Document text
l
, ~ __";-¢...L.i»=. 7
"'_,,-!.?,' .1._~|
I
-- »92~ ;??.' "~-
__" V.-J A", ?. -A-.-- . .
_ _ 92. V .- 1- r. ._ » -.<. =1-_-I - -- -. - s" :.~=:-r a *",: ¢'=!""<~v'»-' =- .- .'-.-;: In _., w : .f-;';- J " .-92-f_§:'.-?,%.j_*7 A 3 ;.,";=_~ L7 -Ey . .92 - - _.r-I V, - ~ ~ - 1
.. . ~~ 7 "|92:é.:I A -, -1- 1.!~ ;_Q__=_»~,:;,M L _ ,_;:-- .51 _y_;;.;=i;|.k:~t__'._~; .__.__5_.£,-B-7_f_92g;ri'-";y;=35} §;.__~_;;E_,}-_£,} »;;;.%;1. I _=.:~=_"--. -,~"-t '>,,- pp --7,]; ;.*,;;;4r=-gr;',- >.:_;,,_-,- "| 4:'I,*ue<'|s.""l$::|i'--Iirki-'f¢5-'.92'lZ'1s'i»-$' "- 1
.~;1 ' 1 f I I H
1
,
£1-I""15_ i } _
I
_ _l
9218 PEACE IN VIETNAM
neutraiist government that he had been trying for so iong to estab-
lish, from 1956 to 1958 it had openly undertaken to subvert and
topple his government by supporting the right-wing {actions under
General Phoumi Nosovan. The Thai government, which joined
the United States in backing Phoumi Nosovan. has continued to
oppose the establishment of a neutralist Laos. This has not made
Souvanna Phoumas subsequent efforts any easier. Whatever the
settlement in Vietnam, the several ethnic components of Laos are
likely to gravitate in the same directions they did prior to their
artiticiai administrative unication by France.
Clearly the force of nationalism in the countries of Southeast
Asia does not justify any simple domino-theory" approach in
United States policy toward that area. The power of this national-
ism will remain the watchful guardian of political independence,
poised against any hint of outside interferencewhether from
China or the United States. As long as Southeast Asian govern-
ments are in harmony with their countries nationalism and so
long as they prove capable, wise, and strong enough to institute
the basic reforms necessary to meet the most pressing socioeco-
nomic demands of their peoples, indigenous Communist leaders
are likely to encounter little success.
How well is the United States relating to these demands for
social revolution and thereby contributing to the security and sta-
bility of the newly emerging nations of Southeast Asia?
Mr
-iv-xi Yfl
1I-1.92 . 92'<- . V e - ~- » -_ ,5. . . '
L . "_".,H .-. . n I II _ .
- I - M fa: 1E V _ __ .,..__'_ iv; %,~._ . . . -, ._ _ - »;.'_55" 7- - t-r ~ =.E"'22/ 2-;i>-- e=" ~ " ~
-av
Fl3: The Need For Socioeconomic__ ;- p'_____e_: Q Change in Southeast Asia
.-, -».- .. _f»_e-."-l'!>."";l.l-!H.7.---Z-. . .»h.~92. _. . .i .- T »-7 -- - I -4 - r- ..;.=;- .<.~, ' .92 " ">;*.':'~.-. r~ '- - I-.92.92.---"-c.-rm: "..- 2'-~».-w .?92-1'V; . 3 _. -_'--,,. ~-92 _.-V-1,1-._'_ , A 1 .. 1;,-'2
. - -'.-1=~--92-=r-,- -1.." . -. 1 . 4 - .- - 92 92,.;= t .92".,-3 _,'-.1r;1",'-.-.~._i92. . - . r, I p Q3"-3-_-.'.-";= -"Si.= ; -K.-..-..4 '- _ F 1t. ; , -i .' ;-, . ~ .1-fa; -'.i_-".-_».-<'_'5-,§_i:--=2
-'-- -' => .1. 7 wt ~=.=,--.' =_-~ -»" .-.:-ti.-I » 1 =',~'-=*¢4ta»'-=- ~-mu-M---~-.~ u= J --5*.~a=t.~'=ee;:er1§»hA_a5.u¢ir'--*J.Kh"" " >1w.'£.§-._...l--=l:.=-1";
I
r
_: » .- ' -L1 _ *-37:? x "ail
1*." . :3 k
._-._......;- = -- _-Y-~~ . ='.- 1 ; E-. -;-,-1, ,92.11924u92Too often, in the complexities of the Vietnam situation itscli
we forget that since World War II a greater percentage of thl
wor1ds wealth has become concentrated in the hands of a smalle
percentage of the earths population than ever before. Althougl
there has been some absolute increase in production in the pre
dominantly agrarian countries of eastern Asia, the increase i
small compared with the rapid growth in population and the risini
expectations of an increasingly aware populace. Paul Marti:
Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, outlined the gen
eral problem in a speech given in Cleveland, Ohio, in Septembe
1964: . .
In the decade from 1950 to 1960 the countries of the underdevelopd
world were able to increase their production of goods and service
from $110 billion to just under $170 billion. This means that at th
beginning of the decade as at the end of it, these countries accounte
for only three-tenths of all the goods and services produced in th
free world as a whole. Over the same period the total population c
these countries increased from one thousand million to thirteen hur
dred million people. That is a rate almost twice as high as that exp:
rienced in the advanced countries of the free world. When the growt
of production is discounted by the growth of population, we nd th:
the less developed countries were able to increase their average pt
19 '"
Imp ' -'-" < -.17 .- ..___.;: -
-.
1; .| . ~*z__:_:-_:
- ,." 311,5; ._ . . . . >-;.. - - _
. i i.
,#_
Q =5,
; .-- 1_, 1.-- - 1. ." 1* ii. _ - 1-.92- 92.1 . . .,_!:
ai
_ ~ .7 ..-. .,_ - :-:l * .. _ ._ .¢i':.;: '-
. ~,. ___.r_~"_ ._L',:,;_ <.F_',_,v '.,- ; .. .'_-.-L'92 ' -.~.' -- ._ 1 .,_ . . _ ,,, .: _",_',_+,. ~~ _y,-,:- ;-;,_.°
'3. 4. . - 3 7" -*1-'~-'>"';i.":.: * :';:*.'..§'.f:§;f%'7£i3'.;*..-'75..14%;?~.-_;,,.- _- ,_~..j ~,-1 1.. ,- " .-..- ,3. -';;;~1-mi!-».>l~ ..1:.1-"-'i 1-...:; @ '£.§'>-*-ii -i Q-".'°=.'-ll..;¥. 1.. s.":~.;:'<-lI'i~.-ii-."*,>,.'ei1s;-.'2~*Ei""'-
.: . aw . W J
=h924-2 .-_ _. _ _20 PEACE INBVIETNAM
capita income over the decade by no more than $25, from $105 in
1950 to $130 in 1960. In other words per capita income in these
countries rose by a mere $2.50 a year. What is more signicant is
that during this ten-year period, the gap between standards of living
in these countries and standards of living in the advanced countries
widened in both absolute and relative terms.
Naturally conditions of livelihood and economic growth in the
underdeveloped countries of Asia vary from country to country
and Lrom men to men countries. The situation in Thailand
and Burma with their general rice surplus is clearly better than
that of India, where food shortages are approaching catastrophic
proportions. Also the rich delta area of southern Thailand presents
a dierent picture from that oi its impoverished northeast. But
these are relative differences and temporary advantages. In none
oi these count-es has a modern economy developed. In varying
degrees they all are dominated by traditional patterns of agrarian
subsistence economy. Land is the essential element of wealth, and
what little private capital is accumulated is usually invested in
buying more land, in usury, or in commodity speculation. Seldom
is it put to work as productive capital beyond making minimal
improvements in land or processing techniques.
The preceding chapter showed that nationalism is the prime
mover in the emancipation from colonial rule. The need and de-
mand ior socioeconomic innovation accompanies nationalism and
becomes more insistent as time goes by. It must necessarily be a
dominant preoccupation of any new national government. The
United States must learn to deal with this and welcome its con-
structive aspects.
In remarks to editors and broadcasters attending a national
foreign policy conference in Washington on April 21, 1964, Presi-
dent Johnson said:
Poverty, hunger, and disease are alictions as old as man himself.
But in our time and in this age there has been a change. The change
is not so much in the realities of life, but in the hopes and expecta-
tions of the future. If a peaceful revolution in these areas is impossible,
e violent revolution is inevitable.
_ 1 , I 1 Vital Speeches of the Day. October I5, 1965, p. 31.
p .
.1-
--,92
'!;"_=~'- :""":i:' ;-; 1' -.~ .'- '- 1- t -2,". P-_= = 1-1. Z "J.-":'-* 5';'§ '3;* - -. .-- _ _ L. ._. t 4.__¢.-. -. .. ----. : .--.1_ ~ -~,;i-- _,, - ',. -,_,_, , .~ .=~.1_,, --_1 t ., ¬s_.,. -5. _._,, .44 -_.p;_,L¢ ._. _._,.,,, 3,; ,3, ,,;,, ,, g:;@;,"",;,g g
=.,i
l
sh! e...#_, _ _ ._.
-- _- . --.'=.: . .__ -" - _=,< 'I.:~_-'--1 ' 1 92 i ' .92 -"92= rs-, - = , 4- - -. ' '" . -J ' 3 . ~ --7 '. I.-:i'92, _ . ;. . :;_..!;. 33:. _.;r-.,;,, =3,L E 2?-if-:"' , a ~.; -.1. "la--_.f. - - ;';-.;_ - -ta?
- _- >--- -~. :='s'.-"_92-_- .»_-¢,_--"I-3;-»~_-¢,<--~_--r_¢-¢r-92_-;.»n~-.=.7,,,-ts . ..,,,s,N,.-_'92 =, ~ '_~;w.;:_1,i.= _--.:"_-'-.»q'~.c_-_- j ;'< 1 rv-'4-_-s-. -.=.".r;.. 3.-1 ;=,1.. -r!? r>v~:.-.n--1,1.-. _.= . . ,=. -;.=..". ,92' as , . . , M
.--.. ' ".. .-'..'.-. . _.. -- an _.2 . ~ .;..- - .,,~. . J - .. :r,:' ,-";~"' ' -..- '. -5, ..Jj-I',1.I"'= " ' "
1 _.-'..r»_-_; . xi-1 ,2-.=-_».-'.:.1';. _'~ .--1 -'*';-.> 92- ';L.-'-' I-jf-':_-__i,,,~, ._|. 71$_ , , ' :'- 1'4: ,1-'./,e
,_ -u
. > ' ' "
._ _ .- ->. _- .Q-~ - . _ ~ - ' r- ,-9. ,5 -i -.-ow
1.-
- E:
a
a
;;'=L 92
I
I
t ii.. 1K.92
ii
nnsn non SOCIOECONOMIC crumcn IN SOUTI-LEAST ASIA 21
However, in facing this problem, jilst as in facing the question
of nationalism in Southeast Asia, the United States governrnerit
has consistently guided its activities with an overriding concern
to stop Communism." In order to deal with the demands for
socioeconomic revolution and also contain Communism, Wash-
ington has evolved a two-prongecl approach: economic assistance
and military assistance with special emphasis on counterinsurgency
programs. This approach is based in part on theories of economic
growth propoimded by Walt W. Rostow, now chairman of the
State Department Policy Planning Council. According to Mr.
Rostow, there are several stages in the transition from the tradi-
tional agrarian economy to modern industrialism with its high mass
consumption. At the beginning this transition is a slow process
requiring the accumulation of vast amounts of capital. When sui-
cient capital has been accumulated or poured into the country
from the outside, its economy reaches a take-o stage. At this
point the various elements of the economy---capital accumulation,
entrepreneurial drives, labor skills, technology-all accelerate
rapidly, thus leading to a stage of self-sustaining growth. Then the
country is well on its way toward the development of a modern
industrial society.
The countries of eastem and southern Asia encompassed in the
vast crescent arch extending from Korea to Pakistan, with the
exceptions of Japan, Singapore, and probably Taiwan, are all still
in the pre-take-o stage, or just beginning to enter it.
In the view of Rostow and other foreign policy planners in
Washington, this is a period fraught with danger, since needs
and desires tend to outrun the capacity to satisfy them, and the
resulting discontent leads to political instability. It is at this point
that Communism has its opportunity to gain ascendancy. There-
fore, as we pour capital and technical assistance into these coun-
tries in order to speed up the process of economic modernization,
we also help friendly governments develop counterinsurgency pro-
grams on a large scale. By so doing, it is hoped that stability can
be maintained through the take-o stage, usually a period of a
decade or two, and that the Communists will be thwarted in their
attempt to gain power during the intervening period.
- Our two-pronged approach of economic assistance and counter-
.,-'
t-v e-" ' W? _-V _ ____ __ _ ___ ___
'1'"???-a, Fe: -"_ .r ts.-» .-,..- ~ -,~'. .
u-1", . .. ..see --
""92-. 5
r-,' -:: r_.|_ '==.= . .
lg l
" v
I ,
92 .- 1- - ,..,. »-n -V -1-;"-1-r , '92.i_'rFt-!:|'.'§*'?§' I-92 __ i 1,; ,'.V-_;r,~.___?_,:. t. .». 1- _.,_ .,. ,.~. -3, i92-"C 15;-"-;I' ""5"? "Iii1.-j;__:_ 1;__ 921,:|_=-_ ,_, _ _* , -;~ -' '=.~ V -4v :92- :--.. . . . .» . - . H. :_.: =1;3. I ~. ":J.."9292r'-is->t".'9292 _; 92,.v 7"- ' " i ' "4. .' 5 -=tl=;--iii ii.-1:-i .;-»-.' 1'5.:.;»i='§rii-.'3jii:'1'-.'313:!-dig
-~-- ~ --~e»---_-¢s___.._.-.-st:-» i_-_- , J_ .92~.» _92 §~ .-.;»- t . ~,.-F-1-.~_92', 'I..92'~, _' ;'-»_ '-,92-92.F>..; ':'-cg-. rs- - -' X- Z
li> . 0 ;i
s ' e 1
*1
|
p , ,!_._';;. ._1Pf " 1. N,~ r ' §"92%?as . > 1 11;;
~ e 1~ ._f
_}
22 PEACE IN VIETNAM
insurgency, however, involves a fatal contradiction. Transition to
the stage of self-sustaining growth requires three elements: capital
accumulation, technical innovation, and institutional change. The
latter includes such matters as land reform, a switch from sub-
sistence to commercial crops, the widespread establishment of
credit, Supply and marketing cooperatives, expanded educational
opportunities, population control, and the introduction of modern
accounting methods and scal responsibility in government It also
necessitates the curtailment of privileges, favoritism, and corrup-
tionhallmarlts of traditional Asian political systems.
Without this institutional change the pouring in of capital and
technical assistance from outside can, at best, produce only a thin
veneer of urban modernization superimposed on a backward,
underdeveloped. and increasingly frustrated society. Indigenous
capital accumulation remains extremely diiiicuit, and increased
production based on improvements in agriculture and in local in-
dustries fails to materialize.
All of these changes have been goals of stated American policy,
but the problem lies in gaining the cooperation of local ruling
groups in overcoming vested interests and the inertia of the old
society. In the past our chief hopes for bringing about change have
rested with the newly emerging, modern-minded, Western-oriented
middle class in these countries; wherever possible we have sup-
ported this class and the "'....'dt.le-r>i=rla%road governments led by it.
Unfortunately this class is small in numbers and almost entirely
conned to the major cities. It has practically no political strength
at all in the vast countryside where most of the population live.
All too frequently the real political power lies with a group
made up of traditional land-based gentry, a closely associated
military caste, and urban merchants who are tied to the traditional
socioeconomic pattern and strongly opposed to any change in the
status quo that aects their immediate interests. Also allied with
this group are many vestial colonial interests: plantation owners,
mine operators, lumber and petroleum rms, and other foreign
concerns that produce raw materials for world markets.
The chief potential counter-force, aside from a small and highly
volatile section of the urban student and working-class population,
consists largely of the mass of irustrated peasantry and ethnic or
_ >92slA492;4 ...._...____ _ ___ ,,,_ _
,,.,_-j-
. .n92-,=-.92-.¢,.. M1»
-.. t" 92- ' " - . M.IQ 1 - _. i__ ,, ; -in
e-__ i
' V1 J-r-'2-, ,,.-- 9,», W... _:5 ' . _r,2_.: -rt, »» 92-_ ---i ll. . _
-- I - i
I
F
1-»-
wyv-92ii
<'1|. ' . l
.. , :- Y -1 --_~,,-e--".,V,_ T, -.r-5,»,--.3;92_-1,--_-_=on;-»-.;-;. ,-»q_-1-a;w 92 -1 ' ' ix "*4 I 4 R A 92 gl
<._ .,
,- ,;_..'...r_;_.,- -.i.¢-92~---_..92--3
"1
Q1:_;- as
,, .K 92t f-92'..:, = '=.92:_=. 2!--. .'* -»»::_-- : ~'- " i'2 -.F92.-'1:?>J:l ,,-1;,v .1
92
l
, lI1
,._.;,:, -. 92~ _. .;.__.--ex
3.-wt -_.' . y A.-I 1
:,- 1- ,,- '
.. :-'1-; -,g_.- ref.
';9292sL"a -~~-
v
.1 -*92 '~o
.$;"- i . -_1 ,
5
-I
f .»
EC
92A
_ . _' -1 $1, -... it
ts}
1 l
>
.- |V,' ..-21"-' .*.'<.I;-1;
1'-" :g@
NEED non socioeconomic cameo IN sournnssr ASIAT 3
23
religious minorities who feel themselves oppressed under the status
quo. The peasantry, although a numerical majority, has heretofore
lived in a state of tradition-bound political apathy and local isola-
tion. When conditions became intolerable, it was capable of reac-
tion in the ionn of lmal riots but was rarely able to mount an
organized mass movement with broad political and social pro-
grams. Now, however, the situation is changing. With the great
advance in communications, the peasantry is becoming more aware
of the world around it, the possibilities of political action, and par-
ticularly the power of organization. The demand ct these people
for change makes them sympathetic to revolutionary programs;
programs that promise the social services and material goods that
signify a fuller, more comfortable life. The lesson of organization
tor such programs in usuahy provided by those most interested in
mass revolutionary change on the peasant level, i.e., Communist
or non-Communist left-wing groups. It is important to point out
that these groups, although they receive moral support from some
Communist countries, derive their basic support from peasant and
worker discontent and are led primarily; by idealistic intellectuals
from the middle class.
Thus, as the existing national governments come under increas-
ing pressure from their people to institute socioeconomic reforms,
change will be inevitable. And since the need has already reached
a critical point in most of these countries, only a stable, highly
organized government with strong powers seems to be capable of
carrying out such reforms. In some places this power may take the
form of a left-wing or even Communist government. But this does
not necessarily mean that a militantly anti-American bloc will
emerge. Surely a major factor is the attitude of the United States
toward these new regimes. By pmsuing a two-pronged policy
which, on the one hand, claims to seek peace, stability, and
progress for the area but which, on the other hand, has as its
overriding concern the stopping of Communism, the United States
is usually obliged to support those committed to maintaining the
status quo, thus almost assuring the very kind of violent and anti-
American revolution that it most seeks to prevent.
On the other hand, it the United States, recognizing the in-
evitability of change and the natural development of a socio-
§A
e as M ;* ' _1:* "E-*~ ' ~"TT ' _. _ A '
. _ _;_ I "3 1 A wt,--~.-.. . I ;
Y r 1 g I I
. v l
' _,. :5.--_:-.
I '<-, -..__- _...._,» . _,_'_,,
ji-
1: ' ' ' '
ta .
. 1
Ir. ~71 = ~- l' 1
at ..z-.'. r y - I-"£15, _~;-.:--
*>.'.I -; i -21,,___:___._ -__!._:. . ; . _. .3, :- .,_~ _,. . - 92. _. 4, PM _.| .» at 42 >_ - .. .../.-..-.¢~.-1.-r -~ J--'h<..92<"....*_g .;=»-. .~?-.- :1:-mt;_- < 5 t -i -'-=.~:= we -2-: .- -= 31¢!.-;,;»~-w:.92~ ¢;¢-->.=5-.-;»;92-.~-- sf_. . ,_:;,_ -A -_'> =92.92:;;~._»>_u--_t-¢._."92-1-N -';_,-;~ .g~
= t_ ~ .<:~-5-= ~.--r'_".~ ».¢;
- - -1--..r_' 1 _ _',- , ._',Y < ~=-*3.. ! J ,"-_',,-1j~' _ §' '_l . _-5'1?-".'-'1-'1.-;P -Y-J. . --I ;-1's"§,.-I-f.-i-1' »9.-2"»p5!-§;t'--$5.1;s'.92' :1;..» . Q . . ;.. .-, 1 ~-.;_n, .»,,,;_.-_,;.-;>..;.-_,; ,-pt; ;;,.=;-,-gs;-_.1_;..-.¢,-.-*.. .3-3-L-.44; tr=;.;a- . -'i.m. - Ll_.54JJ>.,lf' - ' -<21.-11.-"tart-.=....»" '~-ii-1 Iii-' *5?-Y-eve-:n+-
i. i
I
st,"
_ _ .__34 PEACE ti»: warmer
econoc revolution in an area, can offer constructive aid free
from the threat of accompanying political or military intervention,
the governments it is dealing with can develop independently in
the spirit of the nationalism that gave them their rst impetus.
The example of eastern Europe illustrates the importance of
United States policy in matter. A gradnai development of
more or less independent attitudes in international affairs on the
part of the eastem European countries came after the Hungarian
revolt in 1956. The failure of the United States to intervene at the
time demonstrated that it was not prepared to carry through with
its previously declared intention to assist in the liberation of
the captive nations." Thus not only have the leaders of these
countries felt less compelled to seek the protection of the Soviet
Union, but the Soviet Union itself has been more willing to relax
its hold mrer them. As a result the tenriencv tnwnrd extreme no- '- -- -- --- - --~-i - --; ----- ---" |-'
larization in Europe, represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
has been eased, and the chances for peace in Europe now appear
greater than at any time since World War H. Increased inde
pendence on the part of eastern European countries, although
made possible by these circumstances, stems primarily from their
divergent national interests. No matter what ideological ties may
exist between Communists, once a Communist party is in power,
it nds itself moved to meet the needs of its own people apart
from the interest of the associated Communist countries as a
whole. The obvious reluctance of both the Soviet Union and the
eastern European countries to commit themselves to all-out sup-
port of the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front stems
in large measure from this fact.
Some may detnur that to suggest abandonment of prmnt Amer=
ican policy in Southeast Asia in favor of an a1lout emphasis on
constructive socioeconomic aid is an over-simplication of the prob-
lems involved. They well may ask whether it is possible that the
United States need only withdraw its support of status quo regimes
in order to have them give way to progressive governments ready
and able to bring about immediate socioeconomic revolutions, and
at the same time willing to seek the aid of the United States. Of
course the process is by no means so simple. The task facing any
government committed to bringing about fundamental change in
.92'4'I92.r-i
-is-- -er-
in
is 1. .. .92 ,_ , I§ -<2. éliiir -'59 >,_;_ 1 _ gr: pg . -- "F -1*.-. ,--fr" L -T1 t '4. _/<55; _ ' l L1"
_92-<
§§.-'4
._.-,. _.__,-92..I
-<¢:
-a~
at_ -4
-< 4'.
4~.-4.4-r _ -
92-gay! 1-w *'E s k A
92 -c 7 15
. , 1.,-. -_r_-e ,4 -r--. ,1.- 5, 1,.-..:~ 2 ,.-,. -. . --... v ;F='If-- ...._i,..,_
/,5 "
1* -Y1}
i
.-.»__ -..;_. .4,--. -9.-[J '-= -:' !'.;-- .-
.,_- I
. -.-" 'I.-~49.
- ....
. -I92_L. _ D _;_92._ I- .._H.l
. . , . .. -'1'-.'I"?:'l»=.-12';. ": _ -,-92 "1 '... ,-T -' }._~.-_-,'->:'--,1- ..-.f,»,.f' -=,92;:92.-.i_ 1-_.3-; ;-13'--=.:-"i'.1 ft? 1.3.;-'~._* 1..-.< T-.1-_;;-;,,»_,1_,,-'=__; ;5{1,'_-_-3;;1;_i-92";-,;,- W7 5:-;1'1:'~§-I 33 1 ,<, '- Q-i y i-5;';-.s~=";é-
i . L 92
':'J-- I_;;._.. l
'.'{i Tr ?i
.- ii ti:= l I '; i
e,n;§4:§
|l. 5.' E
Ll .~w_'92a-_ i
4 .. .;.,_. ,. . .: 1-41.--~ _:. .'.
' ll
!225
the underdeveloped countries of Asia is so enormous that it is
certain to involve a long, ditcult, and often extremely bitter
process. Left-wing or Communist regimes in themselves do not
constitute any passport to rapid economic progress. Neither China
nor the Soviet Union has escaped serious eofs in the process of
industrialization, particularly in regard to the extremely compli-
cated problem of maintaining a proper balance between industrial
and agricultural development. However, these have generally been
errors committed in the process of growtha growth possible only
after the elimination of the restraints imposed by the old socio-
economic patterns. In this growth both countries have shown a
real responsiveness to the needs oi the people. The rise in the
genera] standard of living, literacy, and health has been spectacu-
lar, oz-mpared with those countries still following an old social
order. An example can be cited from North Vietnam in 1956,
where an effort to apply unsuitable Chinese patterns of agrarian
reform in one province resulted in peasant rioting. Army troops
rsternly subdued the incipient rebellion. The particular reform was
then abandoned for more suitable methods and President Ho Chi
fMinh removed the pro-Chinese oicial who had administered it.
Revolutionary social change has so far always exacted a cost in
ierms of human lives and misery. This cost must be seen in rela-
-tion to the alternative of extending the hunger, disease, ignorance,
and chronic violence of the past into an overpopulated and over-
-,armed world of the future.
Many Asians are now heaping the onus of Western imperialism
.-on American shoulders. This accusation is _not without some jus-
tification and cannot easily be shed. Any new revolutionary gov-
,.ernment that comes to power in Asia will probably begin with
-virulent denunciations of the United States, if only to prove that itNEED FOR SOLJOECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
upholding the cause of anti-imperialism. American-owned busi-
nesses may suer and may be nationalized, and Americans and
their friends certainly nd life less comfortable than be-
-fore. How long would it be before national interests would lead
-these governments to seek some accommodation with the United
;"States? This will be governed by how long and in what measure
. the United States continues to pose a threat. Algeria is a case in
} point. When nally allowed to develop as an independent nation,
_ _ ,_ e = F - - --_:"""" T"_"______-'
-_;...'.,§, - P _ ' _,-. _:_
.-;;,. ,_ Q
92 -3. "4 ~> __,_ _
iiE I. .
