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Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 12/O5/2003
To: Counterterrorism Attn: ITOS1 ETIU4
~ SSA
IOS
International Operations Attn: SSA
New York Attn: PENTTBOM Team
SA
Washington Field Attn: Sq
SA
From: Berlin
Contact: SA I
APPr°ved B1" Ill
Drafted By: i rota
Case ID #: 3l5NWF227l35 Pending!
Title: ABDELGHANI MZOUDI, aka
Talha
ITAOT '
Synopsis: Report testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady provided
on 10/24/2003. .
Administrativ - ' were conducted in the German
language. SA translated his summary notes
' E la . from German in o ng ish
Enclosure s!: Enclosed is one ! FD340 containing original notes
concerning Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady's testimony and the court
proceedings.
Details: On 10/24/2003, Special Agent "SA"!L
attended the morning session of the criminal rial or Abdelghani
Mzoudi convened by the Third Criminal Panel of the Hanseatic Higher
Regional Court . Strafsenat des Hanseatisches
Oberlandesgericht! in Hamburg, Germany.
Appearing for the prosecution were Chief Prosecutor Walter
Hemberger and Prosecutors Dr. Matthias Krau and Gerhardt Hummer from
the Federal Prosecutor's Office for the Federal Republic of Germany
"Generalbundesanwaltschaft"!.
' . _ .
To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 3l5NWF227l35, 12/O5/2003
Appearing for the defense were Gul Pinar and Michael
Rosenthal.
Appearing for the civil litigants "Nebenklager"! were
Andreas Schulz, and Dr. First Name Unknown! von Grohnen, appearing
on behalf of Dr. Ulrich von Jeinsen, and other German attorneys
appearing on behalf of the various civil litigants.
The court now called Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady
hereinafter "Awady"!, a twentyfive 5! year old male, student
residing in Bochum, Germany, to testify about Marwan Yousef Mohamed
Rashed AlShehhi hereinafter "AlShehhi"!.
Awady advised the court that he was not related to
Abdelghani Mzoudi, Mounir El Motassadeq, Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah
Binalshibh, Said Bahaji or Zakariya Essabar.
Awady knew AlShehhi from Dubai in the United Arab
Emirates. They had met when they both traveled to Germany from the
United Arab Emirates.
Awady and AlShehhi attended the same German language
course at the Goethe Institute in Bonn, Germany, and lived together
for six ! months. After completing the language course, they both
took the university admissions examination at the same time.
Upon admission to the university in Bonn, they also
attended the same university preparatory course "Studiumkollegium"!
for two ! weeks. Thereafter, Awady left Bonn in 1997 and moved to
Cologne, Germany" AlShehhi stayed in Bonn to finish the university ,
preparatory course "Studiumkollegium"!.
Awady described AlShehhi as a regular guy with whom one
could have a regular conversation.
- ' AlShehhi was frugal and did not spend much money. He
sometimes rented cars to take trips to France, the Netherlands and to
Berlin. .
Al+Shehhi was "cool." He wore regular label clothing and
had a short beard. He was also a Muslim and prayed five ! times
each day. Usually, he would pray at home, but on Fridays, he would
pray in the mosque in Bonn.
When AlShehhi first moved to Hamburg, he maintained
regular contact with Awady. They would sometimes meet in Bonn.
Awady also traveled to Hamburg a few times to see AlShehhi.
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Re: 315NWF227135, 12/05/2003
AlShehhi had enrolled in the University of Hamburg to
study shipbuilding. Awady noted that there were only two !
locations where one could study shipbuilding, namely at the
universities in Hamburg or Duisburg. '
However, AlShehhi had to return to Bonn approximately six
! months after arriving in Hamburg, since he had to repeat the
university preparatory course "Studiumkollegium"! in Bonn.
During this time period, Awady was living in Cologne and
did not have much time to visit with AlShehhi. Likewise, AlShehhi
was also very busy and did not have much time to see Awady either.
Awady's contact with AlShehhi consisted of the occasional
telephone call. He thought that he might have spoken telephonically
with AlShehhi about once or twice a month. ' A
V After a while the contact between the two diminished.
AlShehhi called Awady once to invite him to his wedding in Dubai on
01/15/2000. AlShehhi explained that he wanted to invite all of his
friends from Germany to the wedding. Awady went and visited
AlShehhi in Dubai in 2000. '
Awady saw AlShehhi once in Hamburg. Awady had heard from
Harad phonetic! Last Name Unknown! that AlShehhi was in Hamburg.
When he saw AlShehhi, he was surprised to see that he was not like
the "old" AlShehhi. Instead, Awady noticed that AlShehhi's
personality had changed. ~
For example, when Awady first knew AlShehhi he lived
alone in a new apartment. Now, AlShehhi was living in an old
apartment with a roommate and without a television set. AlShehhi
had also given up his label clothing in favor of cheap clothing and
cheap jeans.
