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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE
PART 12 OF 25
FILE NUMBER = 100-11392
SUBJECT; AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE
FILE -if: 100-11392
SECTION: I 1.
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1 FROM -Attention: Central Research Section
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SUBJECTI .Ace AND DISARMAMEHT LITERATURE
RICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE
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E °1°$°d are f°11°"inq Plmhleta which were left
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o "Steps Toward Disarmament" ; ii _
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is attributed to
Friends
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Service Committee. .
The pamphlets are being appropriately indexed in the
Charlotte Division and are being furnished Central Research Section
for information and any disposition desired.
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1?FOREWORD
The remarks in this pamphlet by William Davidon, Fenner
Brockway, and Emil Mazey, were originally given as speeches
at 1 labor rally in Chicago, February 20, 1960, held under the
auspices of the American Friends Service Committee. The meet-
ing, attended by some 700 trade unionists who gave Mr. Mazey
a tumultuous standing ovation upon completion of his speech,
had as its theme the title of this pamphlet, Labor's Stake in
Peace."
Due to limitations of space, we are able to print only
excerpts from Davidons and B1-ockway's speeches. On the
other hand, we are including the full text of Emil Mazey's
speech because we feel it is one of the most significant speeches
on this subject given by any high ranking American labor official
to date.
Everyone in his right mind today wants peace. Everyone,
including the President of the United States and spokesmen
for oath major political pa:-ties, speaks glcwingly of peace. Yet,
as a nation, we continue to prepare for war.
Development of more powerful nuclear missiles continues.
Production for germ warfare continues. We spend over 40
billion dollars a year on armaments. There is little it any
serious planning for disarmament and an economy which will
insure full employment if and when disarmament begins.
Obviously, if there is actually to be peace there must be
action taken to end the cold war, stop the runaway arms race,
and plan an economy that can produce for peace.
In the past, the American labor movement has taken the
lead on vital social issues. Today, along with all mankind, Labor
faces the one crucial issue -- the issue of nuclear war and
mass annihilation. Will it have the vision and the courage to
take an unequivocal stand for disarmament and production
for peace? The rally in Chicago and Emil Mazeys speech
suggest that it might.
Perhaps the rst step in this direction, as Mr. Mazey suggests,
is to initiate throughout the labor movement, open discussion
of foreign policy and the vital issues that affect war or peace.
To this end we have published this pamphlet and urge that it be
carefully read and thoroughly discussed by trade unionists
across the country. --
Chicago, April 5, 1960
_ Jack Bollens, Director
Peace Education Program
Chicago Regional Oiiice
American Friends Service Committee__ m___-_.1 --_--I-3..., -c.."'_... -_
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NO DEFENSE
By WILLIAM navmon,
Theoretical Physicist, Argonne National Lrmratory; Chair-'......."~,
Chicago Chapter, Federation of American Scientists; Member,
Third Pugwash Conference of International Scientists in Vienna.
War has always been a chronic disease in human ociety,
but it is no longer a chronic disease. It has suddenly become
a very malignant cancer. it will either wipe us out, or we will
take action which will enable us to get the power into our hands
that will keep it from wiping us out. What now exists in the
world is grossly different from anything in past human affairs.
Why has this big change suddenly occurred? What are
the specific facts which have produced this most unusual change
in human affairs? They are different from anything in our per-
sonal experience, different from anything in the history of our
race. And so, it takes that uniquely human capability of being
able to think objectively about events, of being able to respond
to o situation distinct £1-cm any which we have been prepared
for by our biochemistry.
I Une can point out that the biggest bomb exploded during
World War I1 equaled the approximate size and weight of
three automobiles. In contrast to this, the atom bomb which
was exploded 1800 feet above I-Iirosbdma, and which produced
some 200,000 casualties, fissioned only about three tablespoons
of uranium. This is an abrupt change in human affairs. The
amount of material which one can hold in the palm of 0ne's
hand is capable of wiping out a large city, and human beings
have never before had energy concentrations of this kind avail-
able to them. We will either respond to these facts in a
rational fashion, or go out of ellistence.
This bomb which was exploded over Hiroshima produced
by fire and heat alone the damage that would be produced by
one thousand tons of high incendiaries carefully distributed
over the city. This Hiroshima bomb was large in comparison
with the past. However, in comparison to today's hydrogen
bomb, the Hirsoshima bomb was small. Let's briey describe
wine of the effects of one large thermonuclear weapon.
We can point oat that within the space of a few cubic
feet more energy is released when a thermonuclear explosion
goes off than is generated by the largest hydroelectric station
in a couple of years. Picture for example the northwest part
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at our country, a good part oi its power coming from Grand
Coulee Dam. Picture the power used for industry, for transporta-
tion, for heat and light. Picture all these phenomena going
-on in this part of the country for two years, and then picture
all of this energy being concentrated in the space of a iew
cubic feet, and being released within a millionth or two of a
second. This is the phenomenon which takes place when a
thermonuclear bomb goes off.
The reactions which take place during such an explosion
are 'more intense than those which go on in the interiors of
most stars, let alone on the surface of the earth. It would burn
the eyes of an individual some 300 miles away from the point
oi the explosion. It would look about 100 times as bright as
the sun at a distance oi 100 miles from the point of the explo-
sion. It would set re to objects and char human skin over an
area considerably larger than 1000 square miles. This is the
eifect of a single weapon which can be carried in a single
missile or plane.