Ia
F
-
-_-Tw-_'.'. --- , . . - --~F ' ~'- ' » '1';-".'.*1'<3~..i92-11;"-1-*1 ; "".<-~iI
:3: -~,
at
:
l
i
.-- ' -= 9 -~ -., ._-_. .. _ V _ 92;_ 92'.w< r -- - .-=1-,-Q; t--w -~ =1 v -.» 4* 1-. ,-. , _..- 6 -4..-1; V; . M-_-.»,'.= t" . $711 - .1-F1
> J, _¢-_- .,_ - 92 '- -- 2-§;_Qi'-' ~ -.c~,.:- ' I" '1 H4, .-q=,,.-,- $1.5 ' i g
.. i,, , _,,;.,,%4 --_-.,_,_,-_-.K L A ~_d1"1»=lf:¬_';"{,$.- ~.; 2'."--. innlgl-92 . -:',.-',-'-'»- ,1~' . .. . -' ;- _ - :;._ 1-.-._-_<_-.» ». ., .- 92_ _ ,_.. ~|.. ~.-W -_J4_..-- ., _,_M_. -.-,, _ -y ._, -:_~__|, _~_.~-_1_; -H-_~",_d_-'_-_.-__ =.4 :
W
0»
i
. -- --"er =~;~ --~ ea-3-
.{u=.&#ue--4-»--4--* *_ ' _ . . 3
C ' Z " ' _ 4 Q. C 1-
'*",;§;":--" -5 """..92' " _ "- -I--lV:4C ¥:#_,:;;:.i_F;V;921 L.. . . - - - .- -- -- 1. 3-; -.=_>'.-J;--_"_ _';.',I-;Z '- , _; 3 '~ ; ___ i.¢.'- - - -..; .i -; :- _-~_".,~.~'_-I *_-J-_-*,?.',-32*-. -if-:=.;'.g=-::.I=1.<_J_;;e{-.=_, 4:-~ . ; r§,--c~.'».-;-.- . -'>1:~---it >.=-~_.a §=,£~;Tq;92-g "<;2'»,;@-gm-5;--'4 ».'-'é'=rJ. in .';-L- I = --§_---,~,,-- ,g;_{:f"_'¢,;;'g;' ;;L1;L§23'.*:,--_:_;< -. - ' ~».*- 1*-
I26 ' PEACE IN vrsrmu»
Algeria quickly sought the aid of the United States and eve:
France, and today American and French enterprises play a widen-
ing role in the economic development of that country.
This analysis of revolutionary political and soeioecouomii
movements points to the fact that the old days of military domi-
nance of Asian countries by white Western powers is over. Eco
nomic assistance through trade, loans, and direct aid is more per-
tinent than ever, provided it does not jeopardize the newly wor
political independence. An interesting recognition of the new er:
comes from the British Tory defense spokesman Enoch Poweil
who stated at a conference of the Conservative Party on Octobei
14, 1965, that Britain's military commitment cast of Suez should.
be abandoned because it is self-defeating at some points.
The United States has not yet acknowledged this new era. The
reason given for its continuing military commitment is that South-
east Asia must be defended trorn Chinese Communist encroach-
tnent. The potential role of China in this area must therefore be
considered.
New York Times, October 15, 196$.
I
- J-
-T_|92'_<92-'1' 1-1 .-92_-'-*-_-.- .~..'l.-¢-,..- 1- -, -1- .,H,-.~.__-.-~,-. 4-_t-..k _ >5-__ .. -;.<. <-.;.~' ____*_-_ l .__fT_* __ " __ 1-
=____.
.z._ _,. J,_ __ y; -.
' r
92-
4
3 _
< _=__- P H:-'_»1;,;.92".',;_5.L _92'»e3_.;.__ ,-1- -= -. .';.;.=~.~.
' ' ' ;- _:_ ; _ i ,..»_i--_- _',
-" 1 : - " 1_-_ _ ._ .3 92._t__.__'_,r.,-. 1 _ _-,,. . _,-. ¢._s_=...._t,t=t -.»3,92,.-.92 r_ -.'..-W . .~ -2 .;_.-- 9 tit;-._- . -=.~.~ .;-..,=;..".§_», -' . _ .- ~ ----, a 1 -.;.._<-;. 9292 7.-L ti.-__»..~,. = ~ __ i _ ;-.,_, .-._=92?;-_v-2,'<.?q~'a. - at J .-.n_- -{H1 -' .27--_:.e'uJ¬5'!92:;92i:Z:_-IIJIII5 i-.3~- - _ -. 92.-- > _»i ~.
i 7- i»,-;.»,| - L
.9. "
sit ,
ii, It-E1.».Tg_.'i-; _t gy ;._f,
. 1"-71.--- / .;:. =r .. r 92 -»-. .|~ .,..-,- -97.-:;. :_ r_ ,-a ;.,_._.-acre-»v---921;.;e. g .~v_... ..,_.___ aw:--92<-v-»».._,_,.1q,
- =
1 ",1 'i.,_f_:|
1.e ,,_, 1
- »:,-:-,-~¢-~*92'.92, ".92,- ' r -<* 92.,~ ..,; . .4 - .__.,_.H§ . I ' - - -*
_'_;L_j.. _'.~__.
I.-1}| iF
at
i»-
atgi
ll
i.
i
i
Ii
_ ,-.t -
g _ " . ' ' - t 1"it 2 - . '- t, . l-- -,.-:--».- - - rs .=-. .1» acX - -_1'_92 "2 ' " ' "PL"; --1: 3-,'-Zit-" - '1-.v=
W '"
4: The lRo|e of Chino
The American public seems to be thoroughly convinced that
China is the Number One Enemy in Asia. Talk of a preventive
war to wipe out China's nuclear potential is prevalent now just as
it was during the early l95Os92in regard to the Soviet Union. South
Vietnamese often privately complain that, though it is their people
who are being killed and their country that is being devastated,
the real object of the American military effort is China. Yet there
is no indication that so much as a single Chinese has been in-
volved in the ghting so far.
7 What then can we say about China? Is this a country bent on
establishing a Chinese-dominated, Communist empire in Asia
through political subversion and outright military conquest? In
that case who can talk of independent nationalism or of revolu-
tionary governments making accommodations with the United
States?
First of all, it must be stated clearly that any speculation based
either on subjective prejudices or wishful thinking concerning just
what the Chinese will or will not do in any specic situation is
dangerous. President Truman and General MacArthur, with all
the intelligence resources available during the Korean War, proved
to be terribly wrong when they arbitrarily chose to ignore Chinese
warnings against American troops crossing the 38th parallel and
approaching Chinese borders in the autumn of 1950.
Yet it is possible to make some valid observations concerning
= 27
_.-._-.......--. ..- -in
- .. --- --i '
-92 '.'f:-"- 5 . - _r - _.=~ _= .. _....._.i_... ..- .»i>.= .-.». ." v92.. .. :; 1 . ,_- J--'o::."i" _; . .' »- 1 1"-:'_-"-"~.*.e!-'"--""'-*'*~i,1"' " --92" . . ..is " *=i=5+YY-"=" :* ""192"- " ~;; _ 5?:-' 1.e »3 '
.¢ _.-.ri- . , ._,,...,. ... - .-. 92_, . H, _
'- i 5'» ' "
/Q ,
_ g 0
. -54
1 I .t ._ ,
_. .r~. .~92~-~»-T-.---~ ,__*-:vAv.-- _. _ -= r--;,.. ,.,,,___ .,.'' ' 3 '._~-_.',7';~'.-If-»._*yQ-'1_ I-X H 7 -' =;;-¢;q,'3/_.-_~ a_K, -. .92,_ :4" r , _., I ., 1 s 3 -VA s_.-44,;-cf
-1'3 : I ",-, ,-=_"_'_. ' f .. ._i_ it-f;}_. 5
I - ~. .. .. .. .. 7 ... '-15-i"-5-. '-'=.;f"~.-*, , fr]-;~.f_=-; ;;I.~f~,f-.§.~j 1--11'.-s .-:1-_t;-"-.51:--_§
- -, , ; , _ _ 11.1 .- ._ 1.. ,_--__'.:'1-.';-_', .= -' ;l~-_;,,' _~ _-r -. --_--9: -3 --: r-;1- 1--'f.e;. =_.~t-v :22;$-=;,<=i,?s;;;.;.g1?;£-g;i";,?§, -: ~..i-. -i,-= = .,~-,- .-; _.-_ -..?...c '-r§- f.'~- -= t'---:;_ -"->--';.-§-" .'= it. . -._, .* '.:-'5, i ;- ' .= =we-;- -~= -:@L".J2-'¢~%;-i4'"#@? * ' 7 '"-Ar.-=1- "3 £t1-'="=1'-MI-1-
. -;.~'.n,_:. "5-J
' -pig
|.
" -.
.13 .ii
28 Peace m VIETNAM
Chinese foreign policy and intentions if we are willing to cut
through her verbose hostility, distinguish between her general
propaganda and specic statements of policy, and at the same time
check these against what she is actually doing. Certainly the
Chinese are going through a period of militant nationalism that
accounts for much of their bellicosity. At the same time, the
Chinese leaders believe their revolutionary experience constitutes
a model for other underdeveloped countries. But in spite of this
seemingly extreme orientation, their specic activities have been
tempered by rather conservative guidelines. For example, in terms
of both specic statements and actions, the Chinese have been
extremely cautious in dealing with the United States. They have
gone to some lengths to avoid any direct confrontation with this
country, even permitting American convoys of ships to carry
Nationalist Chinese troops to Ouemoy under their very guns.
Furthermore, although the Chinese have adhered consistently to
certain demands, such as their insistence that Taiwan is an in-
ternal problem that must be settled without any foreign interfer-
ence, they have demonstrated considerable exibility in dealing
with many questions of policy. '
The chief elements of Chinese foreign policy can be listed as
follows:
1. The Chinese insist that all boundary or territorial conces:
sions resulting from the unequal treaties imposed upon China by
the colonial powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
be renegotiated. Recently new boundary agreements have been
negotiated with the now independent countries oi Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, and Outer Mongolia under terms that
more or less preserved the status quo and were generally lair to
all parties. As yet there has been no boundary settlement with
the Soviet Union, India including Sikkhim and Bhutan, Laos, or
Vietnam. The Chinese are respecting the terms of the agreements
they inherited concerning I-long Kong and Macao, and are not
pushing for a return of these territories now.
2. The Peoples Republic of China considers Taiwan to be an
integral part of its territory and the Nationalist government to be
a remnant counterrcvolutionary force" having no legal status and
maintained oniy thr0ugh_Anierican armed intervention. it insists
" ...1 ' --*92»'>' - wa-
¬ -t ..=-.j-:1-§:5.~
i
.- ti
_ I
- "
__ ,_._ --.~»-in---.~.-as. _, -y --Q1;r it:-i;~t,..-" 1 ~'1*.= ':92=:7'*";;:>- .,-t--.-$21 T ".;t=. --?.;' .1,r .,<~.-I -_>_..-*1.<.:'~_<r',:-;-.-is:i,.»~.k___ _,,,~._. _ V.~ '., .2 ".-1'. -1. ~- .-. ' Y -- I t~==..Zt--5" ».-1:;t ,_ 1. ;;.-L' -.1. .1-I
' = .-, ,_§,.tt
*= I Er ;:- t 1.-.*.>:Z-».1'.=.'rt»>?'=<§;Y.-53V, .<~ 3;, Ll 1.-_ 4; _i..: -i'»*l§n'¢.:L'=1eL5-;=t*3Ii.Q»,,h¢=__-;-1hs.».la¥!~ A A-
i
In T
iii: -er - _
1: "9;. Le J
1 l 't
1
I
i
i;
. . _ ' i
#'.r"7:.';...i." . . 1
_.=-- ,_._. _ . . .__...92
I
"rm: ROLE or ctrrrva ' 29
the United States must withdraw its forces from the area. but for
some time has refrained front any rash action either in regard to
Taiwan or the Nationalist-held Olishore islands. '
3. The Chinese say that since 1956 the United States has been
engaged in active aggression against the PcopIes Republic of
China, sometimes directly and sometimes through its puppets,
the Nationalists on Taiwan. Prior to that time the United States
supplied and often took direct part in Nationalist attempts to
suppress the revolution. The United States is also regarded as
having done everything possible to impede the Chinese economic
construction through blockades, embargoes, and general pressure
to isolate mainland China from the rest of the world. Therefore,
the Chinese feel that in the in. st of national security they can-
not tolerate the presence on their borders of any American forces
or of forces under American domination. Such presence will be
met with military force, as happened in Korea and was threatened
in Laos.
4. The Chinese feel that any government in eastern Asia which
permits itself to become an outpost of American military power
poses a threat to the peace of Asia and at least indirectly to the
security of China. Chinese attitudes toward these countries vary
with specic circumstances. Pakistan and Thailand are both mem-
bers of SEATO, but there was considerable dierence in the Chinese
attitude toward them even before the development of the Sinn-
Indian dispute. Governments such as those in Thailand and Sottth
Vietnam, which are associated with American military ventures
involving Chinese interests, are treated as hostile, and the Chinese
give active support, including arms. nancial aid, and other forms
of assistance, to the left-wing movements attempting to overthrow
them. Thailand has recently become a special target because of
the extensite American airbases there that are used in bombing
North Vietnam. The Chinese are less sensitive to American mili-
tary activity in rtoncontigttous nations such as the Philippines.
5. Where countries on Chinas borders have taken a denitely
neutral stand, the Chinese have adopted a policy of general nort-
interfercnce even to the disadvantage of strong dissident left-wing
groups. such as exist within Burma and Nepal.
6. Throughout the rest of the underdeveloped world, the Chi-
-_ ~ .- 1»-
d .
r
'.-/;.'J92:_iL 44 I
Qt
ivaq,-_ A _ _, __ _ t. J. "r "er .1- _ _"..__.. _'7"};';+_1-+-_;_ _ . r ' _.' _. e .11-*-W "=.'* »_-'.,. I- s t. ,._»- -rt. ._ .,,_---,. -__ _ -. -,1 __ f_ I _ 1: - i. __ , . _ -:g.af.,__-:.,§¢...~1. _
Q
-Q
92 »> 1 .. I-74 .,,,,.J. .- .I
.
$'92
Ei{3',.r
Vii ? .
1%
'II*1[7| '_r-_1'.-t.-.|1~ .7.-,
.,~.._ 5,. 92-. J . _,---. _' .-;,;1. >
t | 5' .I m .v- _ ,r .. ,i !92'.|h ,- -1' .
' -r» :. _,. ,/.3; l'-;.'._1..'"-;-:5.-.__
I .92= _ _:_._i. .iI;I-BE, j:'~:_.-'-i_ §j':.'-1 .1--;-it-:_L- ._ ,, _, -_|.r;;=!__,s E. -;fp_.;s_g;- .--Y »_ ;!;_E_~___m
1-
, _ .."92 ' _ .92.2-." 1. ,1? - "_ .'.~ t1 -5-. . _ .-; y ..-'1 . 1 X -V 19'-
..
K
IK*
.1 ".92i-7» *_--.;..2.-; -ta Jinn-|-n
a
-x_~rv-;-|- .1 92._~,_--I-I-.-:__»tL.:>-,1 :.r_l_: V. ,__:_.<;it. . - - i»- - .-.--.|f;- =.-1 . .t. r r
- ,.., »<_':- -,r"-5-.-'~,'.»'-'-:1.">.._¢ _-;.j'-:5< »_',r ~':' ,,= guts-t < -.7-92.§
- --"'2? .'".
111.e -<1 .. P-I..4-'
.. . __ if V
- -:3-u"="
_ ' MrJr
<
IFl
l
T.§
!i rt...t|1.'-r.$
i
tTHE ROLE or CHINA 3i
is an intermediate zone around her borders consisting of gen-
erally friendly or at least neutral countries. Such a zone would not
necessarily be contrary to the interests of the United States. It
would continue to be an area in which Western and Chinese inu-
ense would complete, but not through subversion or military
conquest.
But what about Pekings general warlike attitude, its supposed
denial of the principle oi co-existence, and its esponsal of_ revolu~
tionary wars of liberation as a means of isolating and weakening
the imperialist" nations? This again needs to be examined
carefully, especially since, as one of the main Components of
the Sino~Soviet dispute, the Chinese position in regard to co-
existence has tended to be twisted by both the Soviet and Western
spokesmen.
First, the Chinese maintain that they adhere to the principle
of co-existence of states with different social systems, and re-
peatedly assert that they are for peace. But they insist that this
does not require any people to accept domination by imperialists
or reactionaries or to accept outside aggression. In other words,
wars of liberation and wars resisting aggression are just wars.
Furthermore, they maintain that eo-existence applies in ditlerent
ways to different countries and that different policies must be
adopted toward different types such as other socialist countries,
nonsocialist countries that have recently attained independence,
ordinary capitalist countries, and imperialist countries. The United
States falls in a category by itself as the superimperialist power
bent on world empire through the establishment of military bases
and control of puppet governments throughout the world. With it,
the Chinese maintain, no co-existence is possible as long as the
United States maintains what they now regard as being a policy
of imperialism and aggression. They criticize the Soviet Unions
attempt to obtain peace with the United States through negotiation
because they say a lasting peace can only be assured through uni-
versal disarmament. Anything short of this, especially in the eld
of nuclear weapons, simply perpetuates a military monopoly of
the big powers. But, they say, universal disarmament is com-
pletely unthinkable for the United States at this point for two basic
reasons. First, according to their analysis, its economy is based
- . ...t --~
. _._.
O_H _ *4-...-_4 --.5; - - "~17 ~..7eP 1--r -E
l - _ . . _ _,,- _
" " ~ i - ii-11% ' »-_- - - I- ' @- -----v-~.;- ~-. .-at -' - - ' -is-~>w;»_~a-..~--i " -_ .-_.r __ -.= _- __ -92.= _
-92_:,|: -3;-. _ "# I-.H b -t - -r~.- -. -- <I t , i , 1 . l
92-;_.
y a
Qit
Q
i i
, , . .._ . -.- - ..-_._ gy.-|,-~ u.-I ~ -_r1"-Ii -_ -_ -:1 .r!*f_ .i.=.:;"- 1* I, t t J.~_':'_.'I=.-fl" . ' , 92 ' T _ _ _i ;.;,_.~...
'. L s 92_».r _ '.;.l_|I'. :V_92:.._! l _!:=~ 1.: :5.» §""_4{/__!|.¬.g '.~ t = :-em.-.. .n_, ,; --~~. -. -A _ ..., .t I.~<. ,, . _ ,, .1. .. .iiRigelif5:35-"~?'?'~i"%?ir'Y.'_ 5?; ' < " --,..=._ -,;-:,;;i.;>~ F ~_=',;-~._,t-ts -. Y-5:1-;-*~-*3!» .;_.-, pr 1_ e.-.. - " .. la" *
' ¥-t
. > = .» I1 -gK'?:-Ii.92,.<_' ~..s H92, ,r<i__ ¬
_; _
i
¢
- Q
.i-ii.
'.. ' -'-92.
.r._. .';s_-.--3.. .1-»-vi;-r-..~e-,.-L.-._1»--as.-¢r.aiii<.--=ain,= _-.>_'. ,. - »-in :.?n-:='- 1--4 1 < ' i -»"".4. i.A;L'l_=_".¢1.r_.'LL1;,1l&'£§$i1..-2-*~¬'i'4I-*'-Hi'{»§=i~~'lr.- if T-.»,..t&;,i,"' ii ".15..-- , _ __J - -. »- _ _ _ p V I
a92
~ 30 PEACE IN VIETNAM
: nese have used propaganda and aid in attempts to inuence these
countries toward anti-imperialist and specically anti-American
policies. They have also carried on propaganda activities and
given moral support _to dissident elements in countries that have
adopted strong pro-Western positions. In some places, such as the
Congo and Algeria, where revolutionary warfare had broken out,
_ they have supplied limited material assistance as well.
Thus, even though th 1" der t
Marxist-Leninists, their policies in actual practice ave been
shaped much more by immediate national concerns. They view
the United States as an implacable enemy and their policies and
activities have been directed more against it than for any program
for world revolution or the creation of some new Chinese empire.
Chinas three major military ventures since 1949 have dealt with
such national concerns. In Tibet it reasserted a long-standing Chi-
nese claim to sovereigntya claim which is asserted also by the
Chinese Nationalist government of Taiwan. Its participation in
the Korean War was directed against what it felt to be an immedi-
ate Amcrican threat to its security. The military conflict with
India certainly involved invasion of another country, but was a
limited action taken for the purpose of forcing a settlement of a
irontier dispute.
Furthermore, the Chinese military establishment, although pos-
sessed of tremendous manpower resources, is extremely limited in
offensive weapons and the kind of logistical support necessary for
any strong action outside its borders. It is also the almost unani-
mous view of observers on the spot that, as Charles Taylor, Peking
correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail, says,2 the Chinese
arc now primarily concerned with economic growth and other
internal problems rather than with militarism. '
Clearly what China would like to see, at least for the present,
__-,.. .~ 1 ,._ ._,_ i
= -4,5;-_-.;.,. m_'___1 _ > -~ "_"~ 1-.4-*;. §__ _ . F! .: _4___ , 4_ f:__: .r_i;-_v .,,--92.,_ -,-i_ -',§,,.¢.._.;es,t,~..;,-@- ,- :3 ,._,, .5-e._ ;.+h',,-it _, ,., i. .. __,_1- .. .» - ,.,.. - .
= ~ -' I . - ,..
1 -"- g- -- =_ ~. . , -i 4: _92
.
v .-'-2' 3 A1}; }g'
» *-.'- " V-w-92_ . 1
.~ 1 ' , - ' .3 '¬:'="=k',.,- . , 92.~ . ___ . i< r I
-J '
-'_"i.:~ .'"-'_z' ->1 Y 1--E":-.-.-:~ »~ .~:-~-~r~_-;-1,-¢--we-=. '-92'I'J*D|" '--1-is»-.---i-n--92e'<--rs-,;i .,..,i|, -, ,.-__ _ l4 492|l"' ' - ' -- i .1 __'E£'F»_,.<;92.~_-i- .~ - r. -.'-_;i_..-~-=.--_»-.- . ~. ,.i-...,.=_,._», ,-- ~,i~' 3 i " 1"-Y*'?l-"> '.§§t».:.1'i?$*""='sPa?-.*;~"L 92.'.3.~--l£_= ;..*"~>3.'Lf'~"=.e.- =1" ,.j=_§ _ .--':.:»_'w_._@;=-< ~_-i:L'_i.;<.$"»;*_2i.5- '-Iii, t; ;'.*=; .-».a}i.' , '_ ' -<_, '$7';' , <-fir ': 92.$, t , ~ -,E-r ~ -'?"- w -L i=L;.i'.- . i , .»r;. , I _t , , .,'?',._"J""4;,.r . . e- ~', . 4, -, :-.=: _ _-.'~:r ._.-r-_ ;i._~ _,_i ____ 5: y_. -,-. :1 ElliH I . _ 1: ,. _' A 11,- ;.:- 1 ., ' ;' :;.;,._ -1_"_- .,' , t 1:-I ..' _92'.;-='-_5,-§~,;i.~t-s-_.-;~ ..',.,¢. I1 .;,.1". ' ' i "W - ' i- .' ' "J7 J ¥..-."-.--.'--" fl"? --"12-="" -,"'."~T=- '-1 '. I °~ =~-,r.i»'»it--_'"- .-I " "- I"92l - --, ~.t- . -I ,_~.~ s it j 92- -..~ ,.-- - -..; ;_,'_=;'f M. -.3, éiesj.- ;;,~-1,...~i,,r;_,,,_*;,'., i'_'a-_.2.»i_:."j-cage.r>=t=;f_-1_;,;t,,;;t;=;,;;:_;=;g7;t .3 9;--1-§t,»,.i.I>§r_§,=;;.-=.A_,,,,.-,¢,q.,_,
1,
. _ _+- i
,1':-.
" :-
n-
C
a
- ' 1:;-3
t - 1 " 1-Li.» st 'ti i
..|-4
. _ WM' + VlI92 }
on war production, and disarmament would lead to economic
Collapse. Second, disarmament woul dmenn an end to America:
imperialism and its special privileges overseas. Therefore, the!
reason, the American ruling class could not possibly enter intc
negotiations for a meaningful peace in good faith, and the best
chance of preserving peace, they think, is to weaken imperialism
by supporting peace movements in the advanced capitalist coun-
tries and liberation movements elsewhere.
In recent months, with the escalation of the war in Vietnam,
the Chinese have paid increased attention to the question of libera-
tion movernents. In a recent speech commemorating the twentieth
anniversary of the victory over Japan, Lin Piao, one of China's
leading Communists, addressed himself to this very problem. This
speecha has received considerable attention because Lin attempts
to project the experience of the Chinese Communist guerrilla-type
warfare against Japan and the Nationalists in terms of defeating
the United States on the world scene. He stresses the fact that, in
the face of a strong enemy capable of seizing the is
main lines of communication,
the countryside, and eountrjvsicle alone, can provide the rcvolutionarj
bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory
. . . Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europ-
..4.»<'¢ . _.
0.- 1» '... -92 1 . ; . 1.
' I ; t1 .
t
i'_:R-.
. r-s,r:~_
- T.
v-~w.r":r<: »_-.t»-f-,~-_--.t_. ....._._..._ _.,.'; , J?i '~ - = " '1 '- * "-P >";l Ji1.ts:l'=i;¢T--i-'=~£.e-fit?;-;:t-3,"*-i='i--::"<-}~:-i*x
* . . ".* 1: -__4 -_.-it.-_ >-I_,..0 I ' -. -,._ v!-"ti '
V-I;-V '1 H1.
.',_=A ,_ ,_92
- .,- s 4 .t,. . , .y. ;_-, ,-,1,--:_. .,_.s-;<,._ - ;* P . tg_I
gt-, *" ~T». _.__;-1.-'_.:§. .. . 1 ._ _~,.»_. _.-.-_~,' 1 -,-_i".~ 1'-t_i ;,'».i,.t-_- -3-: _,',lj":"-/.-'1J-3:-."I;-;'_'J'-' -1»- ' .~ .. . . .* . ~ . _~,.¢.. ,2. , ~_ . .>- ,.>-,92..92f.1-.,-t-',, --.92.";'~,I_ l;_.' t i_;_~: -92-y-t_»';t .~ I -' i:;=,92'-'92;I SJ *'- ;,~.»_r.'".¥: »1':_{l~_-'~ 4- - - -4 H .-ii. ...,_;, _».. .-l-...,.~._u.">....»A....-1.a.|.s_..m-A-.92 _ 5i"JE _" 1.-q».._. .
an
?
1
-1,
-ft
Hii ../I
i.|i
I
tJ
THE ROLE OF CHINA _33
and does not rely on the strength of the masses but leans wholly on
foreign aideven though this be aid from Socialist countries which
persist in revolutiouno victory can be won, or be consolidated even
if it is won.
And further on he states,
Of course, every revolution in a country stems from the demands of
its own people. Only when the people in a country are awakened,
mohiiizctl, organized and armed can they overthrow the reactionary
ruie of imperialism and its lackeys through struggle; their role cannot
be replaced or taken over by any people from outside. In this sense,
revolution cannot be imported.