AlShehhi also asked Awady if he was praying regularly and
attending prayer services in the mosque. Awady asked him why he was
so concerned about this, but AlShehhi did not give him a response.
~ AlShehhi told Awady that his studies were too difficult.
Awady asked a friend about the person with whom AlShehhi
was sharing the apartment. The friend told Awady that it was someone
from Yemen. V -
Awady then returned home to Bochum, Germany. The next
time that he saw AlShehhi again was in Dubai, United Arab Emirates
for AlShehhi's wedding. Awady was surprised to see that AlShehhi
had shaved off his beard and was acting like the "old" AlShehhi.
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Awady also saw Al~Shehhi once morekin Bonn. He was unsure
if this occurred before or after the wedding in Dubai, but he thought
that it might have been after the wedding. At that time, AlShehhi
wore Afghanstyle clothing. Awady had to laugh about AlShehhi's
manner of dress. They joked that it was a pajamas, but AlShehhi
said that it was to pray in. ~
A When Awady was in Bonn, he went looking for their friend
Nafa phonetic! Last Name Not Provided!. Awady saw AlShehhi in the
company of Nafa.
Awady did not ask AlShehhi about his studies or what he
was doing when he saw him. '
Awady also noticed that AlShehhi was concentrating upon
other matters, such as religion and praying. AlShehhi had
previously not been so interested in religion.
Awady had a contact telephone number for AlShehhi, but
when he tried to call that telephone number, the telephone number did
not work. Later, Awady called a mutual friend and asked him for Al-
Shehhi's new telephone number. The friend informed Awady that Al-
Shehhi did not have a telephone or a cellular telephone.
At some point, the Embassy for the United Arab Emirates
called Awady and asked him whether he knew where to locate AlShehhi.
Khalid Last Name Not Provided! specifically asked him whether Al-Shehhi was with[::::]in Bochum. Later, AlShehhi's brother came to
Hamburg from the United Arab Emirates to look for him.
Awady testified that the Embassy for the United Arab
Emirates monitored their educational studies, and checked up on them.
Chief Judge Klaus Ruhle asked whether it was true that
they had shared an apartment in Bad Godesberg, Germany near Bonn, and
that AlShehhi later lived with two ! families in Bad Godesberg.
It had been documented in Awady's statement provided to police
investigators that AlShehhi had moved out of the first family's home
since they drank alcohol.
Awady testified that this was true. r
Awady did not know the people with whom AlShehhi '
associated in Hamburg.
When Awady asked AlShehhi why he lived so frugally and
why he did not have a television set in his apartment in Hamburg,
AlShehhi answered that he was living like the Prophet had once
lived. ' .
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- .
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Re: 315NWF227135, 12/O5/2003
When Awady broke off his contact with AlShehhi in 2000,
he believed that AlShehhi was on a "Jihad" somewhere in Afghanistan.
Awady explained that he knew AlShehhi, and he believed that Al-
Shehhi would do such a thing.
After Khalid LNU! called him to inquire why AlShehhi was
not attending his classes at the university, Awady called Al~Shehhi
and asked to meet him in Hamburg. AlShehhi told Awady not to come
to Hamburg. He did not want to see Awady.
Awady believed that AlShehhi did not want him to see how
he was living in Hamburg, and then report this back to the Embassy
for the United Arab Emirates. Awady, however, stayed firm in his
intention to meet with AlShehhi and told him that he would come to
Hamburg the next weekend. A
AlShehhi's father had called Awady's father, who had then
ordered his son to go and check upon AlShehhi. Awady was, thus, not
going to let himself be swayed out of meeting with AlShehhi in
Hamburgr
Awady drove to Hamburg by car and did not know the way to
AlShehhi's apartment. Thus, they met each other at the Hamburg
train station. It was obvious to Awady that AlShehhi did not want
Awady to see his apartment in Hamburg.
Awady knew that AlShehhi would never eat in a restaurant
where wine was served, such as an Italian restaurant. AlShehhi
would also never eat at McDonald's since he claimed that it was owned
by Jews.
Awady, thus, suggested that they go drink tea at Al-
Shehhi's apartment, so that Awady could learn AlShehhi's address.
Neither AlShehhi's brother, nor Ali Last Name Not Provided!, nor
the UAE Embassy, nor Khalid Last Name Not Provided! knew AlShehhi's
address.
Awady did not care about seeing AlShehhi's room, so long
as he got a chance to find out AlShehhi's address. _
In the end, Awady and AlShehhi drove to AlShehhi's
apartment in HamburgHarburg. AlShehhi lived in the apartment on
the first floor. There were two ! or three ! rooms in the.
apartment, as well as a hallway, bathroom and kitchen, Awady
recalled seeing at least one ! bedroom.-
The apartment was sparsely furnished with a few mattresses
and a prayer table.
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To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 315NWF227135, 12/05/2003
Awady did not know how many other people lived in the
apartment since he did not meet anyone else in the apartment.