- In addition to the blast, in addition to the re and the heat
released by such an explosion, large quantities of radioactivity
are produced. We can point out that an H-bomb explosion in
March, 1954, caused some 7,000 square miles to be covered by
lethal quantities of radioactivity. The whole land surface of the
earth, not just that now used by human beings for their living
and growing oi food, but all land above sea level over all the
surface of the eath, could be covered by about 8,000 such explo-
sions. Eight thousand weapons costing about one million dollars
a" piece eight billion dollars, about one-fth of our annual
military budget. This is the cost in money of enough weapons
to destroy the earths population. -
"In the Holifield Committee hearing about which you will
be hearng more this evening from Emil Mazey!, assumptions
were made about the effects oi a limited nuclear war. In the
words of the committee, The attack pattern and basic assump-
tions established by the subcommittee for consideration in
these hearings reflected an attack against the United States
On a limited scale." That is, the number and total megatonnage
oi the weapons employed were less than the potential that the
enemy is capable oi launching against us. In this limited,
hypothetical attack only 263 nuclear weapons were used. Yet
any million Americans were killed immediately, twenty million
were seriously injured, half of the homes in the nation were
made unuseable, and heavy closes of radioactivity covered vast
areas of the country. - '
- "We are placing this kind of destructive capability at the
nger tips, not only of leaders of national powers, but in the
hands of small numbers of people sitting in submarines, small
numbers of people flying bomber planes, small numbers of
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people operating the whole. range of apparatus available to
modern miltary forces. This is an unstable situation, to say -the
least. e '
It is important to realize that the development of delivery
systems has kept space of development of the weapons them-
selves. For instance, the speed of a modern missile is many
times that of a high speed rie bullet. If a missile were to fly
across the front of this auditorium, it would he going so fast
that we would not be able to see it. It would be a block or two
past us before the sound would reach our ears. It would
not be coming in a straight line along the surface of the- earth.
or at a given height in the air. Rather, it might be coming any-
where in a large region several hundred miles high and thousands
of miles in breadth.
In the midst of this vast region, each missile carries
with it the destructive power to wipe out any city. If you knock
down ten percent, or fifty percent, or even ninety percent of
such missiles, the fact remains that each one which gets through
will still produce vast quantities of destruction. In the light
of these developments, the possibilities of defending ourselves in
the usual ways just don't exist. Thus, an entirely new expedient
has been adopted. Unable to defend our people and our cities
by any tangible means, military and political leaders have
substituted the untried and untested program of deterrence.
That is, no longer able to stop the enemy physically, they hope
to deter the enemy by threatening the indiscriminate slaughter
of the whole population.
It is as though we were imable to put out fires any longer,
and therefore the re departments, having all this apparatus at
their disposal, decide that since they cannot fight res suc-
cessfully, they will deter fires. And so they go around the city
spreading gasoline, kerosene and high explosives through the
streets and in eve:-yone's basement. Then nobody will dare drop
I match in a city all set to go up in ames. The fire engines
would parade tlu-ough the streets spreading their exposives and
carrying banners saying, These are our defense forces." And
the people would cheer, These are for our defense. They protect
us because they deter anybody from dropping a match and start-
ing a fire. I wonder how secure we would feel in such a city.
Again, it is as though we were trying to stop automobile
accidents, and so went around tying children of all families to
automobile bumpers. Nobody would dare have an automobile
accident, if their kids were strapped to the front bumpers of
automobiles. How happy we would be,- busily manufacturing
defense racks to be mounted on bumpers. and in which we would
strap our neighbors children to make 8t.l1'6 that lEY Wllld Dill
smash their automobiles into ours.
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Obviously, this would not provide us with defense. This
would not provide security, and similarly in the the world situ-
ation, our reliance upon threats of indiscriminate slaughter does
not provide us with any means of protecting ourselves.
In 1945 the United States and Russia had nuclear weapons.
In 1952 the United States, Russia and Great Britain had nuclear
weapons. In 1960 the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and
France have nuclear weapons. Other countries now have nuclear
.weapons programs under way. It is not only that the major
powers are spreading gasoline and kerosene around the areas
oi the world. More and more small groups of people are clam-
oring to get into the act.
We cannot constantly be putting more hands on the trigger
that might set oi! disaster and expect to get away with it
indefinitely. If we are going to survive, and if we are going
to have a society that is moving ahead to fulll the potentials
for growth and advancement which our world society has today,
something drastic has to take place. A basic change is needed.
Such a basic change cannot be outlined in a few words
tonight. It is at least a starting point, however, to recognize
clearly that we are in a new and untried situation a situa-
tion which requires new and radical action if we are to cope
with it. Rational men don't decide on a course of action simply
by choosng the midpoint in the spectrum of other mens thoughts.
They observe what is occuring in the world and then take action
commensurate with the events and the task at hand.
We might ask ourselves, are we happy simply being tools
for other men? A well oiled tool, one which is kept in fine
condition, but nevertheless a tool whose handle rests in some-
one elses hands. Are you happy about seeing your labor unions
converted into large tool boxes to conveniently keep this bunch
of tools? Are you happy being used as a pawn in this fantastic
game of military buildup and counter military buildup, nuclear
threat and counter threat? Do we want to have some respon-
sibility for running our lives nd controlling our future, or
are we satisfied with being the complicated objects at the
disposal of other men? These are questions that we will have
to answer soon.
I think we realize that we do have a power in our hands
which is greater than that of the atom. We have the power to
control the atom the nucleus is at the disposal oi human
beings. How human beings spend their time and energy is
at the disposal of themselves. This meeting tonight is in part
an answer to the question, what are we going to do with this
power? I am glad to see that we are turning to these problems
titer a long period when we tried to hide from them.
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BRITISH LABOR AND AMERICAN LABOR
By FENNEB BROCKWAY,
Outstanding British Labor Party Leader, Member of Parliament
lor Eton - Slough, recognized world authority on colonialism
end international niiairs.
