in Bolivia. The
American Ambassador expressed satisfaction over this situation and cOJllnended
the way in which the Bureau I B Agents had carried out the Plant Protection
work. (64-2916; 64-~O-1?6)
d.
Kidnappinp;- of Mauricio Hochschlld
\
On the afternoon of July 30, 1944, Mauricio Hochschild, one of the
wealthiest tin magnates in the world, and his manager~;:-::p;::. ~:; IAdOlf Blum wereI=~~ ~s ~~ :;;1~:~ t" dn t P " th men were seized b
and his cohorts and he cap J. ve un
y ugust 15, 1944, during which time they were subjected to many
indignities at the hams of. the kidnappers.
C-'C'
blG
280

b1C
(
The Legal Attache in La paz learned the identity of the kidnappers
and also learned that the ultimate objective of these irxi;viduals was to
kill the victims. On the basis of this information, the ~reau representative
recODml«lded to President Gua.lberto Vi1larroel that iDDnediate action be taken
to secure the victims' re:55e. It i~t::1Y that the American tilitSI')"
Attachef:d~.1. had been informed by f his part in the kidnapping
and tha companions had def' e y ecided to kill &chschild
and Blum. he tary Attache, however, concealed this inf'onnation for three
daY'S and only acDitted knowing it when he ascertained that the Legal Attache
had identified the kidnappers through other sources. The refusal of the
Military- Attache to divulge this in.forl1ation while he was runy aware of
the interest which the American Embassy had in t he kidnapping and the fact
that any delay constituted a grave danger ~o the lives of the victims,
resulted in his being recommended for recall from his post. According
to infomation subsequently received, both Hochschild and Blum were
convinced that their lives were saved by the prompt action of the Legal
Attache. (100-28156)
,
e. Political aJKi Revolutionary Activities
(1.) ~1o~Effa:s~e~~-: Due to the importmlt positioff:'
occupied by Bolivia in the produc"tion -or. ma'terials for the war effort, the'
country was a potenti~ fertile field for Axis activities. Following
the expulsion of the important .Axis Nationals the dangers of espionage
and sabotage on the part of enemy agents was greatly reduced. The pos-
sib~ity remained, however, that through a revolution or coup'd'etat,
p~rsons sympathetic with the Axis powers might be able to seize control of
the country. It, therefore, became vi tal~ important for the Bureau IS
representatives to follow the turbulent political situation ~e17.
.(
S~:el:£t
~81
It was this danger of Bolivia's f,alling into the hams of a -11"0-
Axis group which prompted the State Depart~ent to request that ,an Agent
be assigned to the :&Itbass1 in La paz in the SUDDIl8r of 1941. At that tin!e
information had been received that Jlajor Elias Belmonte, the Bolivian
Military Attache at Berlin, G8I'm8Z\Y, was conspiring to foment a revolution
in Bolivia among certain Amy and goverrrnent officers with the backinG of
German interests. Belmonte expected to assume the Presidency at the
successful conclusion of the revolution and thereafter place the count~
under German domination. This plan was ascen;ained by the British when
Be1monte's letter of final instructions to the German Minister in Bolivia,
Ernest Wendler, was intercepted by British censorship. The cOlmlUnication
was brought to the attention of President &lrique Penaranda who iDJnediately
declared a state of seige, arrested numerous conspirators and declared
Minister Wendler persona non grata, expelling him fran the count17.(6l.-2~6-3l}
~- "--
Dur~ the following years reports were received that Belmonte might
endeavor to ret~ to Bolivia from E..1rope. The fear existed that shO\ii he
succeed in reaching Bolivia, he might institute a revolution and install
a pro-Nazi Uoverment. The matter was, therefore, closely followed
by SIS representatives in America and Europe. Due to the intense interest
of the state Department in the matter, a special memorandum was prepared by

~
the Bureau, based principally on decoded ~an clamestine radio messages
sent by the HDZ ring in Argentina, which showed Belmonte's collaboration
with the Germans while he was in Berlin during the -r. This .-.oralxium
clearl,. irKlicated that the Germans were u8ing Belmonte tor their political
interests and that he hoped to become President of Bolivia through their
support. His connections with the Nazis were further corroborated byo
the subsequent interrogation of top-night German Intelligence Officers.
Through these interrogation8, it was proven that Belmonte had served as
a paid 8Ployee of the German Sicherheitsdienst..
(
Early in 1946 the Boll vian Kirdster of Foreign Affairs advised the
American Charge d' Attaires that the Boll vian GoTenDent, which bad been
f\1rnished paraphrased decoded messages concerning Belmonte, would oot take
&rJI' action in the matter because such punitiTe action a1.ght precipitate
an anbarrusing situation. This decision was further strengthened by
the tact that the evidence was ot such a nature that it could not be d1s-
clo8ed in arIY' action against Be1monte.
In Kq 1946, Belmonte was elected "en absentia" to the Bolivian
Chamber ot Deputi_. Certain sectors of the press 18mched a propaganda
campaign calling tor his return to Bolivia in order that he llight take his
seat in the Chamber of' Deputies. In Jamla1"1' 1947, Belmonte aga1.n endeavored
to return to the Western tiElDisphere. He WQS prevented trom so doing, however,
largeq b7 the inf'ormat10n which was furnished to 'tJ1e Bolivian GoV9rIDent
bY' the Legal A.ttache through the American Ambassador. By the time SIS
operations ceased, BeImonte haQ still not been able to return to Bolivia.
(64-2011)
(2.) Poll tioal Upheavals. The Bureau' s representatiTes in
Bolivia constantlY' followed the unsettled political situation. The first
sucoess.t'u1 revolution ca.e on Dec_er 20" 1943. At that t1ae the Office
of the Legal Attache was the only 8genCT, ei ther c~rc1aJ. or gOTenmental,
which was able to ccx:aun1cate with the outside -.>rld. The aorn1ng that
the revolution occurred the radio transmitter in the Legal Attache's Office
was ueed to furnish the Bureau with information regarding the oTerthrow of
the Bolivian aoTerrment, the iM1viduals responsible for t.he re'Volution,
the 8OUnt of force anploy-ed" and the casualties and danage resulting from
the struggle. In this _ergerq the Bureau radio proTed of invaluable
assistance to the Ambassador aDd other Embassy officials ~ relating messages
to their r8spect1 va headquarters in Washington. (~237?5-24)
b.7C
b7D
,
In this .atter be was ---
~ the policies of the Bolivian
Gove~8~ and the identity o! persons who consulted ... th the President in
instanced I was needed. As 80on as the reYOlutionarr
_goverunent ~ established that Agent was able to ~rk for s~ time as an
I !in the American .bassy. This gave him the opportunity to
correlate the 1n1'ormation previously obtained regarding the individuals who
participated in the new revolutionary' gov8r1W1ent of Gualberto Villarroel

as well as regarding tho.e who had been associated with the pr8Tlou8
regi... (64-'177-122)
(
!he Villarroel GOTernMnt _I frequently threatened by otller
revolutionary toroel. It wal finally overthrown in a very bloody revolu~ion
of JUly 20-21, 1946. At that time the Bureau' s repre8entatives again
performed extreMly uleful work in cOTering the course of the reTolution
and in Mintaining contact with the United States. As ~ the prmous
occasion the Bureau's radio tranam1t'ter in 1& Paz was the only means ot
communication available to American official. in Bolivia. It was util~zed
tor the tranemi ttal of MII&gel tor the 8ta~e Depart~~ a. well a. tor
the War and I'avy Departments, in add! tion to furnishing the Bureau accurate
and U8e,tul reporte ot revolu'tionary development. a8 eoon &I they occurred.
(64-2901)
Per8~.1
s.
The following Speci&l Agents and Special Employees W8re assigned
to SIS 'WOrk in Bolina:
b1C
CrrY-
ASS I Go mAERT
 SIB-
 WJE-
 b2
DA.TE-
8/4S - 1/46
5/46 - io/46
6/42 - 1/4S
7/44 - 8/45
6/4S - 11/4S
2/43 - 1/~
6/4S - 11/43
7/"1 - 6/"2
8/.1 - 9/41
~/"3 - 1-1/43
5/4S - 9/4.3
5/"3 - io/44
1/"2 - 6/42
O.tficial
Legal Attache
Undercover
Undercover
legal At'tache
UndercoTer
Official
Undercover
Official
Undercoyer
Official
Official
Otticial
l
5/43 - 12/4S
11/45 - 7/46
3/43 - 10/43
8/45 - 2/.46
2/4S - 9/43
8/42 - 6/43
5/43 - 11/43
6/45 - 4/4.7
5/43 - 11/4S
'/42 - 12/42
11/43 - s/«
.1-" - 10/44
,1.2 - 7/U
6/46 - 7/.6
7/42 - 9/~
12/... - 11/45
2/4S - 12/.S
~ : \r~
1A paz
La Paz
1& Paz
1A Pal
La Paz
1& Paz
1& Pu
1A Pal
IaPu
1& Paz
1A Pal
Ia Pal
I.a Paz
1& Paz a..
Coohabamba
I.a Paz
1& Paz
La Pal
Ia Par.
1& Pal
Coohabamba
1& Par.
I&Pu
1& Paz
Ia Paz
1& Paz
1& Paz
1& Paz
1& Pal
La Par.
1A Paz
La Paz
Ia Pas
~
(
Ottic1e.l
O.rficial
UnderooTer
Official
Official
Plant SurTey
Official
Legal .1ttache
Ofncial
Underooftr
Ottioial
Legal .8.'ttache
Lelal .8.ttache
Ot'fioial
Plant SurYey
Legal .8.'ttache
Official

p7C
8/42 - 11/43
7/42 - 9/~
8/43 - 11/43
8/42 - 6/42
6/42 - 1/43
UDdercover
Plant Surt'ey
Official
UI1dercOT8r
UnderC0'W'8r
Sucre
Ia Paz
La Paz
I.a Paz
La Paz
(
Bibliography
~.
64-2900
a. Priuoipal InTe8'tigatiTe Pil..
Gen.ral Mi.o.l~u. Pile an BoliTia
84-2900-~ J!8cell8Deoul Pile on German ~ctivitie. in Bolivia
64-2900-B
 MisoellaDeoU8 File ot Japane.e Aotiv1 tie8 in BoliT1a
64-2900-0
 ~8oell8D8ou8 File on Italian JDtivitie. in Bolivia
64-2900-D
 Miscellaneou8 File on Co8mUDist Activities 1D Bolivia
64-2900-E
 Miscellaneous File an SpaDi8h Aotivitiel in BoliT1a
64-2900-'
 ~lc.llan8ou8 File on French Activities in Bolivia
84-2900-G
 Mi8cellaneous Pile on Briti8h ActiTitie8 in Bolivia
64-2900-H Miscellaneou8 File on £merican Activities in Bolivia
64-2901
 ~eral File covering Political Mattera in BoliTia
54-2902
 General File coveriDg BoonoDlio Mattera in Bolivia
64-2903
 General rile oovering 8001al latt.rl in Bolivia
64-2904
 Qceral File ooTering Foreign Agents in BoliTia
German .Agents in Bolivia ~
 64-290400A.
64-2904-B
 Japane8e .&gent. in Boli'ria
64-2904-C
 Italian Agent. in Bolivia
64-2904-"
 Spaui.h .&gRot. in Bolina
64-29~-F
 French .&gent. iJiBolivia
64-2905
 General File ooTering POreign Propaganda in Bolivia
(
64-2905-.&. German Propaganda in Boll'ria
64-2905-0
 Italian Propaganda in Bolivia
64-2905-D Com.un1st Propaganda tm Bolivia
S'te(ET
284- --~~~~- -. - ---

Spanish Propaganda in Bolivia
 64-2CX>5-E
British Propaganda in Bolivia
 64-2905-G
American Propaganda in Bolivia
 64-2905-H
(
General File covering Foreign Penetration in Bolivia
64-2W6
German Penetration in Bo11'ri.a '"
64-2CX)6-A
Japanese Penetration in Bolivia
64-2W6-B
Italian Penetration in Bolivia
 64-2~ 6-c
Spanish Penetration in Bolivia
 64-2W6-E
64-2<x>6-F French Penetration in 8o1i'via
General File covering Sabotage in Bolivia
 64-m7
64-2~8 General File regarding Foreign Residents in Boll via
Gennan Residents in Bolivia
 64-29)8-A
Japanese Residents in Bolivia
 6l.-2WS-B
Italian Resident,s in Bo1.i via
 64-2W8-C
Communist Residents in Bolivia
 64-2W8-D
Spanish Residents in Bolivia
 64-2W8-E
64-2WS-F
 French Residents in Bo1.1 via
64-~8-H Amerlcan Residents in Bolivia
64-29)8-N Austrian Residents in Bo11 via
Qeneru File covering Military &IKi Naval J4atters in Boliv1.a
64-2910
General File covering Foreign Firms in Bolivia
 64-29ll
64-29l1-A
 Geman Firms in Bo1.i via
Japanese Finns in Bali via
 64-291l-B
64-29ll -C
Italian Fi1'Dl8 in Bolivia
.
64-2911-E
 Spanish Fims in Bo11 v1.a
64-2911-H American Firms in Bo11 via
General File relative to Radio Stations in Bolirla
 64-2912
German ~~ ~~tions in Boli'Via
SE6-KET?p;c--- - - --~ , - --
64-29l2-A