Chief Judge Ruhle then asked if he could explain why he
had problems recognizing two ! pictures shown to him by police
investigators. Awady had told the police investigators that he did
not recognize Picture #30, and that he thought that he recognized the
other picture. Awady explained that the pictures depicted the
apartment prior to the renovations. Consequently, Awady was unable
to recognize those pictures. .
Awady did not think that AlShehhi's name was on the
outside apartment door buzzer.
AlShehhi had told Awady that he was not registered as a
resident at that location. He was only temporarily living in that
apartment until he found something better. As a result, his name was
not listed on the outside apartment door buzzer.
Chief Judge Ruhle now showed him two ! pictures of
houses. Awady said that the first picture was not AlShehhi's
apartment building, while the second picture could have been his
apartment building. However, he was unsure of his identification of
that photograph.
Upon seeing a floor plan of an apartment, Awady said that
he was unsure if that was AlShehhi's apartment.
Associate Judge First Name Unknown! Sakuth then asked
whether AlShehhi said that he did not want his Embassy to know his
whereabouts. Awady testified that AlShehhi had not said this.
Awady learned where AlShehhi was living and told him that his
brother also wanted to know his address.
Awady did not report back his findings to AlShehhi's
family. Awady believed AlShehhi when he had said that this was only
a temporary living arrangement, and that he would move out into a
better apartment soon.
Awady later spoke with AlShehhi's brother about this
matter when he came to Germany to look for AlShehhi.
When Awady saw AlShehhi at the wedding, he thought that
things were going better for AlShehhi.
when they met during previous times, AlShehhi never
seemed to care where they would plan to meet. He did, however,
inform Awady that he only had a small room in a student dormitory, so
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To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 315NWF227135, 12/O5/2003
that they might want to meet elsewhere. As a result, they usually
met somewhere else in the city.
AlShehhi told Awady that he wanted to bring his wife back
to Germany from Dubai. He had already applied for a tourist visa for
her, and now he needed a larger apartment for the two ! of them.
Associate Judge Dr. First Name Unknown! Mohr now asked
Awady how many days A1~Shehhi had remained in Dubai. Awady testified
that AlShehhi spent between ten 0! and fifteen 5! days in Dubai.
Awady thought that he might have returned to Germany on January 20th.
Associate Judge Mohr noted an apparent discrepancy in
Awady's testimony. Namely, Awady had stated in his statement
provided to police investigators that Al~Shehhi did not return to
Germany until February. He now asked Awady which date was correct.
Awady answered that he thought that AlShehhi had returned
to Germany by January 20th. He recalled that AlShehhi had told him
that he needed to get back to the university in Hamburg. If he
returned after January 20th, then he would have returned to the
university too late. _
Awady had also heard from A1~Shehhi's brother that Al-
Shehhi needed to stay ten 0! to twenty 0! days in Dubai, since he
needed to procure a new passport.
Chief Prosecutor Hemberger asked Awady whether he had seen
AlShehhi with anyone. Awady answered that he had seen Naja
phonetic! Last Name Not Provided! with AlShehhi.
- The court excused Awady without requiring him to swear an
oath to his testimony.
The court then adjourned until 11:00 a.m., at which time
the next witness would be called.
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To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
'Re: 3l5NWF227l35, 12/O5/2003
LEADGQ;
Set Lead 1: Info!
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT ETIU4, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: Info!
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AT IOI, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 3: Info!
Nlygars I
AT NEW YORK, NY
Read and clear.
Set Lead 4: Discretidnary!
WASHINGTON FIELD
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Disseminate as necessary.
awady.wpd
QQ
8
ALL INFCRMATIDN CONTAINED» - .
" . HEREIN IE UNCLASSIFIED
Iiw-01-31-2003! DATE [|E.11-g|I||3§5 _
' I FEDERAL Bu§'§7W5E'1§|§7E§1H%ALFi6N Eigc
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 12/O5/2003
To: Counterterrorism Attn: ITOS1 ETIU4
' SSA
-IOS
International Operations Attn: SSA
New York Attn: PENTTBOM Team
an iwashington Field Attn: Squa IT-
SA|:|
From: Berlin
Contact: SAI I |
APPr°"ed B1" |:|
Drafted By: I Lcta
Case ID #: 3l5NWF227l35 Pending!
Title: ABDELGHANI MZOUDI, aka
Talha
ITAOT ' -
Synopsis: Report testimony of Heinz Fromm, President of the BfV,
provided on 10/24/2003.
r
Administrative: All court proceedings were conducted in the German
language. SAI wtranslated his summary notes
from German into English.
Enclosure s!: Enclosed is one ! FD34O containing original notes
concerning Heinz Fromm's testimony and the court proceedings.