He chides those who may be fearful of American military power
by repeating the Chinese argument that, while the United States
is strong tactically, it is weak strategically. Its nuclear weapons
cannot be lightly used. The more it attempts to suppress revolu-
tionary movcrncnts, the more isolated and pinned down it becomes
so that it is incapable of concentrating its tactical might. In the
words of Mao Tse-tang, Whenever it commits aggression, it puts
a new noose around its neck. It is besieged ring upon ring by the
people of the whole world.
This is not very pleasant reading for either the dove or the
hawk. For the former it constitutes an acceptance of the use
of violence as a necessary method; for the latter it raises again
the fear of becoming overextended and bogged clown in the morass
of an unwinnable Asian war.
But actually the entire Chinese proposition is based on the
premise that the United States will continue its present stress on
counterinsurgency programs and thus stimulate pressures toward
revolution in the various underdeveloped areas of the world, which
will assume an anti-American slant. Lin Piao's statement in no
way suggests that the Chinese intend to create these revolutions
themselves, even supposing they were able, which they denitely
are not. Though the Chinese have the capacity to provide some
training and material support to revolutionaries, their ability to
inuence revolutionary movements is primarily ideological and
stems from their position as the foremost spokesman of revolution
and deance of the white West. The success of the Chinese
7* fl l I I r"-Y '- I
. '--- i -3.-I'l=-75? ."':- :i"i_i '6'-71 I V H
. g; Q-F - _ X. .;.;_- _ ;j_ 3-Y-far. - ti; 11- - - 1. -"M ~e .. t l' P-'_-*2; .._. .._-.1.-,_~_;é;,.,;-_;-:.,_l N h_
;_:.-~_=. ' H _--='_,- '- :
, . __.
i
r
r
, V! :.' . .- ' --
,_ .¢=
-- -»r~_t-,-i --.-. .,<_---no -7.1.-.,v--__r_ I >r -_ ' '1"£'?"¬j"y-.-::=r¬:-'%-Psi-~%%5-, ; ,-.-,72 1~ F r -7§';1="<'4- $':.Tr§=J'"'-El"'3"? =#,1.*;=-= ».-.': .-- 1- 1 _"*-1"/"i i .»k 592->*>1'-'.i'.?if"$""."..': -"i.<.:"'>"§l-- _. . . _,~_i ,. . _ Mp--I _ 33/ .r:>!».__;,.y ,._ , _{_,
" A I .,, ,¢_~_.: L_-1;-,;;:_ _ ,,_,-4: r # / -'.:l_-Y" -= 5% - ;..- I. -- - !_'r.' =1.- ,. '..--.92 .- -.13 3'?» .- 5--Y r ;-
_..'. 92" __ :92-2.- J _r.._. ;; I ";¢_-_- __. = ~_.~;-A, 115.;-_._~.-r.-. ,-r,r,3-i'- ';.s, ._,-_1,..92-,_ -5:,-., -, -_-._ _-_:,_ .--, _ 92~ -,- -l,.-92-~,_- > _.,--,_._- - ,._.. .-as-§,~-; ~--.1 i~5=r ,-.-. .t='92- mg
I- -4. - - ' ' -3:5 Z §,'3-2'-:='Ji.' i'~s.;".: ".:.- 191;-6;.l92_92!-.'i.*.~»-4---4--1.,-.' "" " '~i-.._4_..;<. 5,Lu-§.-.3l';l4~L.f.|r.~.E1.|:.3L-' .3 -' -;,, ~_ -J, j¢,;_:$;;;5,;>" ,;'§fi_;S¬-E-92¬};;§',i;~;;E»;£T.}J-Y.
4?" . . , "rs .
I. sai-:5 . = 1*.' ' -"<.'.5%- , '__.- * ,2--2. _ ,., '1i- 1- _ ~ I ;.~ '-/
.. o,,*._5. _ .e I!4.4- _ _w -_ i. - ' __= ,l
1'l
I
' .4 .
ta. .X -7-; I -
' in1
l1 s
I
l_.- ._ ._.. _,,_
_ J
34 ' ' PEACE IN VIETN¢92..92-I
Communists in transforming China from a weak, backward nation
in the throes of social and economic collapse to a major world
power capable of challenging the might of the United States and,
moreover, being accepted by it as its chief threat to world leader-
ship, cannot help but arouse interest in the rest of the under-
developed world. And even the most eon'servative_member of the
formerly subjugated colored races tends to enjoy :1 certain iden-
tication at hearing Chinas bellicose deance directed toward
the great white United States. Thus, just as counterinsurgency
tends to intensify the very kind of explosion it seeks to prevent,
so the intensity of American efforts against the Peoples Republic
of China tends to increase Chinas prestige in the underdeveloped
areas of the world.
For over two thousand years the people of Vietnam consid-
ered the Chinese their chief foreign menace; and though they
were profoundly inuenced by Chinese culture--wet rice farming,
political and social institutions, philosophy, law, religion, archi-
tecture, and system of writing-the relations between the two areas
were often marked by erce struggle. The Chinese dominated much
of the Vietnam area up to the tenth century A.D. Vietnam retained
a certain independence within the Chinese tribute system until
the middle of the nineteenth century, when the French gained
ascendancy largely by supporting local native powers against the
Chinese or Chinese-supported regimes. Again after the defeat of
Japan, Chinese nationalist armies occupied the northern area of
Vietnam, where they incurred further distrust by looting the coun-
try and interfering in its domestic policies. In spite of the tradi-
tional fear of Chinese domination, however, events since 1950
have forced North Vietnam into an increasing dependence upon
China. Nowhere has the self-defeating nature of Anierican support
for colonial and right-wing anti-Communist regimes become so
apparent as in Vietnam itself. -
Relations between Chinese and Vietnamese Communists go
back to 1924, when Ho Chi Minh was sent to Canton as part of
the Third International Advisory Mission to Sun Yat-scns nu-
tionalist movement there. At this time I-Io is said to have worked
with Mao Tse-tung in a school for training agrarian revolutionaries
and in "the late l930s to have spent some time in Yenan, capital
.--M'-
ir , _ i 'L,jiZ._!; -1-2:? -' " W_' "92 '7 I. 3"
i
_4 _. ;3_::":_ - _ i-.r" >- ' _ _-_ .1 "' _ _.j -,&-,'.'_-- A _i .11 _H, _,.i 1 i. if_ _ QY7 . gt
'92
F i
' ' .",-.1 I - g L
i
. __ i . " . :
_ K, r '1' . .
l=- -'}',..--,: ~'*;-W----1*, -- ==" : .k 92_92. ';"' Q-_,V_..w.n ._ _V ,,I . ,ii':~-ii, "*'7i.- . .1
-' -- -- .; ~' §- 1.1: Ir -~-_ =- -1-:-"1E'=-idiiiii-i'ii lg:- - .1 :..: 3 ,; .-__';-.-';-,f- ~,' "- l - :' . ,- .1--'» i :25, I . -_,1'--pct =i=' 'i~ Pl," 1"; re;-5 < -=- -4".-" -~ -~.= :..~- t:'= i="sT¢.~* lei : .'92v§'1.N:--4.-'i'-iiii"§1§i292">.l .i"Hi1--~';'-'l5_FE-J*s"J15!"'.'l3 h?'...;.e'4 1-an i~,.~_,m gs no-1, .-; -i.. --;¢J_.-- -_--::A%~.-!- ,1--1-!;.1m.;.1~'.siiii;kea.s.&.;.i'.i<..;.i ¢i,i."iii;;:-:."?.i.
i
I
¥
i
r
1
¢
f
. -,_ w -~ .
_.'+--U-.1
-_..L .. .._'_'._ _.-s=_..'...i_...,-'.._ __-__.1.' ._ ,._ .._n._.n_ _.--1-- .-no.1.-. _. ;n-i- is 1THE Rom on C]-II.92'A
of Chinese Communist territory in northwest China. Practiciil
working relations between Vietnamese and Chinese Communists,
however, did not develop until after the Chinese Communists tool-c
over the mainland of China in I949. In 1950 the Pc0ples Repub-
lic of China along with the Soviet Union granted official recog-
nition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Although Chinese
support for Ho Chi Minhs forces in the war against the French
was limited at rst, after the end of the Korean War captured
American arms and other aid were sent to Vietnam in signicant
amounts. After the Geneva Conference of I954, the Chinese, and
also the Soviet Union, continued to provide North Vietnam with
technical and material assistance in substantial quantities.
During the early years of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the North
Vietnamese Communists endeavored to assume a neutral position,
clearly hoping to avoid being too closely tied to either party.
Beginning in May 1963, after American activities in South Viet-
nam were expanded and intensied, the North Vietnamese, while
maintaining close _ties with the Soviet Union, commenced to give
more consistent support to the Chinese position.
So far the Chinese have apparently taken no initiative in seeking
any negotiations on Vietnam and have insisted that peace can
come only through an American return to the Geneva Agreement
and acceptance of the four-point basis for peace laid down by
the North Vietnamese. The Chinese have also stated that Chinese
volunteers would be available if requested, and recent press reports
indicate that Chinese technicians and laborers are playing an in-
creasing role in helping the Vietnamese repair damage caused by
American bombing. Though the Chinese are clearly amdous to
avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. any American
invasio of North Vietnam itself would-alrnost certainly bring
them openly into the war.
Thus the course of recent events in Vietnam has served to make
China a more imminent threat to the security and independence
of Southeast Asia than it has been before, and indeed than our
earlier analysis suggests it need be. We see little evidence that
China is likely to embark upon a policy oi conquest if Arnericrin
military forces are withdrawn. Chinas efforts to influence its
neighbors through traditional instruments of cultural penetration
1'
Q
i
i
?
3
i.9292. " . ,. _. , .~ - , .- ..=v ..~~4_-_.- r. -' -.-.- '11 1 -. - ,1.-_=.'-' "-r':-_=--- -. 4..,~-_~;-92 < -. =11,- , -.-.:i- -.24: 1'-92' k '7"-'-"1'}?-r.-r*13<".'??*I '.92iz'_<~:;"3C- "111-":?i'i92.92-: -;?92.I_"1z?T;it, ,, , 5 , -.1. .4I!~'92{<> !- K. 92..u. _,. ' , 92 1 k, . .,..., -92
,92.- '~ I .:,,--.. -.Mam.-_~~ _ _
,_-_.. . L92.
7_._,
.. < M1,, .. _- .... ., 1 ,we-.. ...;, ~.;92.'_-- ...~-.,...- ._ ._. H.-. ._. >1? _ ~ 36 PEACE IN
_ - _ _ '1 and economic pressure will surely continue, as they
centuries. The new countries stzmd a better chance of
- 1 _ .- . * independence as 21 result of their own aroused forces of
___, _ . . isrn than through American miiitzuy intervention.
. .Q
gt? -;,=, . ._¢! . 1..
'1 _. - _ ., _ .---";¢-z.. 1; -i.- .~.'=' >1 .;--}.'.'1=:;-.1-=:=:> 3 -r _ V_ 1 . _ . ,. . 1.... .j=.--._*__1'-,1.é';_;t:;__,',-Iz=-;i*,:z_*11>__'»;'»-11 el-2,-r-:~ - .71 7-1 .~*1=,r-1--.-. ".--: ?;»i¬-. 1. I -.es ~;I:" §'U_5»':§92'=",?,;i~"= 1".-3.r.'%-"=1-1.-1-;3"i='<c-w-3 r-~' r -L aw;-_;»_ ~ "t-1;.--_:,-51": -..:':_.E»f.' {g-9 »_1'_-___r_:,'-=|-.,_.;_;?> * 4, E hm-m ,,'=t=i.:?'
M_L . 1 - ' '||'1;. :=-15' .;f;,_'.'1-|'j..'i.-'5;~.92;'=- --s>'_'b'~L
"um. _____ ._s___._.- .-.._~.*-.s-~=~1. A v~1-ai92|l|...-.|=@i£-...;i.W;~.»-w.»iv=-_-- . _.
-x _ Ir
.=
:5; _ §"_."- . - .'!.._-2% .;;.~ 1 ._.61; . .' . i~ "' :_-T1. QT -" -»== ' . -. . ._-. _- V V IF' V '-""" -- V -' ' ". ., i- Mu. _ .4 _ _ -so .- t _ _ __ . A i _._ '..._~ -54' . ".401-dI~'-I=1'~;w --':v.- _. ._. ._ - - -
VIETNAM
have for
retaining
national-
. J
; --s . . .
_ " F- -"' . 1-.'5.. -. ,
I. i" >.~¢ ;|1P._. - .
' -I .92 , .1 i '
,_. -it - b -92
_ t 92.
. t ..-n~ '
at r e Y ~ -- - .->--I :92"'_l! _b92'IY '_'F » -*_,¢..-.92_»-.-1... zs-_,-.._,.,..,...__,,..¢_P-i._,,..,
1 ":i ..:-, _f' .{ 1;.-fg i: @1231 ,>~-~;';<. Q», ;§ ,.<.;,;~, - 1; =.=_.p ya. ¥Q_.r,¢/»92.... us. "-_",-; -',-J1.-.--.'.;1-..=c;i-'; ,/-u'_-; . A-_1.r my .;-...' <~',_'_ s _ _=';-!i":-'~!i~=,~'-__'1_-, -:11, .;f;._;" ,-.j -'.-_'£;I,,_'.~ .-i _'i', F-i."-:§_- ,-s.-=;.~ ~ ; __ . 92 -1_=:',{=@-';*£92.=*-.' . _ C r - -1_92~_ 5:5 1-=;-L,= v,»' 1-.;',;,i';.»-;+--,-;<;':P _f"_.§;-. ¢'_--- ' ,-:1 .;=j;=>;-_=;,'._-_;'=...,':<=' , i"'.~' .l'- ':'-". I-, Pi - 3';-'1 ';!:i 1.:-"k'f'.i1 §-ii:151.,-':i»i'3xsffgii-f'-ii; ., ,1, 1- _ ,-__-., _ 6. __ .. ..,-.. e, ..'_>92' .t -K»! .-":5;-'; 5;; .r-1:".;3;.~. I-FF¥';J92:921:'£-z;';¬L{iE_ i
-.. ,5
J; J
F' L
lu
» 1%
ti.
...5: History oi United States
Involvement in Vietnam
In most of Southeast Asia, anti-colonial nationalist movements
secured independence either peacefully or following a bitter but
relatively brief struggle. The notable exception was Vietnam. There.
Frances wartime policies and her continuing stubborn resistance
to the demands of Vietnamese nationalists brought non-Comrnu-
nist and Communist patriots together i.n a common eort to secure
independence. '
In their occupation of colonial Southeast Asia during World
War Ll, the Japanese--except in the French coioniesdeerned it
advantageous to work through eiements of the Western educated
native elites, regarding them as more reliable than the colonial
civil servants. In return for their cooperation in administering the
occupied countries, the Japanese usually antetl educated na-
tionals highcr administrative positions and considerabiy greater
scope for political activities than they had previously enjoyed.
The Japanese also made promises of independence and sometimes
granted a signicant measure of freedom to organize nationalist
movements. Nationalist leaders, therefore, usually found it more
to th sts to operate above ground, in some sort of ma -
riage of convenience with the Japanese, than to attempt under-
ground resistance.
The one great exception was Indochina Vietnam, Cambodia,
37
- . _.;r.._.,....-- -
3 - '_ .,92-.- -n '12.1-,-_;_ =._¢ 2-:_._' __-.,'_rx_j:
:' i 7..-t"Q ~I.-.
v92a ., "' -u -A'1mi. _,
H-
r
, |
. _ r
; .
,-1-;-;q;+g-~;,-3--,_-_-.-u~,--r-w,-,-_..__-_-,._.--- ,y"q ,,.....,_.._< t~ = .- - : . A .9-4 i. .-; -92i ts. ,-J -s. I 1__ -_ ' -' -'.,,._ c ; _ ..: pr:
r i- ' 92 i _
r li -.- .92- -' : .- .. w-_92_z_'rs - s.-_ -.,.,.I
FT-
- S.-I .- ,1i.'-itP: 92"-Jpn
3
l
--wt-n--J
A. <-I f'- = T;..?.<':'3.§-.;T-';.';s+.i.»"'l92 . . . . . - . '-.rs..:.», H-i>*5-1-L=i>3:='-~~.'» r-it ,'g=»;§."*j-Z'i.%-l"i- 1. ~ .- =. it . ..*. at t;..*2.-._;_;-;.i;;;;;rgi.#_; ' "~' -F 'a':'." - -st:-,-5-, . "
R. .Egg . I - '. '
1.r
E
92
s14- - I
gag._ ..K
lI
I
T
is.t.¢-I-I.
t
i
iJ
33 PEACE IN VIETNAM
and Laos!. Here in 1941 the pro-Vichy French administration
promptly came to terms with the Japanese, making an arrange-
ment whereby they were to retain their administrative positions,
under general control and supervision of the Japanese. In Viet-
nam, then, the Japanese were able to rely upon the French and
had no need to make concessions to the leading nationalists. Con-
sequently, along with their French collaborators, the Japanese
cracked down very hard upon any nationalist activity. Because
of this, non-Communist as well as pro-Communist Vietnamese
nationalists were forced to operate underground, a level of political
activity in which the Communists were already experienced. Thus,
even at this early stage, the most important channel open to Viet-
namese who wished to free their country from French control
was one where Vietnamese Communists already had an entrenched
position. Indeed, the only strong and organized underground in
existence was that which had been built up by the Vietnamese
Communists under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Thus most
Vietnamese nationalists, regardless of their political convictions,
joined. The ability of the various groups to work together was
undoubtedly increased by the fact that from the very outset the
Vietnamese Communist movement had a strong nationalist bias.
Although Ho Chi Minh, the leader of this wide nationalist coali-
tion known as the Vietminh, was a Communist who had spe-nt
some time in Russia and China, he held his position by virtue of
his nationalism rather than his Communism, as even Ngo Dinh
Diem acknowledged.
During World War ll the Vietminh received considerable sup-
port from Chiang Kai-sheks government and, as the war drew
to a close, from the American Ofce of Strategic Services, forc-
runner of the CIA. It developed increasing power, and by May
1945 had liberated a part of northern Vietnam from Japanese rule.
When Japan capitulated, the Vietminh and supporting groups
supplanted the discredited and weakly backed national regime
which the Japanese at the eleventh hour had established under
Bao Dai, the previous French colonial puppet-emperor of Annarn
central Vietnam}.
The policies of the French in Vietnam in the period after the
war were of even greater importance in causing nationalism to
..i. I ..i" _|.i-mi.-I H I. I.-_.-iii
92- 92- .'..'
' -,'3"B'I|V-I-C. 3i"' V ' --§>'¢'~I92IL§1r'.;,:.».~t- '_ .5... - i-~ . ': ,a ' - _:~ .. __:3,_t_- . ;_'-i:-;?.; 4, _ _ _
is - I .
~ 1 H -1.
924
1.
n
_ 1 * - -i >
-'1 __._ L,
_ . . .. - 92 3:
*.*~' . _
~-tar; _. I '
.= 11:;-I-.~=__-.p_92---I , - >- 1',->4--J1.3rm--;92-;!'92f}:'f{9r?92$92f;'"92§"Tf!'l1*l_'fV:q~r-E-92i'fI'P:l:'f_'lfg92392"i.: 5.5 ._-" . ',»'-_ .~, .- ' _1;~,_ . -L. .. ./-. ' ,,. -,_._-..,-' .-.1 _=-'_3_-_iA_- -"3I .= i -. 1 -- ,=-K §;'»':7..~.->1,-§ p-1-=-Ci!'§¬*r,.1$»91i.;>j>. -is-'-va-;.-_.t-T4 " I '-=¢ -"-92¢'r92i--- t92..>;-*-;- --.s--i i ~. - ~i l» .-.--,-,- . ;-.>92,~r-.~.¢..g .; -:..'~ .2 -_<, . -,-. ,-1 .,. >4 5 __1- -..; .4-- .~Iv , . J < ¢'-~;'- -== - " J= r '~.;_-,.-y >r.-Q4_-i i;_- r ~-J. ,_1~-.- ._..~v.,._ ___ r-1..-.;I _i§_ "_ . ,. -. _ . _ _ .5 :_;.-_;, ~f-_.,l-~.- ._-_..,;-;-._;.-;Y if. - .-; .'-l 11"; i'if'= " 1-J-f'*' "°' i.-iv: 1'? 3-'." 3l":'~T -5.-.i'.'..'3'= I-K-'-if-l;- -' ' - -' Y .1 *1 , . i".{ - " Fin '- .' : .i.*;-.3, ' ':,r-'1_._ _| _I .7 If ._ ;k_._ K _. _. __ _ _._92k I NI. .4. .'3_._ -_..;;..».Ul!.. , - .. . . . ~..l»s .. -_-. -- ;.-. ;';-;i,'-1:-~ -3 : -.--:_-,;t., ?:,-:- -7~.',-»~.- l.- -.:,..*-.
92_-'.».-,3 .. tr .i"'_LJ.1:;L: ..='.~:-,Z,si=.t'_.s-.gt;i.t-,1 ~,¢ ;ss1t~;'-is; :'ii;f§ ~ =~'-Eirsctsae.
,,
4
1
.l-$.23-.' . -» e i-c.-it 1 ;
Y
A 1l
i
Q_ r
7* lr
1
e .' 1.I i
!. . .__.._.a.__ _ ._. _ J92
. J -u
HISTORY on UNITED stares tuvotvestexr IN VIETNAM _39
fuse with Communism. Again, Vietnam stood in contrast to the
non-French colonial areas of Southeast Asia. For unlike the Amer-
icans and British who had the wisdom to grant independence to
their colonies, and unlike the less powerful Dutch whom the
United States refused to support after 1949, the French remained
intransigent. With increasing American support, they continued
to resist Vietnamese claims for independence to the very last
down to their military defeat at Dienbienphu in 1954. This un-
yielding French policy gave Vietnamese nationalists of all political
orientations, pro-Communist and non-Communist, no effective al-
ternative but to work together against the French. Thus in Vict-
nam, in marked contrast to the other countries of Southeast Asia,
the mainstream of the nationalist movement came under the dom-
ination of a largely Communist leadership; and all Vietnamese
recognized I-Io Chi Minhs Communist-led Vietminh as the force
that successfully opposed French power and eventually secured
Vietnamese independence. V
Although Franklin Roosevelt had made clear his opposition to
any reoccupation of Vietnam by France and had advocated mak-
ing it a United Nations trusteeship territory, the Truman admin-
istrationwhile hoping France would ultimately grant Vietnam
independenccundertook to back French efforts to re-establish
control. To avoid antagonizing France, which it was hoped could
be made the keystone of an American-sponsored European mili-
tary alliance, the United States temporized in Vietnam with respect
to its general commitment to self-determination. Our support to
France increased until we were underwriting two-thirds of the
costs of her military effort, with well over a billion dollars allocated
in the year 1953 alone. By granting this support, the United States
took its rst long step toward making the Vietnamese cynical
about American protestations of support for national scIf-clctcr-
IHLHZIUGTL.
Frances military defeat culminated in mid-1954 with Dicti-
bienphu, setting the stage for the Geneva Conference of that year.
An understanding of the political failure that accompanied this
military defeat is most important to any analysis of the present
situation. In 1950 the French had established a Vietnamese regime
under Bao Dai. Never given political autonomy, let alone inde-
r ,
2,. .. .. _ .. ' -*:1'."7?*-~- .. .
} . A
ii
>
4
1
:.-..~.-7<T-r- W _ ._ _ mad,--..._.._.F-p-e.----1--__ _a -1 Lani
r92
. - . t -' : _l -' = ._"' '7' '"' " ."""-".""""- !"' .t '~ "'f - . .-1 =..: - ' - 3. '-"-'-92.q-;'92"92E"=- --.!"<.F-~ .-'~'-:."* --1'1-Qt-.-" - 1 "|.§1,1, ..h I .. _ f M »_-_:_;- :=~_., .m~ __-,~._.,_'-.-,,,..:- -92 i.-.wA_92-' _ -1. . _.h-_ . - .,,.__92. :._-7, t_.H._,__ A._,_»:.:. I. ! 1 '_..92} _,
t . ,t< »» . .1 " . - . 1:: .».--*.=.'.--.=-' -'~ re 'r. ,,. - i- - . i-:'» -- ,-_:'. .,~ q .~ ;---. i*."s'1<-C,-.5'-.w.';'I"; -var"K r ,. 1__»_.--._--;.- 4":-l|'1' 1-:-., 92: 11; ,3. = -_-'~-.-.~>_.w-.-;.~.,r-.»-.». -~.e.,=1E~ is. , Mei.-» t 4 L ---1->Isniiozetn.'i.-.-tn.-;'1I;:-i-:54$» Qsitluitii-.e=Fi¬~,'airi¢-J-,
-ii
1i.'J~I- -"_' :3r » -t -i
Sr1'
4
it,
t'3
..PEACE 1N VlET!92'Al92I
pendence, this regime had proved incapable of winning popular
support. Most of its administrators were Frenchmen or Vietnamese
who were regarded by the population as agents of the French.
At the time of Geneva there were, then, two competing gov-
ernments. One was the Viettninh government of Ho Chi Minh, con-
trolling about threcquarters of the country, with approximately
as much of its territory south as north of the 17th parallel. The
other government was the French military administration with
its Vietnamese veneer--the essentially puppet government of Bao
Dai, operating in French-held enclaves both north and south of
the 17th parallel, and largely conned to urban areas such as
Hanoi, Saigon, and their immediate surroundings.
The representatives of nine governments participated in the
Geneva Conference of 1954: Cambodia, the Peoples Republic
of China, France, Laos, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the
Vietminh!, the State of Vietnam the French-supported Bao Dai
regime!, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United King-
dom, and the United States of America. it is important to note
that there were two agreements: The Geneva Accords Final
Declaration! and the Geneva Armistice Agreement Agreement
on the Cessation of I-Iostilities!.1 The armistice agreement was
the essential foundation upon which the Accords rested. It pro-
vided for a military truce between two parties only: Ho Chi
Minhs Vietminh government and the French military command.
The regime of Bao Dai, of which the present Saigon government
is successor, was merely the powerless agent of the French mili-
tary administration. It was the French who disposed of all real
authority in those areas not controlled by the Vietminh. This
military truce between the French and the Vicrminh was the
basic document, providing for temporary partition of Vietnam
and for the withdrawal of French troops from north, and of Viet-
minh forces from south, of the 17th parallel.
This partition, however, was clearly described in terms of a
military regroupment of forces. lt involved no political boundary
and certainly provided no basis for the establishment of a separate
state in the South. Article 6 of the Final Declaration at Geneva
.t,t t 1. 1-. ' - . -K 'coaiu not nave oeen more explicit. The Conference recognizes
See Appendix I-A.
_' 1_ ~:_:Inn:.. " _ -_"
_$_, _ __ .,V:,, ...,__.:_ -
rs'51,: in ' r
a .
l
I
4
__... - . -_,.
_.j_' -:71 . 13->. -' -.;_.> ¢!.- . . i, . . C .§ t
_ N ,_,..,,,.-._..._,_c,.,_.._.._.._._..--_.-.,,._._..;_..t._.., .....r- . -=- . -.= . ,;---.i ,'..»Y-:11; si.~:- ?,~.- i; -. -'... -- »1 .92. -.1 ,.'-3". :- ; i
4. . .»-. .<. W .- Fr ' . ,, ,-- -.' A * '11-' -.:."