64-2912-8
 J.pane.e Radio Station. iD Bolin.
M-2912-C
 Italian Radio StatiODI in BoliTia
64-2912
 General I'1le o0'V'8r1ng Plmt Survey Program iu Bolin.
,
M-ZOllS
 Major Bli.. Belmnte
66-2~62-204:
 Repa'tr1a't1an ot .&xi. -a't1onal. in Bolina
64-309-~ ~gliDg ActiTiti.. in BoliTia
100-28156
 ~icio lIoohaohild
b.
Admini.trat1v8 11le.
64-4500 General Office AdminiltratiTe File for BoliTia
64-498.-204
 bthly Report Sheet. trom Legal .a.ttaohe'. Otfice in Bolin.
64-4188
 Li Ying Candi tioD8 in Boll vi.
67-383665
:~
attice PerloDDel File tor te,al AttaChe's Otfic~ in BoliTia
til.d under caption, 8B.ballY, La Paz, Bolivia.- The Inspection
Report. lubmitted relatiye to thi. oftice are in a .eparate
.folder.
t
64-298~~-2~
 Polio. Matter. in Bol1T1a
64-4123-2~
 Into~t fil. tor Bolin.
o. Monograph'
-To~alitarian Ao~1Ti~i., in BoliTia8
various ~e. of the Bureau'l work iD BoliT1a.
GeDeral 8Onograph GOT.ring
Printed JUne 1942, 81 page..
.818 Otfice, I& Pas.
and taci1i tie. in L& Pas.
CODt&inl photo~raphl ot Legal Attache'. otti cel
.C~.t Ji)T~t iD I..tiD Aaerica. General aoDOgraph covering
CommaD1.. an a hem1lphere balil. Publi8hed January, 1946; page. 24 - 25 refer
to Bolint..
8Th. Japan.a. in IAtin .&.-rioa- OeD8ral 8ODograph.
BoTember. 1945. page. 99 to 105 reter to Bo11Tia.
hbU8hed
88IS Ottic., La Paz, Boli Tia.
tacil1 tie. in Boll na.
 (
81otograph8 of t he SIB offic.. aDd
,
286

BRAZIL
I.
SIB Facll1 ties and Object! V88
 1.
SIB conr&ge in Brasil was inaugurated in October l~O, when
the first Agent was sent 'to R10 de Jam1ro. CoTe rage was subsequently
expanded until October 1943, when a total ot fitty Special j.g8nte aDd
Special :.tp10ye8s '891'8 &ssigmd to ~ countr,-. By A.ugust 1946, when
the tinal reduction in .tatt was begun, there wre twenty j.g8nts etatioMd
throughout the republic.
P'oUowing ~he a8s1gD8nt of penonnel attached to 'Ule :Imb&887 ~ the
Legal Attache's Oftice as established in the »nba887 building proper, .baring
space with 'the st& te I»part88nt repNsenta t1 we.
Ole to its location, Brazil was one ot the ~st etrategic
countries in the plans of the .1:I1s powers. The wli-la1d plans to use Brazil
as an espionage base, howe..er, wre disrupted b7 815 operations coordiMted
with the cooperative acti'Yitiee ot the Brazilian police. D1r1ng the daJ8
prior to the in~lftment ot the UDited Statee in tJ1e war, the objectives o.t
the 8IS representatiws in BrasU .ere ~e i~ntification o.t .1:I1s agents and
the determ1.D&tion of their activities. Following Ute breach of relations
between Brazil and tJ1e A:z1s countries in ~bruar7,.1942, and the declaration o.t
war b7 Brazil on .&.ugust 22, 1942, t.hese objectift8 wre extended to .turn1Sh1n&
pertinent 1nt0r8 tion to the BrazU1&n autllori ties tor use in the arrest ot
eMIII7 agents and to cooperating with the police in the prosecution ot
charges against til08e agents. 'D1e close police liaison which was maintainecl
by the SIB representatiTes peraitted ~ to interview and interrogate the
more important Axis agents arrested by the Bf"azUian police. ~ugtl tlwee
interrogations it was possible to develop acre cOJI)lete details relative
to ene~ actiTit1es and intelligence organisations. In Tin ot the
cooperative att1ta.. of tM Brazilian GoftrrJ8nt, the tUD~~ntal SIB
objectives in that country-.ere ~t 0n17 those of an intelligence agenc7
but also those of an agen07 cou..borating in law entorc.ent work.
J
~ value of SIB cooperation with tbe BN8ilian police in combating
AJd.s intel11gence activities in &-azil was attested to b7 Ik'. Joaqu1m .Antunes
de Olivbe1N, the principal contact betnen the Bureau's representative aM
the Brazilian police, on the occasion of his pro~tion to 'Ule razE of
COIIID&nder. In reP11'lDi to speeches praising his leadership of Brazil 's
campaign against Ans activities, Antunes stated t.hat ninet7 per cent of the
success obtai~d by his colleagues and hia8elf in counterespionage could be
attributed to the activitie8 ot the Bureau in Brazil.
2.
ajor J.cco.pl1.8h8nts
\l
Gerl1&n .A.ati 'Vi tie.
 a.
~.E:eR~t -
281
'D1e mst outstanding achieVSlent o.t 8IS opere. tiona in Brazil was
the investigation of espioD8.g8 activitie8 'Which led to the discovert' ot
several rings in co8lUDication with Ge~ b7 _ana o.t c1andest~ radio
trennd tters. ~en this into1'8ation was turned over to the Brazi11an
authorities the lea~rs and collaborators o.t ~e various riDge were 18nediately

arrested and the aot1v1tiel which oaused Brasil. and Rio de Janeiro in
partioular. to be called the center of Nazi espionage in the western
Hem1lphere were brought to an abrupt close.
(
On March 10, 1942, the police of S~o Paulo arrested Nils Christian
Christensen, the chief of the clandestine radio ring known as alT. Some at
the 8JDbers of this ring were connected with other espionage riDge. In
addition ~o the CIT group. there were five other rings designated, &8 in
the case of CIT, by the call letter. of ~eir radio transmi ttersl CEL, LI~
JOB, HTT. and LFS. The premature action of the Baa Paulo police forced the
Bureau' s representati'98 in Rio de Janeiro to deliver the 1n:formatioo in his
pos8e8sion to the local authoritie8 so tha~ the members of the hitherto
uncovered rings would have no opportunity to escape or destroy evidence.
On Karch 20, 1942. it was reported that with few exceptions all of the
members of the radio rings had been taken into custody by the Brazilian
authorities. (64-30l2-A-2-83;6"3012~-S-69;6"SO12-A-4-89)
IDIIIediately after these arrests the Berlin radio began to attack
Brazil in i t8 broadcast8 and to threaten repri.ala. fheae threats were
ultimately carried out by the sinking ot five Brazilian ships by Ge~
8ubmar1nes. Vew8 of these sinking. ... made pUblic. by the Brazilian Govern-
ment on August 18, 1942, and on August 22, w.r W&S declared on the Axis
powers. (64-3000-A-289,339)
A con8iderable amount of the inve8tigation conducted relative to
these e8pionage group8 was based on information obtained trom the messages
transmitted to and received by the clande8tine .tation.. The technical
facilities of the Bureau were used to monitor the several German transmitters,
and by ~aly.i. and coordination of info~ation obtained from the decodes
ot the _ssage8, tumished by the Technical Laboratory, ~d the intensive
inveltigation by SIB repre.8ntati V88. the pers~ referred to in the mel8ages
were identif1ed. their cover names ascertained. and their associates were
establi8hed.
\
IDtoru-.tion thus ob'tained f'acil1'ta'ted 'the inns'tigation of apn'ts
in other countries. For example. it was discovered that Xsmpter of LIR had
agents in Buenos Aires. Argentina in the persons of Ottomar MUller. Hans
Happ. and Walter Freiwald. who have been pre'riously di.cussed in t!8 sect;im
regarding Argentina. (~SO12-A-2-160)
10 obtain the neoessary information in these oases. SIS repr.-
senta~V8s oonduc'ted.8urveillence8 and in one instance employed a double
agent. I I who obtained iJDportant information from Antonio Gama
Pinto or the CD. group by deli nring to him certain agaline8 containing
data o,r intere8t to G8m& Pinto'. employers. The.e magazine. were turni.hed
tal by the Bureau" representatin8 in Rio de Janeiro. I I was
~'so ~s~u~ed in an apart..nt acro.. frla the place maintained by Federico
I:empter end Herbert Ton Heyer who were endeavoring to operate a trmlmi tter.
(64-3012-A.-2)
(
b7C
288

Location of
AGENTS WHO SUPPLIED INFORMATION
TO SECRET AXIS RADIOS
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 aANDESTlN; RADIO
STATION
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CC»fTACT TO ~~
co.JNTRY
Ir -. AI,..
.;
JUN~ 1946
s'EI:kr
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Another important development resulting from the work of SIS
related to the prosecution of enemy agents under Brazilian law. The
activities of the German espionage rings took place While Brazil was not
at war and there was no law in effect under which they could be prosecuted.
The Br&zilian consti tutian moreover contained an article expressly pro-
hibiting the enactment ot retroactive law.. The Government' B first step.
therefore. was to revoke that article and its second step was the
publication on October 1.1942. ot a decree designating crimes and offonses
against the nation..l security. The decree was made retroactive to the date
of the severance of relations with Germany. Italy and Japan. Under this
decree convictions were obtained and sentences passed on the members ot the
various espionage groups. As a result ot this action. the German espionage
system in Brazil was effectively broken up. (64-3001-230-244)
(1). ~!ad1~~~ - Probably tJle most important of the
early German clandestine radio rings in South America was the GEL group.
This rinG fonned an integral part in the pattern of German espionage in the
Western Hemisphere and was linked with GerMan aGents in the United st~tes.
serving as a relay unit in forwarding cocmlunications from Nazi aGents in
this country to Germany.
(
The leader of the CEL group was Albrecht Gustav Ingels. a ranking
executi ve and director of the well known German firm. Allgemeine
Elektrizi taets GesellsChait. (AGE). Engels. however. received a gro~t deal
of his inspiration and direction from Hermann F. Bohny. the German Naval
Attache to Brazil and Johannes Siegfried Becker. ,Vho later blossomed out
as the chief Sicherhei tsdienst agent in South America.
Engels was originally recruited as an Abwehr agent in September,
1939. Toward the end of 1940 he w.s approached by Johannes Siegfried Becker
Who proposed the development of a complete espionage orge~ization with
Engels as Executive Director. Beoker provided Engels with secret inks,
codes, and a radio transmitter. A microphotographic machine was also made
available tor his use. The initial radio contact wi th Germ~y was worked
out by Becker and Benno Sov1sch, a German radio technician, now decep~ed.
The principal radio technician and operp.tor tor the station, Ernst Ramuz,
was recruited by Engels.
Dietrich Niebuhr, ~.~o as previously indicated, was the German
Naval Attache in Buenos Aires ~d Rio de Janeiro. supplied Engels on one
occasion with 60,000 Argentine pesos. It appears that the Engels group
had at its disposal at least $112,000.00. united states currency. Engels
subsequently claimed that moat of his 8{;ente worked for patriotic reasons
and were not paid. This appears to have been borne out by the fact that on
the eve of his arrest Engels was able to turn over approximately .85,000.00to Gustav Glock. Secretary to the German Embassy. .
 (
290