Details: On 10/24/2003, Special Agent "SA"!|
attended the morning session of the criminal trial of Abdelghani
Mzoudi convened by the Third Criminal Panel of the Hanseatic Higher
Regional Court . Strafsenat des Hanseatisches
Oberlandesgericht! in Hamburg, Germany.
Appearing for the prosecution were Chief Prosecutor Walter
Hemberger and Prosecutors Dr. Matthias Krau and Gerhardt Hummer from
the Federal Prosecutor's Office for the Federal Republic of Germany
"Generalbundesanwaltschaft"!.
Appearing for the defense were Gul Pinar and Michael
Rosenthal.
¢ -
To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 315NWF227l35, 12/O5/2003
Appearing for the civil litigants "Nebenklager"! were
Andreas Schulz, and Dr. First name Unknown! von Grohnen, appearing
on behalf of Dr. Ulrich von Jeinsen, and other German attorneys
appearing on behalf of the various civil litigants.
The court now called Heinz Fromm hereinafter "Fromm"!, a
fiftyfive 5! year old attorney currently serving as the President
of the German Federal Office of Constitutional Protection "Bundesamt
fur Verfassungsschutz", hereinafter "BfV"! located in Cologne,
Germany, to testify about statements concerning September llth which
he had made during an interview with the "SudDeutsche Zeitung" on
07/06/2003.
Fromm advised the court that he was not related to
Abdelghani Mzoudi, Mounir El Motassadeg, Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah
Binalshibh, Said Bahaji or Zakariya Essabar.
Fromm provided the court with a letter from the
Minister of the Interior which addressed the scope of his
to provide testimony before the court. Fromm's testimony
restricted to statements he had made to the "SudDeutscheGerman
authority
was
Zeitung."
He was prohibited from disclosing any classified sources or any
information derived from foreign sources.
Fromm testified that he gave the interview to the
"SudDeutsche Zeitung" and that all of his statements made during the
interview were correct. Specifically, the attacks of September llth
were not conceived in Hamburg, but rather in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, those individuals_from Hamburg who had been involved in
the attacks on September llth had wanted to travel to Chechnya to
fight. Upon reaching Afghanistan, they were recruited by AlQaeda
for their English abilities, and were persuaded to participate in the
_ September llth attacks.
This represented the conclusion of the BfV which it
publicly reported in May 2003 as part of its Annual Report for the
Year 2002. The BfV's conclusion was based upon the totality of the
information available to it. '
~According to Fromm, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed hereinafter
"KSM"! was the operational "mastermind" of the September llth attacks
for Al Qaeda. This view of KSM as the "mastermind" was supported by
an AlJazeera interview of Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah Binalshibh
hereinafter "Binalshibh"! and KSM conducted in 2002. The interview
was first broadcast by the AlJazeera network in September 2002.
Specialists at the BfV had analyzed this interview and
deemed it as authentic. V
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Furthermore, the AlJazeera journalist, who had
interviewed both Binalshibh and KSM, later co~authored a book,
Masterminds of Terror, which explained the interview results in
greater detail. The book stated that the planning for the September
llth attacks originated in Afghanistan with KSM.
That the planning for the September 11th attacks
originated in Afghanistan was the critical point, according to Fromm.
The BfV knows, or believes to know, that the Hamburg Group intended
to travel to Chechnya. '
Chief Judge Klaus Ruhle then asked Fromm whether
Binalshibh, Mohammed Atta, Marwan Yousef Mohamed Rashed AlShehhi and
Ziad Samar Jarrah traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight in
Chechnya and then proposed the September llth concept to senior Al-
Qaeda leadership there, or whether the entire plan was conceived
solely in Afghanistan by KSM.
Fromm testified that the Hamburg Group became ever more
radical in its views. While in Hamburg, they developed an interest
in participating in a militant "Jihad." The BfV was certain of this
development.
However, the planning of the attacks on New York City and
the Pentagon were conceived and initiated much earlier in
Afghanistan.
The BfV was convinced that the members of the Hamburg
Group only intended to travel to Chechnya to participate in a
"Jihad." -
A Chief Judge Ruhle asked Fromm to identify the sources of
information upon which the BfV was basing its conclusions.
Fromm stated that these conclusions were based upon the
investigative results developed by the police and by the prosecutor's
offices, from information exchanged with domestic and foreign
intelligence agencies, and upon both intelligence operations and
"open sources" of information derived from the Internet.
The Chief Judge then asked whether Fromm was basing his
conclusions upon information developed by the German Federal Criminal
Police "Bundeskriminalamt", hereinafter "BKA"!.
Fromm testified that he had not said that they were
planning to go to Chechnya by way of Afghanistan. They only wanted
to go to Chechnya, but at some point they changed their plans and
decided to go to Afghanistan instead. Once they arrived in
Afghanistan their "target direction" was altered.
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The Chief Judge then asked whether he had understood Fromm
correctly, in that they only wanted to go to Afghanistan and not to
Chechnya via Afghanistan.