I am speaking tonight to a gathering oi trade unionists, so
let me state clearly to you the view of our labor movement in
Great Britain. Before our gathering tonight, I was present at
8 discussion between representatives of your trade unions in
Chicago on this problem of war and peace, and it was recognized
that there are two views within your labor movement. First,
there is the view oi most oi your official leadership, which is
diicult to distinguish from the views of other leaders who
are skeptical about disarmament and who believe that America
must arm and Second, there ere views which I hope to
hear "tonight irom Mr. Mazey, in a speech which I believe may
be quite historic for the labor movement in this country -
views which urge that in this situation we must find a way of
establishing peace and bringing about disarmament.
There are also two views in the British labor movement.
The views that Brother Mazey holds represent the majority
viewpoint in Britain today. Let rne state them in specific terms.
First, the whole labor movement in Britain is opposed to
the re-tern oi any testing oi atomic or hydrogen bombs, The
whole labor movement has declared that the construction of
military bases in Britain, including the bases where there are
American weapons, should be stopped at least until the disarm-
ament conference has met and had an opportunity to develop
a disarmament plan The whole labor movement desires that
Britain shall lead the formation of a non-nuclear club among
nations which will have no nuclear weapons whatsoever. For
this policy, the whole of our trade union movement, the whole
of our Labor Party, the whole of our cooperative movement is
pledged.
Second, there is the view in our labor movement which
goes further than this. It is a view which, I suppose, is already
supported by one third of our labor movement, including our
largest trade union, the Transport and General Workers Union
with close to two million members, of which Mr. Frank Cousins
is the distinguished secretary. This View is that Great Britain
should take the unequivocal step of leadership in the world by
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dis-banding itself of nuclear weapons altogether. I share this
View and urge it on both practical and moral grounds.
I have been in America five weeks, travelling from the West
Coast to the East. I have gotten this impression of America.
There is a great well of opinion here which desires disarmament
Ind peace, just as deeply as any people on earth. I find it
everywhere - but you must nd some means of giving it
practical political expression. Forgive me if I say this, but I
am puzzled when I look at your two political parties. We have
been taught to believe, and since I know some of its leaders I
do believe, that your Democratic Party is the more liberal
of the two. But I get deeply disturbed when I find some of
your Democratic leaders even outrightening" your Republican
leaders in the advocacy of more armaments. -
While I have found this great well of peace sentiment here
- fotmd it in the universities, found it in the factories, found
it in the churches -- I am disturbed by another element in
American society. Whilst I was in California I visited the Rand
Corporation. Now the Rand Corporation consists of scientists
and technicians who advise your Air Force and who advise your
government. I spent two hours in discussion with those scientists
and technicians, and frankly I came away rightened. They did
not seriously consider the possibility of disarmament. They
believed that the only way to maintain peace in the world is
for Russia and the United States to develop an equality of arms,
each producing correspondingly more efficient and destructive
weapons. I said to them that it is unlikely that we can build
up these mighty mountains of destruction without some accident
taking place, without some miscalculation, without some local
conict leading to a world conflict. While America and Russia
are building their skyscrapers of arms in this way, other nations
will no doubt take similar action. Britain already has its hydro-
gen bombs, France has now invaded the nuclear sphere. Vilho
next -- China, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Eastern European countries,
-TIPBTI, Western Germany? At this moment there are twelve
governments which are capable of producing the hydrogen bomb.
I say to this audience, if the nuclear arms race continues
with other nations Producing these bombs, manageable disarm-
ament will become impossible. We should then be face to face
with human suicide. No sane pe!'S0l1 can contemplate this. We
must have disarmament or perish.
I went to your factories in San Diego, miles of them. Ninety
percent of the labor there is making weapons of war - bombing
planes, rockets, missiles. Here, when one thinks of dlS31'I1'l-
ment, he must think of unemployment too. Disarmament -
unemployment. What is the answer? The answer is new em-
ployment. The answer is a better life for all. Whenever in the
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British House of Commons we ask for more to be spent on
education, more on housing, more on health, more on meeting
the problems of poverty, the answer is, "We can't afford it --
expenditure upon defense." I have said to them, and I say to
you, reduce your expenditure on defense. Finally end your ex-
penditure upon defense, and turn those vast sums in every
country of the world to lifting the lives of people.
Unemployment need not be. If we decided through the
United Nations to pool there the expenditures we have been
making on arms, to lift the standards of life in the under
developed countries, the immediate demand would be on the
industries which are now making arms. There would be a great
demand for power stations, for dams on rivers, for electrification,
for irrigation, for locomotives and tractors, for pumping stations
to lift the water under the deserts to the surface so there
would be fertile soil. Such a policy would make an immediate
and overwhelming demand on our industries, and the work of
our men, instead of being devoted to death and destruction, would
be devoted to construction for life. - = . 1 _ ,
I conclude by saying to you, this struggle against war is
not only a negative struggle to prevent disaster to mankind.
It is that. But it is also the great constructive struggle to lift
man to higher planes than man has ever reached before. This
is a crucial year, and I ask you, brothers and sisters, to take every
possible step and measure during this year to let your leaders
and representatives know that the will of the people is to disarm
and live in peace. ' -
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" FOREIGN POLICY
By EMIL MAZEY.
Secretary-Treasurer, International Union, UAW
I welcome the opportimity to discuss the Foreign Policy of
the United States because workers of our country have the
most to lose if our Foreign Policy should lead to World War III.
As in all Wars, workers are the first and most munerous casual-
Therefore, we in organized labor have a special interest and
a-special concern for the maintenance of peace.
Labor leaders, the same as leaders of other elements of
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issues because of the fear of being misunderstood and because of
the {ear of being labeled soft on Communism. To emphasize
this timidity on the part of the labor movement, I wish to point
out that in February of 1955, during the Matsu and Quemoy
Island disputes, I raised the subiect matter at a closed meet-
-ing of the C10 Executive Board, and expressed my deep con-
cern for policies that I thought were improper on the part
of our government and that would lead to World War III. I did
not ask the CIO on this occasion to take a position, but urged
them to re-evaluate our attitude towards the entire China crisis.