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'nle CEL radio r1nI was broken up b7 ~ arrest! of tbe principal
operators in the ear17 part. o.t 1942. BDgel8 was arrested on Karch lS, 1942,
and subsequently sentenced to thirtr-three ,ears impr1solaent. Bea"7
sentences were 8180 Ii Ten to -IJ1' o.t the other participant. in this ring.
Hermann r. Boh1V' was eumpted because ot bis diplO8t1c i8uzd.t7 as GerII&n
Naval Attache. Hans Otto *1er was sentenced to t.ent,.-t1.T8 J8&J"8; Herbert
Julius 'IOn Heyer -s sentenced to Wentr 18ar8 J BanI 181nr1g 981 vert we
"en tenced to tnnt,. "ears; Ban8 Kurt _yer Clas8on to twent7 78ar8 J Edward
~ld, ~ KIlth, and Ibldolf ~born to t8nt7-ti'Ve 188rs each. (64-JOl2-A.-J)
Clo8817 associated with the CIL ~p, although ~t actuali7
a part of' it, was a group headed by 'D1eooor Friedrich Sch1egel. Schlegel,
a ~r-.n of'f'icer, as in Brazil when the war broke out. lie cont.cted Bemo
Sortsch wi¥:> ~lt. him a radio transmtter and 1nstructed an operetor how
to get in coJl8D1n1cation with SChlegel's cOlrP&r17 in Ge~1I)" 1n order to
f'orward intel1ige~e in!'orut.1on. .&..tter .iugu8t, 1941, Schlegel tl'8.D881tted
clalxlest.1ne .-sages to C8r8&r11' using 9)11' fraut-.nn .. hi8 radio operator.
He also f'umished _ter1al u, Iogell to be ~m1tted to 0ez-.f11'. Schlegel 'I
sub-ring _8 broken up by the Brazilian police in Karch, 1942. Schleiel was
subeequentl,J' HDtenced to f'ourteen 18&r8 18pr1.o~nt. and 'fr&ut-.DD given an eight. ~arl sentence. (64-3012-.&.-3)
(2) CIT ~~o ~ ~. ~ of the 8OSt IUcce88ful rinp
was the group known &8 tbe CIT. 'lb18 r1ng began operatiGD8 in Ka7, 1941., in
several coastal oi tie., pr1nci..~1ly Bio de Janeiro, Santos, Sao Paulo andRec1f'e. 'DJe ring spec1al1.ed in _ritiM 1D.tol'8&t1on and used three trana- t
mitters, onl70" of which .tunctioned eucce88tu1l,y. In all, tlI8 group sent 8~
490 _s8ages to GerMD7.
c
DIe head of tl1e CIT ring was Josef Jacob JObarme8 Starziczrq, who
was known in Brazil under the DIae Rils Christian Chri8tensen. It..s the
arrest of 'th1s 1nd1'ridual b7 the Sac Paulo police, which forced the Bureau's
representati'Y88 in Brazil to turn owr the aft1lable data regarding ~
other 1nt.el'-related ~r8D espionage organ1z&~oD8 prema'tUr8lJ'. Dle
1nt.rrogat1on of St..rsicBD7 and nbeequet inT8st.1pt.1on resulted in t.b8
arrest of appro:l1MtelT for't.7 1nd1'Yiduals, e1ibt.88n of whoa wre oon'Yict.ed
of e8pionage on October 29, 191.3, and sentenced to . total of 309 years in
pri8on.
StanicZ1J7 _s oric:tna1]1 prepared b7 ~rman Intell1gence .tor
as8ign8nt in England. ~ftr,.. a result of e.xcess1w drinking and a
severe oer'VOua condition, beliewd to ba'98 been s81.t-1ID1ced in order to
awid ~part1ng on tm mia_ion to D1gland, Starz1cslV' bec-. 8e.,.~
in and the trip was canceled.
SE~
292

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Following his recovery. he waa trained for a mission to the
1festern Hemisphere and sent to Br&zil in order to create an espionage
organization and install a communic&tions system between that country and
Germ&ny. He w&s then to proceed to the United Stetes on & similar mission.
A~ the time of his arrest on MarCh 10, 1942, St&rziczny had
groups of agents sending him inforlll&tion from. ~c1fe in the oorthern part
of Brazil and from Santos and Sao Paulo in the ~outh. Be also received
supplement~ data from agents in Rio de Janeiro. He likewise maintained
some contac~ wi th agen~a attached to other Ge~ espionage groups suCh
as Engels of the CEL ring md Hermann Bohny.
starzic~yrs first radio messages were sent to Germ8nY in May.
1941. approximately one month alter his arrival in Brazil. Benno Sovisch.
who assisted other German radio rings in Brazil. aided in setting up the
transmitter.
The activities of ~be ring '~re brought to an abrupt close with
Starziczny's arrest. Heavy sentences were meted out to the &gents of the
ring. Starzicany receiving a thirty year prison te~ Hans Ulrich Uebele.
Carlos Hlna von den St8iDen, Fritz 48issflog, Albert Schwab, Karl YUgge
and Heinrich Bleinroth received twenty-five year sentences. Max Bernhardt.
Wal ter Bartels. Martin Peter FriedriCh Petzold, lilhelm Gieseler, Antonio
Gong~ves da Cunha. Joaquim Pinto de Oliveira and Jose Ferreira Dias were
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Other agents of the ring were
given seven or eight year sentences. (64-30l2-A-4)
(3) LIR Radio Ring - This ring has been previously
discussed in part in the section on Argentina. It operated one or the most
successfUl clandestine. stations in Rio de Janeiro during 1941 and part or 194
It was originally organized by Friedrich Kempter for the purpose or supplyiD!
Germany with information concerning Allied ship movements.
Kempterts operations were cloaked under the cover of a credit
reporting service known as Info~ora Rapida, Ltd., with 1he assistance of
an Austrian named Heriberto J. Muller.' Kempter ~8 employed by the Ge~
High CoJmDand in March, 1940, and early in that year he began furnishing
reports tram Brazil to a cover company in Germany. Near the end of the
ye~ it was suggested that he secure a radio technician to assist in trans.
mi ~ing information to Germany relative to neutral and allied shipping in
Brazilian ports. With the assistance of Benno Sovisch, Kempter erected a
transmi~ing station and funneled information to Germany relative to ship
move~nts in Brazilian waters.
Iempter had numerous contacts outside of Brazil itt' addition to
his previously described LSsociates in Argentitta. He received information
from Uruguay and Ecuador ~d was instructed to contaot Heinrich Clausing-
a steward on one of the Good Neighbor Fleet ships of the )4oore-KcCormaok
294
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Lines. Betore he could contact Clau8ing. honver. the latter was arre8ted
in the UDited States for hi8 espionage activities in the spy ring led by
Frederick JoUbert Duquesne. lempter likewise maintained contact with other
German e8pionage groups in Braail 8uch as the CEL organization and had
informants in Recite and Bahia. Brazil.
Following the death of Bemo SoTiloh, the technical work m 'the
transmitters was handled by Gustav Edward Utzinger. The activities of
the LIR ring were broken up by the arrest of Xempter on March 20, 1942.
ftlereaf-ter his various associates were also apprehended. Xempter_s
sentenced to twenty-ti V8 years imprisonment; Karl Eugen Haering was Ei ven
twenty years; Heriber~ Joseph MUller eight years and Carlos Fink seven
years. Utzinger escaped and eventually went to Argentina ~here he was
arrested by the Buenos Aires police in August 1944. (64-3012-A-2)
(4) LFS Ring. Although aurpassed in efficiency by s~
of the larger clandestine radio rings in Brazil, the LFS group beaded by
Brank Walter Jordan constituted a definite threat to the allied war effort.
Jordan. world ~raV8ler. newspaper corre8ponden~ and pbo~ographer.
s recruited and trained in Genaany tor en espionage uaigtment in Ric de
Jeneiro. His special task was to aubmi ~ ~o Germany, by radio, allied shipping
information .
Jordan reached Brazil in the early part ot 1941 aboard the German
blockade runner -Lech". py June 1941. he had a radio station in operation.
Some litty-nine messages were exohanged between his station and Germany.
when his last message was intercepted on March 6. 1942. MOst ot the intor-
mation 8ubmitted by Jordan pertained to allied vessels, their cargoes and
destinations. A tew messages concerned Brasilian troop movements and the
shiJDent ot ~chanised equip_nt to 't he Borth ot Brasil.
Jordan Clliated 'the aid ot Dr. Han8 Holl and Herber't Winter8'tein.
Holl, a naturalized Brazilian of German birth, was a 'technician in 'the
Brazilian Mini8't~ ot Aeronautics and as such had access 'to vi'tal data on
Brazilian plane production. Winter8tein 8u~plied Jord~ with commercial
information 8nd assi8'ted in recrui'ting Walter Moll who furnished data abou't
shipments.
The LFS ring was effecti~ly broken up in March 1942. when the
police arre8ted Jordan and eTentually rounded up all of his as8istants.
Jordan was sentenced to twenty years impri8onment; .1a1 ter MOll and Gnecco
de Carvalho were sentenced to fourteen and eight year. respectift1y.
Alfonso Dige8er. Hans Holl. Herbert ~ Karl Ernest Winterstein. Julius
Wilhelm Karl Baum and Eduardo Pacheco de Andrade all reoei~d eight year
sentences. (64-3012-A-5)
296

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(5) HTT Radio Ring. The Dnly known German espionage
group whose operations were entrusted to non-Germans was that which centered
around the radio transmitter identified by its ce.ll letters HTT. The moving
forces behind the rather ineffective operations of this station were Sandor
Mocsan end Janos SAlamon, both H1mguia.n nationals. At the time the act- i
ivities of this group were discovered MocsaD and Salamn were already in the I
custody of the British authorities At Trinidad where they had been removed t
from ~he vessel on which they were attempting to return to Europe. Their I
transmitter as well as the Agents who fed it with information were left under
the supervision of Ellemer Jose Nagy. Nagy had become assistant radio ~
operator after contact with Hungary was established and he hAd gathered to- ~
gether a number of informants among whom were several pilots of the Italian
Liner Lati.
Sal8DW)n had arrived in Rio de J metro originally as a member of
the Hungarian Legation. ostensibly for the purpose of studying the commercial
possibilit:t8sof Brazil in connection with t he Free Port of Hungary. Shortly
af'ter his arrival he bought a salad oil factory as e. "front" for his intended
activities. The transmitter used by the group was brought to Brazil in the
Hungarian diplomatic pouch by Kocsan. Sal8mon gradually built up a small
ring of informants. among wham was Joffre Magalhaes dos Santos. an invest-
igator for the Brazilian Police.
(
When pertinent information was furnished to the Brazilian Police
by the Bureau' s representatives. Janos Salamon and S~dor Uotsan were alread~
under arrest by the British. The Brazilian authorities. hovrever. arrested
the remaining members of the gang and Joffre yagalhaes dos Santos end
Ellemer Jose Nagy were subsequently sentenced to ~venty-five years imprison-
ment. (64-3012-.1.-6)
(6) JOB Radio Group. Another constituent ot the German
espionage system in Brazil was the small group o£ agents headed by Otlmlar
Gamillscheg. Which centered around the clandestine radio station JOH.
Gamillschegts work as an espionage agent began in 1941 upon his
return to Brazil from Germany. His principal assistant was Adelberto
f{amszer. a Rumanian. who had resided in Brazil since 1924. Wamazer assisted
in recruiting agents and at one time endeaTO'~d to place an agent in Panama.
The Brazilian Police put an end to the activities of the JCH group
at the time the general round-up or Axis -Cents was made. As. result.
Gamillscheg was sentcnced to an unspecified term in prison and Wamszer was
given a twenty'-five year sentence. (64-3012-A-7)
(7) Werner Christoph Wal temath~ In Sao Paulo a t!losely
knit organization was founded by Werner <2lr18'tOph w~temath who had been
recruitedasln-.pionage agent in Germmy for the purpose of reporting develop'
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menta in American and Cm ~dian avi~tion. W~l tem~th had resided in Br~zil
from 1930 to 1939 when he returned to GerDany for ~ visit. While there
he WI'.s compelled to serve in the Army and 4!om May 194J to ~ay 1941# he
WC~ in the SibQal Corp. He w~s rele;sed from the Army on condition th~t
he would return to Brazil# construct ~ r~dio transmitter. and furnish
information reg~rdingthe United Stc.tes. W~ temath returned to Br~zil in
July 1941.
~
After settling in Sao Paulo. ~al temath constructed a radio trana-
mi tter with the assist~ce of Cerlos Mossbach. This st&.tion used the cf.ll
letters MNT and transmitted several messages which were intercepted by
monitar~ in the United States. It ~S not definitely determined. however.
whether the control station in Genn~y W8S able to receive these De ssagec.
81 though it did send calls to MNT whi ch were received by .ial temath.
The principal value of vialtemath to the Germa.n esp;-:1na.ze system
~~S through the information which he furnished in secret writ1Agletters
addressed to a drop box in JlR.drid, Spain, md in his microphotogr,-phs which
~~re sent through Argentina. These microphotographs were ~de by a photo-
~r~~her, Hans Gunther liuller, and were smuggled in care of Paulo Greise,
i.f~-ltemath's brother-in-law, to Alfredo Volckers, a contact in Argentina.
Volckers in turn arranged for films to be sent to Waltemath by the saoe
means and also forwarded him addi tional microphotobr~phs containing in-
structions.
On the basis of the information made avpilable to them by the
Bureau's representatives. the Sao Paulo police on June 1.1943 raided
Wi.ltemath's house and found a hole dug beneath the living room floor in
wldch ?,ere concealed the radio transmitter. a receiver set. microfilm
contQining code instructions. a schedule of transmissions. and a book to
be used as a code. This hole was large enough to allow Waltemath to work
underneath his living room without being observed or disturbed. 1ben
questioned '!idtemath fully confessed his espionage activities md im-
plicated ten other agents as well as fifteen espionage contacts of the rinc.
In December 194~. he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Paulo
Greise WQS given a twenty year sentence and the others were sentenced to
varying lesser terms. Hans Christian Von Kotze. with whom ";18.1 teme.th had
- viorked closely. fled from Bra.zi: and went to Canada. where he l.1.ter became
I I He was sentenced in absentia by the
Brazilian courts to twenty-five yea.rs in prison.
The initial information in this case was received by the Bureau
from British sources. Almost the entire investigation and interrogation.
however... handled by SIB agents in Brazil in cooperation with '6le Sao
Paulo police. (64-21910)
 .
301