Fromm answered that this was correct. They had traveled
to Afghanistan because they knew that one could complete military
training there in less than one year. This, according to Fromm, was
their goal for traveling to Afghanistan.
It was the BfV's conclusion that they were recruited in
Afghanistan as a result of their English language abilities, and
their familiarity with Western countries. This conclusion was based
upon "open" sources of information available to the BfV.
The attacks
were planned by KSM.
Germany simply became
to volunteer for this
Chief Judgeon the World Trade Center hereinafter "WTC"!
Those who had arrived in Afghanistan from
the means to execute the plan. They were asked
plan. g
Ruhle asked whether Fromm meant that the
entire plan had been conceived by Binalshibh and KSM. Fromm
testified that this was correct.
The Chief Judge told Fromm that Motassadeq had claimed
this same allegation.
Higher Regional CourtThe Chief Judge noted that the Hanseatic
in Hamburg had recently convicted Mounir El
Motassadeq hereinafter "Motassadeq"! under a prosecutorial theory
similar to the one now presented before the Mzoudi trial court. He
asked Fromm whether they had just convicted an innocent man to
fifteen 5! years in prison. The Chief Judge rhetorically asked
Fromm that if his interpretation of the facts was accurate, then
should not the court have declared Motassadeq innocent and released
him?
Defense attorney Pinar then noted for the court that the
Binalshibh interview was considered by intelligence services to be
true and accurate.
Chief Judge Ruhle asked whether the BfV had any of its own
sources upon which the BfV was basing its conclusions.
Fromm answered that there were none in that regard.
The Chief Judge then asked whether there was a person who
could corroborate that the Hamburg Group was recruited for the
September llth attacks in Afghanistan.
Fromm referred the court to look to the "open" sources of
information available. For example, page 30 of the U.S.
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I
Congressional Report on September llth stated that the American
intelligence community considered KSM to have been the "mastermind"
for the attacks. Fromm was not permitted to testify to anything more
than this statement.
The Chief Judge asked again whether it was Fromm's
testimony that the planning for the September llth attacks was
devised and decided upon solely in Afghanistan. Fromm testified that
this was correct.
Chief Judge Ruhle now asked if there were any sources
which could state that the Hamburg Group had not considered or
conceived of the September llth attacks on their own.
Fromm answered that it was not so "black and white" as the
court was trying to depict the situation. The members of the Hamburg
Group were not completely clueless when they traveled to Afghanistan.
They intended to undertake a "Jihad" and the trip to Afghanistan was
in preparation for such activities. However, once they arrived in
Afghanistan, their ultimate goal became finalized. Their purpose was
redirected and they were set upon the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon as their final target.
Furthermore, Fromm noted that there were two ! of the
September llth participants who were mentioned on page 233 of the
U.S. Congressional Report on September llth as having been in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia in January. It was known that Khalid AlMidhair and
Nawaf AlHamsi traveled to the United States from Malaysia to
commence with their flight training. This was an important point,
according to Fromm.
If the Hamburg Group conceived of the plan on its own in
Hamburg, and then traveled to Afghanistan to present this plan as
alleged, then it was unlikely that AlMidhair and AlHamsi would
travel to the United States from Malaysia at approximately the same
time for the same reason. Consequently, it was the BfV's conclusion
that AlQaeda's senior leadership had been searching throughout the
entire world for persons to be recruited for the September llth
attacks.
Of further importance was the fact that the members of the
Hamburg Group never undertook any activities to prepare for the
September llth attacks prior to December 1999. Although they already
displayed antiAmerican sentiments, they never undertook any specific
preparations such as seeking flight instruction in Germany.
According to Fromm, it was possible that they might have undertaken
some actions in furtherance of which the BfV was unaware, but,
generally, the BfV had concluded that the plan for the September llth
attacks had not originated in Hamburg. ' _ '
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1b/C
Chief Judge Ruhle then asked if Fromm was aware that
Binalshibh had flown to Malaysia before his travels to Afghanistan,
and whether Fromm could explain the significance of this fact. Fromm
answered that he had no authority to testify further on this matter.
The Chief Judge then asked whether Fromm could completely
exclude the possibility that the idea and plan to use aircraft as -
bombs had existed before the group's trip to Afghanistan. Fromm said
that this could not be completely discounted.
Associate Judge First Name Unknown! Sakuth then asked why
they gave up on their plan to go to Chechnya. Fromm answered, "no,"
and added that he could give no further information.
He then asked Fromm if he could explain the group's
motivation for changing their plans. Again, Fromm answered, "no,"
and added that he could give no further information.
Chief Judge Ruhle then asked Fromm what exactly he had
meant with his answer, "no." He asked whether Fromm meant that he
did not know the answer to the question, or that he was not
authorized to provide an answer to that question.
Fromm answered that if he provided any further explanation
in his answers, then the court and the public would know what he did
or did not know.