I was shocked when a motion was made to expunge my re-
marks from the record and was even more shocked when a
majority of the Board Members supported this action.
I am sure that what I have to say today will be unpopular
with some labor leaders and among some of the politicians of
the country, but I am going to express my views whether any-
body likes what I have to say or not.
I am deeply concered with the real possibility of an atomic-
missile war that could destroy a good part of the world.
The movie and the book, On the Beach," only slightly
exaggerates the consequences of an atomic attack on the peoples
of our world. -
The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy recently
%ued a report based on findings and testimony of specialists
from U. S. Goverment Agencies on the effect of a mass nuclear
attack on the United States if the attack took place in mid-
October. -
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TARGETS HIT WOULD BE: 71 big urban areas, 21 atomic
installations, 132 military installations.
WEAPONS USED: 263 nuclear missiles and bombs, with
power ranging from 1 million to 10 million tons of TNT.
' HERBS WHAT WQUL!! HAPPEN-
FALL-OUT: Shown here as it would be 7 hours after the
attack, the fall-out pattern would cover much of the U. S.,
with radioactive debris blown by winds typical of mid-
October.
DAMAGE INFLICTED: Most big cities wrecked, a fourth
of all dwellings destroyed, another fourth made unuseable,
food supplies contaminated.
CASUALTIES: 50 million American dead, 20 million seri-
ously injured.
I am not secure in the assurances given us by some of our
public officials and military leaders that we have deterrent
power, that is the power to retaliate, and, therefore, we need
not be too concerned about the possibilities of war as long as
as we maintain an adequate arsenal of atomic and nuclear
weapons.
I find it difficult to know what the truth is concerning
our defenses against possibie nuclear warfare because_of the
conicting views and opinions of men in public office and of
our military leaders.
It becomes even more difficult for a layman to properly
evaluate the seriousness of our defense posture because so many
former generals and admirals now occupy key positions at
scandalous salaries for companies engaged in defense produc-
tion that it is hard to know whether our military leaders are
expressing honest, patriotic views or are merely making a pitch
for a post-service job for a company engaged in military pro-
duction.
An additional difficulty in objectively discussing the ele-
ments for peace is the vested interest that many corporations
have in the continuation of the cold war. Over 90% of all the
aircraft production in our country is for military purpses and
the only customer is Uncle Sam. Therefore, the aircraft industry,
which has been built as a result of large subsidies from the
U. S. Treasury, has a special interest to keep the cold war
going. The end of the cold war could mean the end of their
nisiness.
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Workers engaged in military production also have I vested
right in the continuation of the cold war because our govern-
ment has no plans on how to use the detsnse plants tor peace-
time production and how to adequately guarantee full employ-
ment and purchasing power to workers engaged in military
production.
During World War II, any worker who was warm was able
to get a job, despite his age, sex or color of his skin Many
of them were heard to remark, I hope the war lasts forever."
This comment is understandable, especially after a worker has
been plagued with unemployment, insecurity and want, many of
them from the dark days of the 1930 depression. =
' In view oi the conicting political and military opinions,
and because of the obvious vested rights that employers -and
some workers have in the continuation of the cold war, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to get intelligent public discussion of
Iwhat steps our nation can take to achieve lasting peace and to
bring about universal disarmament and the end to wasteful
expenditures of our resources, which now amount to more than
$41 billion yearly. One hundred seventy-ve billion dollars is
spent yearly by all of the countries of the world for military
purposes.
In preparing my remarks for this meeting tonight, I have
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'of our nation than in any other period of my life. I have read
remarks and some statements oi military leaders wherein it is
maintained that because of the development of the atom and H
bomb and other nuclear and atomic weapons, and the develop-
ment of the missile, there is no possibility of an attack being
made on our country because of our ability of immediate reprisal
that would destroy or seriously cripple a potential attacker.
I have read statements by some of our leaders who try to
reassure the people of our country that not everybody would be
destroyed in a nuclear war that only a portion of the popula-
tion would he destroyed.
I have read with alarm proposals by one military leader who
behaves that we ought to keep our planes in the air on a 24-
hour continuous alert basis, fully armed with atomic weapons.
I have read proposals that we ought to increase our atomic
submarine fleet and that we ought to have some of them stationed
io the coast of Russia, submerged under water for as much
as 4 or 5 months, ready to retaliate immediately in the event
our country is attacked. '
After reading and studying these numerous proposals, I am
more alarmed than ever that World War III might start as a
result oi an accident, a crash of a plane loaded withatomic
Weapons, or by some trigger-happy Colonel who would push a
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button because he misread Signs that appeared to be an attack
against us. . . . . f
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I HAVE, THEREFORE, REACHED THE CONCLUSION
THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE T0 PEACE.
The people of our nation have been spared the horrible
experiences of destruction oi our homes and our families through
bombing of our cities. Although almost every American family
had some members in the armed forces during World War II,
and although all of us have been touched in one degree or another
_by loss of lite of a relative or friend in World War II, I am
airaid that our citizens do not as yet fully comprehend the
significance of war with modern weapons. The people in Eng=
land, Germany, France, Hiroshima and other cities and countries,
that felt and experienced destructive power of military machines
in World War II, have a stronger yearning for peace because of
these experiences. We have been protected from warfare in our
country by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in World War I
and World War II. We no longer have that protection.
The development of jet planes and bombers and the develop-
ment of missiles capable of tiring a hydrogen bomb warhead
completely destroys the protection that we had in the last
two bloody World Wars.