(
(8) Ferando Manoel de Almeida e Motta Marques. As a
reaul t of an investigation instituted by gIg representatives in Brazil.
Ferando Mancel de Almeida e ~otta Marques was arrested by the Brazilian
authori ties after informatioD concerning his activities had been placed
in their hands through appropriate Embassy channels. Mt.rque8 was
thoroughly interrogated by SIS representatives in Rio de Janeiro at which
time be admitted having been recruited by Frm cisco Pereira e Abreu. an
agent of the Information Service of the Portuguese '~g10D. ~.rques' s
Chief duties consisted of fUrnishing information regarding plots by Portu-
guese exiles to deliver certain islands to the Allies. He was also
instructed in the operation of a short wave radio transm1 tter. An invest-
ig~tion further revealed that he had corresponded in secret ink with his
father. Carlos. in Portugal, who was an active Axis agent. Further
inveatig&tion by Bureau representatives revealed that Carlos, the father.
had been arrested in Portugal and additional questioning of Fernando in-
dicated -that he 1".-as a member of an organization smu:-,glinG platinum and
industrial diamonds to Portugal which were delivered by his father to the
Gcrman authorities. On December 13. 1943 Marques WAS sentenced to eightyears imprisonment by the Brazilian courts. . (64-20122)
(9) 1118 Ap1'el Sabotage Group. In 1945 the Brazilian
aspects 01' the so-called Apfel Sabo-tage Case were brousht to a logical
conclusion. This case is discussed further in the section on Chile.
1
 This sabot~e ring organized by the Germans was international
in scope and covered the most important countries of ~outh America. Georg
Konrad Friedrich Blass alias "Dr. Braun". one of the leaders of the
group, was in charge of sabotage activities in Brazil and ~e northern
countries Df South America. Blass had been an engineer and professor in
one of the German Un! versi ties prior to his recruitment as a sabotage
agent by a member of the Germm High COJllnanG. He was gi nn the code n..
"Dr. Braun.- and sent to Rio de Janeiro to organize a sabotage ring. In
April 1940, Blass contacted Boris Dreher. a Ge~sn National, resident in
Rio de Janeiro, who due to his business connections had wide aquaintance-
ships throughout various Latin Americ&n countries. Due to his extensive
commercial activities. Dreher had been selected to ~ccompany Dr. Br~un on
a tour of several of the South American countries to perfect the sabotabe
organization. Dreher was later chosen as Braun's substitute in the event
the latter should be forced to leave Brazil.
.Another German National. Karl Ot-to Gohl. had 8.lready been sent
by the German Government to 88.0 Paulo. Brazil. in charGe of s8.bot8.go
8.ctivitiea in that locality. Gohl was an able engineer and w&s consulted
frequently by officials of the Brazilian Government. Because of these
contacts. he ~'s considered to be of particular value to the s8.botage
group.
«

About two weeks after Blais' arrival in Rio de Janeiro. be and
Dreher viii ted Gohl in S ao Paulo. Gobl later acted as contact man in
introducing Blass to Albert Juliul Von Appen who was in Charge ot sabotage
in Chile and Feru.
AccaD.panied by Dreher, Blase visited Colombia, Ven~&U8l.. Peru,
and Bcuador. In Colombia, Blase recruited additional 8abotage agents and
left .2,000 each with Ern8t Karl BPggemann and Hans Lahrius, later arranging
for Ge~an officials to send 110,000 each to Roggemann and Berlld Von Krogh
through the Banco Germanioo in Co1csbia.
No actual sabotage was oommi tted by the Blaaa-Gohl group. In
January, 1940, in8truotions fro. Germ8nY had ordered that sabotage activities
should be held in a~ce, pendin~ the arrival of an appropriate time.
Actual instructions to commeDce operations were Dever sent to the group.
One plan, ho_ver, was laid by members of the ring, acting through
a Brazilian Air Force Captain, to set fire to the German 8hip, "~ndhuk",
which had been interned by the Brazilian Government aM was to be turned
over to the UDited St.tes authorities. One of the intercepted clande8tine
radio .__ages indicated that Gerardo Margella Mourao waa involved in this
plot. This inro~ation was fUrni8hed to the Brazilian police by SIS repre-
sentative8 together with the data developed ~hrough inTe8t1gation of Mourao.
With this information the police w8re 8ble to fit Vourao into his properplace as a member cf ~he 8abo~age group ben~ on destroying the -Windhuk. n
Kourao and other members of this particular band were taken 1n~0 custody in
September. 1942, by the Brazilian police.
(
One actual erfort to commit sabotage was made by Karl Gobl. He
and two assistants intended to destroy the Cubatao Power Plant and they
actually went to the site of the Plant with a aack or dynamite.
C1!"CU1Utanoel arose. howewr. which caused them to leave the ~am1te in
the suburbs of Saa Paulo and abandon the plan.
The case was broken in March 1945. when Von Appen. in Chile.
disclosed the ramifications of the German sabotage organization in South
America to the Chilean police. !he Legal Attaches in the various
countries 8asisted the 10c81 goTeruments in breaking up the rings and in
apprehending the principal 8ubjects. Dr. Braun was arrested by the
Brazilian police on March 31. 1945. under questioning he adm1t~ed his
participation in the acti vi tie8 of the group ~d stated that approximately
800.000 had been made available to him and Karl Voghl tor 8abotage purpo.e..
,Braun implicated Albert 'ft111e. 'ilal ter AugU8tin. and Hans Otto Yeier &8
_Blbers ot his organization. Allot the8e individuals were detained by the
Brazilian police and admitted their activities. (S..3012-A-3-l78) (S4-2330!
(
303

(10) Bl.aok Listed Firu. fith Ngard to ~ United
states Procl&i88d List ot Certain Blocked Rationale, the acti'9ities ot SIS
representat.i'V88 1.n a,.&z1.1 ~re o.t considerable i8IPOrt.a~e. nIr:i.Di the
inV8s't1ga't1on ot tJ1e levera! clancMst1ns radio rings, 1nf'ol'Mt.1on 88
obta1ned wh.ich conclue1V8q ehowd the part1c1.pat1.on of the powerful German
firms, Hermann Stol ts '- Cia. and ~eockJr Wille &: Cia. in Nazi act.1 'Vi ties.
In tl1e pro8ecut.1.on o.t Dleodor Sch1epl, t.o whoa reference ba. previously
been _de, the director. ot t. Ier8IDD Stolt. organisation wre charged
wi th .cr1a1nal respona1.b1l1. t.~ .tor ~e part. played 1.n ..piosp act1. vi t.1.e8
by their firm. (64-3004-.1-1369 )
(
Other tir8 on the Procl&18d List whose act1 vitias ~re also
in'98stipted 1.D oomect1on w1tl1 the act1rtUe8 or espionage agents were:
R1..caroo 1t)dtWre &:. Cia. (R1.caroo lAdders) - (61.-3004-£.-361)
1CO8 )(arathon <k> Brazil ('D18Ooor ~hlegel) - (61.-.3012-1-.3-12)
'ruboe Kanne88m1 (Am L1.ecke.teld) - (6I.-3~.&.-73S)
Stark &. Cia. (Werner Stark) - (6l.-.3012-A.-4 - 79)
Intor8dora Rapida Ltda. (Federico I~ter) - (64-3012-'&'-.2)
Siemens-Schuckert - (BraZilian Konograph, pa~ 1.30)
Ze188 Sociedad Opt1ca Ltda. (D-. HeiDrich m8Myer) - (64-3012-.&.-.2)
A..K.G. CoJl)aDh1a Sul AEricaaa de Blectricidad
(Albrecht BDgel8) - (64- JO1.2-.&.- 3 - 183)
,,"uto DL8tr1bu1dora Ltda. (Kurt Metzner) - (6i.-30l2-A.-4 -89)
Richard Burger8 (Richard a&rpr8) - (Brasll1an Konograph, pagee
120, 126, 150)Wilhe1a Adol.t Paul O1e8eler (Gieseler) - (64-301.2"""'-4 - 89)
We1szfiog Ir8&oI (Fritz --isanog) - (64-30l2-A-'t - 89)
'lhrough 1n1t1at1q and resouroe1'u1Dess, ODe of the SIB
repre.entatives in Sao Paulo, Bralil, ... able to penetrate the ~rman
coDmluDi ~ and through his clos8 contacts and associations with aeabera
ot that c~'t7, -u. atr8au was able to obtain iaportant 1nt01'8&t10n
concerDiDg the dea1iDp o.t the -nOD Ger-.n 1nd1 'Vidual. who were plaoed
on the mack List. (64-20614-14)
b.
'D1e CoImUD1st Mov.-nt
(1) Local Co-.m1rl J.ctiY1t1... b Co~iet ., ment during the ear~ stagee or SIB coverage in Brazil -s not ot Pr1817
interest. m.. ~ t.b8 growing 1n.t1.uence ot the Co-,n1et ele.nt.a, bOW8ftr,
and the tiDal legalization ot tI8 Part7 in .&.pril, 1945, tiles. act1Y1t1es
achieved a .tatua ot Mjor 1JI;).)rt&nce. SIB COftftg. ot ~st and
Soviet _tt.rs in Brazil -- b1.gbq ettect1'ge through a coab1Dation ot
police intoraan't8, regular 1n.tor-.ny within tM ~'n1_t Part,. and
techD1cal cowrage. D1r1ng \118 l&8t two 7Mr8 ot S18 operatioD8, our
Br-.zUian CO'98r&ge 88 higbl7 .ttecti 'ft.
T
304

~e principal objectiw8 of C~!-n-1st in'Yestigattonl were tbe
identitication ot ~t l8aders and prO81nent part,. _bers and
s)'1lP&th1zera, &8 nll &8 the determination of geMral C08uD1st acti'91t1e8.
Fo11owine the unsucce88ful ~8t re-volution of ~vember, 1935,
Brazilian ~.lni .t leade1'8 were enled or arre.t.ed and i8Pri80Md.
The principal leader, ~8 carlos Pre8tes, .. gi'Y8n a long 8entence tor
insurrection and aarc8r. '!!Ie Vargas (k)ft~nt 'took I¥) turt.her chance8 with
CoJ8B1.m1- and suppressed it rigid1:r. .. a reaul t, earl7 8IS ~st
COft1'8.ge dealt princ1pall7 with 88certa1ning the cO8Plete backgl'OUIxi of
ColmuDist l.a~n inside and outaic» ot Brazil, and with cO8j>illng information
concerning the rewlut.1on fro. police f11es and fro. an intOr88.nt whose
intorMtion was DOh mre CO8Plete than 'that ot the police. 'D11. _terial considered of ue in evaluat.ing ~un1st activiti.. el8ewhere in ~t.in
America and in keeping abrea8t ot BruiUan CQ881nim in tJ1e eftnt it .bould
again beo08 acUTe. (64-4123-205-1,2,61.3)
On April 18, 1945, Pre8ident Oetul1o Vargas i8sued an &8De8V decree
.tor all poll tical pri80ner8 1nc1uaiDg ~ft~8t8. Pre.tee and bis comrades
were rwleased and 18I8cttatel,- began reorganising their ranks. ~.,. at tirst
os'tenaibq .tollowed a m~rate 1e.ttiat poliC7 and within a _hart tiM
set up an organisation maberin& fro. tort.,. to fit't..,. tllouaand I18mb8ra.
Prlstes supported the Vargas .Adm1D1stration untll tbe coup d' etat o.t
October 29, 1945, which r8mftd Vargas troa of..tice. nlring the lub8eQ.uent
elections, Pre_tee supported Iedcm hiM, a political ~, .tor 'Ule
presidency. 1b1a indi'91.dua1 lo8t co~lQ8i"'l7 to General Dltra, but
the Coaunist Part7 i tael.t polled O'V8r .tift hundred thousand wtes and
elected Preates to the Senate, together with tour teen represeDtatiY8.
to the Chamber o.t ~putiea.
Prestes atteapted to gain ~ tawr ot Presi~nt DI~, but it
soon beC8118 ev1~t ~t Dl'tra and his i.N7 supporters were strict1,y
op}X)sed to Co8Un1.- and would take adftDtage of &DJ' opportunit,. to
restrict or suppress Co-umst actiY1Ues. ~cre88 wre prepared under
which Co8DaDist leac8rs could be arrested, the part,. closed, and all
CoJImIID1st.s barred tro. (k)ft~Dt or Ar81! .en1~. OIring 'the preparation
ot these decrees, inquiries ...re 8&de o.t our police liai80n repNsenta tift
for advice a. to tJ1e nature ot existing UDi ted staws legislation against
CoJ8IIn1.. . ( 6lt -,200-.205-278 )
Added oppoe1t1on to tbe C08811"1sts &rose after a .tate.nt by
Prest.es on March 15, 1946, 'to tbe effect that be and his part,7 'M)uld
side with the So..tet Union it BrasU 8bo~d bec-.e in'YOITed in an
~r1al18t. Rr &piD8t alsl1a. ~UDt.1D& tenBion c&8 to a bead on
va,. 23, 1946 when ~.t c8te1'81nati.on to hold a us- .etiDI in
a ckJWDtown Rio de Janeiro square was oppo.ed b1' poUC8 force.
~ET
305