, w i - ' ' . I-,'=..-,;-.-j§?92'-j.#_', ._,.',-I.-1-. . .:- ; , -_ 1:, _~;,?-;, -;'-,1-141---5--1-ft--.2 .=;r-.1»,
;':l.";~ .. , .21-' .~.~='-1 '.~:1;. -~ Q g.'~-.:u.:;sai;1.»*-<..".=:,£a24.>§.=' -rs~.=:$-13.11-U.-2:->*?E~*i~=1*r¥
-92 .
.¢; -y> i '-1, _.,: Y " ;' L"-.' e .sq. . i t s "" .1.--.". ». L , p
oyi i
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES lT92'V JLVE.l92IE.-|'T IN VIETN.-92l92»I 4-i
that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam
is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and
that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not
or ttfi oria
in any way be interpreted as constituting a pol
boundary. 2
The Vietminh was reluctant to agree to this partition, which
left it with slightly less than half of the territory of Vietnam
despite the fact that at the time it controlled three-quarters. How-
ever, Ho Chi Minhs government was under strong Soviet and
Chinese pressure to give way on this point. The concern of China.
and probably also the Soviet Union, was that continuation of
the war might cause the introduction of American military power
possibly aton1iein support oi the French, a course ol action
which the United States did in fact come very close to taking.
The Vietminh accepted this temporary loss because of the explicit
promise in both the armistice agreement and in the Geneva Dec-
laration that within a period of two years national elections would
be held to unify the country. They had every reason to believe
that these elections would take place because the agreements
stipulated that France. the other party to the armistice, was to
maintain control of civil administration in the South until elections
were held Article 14a of the armistice agreement!. In eliect,
then, the elections and the military truce were interdependent, a
tact often disregarded.
Despite this stipulation, less than a year after the Geneva Con-
ference, France, alleging American pressure, pulledyout of Viet-
nam without honoring its obligations concerning the elections;
and the United States stepped in to ll the void left by the depar-
ture of French power.
The United States had not been a party to the military truce
and had not actually assented to the Geneva Declaration. in-
torrned observers have said that the major reason was the unwill-
ingness of Secretary of State Dulles to appear to give any ground
to Communism, especially at the time of an election campaign.
Instead, at Geneva the United States had made its own unilateral
declaration wherein it undertook to refrain from the _threat or use
of force t0_disturb the Geneva Accords. With respect to the pro-
* Sec Appendix l~B_ .4
H . I i. _ it-ii _|i.- I. E i , . .
. l
T
I
_, ._... ...$ .._.i i "=_-~~.. V-92 - "-
it ,2 N ._,__ _iV_ e. e -._-h-'-t~g.,-i,;s,__,_- -_| , _ ...., 92>' . __ .-- , YV-.V - .-
,>a '- Lt >1 . - _ I» ' -,. '23 3.? r r ..?=. .' ' fv_ ,.j- ~_¢ ~> -_ --- , .
' "1 1" - .=> -V K» i . ' I
U ' -..* an _~.
92
Q
1 . . '
l _-._,._- .»t i .
x
_ , ~ V ,. --:-P . ¢ -. <
, .,_-t -.~ __ i ,- .-_ -, i.-.- t_- ~V--_-.~_~. ._- ,- _!_.-_-_;y ,7, -- _-, i}_,9_,,u, ._-»__92,;o_ Pp..1-._.;F K-.___§_»r.-.,____ Q»; _.92_-:~_3,$, __rt}r_'._ .:-.1, f-"ti-¥_g9292_ _:_.;.92,,:_.-éy;§92f_.yz;i;g}B1»:s:t;§~_3- _._-..'r.t;-_""t' ~' -""1 '..i."' ;.tf§ ~f-§..i.*'_,.."*°i~I4.-K "'-'1-si=-.2§u.~A-t..."~92 i :"" "e§§"_.§,.f" '-"t
.1...
| >" '-win-.;.-r=lv<92,'-s '-'
» ~_»_t-__~_. -r-.~~ ,- Lg~*III7'Wi1'lI_P'I_§;':¥y'_ -mi-1"-A1-1|I"l_¢1"''92!¥92b'I];*'-T"<"'?1°¬-f"'92*In'F."-Fr92- ql .-. la ;- V . . . .. .t V - .' * '> '--tw-1 '-"- -. =92r<~-1 '£:.:'; in."-.tV'1-., * " " Q-':~;'-' " '~-< P.-'.i=71.--, '.1g*-n-' ~52 <-Y; ,-, - -;. .. V Wu -,V, V - , .,V y , __. _._,_,>.J ;;__ , .~ _92,_t__ 1< 92- " .. iiI_i
l
U
'-"-'.-.133 .0
uq
est!
KiK
J
42 I PEACE IN VIETNAM
vision for elections, it had stated: In the ease of nations now
divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve
unity through elections supervised by the United Nations to insure
that they are conducted fairly. 3 In its declaration the United
States likewise spoke only" of a single Vietnam, not of a South
and a North Vietnam.
It was not until January 1955 that France transferred all the
essential attributes of authority to the Saigon regime headed by
Bao Dai. But even before this the United States had begun to
support his administration and especially Prime Minister Ngo
Dinh Diem, who had been appointed by Bao Daj two weeks
before the Geneva Conference concluded.
Diem came from a Roman Catholic i'viandan'n family which
served the vestigial and effectively French-controlled imperial
Annamese court at Hué in central Vietnam. After working, in the
imperial administration for four years, Diem resigned in i933
because of a dispute with Emperor Bao Dai. In 1949, following
a long period of political retirement and study, Diem was offered
the premiership by Ho Chi Minh. He turned it down, in part
because he held the Vietminh responsible for the murder of his
brother. After an unsuccessful attempt to develop a rival political
narrv hf-. IPFT Vietnam in Ancntcf IQQH nnrl qnnnf fnnr m=~nrc: nhrnnrir.___J, --_ .._-- . --_ .-.-. ..c, a .-.-C,-en .1 -v an-.. 92.|IJ92Il.lI- -vs. Jvunu I-A92.!A92192-Lul,
mostly in the United States. At least as early as November 1954,
the United States had decided to support Diem in setting'up an
anti-Communist state in South Vietnam, making clear that Amer-
ican aid would be given to him alone.
While the Saigon regime of Ngo Dinh Diem soon discncum-
bered itself of Bao Dai and freed itself of French control, it failed
to satisfy nationalist aspirations. Ho Chi Minh, who for the pre-
vious decade had been the acknowledged head of the Vietnamese
nationalist movement, simply could not be displaced by Ngo Dinh
Diem, a man supported from the outside, little known, and absent
from the country during the critical years of the war against the
French. Partition did not mean that the area south of the 17th
parallel emerged free of Communist inuence or of predispositions
inwarrl the re-rvime nf IIn hi Minh The nnn 1-trim them r~ lrl.-.._-_ --_- .-a.-..- _,- --c V... _........ ...- pupu,...Na ........ Boulhl
' Sec Appendix I-C.
i I , ' - ii T ' ' _ ' ihim-
__.._A __ '' 7 7 . 7 7 77 7 7 - v -
' " __;jii' __ #7. 7. ._.-- 7 _ _ g " -V_ -»g.1:=.. '
- .7
" v."~;7;.1a-.2 _- L l .451_ " ..l ;_- 7
j .
.1-
" g, , 6;.-c-yh :.=- 1 ' ' <-.=¥,<_*E- V.»-. >,--..--_ » 7: 7, _'- ,-yfs --~ Ky/'3' . ' ' ':' 7 <31
'_.':V; gig ,_"; ; |_?_?1.i'.1 _:;,<. .7 ,_._, g 1: ' ._ ;_._ . .-1,: t 92 3,,. » -47 .
» 5
:
_, . -7 __ .,..,7.,T._.».,.,, ,,>.~n-4-:_y-fy?-vn!yz-frr~_- .,»... ...-a--»».~._.--~--.w,-_-;-7.,-- .7,-11 .. .7 _- .-_.-i.,. ...i._._ -. ., --' "-.1 ,4 »l;,_':"."-2:;-.. _-, ~~.- .:_.Asg92: i *.:i~_",¢ e -.;V.~-'.i.- ~- -, ;~ "/::_,-._'-J
" .. _ E .
. _ __ . ,1 1 . H , 2.-_"_-L:___> Z; I _;:._r',I._.-y _92:i..':¢ii.,,:E___- _-._1__. ,__- I_: i.92:-_i,..'_~A_i: 7 1.-N, :_- _=;1_ i. », 5;-92~,_i §..7.»,1.5'-;7,;},.: ! y ,.-.-,,.7.,-K 1' . ;_-*-~ ~_.-:-- r7 x 7 er ._ 3 1 -l~;f._j 1-3,-.-,;.j_--'-;_>:,."t.,,.' 3;: ;7.'=7;__,; .s,;7;- _*__ -is 7-"_ 2- 1. 'e._:-=1.-.:;a: at. at
. .9-2 W :1 , .=" -3..j:' 1 7 -5 .1.
> ' 1* " 1 1;... -
Q
&
s
5 .
lg
_ ,* I
»HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM .43
not forget that it was the Vietminh regime, now ensconced in the
North, that drove out the French; and many landless peasants
remembered that it was the Vietminh that had divided up the
estates of absentee landlords for their benet.
By helping to establish a separate state south of the armistice
line, the United States was clearly acting in deance of the Geneva
Accords. In effect, both the United States and Saigon accepted,
and insisted that Hanoi accept, only those aspects of the Geneva
Agreements that they found advantageous and repudiated those
provisions that they regarded as contrary to their interests.
Thus, with American encouragement, Diem announced in
mid-1955 that the elections promised at Geneva would not
be held. Until 1958 the Hanoi government persisted in its
efforts to anange for the promised elections, but Diem, consist-
ently backed by the United States, refused. During at least the
rst three years of the postGeneva period, there was a lull in the
military struggle. Hanoi refrained from support of insurrectionary
activity in the South. But by repudiating the heart of the Geneva
Agreements, Diem made civil war inevitable. When, in a civil
war, a military struggle for power ends on the agreed condition
that the competition will be transferred to the political level, the
side which repudiates the agreed conditions must expect that the
military struggle will be resumed.
Although American support was given to Diem, the United
States did not make a blank-check commitment to whatever regime
happened to hold power in Saigon. What has been referred to
as the U.S. commitment was a limited, qualied pledge of
economic support, and it was made specically to Diems govern-
ment. It was not in any sense a pledge of mr'limr_v support. The
cornerstone of our Vietnam involvement, President Eiscnhowers
letter to Diem in October 1954, was simply an undertaking to
examine" with Diem how an intelligent program of American aid
given directly to your government can assist Vietnam . . . in
developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of l'¬Slst.
ing attempted subversion or aggression through military means.
A critical qualication was that even this economic aid was to be
subject to Dienfs carrying through reforms responsive to the
_,_ _ _, ________q,.,.,_;,,,_ _--.... -__-
u-._ . .. ' ti-i -'-I;-, ;__' "~92-_~- ' ...Q-j-ms; - r-"F": .. . ' - J -:' . "F-J1 .-;.;' .1 . -. ._ ._ N _7
91?
2%v.
"E
Q
i
P;.,=;. ' - "<;_.;<
1;: -:5 i :r.=,=;:- '-J A
PF . "£1-is .1 -- - .._.L ' A .- -P = ,-.;.1- <_ "
, .'- -t ; .- i ¢'1~;."> - '~ =1 ...'-,,
. .<. ,_ r- , 2,.-_r_*:. ' - *»-- I - »- .D v i 92 '1;._ #-
.
4,, t. w -~&, 92 .1.t t:9 :_-a--_ 1;
-
GI
-t
.
_.r_}.,_ I_ _,._~;.,.-é-t. _..> ,7. _ _* - , -,,:. i-'_"'i'i§='Z-ii-_.'~.;'¢' .. . . .. .92 . -. -.. -mgr-:4--.t<--1 ...:r'1. ; 4 - ; tr-' _.?=.;.": 5 ' _' _-.'~-_-..'.-"l- L J-L -.-'.- -.~, ~--,'/"c- "J1 l'~:.. -1;-', .s>.?"92Z-*;It~:- i';';L-Liéil-;i ; - .~ .::.~ >';_Lt ..r1i-Y * 1; ' "-'*?t;si_'l.e.*.-I»"i =--'*-- it-1'"
ir. -_-xx
92 , _ ._ ..,.. _.i}? .
Q1' J.1i
i
i
4
_ __ .___.._..___.. i.--_.1..--1 _.... __ _&n&92
. i
I-KT
i
92
|
|
|
|
144 i PEACE IN VIETNAM
aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Thus, in concluding his
letter, President Eisenhower wrote:
The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met
by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in under-
taking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your
own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an inde-
pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a govern-
ment would, I hope, he so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of
its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance,
that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any
who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.
This is the substance of the Eisenhower commitment to which
the present administration often refers when it is invoking Amer-
ican honor. l
Except for Eisenhowefs letter, the only other undertaking which
the Administration cites as a proof of a. Vietnam commitment is
the treaty of the Southeast Asia Treaty Urganization. But this
treaty involves no American pledge to the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment, which was not and could not be a signatory. With
respect to the area of South Vietnam, and also that of Cambodia
and Laos, SEATO provides that in cases of aggression by armed
attack, each SEATO power is to meet the common danger_in
accordance with its constitutional processes, and in cases of sub-
version, to consult with the several SEATO sivnatories in
order to agree on the measures to be taken for common defense.
Cl§A"l"f'92 4|». 1-» H,-.4 ..¢92A '|- -"=4 1.-.92.-L-as I» 1-Inn I92 t 0¬u1_;r921.92.1, ut, W35 nut etuu in nut E t L»92-l5C LO tn
South Vietnam. The treaty merely provides that each member
country should determine whether its own security interests require
it to respond to developments in that area and, when this hap-
pens, to consult with other signatories on any defense measure to
be taken. The United States has certainly never been able to bring
its SEATO allies to agree that the treatys vague language could
possibly be translated as any kind of commitment to the govern-
ment of South Vietnam. President l- ennedys view of the United
States commitment is best summed up in the statement he made
in September 1963, when he said: ln the nai anaiysis, it's their
war. Theyrc the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help
_ _ g ,__,--,--..t-y " :i920't._. ' r . __r _ ' - A __ - ~ .
l
-5 her » -= at : - . ' ire: -W ' - 1; -'-;'r 1 '_ _,7j-- ;-5; ;_."92. 2- rlt-,__ . ii.. 1 . - I:-=. tits-' .' 7 8'-P ..}';"92 ~'-',= i w".:":i '-. -.-,=.;-l - 7 -.. - t ._» .=_ ____. 7 -. _,.~.*.-
. ..92 , _ ,.
1'
l
... -' i
. . ----t--.~_ .. .. -. -- -- = I .-.-¢.__ _.-_>~,.j.-1- 1 92 at ~.-.:~_-;< _: .--$.-~!'."7'.;'-".- > 4 ii ' 1- I -* .-" -Q! - -- I »-,,_gq; _:;
*' ' . 1"i'- 1."-5'* ' _ -3- ." <:., '-.. 3?.. . . . l rt.»--~.-;.-. ,-. -- ;__-_: _!_- , .1; .'=;_ .-_.-.-_92 .=_ -: ~_i -. *- i__ i_ __.-3,, ' 1'. . '. '1 I, ~*-,3 , -=:.~_ I-'_'92 ---3..»-1 if-1. -. '.~ ->'-'_u» it. r ;~ -, ~ = H ir~-»-'"-;i-»"2:»;=-.a- '~" .>=3t--P-'.¢r~;¥-all--vi-»";;,1y7~a. Y -; -;-1 ~___ _~ . ~;._-;- _.;..j-='_927 : *'*:- -'.:;' 1,. i;-1,-.~:sI-.x'-LH.i==92""' .t::i;;.it: -i'l',~=,_--=-,,'.~;1>>v*'tr}:5,53"--~<'§,,-.'S-.--.=..1===.i:i...,£.=..ti._92' "'- ""7 " ;p.'1t-"t,-anti
r" . it l_ .;$ * _~~=1 .
4
I .
i
II
I
E
- -~_'r~ " ' .Hill _ ..... - ...._-_.'. ~ '_ .- in is»:-. _;
92;£f,;,.." A; .. V.-r.-_>..» _' . 1., --_;',__ sQt§sa.>_ _.... . ti. _92..._ 7 i._ ._ i-.i,|_. _ if, . ii
HISTORY on umrno stares INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM '45
them, give them equipment, we can send our men out there as
advisers but they have to win it. _
Like those of Ho Chi Minh, the methods of Ngo Dinh Diem
' ' - eh . 4 A r ti" 1 AG..- 1...-.vvf Ztt.tthG:tEZ!i':t ., bu: U12! w'¬{6 st. 1.'iui'iiini.S92Is':iL1v3lY CILLLLIVC.
Unlike I-Io, Diem lacked Contact with the bulk of his people, and
he had no trained and dedicated party cadres and officials upon
whom to rely. Most of the educated people who have worked in
Diems govemment and the governments that have succeeded it
have been of two kinds: southerners who had collaborated with
the French and thereby alienated the local population; or anti-
Communist refugees from the North without roots in South Viet-
nam, men who speak a different dialect and most of whom are
Roman Catholic, a religion foreign to the OVC[92Vi'lQl1'1'_li!]g majority
of southerners. Moreover, at a very early stage Diem antagonized
a large part of the southern peasantry by largely undoing the
agrarian reforms that I-I0 Chi Minhs regime had carried out.
Lands previously divided among the peasantry were restored to
the landlords, and police supported the collection of ve years
back rent. In mid-I956 Diem uprooted the traditional system of
village autonomy by abolishing the elected village councils. Ht.
replaced them with officials who were appointed by and served
as agents of the central government. Diem also removed many
able and popular ofcials, leaders with strong local roots who
had worked under the previous Viettninh administration. These
men were often replaced with corrupt and oppressive appointees
from outside, further alienating the rural population.
Diem governed with a harsh and heavy hand, countenancing no
genuine opposition to his regime and indiscriminately denouncing
as Communists those who opposed him, whatever their political
views. By 1957 the harshness of Diems repression had sparked
uprisings against him, often not Communist-led. The Vietcong
was able to build upon these later when its cadres became active.
By 1958, forrner Vietminh supporters living in the South had
begun to organize guerriila operations against Diem, undertaking
by 1959 a campaign of assassination of village chiefs. It must be
recognized that this campaign, although often effective in disrupt-
ing Dierns efforts to establish his own administration throughout
the country, did not antagonize the rural population so widely
' 1, l
B -2 . = .-=1-=.1' 92 .»92. - 3,4 _.i_J t .-i
if_.@_._
1-,7 _ .. . W7 W ___ _ 92
I»»»-=- »~ - _i' I
01
92
.1 . ,..,_-.-,. ',_,_ * ,-92- 1 9-:.~.-..: 'J.:.-is '~ = . '- ~.-;.- ~; . . --:1 -.. . --4 - . - -1-»' . -. _ Y-'1.- '- re; '. . ..92 .1.-~~ -Fri" ' I5.-392-1 __---92 -~ .-: .. '1», 'rm .-- _.
t
I
i
I
l
6;':"i%I~f' - ,_ -it.'...£-.=~:*:»s'.a's.-..'.-..~.-¢'-»-_ 1 -. 11'1"rt-Z"Z:-U_:;|i1l';§.'»;1?92-1 Y 7 --_-_ - ~ '~-7* '_ ./"= - ---it-'--'.»~.-:3 - n-_~:-.- ::. 2. -.---so -..-u ;-.=_92..-4»,--_:f1,,.-_}!:3; "..I-f-'.f.-.';"-.»n- »_L1_t<-;92;~~.
._1-' .~
-I .-_. A ,, .
t .3; ",'|;:il"1
4. ,» _ _
a
I
d a
» 1
.- - Q '__
"7.. ~:£ ,9».~.'~ .r'. I-"-1 - -. . -,
__--'--.
.92_> r_ ,--,- w-r-~.w,-..r_ " -.7, -T{*'-T1 ;;r'{~. - ,, *1
-. -.. - .-.E~-:;..=- _.,-_;~_-----_~, _-e~-.;j|t_- .7-5:. t-:5 1; 1?: r;-51*--'» i;-ii" ',-.. .11-i-s.-._ai....t<. .._,;~,_. . _
4.:-if 5., 1, .-"'"_.Y?¢1"P
-iFI~;'-.jI
.t__,_,-_,_'.;'." .
..< . ;_-,..- l _.; E9 £",:§*_i'..i;i'.}fl:.Tl;§
.,-tU
2,
In
=9
r
2
l
I
I
... ._h ._ l_._ _..._. ..._.. ._ _. . iv
i
r
V
I
|
iK
, .}
46 i ' PEACE IN vrsrrmm
as some accounts have suggested. In fact, these assassinations
were largely on a selective basis. The underground organization
showed canny intelligence in eliminating the most unpopular
Diem-appointed ofcials. Thus, the veteran Southeast Asian cor-
respondent, Denis Warner, hardly a supporter of Hanoi, writes in
his book, The Last Confucian p. S9!: Summary Viet Cong
justice for a village chief guilty of corruption or brutality did not
oend the peasants. On the contrary, it tended to endow the Viet
Cong with some of the characteristics of Robin Hood and his
band of merry men . . .
The exact point at which Hanoi began to support insurrection-
ary activity in the South is subject to much dispute, but certainly
in 1960 such support was made public by Hanoi. In September of
that year, Ho Chi Minhs government formally acknowledged the
southern dissidents as the National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam NFLSV!. This was in eect the political arm of
the insurgents, a grouping that Diem collectively labeled Viet-
cong and that certainly incorporated a large number of the Viet-
minhs former adherents in the South as well as other elements
opposed to Diem. The leader of the National Liberation Front,
Nguyen Huu Tho, is a southerner, a Saigon lawyer rst arrested
during the period of French control and later, in November of
1954, by Diem. While still in jail, in 1959, he wrote a lctter to
ex-Vietminh southerners urging them to form a national front.
In May 1961, approximately a year after the Front was formally
established, he escaped from prison and soon emerged as the
Fronts principal leader. According to Tran Van Huu, who served
as Bao Dais prime minister from 1951 to 1953, Nguyen Huu
Tho is very well known in Saigon as a person who was most
active in opposition to the French in the colonial period. By
1960 members of the Vietcong were being given training in the
North, and some arms were being sent south, although the vast
majority of the arms employed by the insurgents continued to be
American equipment captured from or sold by Diems troops.
Meanwhile, United States ofcials in Vietnam were increasingly
frustrated in their efforts to induce Diem to institute the sort of
reforms necessary for winning popular support. The hope that
92@ /' g
v ~§ 'i92*'4.
10- .I '1 _ ~ , , -
-1:-=
._..-:--1_-+-gv-|g»i-.e-=;~1v_-,'!"'-1.~~.- --aces-_w-~-wry!--1-q»-.~r_~*.'7='v.'
_r _-t J . J ,, ,.; _.- -, jg my
F92
y I<
~t-:. -~"_'I:,-~'_ "!92 .- .
t. r .- 1 i, . ~.~._"-QP-.*l%'!:~-r?»7l:'§. 'J.'ir' .l '~ - ~ . '.i,~,~@.~»-#- -e-+~~1i -1-
'_,-__' :1..¬. .-Zas Z-.:.-1 :;'f Z':.;i'¥'.>'; ~ ~~ 1 I
iyi
:g;_§l
O
v~<
ai ' .' -.92 1. " . "_="'3 .»92. "3.-,-',:'1y'-it,- "?=.kf,5§L'.»'i-"3 I ii"_,|=_j;¥_;,;_J-r_- !,r;,._;'_-'--,;_*_.r -:§:j-,_1_~;,:.-;»"t~__»* i..".-s;>a==~?92=_2-..'~. s.<.:s$-t'lI-~*1L~*al£§I
Q n
-Ira. 1'is 1- -
- F». L -.4/-to
F .. V-,. ."v!i .
l
l
ll
rll
.l
1
it
»
ig _ H I, - ,,~ M,
_ E
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNABI A 47
full and unstinting American backing would make him more
cooperative in such matters proved totally illusory. Criticaliy im-
portant social and economic reforms urged by the United States
were either not carried out or were attended by so much corrup~
tion and inefciency that they resulted in even greater alienation
of the population. Dierns program of agrarian reform could
hardly have been expected to secure him signicant political sup-
port. Even the modest redistribution of land for which it provided
did not get underway until 1958. The program was restricted to
rice-growing lands; and even with regard to these holdings, land-
lords were permitted to keep up to 284 acres. Where rice proper-
ties in excess of this amount were made available for redistribution,
the peasant had to pay for the land in full, and he received title
to it only after he had paid the last of six installments. For those
many landless peasants in the South who had been given such
lands by the Vietminh in the period before Geneva, the right to
purchase what they regarded as already their own did not make
them particularly grateful to the government in Saigon. The stra-
tegic hamlet program, for which American officials initially made
such extravagant claims, turned out to be in most areas a tragic
failure that worked great hardship upon and further alienated
the rural population. Its objective was to resettle peasants in
larger and more easily protected concentrations where they were
to benet from new or improved social services. In tact, most oi
the peasantry affected were signicantly worse off than before.
Apart from the trauma of being uprooted from their homes and
ancestral lands, they were usuaily quite inadequately compensated
for the property they had been forced to abandon, They were
often harshly treated, generally unable to discover the new social
services they had been promised, and usually no better protected
than before from the ravages of guerrilla warfare.
Despite repeated optimistic pronouncements by American mili-
tary and civilian officials, by I963 it had become clear to President
Kennedy that Diem and his family were incapable of stemming
the rapid political and military disintegration of the South Viet-
namese regime. The massive build-up of American aid to the
South Vietnamese anny had proved ineffective, for the Vietcong
. p P
in
v
t
3??
"Q__-as.
.-311r J
<-=-@ ..
. .
-._Iv
1; I -1. 2:. .1%--.3?
.»
{zit1 92 1 ,
.- gt
,,.. r--=~.'¢
lath.
9292t :_=I,
' 92
:-rt, e, It ._f92 ,,/v :_,_
I gt-F* 19. -e
'1
_.~
,-
:1
it;_ i:'-"»'.-." 3 -" -' ".-. 1."--'-.'r'T»' cf->.'='.' '-92 '2?-'*"£.¥1.-l~J.=¢>3.-iii i?§=l;""s*..r*1.=_»=§"-"°3tlEI »-- -- pr » _ , » -- -...s ;92l_t-~. >- é~_,r 1,. pi I3 ",j._~; ~ we t,_...;~'-I z_----..-t- - -- .< .: a1_-jlgju-_.92-__. R. = ,- _
I
_ .._'~tIaI T" " - "' " T1? .1-is' -ft - airlb -1? . . st;
..J,s_...;.t.,q-ts_-0-92
FEACE TN VIETNAM
beneted more from the vast infusion of American weapons than
did the South Vietnamese army and had, in fact, been able to
use the government as a supply store.