Recently United States Admiral Arleigh Burke, testifying
before a Congressional Committee, was asked the following
question:
Senator Stennis: We have a memorandum here that last
year the Secretary of Defense made the statement that onepolaris submarine carries as much destructive power as all the
bombs dropped by both sides during World War II."
Admiral Burke: Yes, sir, this missile -- warhead -- will be
many times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It
is not a small one."
Because of these facts, I believe that it is incumbent upon
us to publicly discuss the question of peace and war in a
rational and objective manner so that we can develop policies
and programs that can minimize the tensions that could erupt
into World War III, and endeavor to create a public climate
that could make universal disarmament a reality.
I am alarmed at the increase of the Nuclear Club which now
wnteins as members the United States, Russia, Great Britain
and France. I am particularly worried about France having the
atom bomb because of its internal problems in Algeria and the
internal dissension that exisits in France. I am afraid to trust
atomic and nuclear weapons in the hands of people like General
Massu of the French Army. ' _ p _ _ .
13
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II believe that the following steps must be taken to reduce
world tension and to establish a basis for maintenance of world
peace:
We must step up our discussion with the Russians, Great
Britain and France for the ending of the testing of atomic and
nuclear weapons. We must seek ways and means of fool-proof
inspection and detection of testing of weapons. In the meantime,
the United States should not engage in any testing of nuclear
weapons and should urge the other countries to join them in
banning the tests.
I believe that serious consideration should be given to
the proposal of Thomas E. Murray, former member of the
Atomic Energy Commission, who believes we ought to set up a
UN Commission with the power of destroying the stockpile
of nuclear weapons on a matching basis with the Russians
and other countries, who have these weapons.
I beleieve that we must work towards universal disarmament
and be more flexible in our discussions with the Russians on
this subject. -
Our government must also immediately establish a National
Planning Board for the peaceful use of our military plant so
that we can guarantee full employment to the workers now
engaged in military production.
This proposal is not new. Waiter Reuther, President of the
UAW, proposed after World War II, the use of our aircraft plants
to produce housing on a mass production basis.
' If only one per cent of the one hundred seventy-ve billion
dollars that is annually spent for military purposes was used
to wipe out hunger and raise the living standards of the back-
ward countries of the world, we would have one billion seven
hundred fifty million dollars available for these purposes. If
all of the C0lIIllI1'l8S reduced their military expenditures across the
board on a ten per cent basis, this would mean seventeen andne-half billion dollars available in the war against hunger and
isease.
I believe that no meaningful decision towards universal
disarmament can be achieved with our present policy towards
Red China. I urge a complete re-evaluation of our Foreign
Policy towards China on a realistic and objective basis.
I believe that it is foolish to pretend that Bed China with
800 million people, over half of Asia, doesn't exist.
I believe that tensions with China and with other sections
of the world are unnecessarily prolonged by the belief that Chiang
Kai-shek and his discredited, corrupt military dictatorship is the
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true spokesman for China and that it is the policy of the United
States to return Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Mainland.
President Eisenhower must take the major blame for our
completely unrealistic attitude towards Red China.
You recall that in his first State of the Union message on
February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower told the world that he
had unleashed Chiang Kai-shek." He also charged former Presi-
dent Truman with "using the United States Navy as a defensive
arm for Communist China." These are the exact words of the
President:
There is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that
required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsi-
bilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. This permitted
those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers,
and those of our United Nations allies, in Korea.
I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the 7th Fleet no
longer be employed to shield Communist China."
I believe that our government should give immediate and
serious consideration to proposals by the CONLON COM-
MISSION" that made studies on the United States Foreign
Policy tor the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate. .
This Commission concluded, A government having effective
control over only 10 million people cannot indenitely hold
a major power position in the name of 600 million Chinese."
They further said that, "Isolation in relation to our policy
with China always serves totalitarianism."
One of the alternatives they proposed to the Chinese ques-H
tion was to take steps to establish normal relations with China
that would include: -
1! The recognition of Communist China by the United States,
2! support for its seating in the United Nations, and 3! general
treatment equal to that which the United States accords to
the Soviet Union. The Commission supports this policy on the
following grounds. i
"a! In accordance with established international practices to
which U. S. policy has usually adhered, the recognition of Com-
munist China would not signify approval of the regime, but
rather its existence as a de facto government, having control over
some 660 million people. To accept these facts of life is in the
national interests of the United States because it is essential that
we establish a realistic policy toward Asia as the first step in
a long range economic and politcal competition with Communism.
Nonrecognition has not prevented the rise of Communist China.
It has isolated us as much as the Communists, giving our policy
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'ma essentially unilateral character, making it defensive, and
negative. . . ' ' .'
H, _b! Normalization of relations, if successful, would give us
greater access to the Chinese people, from whom we are now
almost completely cut off. It would thus make possible some
ldnd of informational and cultural relations program which
might provide certain pressures upon the Communist leaders
todemphasize hate and fear of the United States. Moreover, it
would provide us wth direct communications in terms of oicial
channels, thereby reducing the threat of miscalculation on both
sides.
c! The primary function of the United Nations today is
an international forum whereby issues can be debated and
nations called to account before the world; as an instrumentality
for the mediation of disputes through its technical staff; and
as a valuable organization ior a multitude of nonpolitical pur-
poses of a social, educational, or research nature. As long as
the government controlling one-half of the people of Asia is
outside the United Nations, that organization will be seriously
handicapped in terms of the above functions.
- And Communist China outside the United Nations may be
more of a disruption than Communist China in the United
Nations in a variety of ways. There are advantages in being
an international outlaw, not being legally bound to international
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thereby being able to compartmentalize ones policies. Moi-e~
over, the U. S. policy of suporting the Government of Taiwan
as the only legitimate government of China in the UN is in
serious danger of losing by attrition. Despite our pressure,
this position is becomng more difficult to sustain in the inter-
national scene, and is being sliced away, a sliver at a time.