~r .0000t1me prenousq ~he Col8m1st P8.l't7 had pl81ned on
holdiDg a huge ...1 Meting at the Carioca Pl&Ea in downtown Rio de
J8ZJ.eiro on the afternoon aDd 8T8n1Dg o.f M8J' 23. l~. !'vent,-tour
hours before the meeting the Police Department retuaed to grant per-
at.sion 8Dd reco~nded that it be beId 1D 8Dother Plaza near the out-
.kirt. ot the cit7. !he question ot whether or not the Eeting vaal!
be held d8Velo~ into a .bow ot .trength between the Communi.t Part7
and the pOlice. The c~~t sts r.pOrt~ belieTed that ~he Police
order would not be backed up b7 the OoTerDMnt. In .pi te ot the W8I'D-
lng, approx1matel.,. .forty thous8Dd per.one arrived at the Carioca Plasa
before the police attempted to break. up the gat.her~. .&. person who
was a.ttervard identined .. a Com.m1.t Part7 gaDm8n tired the .t1rst
shot at a Mounted Mll1t8.t"y Policeman 81¥!. there 8D8'U8d 8D excbaDge of
gUJLfire. One per.on W88 reported to have been k1lled aa4 torf.7 persona
inclu41ng three policemen were vouD4ed.
(
Tbi. confl1ct between the ~.t8 8D4 tbe Brac1l18D police
waa regarded.. h1.t.:'::: ::'-~~:~~it becc.e 1 t W88 DOt known hOW tar the
diaorde- a1.gilt go. r8gt:1l8r 1nfO1'88Dt cover-
age, the :sure-Ie repre.entat1"- pt CODe 8D abreast ot the prop-e88
of the affair and were able to keep the Charp 4' Attaire8 edrlaed almost
on a blow-~blow baais. Be 1n turn forwarded the information to tbe
State Department ~ cable aDd telephone.
(
 !'he import8D.Ce of the incident vU 1'urth8r attested to b7 111-
fo1'lD&tion received thro'ach SIS technical caverage that the Roasi-
.Ambassador to Brazll v.. being kept 8dri8ed b7 telephone of the course
of the disorders. Information regarding the occurrences vas 1'D.rD.18hed
to the :au.aa1an EmbU87 b7 the 'rU8 1'... AgenC7 repre8entative, Jorp
Kalu«UiD.. !he SOTiet .ab88Iad.or v88 al80 know to have co_nted that
the Co8DUD1at defiance of the police order V88 pr...tve am. that "the
time had not 7et come tor ,hat 80rt of 'bing.- (9t-2<X>-205-370)
!hrou&h the coyerage of Co8Dm1st aattera maintained by the
Legal Attache' 8 Office. he V&I able to keep the American Jmbaa.ador
tully edVi8ed of all develO18entl of interest. One euch inatmce vaa
the occea1on on which the Bureml'. repre.entat1'Y'e vea able to V~
Jmbae.edor .AdolliL :Berl. in ad'Y'8DC8 that the Brazilian Oo~-m1.lt8 1D-
temed to 1nteneif)'- their attacks on:aim. It \IM like-Ji!ie !>O'9i~1'3
~~ .;eJ~J t~~ AnbS8.~ior ani Preslde~t Tr~~ advised regarding the iD-
tention of the BraEili~ C~8' Party to contiDDe aDd accelerate
thelr crit1cl.. of .&.ricCl forelp pol1o,.. ~ the 'bu1. of 'hi. type
of information ,he Legal Jtt8Che vas al.o able to &I.l.t the Amb88.ador
&Dd. other ~b8887 off1cers ln -veriac offlcial inqu1r1.. r.gard.\Dg the
CO8aaD1at mDYement ln Brazil. (64-200-205-l~2. l~; 156, 202)
:r
306

.
Another iD8tanoe or the effectinD888 of the Bureau's coverage
in Brazil occurred in the latter part of October, 1945, when t.he O1'fioe o.t
the t.ga1 Attache was the oDl,. ioV8stigatiTe agency aare of the where-
aboota of Luis Carlos Preates. Following the Arm7 Coup o.t October 29, 194.5,
many of the C<8a1Unut z.adere ..re arrested b7 the police as a precautionary
measure. Preste8, howeftr, 'Rot into hidiog and, as the Head of. the Part,.,
the Brazilian poUce exerted 8'98ry e.t£ort to locate hi.. Rumore.re
rampant that Preat.e8 bad fled fr~ the city or 8'980 f~ the countr,-. The
technical coverage at CCXlDuniat Part,. beadquarten Eintained b,. the Bureau '8
representative8, howver, disclosed tat Prestee ~ still in the city and
made available ~ temporary addre8S. .A8 a re8ult of th18 information'8
being fun118hed to t~ &nbassYaM the State Department, the J.-rican
Gove~nt was aare o.t Pre8t.e8 '8 whereabOllt8 while the Brazilian officials
wre still attempting to locate him. (64-200-205-1'71)
The 8uccessful liaison maiDta1D8d by the :B11'eau's representatives
with the Braz1l1an Police Department.. the source ot very valuable in-
formation regarding the CCXDIIUn1at acti'Yities. The Bureau's coverage of
CoI:II:IUni8m in Brasil cou1ti not have been near~ as complete witJlout the
mterial so obta1l8d. An eDl1ple or 'the effectiveness of th18 ~s~
came as a sequel to the riots ot .A.ugust 30-31, 1946. At that t1me the
Brazilian polio. toc*: all the recorda available in the Ccxmnunist Party
oftices to the Police Department tor photograJXlj.ng. Thrwgh the gocxl
relatioD8 a1ntained wit.h the police.. tIw .oat iDlPortant recorda such 88
memberehip list. wre made available to the Isgallttache's Office for
J¥lotographing prim- to being returned to the CcaIn1D1.8t Party tiles. The
receipt of th18 inf"or_t1on added i~urably to the completeness ot SIS
records regarQilJl C~unis. in Brazil. (64-200-205-483,562 )
(2) §oviet Activ1t1es. Soviet activitiea in Brazil
began e8sent1all," with the establishmDt of dlp1oatlc relatioD8 between the
U.S.S.R. and Brazil on April 2, 1945. The Soviet Goftmm8nt sub8equentq
sent Jorge D.1agiD to Rio de Janeiro as repres.ntatift ot the Sonet B8W8
Agency, Tass. Ka1ag1D wu active in 8king preparations for the arri..l
of the Soviet .A2-~sador and in attempting to secure favorable publicity
for the Soviet Union. Formal reJatioDB ere established between the tW'o
countries in Ma7, 1946, when Jacob Sur1ts arrived as Russian Ambassador.
The Soviet representatives within a 8hort period of tiE be~
active in diplomatic and comerc1al circles. Liaison with the Brazilian
COIImUnist Part)" _s large~ uintained through the TUB repre8entatiw.
In b cGllDerc1al field t~ Russians be~ interested in c~rc1al nego't1a-
tione which wou]d divert from tbe United State8 maDY at the Brszilian
products which bad been purchased almost exclU8ivel)" by the United States.
As in otJ1er countri.88 where Russian D:Lpl~ti.c 1ri.8sio.- ..re
establiahed, shortlY' after the torut1on ot the &abuS7. there were in-
creased 1l¥i1cations or Intelligence acUntie., not onJ:T 1.n the Ccamuniat
Partir ot Brasil Wt &180 in 'tIM Pol18h am Yugos1av Legations. b
SEl:R~i: 301

!ure~l. reprelentatiTee followed these actiT1\iee C108.~ until the
clo8inc of 818 act1T1tiea in Brazil on Jan~ 20. 1947. (~2ll-205;
1°5-5169; 100-,345359)
Domestic Political Mattera
 c.
!he 8trat.~c po.1'10n of Br..11 dur1ng the war ae a yae' re.erv01r
of material wealth 8I1d as a base of operations during the battle of the
South Atlantic empba81sed the great importaDCe of Brazill. po11tical po.ition
in world affairs" well 88 in the poll tical deTe1ollD8D.t of South _rica.
Brazil emerged 88 one of ~ 'wo leal.iDg power. in South A11t8r1ca ~ i t.
political actiT1ties became of maJor import&DCe in hemi8phere 1ntel1i~nce.
Since 1934. Brazil had been gpTerDed ~ Pre81dent Getu1io Vargaa
under a 878t.. of h1~ centralir.ed J'ederal control which had aboU.hed
poli tical parties aDd had exerci8ed close 8uperT18ion oyer the press, radio,
labor union., local IPvernment.. aDd pract ical~ .ver.,. phase of ~razi1i8D
life. Daring the war, Brazil actiTeq aided the .Allies am. in fact beCaM
an active Al~ her8elf. The economic d18crgaaization brought about by the
war led to increasing di88atisfaction among the Brazilian people 8D4 th1.
together with the~.ition to Vargae' .trong control. contributed to gr0w-
ing unrest. During the period of holtilit1el, internal differences, al-
though 1ncreu1n& in number were overridden by the g:oeater international
problems. HOwever, 8oon ~er the ceBlation of hosti11ties, factorl c~
tr1butiDg to the unrest multiplied aDl oulainated eventually in the coup
d I etat engineered ~ the BraziU8D Armed Forces which forced the resigna-
tion ot Var~ on October 29, 1945.
Earlier. in Jpril 1945. Vargas had decreed that national elections
for the long dormant !razilian parliament would be held 88 well 88 elections
for Preaident and local otf1cial.. At that time the organisation o~ political
parties was apecit1oalq 81thoriled aDd ,he QoyerDMnt control of preaa. radio
and other toraa of pUblic ezpre..ion were comple'el7 relezed. (64-3001-1211)
b7'C
~7p
'!'he i.-diate reaction to rele..e of control. 'b7 Vargu wu an
enormoua eXp&D8ion of political acti T1 tT throughout the countr,. !hie
increased political actiT1t7 nece8aitated immediate exteneion of political
coverage ~ the Legal Attache's Office in order to inaure being in a po8ition
to promptq and accurateq report the activitie. of va.rious political groups
within the countr,. '!'he political c_pa1~ which begun 88 pr1ma.r1~ a
conteat between the ~vo maJor political parties developed \0 a po1D~ where
the main i8.. became whether or not Vargas would attempt a political maneuver
to maintain h18elf' in power 8M. avoid the elections. '!'he Bure.'e repre-
sentatives were able to report the co8pUcated :Brasilien political picture
wi th accur8C7 u4 d1.'D&~ch. IMlu4ed in ~he .ources which bad been develO~
I:~~ ~:.. - ~IS agent. had b.en a :lM)l1tical 8%11e duriDg a great deal of tbe
Vargas re upon hi. return to :Brasil soon after the 8Dnoancement of
the electione had
.¥- --~ --
 -.1

'"'7~~ ~
b7~
,I-~m.~ ~ in Rio 4~ J8D81.ru, gau .EIU r:°~O .~~~'
""ana1 ; - - ~-- -- --.; f\uoD18hed current accurate inf'orma-
tion on the a.ar ~Q d8¥ Cn8Dg88 -~~ ~ ~~ pol1tlcal 8ceDe- During thi. period,
the LegeJ. Attechel. coverage of the CoDllUD18t Part., act1v1t1e. wh1ch has
been di8CU8.ed preV10U8~ pl.-ed an important part 111. completing pol1t1c&1.cover8C$- The Communi8t Party of Brazil had reor~led openlr alODg with
other po11t1c&1. part1e. - vas enre-ll' ect1ve 1n the callpa1gn- (61.-JOOl-
1211)
(
(
---J 309
--~~~( L-

All ot ~8 in.toration was turn18hed to the AabUsador ~-
d1atel7 upon its ftceipt and to 'the BI1reau b7 radio 80 that ~be Bureau ..
able to currenu,. &dY18e 1Dt.erest.ed agenci.. in "'h!ngton.
t
*rl7 in tb8 &tte~on of October 29, 1945 reliable IOurC88 in-
for8d 'the I.agal A t'tac.. tbat Presi~t Varg&8 bad just appointed h1a
brother Benj881D Varcu &8 Chief of Police in Rio de Ja~iro and that in
new of B«1juin Vargas' una&TOry reputation.. & stronc-ara 8I.D tor the
Varcu "11M tJ11s ~uld be interpreted as t~ e~.cted ~q b7 Vargas
to eet aside the election. A];8)st ~diatel7 the &l"8d torces UD~r \he
direct leadership ot General Dlt.ra and Brigadier OC88z took control of
key ,positions in Rto de Janeiro and otller ~n cities. b7.re able to
torce the resignation ot Vargas in & bloodless coup d'etat which was
succeletal11' completed by the earl7 ~m1ng hours ot 'the tollowing da7
with the e8t.bl1~t ot & pron8io_1 goftrDMDt UDder the President of
the SuPre8 Court. COYer&ge of all phasee ot the aO.,..Mnt ws utDta1Ded
by the ~ga1 Attache who ftrb8.ll7 tum18bed the Mba8ea~r a NlID1na,
accurate account ot the 81.l1tar,. coup d'etat and Mnt ten radiograu to
the Bureau g1 'Wing hourly reports which were oed to pronde tlle State
~part.8nt the Den 8)rD1Dg with & co.plete s1I8&rJ of the 8'98nts of the
prenoua night. (64-.3001-12.31 and seriale 1047 t.hru 1056)
FoUowiDg Ute rem'Yal of Vargas .rro. the pres1~PC7, the elec-
tions were held &8 previoU8l7 decreed and the Legal1.ttache contiDUed to
utili" his conrage to report on the conduct of the elections and later
to tum1sh reliable 1ntor8t1on on the deliberatioDS of ~ Congress and
the wr1 ting of the ... conati tut1on.
(
J.long with Ule reacti-tion of ftrioua political croups within
the country there was a rebirth of ac'ti'tit,. on Ule part of tollown of
PliDio salgado, le.~r of the Green ~ *..-nt which as aI.o ~ ..
~e Intoegraliet Part7. ftlis bod7 which had been actiTe in the aidd18 ot
the 19308 a Fascist \Jpe organisation which bad been disband8d b7 Varcu in
1938 and its 1eac8r, Salpdo, fo~d into political exile in Portugal.
lithough the Ck"8en ~rt KoV8ent bad re8&1ned a factor in Brar.ilian lite,
it was ~t 0peDl;y reorcanized until its followers fomed tJ1e ParUdo
RBpre.entac&o Popular 'to 'take part in the poUtical oupaign. the lAg&!
Attache was at that t.i88 able to prepare a C(8preheneiTe report .howing the b
bisto1"1' and develoP8nt ot the Green Shirt ~ft8Dt and 'to later accure.t.eq
and fuli7 report tJ1e political acti'rit1es of ~...~;~~~:;;;~:~~~:~~&luable b
.(_4" a+.c...ft --pliing t.ha ~vement was obtaimd throupl
~wbo was a e to
~t &1.80
(61.-29520)
c
.latiOD8 between Argentiaa and Brazil wre probabl7 the m.t
important of all d1pl~tic relations in SOuth AErica. Because of ~8
the Legal A. ttache '8 Ofrica in Rio c» Janeiro found it nec88s&r,- to extend
i te informant co'Yerage and was a bla to c8'V8lop &8 a con.t1.dential 1n..toraant