It was the highly publicized, heavy-handed treatment
Vietnam's Buddhists that provided the Administration
means of getting off the Diem hook in a way acceptable
bers of Congress who might otherwise have attacked it with the
charge of opposing an anti-Communist government. In effect.
Washington signaled to the military in South Vietnam that we had
abandoned our policy of sink or swim with Diem" and would be
pleased to see the army take over.
This was a calculated risk and a policy born of desperation.
For there was no assurance that the Vietnamese army would be
able to establish an eective government or command suicient
popular support. But it was believed that if the army were relieved
of the constraints of Diem and his coterie, it would ght more
eectively. This expectation, however, disregarded several facts.
First, there was a lack of unity within the army. Second, the Viet-
cong had already built up its strength in the South and controlled
over half the area. Third, even in that part of the country con-
trolled by Diem, and particularly in the rural areas, the military
leaders enjoyed little or no more support than did Diem. Thus,
contrary to expectations, the army was no more successful than
Diem, either in building popular support or in carrying out the
measures necessary to secure such support. For a period of about
three months following the overthrow of Diem, political controls
were relaxed and the military junta headed by Big Iviinh Gen-
eral Duong Van Minh! gave public opinion greater freedom of
expression than it had probably ever enjoyed before. However,
with the coup détat of General Nguyen Khanh on January 30,
1964, the government returned to the level of repression that had
existed under Diem. and the several governments installed by the
subsquent series of coups have been only a little less or a little
more repressive. The arca of South Vietnam controlled by Saigon
continued to shrink. By the end of 1964 a crisis was emerging,
with Saigorfs position being eroded at an accelerating rate, both
politically and militarily. The deterioration of the military situation
was reected in a rate of descrtion among new recruits that hadof South
with the
to mem-
r -- - 1-~:" ' _-- _ : .. __-;_..~i_.{-,
A -.1.-
Gt
~--==~,--q=-r-~ pr'92zI92'~~- ---l-.-..-..:-_--..-.-. .-q-.__ .;. : . _. _ _;..-,,. ___,, __m_,q P?" _-"I" 'i - - - . '. - , 1-...'-1-_/I -'=~..~;.-;92t:'-;_-_ 1'.» 92_»'~_ .* -'~';'_='-_. .'.'.,r » f".1_.:> I:__ K ., _. .s_-,....92_., ,,_,__ _ J. ._~ .. .t -._.l
- -.<. . Li'."'-»"f .--. r '- :'r"!s'.'»-1"J¢"i J--_ *4 ._5L 1-~-=; ,',;;;-- .i, i - M ~ - re 'Q92..al".¢,| 1" 5?f3?JJ.5.i,§:L.¢;l.Qi!,}J.z1t.hi<""'-as-l92i$?;#l7.=§aQI'it.'§;.. -35"
».4,,, 3:-_.'92 _."-V - - _ -..~"<'<.i ' -I i.;_ -_ _ ' . _i,;§.' at tz:; - -»§;5 "1~14.-.=-n-I Wile iiggyw"
< 1* .
. " _ - ..'~g1_j
-v . ' _-lifts '~ it-.1 tl>
4 . 1
1.I .
4
l
l
15 _P. . _..__dt._.t_._,§.a, __ _, N __,_~;_. ._ ._ _<:F
. . ._ __ J:-.i,. 92 ... . - * .. .22
.. ..:;-- ». -.--»t.:"- I.-:-.i:.--.'-w..-ii: M .- .. . ,_ .,.r..,..-,,,..e.. .-,., fl
} 1Q .
J
.
T-
A
-J
§[3
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEIWENT IN V_lETN/92l92i
increased to 30 per cent by January of 1965. The disintegrating
position of the Saigon administration coincided with a perceptible
growth in war-weariness among the South Vietnamese. Demands
for a peacehil settlement multiplied. In Saigon itself, as well as in
such Buddhist strongholds as Hue. students and monks publicly
advocated an end to the ghting and called for negotiations with
Hanoi. '
It was at this juncture that the Johnson Administration, fearing
that the Saigon army and government would fall apart, undertook
to stiffen their morale with direct American military intervention
and the bombing of North Vietnam. Increasing the direct Amer-
ican military involvement, to a point where the United States has
assumed the maior burden of offensive military operations against
the Vietcong, has undoubtedly reduced the disposition of the
South Vietnamese military leaders, and other members of that
minority that has a vested interest in the present regime, to
come to any negotiated settlement with the Vietcong. It is claimed
that increased American involvement has had a similar f°" "
most of the civilian population, but such an effect is dilticult to
demonstrate because the present junta led by General Ky has out-
lawed as traitors ail those who urge negotiations with the Vietcong
or even discuss the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
The history of these two decades of increasing American in-
volvement in Vietnam shows the danger of ignoring the underlying
ground swell of nationalism with its strong. accent on anti-colonial-
ism. Having reviewed this history, perhaps we can understand
why the school teacher in I-Iué sad that the Americans areCHCUL UH
YO
Communists of the Vietnamese men. Starting from a wrong as-
sumption, the Unitcd States has piled one error on another, moving
deeper and deeper into a deteriorating situation. In the midst of
a full-scale war, the choices are limited to desperate alternatives.
Constructive solutions are hard to nd. What has happened to
the attempts to nd a formula for negotiations? What kind of a
settlement may be possible?
+-~ ;: _p_p**A fie ~:_*_', __, -_ $1; e - -e ,1,*5: . U WI -: __ _ _! __.__'_:= V _--_. ! » -»-.¢_-,»-.>~ 1 ' '* 1'2"-.1 " " ' "".t92f-i:?;"""'-?7-'~ " " i=; V. ., . W - '92j| _ _ _r-,-; l92é~;- .=.-I _ - .
i . -"P ;*-;'; _ Ii?- -r'92 "'.' _t . -I-..= ~ . its :;. "ii :. " ... ;-- =_ ,.;,';:_-=* _ kg _ 92_-5';-'; '~ - '3? V if 3'i .; '1 Lg?" Q l-_!.~' - ,, _ _;.1 1,t . , . I -6 . . -
92 m.QQ-I
i
Q '
res t0
' I n _ .
-__.._._..»-. "Y - v. y.,,_...,y It .. ." .2 92 -.-E: _<'92 1 ;_1":',i'-'._I--fi__i.1- ~ lC:'-' .1._-_~i-,q- »i-_ ;_-I =- A. » " :=f;=-I-:4 1 3 It ~' ~ " 1i= :»..=_= 5;; -=1-'~'=-;=; -3
- = =- -l :';".,,:;_. y y ~ , 92_1_ y.,/ ;..<__ 4 _ ,.;s.;=;;;-"_:"¢:~<=:=f;,r;~=;t-'1; _ - I.- - y > rs» -=_=.,.-' ;92_92'i --;.'t*-sh,-'-.»'-*-='" ."1."'~i._92t . ,- ., -. . '. l W ,1 -< »--- -.-. 1%..-' fwrr--<'.'192.-:_=. ..F~1 ==i1-4'--"F1-'».;&<."''1'- »'92' ' . »---' f; 'Z',;'>'5:_»." "'-.',~. =9» L92'f.!i-LI./I-j',,{T, §-;*:=1,7$311;.1.i"'3§"t-1 ;i,92*"ir'i. f$}i§;'§;'f6"'~$i?e-__; ;:.;A§;_-iii. ,<_r-1., ,"92:rl 4:. ~;_:~'-,._-_f_- --=_'.!, --5;--_E; yfxlr -,1-_.1. .F:_»]-siaa-_i§~¢!.s,92I,;2_.Id_._;r<E_ ti;-.-:;;t:;;-;_'__;'_:
-~11
"V I}-L _ "-_'_,~ ,4 , -ta?-!~' ";i-;-' =-f hfo. .~_~I §.~ ' -,-_-1*._t" . » L . 9 I Q 'n -,:- 1 ~,., -J - .t F . it in-1 I Q1-___
t
-E
4
re
- J... ..__-._n.b._tr.__.»_....._._.. ._»
- >.r___t:_t:__ n_....._I_
IYBQOIIGHOII FULLIB
In July 1965, it was brought to public n0tice,1 and subsequent
admitted by the United States Department of State, that in Se;
tember 1964 the North Vietnamese government oered throng
U Thant to send a representative to Rangoon to meet with
United States representative and discuss the ending of hostilitit
in Vietnam. The United States did not reply to this oer for rm
months, presumably because of the presidential election, and the
rejected it. '
At that time the war was going badly for the United Stat:
and Secretary of Defense McNamara is reported to have felt th:
the shaky Saigon government could not survive the prospect r
peace tall-ts. The reason now officially given for the rejection
that Secretary of State Rusks antennae did not indicate to hii
that the North Vietnamese seriously wanted to negotiate. H
apparently did not think it important to verify this by arrangir
the requested quiet discussions. Later U Thant tried for an on
right cease-re, offering to forward to the other side any tern
the United States wished to propose even including the drawir
of a truce line through Laos as well as Vietnam. Again he wz
rebued by the United Slates.
Though these facts came as a shock to most Americans an
Eric Sevareid, CBS Radio, London, July 28, 1965, and Look, Novemb
26, 1965.
"Robert McCloskey, New York Times, November I7, 1965.
50
'1'-':'92 . i _ . . ,. ... I , . .-n-4-': ii--"-4* .'r"'-I-92LLii's41:L..a..u_4' '1 " " " '-'4":i."-'1i.~--»-Bil:-'5_" ' ' " " " ":92- ..'=I-ll-Ki-ti1'.'>|.
ll _ - 92J17_-__1 ,;- _ r-,,. 1. L Q. .-. L.e Fm ' -Q.J_-:;_:I-- ii ;::':'_*'*
-= ii :i:1"§- "
iii f .-
$3,,
Ila t J- in-is ..__. _.Qéii. =! P. . J-.
. *1-';A"t.
I' - ' -.-.. - -. <>-J 4-, ..~§,'==~j:-. r, -.i---.,-,:_ i.92_ . . l !.1i - - -,i -. .,,,. t'f..-_-t.-"V i- i -J. ~i-- .'..',_._. .--<:
Q ' "=.".-..,~, it ;n_"t-§_,.*.§-1=-_i'vLi;f-i_-git
;__ -» -. ,-:1 -- 92 -t". it-.s';;§E.i ,?;=1- ! , I int , _.~ 4 . 92 tt~,,<,92i,i,_'_-t--i-.@._; . ,.-W-1,2,-~:-,1 ,/_;_' ' I
-r
.~:' ;' -._. 1- ; ;_.
F tn92
THE I92'1?GOT!AT10} JZZLE _ L
created something of a crisis of condence in the government, a
careful reading of the New York Timesisliows that the United
States has rejected no fewer than seven eorts to negotiate an
end to the war. A
As early as the fall of 1963, at a press conference right after
Diems assassination, Secretary Rusk turned down a French pro-
posal for a neutral, independent South Vietnam. Hanoi, at this
time, expressed willingness to discuss the establishment of a coali-
tion. ncutralist government in South Vietnam. In July 1964, the
United States rejected a suggestion by U Thant for reconvening
the Geneva Conference of the nine nations that had negotiated
the original settlement of the Indochina War in 1954. In December
1964, Ho Chi Minh notied France of his desire to discuss an
accommodation with the United States; and in early February
1965, President de Gaulle, at the urging of North Vietnam, re-
quested a reconvening of the Geneva Conference to discuss the
future of Southeast Asia and the United Nations. There were
indications that the Peoples Republic of China would have been
willing to attend and that withdrawal of United States forces from
South Vietnam would not have been a prerequisite, provided even-
tual withdrawal could be expected as a result of a peace settlement.
The Administrations reaction was to say that we had given France
no mandate to act as a mediator and were not interested in a
return to the conference table at that time. On February 24, the
Soviet Union, angering some of the other Communist countries
by doing so, joined France to press for reconvening the Geneva
Conference to negotiate a settlement for South Vietnam.
At this same time U Thant suggested possible preliminaries to
a Geneva=tvpe coiifereiiec to discuss a possible peace settlement: ,
interlinked diaioguesg among the parties most directly involved,
and an informal seven-power conference, including all the Geneva
Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fail, Vietnam Reader New York: Ran-
dom House, 1965!.
New York Titties, March 9, 1965, and Manchester Guardian, August 9,
1965.
New York Times. March 9, 1965. '
" Drew Middleton, New York Times, February 23, 1965.
' Drew Middleton, New York Times, February 25, 1965.' _ ' ' Thomas Hamilton, New York Times, February 25, 196$.
5' -= = " Thomzis Haniilto York Times, March 9, 1965.
., ' ., - .i_,,,i.,_ A r.. In-i-*""*" ' ':'-_ *~-:'.'.'-' ' 35' '-i_ .,.-. r.-_ .. '2-1:.-. , _}:s.--. ' -5'-1".§ii'-7:.-;"-r : .. " - ' 1~-.-- .¥ii{i+~'.A~.~' - - -Q .
- _ '__ .._.,,,'; .L_'_._ _.=,-_ __ ,_, _ _" -- ' 1-; ...- .__....._ H, ti _ 1
._-a.»..-.-t-. __' -- »'r.
7 --192- I->;.e:# "-I
- ~.:".'- ' _ .' " ~1r"3h_ .v _ I
t I
., .. _tr _ --.< tkfg-t
-"¢Sl
va
92 . -'17-,-.~ 5. .-Y-..,_,|,,.¢,.,--.._-¢,¢s,~_--,1.,,,t.._.,-»-5?... r._,~_-1,4,1,-a;-._-.,_-tq--.V-..A_ _92i
- 4 > ' s Pf-~ :;r.t~? i <-.:~ -1.1: 15-i 1,4 5i',._'* 5. fr :'=_;,-._t_:.;._'_u5.>:__~. . -l-13.; _.~, _:--.92.92,-Us :;_, .3
. .;-..-.:;.~.'~.~' it. . J; 1*-'.-» I-:=n.:»= -1*.-"-"t t-' _ .92 7», ..:~==',r'..:-.l:":.t' , -2-'=~.'t¢t 1-= E4- .;"i~l"=--92';13-F1 -i"5i7 ~.*:<l "-wt?.-it--a -:=.-=:a.-...." t._-4"-u...s....,._"' '-" ' -=1-¢--*-»-re-' ' " '* ' " " =t; ,~I-i=,,-"i',»;;t:;ts-_~*>4
J!
43 .
. , : _
i
1
~
FU Ti
. ,4 _._.f . ," 1 in
t1
92.__ 1 -»-~- ,. <.~'~;: r.~-~,,..- , P
ii
*3
P52 PEAC r VIETNAI
powers exoept Laos and Cambodia. North Vietnam indicated itseI
receptive to this suggestion, as did France? The United State:
however, replied coldly, There are no authorized negotiation
under way with Mr. Thant or any other government. 1 U Thai".
further drew upon himself the wrath of the United States govern
merit by saying, I arn sure that the geat American people, i
only they knew the true facts and the background of the develop
meats in Vietnam, will agree with me that further bloodshed i
unnecessary. 1*
Hoping that the mere opening of negotiations might result in
tacit ceasere, France urged that neither the United States no
the Peoples Republic of China make any preconditions to nego
tiations. But Secretary Rusk said that the United States woult
agree to no conference until after North Vietnam had stopped th
ow of men and arms to the Vietcong. Furthermore, he refuse
to commit the Administration to any denite course, even i
North Vietnam agreed to end its support of the Vietcong. O;
February 27, the State Department published its widely dispute-
White Paper in an effort to prove that this support was prepon
dcrant.
In February and early March 1965 the United States was begin
ning large-scale American-piloted combat missions against the Vie!
cong in South Vietnam and massive air raids against North Viet
narn. These were no longer retaliation against specic provocativ
acts but were an avowed eort to punish North Vietnam unti
oleials were willing to negotiate on terms acceptable to th
United States. At the same time, Secretary Rusk made it clear tha
the preconditions for any negotiations must be North Vietnam
cessation of all aid to the Vietcong and an assurance that th
peace settlement would insure the security and independence
of South Vieuiam This was interpreted in Vietnam to rnea
° New York Times, February 26, 1965.
1 George E. Reedy, White House Press Secretary, as quoted by Max Frat
kc]. New York Times, February 25, 1965.
*2 New York Times, February 25, I965.
New York Times, Februarv 26, 1965.
" Max Frankel, New York Tinivs, February 26, 1965.
Drew Middleton, New York Times, February 25, 1965.
New York Times, February 26, 1965.
7 . . . . . .. . _ _, .
~ -- ..--..-.__ _'= 1: a .._, . ¢- . __,- .._ - 4|--+ _.. -- _- -
A LL <1-...-.».;:_ ~ +7
.- .12I - -- ,.-' ,1-' , 4 .. .,_ .i __ ___. .
V
O> _ ~ ___}'&_ -.._..,
- -"".§ :"< 1 ii}. i' . ea.
'92._:nF' 92.El;-
_92 ,- ..w M " " xx~ -t . ~,._;|:, -+5 #1: -J?.+;.~
-' _J__l.92.4 I_'
S
.':>~-Z--i. 1-, _._.t. 1;. ,.- .
ri . ii-r»-_1..~..'¢;; .- . l_ ,"'»:_, I-g.t. - 4 .-. .. -. i, _ ,. . . , ... ts ,t .,. ism. '.~.-- -,.. ..-921- _ -. ~* - -L -.m . .. .1. .. .- 92- . ---l , , ---.i.-t.-'- llwf 1.- .~.-.» ..1 - _. .._. ._ ,., -i . , _ ,- .,- .3 .~-A __<. .,;v,,-. ,,. i_,.._.v ,. 'w192;_-, _¢ ,_ir'? I... -,1! nu, ._-,,-e..~- .2.-as '- "-- at " 1'}:..;m£_.3-i$m-»i-_ -. i~.n..t-.-;1e,-_»i~.s.--..i¢.i:
I-st}.
i-K
Q.
,1.-._-,_ . ;;- 4 i ~ -1 -t
1* -?iis.-:~ :5. §» .- ' w
. .;. :7 . ,..__». 5
. :4-
1'lHE i92'EGO'Il' in PUZZLE 53i-
that the l_JlllltJki States intends to keep its military forces in >oui'n
Vietnam indenitely and that North Vietnam must abandon its
goal of reunication of Vietnam. North Vietnam showed no inter-
est in these terms and the National Liberation Front atly rejected
any attempts to negotiate as long as any United States forces
remained in Vietnam."
On Aprii 1, however, " """ Warbey, a British Labor
reported that his tall-ts with I-10 Chi Minh indicated that the on
precondition for negotiations on which the North would insist
was cessation of United States bombing attacks upon it.
On April 7, President Johnson, in his speech at Johns Hopkins
University, declared that the United States would consent to un-
conditional discussions." He stipulated, however, that the United
States would settle for nothing less than an independent South
Vietnam. His speech was predicated on the assumption that the
National Liberation Front was an adversary nieh whom the United
States was not willing to negotiate. He insisted that North Viet-
nam, urged on by Peking, was the aggressor, and that orders, men,
supplies, and arms owing in from the North were the heartbeat
of the war. This lent special signicance to his proviso that the
United States would enter into discussions with the governments
concerned.
Reactions to this speech were predictable. The National Libera-
tion Front considered the speech proof that the United States was
ignoring it, the chief antagonist. The National Liberation Front
and North Vietnam both knew that Hanoi could not end the War
on behalf of the National Liberation Front, even if it wanted to
do so. Peking rejected the speech as a device for perpetuating the
partition of Vietnam and lettinn the United States stav 'on in South
Vietnam, thu F ""-
_ . y 92 .- .-,.92S. "' ' "_ _ 3: , . .
. ' H AV mi '3-k gee. 4
92
S
-
1' K - ~ - v e ~ -s 92.sr-~>~_ .5-1-:1; _-_»;-.-_=-5->,-7-t--is-_T,,.,92_,,,,.92_..__t,,,¢g.7,. ,,#,g ,W,.
¢'c';i'i/12;".- .92L" 1;-";'-4'_~;'§_i_=--N f._5;:";_;f I»,--j-..-. --F'._- -.'~--.'-;'- ii}-I 3-1" _-1-,.-~. - ts-.-3 92 -. _'-;._ ,1:-.-*1?-1 1 131,11
N .._ -7-: , ." - Q _ t" , .t 5 _ .t ' > ' _ ~ '_t.' " -i. -§-- .0 .' E. , . . ._ _. __,r _ _.g._t' .:_ __ 2:. .r ii-___.gti, _. J; ;.--1%
. .. 1-A-a-1;-,'_.=.. 5 1'=3».;,;i92=itr.1,.*;.5;; '-,.,-_t;_.--.-;,i;I-.5-'.-_'¢i'i» '-7.,---_¬ ~, M -.-- ,.-1* .- - 1°IT'§It$¥.=1-'3=.'~92w.'~§iii"-1"." L'-I 5' :-Zi-.£;E i¥;5!~'5-W5-i-192u-~----s".-{..1..'.a'_.92,_;"..t.§L "'¢L,,§-:- .>'.'i-S13 -3;-me '~:;-92~m.'i",,;_g.§1,-.9-7&1;=.::*-,..Q¢£2k%£f»:';i_,
i_t_ 92 _._ I _. s *
.
.- 2},--_'e-..._..a .. _ t» .|»~'. __Chi-1'-V -~ -~ ~ - -- -..~ r. -54 PEACE jvirrsi-.:92
be barred from all negotiation, since it is only an instrurnen
created by the Communist North Vietnamese. The leailet alst
declared that negotiations could take place only after precondi-
tions such as the withdrawal of Communist troops and cadres:
laid out by the Republic of Vietnam during eventual prcliminarj
.,n... .-.:n 1.....- -92r92492092 ..,-.~.-. n1 A ' H . ' -toms win imvc uccii aeeepieb Emu C.1TI'l6£l OBI. Tlil Wlii.Lil'tt92.s£.
was further specied as meaning previous, witlidrawal of the Viet-
cong armed units and political cadres as well as those of tilt
North Vietnamese. This amounted to a denial of the President:
offer of unconditional discussions.
A senior North Vietnamese diplomat announced that, sine:
major North Vietnamese objectives are reunication and neutral
ization of Vietnam, withdrawal of United States forces and I
coalition government in South Vietnam were essential to an:
settlement, and therefore negotiations on President Johnson
terms would amount to surrender? On April 8, 1965, Premie
Pham Van Dong of the Democratic Republic North Vietnam:
stated the Four Points, to be discussed below, as the basis O1
which it would agree to a Geneva-type conference for negotiatin;
a peace settlement.
The National Liberation Fronts negotiating position, which ha:
hardened in March as soon as the rst United States Marine
landed in South Vietnam, was now matched by a hardening o
North Vietnams position as indicated by I-lanois refusal to re
eeive U Thant or, nally, even letters from him. North Vietnan
also refused to receive British missions to explore the possibilit;
of negotiations. Even if the United States negotiating positioi
were to become clear and reasonably satisfactory to North Viet
nam, Hanoi was not likely to agree to negotiate while Unitet
States bombings continued.
In mid-May, hard-pressed by critics at home and abroad, th
United States halted its bombing of North Vietnam. It was late
revealed 23 that Secretary of State Rusk transmitted a secret mes
sage to Hanoi at this time through the North Vietnamese Embass
in Moscow. The message stated that the bombing suspension coul-
" New York Times, April 10, 1965.
Drew Middleton, New York Times, December 3, 1965.
Editorial, New York Times, December 30. 1965.
I-_.¢-W
tot. ,.1.-,_4 -1-. ' - _
' side ad, t
if.-:
-Est
- - 92 =~ w ""1"? --.---_.,.., i.
_ . 1:, 3 at 5 ,-..-_.92._'.-f-1,.-,..-' .=, 92 .4 , . -.1,--El,-i.-ii" ":".-t,'ut".1If'F,'»§,-'=';5?>.?1-3 -'E},'lv...= _ .e~ ., ~ _ ..* t.=|'._;_-:.'.L_;_<-Q» ;__>'_. -3;-_ ,-92~. i!;_» 1,,-t._. _, - ~ -3- .,,,»_<.. .4, , __. .
~-- it-~e~ _. =-F-.-,.-W-.,_-.._-....e._...sc _.,c. 1.-»-= _,. M» .t, . i = .-,,l
i
3.
u
e 4
1f'.<P ',7»"r!L" M '1
:
.-- 5-,-_--T
- 1-15
. s:?#nY1;¢;etJi ' ' " * 2 I. .._'-_,»-J
J r _ '. _-_'t_ :- i:_.. _-_
1 V-~ e e "~6-owv 1 n-rs-1nt,1!bta.s.5.92sss-t'.t:i';iiéZ1i-s
_;:_<;_:.
Y .;_-.-:=-;
. _ . _ . i..-<_-.t_,1- s
t
-4
-4-
t-.
' 1rTHE rseooriitrir PUZZLE i 5
it
be extended if tncre were signicant reductions" in Communist
armed attacks in South Vietnam. A permanent end to the bomb-
ing in the North, it said, could only come through an end to armed
attacks by the Vietcong in the South. There was no mention of
negotiations or even informal discussions, such as President John-
son had proposed on April 7. There was no reference to Hanois
Four Points peace plan of April 8, 1965. The bombings were
resumed after ve days, hardly enough time for the National Lib-
eration Front and North Vietnam to consult on any proposal for
negotiations. In spite of this short interval of time and the tone
of the American note. which was close to an ultimatum, a response
did come from Hanoi. The day before the bombings were re-
sumed, the government of North Vietnam contacted the French
government and asked it to inform Washington that North Vietnam
was prepared to negotiate on the basis of its Four Points without
demanding the prior complete withdrawal of United States forces
from South Vietnam. High-ranking French ofcials, while admit-
ting that this oer from Hanoi did not make any substantial con-
cessions to the United States, expressed regret that even though,
as the State Department contends, the offer was not transmitted to
it until a few hours after the bombings had been resumed, the
United States did not again halt the bombings long enough to in-
duce a possible improvement in the oer.
One cannot but be amazed. in view of these seven documented
missed opportunities for exploring the sincerity of North Viet-
namese oflers for negotiation, that President Johnson declared at
his press conference on July 13, I must say that candor compels
me to tell you that there has not been the slightest indication that
the other side is interested in negotiation or in unconditional dis-
cussion, although the United States has made some dozen separate
attempts to bring that about.
The experience in November and December 1965, regarding
another apparent peace feeler, seems to emphasize the lessons of
prior incidents. At the very time that Secretary of State Rusk was
seeking clarication of a reported statement on negotiations by
Ho Chi Minh, United States planes bombed a power plant only
fourteen miles from Haiphong, opening up a new phase of escala-
" New York Times, November 19, 1965.
I. I: ..jt..t
-==.-92».»--.<ii»_..- n__ 92 ...--.l._'.t_~ 2
_. .'e'i'="t:;.-*.»: 92.":~§.*,-5',;P.=-. -Ii:-Q 5 T ;___;,?.;.,.;1_.-:r,;~ -fr- -4 .»,.-.--i-I-. .. -92t _;.; ~.- =~.-.-.-eh -..= . . tit -S .~ "M" "'fZ;;;i=F~~"-2:
S 2 92l
Q :
l
Q . .
t 5
--r. ---<" -J ">r .-_ .. . ., . -. _;_.... ~_¢__,-..-...,_.__. . .