* Chief Judge Ruhle explained to Fromm that this was why he
had been called as a witness before the court. »
Defense attorney Gul Pinar now complained to the court
that it was treating Fromm differently than how it had treated the
FBI witness. When the FBI witness had advised the court that he did
not have the authority to testify on that matter, the court had only
laughed and allowed him to continue. '
Chief Judge Ruhle informed Pinar that Special Agent
[::::::::::::]had presented the court with a written authorization
restricting his testimony to certain matters. _
Fromm now testified that he did not want to say further
what he did or did not know.
The Chief Judge explained that the issue revolved around
whether he was or was not authorized to testify before the court on
these matters. '
Fromm testified that he did not want to disclose matters
about which someone would be able to deduce that his agency was in
. , _ 1
To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 3l5NWF22'/135, 12/05/2003 .
possession of certain documents which the court and the public were
barred from seeing. Consequently, he had decided to confine his
answers simply to the word "no."
A Chief Judge Ruhle advised Fromm that the word "no" had a
double meaning. Namely, the court could interpret it as Fromm did '
not know the answer to the question, or that Fromm was not authorized
to provide testimony on that specific matter.
Fromm expressed his concern that others, and by that he
did not mean the court, would be able to gain insights into certain
matters. He was concerned that the questions could narrow the scope
to such a degree that one could deduce certain information from his
answers. Fromm was worried about inadvertently disclosing classified
information. Thus, he had confined himself to the simplest possible
answer.
Associate Judge Sakuth then asked Fromm whether he had any
knowledge whether the members of the Hamburg Group were recruited
solely in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or whether they had been
recruited in Hamburg which resulted in an invitation to travel to
Afghanistan. .
- Fromm said that he did not understand what the Judge had
meant by "recruited."
Associate Judge Sakuth clarified that he meant whether
they had been recruited to attack the World Trade Center.
Fromm testified that this did not occur here in Germany,
but rather later in Afghanistan.
Associate Judge Sakuth asked whether Fromm derived this
information from "open" sources of information as well. Fromm
testified that it was derived mainly from "open" sources of
information which the BfV had analyzed and weighed with respect to
credibility.
Associate Judge Dr. First Name Unknown! Mohr then asked
how the interview of Fromm had come to exist. Fromm explained that a
journalist had called the BfV and asked if Fromm could sit for an
interview concerning the events of September llth. Fromm had agreed
to do so.
The Minister of the Interior had been advised of the
interview and could have objected to Fromm providing an interview.
He did not do so.
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The journalist's questions were submitted to the BfV in a
written format in advance of the scheduled interview. Then, BfV
experts reviewed the questions and provided Fromm with appropriate
answers to the questions. Fromm reviewed the prepared answers, and
subsequently gave those same answers to the questions posed by the
journalist during the interview.
Associate Judge Dr. Mohr then asked whether Fromm had
discussed those answers before the interview with other federal
agencies. Fromm answered that he had not done so.
The Associate Judge then asked whether anyone else was
present during the interview with Fromm. Fromm testified that the
head of the BfV's Press Office was also present during the interview.
Prosecutor Dr. Matthias Krau next asked how high up the
planning for the September llth attacks originated in the AlQaeda A
leadership, or if the basic idea for the attacks had been formed in
Hamburg. Fromm testified that it was difficult to make a general
statement about such matters. The BfV had concluded that the goal of
attacking the World Trade Center had existed with AlQaeda for a very
long time. It was the type of goal for which they undertook long-
term planning. A similar example was the attack on the U.S. navy _
ship, the U.S.S. Cole. This was another target for which AlQaeda
conducted longterm planning and preparations.
Prosecutor Dr. Krau noted that Fromm had just testified
that AlShehhi, Binalshibh and Atta had all traveled to Afghanistan
in 1999. He now asked whether Fromm had any information if any one
of them had traveled to Afghanistan prior to the 1999 trip.
Fromm testified there were claims that Atta had traveled
to Afghanistan during 1998, but the BfV had no evidence to support
these claims. '
Prosecutor Dr. Krau next asked Fromm whether Binalshibh
had ever traveled to Afghanistan prior to the 1999 trip. Fromm
testified that this question was beyond the scope of his own
knowledge. _ '
Chief Prosecutor Dr. Walter Hemberger asked Fromm how many
people were trained in the camp in Afghanistan which the members of
the Hamburg Group had attended. Fromm testified that he could not
provide a precise number. Suffice it to say that the numbers were in
the five ! digits, encompassing thousands of participants. The
BfV, however, did not have any precise numbers to that effect.
The Chief Prosecutor now asked Fromm how many of these
thousand of participants spoke English. Fromm answered "no."
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Next, he asked Fromm how many.of the thousands of
participants had come to the camp from Western countries. Again,
Fromm answered "no." He then stated that he was unsure if he was
permitted to provide an answer, since he was uncertain if this
question was related to the scope of his prior interview. After all,
Fromm explained that he was not an expert witness.