._::::!~GRE!:::~...~
,
!he 515 jgents DOt o~ covered .nbYersiye matters. but also
acted as the Bureau' s repre.entat1ye. in criminal cases. The most out-
staDding inatanC8 in which ~e Bureau. throucn it. SIS Agents in Brazil.
was able to extend ita cooperation with local American law enforcement
officers to foreign land. was the case of IrTiDg Goodspeed. who was wanted
for UBl8Wt'l11 flight to avoid prosecution on a murder charge in 1'e:r:A8.
On October 31, 1~, Marlin Cap of Dallas, Texas, WU murdered
bY' ~ IDd1ndual whom the 1'8%88 police lublequentq identified 88 Irv1ng
Goodspeed. !hi. 1nd1nduAl.bad co. to ~ attention pr8TioU81Y' wben on b7C
April :J>. 1938. he ...istedl I am 80me of his associates to
escape tr~ the Ji>ntague, !exae Oount.-r Jail. !'he Bu.reml entered the cue
when it WU determined that Goodlpeed had left Te%88. IDYeltigation d8Vel~
the fact that ~-~ ha!. f'led to New York where he had obtained eaployment
aboard the 55 ..~~N V1C'ft)~ of the Moore-McCora1ck Linel .n route to
Santos, :Bras1l. !he Legal Attache 111. Bio de Janeiro V88 nrompt1Y' notified
and requested to make &rrancement8 tor American Consular officials in :Brazil
to take Goodspeed into cuatOd3 10 that he could be returned to the United
states. .At the reqult of 8IS repre.entatiY.., the .American Consul at
Santos .ecured the arre.t of the lubject bY' the :Br&Eil1an Mar1time Police.
(
I~~~n sa no treat,. .,. .~radLtiOD e.xi.tad between the Un! ted
State8 aDd Brazil, diffioalt7 aro8e over the proper manner in whiCh Good-
speed could be returned to the United States. !he !e%&8 ~thoritie8 ..nt
two representatives to Brazil to effect the .ubjectl8 return. Due to their
i~bilit7 to .peak the l~ aDd their lack of familiar1t7 with Brazilian
custom.. these officers were helple.. to act. American Emb88.7 officials in
Rio de Janeiro were ot little &8si.tance .ince th87 were not equipped or
trained to haDdle .uch aatter8. The TexB8 official. would ~e found it
practicall7 i8pO..1ble to effect the deportation of Good8peed without the
ass18tance of the Bureau's representat1ves.
With the aid of ODe of the ~l8nts ...igaed to the Legal jttache I.
Office, however, 8Z"r8D&\,ment8 were ..e aDd Goodspeed vas returned \0 the
United States am lentecced to the term from two to 11xtr '1ear8 for murdeor.
The marder of Marlin Camp attracted coDS14erable pah11c1t1 in
Texaa aDd the T8xaa authoritie. afterward. expre...4 their ~reciat1on for
:gr~~-

.-~&e~-
the assistance rendered b7 the Bureau in returDiQg Good.peed to ~he United
States for prosecution. !biB case V88 subsequen\ly cited b7 the ~al1..
?ot)m1ng Heva" of D&1.188. '1'8%88. as an inspiration to peace officers for simi-
lar diligent and cooperatiTe efforts in cri81nal iuve.tigatioD8. (88-2911;
91-1182-26)
«
e. ProoureMnt of !technical Data - - ~ -
In addition to their regul8Z' inv..tigative work, the Burea'a
repre8entatiT.' in :Brazil were able to obtain econoad.c am technical in-
formation which were of import8DC8 to the American Qoverument.
!he SIS Section vae able to ..s1st the III Laboratory when the
Legal J.tt8Che's Office in Rio de Janeiro secured a lcoge number of ten-
books ooncern1Dg crJPtogr~ which were in the possession of an infO1'm8Dt
of the Rio Office. Some twentr-fiTe of these tenbooks were .nre_l7 rare
and could not b. obtained in tbe UDited. States. !'he owner of tbe boob at
fir8t desired to 8el1 them, but on being advi.ed the booka were desired b7
the office of the Legal Attache as a branch of the Amer1caA Government, he
offered to donate them. !be boob were ult1mate1.tr procured for a ~m1nal
sum in order to gtTe the Bur.an clear title to the ownership. This purchase
was a Taluable addition to the Burean'. collection of information on c~to-
grap}q aDd could not baYe been obtained in the United State.. (80-11-5611)
c
One of the Burea'a repre.entatives in 8ao Paulo, :Brazil, was able
to aecure a Jap8D88e Mili t8l7 Book which in turn was made _ailable to the
.A:1lU aM B&v7 Dep~ment8- 'l'hrOugb an inf'orm8ll.t, he came 1nto possession of
the nJapces8 Air Raid Defense Manual- which hat been P'1blished in 1'oqo by
Brigadier aeMr&1. Tehei Doijo, M1n1ster of War PropagaD!.a. .A review ot the
book revealed information concerning JBp&D8se .tat1.tic. on the air power of
Rue.ia, China, bgl~, ,be United State., Germ8!V', )'rance, and Ital:J'- It
al80 conta1D84 detailed 1nforll8.tion regatodiDg bombs, geaes end air raid de-
feu. 1DCl~Dg detection in reporting ot planes, organisation of defeDdera,
operation of r~ tllhtera, .earch l1~ts, 118tening device., camoutlage,
blackouts in factorie. and railrQ84 districts, protection of airport.,
care ot the inJured and s1gDal 87.te.. The book &1.0 contained detailed
information regarding the Ja~e8e deteD8e again.t gas attacka. In view of
the nature of the information contained in this ~!"~ it wee promptl7 tar-
nished to the War and B~ Departments tor their po.sible use in pro.ecuting
the W8:" against Japan- (62-609-'>-8-260)
312
The Bureau's representat1yes in »raz11 were also able to secure
1D.:formatlon reg8o1'dlDg Japan tor the :roreip lcoaoJl1c MmlDiltration in re-
sponse to that or~latiOD'. reque.t f.'r data ooncerD1ug the location ot
.trategic industries aDd tranaportation B11tems in Japan, together with
~ related. 1n.for8&tion. !be :BI1rec'. 818 Of'.f1oes were req'U8sted to .eoure
&1.1 at'a11able p8Dphl8t., catalo&U8s, uga.zine., &ad other printed matter
which would contain thi. 1n.formation. ConaiderAble information V&8 fUr-
n1.hed by the yar10'Q8 SIS O.t.f1ce.. !'he Bureau'. repr..entatty.. in Rio

t
In the p~t-war period, the Bureau's representatives in Brazil
were also able to assist other branches of the Alnerican Government by c~-
lecting information regarding monazite deposits in Brazil. Following the
publicitY' accom~g the explosions of the atomic bombs over Japan, .ost
of the nations openingly or COftrt~ began their search fcn- radio-e.ctive
materials. Numerous representatives or various aations showed an accurate
interest in the Brazilian deposits or B)nozite, a material from which
thori\D, a radio-ac ive substance is acted. 0 the kn CXlozite
deposits in BrasiThe Bureau'. representa vee 0 were a 0 convertI I and t.brough him were able to follow close~ a 0 r8
of the various foreign agents who wre endeavoring to obtain access to
Brasil's only known radio-active depositS. (100-344.106)
(
 Personnel- -
3.
~IG~7
.§!§a.t
 .91.'!'I b2
Victoria
Belem
Sao Paulo
Rio de Janeiro
Recite
Rio de Janeiro
Port Alegre
Travel
Porto Alegre
NA}::E- -
Of'ticial
Official
Police Liais
P1antSurve'-;y
Undercover
Plant Sum)"
Ulxiercowr
Undercover
Undercover
Official
undercover
Urdercowr
UMercover
Undercover
1st~alAt1.-.ache "
DATE-
11/42 - 2/44
2/44 - 2/45
3/45 - 9/46
.3/43 - 5/43
10/42 - 8/4.3
3/43 - 5/43
10/41 - l2/~1
2142 - 9/42
8/41 - 1/44
6&0 ~. 12/42 - 6/43
Rio de Janeiro 6/43 - 1/44
Bata]. 6/41 - 6/42
Rio de Janeiro 6/42 - 11/42
Rio de Janeiro 12/42 - 12/44
31 ?.. \.
B1.], 'to 515 work in raz a: Q1C

b7C..
ASSIGNfAFJrr~
NA!E 815. - --
(
Official
Police Liaison
Ul¥iercover
Official
IBgaI Attache
Ul¥iercO'Nr
Undercover
orticial
ortic1al
Ofti.cial
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
UDdercaver
Ulxlereover
UMercover
Undercover
Plant Surve)'
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
UMercover
Official
Undercowr
Undercover
UMercover
UMercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
U nde rcaver
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
O£f"ic1al
Official
. Plant Su rv8 Y'
UtKiercoftr
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
Ul¥1ercover
Pou.C8 L1.aiso
Official
Undercover
Undercover
Undercover
314
lata1 6/42 - 11/42
Porto .Alegre if 44 - 10/46
Rio de Janeiro 4/41 - 6/4.3
Rio de Janeiro 7/46 - 10/46
Rio de Janeiro 3145 - 6/46
Sao Paulo '1.2/42 - 6/43
Rio de Janeiro 10/4.3 - 12/4.3
Rio de Janeiro 1/4.3 - 1/45
Rio de Janeiro 1/4.3 - 8/43
Be18 7/42 - 1/44
Sao Paulo 1/42 - 12/4.3
Sao Paulo 3/44 - 11/44
(TravelRio de Janeiro
Porte Ale greSao Paulo) 12/40 - 6/41
Sao Paulo 5/43 - 12/43
Rio de Janeiro 10/4.3 -
Rio de Janeiro 12140 -
110 de Janeiro 8/;.S-
Rio de Janeiro .3/43-
Rio de Janeiro 7/43-
Rio de Janeiro 5/45 -,Sao Paulo 10/42 - 9/44
Belle HorUonte 6/43 - 12/4.3
Sao Paulo 2/46 - 1/;'7
Rio de Janeiro 11/41 -
Rio de Janeiro 51;'5-
Rio de Janeiro 5/43-Belem 7/;..3 -Racif'e 7/41 - 10/41
Rio de Janeiro S/42 - 1/44
8&0 Paulo 814.3 - 1/44
Rio de Janeiro .3/4.3 - S/43
Rio de Janeiro 5/4.3 - 1/1.4
Rio de Janeiro 2/43 - 8/4.3
Rio OraMe 9/43 - 12/43
Porto Alegre 2/42 - .3/44
Bahia 9/;'1 - 11/44
Rio de Janeiro 11/44 - 1/46
Rio de Janeiro 3/43 - 5/43
Rio de Janeiro 10/40 - 3/41
Rio de Janei.ro 6/1.4 - 10/44
Sao Salvador 12/41 - 6/42sa 0 Paulo 6/;'1 - 1/42
Rio de Janeiro 10/41 - 2/42
Rio de Janeiro 7/43 - 7/;'7
Rio de Janeiro 5/4.3 - 1/44
Rio de Janeiro 5/4.3-
Rio de Janeiro 6/4.3-
de Janeiro 9/45-