» , -1 , _: f... .1 ;'. * t ~.:- -:- ' t ;.
. . '. . 'i- > ;i -n " "-.r, . t. .t - »-.- -,=-~' . -- Y . -. .- - .--, 5;.-J -|.~- .' -.1 . .2- 1 -'_;.j_.--.:*.-1. ;..-t; ;""__i Z1~;',t;a.: ti. -5-;»;;r;-i»_+..¬,,~ :1'-M-~»_.e-%-»<- - -- - em- E-it-2.3:-t=-.=t.....t...tt92 - " -' " . |'-I'1?'tP§'n ¢ia:'JI.."-~5
t
tan l
t - , _.92.J -,'r92.'
'34
l56 PEACE IN VIETNAM
tion. Rus television interview at this time expressed la most
rigid admmstration view with regard to the National Liberation
Front?" The United States cannot expect to escalate the war of
deeds and words and at the same time talk peace?
What, exactly, are the points that have been set forth by the
North Vietnamese, the National Liberation Front, and the United
States as a basis for negotiation? Are they so far apart that there
is no possible basis for d n at a eonfe table? Let '-is
rst look at the various negotiating points, then consider develop-
ments that indicate a converging of views.
A. North Vietnam
The rmly repeated negotiating position of Hanoi was rst
given in the following statement of Premier Pham Van Dong
on April 8, 1965.
It is the unswerving policy of the government of the D.R.V. [Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietna.m] to strictly respect the I954 Geneva Agree-
ments on Vict-Nam and to correctly implement their basic provisions
as embodied in the following points:
l. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese peo-
piepeace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.
According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States government
must withdraw from South Viet-Nam United States troops, military
personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all United States mili-
tary bases there, ea.nee] its military alliance with South Viet-Nam.
1t must end its policy of intervention and aggressio_n in South Viet-
Nam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States govern-
ment must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely
cease all eneroachments on t-he territory and sovereignty of the D.R.V.
2. Pending the peaceful reunication of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam
is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of
the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam must be strictly respected.
The two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with
foreign countries. There must be no foreign military bases, troops, or
military personnel in their respective territory.
3. The internal affairs of South 92.1iet-Nam must be settled by the
New York Times, December 8. 1965.
2'" See Arthur Kroek, New York Times, December 21. 1965.
5
THE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE 5'7
South Vietnanicsr "iple themselves, in accordance with the prog _£-
of the NFLSV [u._ t-South Vietnam National Liberation Front], with-
, ,;i-, . ,:;,- ,;, ~ E - __,t,_.._ out any foreign interference.
ti;
-3 - ,. t ~ T. A. _.' w . .- -- -.;- M-l_7A_"Vf'"r 1 .- - .. :.;_,__ 1-.» :1 -
. - . ~ -H.4. *5" . 1' _ 1- =9-;_r92r-"1 --
.e ~< **a?=%§-.*- -
i
s
I
s 3*
~~7T3~. ':i**|'.r'q'*:*'I'*-"1:92* ~'r V. . .; 1-.-_' Y? -.>¢_»_ ..--. -{.7-1-T :.. .~%_ 5- "I. I-' i": , '.:5;"§i-925;'7=l~.: :'l>"i-'il-".iI'§ll"".-?i"='§ir"*"i- 3'3 -"~'» -91
It__,¢_92t_! . , .- - .-.-t».._ , -;. . 92 -;. _.._;». _-; ~-:,.~-_<; ¢ .1. J V.._ >92_.;,,_,:,, ._ ~,.{,_.,a.. r -- " =
. .. I J r. f H. .~ "~5"71"'l-P-"-l
I t- - J--" : "I--.';§--In.=.-I-<14-}£s~::'-~'-'j3"7.* _ ,i_ _.v_t __ .,_. _ _ .. _ ,. . _ . _. _. __W h_ _ _:~_ -- .-'_~:-._n_,.*»_ '.1i-';~:- .5,-3 -_- t-_it_-=.r_;,>~_-; r~'lt....=;.~-.<-.. '!'.'>.>. "- ._£-'_s,t.|-i,"_-=.i.r':"..'.1¢.'.:.kJ.'t.;L1..-.»..tJ '- =%;=t=m:r._."~ t§a~.r:rclri~-.>r§-.i':~292
ti .
=
. =-:1 "
he . »
a.-_ ' _/ -V i-';.f, ;
_ ., ,, _._ .__ _ x _ ti ' _it}{__:I.. _4. The peaceful reunication of Viet-Nari": is to be settled by. the
Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference?
B. The National Liberation Front A
The program of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-
nam refcrred to in the statement of Premier Pham Van Dong was
issued on December 20, I960. It consists of ten major headings
with numerous subheadings dealing with the overthrow of the
camouflaged colonial regime of the American imperialists ; pro-
posals for liberal democratic reform and civil rights; for economic
improvement, agrarian reform, cultural and educational develop-
mcnt, creation of a national army, a foreign policy of peaceand
neutrality, preparation for reunication, and the defense of uni-
versal peace. A few of the clauses most pertinent for this nego-
Liatioh study are here excerpted?
--Elect a new National Assembly through universal suffrage.
Rcward oicers and soldiers having participated in the struggle
against the domination by the Americans and their servants; adopt
a policy of clemency toward the former collaborators of the Ameri-
cans and Diemists guilty of crimes against the people but who have
nally repented and are ready to serve the people.
-Al-iolish all foreign military bases established on the territory of
Vict-Nam.
-St:ty out of any military bloc; refuse any military alliance with
another country.
Accept economic aid from any country willing to help us without
attaching any conditions to such help. 2
The National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam advocates the
peaceful reunication by stages, on the basis of negotiation and
through the seeking of ways and means in conformity with the
interests of the Vietnamese nation. .
~~Commercial and cultural exchanges between the two zones will be
implemented; the inhabitants of the two zones will be free to move
Submitted in 8 government report from Hanoi dated April 1965. IB-
portcd in New York Times, August .l-1. 1965.
" The full document is given in Appendix ll.
. ti
'!l
3
.e
Q
?
...,
_,'-_~ "1 " _ . - ."'._ _' ._. W. ,_ :~' 4. ;':,- ,;;.;'; ; i-_--L;.-:__;-.;_i;t_j._: ..- .-; .-., _h.;_._'-.;-.1; - -~ -" it .; ~ =-"-";';sf ==.:':<>f£~i-*.-at?4--.-n-4;-to-av-v;-.~i.4~--=$-u-i.,<_as.s.[_;_;_,,-- P; -. r -w -.-. mfi-"'. 1:1 -Fug y./2 .3? ~..*>i,-92 mm;-= .v ~ -J |1
i--VA -/W...__|-- 1.4, _ -; _ -
_ . ,.-. g-. -1 ,»"."';='-.1 * :.
' 0
0
-. . ' ti' - =9 - tit.-e_ --i 14- - -4;
. t- ii ea " -mi W _1" .-..."
.' _i.|.~_.
D <
-:5.
tF
.!._.=..-it
a- -ii
7i =3'». ,--_., I .'_< _ i._'--."=1" " ~ u-Y :1 '~<.=...~ -.-,1: i _ =;;.i; ;T5 -* rig"; r p_
xii! / 1'5 92 i'
- Q. ._.. ...____.,._,_i_ , . ---_..t ,_.».....-...~i. _ H " "' ' " '" - " .i Ir .-. ._-. , .-. . :5-gt -,i ;,_'§'uA .- 92. 92 V *1 , § i - -V i": '- i r- iJ ! . 92 *92 I § ~- i53 PEACE f 92lETl
about throughout the country. . . . The freedom oipostal
l changes will be guaranteed."
Statements of the National Liberation Fronfs negotiating 1:
" *-it tion were given to an American professor, Robert S. Browne.
i a French journalist, Georges Chaard. These indicate consider
extension from the ten-point program which did not deal dirt
with negotiation or the Geneva accords.
Browne reports that the National Liberation Front calls
1. An immediate cease-fire, with a freezing of the current ntili
position.
Adjudication by an international body in districts where cor
is in dispute.
United States preparation and execution of troop withdr:
over a six-month period.
A district-by-district election Campaign irom which a coali
government could emerge. 2.
3.
4.
Chaffard received a longer and more comprehensive stater
from Huyn Tan Phat, the Vice-President of the National Lil:
l.iu!1 Front:
Our rst task will be to rebuild the economy of South Vietnam. 1* -=; ' " . .- . . _ .~ f ' that we will need . . . foreign economic aid and foreign investm
. . . To get aid from western countries we will have to follc
policy of neutrality. We know the capitalists. They will want gut
tees. We are realists. Even United States aid will be welcome.
The unication of the armed forces and of the administration
coexistence of cadres of diverse origins . . . this is going to pr:
delicate problems. . . .
We shall be obliged to observe neutrality. How long will that
Ten years? Fifteen? More perhaps. . . .
We will not even approach the problem of unication for a
long time. . . . One can see that the . . . structure . . . will i
more from the north. That will delay reunication. . . . Wher
time comes for unication it will take place on a basis precluding
nexation of one zone by another.
" Marcus G. Rasltin, Bernard B. Fall, The Vr'et-Nam Reader, pp. 216
° New York Timr'.t, July 22. 1965.
Vie: Report, July 1965, quoting lExprcsse, April 25, I965.
Ti
-r.,..._.
.;~-_-. ./, _- 92-. . .
< -1 ,|__ -5 pit,-
._ % -
<..<.~ I-.r_. '."',-.. It r' :" ,3.I i} J >5
' i V ;»=i;.:.*-!_<§i92§,r.-F.W V
w
-_*___
.73
ii" ,3
Up ' - ...,_-_§._- 92 I ~,_;a_!< 92 > A 92 t Us 1.3..__.-~. . M.
t -.- t- . ..
.~.r ,,.| .;.__7t < -.
._-nan.--.->21.-; !'.';- :5-t » ,_ '. J, -35;.-;~.'-'< -1- ;¢?'= Rt -er _r*'r -' " " ':-1 --' -' -"£tL.L' be LL. "7-"-' '1-. i.:.' . ' ' "7-* Ee= ' " -=~-'3&"§'-1.§:i_.Li=a-iiv-.$?-.i-
.s =_;
. -H
=, .>- >i
r I
0
1
._1
r
r1:-us NEGOTIATIO.92' PUZZLE 59
c. United Stat i 1
On August 3, 1965, Dean Rusk set forth the United States
position on negotiating principles. __
I. An end to aggression and subversion.
2. Freedom fo5rwSouth Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own
destiny, in conformity with democratic principles and without any
foreign interference.
3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military meas-
ures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the
nations that have come to its aid . . . and the removal of foreign
military forces from South Vietnam.
We endorse these principles. In essence they constitute a return to the
basic purpose of the Geneva accords of 1954. Further relations could
be worked out by peaceful means. And this means the question of a
free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter
of reunication. . . . When the aggression has ceased and the free-
doni of South Vietnam is assured, we will withdraw our forces. . . .
When the men and arms inltrated by the north are withdrawn and
Hanoi ceases its support and guidance of the war in the south, what-
ever remains in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter for the
South Vietnamese themsel92=es.i-*1
A summary of the United States negotiating positions was
recently given by Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Ambassador
to the United Nations, in a letter to Secretary General U Thant
in which he reported on the far-ung New Year eorts of the
government to seek peace.
Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of
governments are the following: that the United States is prepared
for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions what-
soever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of I954 and 1962, that
a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a
cease-re might be the rst order of business in any discussions or
negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its
rorces Irom boutn Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position
to determine its own future without external interference, -that the
United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Viet-
" Why Vietnam Government Printing Oice, Washington, D.C., I965!.
Q m 1|;-H.» l _
._1 :.~'u- '
.it
at-. __
" J-= _.--,i;_-_;;-' J_.y_. _ l _ . w ~.._ - _ .92. _ .<>f§~.'-' i ". tI_ - '.,'..} t._ M _ __ ___' kg. A_, _ - -.,-.». .
K31 --V ,--;;-_>:_- -'11 -r 92 ;-- "P1, 3.7- *_'3'1. _r:-*1:T*~** IyT?f92_"W*"¥92F_92'I92"hf_-vv9292 __-_~
= 2- -'=. - =.-= 5" . -, ,'-_;>i-§;:"-sic-rttai 1,»: 1:. $1-: ~. _:i ;~'.;:~;.:-k it; if I;;_; -'.- ,;f.' ;_:--.:-."~ vi
.- t --1~j L».. ._. _ .., ..r._¢...,<_ -y.-'-. ._.-._-,.,--.._.,~ _;;;_' - , - .-. .._ _4 . ;.»i '1 - i -= ~.I.-1:---I rt,» _---_.t'.~:;'-- - . _ ".92 _. .._r, . _L_-__, _.-At. ,.r._ -,V,_92 1,; .__,92,___ ,.l _., _,,!;-,:..;f1tc_-J.r.>_s....,..,,
.1 .
= ' ' i i - i :
__ .__._. » 'i5.'._' __ 3- - -_ j__"_.'92ry__ _ '=.1.§iL. _ . I31 - 7.3- . F; L
-. M-..-till? Q New- y "I-that >1l
v
in .60 __ PLACE J VIETNA
r92'92rI1 Qtsn +1-in Cult -= -n.-Jir--I riwnnhiu-n :10 Q.-92|921|'92 92/Yiatnqrn clhnnlri luuiu, |:,||,u, Ljjli !l.-HLJID }.|uuu92.a: Quuuluiu up 92.J92JLl92ll vi»; - | u -1| urn-u-u I
determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through dcm
cratic processes and that the question of the reunication of the tv
Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.
A close scrutiny of the points above reveals that starting fro"
mutually incompatible and apparently rigid 'negotiatin§1_ positioi
in the winter of 1964-65-»-each demanding from the other tl
equivalent of unconditional surrenclercertain aspects of the n
gotiating positions of both sides became more exible and the
peace terms seemed to be converging signicantly.
1. Geneva Agreentertts. Both sides claim that they want I
negotiate on the basis of the I954 Geneva Agreements, althoug
North Vietnam emphasizes that this means United States witl
drawal and conducting the elections which the United Stat:
blocked in 1956; whereas the United States has tended to en
phasize that it means ! North Vietnamese withdrawal,
acceptance of the political partition of Vietnam, authorized oni
as a temporary military division in 1954, and ! the acccptanc
by the National Liberation Front of political conditions before
came into existence.
2. Hanoi: Four Points and United States lV:'rhdrawal. Tl
United States has moved from adamant rejection of Hanois For
Points when they were put forth in April to an avowed willingne:
.'o discuss them as part of the agenda for negotiations. A cruci.
point is the question of withdrawal of American military force
This is put as the rst of the Four Points, and in every publ
utterance from Hanoi it is the implied basis upon which any negt
tiations must be started. There have been repeated hints, howcve
from North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front ofcia
in Algiers, Prague, Paris, and Moscow ? that the withdraw;
of United States forces from South Vietnam may not be a pr:
condition for starting negotiations as long as withdrawal is uncle
stood to be a necessary result of a peace settlement. This was als
United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 478
January 5. 1966.
Sanford Gottlieh, Sane World, September 1965.
New York Times, October 28, I065,92 i " Sanford Gottlieb, Srmc Worid, September 1965.
:7 Lord Fenrier Brockway, New York Times, August 22. 1965.
:5 ' -.._, < _5 -'._ - - -. .. _ _ . . _-55!;--, ,. -;»__~ ,
__ ,_;'-,,A_ _ 1 _- _- 7-H» T. - »=,= _-ix .' -~ti .| .- J 3
r , if .
I ' t
- 6» .~;:-it t t.'i-ff ff-' '1-' - -¢5:f-;!;:.~-_r>? - ... 2;;al-r -_ . 3 :-»,-,~ .." "ri=¬» ::.=r'.' *2; _,_ , 5., 1.1%._._.;_=. ;,__y ,9292_ _; '
isat
-5*»-$9 -~--.---_:=-:--1- ----. -;:w:...',.*.-._' ..,a*w-....,..,.c.., . _,,., - - -__a;92. I 1 IV: ___'!__._<'._ . , 4 -x _~ -l-1--3.-P-_>;,: ?=n_§w4-.1'7. ' " ' "iQ."1'"'<;1"."*i.921'"-'.?.=-" 1 . '---'-"w'.3? '.'---1'-." "'1-m' §= >I-'-- 1- -- . 1 ..92 $---r<',- :-.. 2:0. -._ - A :-.r:,- »~.92._ -,- - , *;g- Q . - V _ -..<. , . :- --r t_ *- .-_,L v.__ _-. J r .i t. -: r- - ', -' 1;t l ,.-. .~ q _..,:.- F -. -, ~ tr.~ , . . , .i. > .. 7 .- -. -. 1 - 1-: - - ,-
. . I- '2, ' '-.!t_,'-;"_.'.-':..5'. -',',.f-
.. . . . .. . . . . ' I . K ._ . ,_ .- A F ,,; ,._92-,- .~ - .- .,-. ~_=.|, '__-r;-_'~,.-1.-,. ;~.- ¢-ii,-;;,§~_.'_= »,;=~;v.92'.=';d.-r.~-='-~" A "*4. 1- - J _-="-> 'Kl~w1-1?-t.'li#927ii=JE1U'-.'a¢§.t§>&1*-E1-3 +,s,,,,t-"
*
, y .A ~ - I - '6!
= T3-'1':- _. iv =1 -;;H==--. "15 -' 1;. '-L< -:.-at:-' I .1!-. .. . i i
vi
1
re
' _,
I
' I
0Ii-..
- .-.,_~.THE NEGOT. _.o.'~.' PUZZLE 61
the message of Mr. Janos Peter, Foreign Minister of Hungary, in
his message to the United Nations General Assembly in October
I965. Meanwl1ile,_the United States has declared that all it wants
is a settlement that will permit its honorable withdrawal from
Vietnam.
3. Autonomy of South Vietnam and Reurdficntion. Point four
of the Hanoi pronouncement indicates considerable modication
of the Geneva accord which provided only a temporary military
dividing line at the 17th parallel. North Vietnam has indicated its
willingness to accept an autonomous regime in South Vietnam
provided it genuinely represents all major sections of the south-
ern population and that both governments should have the right
to enjoy economic, cultural, and fraternal relations with coun-
tries of their own choice. This represents a deference to the
wishes of the National Liberation Front, which has indicated that
it'wants to delay reunication until it is strong and stable enough
to negotiate with the North on terms of equality. The United
States, while continually emphasizing a free, independent South
Vietnam, has nevertheless indicated acceptance of the right of
North and South to unite, it they choose, without foreign inter-
ference.
4. Third Party Presence. The United States has moved f_rom
irritated outbursts over U Thants efforts for negotiation to a
general appeal to the United Nations to use its good omces
though the United States has not formally laid the Vietnam prob-
lem before the United Nations as it was bound by the U.N.
Charter to do before taking unilateral military action!. The North
Vietnamese have given some evidence that they accept the need
of a third-party presence to supervise a cease-re and elections
in South Vietnam, as specified by the Geneva Agreements of
1954. A question remains as to what kind of third party would
be accepted by all parties and what the terms of reference would
be. This would of necessity be a major part of negotiating dis-
eusstons.
' William Warbeyreporting interviews with Ho Chi Minh and Prime
Minister Pham Var: Dong in letter to the TfmeS of London, April 1, 1905.
" See Ambassador Goldbergs letter to U Thant, New York Times, Jan-
uary 6. 1966.
' Fenner Brockway, London Il"rr'brme, September 10, 1965.
--- - » -_ '_Q_;:,ir~'-¢l.li;-- :_,_*--71;;I7 .{='i, Q .- . r'_
5.? -~ .. .
--=9.-;_=-~;~ , ' P _' = Q?
N _ _ .i.._ F. Q A
I92 . t
I
.3 '~=-- - ' ~
I
. .. , .ii:'1'-"d"3;1'i Q¢ " 3"-'-"-H-' i; '11": .~i."' ';92i- ._--.4 V >d'JI," . 92 , It - . -1 H _it-..-5 -;_. > ,'l; ,-1.,-._f .j'...- ._-*1-. = 1 - - .. -. ,_-, '.i .-. »i , ~ -= < 1" . -= » = --.0 -- =. -' I 1- ft " * I... » .--- - -.-i,i;.w'~~. u. -» =.»-.". -~'~=.-:92-I':J=92»='92-1-"u 1' '.»92 . _ . _.... . .. .-.,,. ... e 5...:,,, .1.
ill
. *~1..J - ' -""'.- - .1 Ki -12! .a=- - . -;'.'.92.'f,.;._ . _ .__92 . _ V .. . _... . 4
. . _|% _ . _ _ . .
. _ ,_,-~_.»-Q-EIi~""..,.' ~ ;_; -3" 1- ,--.-we ... 1...; _ '-.- """$' -.:.I""'--ea . ' ..'»:~=.,,. , i .. 1 -<_.t*"h!"-_._ . 4,'* -§§S st'§-,1 5 _ us _{_ r _ ._ V ._ . i. . i ~--'-'--'--- --*- .~i~.2:....._.;;-...._.,.....;62 PEACE ix VIETT
5. The Pface of the National Liberation From and the Que:
of Elections. The United States has moved from a positiot
refusal to recognize any right of the National Liberation F
to be at the negotiating table to a statement by Pre.<i.:'ent Join
that the presence of the National Liberation Front is not an
surrnountabie obstacle and that they would have nodillic
being represented and having their view represented." *1 The
tional Liberation Front and Hanoi, on the other hand. have insi
all along that the Front must havean inde at role of its 1
in negotiations. Any hope deriving from ambiguity oi
Presidenfs statement was probably dashed the staternen
the Secretary of State in a television inter92'ie92-'~' in December 1E
The New Y'o.'-.1: Times reports that Mr. R253-: indicated that
Vic-tcongs political organization, the National Liberation Fr
would not be given any political status or influence in South 92
mam through negotiations." *2
A question also remains about what type of South Yietnan
rE:presenLati92'e the National Liberation Front and the T92'ot'il'i 92
namese will accept at the conference table. Public Statements l
indicated their unwillingness to treat with the Saigon governn
of General Ky.
The program of the National Liberation Front is Premier Pl
Van Dongfs third point. This has D¬. 92 er been accepted by
United States. One part of the program is the election of ti
widely representative National Assembly through universal sutir
The United States has indicated its willins. * tltst free e
tions take place, but it has never stated that it would accept
inevitable election of National Liberation Front tertesentati
including some Communists, in the res'_'I:it1§ I Yietnan
government. In fact, Secretary Rusk has said:
If the South Vietnamese people have a chance in free election
make their o-.=.-n choices. they will not elect a Ccr:irrn.rt:=: to pow:
Saigon. I do not believe that the South 92'iet;'!:*.rnese pebble will be
rst people in history freely to elect a Cornmonrst r92-:"_:;::;.-..*3
President lohnsoi-is press conference. July Z3. 1°45.
hint Frankel. New Yorir Times. Deceniber S "3**§_
Max Frankel. New YOrk Times, Deceitiber S. 65.
.=_v - __n-..._r t_...___| _ ;___ _
...» __< - ,_- K.-
- Pg, -; -rm
Q ,
-i-
5 .
S
?
' ii - . --- - {T C"T' 1'__ _ g. -_.-.i:--.3? "'3 A if 1M _ ' ;- .
iC
"1 -» s ..t r - __~,' 1 rn _,,~< AJr1
Q
_ _,,___ 1< i:-:,92g;"" t .I I - _ ._ ._, .__h-:5 :_I
-. 2" Y. ' '
. .--,. _ ._ - _~_>.-»...-__»_ _92 -. _.:|_ . , 1. -.:-;_-1 :',92_ _= , _<_»--..';
151'-'.»'..;r~ 1- -it i1 _ _92-; , - V; -- -4 92- _-.-;_r ,. ._.---.-,1. .4; _t_;._§_},t~1,:.:;._-§;;i_§-,?'~|*Ql.' :'.:';,|I1,"'_" r ~i-' ~ t- P. - ..»~-:~ Li"92:" ",'l":v; *.i ='~-t ..-. r-zwr-I;.1"--4:11---a -F -=,.'~ 1--aw==+.~¢.s.=i.¢.-=-,;..-- » -1-1' --,5.-r..-;':=_--i,,-,f5._.;_j .'».§L."-'.';T:gt192_3i92'- 11-? ;,:-it -if 'Q"$Ti'z'7?~_-?"§,:;v&lla
i1
ll
l
1
l
,.
2,?
. ,1 i;_-.
I
_~.-i
- - ,. _.~' _ , .4: ~ 3'92.I. s K f?, <-ts H gt Q4
92 -
1-3-£3 -~<~
__..__ ¢.,H. . ._.-.-._..,..-92_.___. ....U
ii
T
-1
ITHE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE ' ,6}
The Secretary of State may not intend this to mean that an elec-
tion that chooses Communists is ip.s'0 facro not a free election, but to
the Vietnamese citizen this must sound like the usual situation un-
der the Diem regime in which lists of voters were drawn to rule out
all dissident elements. Because of its political repercussions here
in the United States, the proposal of any coalition government
including Communists is a principal stumbling block for negotia-
tions.
The course of negotiation feelers has gone through several
phases. It is clear that the United States showed a complete cool-
ness toward negotiations from the fall of the Diem regime on
November l, 1963, up to the Presidents Johns Hopkins speech on
April 7, 1965. From that speech through the July 28 press con-
ference and up to the events of the turn of the year, various
expressions were made indicating an interest in negotiations, and
separate elements of possible settlement were put forth. The sin-
cerity of American offers was subject to question on four counts.
First, any actual overtures from the other side were ignored or
rebuffed as in the incident at the end of the ve-day bombing lull
in May. Second, the government in Saigon made frequent state-
ments against negotiations and passed a law in May 1965 that
made talk of peace a treasonable offense. Third, each major
statement for negotiations was coupled with the announcement of
a new phase of armed forces build-up and oflensive action. Fourth,
there was no attempt on the part of the United States to put all
its pieces of negotiation into one package and present it with con-
viction and corresponding action. -
By the end of I965 the cycle had run its complete course, and
the Johnson Administration, rather than being aloof from any
talk of negotiation, set forth on a dramatic worldwide effort to
persuade ail nations including Hanoi that the United States really
wanted to bring the dispute from the battleeld to the conference
table. Ambassador Harriman went to Poland, Yugoslavia, and
India. Poland and India are members of the International Control
Commission for Vietnam; Yugoslavia is one of the nonaligried
countries that has offered to mediate.! McGeorge Bundy, Special
bee Appendix III.
._,_ _ ._,-- --------7 - 3.3;: - i - I .7 ~ -»
r e - 1* .' -_,'_j -'-Z " ,5» . . -- .1. -- ".4... -t . -= '1- .18. 7.1- _ '-'*.~- s" '1 -
..1-_ _
.,..