The problems of peace and the problems of war must
become the concern of all the people and not just military and
political leaders. -
' I call upon ml oi our citizens to take mater interest i_n
our Foreign Policy to stimulate objective discussion without
fear of the slurs and the slanders of those within our gov-
ernment who use the fear of Soviet Russia and Communism
as a convenient way to stifle democratic discussion of this most
important problem.
'l ~ I am confident that we can find a way to reduce the world
tensions and to work towards world disarmament.
Q _;I am sure that if we can use our good common sense we
can, during our lifetime, develop an America and help build
a,world in which we have abundance, in which we have secur-
ity, in which we have freedom and justice and in which we have
peace not. only for our time, but for all time. g
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SUGGESTED READINGS
_. - Io p ___ 41.- A111!!!1 IVBLIBDIE 11-U11! IIIIB AI BL-
BOOKS
'.lhe Causes of World War Three, by C. Wright Mi11S- N-Y» 5im°!92
and Schuster, 1958, 1'?2pp., paper cover, $1.50.
Defense in the Nuclear Age, by Commander Stephen King-Hall,
with introduction by Edward R. Murrow. 1959, 234pp., hard cover,
$2375.
The Arms Race. A Program for World Disarament, by Philip
Noel-Baker. N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1958, 563pp., paper cover,
$2.00.
No More War! by Linus Pauling. Docld, Mead & Company, 1958,
237pp., paper cover, $1.85.
PAMPHLETS
Eabor and the Coici War, by Stewart Ivieacham, 3ipp., 35¢
The Morals of Extermination, by Lewis Mumford, 14pp., 10¢
Speak Truth to Power, by AFSC working committee, 'I0pp., 25¢
Getting Rid of War: National Policy and Personal Responsibility,
by A. J. Muste, 12pp., 10¢
Morals and Missiles, essays by group of Catholic clergyman, 76pp..
40¢ _
1970 Without Arms Control, by National Planning Association
committee, 72pp., $1.25
Questions on Disarmament and Your Job, by Friends Committee
on National Legislation, 15pp., 10¢ .
Deterrence Assures our Defeat, by Sid Lens, 6pp., 5¢
Weaponry, Technology, Science: Life or Death?, by William C
Davidon, 4pp., 5¢1
__,,,, It- ,. es . ;§|I.',¢ <L ,.-.....,,.._-~_-..¢-4-n-.<----=-»
. Order additional copies from
NATIONAL react: urnaawnns ssnvrcn
amaaxcan nmmns snnvxcr: communes
20 South ms s:., Philadeiphia 1, Pa.
or nearest AFSC office:
AUSTIN 1, TEXAS
1705 North Congress Ave.
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASS.
130 Brattle St.
P. O. Box 247
OHICAGO 7, 'l'L"LINOi5
300 West Congress Parkway
DAYTON 6, OHIO
915 Salem Ave.
DES MOINES 12, IOWA
4211 Grand Ave.
HIGH POINT, N. C-
iii S. ain Si.
Box 1307NEW YORK 3 NYC area only!
237 Third Ave.
rasaomm, c.u.n~o1m1A
825 East Union Ave.
P. O. B01 991
?iiii.nu EL?HiA ':, ea.
20 South 12th St.
PORTLAND 15, ORE.
4312 S. E. Stark St.
SAN FRANCISCO 15, CALIF.
1830 Sutter St.
SEATTLE 5, WASHINGTON
3959 15th Ava, R. E.
7 A A Quantity/7 orders:
12¢ each per 50016¢ each per l
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THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, since its found-
ing in 1917, has tried to promote the economic,
social, moral, and spiritual unity of all man-
kind. In international relations it has attempted
to bring about arderstareling where there has
been hostility and contact where there has been
separation. In civil rights it has tried to show that
nonuiolence can be eeetively transformed into
o power which can win out in the face of dis-
crimination and repression.
This pamphlet recognizes the growing aware-
ness that war can no longer be on instrument of
foreign policy. What does this imply? Are there
not other forms of power aside from weapons
which can be the basis of settling disputes? Can
we not move towards a more human society at
home and abroad by seeking nonviolent paths
to the settlement of conflict? What is the relo-
tionship between disarmament, civil rights, and
full employment? The author believes that these
questions should logically grow out of any dis-
cussion of the economics of arms and disarma-
ment. AFSC works for a society that is nonvio-
lently ordered and in which men are neither de-
based nor exploited for any reason or for any
purpose. This pamphlet, by raising important
issues which face our country today, helps in that
work.
Published as an educational service
by the National Peace Literature Service of
The American Friends Service Committee, 160 N. I5 St., Philadelphia 2, Pa.
, 1964
. _ 9- 1- t. - - um . 92-; -- .__--_.. _ , =7 -- _ -
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and the War on PovertyDisarmament
In Southern California there is a small ghost town of half-built homes,
empty streets, and unused schools. It is a brand new town, but no one
lives there. It was built for the families of technicians, engineers, and
Air Force personnel to be stationed at a nearby air base. But plans
changed, and the base was never built. The ghost town spotlights a
problem: We produce what we do not use; we have needs that are
not met. '
In this country one home in six is below standard- Our infant
mortality rate is higher than that of ten other countries. Seventy
million of us suffer from one or more chronic diseases. Every time we
build a bomber we use money that could build hundreds of classrooms;
each time we launch a ship dozens of playgrounds could be constructed;
and each time we bury a miaile in a silo we bury t-he equivalent of
thousands of family homes.
l* **i*T *"*'*i
l "As the richest country in the world, we should not need to oer
half a loaf of health when we have a unique opportunity to
t make this a nation of healthy people . . . Millions . . . suer
t untold agonies and lead frustrating and unproductive l£ues- i
92 and thousands dr'cn0t because we do not know how to help 92
them. but because they cannot obtain the quantity and quality t.
of medical care that we are capable of and more morally Obtin
gated I0 provide.