..-:':jS~.RfI=~
!!)"I,)~.
~I~
 CITY DATE- -
Sao Paulo 11/42 -
Rio de Janeiro 3/43-Rio de Janeiro 12/43 -
Rio de Janeiro 8/43 - 8/44
Rio de Janeiro 3/43 - 4/43
Bahia 5/43 - n/43
tti.o de Janeiro 7/46 - -9/46
Rio de Janeiro 1/43 - 7/43
norianopol18 7/43 - 12/43
Curitiba 12/43 - 1/45
Bao Paulo 1/45 - 7/45
Rio de Janeiro 3143 - 5/43
Rio de Janeiro 3/43-
Rio de Janeiro 5/43-Porto Alegre 6/43 -
Sao Paulo 10/43. -
Rio de Janeiro 7/43-
&BI.h1aBello Horisonte 6/43 - 12/43
Recite 11/41 - 12/42
Sao Paulo 12/42 -
Sao Paulo 7/42 -
Curitaba 3/43 -
norianopol1s 4/43-Rio de Janeiro 1/44 - 12/47
~-12/42 ~ 7/44
5/43 - 12/43
4/46 - 2/47
3/43 - 1/45
5/42 - 10/42
10/42 - 12143
.., 7/43 - 11/43
12/42 - 12/43
.m
 b1e
N.A11E--
(
Ul¥isrcover
,P1ant Survey
Ul¥isrcaver
UJ¥1eroover
.Plant survey
Undercover
Legal Attache
Undercover
Otf.icial
Official
Otf.icla1
Plant SUrV87
P1ant SurveY'
Of.f.icial
Ul¥iercover
Urxiercover
Underc0'V8r
Ulxiercover
Undercowr
Official
Official
Of'f i cial
Official
Legal--Attache
&. Police Liaisa
Natal O1'ficial
Rio de Janeiro Undercover
Rio Official
Sao Paulo Undercover
Rio de Janeiro Undercover
Fortaleza Otf1c1al
Rio de Janeiro Ui¥lercover
Santos Official
Belem
*n&osRio de Janeiro 4/1.3 - 5/43 Plant SurveY'
Rio de Jal1ei.ro 3/43 - .5/4.3 --Plal1t SurV81'
Sao Paulo 6/42 - 3/43 Underconr
Bello Honaoote 3/43 - 6/44 Ot.ric1al
Natal 6/44 - 11/4.5 O1'fic1&l
Rio de Janeiro U/4.5 - 2/47 OfficiAl
Rio de Janeiro 6/1.3 - 2/47 Ui¥leroOYer
Rio de Ja~1ro 3/43 - 5/43 Plant Surve.,.
Rio de Janeiro 6/43 - 12/43 Urderconr
Sao Paulo 2/46 - 10/46 Offioial
Rio de Janeiro 6/42 - 4/43 Official
Porto .1legre - 8/43 Official
Rio de Janeiro - 4/44 Official
Porto .&leg1'8 ,- 5/44 Official
Rio de Janeiro - 7/45 Official
,
t
~:.5,~t.~ET--- -,~ . -,

Q2
~IGNMSH.T.
 rim ~
Sao Paulo 8/4.3 - 1/44
5&0 Paulo - i//.4
Rio de Janeiro - 3/45
Rio de Janeiro -
JIa_~ -
Rio de Janeiro 9/43-Rio de Janeiro 16/45 -
Rio de Janeiro 3/43-
Rio de Janeiro 3/43-Rio de Janeiro 9/43 - 9/46
Rio de Janeiro 6/45-
Rio de Janeiro 9/45-:Natal 4/46 -
Rio de Janeiro 511.1-
(
Po 11 oe LiaiS on
Ul:¥iercover
U J¥1 e ro 0V'8r
UJ¥1ercover
Official
Official
Ulxlercover
Plant Survey
Plant Survey
Official
Ot"ficial
Ut¥iercaver
Official
lsgal Attache
Recite J./ 42 - 12//.3
Rio de Janeiro 3/43 - 5/43
5&0 paulo 9//.3 - 12/41.
Official
Plant Surve'1
Undercover
&.
\
1/
(

~~---
64-300')
64-3004
Geral&n Agents in Brazil
64-)004-.A..
64-)OtY.-B
lta1ian Agents in Brasil
64-.3004-C
64-.3004-D
v
c~~ni.st Agents in Brazil
Ro\ID&nian Agent.8 in BraZil
64-.3004-J
(
Qel-,.B.n Propaganda in Brazil.
64- )005~A.
64-)OO5-B
Italian rropagalK!a in Br8.B11
British Propagal¥la in Brasil.
64- 3005-G
(
64- Joct>-A
64-3~B
64-~ It@,lian Penetration in BraSil
~-~. ~:::~r~:RE{ 31'
 \

/y.~~
ComlnW118t Penetra~on in Brazil
64-3~D
64-3(XX)-E Spanish Penetration in Brasil
(
French Penetration in Brazil
64-3~F
General File connng Sabotage in Brazil
64- 30C17
German Sabotage in, Brasil
64-300?-A
6l.-3007-B Japanese Sabotage in Brasil
64-300'7-0 Brlti8h Sabotage in Brasil
General J'ile regarding Foreign Residents in Brazil
64-)OCS
German Residents in Brazil
64-3008-A.
Japanese Residents in Brazil
 64-3 008-B
I~l1&D Residenta in Brazil
64-3~
CaDmun1st Residents in Brazil
64-3000-D
(
 64-)008-E Spanish Residents in Brazil
French Residents in Bruil
64-3008-F
64-3~ British Residents in Brazil
64-3~-H AMrican Residents in Brasil
Hungarian Residents in Brazil
64-3<d-I
64-3000-1 SwiSs Residents in Brazil
64-3008-L Swedish Residents in Brazil
64-3<XS-K portuguese Residents in Brazil
64-3000-N Austrian Residents in Brazil
64-3010 General Fi1s covering K111tary and Naval Matters in Brazil
GeMral File cOV'er1ng Foreign 1irms in Brazil
64-301.1
German Firms 1n ~1l
64-30U-A.
64- ,30n-B Japanese F1rm8 in Brazil
Italian Fi1'IIS in Brasll
 64- 30n-C
64-30U-E SpanUh F11W in Brasil

st~~£J
C~1.t Part7 of ~J
 64-200-205
SOY18t Diplomatic Aoti?1ti.. in Br8sil
6I.-2U-2OS
Pol1oe Matters in Brasil
64-2983.3-205
Smugglinc Activitie8 in Brasil
 64- J ~-.2 0;
~~trat1V8 Fi1ea
 b.
64-1.1.80 General Office AdIl~ni.trat1'98 File tor Brasil
64-4984 KODthq Office Reports trca Brasil
Poet Reports (Xl L1nng CoDiit.1oDS in Brazil
 64-1.670
Personnel nle tor the legal Attache's O.ttice in Brazil tiled
umer the capt1on -.bas81, Rio de J8I18irO, Brazil.- The
.r-pection I8porte eubldtted relat1w to th1a ottice are in
a e8i8r&te tolder.
67-.383703
Intormant F118 tor Brazil
 64-1.l23-2~
MonO£r&PM
c.
.Totalitarian Activities in Brazil T0daJ8 -- OeDSral .apograph
covering ftrious pbaaes of the Bureau 18 work in Brazil. Published December"
1942; 21.2 pages.
.SIS Oftice, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. - Monograph containing
photographs of' the 818 Offices in Rio de Janeiro.
.CODIImDist IlOTeII8nt 1.n Latin ""rica8 - General mooograph
covering C~m in Latin America; pages 25 to 27 deal with the CaDmun1st
Party in Brazil. hbl1ahed January I 1946.
8German E8pioMge in Latin America8 - General 8ooograph on German
espiOD&ge activities. Pages 49 to 99 cover these activities in Brazil.
Publiahed June" 1946.
8The Japanese in LaUn America- - General monograph oover1ng
Japanese acti'9'ities. Pages 11.3 to 164 deal with t.b8 Japanese in Brazil.
Publ1ahed November 1945.
8ClaMestine Radio StatioD8 Utilised by the Geraan Bapiomge
5,atem.8 General monograph setting forth tbe organiSation and activities
or tbe early German radj,o circuits and inollK1ing all 8uch c1rcW.ts in
Brasil. Published Febl"uArT 1942; 17 ~es.
320

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*.1or A.ooOlRpli.~nt.
2.
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through this arrangeaent. 'the Bar.au ha. &1.0 be. able to ooy.r
the aoti'ritiel ot .&aerioan Co8UD1~::~:~= ~t' 4ur their 'Wi,ita 'to Canada. Inthia oODDection. the iDfo~tl0 recarding the b7D
actlTities ot William Z. Foster aD e 8plon Dg their 'rili't 'to
Toronto troa "" Sl to Jtme 3. 19'6. ot Talue in the aar.au' I oon'timted
coverage ot the .erloan C~5 at 8JT-m. IntorMtion.. ,iailarl.,
obtained re~&rdiDg Paul Robe,on'. Tiltt to W~ipe, in February. 1947.
(lOO-S-l'4:8)
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bl
~1D
- - -~ \ ::-.;::;;" J D 1
&2!
ASSIGWlmn'
 818 :&0.
CITY-
DATE
 llAJ~
b1C
O.ttioial
Official
I ID Ottawa
I I Otta,,-a
4. Bibliography
a. ~DT.8t1gatiT. Fil..
64-200-24S Communist Party or Can~~
1/44 to date5/42 - 1/44
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Sorlet D1plo..tio Actin tiel 1D Canada
 64-211-24:3
-Corby C..e-
 100-$42972
~n1.tratlT8 Pile.
 b.
General Office AdJI1n1ltrat1Te 1'118 tor Li..11c OtfiO8, Otta_, Ck!.tar10
64-4918
ottice VDDthlf Report. tor Lia1lon Ottioe, Ot'tawa, Ontario
 64-&984-US
64-4725
 PO8t Reporte Regarding Canada
Co8btDed Ottioe PtrloDD81 F1le and ~.peot1OD Pile.
'ti'tle 8Uai8on, Ot'tawa, ~'tar10..
67-~8~51
 Filed 1mde~
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322