Chief Prosecutor Dr. Hemberger told Fromm that he had just
testified that there had been thousands of participants at the camp,
and that these four ! participants had been selected and recruited
for their knowledge of English and familiarity with Western
countries. He now wanted Fromm to explain why they had been selected
over the thousands of other participants.
Fromm explained that an analysis conducted by the BfV and
others had come to the conclusion that there were no other suitable
people available. Fromm could only speculate that they had been
selected for their language abilities.
Attorney Andreas Schulz asked Fromm if he could provide a
specific time period for the recruitment in Afghanistan. Fromm asked
whether Schulz wanted him to narrow the time frame. Schulz asked him
to do so.
Fromm then testified that since they knew when the Hamburg
participants traveled to Afghanistan, they had concluded that the
recruitment occurred at some time around January.
Attorney Schulz then directed Fromm's attention to a news
article in "Die Welt," in which it was noted that AlQaeda's former,
closely controlled, hierarchical leadership structure had been
altered to a more loose networklike form after September llth. He
asked Fromm if he could comment to this change.
Fromm testified that some aspects of AlQaeda's methods
had undergone changes due to the successes of the military campaign
. against AlQaeda in Afghanistan and the worldwide manhunts for .
senior AlQaeda leaders. That AlQaeda had changed its leadership
and planning structure was evident from AlQaeda attacks executed
since O9/ll/2001. Prior to September llth, the planning and
coordination for such attacks was being undertaken from Afghanistan.
Attorney E:::::]now asked Fromm whether his testimony
' before the court today concerning Afghanistan was not the result of
recent criticism directed against his agency, the BfV, for having
overlooked the threat of AlQaeda in Hamburg, and not having done
enough prior to September llth to investigate that threat.
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Fromm stated that the testimony that he gave today was the
result of analysis conducted by the BfV's experts. The BfV experts,
as well as Fromm himself, were convinced of the accuracy of their
conclusions.
Attorney Schulz asked to what degree the effect of
disinformation by AlQaeda had been considered with respect to his
testimony pertaining to the AlQaeda camp in Afghanistan. Fromm
advised that disinformation was always present in such information,
and it had been appropriately considered in the final analysis.
Attorney Schulz now rephrased his question and asked
again to what degree the disinformation had been considered with
respect to the "open" sources of information upon which Fromm was
basing his testimony about the camp in Afghanistan.
Fromm testified that disinformation was always considered
in the final analysis, but the greater the number of independent
sources of information one utilized in the analysis, the higher the
probability that the information was accurate.
Attorney Schulz asked Fromm to explain how this was
specifically addressed. Fromm responded that the question had
already been answered. All the sources of information utilized had
been noted. -
Attorney Schulz asked Fromm how the disinformation was
checked. Fromm explained that he did not check the information
himself since he is only the head of a federal agency.
Attorney Schulz advised Fromm that such checking of the
information was important to the final analytical conclusions. One
could not simply read a book and then state that one was convinced of
its credibility. Schulz asked Fromm what the BfV had done to check
the "open" sources of information upon which it was basing its
conclusions. ~
Fromm answered that the information had been checked.
Attorney Schulz asked whether the U.S. Congressional
Report on September llth was one of the sources of information
against which the other "open" sources had been checked. Fromm
answered that this was correct.
Attorney[:::::]now asked Fromm what he had meant by the
"intelligence community." Fromm testified that all intelligence
services work in a similar manner. They either exclude something as
improbable, or they are convinced of its accuracy and credibility.
Fromm could not say any more to this matter.
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Attorney Schulz then asked Fromm who had checked the
accuracy of the U.S. Congressional Report on September llth. Fromm
could not answer that question, and suggested that Schulz direct his
question to the United States Government.
Defense attorney Pinar asked Fromm what he would say if
someone stated that the planning had not occurred in Afghanistan, but
instead in Hamburg. Fromm testified that this would contradict the
analysis and conclusions of the BfV.
She now asked whether this was derived from "open" sources
of information.- Fromm testified that it was derived from all
available "open" sources of information which had been evaluated.
She then asked how probable was it that the idea for using
aircraft as bombs for September llth had been conceived in Hamburg
before the trip to Afghanistan. »
-- ' Attorney Schulz objected to the form of the question as
being based upon probability factors.
The Chief Judge overruled the objection and allowed the
question to stand.
' Attorney Schulz asked the entire court panel to issue a
formal ruling._ _
The court now granted a short recess, while it deliberated-
about the objection.
When the court returned to the courtroom, the Chief Judge
ruled that the question, of the likelihood of the Hamburg Group
having conceived of utilizing aircraft as bombs before the
Afghanistan trip, would be permitted to stand.
Fromm now testified that he was only familiar with the
BfV's own analysis and conclusions. He could not exclude the
possibility that the idea had been conceived in Hamburg, but he could
not say so with any specific degree of probability.