-- Policy Resolutions. AFL-C10, Adopted November 1963
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We have the ability and resources to meet the needs of all of our
people, and many of those overseas. We are not meeting those needs.
Yet we spend billions on bombs, planes and missiles which we hope will
'never be used. As J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, recently said,
There is indeed a_ most striking paradox in the fact that mil-
itary budgets of over $50 billion are adopted by the Congress
after only perfunctory debate while domestic education and
welfare programs involving sums which are mere fractions of
the military budget are painstakingly examined and then either
considerably reduced or rejected outright . . .
fk l92Cl92 nu» n--kliq -pun-'I|-'_I l'92-H. ---A Al lie... Qua-|92::J5|I| :w92 JI-in lmauuiu"I'lll- Q15 ULIJ yuuuu IIIICU-B. 92IIlU UUL U1 {INC l.l.I.I.l.I.lU§ -Ill kl-H-5 Ulll-Ill
try has less than $3000 income per year. Another one out of five fam-
ilies is deprived of a good diet, decent housing, or basic medical atten-
tion. This means that 40 per cent of the nations population lives either
in deprivation or in outright poverty. Some of our needs, spelled out in
dollars, look like this:
Our housing includes about 3 million dilapidated units. If everyone
in our growing population is to have a decent home by 1970 we must
build about two million units at a cost of $25 billion every year.
This means an increase of about 50 per cent over what we are spend-_
ing now. At least some ol this could be built by private developers
but, since much new housing should go to low-income people, govem-
ment will have to play a major role. i
Just to keep our educational system going at its present inadeqiiate
level will require spending 50 per cent more by the year 1970 than
at present because of our population growth. This means we must
aim at spending about $30 billion each year at minimum, rather than
our present $20 billion.
One ol the most serious needs in our society is adequate medical
care for all. Just to k%p up with the population, much less improve
medical care, we should spend, by 1970, $1 billion to train physicians
and $9 billion to build hospitals. We should spend $4.5 billion by
1970 to provide minimum state and local public health services. Ade-
quate income for all wage earners while they are ill will take $22.2
billion by 1970. And this is not even Medicart'.it is only extended
insurance coverage. _
To bring the buying power of all American families so important in
maintaining demand for goods! up to a minimum of $4000 per year,
not a grandiose sum, and of persons living alone up to $1500, will
take $30 billion a year. This $30 billion could be added to the econ-
only if we had full employment, if plantswere producing at full
mpacity, and if our graduated income tax were fairly applied.
Many of the poor are aged. The average benet under social security
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muons ,5 ___ _ We . ,. 3 MIIIIONS
1%2, 1963,: 1%; 1963 W ,_,
for a retired worker today is $76 per month, or about $900 per year;
for a couple it is $127 per month, or $1525 per year. If these benets
were raised so the average worker got even 50 per cent of his pre-
retirernent income, and a couple got 75 per cent, it would cost about
$9 billion per year.
Every American has an interest in seeing these and many other
needs met, regardless of his race, creed, or national background. But
our Negro citizens have an even greater need, because, as the result of
slavery plus one hundred years of discrimination, a much higher per-
centage of them are poor. They tend to be found in the less-skilled jobs
becausethey do not have the seniority or training of other workers.
They are frequently the victims of layos-the rst red, the last hired.
While 26 per cent of white families had incomes of under $4000 in
1962, a heavy enough indictment of our wealthy society by itself,
60 per cent of Negro families had incomes of less than $4000! In part,
this difference is because Negroes have twice the unemployment rate
of whitesat present about 11 per cent as compared to the white rate
of about 5 per cent.
Unemployment rates for Negroes are even worse when it comes
to young people and long-term unemployment. About one in four
Negroes aged 16 through 24 cannot {ind work. Nearly one in three of
America's long-term unemployed is a Negro.
This is why the August 1963 civil rights March on Washington
linked Jobs to the demand for Freedom. As the U.S. News and World
Report said last June, "the key to success in dealing with the race
problem of this country more and more is found to center in one thing
-jobs." As the civil rights movement begins to deal with the problems
confronting the Negro community jobs, housing, schools!, it will
become part and parcel of the "war on poverty." Indeed, it may soon
take the leadership in arousing the nation to act on this problem. In the
next iew years, therefore, white Americans who participate in efforts
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92.to secure justice for the Negro will also nd themselves ghting to
secure a better way of life for all; and, in turn, those who desire to
improve the lot of all will nd the civil rights organizations key allies.
Increasingly the civil rights and anti-poverty drives lead us to
consider the fact that the bulk of our federal funds are now spent not
on human needs, but on arms. President Johnson, in his State of the
Union Message of January 1964, linked his cut in the defense budget
to the need for solving problems of education, health, manpower retrain-
ing, and poverty in the Appalachians. If these problems are really to
be solved, civil rights and anti-poverty forces will have to demand
further cutbacks in military spending.
Wliile it is technically possible to spend both for military and
public welfare purposes, this has so far not been politically possible.
The very forces which are most strongly for military spending tend
to be most opposed to government action on either social welfare or
civil rights. As Senator George McGovern has rightly pointed out,
92.Uhe-n a major personage oi the public resources of our society is
devoted to the accumulation of devastating weapons of war, the spirit
of democracy suffers. The arms race has created an anti-human polit-
ical climate in which real concern for human needs has not developed.
Obviously, many individuals feel that it it comes to a choice be-
tween military power and improving our standard of living, then we
must "tighten our belts" and choose guns and missiles. The price of
security, they say, is a bigger and bigger Inilitary force, for only
strength acts as a deterrent to Soviet expansion. They forget that
nuclear weapons cannot provide security. Deterrence depends upon
being willing to use the weawns. It we are willing to um them, the l:ke=
lihood is that they will eventually be used. As President Kemiedy
pointed out, even victory in a nuclear war would be ashes in our mouths.