F.
CHILE
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1. !IS Pacil1'tie. and Objec-tiTe.
SIB coT.rage of Chile was rir.t .tarted in Oc'tober- 1940-
with the a.sip8n't of one acen't to ~'tiago in an 1m.dercoTer capaoi'tJ.
Coverage wa. .ub.equen't1y .uc--n'ted un'til Oc'tober- 194~. when for'ty-~e
agen't8 were s'tationed in Tarious part. or the Republic. In August. IS46.
when the tiDAl reduction of personnel becan. .1eTen agent. were under
a.8igDm8J1't in Chile.
lollawin£ the ..tabli.h88nt ot the Legal Attache'. ottice 1n
Santiago. the Bureau'. repr..entati Tel attaoh~ to the Imbas.y were
turni8hed .pace 1n the buildin£ which wal occupied by the other 1mba8sy
office.. !he 8&entl who were a8si~ed to Tarious consulate. throughout
Chile were l1kew1le afforded .pace in the con.ular ottice..
!be objeot1Tes ot SIB in Chile ..re largely those ot an
intelligence agency in identityiDg £Xis ag8Dts and deter.tning their
actiTi'tiel. The incrimnating 1n.toration which ft.S d8Teloped ft.S
turned 0T8r to the Chilean officials through diplO8&t1c chaDnel. in
order to bring pressure ~ the Chilean GoTerDD8Dt to abandon its policy
of neutrality and to w.ed out the indiTiduals Who made Chile one of
the principal center. of Axis actiTitie..
«
!he excellent relat1Dn8 with the Chilean Polioe, which were
developed by ~he Bureaut. repre.en~atiT8., gaTe our agent. the opportunity
to influence, and in Fart direct, lODe ot the Chilean iDTeltiga~ionB ot
~. aotiT1~le. 8Dd to a..I.t indireotly in the pro.eoutlon ot .ome ot
the oharge. 48Teloped through thole 1nTeltigati~.
~jor AoOOmpU8b88Dt8
a. 08~ .Aoti vi tie.
2.
In Chile the German intelligence .erT1oe e.t&bli.hed, and
throughou't World War II adeaTored 'to _in'tain, 8D infora'tion .er'rlce
and -ana of oomJllm1oation b8t...en the We.tem Hem1.phere and Germany.
The.e aotiTities were aided by 'the extent 'to whiCh the Gerw8D8 had
already paetrated i~to al8ost ery field of Chilean lite through the
estab11.hmeut of a lar~e German oolo~y. and 'through the formation of
e%ten.iT. commercial rela~ion.. A8 the R.publio Qt Chile was the next
to the last Latin J.-rioau o~try 'to a.TV rela'tions with GerJrauy, 8IlY
ot the Jazi ~_t. _0 had beO08e tir8l'1' e.t&bliahed were able 'to OOD-tinue
th.ir acti ~ tie. a~aiu.t 'the Allied P0W8rs.
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The fact that relations were not br<icen by Chile until January, 1943,
and the repatriation of Axis Diplomatic Representatives was further
delayed unUl September, 1943, aided the enellO" agents in continuing
their activities.
(
Evidence ot IIBjor actin ties on the part ot the German Intelli-
gence Service was noted in Chile as early as 1940. The ra~rications ot
t:1e espionage organizations centered in that COUDtrT were so extensive
that the 1.eaders directed aoo controlled agents located throughout Iatin
America.
Geman espionage ac'tiv1t1es in Chile wre first sponsored
by Ge~n diplomatic personnel. General Friedrich Wolt', who was appointed
'~rman filitary Attache in July, 1940, was the principal AbW8hr repre-
sentative. Following Wolt 'a transt'er to Argentina on Decem't)er 6, 1942,
he was succeeded in comuand of Abwehr activities by Major Ludwig Van
Bohlen, the Oennan Air Attache. Von Bohlen continued and extended the
J4.b'.Tehr intelligence activities and at the tiE of h1a repatri2tion on
September 29, 191.3, he was said to have been ot' the opinion that he had
established an espionage organization which would be able to renain in
operation throughout the _r providing Gennany with 'vital information
!:rom throughout the Western Hemisphere.
The groundwork for the breach of relations with t!:8 Axis nations
on the part ot Chile was laid by the Bure.u t s SIS representatives. On
October 8, 1942, Chile sa confronted with the stateEnt made in a speech
by Assistant Secretary ot State SUJID8r Welles that she was .stabbing her
neighbors in the back" by allowing spies to operate in her territory to
the detriment of the Western Hemisphere. The President of Chile knew to
.lat Welles was reterring. It was the clandestine radio station PIL mich
i1ad been in contact wi th ~nDany tor D¥>re than a year supplying shipping
and intelligence information turnished by members of an espionage ring,
which iDc1uded unwig V~ Bohlen, the Air Attache of the German .IA:!1bassy.
The officials of the Ch11san Govennent wre aware of these
activities because a comprehensive memorandum on the subject had been'
prepared by SIS Agents on June 30, 191.2, aM delivered to them through
diplollE.tic channels. The material contained in the EmorarKium consisted
of decodes of clandestine messages sent and received by the station and
the results of investigations of the various subjects conducted qy SIB,
all correlated into a tactual story of espionage and potential sabo't.age
on the part of the Axis in South America. (64-,31l2-A-2-l26)
A few days atter Welles' s speech the President of Chile re-
or~anized his cabinet eliminating Barros Jarpa, the Foreign ~nister who
.appeared to have been partially responsible for the deJa,. in acting on
tte espionage charges, and on October 25, 19'-2, t.be roul¥i-up of Ax18
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spies began. Thie round~::no:.:~~ ::::~:~ ~:~:~.ts acting through~IS uer;wbo had been 8e ng as one 0 r co en 0 .
L{b4-3J.Of; 64-)lO4-A) -
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The actual installation and operation of the pn. transmitter was
carried. out by Johannes Peter Szeraws, a German radio operatOr who had entered
Chile iUegall:y in 1939 as a deserter from a German ship.
t
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In addition to being of assistance to the German Government,
members or the PIt organization~ also mde aritiaM) repor'ts available to
certain Japanese agents in Chile. Tnis was done under express authority
from Berlin.
During October, 1941, Von Sohulz-liausmann left Chi.1e far
Argentina without giving a reason for severing his connections with t}"
North German IJ.o)'d Line. It was repor'ted that he was dissatisfied
wi. t.h the work of the Geman agents operating iJ1 Chile. Fr(Xll Buenos
Aires, he advised the German Intelli.gence Service the.t he could be
contacted through his new employer, the firm of Branberg and Company.
Von Schulz-Hauamann was taken into custody bY' the J.rgenti~ police in
I\:ovember, 1942, but was subeequent~ released. ~ April, 1945, he 'R8
again detained and in December of that year, wh1.le still in custody,
he committed a suicide.
After Von Schulz-Hausmann left Chile, Heinrich B. Reiners
be care the leader of the PIL group. Reiners ~ a German National who
had resided in Chile .ince 1935. He operated a l18.ritime freight office
in Valparaiso and _de :frequent trips up aM down the Chilean coast tor
the purpose of contacting German sympathizers who supplied him with
shipping in!orMtion. Reiners was assisted by his wife, Isabelle Pi.derit
de Reiners, who was active in forwarding correspondence from various
espionage agents in the Western Hemisphere, as well as from agents in
Shanghai. Reiners continued to direct the activities of the PYL group
until October, 1942, when he 1"led to Argentina and from there t.o Gerl!lany.
Reiners was also assisted by Hans Bl~, a GerDlan National,
who served as anager for Trans-Radio Chilena in Valparaiso. When Blume
was sought by Chilean authorities for quest~on in October, 1942, be
took refuge in the Gennany FAnbassy arxi subsequently fled to Argentina.
Tfiere he beca~ associated with Johannes S1.egrried :EEcker and Gustav
Ji;dward Utzinger in the operations of a network of clandestine radio
stations until August, 1944, when he ns appremooed by the Argent~ne
authorities.
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SIB representatives located the PIt transmitter and developed
information regarding. the individuals involved in tJ1e activities
of the ring. ~n the Chilean Government finally toOk action in October,
1942, on the baSis of the inforuation furnished them, the Bureau's.
re resentatives were able to direct the round-u or ants
persons .
arrested as a result of these raids, seven were released due to the fact
that there were, at that tiDe, no adequate statutes in Chilean laW'
covering this type of 'riolation, particularly in regard to Chilean
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cit1zena. Ten other ipd1'ridua~ wre interned apd wrraats wre iss_d
tor Voa Schull-Hausmann, Bl1b8 ~ R8iDen, 8M Szeraws who bad un Chile
tor Argentina..
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In ~ trials CondUCMd by the Ch1lean GO9'emment ~ 1 t W8
ascertained tbat tbe o~ 18gal rlolat.1on of which the subjects wre
guiltT uJ¥iv tben existing Chilean law.. tbe B18ct.rical SeM'ices I.aw~
wtdch prohibited tm clamestine insul1ation of radio 8tations. Although
the ccalrt prooeedi[8J -re 1D8t1tutAd during October~ 19'.2, t~ JI1D1ster
of the Court. of Aweala at V&lpe.raiso d1d. Dot conclude bia ca8e 1D1t.1l
December 6, 1944. At that ~1me Han8 Hofbauer, tM ~r of the tara 011
which the PIt eta "ion.. 1nst.aUed... convicted of a rlolat.1~ at' tbe
Elact.r1cal Service. Jaw. Consideration.. a180 given to the institution
of extradition proceedings aSa1x-t \be other subject. 1DTolved 10 the
1DStalla~10D ot the radio 8_tion, but who bad tled frO. [email protected] juriS-
diction.
B7 detaj,D~Dg ~ q1I8st1oa1ng persons 1DTolTed 111 the PIL group,
the Chilean autbori ties interrupted tor a briet tw work ot the 08rman
Intelligenoe Service in Ch118. lAldw1g VOil Bohlen la8de an an&l1818 ot the
entire trial proceedings aEd ot the erideDoe presented at the trial tor
the purpose of 1nstn"1ng tbat f'u\ure operations would not be subject to
discovery by Chilean or Allied intelligence agencies. In this 8emoraMWl1,
Von Bdllen lUted \~ following observations 8
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(1) The cardiu1 aistake .. the 1D8ufficienC7 of t.be original
aT and t.be tranam.1ssion of the I.COM ke7 t.oget.her wit.h
the fir8t., which pe1'ldtt.ed tIM code to be broken.
(2) Uter tJ1e receipt of' the Legel Attache'l aemorandum b7 the
~leaD Gove1'D:a8Dt, co1181derable ti- .. ava11able 1n
which to cCXlceal all C18S. bIrt, proper .tepa wre Dot taken
1D spite of the order. iSsued 1D this regard.
(3)
(4)
Mistakes had been 8de in the .election of' personnel.
Too man,. people knew ot the location ot the transmitter
as _11 as its activities.
(5)
DepeDdabiliV and the neoessar7 characteristics suitable
f'or such work are Bore iaport.ant in the selection of' co-
workers ~ :" good technical abil1v.
(6) When it appears that a olaMest1J1e 8tatiOb ba. been
discovered, t.b8 persons prino1pau,. iDTol'Y8d. should
disappear and arrange_nts tor such an 8wntua11tT
should be planned 111 det.a1l.
,."
329
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!he breakiDg 1IP or the m croup did not ter81D&te Ger8n
actirlties in ~e, am o't.b8r crOup8 coD't1m18d to operate. !be di8-
closure or the identities or the peraoD8 CODD8cted wi ~ the ring,
howeV'8r, largel7 tera1aated their U8etulD88S &8 espionage agents. The
publici t7 g1 WD to 'the ...i e.pioDage acti rl tie. in Chile am the
Chilean Qoy.-iJMDt'. iDab1lity to br1nc pro..cution in such 1D8tances,
re8ult.8d in D8W' aecur1t7 1... being enacted which per81tted prosecution
of future cases in the Chilean courts. (6S-35145; 640-3112-A)
(2) ~ Aprel Sabotaae ~S!. ~e or the grOUp8
or 0er88D alent. 1Ddirectl,. connected with the Pn. rlDg, b\1t whole
messages were tr8D8aitad onr the PIL 8tatioo was the so-called Apfel
Sabotage Rine. Thi8 group bas been treated in part UlKier the section on
Brasil. The ring was 80 D8II8d because the nr.t iMications or ita
existence C8M tra decoded PIL _ssages addres8ed to or sent b7 an
imirldual wh088 cod. D88 as .Aptel." It _s supected that th18 n8
the code Dae for Albert .JQli- Von Appen, who _s arrested am held
tor q_8tioDiDg at the t1M the Pn agents were rounded up in October,
1942. Froa the information aTaUable, hanver, it was iapo..1ble to
prove t.h18 coDdition aDd Von Appen was released. Shortly atterwards,
hOW'eftr, due to tbe deftl0i88nta or the war, he, along with other Germans,
wa. placed ulxier reawicted residence roles. In March, 1945, uMer tortber
q~s't1oD1Di, VOD App8n acmdtted that he was -Apfel. and was in charge of
Gel"ll8D aabotage in Chile, Peru, and ArieDt1D&.
f
Von Appen was a OerMn natioD&l who bad been a resident in CItile
since 1937, a8 an iDapector for the BaaOOrg-American Line. In 1939, he
was recruited for aabotage work b7 Joachia R1¥Iloff, a German ~ otficer
who arrived in South Aaerica with t.b8 8p8citi.c a18sion ot recruitiDg
sabotage agenta. Van j.pp8n 'AS rec~eDded to R\Xiloff b7 Dietrich l1ebuhr,
the Geraan laval Attache in ArgentiDa. As a result, he was sent to Gersan,-
in 1939, where be was trained in eabotap work. At Vz AppeIl'e sugge8tion,
the Germans also recruited KUrt Heuer, an inspector for the B8mburg-
AMrican Line in Peru, as a 888ber ot the ring. Arrang_ent8 bad pre'9'1ouel,.
been made for WUhela Lange of Bueno8 Aire8, Arr.eDt.1Da, to take charge
ot 8abotage operatioD8 in ArgenttDa. Lange, however, was unable to return
to Germany tor iD8truct.1on, and he was trained by Von Appen ~ the lat.ter'8
return to the We8tern Hnd.sphere. Arrq8D18nts 'Are al80 ude b7 the
Gercans tor Earl Otto Gohl to ~e sabotage in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Brazilian activities were subsequently placed uDd8r the charge ot Georg
Kom-ad Friedrich Bla88, alias 8D1-. Braun,. who was to direct German
sabotage in Brasil and the northern part ot South AMrica.
Yon Appen am his associates were in po8session or 8Xpl08i ft.
aOO other eQ.uip8Dt with which to comuct tMir o8mpa1gn ot .abotaie.
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After Von Appen returned to the Western Hemisphere. however. the GermaD
Foreign Office and Admiralty i8sued 8pecific instruction8 that no hostile
actions lhould be committed against the South American countrie8 at that
time in view of the then ex1eting political 8ituation. Arrangements were
8Ubeequently made whereby ~lasl in Rio de Janeiro was to be DOtified of
any change in in8tructions. Blass in turn was to notify Ton Appen. Since
no additional instructions were eTer lent. the e%tens1Te aabotage
organi&ation e8tabli8hed throUCbout South America va. ~8Ter called upon
to fulfil its fanctions.
.
Ton Appen had been tentatively identified a8 8Apfel- prior to hi.
arrest in 1942. upon hi. release the !ureau's representatives continued to
follow his activities closel1. They were therefo~., in a po.it1on to ass1et
the Chilean police when he vas ~.interrogated in VArch. 1945. When confronted
with the information compiled b7 815. he conf...ed. At that time Ton
Appen a4aitted that hie group included Kurt Beue~ in Peru. !o~is Drehe~
of !razil ~ho was then re.iding in Chile. ~runo Johannsen and Oscar PO8n8gen
of Colombia. and :lrn8t Gerhard !:art Boggem&nn of' Venezuela. The Legal
At tache 8 in the various countrie8 1mmediatelr made available to the local
gove~nments the info~mation which they bad co~iled ~eeardlDg the varioul
members of this aabotage ring. Additional interrogations of the ind1Tiduale
identified by Von Appen. rooted out the remaining members of the organization.
Each step in the 1ftTeltigat1on, detention. and the prosecution of the
individuals inTolTed vas the result of investigation by the Bureau's SIB
repre sent at iTe8.
(
!he Chilean Government did not prosecute Ton Appen and hiB
associates as it appeared tbat no actual sabotage had been committed, and
there was no adequate legislation in existence to COTer their actiTit1ee.
Expulsion decrees, howeTer, were t..ue~ against Ton Appen, Dreher. and
Heinrich Hallbauer; aDd these agent. were expelled from Chile tor intern-
ment in the United States and aubseo.uent repatriation to Ger-n.v.
(64-23309; 65-35145)
(3) POZ ~8!.. following the 418clolure of the PYL group
to the Chilean Goy
…[truncated]