I-.- . VIA! - - -1.. -......_. __, .- r -1. -=;b'"n.. git _ . =__ K 1 _ =- .. ' rs 4. -=:1-;,-:= - " ' ' i .t ..~-1*» ' '1' -- - .1..-..;~.,.=. . , 3 . Q -.:_ ; .'-'. '-- '' '_ _ 91.. .- . _ ,»v- - .. 1~~ w» er- .; W .' I.. . .. I
_ _ ._. . 1LL _ 1
In
.-p.
, ., -92 Y... ~._ , _ __r4- ,,--.1.-.1;..,=. 'c _ 92 /
_. - '1_ . _. _' ;i_'__-_-:___:_1;>'__*~.=;._..;,-'... .. . ._- . -' ' -" ~ !».~;:-- '- .1 -. -1-_--I--"--.;-.92.~ =_.-;.a.- -92-"'$»T¢=l__-?.'--ins. -f. ., V .,_ .,,_ pg ..r. ._._ _,.,1.., _,,.;__-,- -a ;..;92--, Z»,r...;..--_.. ; M-3 . ' 1 l ; ..- '_; '_'5.-__|,A s .,_ 4 ,:.'_.'»._ -__§__.-._;.._1_-§;}».v:- E 11;.-- 5;, -§_'r;'.§-.- r_-;~_-4. "-'<.".~ Q13. -:55 ;=|:- -- ,'lf5..~>r*'5:.'-55; '.'~'ii926"l¢-?ilu_3- ?t.#.*. -.5: ,.. i
. -. -- . i wt." git L-y-':_ *». "K =- -292 _~ __'.n»' ~': ,, . -92 -. , I ~'.I-.P.,_*. " ~ i .. *1"? V 1;.--'i.~,., ,q.-,- . - ' *. --. .;.=?., .1 -.,».. . _t:r'-' '. 1' '5; ' -<r'*=r'r=<i.'192' -we 92F:~ ~. ;~'.;-' -':, <.'L"r.". '1-- -:-' -'"». '~ :,- :-:" ."'.-"1:= A .-92-.i';r- *3: -<31; I--. ":;-"*->'.l-" :T'»'.*-1-"-D -- -5-> . '.M.i; .-"__. >;. ,s-92 2,/-_-. '-i$»..-i ' 92.--M, '-L; .»- -r-92.- I
Jun sn-. 7 ""'§4" J
' Z"? ' ','=;',>.*.' Q
..:q. _
6 _ _._z ~
.. J1 I-b _
. _{-.. _5, - _ _ '
"~~-0-, ..5-1
ii
it
it
jl1 T J
64 PEACE IN VIEl
Assistant to the President, ew to Ottawa. Canada is the
member of the Control Commission.! Arthur Goldber", U D
States Ambassador to the United Nations, 92FiSiEt'5Ci ?ope Pat
and then had high-level talks in Rome, Paris, and London. '
President Hubert Humphrey made a tour to the Far Ea
discuss Vietnam, among other things. Ambassador Kohler
ferred with Soviet oicials in Moscow. Assistant Secretar
State G. Mennen Williams explained Washingtotfs position [1
leaders of several African countries, and Under Secretary of
Thomas C. Mann did the same in Mexico City. This rather
tling switch from secrecy to glaring publicity, from carefully
trolled channels to _iet-diplomacy, as James Reston calle
brought forth no concessions from Hanoi and only more dc
ciations of a peace-hoax.
The intensive peace eorts of those days may indicate tha
President was genuinely interested in stopping the war, but the r
ods and the terms were not likely to be a
side. As Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen has aid, In dealing
the Communists, remember that in their mind what is seer
serious, and what is public is merely propaganda. *5 A sir
assessment is usually made in Washington concerning Comm
approaches. The main ingredient lacking in the American E
recipe was any assurance that the National Liberation Front c
have its own representative in the peace conference or in
future political arrangements for South Vietnam. The conti
bombing in the South during the cessation of bombing in
North made it diicult for Hanoi to make otlers without see
to betray its ally in the South. Moreover, new units of troops
landed in South Vietnam, bringing the total to 190,000 at the
of the year, and the bombing of supply routes in Laos was
intensied. Neither of these developments was likely rg bl
gnrdetl by Hanoi as an indication of peaceful intent or as a
tribution to an atmosphere of negotiation.
This experience of the peace olicnsive of the 1966
Year period brought into reliei the false premises and mist
' *"" '"""c shaped United States public opinionwin tn l'i'92r_92 |L/my I-92-I 92.u92. 1
0-Llli.lL uuv
.i T- _. .
ir '?.. I - --'1:- ' i _ -'-tr." ;=11--" . 5
ggy :- ..=n' Z-"l 1.. ~~*- ~.- . '-.1»..- .._ =._ _ . __ _. __ _=_ 1 _ ___ ,0 _ "NE; ..
.- " --. .-".55."-_ - ... ';,~. ; -.s- I" 1 . ~_ .7 _ _ Ab. _ ,_=_ _A __,_ .1 . . __ _:_ ._ --__. 4 .-_ , - .V 4
V I - ... -*-- *-- ' *92 _;Jg}FH: I.l. T, _ . 3.1. , ' r
i
1 ~.-4, ._ l
. -r ..*"
. .I__. . ; _-oi;-:. .' __ -. lI i
i
u ..i
Iii
1
it
. :
. fa '
-4.- _'-- "..' 1' -1!.-1§. re. I- .3. ,;;.- 1.., - _j- ,
.,. ">2".*7 - - <
l
l
. -. ,92 .-Il
V...W " 1 t A .' '.I-i.-_§ W
in
- - I I .-2"" 1.7: J. .11 .-,' =1 -' .-'..:-1'-.'.->51"-1' '92".'- :=.i;"..:*-"~,J;..1;@ .=-Ir;=e.:;!. t1.;:.;..a.¢_.s.,-"-" -Y ' * "i1"=?' <i '=is',t_i~§i*l;=i ;
. l
i' it
|
1 |I .
, " . . ,"_";;'.~._,,_.THE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE
policy toward Vietnam and much of Southeast Asia for years.
These misleading guidelines are recapitulatcd here as keys for
understanding the negotiation puzzle and the kind of proposals
that might bring a settlement. The rst such false premise is that
this dirty little war can be won. Policy makers in the United
States seem to think that the National Liberation Front and North
Vietnam can be bombed, burned, or starved into submission and
that then a settlement advantageous to the United States and the
forces it is backing can be reached. But this is to misread the
special nature and the thirty-year history of the Communist-
nationalist movement in Vietnam. The National Liberation Front
and the North Vietnamese are red with crusading zeal. Their
determination to resist United States intrusion renders victory
impossible in any complete sense. Thus far every escalation on the
part of the United States has led to a corresponding effort by the
Vietnamese nationalists and Communists, backed by increasing
commitments from the Soviet Union and China.
The second unrealistic premise is that this is a war of aggression
by the North Vietnamese instigated by China against the South.
Such a view distorts the origin of the conflict, the role of the
National Liberation Front, and the actual relationship between
Hanoi and Peking. This is essentially a civil war. True, the Na-
tional Libcration Front receives increasing support from the North
Vietnamese, but the revolt in South Vietnam was begun and is still
sustained by groups of South Vietnamese who turned against the
Saigon government. Resistance against the Saigon government is
likely to continue, gaining much propaganda advantage from the
U.S. military operation. There is no reason to believe that the
National Liberation Front will disappear from the scene. lt is
probably now the strongest indigenous political force in South
Vietnam. Peking is offering support for what it considers a move-
ment of liberation, but it is clear that the support thus far has not
had a signicant ellect on the Course of the conflict. -
False premise number three is the assumption that if Vietnam
becomes a Communist state, all the other countries in Southeast
Asia will follow like a row of dominoes. Vietnam is the setting
for a unique convergence of nationalism and Communism. What
happens there will not necessarily determine developments in other
* ----Y" - i . . ._. . .. _ .., ..65
~> 4*'~*Y ' A
. -
so . .. _,. ., . '1 at » ._.-' >~- 5.21"- ~ -. .U _ ._,_ ! . . '3; _ tn:-.
- .- -.11 ~»-=*-.."-.
-'1'--~ ':=-.'v " us, '-I 92
J
4
.. .-.,.__~,_...t
i
.7 " _-' .'»='
. _ V.
Ia 92 ; , I * E1 I J1 92 J f .. . » . -. F-iv-92 .-L~'..x..;E-.-1-..-.-- . *. 4 H. --. . "= ~"-4: '..~;'.'-t I .-'~ '- '. i.-,-7-<:.*~-V, 1 " = - ' _ :_-.-¢..i--ii-'-vii-EL-.11r.iLirl1.'-;*4;Ly:;l;},.;,1i¥Ql¥¥;' 'iiT:it.{§;Z'7,.-.l:j_§§i'§Z!,1-£ij%g
:t 92
I. '""- -- -~. -¢» '- . a_'_._'_r;,,__.*,._.._, .. .._.__.
. , .- . ..,~.i,.i-i>- "'92<I'v"4 ..-.-~r-it--rvs ~'-;,-_-,<,,.-.92_;<.- y-. ;.~.-..»;¢ k <-.~,-." -r --»-:.92< » ii .i§~. ..r . Ml_- .,_ _..--.; M." -~."" ~. _-
4 .,- .1 e , ._.
1, _.-,; ._ ...._,_- ,.-i.
as92
v»-4P
9'
1"LJl.I .. .,._I I.. 4 4agti--= - ;-':- .-i. 1'-1.r,'l92
=,. ___ii.
I
I
i .,-
l.
.1
.7
t
i
l
i
lc, _- i ea-arms-"1-'-~=»er ~- - r .45..-._' .;..
_ Di
66 PEACE IN vnzrt
countries. Even if some countries should turn to Communist
their own socioeconomic revolutions, this need not threaten l
imate American interests. The United States has found it pos-
to get along with the Communist countries in eastern Europe
thus could presumably coexist with Communist countries in So
east Asia. What the United States wants to avoid is the form:
of strong hostile states, particularly such states dependent L
and aligned with China. But this is precisely what our prc
military policy promotes by preventing the natural developr
of national socioeconomic revolutions and forcing countries
as North Vietnam into dependence on China.
E the Unite es ren
The fourth false premise is the
on its commitment to the Saigon regime, American credit
will be questioned in Europe as well as in Asia. This argur
is the one most often raised in defense of United States pc
It seems to strike at the very heart of our honor as a nation.
what does this commitment actually mean? All-out commit:
to the present Saigon government actually did not exist pric
the Johnson Administration. It was made by that Administra
albeit in terms suggesting that it was merely a logical continua
of earlier commitments made by Presidents Eisenhower
Kennedy. Now the Administration insists that an unlimited A
ican commitment exists and that, this being so, the crcdibilit
the American government is at stake in any settlement in Viett
Thus, although there are grounds for doubting the Admini
tions credibility in dealing candidly with the American pe
over the problem of Vietnam, the public is asked to give L
served support to the government so that its credibility ab
will remain untarnished.
The Administration is actually trying to make credible vvh
not credible. It is not credible that American military power c
be translated into political solutions where politically reqt
conditions do not exist. It is not credible that condence coul
inspired among other countries by untlagging military pursu
ends, even wlietrthese are unreal and inconsistent with l
political and social facts. It destroys both condence and credit
when America pursues a mistaken course doggedly, rcgardlt
the consequences? and regardless of the human sulicring we in
v
1..v A I
-» 1, ..92 l
-- ~72 ... .. .. . :
1
I. -
1
1
.,_... ..1 1"92w92l 92._ -1- --,._.. ,._-4-U,--._
R5' 'T"*"'3 """-""""-"'**""'l "1-iv--...s-i--..--iv»,--..~.;.,-..-..-...,.., -
_ I 7 t-.1' -t. 4|u -_.- Q
" '.'92 """ ' ' ' 92!, 1'. .'- '.~ --. '~ ti : - ='-'-1'-".-r in-__ 1 3',-",»_.~.-,-; _. ». 3,},-,-J~..~1 1: ;92":_!s_ .'-,..:l§_;:;, ';1--1;;;-;.t_,§-.-.;',s;.?;;{¢;3; ._-1"""" "* -'- *"""-" """'-**"~'~--"'**---»-K-' 1 '- " ' 'n'- * %..=;'rt-$1-.>$~i~.i'»-;IY;-r'.1=l£
-L1".r . . - _ . _ ,
J" ,~ a
_ if ~-.',- . - jg-i w. A -* * .;J'., £3 - ;-1 1
:-;<:r 1?-1' .%= ' .. "I? ' is sis:-"es ll
lu"-ii . - ~i ii i _.-H.--i~ H. i _ I .
l
1 l
I I
l
l
ll
ll
lTHE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE 67
To give unqualied, undiseriminating support to a military
junta, as during 1964 and 1965, only makes credible to the
world the accusation that the United States has abandoned and
violated very pol" and * ' - '- upon h the
country was founded.
American military power is credible. An Asian ambassador,
interviewed in the summer of 1965, was asked whether a cessa-
tion of bombing by the United States would be interpreted as a
sign of weakness. He replied:
Weaknessll With the 7th Fleet and the U.S. Air Force? All Asia--all
the worldknows the United States is the most powerful nation in
history, and can do what it wants. You don't have to show us that.
We know it, and we don: understand hOw' you can thi 1' yone
will question your power."
It is not the military credibility of the United States that is
lacking, but credibility in matters of rationality, political maturity,
and legal and moral responsibility. In the eyes of a large part of
the world. United States conduct in Vietnam has already brought
its credibility with respect to these nonmilitary qualities into
question. Much can be done to restore American credibility and
honor if the United States will abandon its clearly ealamitons
policy of reliance upon military means to achieve impossible
political ends.
With policies built on such premises, it is understandable how
nu;-_ - - '
at. .~ _ 1 --i" -ts»w
F ii 1"-'-Ht-"I'92 i iii -_ I I; 92 ' I 4'
i; ,.'._i'-'L.~ .>">. 3" 1.' I-r-1." -zef 1. - '_-L7,.
v .
if
¢ v
§
I
-11
1»
r - 92 ~ ,1--.»-; ->. - -5, » ~ ,., '5"92i_"_"'f¢K:fL,92|-I#.I:_"fl-|"E_':'f92"'-FFR,92f:I:'7v ..,,.?- . ~ -t-.-;.._..,-. .-.- -1,- ._92»..n,ls ax _.,_ ..
V _-=._ ; _-; _t.j_- 92 . , .' ,-" . .-- .~_92- _=
. I -1 ti ' '.-.a -. _- .. -V ,A _-_- e _ ; -- .=.- K-. _-"ii-i?.- 1- -"-':_ _. .. . Y, 1.. ,- H, -.., -92~_~ . .|--..~> *..<.i.._', 1.;/;._,;.192;w;;92<--_-'t _ - _; .- -;._- ~; ,'--;- ;92,-;.-_»._;- :93,-it-_;_-r:;.92,._ 32:3 ;;_gi,;,t;§t5._.-4. i,.s-'="'£:.¢,'- :;1>:'f. 'e»__:_:.-_;Lt .:'_.-Q-'" '.>_1~i;':n'=Z:.1i.:t;~'- -~1'--r
- In
,9"A I . --: ' i i J-5 -'t,._-' '- 1 .1-J-'
I -t. _"" " I.. - l ' -.P' $3,. ._. -Q
if
I
»~6 A e, if _ *7 _,_ _ ___~~~ _~ _ if H _ .- - , : - ' ~ - -- -- ' . _ 4'. .'--t-.--._ ~.r- 2 ' 1,-. .-5--5'-,,.":,-.~ -v. - .,,.e.. A -- __;>- .... . 92. iv ,, V 1i"-¢ "<'~"~ . ~z:S- - _-I -K, --1-.¢.-1: ' "-"=£ri»:;--=¢-».~.-F--.=.f'- !';'1 _
'-'- _;;
7; Possibilities For o Settlement
A i_:-31:12:} settlement with orderly withdrawal of American
;';1::; :*;'.i12:f; forces will not be easy to arrange. It is a co
5:: r-ii emoio:1i booby traps and logical nrnbushes. The hc
if the '-_*.er's:ti"»: makes us persevere in making proposals, no 1
3:? Li; 1:31:25-2 or eztsily betrayed by the next headline.
X: ecieticzt -1:. Vietnam is possible without a clear and uneqt"
:31 ;::::-:1r.ce::*.ent by the United States tl_1nt it intends to end
" " *~"_'" 9. seitnent that will include withdrawit __ ' 5 forces .~
_:=""'- " i -'iiiif'!1'92 iwcpc Ti~' nr n n=._-_.._-__=__-i: :15 _r._...i..._{ ....s-... ...tS k,.o..o..n. .
s.'_:::::'.:.i by Lzmedictte and meaningful actions to prove our g
t';r;':. '.'::il s"_:ii intentions are made clear, neither the Sa
t:;:::_: tar the National Liberation Front and Hanoi will take :
;;§;;-" ;:_=r owertures on our part to negotiate. This will be espec"
17.; ;:' ét -2ITQl.1'1i_< in Saigon, such as that licatled by Ptc:
El;-' ='~'?.i:I: Iiis consistently avoided any positive cndorsetrlcn
::;-:-"_::'c:s rift: up through the I966 New Your peace oliensi
21:2 Lil: the United States was indicating to the whole W-
..s 1-jQ:;.:ss :0 negotiate. The North Vietnamese are extret:
.1;-";i:i:l_*s cf _¢ut1en:;in intentions because, so often in the r
:13 3;: 11 ilngness to negotiate has been 'dCCUl"P lI1i¬LI or
Q:-?»c_ 5:: increased ntilitztry cfiorts and because the bases
is now building at Cum Ranh Buy, Nha Tr: '. azte; SL125
".92a- ; ..P.':=.§.]'C~.fll-11H!! 16, 1966: Report of inic."~ie9292' of Seer:
9 =7 '
1
3.
.__ It
k "92Q"'
.<._
- - -_-._¢-gt..-
. . V ' v .2
. . " 4- --
K
1
0
Pti
" 1'.-_. .,
-'~-I e Q _t»-.».--,~;¢-->~»- ;-->,->, <1.--,-1,5»?!---;t-9t-1-at,-.-5..-1.-., "3'--¢-uI-
_2- P #44g ~1. _ -92 .
1",- 1 /w - ---4 .i---.. ,-.- -92- . 5~-- .1; - --it fi_'-";_"{:92;-J_!,';,_92l| as :-.1*'*.1'-;.»'-_- "If-,-_-y t x 1.. I " _"'--f.'.' <'_ if:-re-~".¢; --,-$92:_=_-i_92-12?," -;.~j_f92, . a. ,. _. ..*. ,_
- '-H _ - -1- '- -
é ,. , .1, V- ;,l?...__ .1. ~.-
i '--a;*:'~ ''--i .1 4,.~'- .. at -. ,-=- 1-.= .-1*:-1 '_'- ~g-.- >1-~-. -' -= -'-e;','~;' 0". 92. 1:--;t .'r_-t,;.'_»'_-- Z ~; r1- ta..,: _. -- .-=-, , , .. '924 -t-- 92_ --92 ,3-t .--.-Mg-+ J =.-_-.,- .--- ~ -3» ;- - -3 ~' -"-;_-in .¢-.».= . .:-g'~_.;r' ,,.,;,§.'e;-H31 *5 '<'-,:r'~.3-*= "T
'1 .0:
4~_. i -"-'" 4' "A-
* 4*
4:
.
~ _.t-.--W 3: _. 1 1." - ..92_|~.r __ ail v2&5" . a '1"-'-"1A .- -.-,t - ,. .-' _ __-_ k: _-;' .__;.LF =~_f.k.__Q_<.__J.;. Q
r; "-,= _.1" -,- -. * J, ~, N, i. 1._i92..:-- ft-_:~-». 1.-.1-_. :- :-w,§?- J t.*'~r'-,,';_; .,.1:t.-1 a<.,r;: we
.
i
F
9
Z~=;
...
92
i
1- -.
- -t."- rahre--*1 r 1.i ; _. n-Iv -*: o .' ._ ,>1-' --e _ *i.. ~¢- ~ - i" , <-- - ' .-e--. = -- e..e-e-we ere -::-1, -1. ~_
7: Possibilities For ct Settlement
A esliical 5- ent With orderly withdrawal of American
will not be easy to arrange. It is a ec
oby traps and logical ztrnbushcs. The ht
' s us persevere in making proposals, no
.e or easily betrayed by the next headline.--' 7'-.= -,'-,I-._--4-_
'*.-' ~_- .;|"| ,_5- .-._ _ - t... .
_92:92-"92_'!r192:92
.'_ _ t1.F, l* 92 J. 92.
,-ia .'f.LilI.'1IT
EEI '1'-"._Q ¬1'QOTLC
_ ,_-.- ...,A» .H.
- .3. 1 :;t Vietnam is possible without a clear and uneqt
S-itlt bv the United States that it intends to enc_F92l ---.- -1|-.1-.92_. . _.-.._.._.92-92-
"_:fD¬t'1t that will include withdrawing its forces
;'i5:1:'_li;; its military bases. This pronouncement will have t
5::-::.:;T or imedittte and meaningful actions to prove our _:
sh intentions are made clear, neither the Sa
-.. -;-_-.1 -- 1,» -2,.-:._.._ t_.. National Liberation Front and Hanoi will take
3:51;-' 1:1; 0*-eziures on our part to negotiate. This will be espec.. .-- -'~ Y 1'ii"._.. p __.-. 2.»
":_; 5: ;;.*'-"a::_:tents in Smgon, such :1s that headed by Pre
31;: L-.1: consistently avoided any positive enClOISt-tmen
6 i c :- {git up through the 1966 New Year peace ofiens_,._ _._1_ .17 ,_
;- ;._ -"_I', .-_.,-'92._l "__.92. _.~United States was indicating to the whole rt
to negotiate. The North Vietnamese are cxtrct
.-krnencan intentions because, so often in the 1
121$ -if :1: Twllingness to negotiate has been accompanied or
ls?-ei '31." i::_-eased military efforts and because the bases
is now building at Cam Rtmh Bay, Nhtt Tr."_= '--1._§Z_" II;§5
5'_'¬:-:;:3_5 CI
t »-|-_-_ -'92.rI..n5Lw92- S;;:es
.92¢'- 1'1-r-'. T.'Pr:es. January 16, 1966: Report of int».-r92.i~ew of Seer-t
?;_'~.t. ;.;' ?r.:'..:: i92'_92'.
68
e:-_ -1: S S _
, "'- ,,_ t,.,__r-tvi -. _,,.,,.lr""'" 1 »
? P " " """*="""""""'Ir'""'zr-.~-92. FII-In-Ir V
1 1 ._
92 r< U 7 '1 r J l. , R 1_ .t__?_.Ii._ F-r341A_vg:"92_!! ., *-923~L2 $5 g:ae' I-,
8 1
~¢ _. ~ "-"" -e "- ... - . .t»-._ __ ; " ai '.~.1-_ - -_ " ~=
POSSlBILiTlES non A SETTLEMENT ' 69'
and Da Nang appear to them to be of a larger and more permanent
kind than required by the present war in Vietnam. It is important,
therefore, that while we ask for negotiations we also announce
immediate steps of dc-escalation such as the cessation of bombing
in both North and South and a freeze on further troop buildup.
Further steps could include refraining from provocative tactics
such as patrols in force, unprovoked attacks, and efforts to expand
the areas of occupation.
Any pronouncement by the United States must also afrm that
the future of Vietnam should be decided by the Vietnamese them-
selves. At the same time, the United States should make clear
that it is willing to sign and support such agreements as may be
developed guaranteeing a settlement. This assurance could erase
doubts stemming from the refusal of the United States to endorse
the 1954 Geneva Accords. Pharn Van Dong, premier of North
Vietnam, has insisted on the importance of full United States
participation in any agreement? The pronouncement should make
clear that the National Liberation Front would be included in any
negotiations and in any political settlement in South Vietnam as
a party in its own right and not an appendage of the Hanoi
delegation. Such a declaration would probably Open the way for
desirable changes in the present political situation in Saigon. No
one can foretell what might emerge in terms of local political
forces. But it is possible that the nonmilitary elements that pat ed
the way for the overthrow of the Diem regime and that have since
been suppressed would re-emerge and could help speed the process
of reaching a settlement.
Two unilateral steps then constitute the sine qua non for nego-
tiations. Variants as to order of announcement or extent of action
may be necessary; but before any serious negotiating is possible,
the United States needs to make clear rst that it does not plan
to continue its military in92"olvernent_ar1d is starting on immediate
steps of dc-escalation and. second, that the Vietnamese, including
the National Liberation Front, must decide their own fate. It is
often said that by making unilateral moves the United States is
giving up bargaining counters or even blue chips" as if the Vict-
natnese situation were part of a complicated game. Our goal,
William W';1rbey, HP, .92'e1-.' Yurlii T."mr'.s', November 28, 1965.
_r --,92~*,92, it. ./J-9,;"5,~'. ,
-¢
P <
»
i--,-- -.---»-s--v-p-M--e-~.,-_.~_'_ -. -. .".<. -
_ ;-. y .. ..F5-'1
it
l
F "- -~'*g=_~-rj-::w5.-.-q;-e-_-.~*-r-r;-q-in-w-w-3-|_~,a|
;=..= - 1:'.=.-ti
tr.-r r. . -3
at
Z-. ;.i@
--: - _ ..-=> .-J i~..92_.H .___.| -» _
4- -all -1];J>!','I{iJt2:} ;t .- Y '--'.~.=-92-t.-' -.,~ . '> '. ~. - .i".':l-1 -I '=."ii'-'.---.-E t .921l2"92.a"'~A'; -*~ -.=-1 !92~.-.3LI;,:A2s}iL;§'lfa.'~ .~.'¢,-, ~=~-.; -5:-mi
"I
=~
1' b~~
-I
-y .. it 7Q
.92 .
_ . . ',-1 ~Ir
" "H IV ...-..
i .-P.it
l92
1
H.
tlIr
i
I.
[1
|
i
>
l
l
l. -J
70 PEACE IN vn:"r92r
however, must be to bring the war to an end. Steps _to convii
our adversaries of our sincerity are evidently necessary.
While these initiatives are in progress, a whole series of fore
international to local, need to be brought to bear on the problei
The following progression is set forth, not as a rigid pattern, l
as suggestive of the wide possibilities.
1. The United States could call for a general cease-fire for
parties, supervised by an international body to keep order 2
prevent reprisals. Such supervision might be carried on by
International Control Commission ICC!, which was set up
the Geneva Agreements and is composed of representatives
Canada, India, and Poland. The ICC would have to be enlarg
or reorganized and given a rmer mandate in order to meet
objections on both sides to its present composition and functioni
2. At the same time, a Geneva-type conference should be cal
together to reapply the principles of the Geneva Agreements
1954 to the current situation. The logical group to form sucl
conference would be the original Geneva powers, which could
assembled on request from concerned parties by the co-chairrn
Britain and the Soviet -Union. Some dilculties would arise
reconvening this group as originally constituted. For example,
National Liberation Front, which had no place in the framem
of the original body, must be included now.