Defense attorney Pinar asked whether there was any other
analysis which had come to a different conclusion than the one
presented by Fromm. Fromm testified that the BfV was unaware of any
activities that were undertaken in Germany to prepare for the
September llth attacks. The first indications of preparations for
the September 11th attacks came at the end of 1999 when the Hamburg
Group members began to interest themselves in flight training.
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Defense attorney Pinar now asked that Fromm's testimony be
cited in the final verdict.
Chief Judge Ruhle informed Pinar that it would be noted;
Defense attorney Pinar then asked Fromm if he could
explain what he had meant by his testimony that the members of the
Hamburg Group became ever more radical in their perspective.
Fromm advised that he had already explained this to the
court. Atta and the other members of the Hamburg Group were not the
fanatical Muslims that they later became to be. They had decided in
1998 or 1999 to take part in a Holy War and fight to the death, if
necessary.
Defense attorney Pinar then asked whether it was a
necessary element of their radical development to travel to
Afghanistan. Fromm answered that it was not a necessary aspect of
radical Islamic development. A
She also asked whether Islamic radicals go to Afghanistan
to participate in a "Jihad." Fromm advised that those radicals could
go to Afghanistan to participate in "Jihad." However, they could
also go to Chechnya and Bosnia to participate in a "Jihad."
Defense attorney Pinar asked how Fromm was able to
identify the time period during which the Hamburg Group members were
recruited for the September 11th plan. Fromm testified that this
information was derived from the results of statements given by
detained Mujahadeen. The information was also derived from "open"
sources of information and information shared with the BfV by other
intelligence agencies. Fromm could not answer the question any
further.
Prosecutor Dr. Krau next asked Fromm if he was aware that
flight simulator computer programs had been discovered on
Motassadeq's computer, and that these programs had existed on his
computer prior to 1999. Fromm testified that this information was
not known to him. If this were true, then such information would
have been known by the experts at the BfV. Nonetheless, Fromm did
not consider this information as relevant, since it would not have
altered the final conclusion issued by the BfV.
Chief Prosecutor Walter Hemberger then asked Fromm if he
had understood Fromm's testimony correctly. Namely, the BfVs
conclusion that there was no previous intention to commit the acts of
September 11th was based upon the absence of preparations for
executing the plan, such as undertaking flight training. Fromm
answered that it could not be viewed in such a strict manner.
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Associate Judge Sakuth asked Fromm how the AlJazeera
journalist had been able to travel to Afghanistan and find the
AlQaeda leadership. -Fromm testified that it was described in the
book. The journalist initially traveled to Pakistan where he waited
for a telephone call. Thereafter, he was taken to a location where
he was able to interview Binalshibh and KSM. Fromm had not seen the
video of the interview, but he was familiar with the subsequent book.
Fromm only knew the substance of the book's statements. _
Defense attorney Pinar noted that she had seen the video,
but that one could not see the faces of the interview subjects. She
asked Fromm whether he doubted the authenticity of the identities of
the interview subjects. Fromm answered that he did not doubt the "
identities of the interview subjects. In fact he had no doubts
whatsoever regarding the authenticity of the statements made or the
identities of the subjects.
Chief Judge Ruhle asked if Fromm was basing his
conclusions on the book by the AlJazeera journalist. Fromm said
that it was so.
The Chief Judge informed Fromm that he was unfamiliar with .
this interview, either on film or in book format. Fromm suggested
that the court obtain excerpts of the interview from the Internet.
The court then excused Fromm without requiring him to
swear an oath to this testimony.
Defense Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and Release the Defendant
Defense attorney Michael Rosenthal advised the court that
Fromm's testimony, which had been based upon carefully analyzed
information, presented conclusions fundamentally contradicting the
prosecutorial theory for the case. His testimony called into
question not only whether the planning for the September llth attacks
had been formulated in Hamburg, but also whether such planning
existed before or after 1999. If Fromm's testimony was correct, then
the prosecution's Indictment was fundamentally flawed. Consequently,
the defense was filing a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and Release
the Defendant from Custody. _
Chief Prosecutor Hemberger argued against a dismissal of
the matter. 'Fromm's testimony should not mislead the court into
concluding that the prosecution's Indictment was incorrect. His
testimony was based upon conclusions which had no further bearing to
the main elements of the underlying criminal offenses.
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Chief Judge Ruhle informed the defense that any Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment and Release the Defendant from Custody neededv
to be in writing.
Thereafter, the court adjourned for lunch until
1:30 p.m. at which time the next witness was scheduled to testify.
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To: Counterterrorism From: ~Berlin
Re: 3l5NWF227l35, 12/05/2003
LEAD§ !: .
Set Lead 1: Info!
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT ETIU4, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: Info!
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AT IOI, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 3: Info! _
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
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Set Lead 4: Discretionary!
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Disseminate as necessary.
fromm2.wpd
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