A more complicated problem is the official representation
the present Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam. The pres
military hierarchy in Saigon can be expected to do all in its poi
to resist eiiorts to end the war on terms it would regard as
favorable. Its suppression of any expressions in favor of a peact
settlement has made open organized opposition to the war imp
sible.3 There is a large non-Communist sector of the populati
of which the Buddhists and intellectual communities represent c
a part, which is vitally interested in ending the war. Some me
must be found to permit them to express themselves. This '
require an end to censorship of the press, restored freedom
political discussion and organization, and the institution of st
oilicially recognized body for public representation.
See Appendix III: Decree Law outlawing Communism and pm-C
munist neutralism.
5 d
I--3- -1.3; _..t_-=.,1-
f:92 /.'T92 Ki_»
ii
ti
Q.
It
F
-~'-;-- if-rt 1» P'e1v1?'It'9'-ilvvlflj-w1qwv$Ir-4 '4I923Ili92-q',,,§92'§f< ,_-,
1 ._ , 4 _; ,-;-.-;;-§_.";.~r=,M 92 H ; rA_ 1 _,92,._,_:__._,_/,:_,_:i:.. -_. U- ..=,¢r__,'-.-¢ 1.;*'92.-_i is . » - =.s-..--;,_ '92 r =-- 1" I Q _"'l.j;.4I'.""i'd92 r .1 1 .»I w _,..,., .,-_.':_~. tar .~:-,--" , , 2,, I .,.-- "i; »$"_.;;- ~..<..t..'.z =-u-i inn .-Qt e.eta~s;¢é-ti>§"il§..Ii5'>a
-.
92 ll 5 F -.; 1 I- '
iiI.
J -
A cc-rrl ..u_. 1
One suggestion for achieving this is that the current Saigon
government be pressed to establish a council of notables repre-
senting a wide cross section of civilian and religious leaders who,
in conjunction with the Saigon government, could form a negotiat-
ing authority. Such a council might initiate a representative refer-
endum in Saigon and other urban centers on the issue of whether
or not the government should enter into negotiations with the
Nationalliberation Front. Such a referendum might be conducted
under international auspices, thus providing a precedent for the
elections that will have to be conducted after a treaty is negotiated.
Even then it would be difficult to arrange a- fair vote because of
unsettled political conditions, intensied by the large number of
displaced persons.
If major obstacles arose in setting up a new Geneva-type confer-
ence, it might be necessary to convene a new group of concerned
powers, possibly through the good offices of the United Nations
Secretaly General. Some exploratory efforts, preferably quiet and
private, would clearly be necessa before a decision on the best
way to solve this problem could be made.
The United Nations itself would in normal circumstances be
the natural springboard for the launching of negotiations, the over-
seeing of a cease-re, the policing of elections, and the carrying
on of necessary peace-keeping activities. Expertise in these areas
has been developed through years of varied experience. Many per-
sons in the United States have suggested a major role for the
United Nations. Unfortunately, in this case the United Nations
73 ..__._._ &n-I-I3-'-.; - g ~ W _" if ""1:
wt: r
'
~r--.
i»
4.- ,092 . 92-. ,4--__>--,.;"f-i.' ?92
+3-i-t.'-_-; _. . " »:>.;, -1 J ..i,."5< ;.*.";;:- ' -.M _- ¥§...,i.-_
. I -.
., -. 92.__
X
-i'._.i
- .. .. .,. .1V ... . --~w.;~.;- P .-- i -
- "?"I"_Tf~'."-."'f' ' .. .1. ' .:'; ~ - , ---' - - -
E
; l
s-Ir '-B
rryilvl Y-V-1 .. .-~- _ i. -._ *. _}"; n; 1 1.2 :-. --s'a1.-; ~ - .-.~-fl: ,:<-_. :92_. -l < 92- _..r:_L- ! A I L_|.:_.__.~,.%
. ~ " T-zl-<1-ii
_ _. -. . .. 2.. .1. i......._,-V,-1', -_ . , _ . .7: ' . , -. .. _ . v - ,7 >4:92Il§V::.V5; 1-.i. " , 92 , 1 , ,~~' .- _ . _--.-A rt ,,.' .;.f92~"-'.-";.:; T " .- Ft-=-.1 I-.: _'.;.;~._-;.'.r.. ..:.-_+-._'ri_.- i. ,,,~ -, -4.: ._-a..i.ia.~r.i.s.92.:t-a.e._-,:.,~...:.i.i 1Ai|:@:§1§
.-"MI I
* SF
X a V 1;. .-.-_-¢
L
-ii .
J 1I.
i
ii
§
zi
.21u
i.
i-1
1.
I
vi
5
' i
,
!|
-I
5
5
l72 PEACE IN VIETN.-92l92-l
negotiation see-saw in the fall of 1965, the State Department was
engaged in Convincing as many national representatives as possible
that the government of mainland China should not be given the
credentials for representing China in the United Nations. U Thant
as Secretary General has rnacle some helpful offers to mediate and
he may yet play a valuable role.
3. Once the Geneva-type conference has been convened, its
rst task would be to encourage Saigon and the National Libera-
tion Front to reach agreement on the formation of a Vietnamese
Provisional Executive to maintain temporary adniinistration of
South Vietnam and take measures necessary for the establishment
of a provisional government. Such arrangements would not be
simple and the early inclusion of an international force is likely
to be required. In an inammatory situation with anarchy and
chaos near the surface, transitional steps of government are not
easily carried out. However, the experience of Algeria and the
Dominican Republic can be cited to show that, at least under some
circumstances, a provisional executive has been a possible formula.
4. International supervisory forces should he brought into South
Vietnam under the aegis of the negotiating conference as eariy
as possible. A natural starting point is the International Control
Commission ICC! set up for the Geneva Conference of 1954.
Both sides have indicated willingness to use the ICC as a point
of departure. Insofar as the provisional government can estab-
lish stable authority, the function of the international forces could
be minimized, and yet they might be needed to restrain certain
militant elements on either side which might attempt to sabotage the
negotiations. Such a presence might also be of help in guaranteeing
against reprisals.
5. The phased withdrawal of United States forces cannot be
blueprinted this far in advance of negotiations. It is likely that as
the provisional government, with the help of international police,
takes over control, the United States forces should be ivithdrawn
as rapidly as possible into three or four enclaves. These enclaves
could be sanctuaries for refugees fearing reprisals and bases for
logistical support that might still be needed for international
forces. The drawing into enclaves would be a [Cmpnr:tI'!' move
preparatory to complete withdrawal and dismantling of bases.
'1 ._ ~15 '_;-cg
If
2
.l
1
r
it
""FY_j4'D92 ...¢.c...._.=-.1,»-t.--. 1",-1'2 t ,__
1 - J . -- ' .'~-- 4- '92 i -TI '.-~'~I»'u-.~. -i--"we. I-.1. a-..;'=...I;;r_-_; a.;£li' .1;-'.- .='.:i...'_.-=,,_, :15
"J. ,.
i
. if
>92< ". t '
'. .- t. - .-'
air t-'~
t92,.-. -,.. s-t. . .._.v-3".. ~ 5
$3? i'-'- __.'*¬-ii.-',_ _ _,i
m. . '3'. _ - 0_ _.._. g, I._ . my 92_..'.'~_r'> - .
"H-.....-/" ' _ --._..-I
1.92- _ - : . _ - , _ . _,c- , . _,. . ._,_ ..__: ,_' , __ , _.. _ - y . .. 7. i in ._.__, -r. ' _ -_=-.j=t;-1'. _ ; s. E ,;; _;__r' '_-1 _ S , -;:.. ".- i-5'19 .- -I -0 j92._~7»_"; T}. .4 -_~ 0- _- _ ._. ur-
"wk, I
.__._
vrqtw
-VA.
.-, _.. _..,a., .e92~.,7.-
~::*§: fit. ¢.92i'~.- 1,--' -;: -_._--J ll. -,9.
.'r.I- ._ n. .:,_~_
. '-
h
i
t... 4 _.|92 5=1 1 92 O t- i i a ,s£,*:i ~ » :.I.] i Y-._,.___....._.,t...,._...-.-u - , .' -,1-..-4 -. .-3, . . {r1. .i
_.'>-:1-ii.-gll ,' _ .
~ . 3- .-.4ei-I -i.--~.-I >."-- "ml-T $.11
3
.-
*_"¥%_. -r:.s"f.'>_ _- -92-J' 1.1g._.- .-. _ .
_.-,-92 1-..t.92.- g _yH,,r __1r bg'._|92--~ ., .A W-
RJ
l
l
rPOSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT '7_3
6. The provisional government would direct the demobilization
of armed forces on both sides and the withdrawal trom South
Vietnam of all outside forces, both North Vietriamcse and Ameri-
can, under the surveillance of the international presence. The
provisional government would also be responsible for conducting
elections, again under the scrutiny of an international umpire.
The object of such elections might be a Constitutional Assembly
or an actual permanent government.
"l. Successful negotiations may still leave some elements in
South Vietnam in danger of reprisals. Predictions have varied
greatly as to the number of persons on either side who might need
to S¬¬l-C sanctuary. The type of regime developed in negotiations
elections would make an important difference. On the side of opti-
mistic predictions is the amazingly favorable experience of the
amnesty and exchange of persons between the two zones after the
first Geneva Conference. On the pessimistic side is the cruel nature
of the current civil War, which may lead to personal vendettas in
the villages and mass repnsals. The United States would certainly
owe an obligation to assist persons who felt they might be in jeops
ardy because of the United States military withdrawal. A precedent
is already at hand in the case of Cuban refugees. Special legislation
would be needed to bring them into this country. This would be
costly, but the war is now being conducted at an innitely greater
expense. e
8. The nal act of the Geneva-type conference should be an
international agreement guaranteeing Vietnam's neutrality and
its freedom from any outside interference. Major questions such
as reunification should be left to the Vietnamese after the estab-
lishment of responsible government in South Vietnam and the
achieverncnt of relative stability. There should be guarantees
against armed intervention or inltration from either North or
South Vietnam in the afiairs of the other state, but it should
be made clear that nothing in the agreement precludes even-
tual reunication of North and South should the Vietnamese
so decide. Provisions for commercial and cultural exchange, frec-
dom of movement, and postal service between the two countries
might well be included.
9. The way may then be open to fulll the long-delayed prom-
"1 I '£k an
-4 ...
' I.
in* ..
_ e
I
7?. -- -'.7:'~,1ii:-J?-':"';'5; '. '55; ii ., . .. .i.r:- _-= I .~g;r=.=.u- »',.:. .
4 , i I7'.» . ." -7=.f .
~ F 92
mh _4¢ Y ,-i-.--";,-.--w-?-'_'.- ,,- -=_; ,;=.,.'e_.-,_ .:,..~,T_~,,-T_- _
' ~ =5;-. 1. 1'1 --92:..-N. L1r92r- -1--
§:."§';>.iEi92t:-.-.,?T.-_','_J.t-nfil-:.ii.->.¢1..M' 3- 1,1,3» gs ~',~;-_;= --,"~ --. t_;.='-§~<e;;-
km iv.i .
' v.
._'/a V , -..,_" . .e-' '-Y
e-- -91%
-_. ' A __,_: , _ ,,,-.-, t~._-_= ._-, ». _ -, ,..92|i|'.192|. .. I! . L. ..
i 4 1 .,»
92-
-- -e 1 1. ,-'-~ .-:..;s§>4_. --1}; ;lJ:_>5;¢V"I: l.;'*'4l92 1: 4
I f..'.. _ __
-. 2'.92
a.
s
e 1
2.
< K
71vb -. V e r H" __'1,,--. " _ we -
74 PEACE IN VIET
ises of massive e:::.";: :o pie of Vietnam. In his 1
7 speech Presi;e:: .":';s.:: sii:
These cop;-.e5 cf S-:=_"_':e=_=t Asia. are homes for millions oi
poverishecl _:>e:_: e. 3;; isj: :'.1ese people rise at dawn and str
through unnj :e :_;':: .3 steitie existence from the soii. The!
often wrackei :7; pi:-.5-zed by hunger, and death corn
the earl}: age cf 4. . . .
The United .92's;i:?_s "_s alreaif- active!!-' engaged in developme
this area. . . . .l_:.i I ';c;'e :::;';E:c that the Secretary General 0
United f92'atic'_= :c;I;' _se :';e presjge of his great ofce and his
knowledge oi .=_=1;= 2; ;'__=:e. soon as possible, with the COUI
of that are:-., 1 _:'1_: 5:: cc-o_:e?::;on i: incre:-nsed development.
For Our 1:: I '-=-Q '.':e ::;ess to join in a billion-c
American i.n'-;s:e;; 3. efc.-t seen as it is under way.
To the i.t:;'i;:: :';s 77:52: cf poverty has now been adclec
fantastic c'es:.'.':'_":: ::' zcéern T-"Jr. The American people
a responsil:ilZ:j: to ;_ss"_=: i: ice repsir of the damage wrongl
both South a:i .92'::i: 92fe2:'-41 bu" the vvar. It is imperative
we do so if Y»: ;-;e :: see: ;':.s lie: isctn becoming an expli
center for biier ii-.#..':eri:;::s:1 1: toe foture. This will rel
vast amounz .:: L':.:.=;' Stszes 1:3. but will be far less costly
the continu-a:':; c-5 :2 war. More important than the quanti
aid oficred is :2 st;-L: J '-'~'.;:'3 it is offered. Any future part
the Arnericazs :;;:." ¢~"._' :e.:;:e a high degree of respect fo;
people of 92'ie:_=::. Ac: :;s: ':e c"::.i§.- estentled without st
attached. This 2:4: 1: J: it ernes under the auspices t
internationai 1;-if. '; ;e:e::-L -"J :::ed States will have to
...._.,..-..- .. t~..;;.,.92 .'_, ,~~.-__._I1 '--:-.1-,-s.-,~.1.t 2, . I rl-11llC¢tLl> {U L92-u___._'-: _Z ;_~._."-._.._-. so/92.1..1.| 1~..92U1Llt1UlL in I-113 E
area, not as _:_:t if ; :_=::i: 1: "s:.i_n C0:":rnunism" but as
of a positive :::_::;: ;:' ;'e;;:;: '-92;-11 the pressing needs or
people. _ _Full ad'."e:".;;e s;:"_'i re teien of the cooperation alt
achieved bx" 5;: I_'."_"i:; N::::s Economic Commission for
and the Fa: E;§:. =';:_:: i:s '_-_<'."ices plans for the Mekong l
developrnenz ';_-.2 3:5; I,-_i~.i_ projecting a technological rcvol
affecting the 1:-as :5 i"-'2: 3.1- 11:50:". people. The Asian Dev
ment Bank, est: 1: 7»: .3 c_::t::§on, uith one billion dolln
resources, cc__; '2: ;1e;1 2 L1:-_;er role. The Asian lnslilvli
I ~<A_ r 1,->__ _ .__* . ,.;. - - - -
,_:?___ i E
1
1'
1
5'55 .-.1 F t-92 - .~- :1"-- .2.-.:_ '". _ 7:--,E,__ L 4 ;:- .ir';'» >=-. :~T- '_ " . -; 5.. I-. ;.;. J,~.,,; _ - 5. . It -' '
" . ~ ~t '1~ I . . -_
1 ver: -. p I 4 .., 1 r" -,
_. ,-.» ., -_ I ,-_ _, . ,_ ._ ., t.-. _i- _~,,i__, . y =,_,-,;_-; tri- -»"..-_:-- .;~-. V ;':'s'~,-.= '" .-'<'.92.<ti¢».i,92&,-e;-V-L?E ...?151?.;?1§I92;r';-'".E'=.i*-Z? --~da~..-.r-1 ~li''i;|J-ulgi -'_¢q:1_-_3_.».-_,5.q;,..-s 1.:-a,¢,,,,',g-,_i,@ ,5 j'~*s_-:;'Q__;,~_,,__;g§.'-{».._;,g.M;-
'
i "I"; 3
. .
___
i .5
I
- ,. .t -,1an-»--~ _. .. -c ,--. >--' .".-Q. ' '- hiqw--r , ;; . --r;---7.-V ' '
- I _,....;-2|-=_i.Cj_l_ __-._'_ __ _ _
I. p J I
its
Economic Development and Planning could greatly expand its
efforts to train government oicials. Following the example of
the United Nations response to the Congo crisis, a special emer-
gency reconstruction fund could be established under the United
Nations which would mobilize the sl-till and experience available
through other international agencies.
10. In every effort to achieve a settlement, the long-range goal
of stability in Southeast Asia must be kept in mind. The United
Nations could assist this process if both the Peoples Republic of
China and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam are no
longer outlaws but participants in the world community of nations.
This would require that the issue of Chinese representation in the
U.N. be solved. North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, could then
become an Observer at the U.N. with full opportunities to take
part in the economic and social programs of the U.N. system and
with opportunities for diplomatic consultation at Headquarters.
With Peking as a member, and with some agreement reached for
self-determination in the whole area of Vietnam, steps could be
taken for some type of U.N. guarantee of the neutrality of Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Underlying the immediate steps would
be the broader objectives: the achievement of universality of mem-
bership in the U.N. and the development of accepted processes for
the achievement of security through peaceful settlement, peaceful
change, and the promotion of human rights.POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT
_l'_7_ K" ;92. .> ._ é" Q rm" Q V ~ --
-1. V_ W ~
r 1 92§ -ap» 'wen* N
. -<
3
s
. ,-f"=~92' .'..= 13.1 7J'?J'- _7.__,..=._,,-_-.=¢.-<7-t-.=___;. .7_.___.,_A..,¢_7,.,.,,,,,,_..-._M9R7__i
..'~:.',%
'1 '51!~: =111; _- j;__ 1;; -- j. _;.:._- , J .-.-.~x.;..3;._ my _92;,.V ?;__-n;;-~ .-~ ~ ; - *' it .t wt,-,».,. 19, -~- 7.1.. e . '*- Q _ _-n- .- _
_ 2 r
=»-:.= ti-T
.i.;-_:» - 1-s._ _ -. _-;_ . . - __ ,,'. ; _- . =_. -. ,;._ ;.._-'___u, l} _. ;:-_= , , pw ..- .- us -- .t - t- - : .-'. c. -it-, ~__,.~_- . 7:.;92'-.7 "- '. .i5."".92-"-|92,s':.--.-M ;1!-{.1-_'r§}4j-».,:_.',.92 H».-Q, ,e_ M», -1 ._.,- 92_,-. -.c"a:92_.-;~ - =--'-:;k.»=92»-=-;:.1- <'- ..;;.-v.~t;..-_"~,1_:=-,. ;,;,_--_'-=. Jllkn-£u:~:4Ul~ '0-+» v. _-Mid.9212¢-1-%i-ti-<-»¢»u#@,333~2'>s>92;iazir.¢¢92;%:1&==~r;s1.iusi .e;'.'.!:-.-.-.t.ut~.i";..92
F I .
4
1!".
7'
I
rt
., R ._ _ *1 ;"» 1'21 ,;_-;--r92=.._v
at
1
9.
.»
Q3}
q.'_j§,_
EAi
=I
Condunon
As 1966 begins, hopes for a new day in Vietnam hang i
balance. Will the record of escalating horror in 1965 be exts
in 1966, or will it be succeeded by a record of escalating p
The past year of devastation and deadlock has Shown the
defeating nature of military solutions to political and ccor
problems. A new approach must be found.
The experience of Vietnam has shown the need for Arne
understanding of the social forces irnpelling change in vast
of the world. Our future and that of Asia, Africa, and Latin P
ica are clearly interlocked. Although most Americans benet
our growing productivity, the gap between the have and
not" peoples steadily widens. In their affluence, Americans
scarcely realize the desperation of peoples in most deveh
nations today. The ghettos of our own cities provide but a .
sample of the social dynamite among the poorer nations. T
conditions cannot be met by dogmatic anti-Communism. Re
tionary change of some kind is necessary. The tragedy of
nam shows that revolutionary forces can turn to civil war,
civil war can lead to outside intervention, and intervention
lead to an ever-widening arena of conict, with the specter o
Hvbomb looming as the ultimate debacle-all this unless the l'~
of change are channeled into constructive courses.
American understanding must go beyond turning from des
tire to can-stnictive approaches. It must become aware oi
76
" '"f"'_ i ' T
i " . rt _ _ ,:f"_k ;il. "!..-- 1¬__.__,;,,.,_w ..
_ _ "_
- _ i .1.». - _ : _ :1-_ * re
92-..83's 2 '
viii;-.-r --_.= __92.....-_;-.-* 92___jr Y
"9
a
1:
fl» .
* B
_ ,, v- c . ,L _.,,<. ,_ ; _.~ , __ W1_t, »92 9..., s,.. l. Mi 92 .4- -_ » I ,*.__> 92 .92 V L ,_,..- p t __ _. .. , .1. ..< ", . .- .~'.-'~-"-;, .<~.._',
in _ I _. .| l._._.,_-_ L -_,i- _t_'-;,.__;.*._i_&.__.-=,?. _t.w;_ -.- -- .- ,l-.- ~. -.--'t~~92<;.~"--- - ,'|-'J','_1 - '~ V -' -- . '-. - -;- .~_-.~'.» :.'----1.-1- '- {;-r,.-~- -V.r;..4;'_ :>- A--92
54¢
. }.__ .- -' -.A
j_.s._' I -.4. -
C
a
4
___ .;é&-JG -1
"I '.' 92 as '
'_I~'.':'--i_ ' 1;,
A. <_.
_ ...._........._._.h_ 14- ........,.._. _' .1. -=,~sr-¢...u»...n._. - _l -_-
- ---< - -w7
.3 '1,
1 »~ .- '2v
4» 924
i
ll
l
ll
l
1
ll
i
It
i
<
1
ll
l
,.
l
l
ll
l
l
IK
ICONCLUSION .77
subtle and dangerous assumption that the United States can deter-
mine the course of the whole world, either through rniltiary power
or economic power. We condemn the concept of policing the world
only to fall into the trap of. trying to buy the "w'orids allegiance
with our largesse. The fallacy of the Pax Americana is still con~
ditioning our thinking.
In the not-so-remote day when we were not a great power and
were still looked down upon by the European powers, which were
then engaged in exploiting Asia and Africa and parcelling out
among themselves extraterritorial rights in China, America was
admired everywhere. Refugees sought our shores. Patriots took
inspiration and courage from the Declaration of Independence and
the writinm: of .TeiTr-'-rsnn and I inrtnln -'- ..__v...c.. _,. -____,._._..- _.-__. ._._.__._.....
Now we are technically developed, rich, mightyand no longer
admired. The downtrodden multitudes look elsewhere, to the very
elements that we are bent on destroying. We must refurbish the
American dream and seek ways to enlarge it into a world dream.
But we must remember that we Americans are only a small por-
tion of the dreamers.
The world to come must be built on international accommoda-
tion and cooperation. The year 1965, when violence reached a new
peak in Vietnam and the United Nations was crippled for nine
months, was supposed to be International Cooperation Year. The
new order struggles to be born against great difculties. Progress
in conquering disease leads to a setback in conquering poverty.
The stresses of change produce strains within each new nation, and
lead to heightened tensions between nations.
Americans have a natural optimism born of our experience, at
faith that every condition of man can be changed for the bctter._ If
we can apply this faith with perspective and with understanding of
those whose experience has been less fortunate, we will be able to
share in building a world ruled by human rights and human dignity.
_ J
. ___ V T, 7 -1'»
* - h . -- 1._> _
2*. H ,-~- 11- '-_=.'._J .. _ . 1'_._,__.,.....,,_
.__,.-I .7 -f-. .>-..__-"
v ,_:. - .
I
0
Q |__" 1"i
_,|.
.;
:
' 1_A '.l4
W - 9 :' - Appendix I: The 1954 Geneva e
.. ,_____ H
_ k ,.. .__ ._._,...T,.,92¢_ . .;->5, is-.-_..,.,'. ,,'-.-~-;--yp r;- <--.-;--<--1.-9--.-'-W, -'f-r>-'-_-P;-*=-Q- .- -.'-'.<-. . ,_..,,_-_.,;=-_ e
.. .~.- t
I l;_ . , ';j§=": .- J T
ii1 . '_92-, J -.- >| - 4 '7. .-; . 1. -2 ~ma".--'if£i;-"'/5i -- -3% A."-ii "~ A--1? ?._,._ _. 1 .1 , .., ;_ __ ... i » , . ., .. 39 . 1, :-. .1'_,*.,, -,-92;,.I haw _.-_-E-1. -4.1»
1} =;,:' i 1ii
. I ;_
. ;9 .
v
- _&92 t _; ~|Agreements on Vietnam
Appendix lA
The Geneva Agreements iheoreiicaiiy ended Ike war ii
tween French Union forces and the Vietnrin/1 in Laos, Ca:
bodia, and Vietnam. These xrares were to bet-Onze fully -ind
pendent countries, wirh the lax!-named pnrtirinned near ti
17th parallel into two smies pending reunication throzrglz fr.
elections to be /re/d by Jniy 20, 1956. The United States m
Vietnam are n0! signatories to these agreemenis.!
Agreement on the Cessation of Hoslilies in Vief~Nc1:T
July 20, 1954
Chapter IPr0visi0na1 Military Demarcation Line and
Dcnulitzuized Zone
Article I .
A provisional military demarcation linc shall be xed, on either sid-
of which the forces of the {W0 parties shall be regroupcd alter Ihdi
78
"1 @- ,. ;,;.:.:-~._,.:______ ;_ __A-, "_.f_ _qt_ _l'. ;'f'_';w Z. W J Vi» _
-5'" ._. .'
!92.
4
' t
492 t 2
r 1-F-1-:1 as 1*
.'/t-- .--l ~..»~ -,, -.-I_-, .. . < ~ ,--_t. .--iv-.. '-w-'1.<_ .
sr'.t
7
hr3'} _
-I. --t.
Q*1-
O_,, ._~ .35-1- ._:|I92l1v1 ~-'__ ;__. _.. 15 "_- .. '- $5:--;':"£,_.'. .
.r.~ _>.2!.¢;_. !-
-._;-w
l
l
8
'-v
I .
.. --._-"reg. ,.-. _:. n_,_..._.,.,..:..,.,...,....s_¢,,,,.,__..,,,f__,m:_ _r__:_ m_ __';?
>J ..,,._. 4* . 92 > ' 'at1 3 ,.t! st-.92._ _. _hK?!__._. _,, ._ __ I 1:._,_92_;..,-. H: " = ~$ '.-.=."-t'--._=-~':-:51" I-
" ".4:
1,4 t= .._.;--;:-_- - t ..._ l __ = '-.,;;.,l. t. - ,s..- tr 1-'~. 1, , . . . 92 . .. -. ,~ A .l.x'~ -->1-c--.»-trrwrt--.<-t.-' -~ ._-_- - .-_ ,.._._= ..v,- .-* ,,--_-92,92 ~_-,t- - .-._r~.v_»1,__<'-;-, ,3» _- -~.'. _.=- - ._. i ._-wt ..-.-'.;:_~_,~.u~_»._i..--their...-.. ---'-'-'- t_';t__: ,_-,5},-t:-_f1j_-_. - t-;_3',__-_:~_~ ~-.-;-§;;,_§_,=tfj.*_- "5' .1?-drl rf' w:--._."= V '1
I7 - --
…[truncated]