We now have enough weapons to destroy the U.S.S.R. many times
over. Professor Seymour Melrnan recently suggested that in view of
our present fantastic surplus oi destructive power we can maintain
whatever military "security" these weapons provide, and cut back on the
military budget. We can use the savings to meet domestic needs. Sen-
ltor McGovern, in the light of this evidence, has raised these questions:
I ask what possible advantage there can be to the United
States in appropriating additional Billions of dollars to Build
more missiles when we already have excess capacity to destroy
the potential enemy? How many times is it necessary to kill a
marl or kill c nation? , . . one quick nuclear exchange would
now leave 100 million Americans dead, an equal number of
Russians, and nearly as many West Europeans, is that not
enough to deter anyone other than a madman from setting o
such a catastrophe? And if either side yields to madness or
rniscalculation, can any number of arms save us?"
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Ibis means that we must stop aiding military and feudal govern-
ments just because they claim to be our friends. If military aid to such
governments were cut, more could be spent on the kind oi aid which
meets people's needs.
- Just as reducing military spending at home would release funds
to help solve the poverty problem, so reductions oi military aid abroad
could help to create a real social deter1'entwe could line up with
forces in the developing nations who are trying to bring a better way
oi life to their people. Only when we commit ourselves fully to helping
the forces of reform throughout the world will people begin to consider
democratic alternatives.
Military strength does not give us security at home, and it does not
act as an eiiective deterrent to totalitarianism abroad. A sound domestic
policy is one which solves the problems oi inequality and poverty-and
IO is a sound foreign policy.
i How your TEX noun: is SPENT If
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lr_8 Iniliion to 29 million unemployed at a single time. Thwe timates
vary_aocording to the speed and amount of arms cuts.
In certain parts of the country the problem is worse because some
areas depend more heavily on these contracts than others, When the
Skybolt project in Southern California was cancelled in January 1963,
over 5,000 men, many of them technicians and engineers, were laid o
within two months. In Los Angeles about 44 per cent and in Seattle
about 43 per cent of the jobs depend one way or another on defense
contracts. In Colorado the military budget provides one dollar out of
every four of all personalspending. In New York State, Governor
Rockefeller announced early in 1962 that Long Island was in danger
of becoming a "distressed area." The scheduled closing of a Republic
Aircraft plant there meant a possible loss, including subcontractors, of
80,000 to 90,000 jobs. Region after region has either already been
affected or may soon be affected by arms cutbacks. One economist has
privately made the dire prediction that within a short time Southern
California will be Nest Virginia, with beaches."
The Federal Government and industry have learned a great deal
about economic planning for military production. Now we must learn
to plan to meet human needs and we must begin to convert our 81'.f1'lS-
oentered economy into a pwcetirne economy. Military contractors are
told to think about reconverting," but many do not know how; they
were never in the civilian market to begin with. Many have never had
to deal with civilian problems of cutting costs, nding new markets, and
planning new products to meet public needs. Many don't know how to
compete and are reluctant to leam. They have produced too long for a
single consumer who guarantees prots out of an inexhaustible public
purse. Some simply can't understand that the and of the defense prot
line may be approaching. Instead of nding ways to produce for civilian
needs, they keep trying to get a bigger slice of the smaller and smaller
defense pie.
Within the government, while recently there has been an increase
of hopeful talk, little actually has been done. In the Department of
Defense, the Ofce of Economic Adjustment, which is supposed to keep
watch over problems of shifts in military spending, as recently as No-
vember 1963 consisted of three sta people and two secretariesless
than an army squad in size to care for a nationwide problem. The Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency announced $3,800,000 worth of re-
search contracts and grants in June 1963. Not a penny of that was for
research on the domestic economic impact of disarmament. The Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers, as late as May 1964, had limited its advice
to tax reduction, improved labor market information services, and sim-
ilar measures. Federal agencies have failed to_speak up clearly and
urgently for measures such as Senator McGovems 1964 Bill; it would
require firms with 25 per cent or more workers employed on military
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contracts to set up their own industrial conversion committees. Given
the fact that a business needs anywhere from one to perhaps three or
four years lead time" to prepare for new products, it is already too
late as iar as many communities are concerned. The contract cutbacks
will hit them before they have planned for the change.
Faced with a great opportunity to solve the problems of poverty
and inequality at home and abroad, we are missing the boat. The civil
rights movement, those involved with the war on poverty, trade union-
ists who have had a traditional interest in solving a long series of
social problems, the peace groups, and many other concerned Amer-
icans must help change this situation. The civil rights struggle is
already forcing Americans to grapple with the broader problems of jobs,
housing, and schools. If the effort to end poverty is to succeed, we must
decide how vast federal funds are to be spent: Qhall it be for the war
on mankind, or for the struggle to end poverty and injustice? We can-
not do both. .
_ Non-military solutions to the cold war can release the funds, man-
power, and talent needed to solve civilian problems. Decent schools,
housing, and medical care for all can be achieved. Minimum incomes
which condemn liens of millions to poverty can be raised. If we demand
that these problems be solved, then we shall have to re-consider how
we now spend our money. To solve our domestic problems requires a
non-military foreign policy. In this way peace and the achievement of a
better life become a singie issue. _
How do we go about making the most of the opportunity ahead,
hastead of wasting this chance to build a better world? ,
The rst step is to build a political force in this country for that
Purpose. We do not hold to a conspiracy theory. oi government, but
there are interests which continually try to block every move in the
direction of reform, the achievement of equal rights and the re-appraisal
oi o|.u~ foreign policy. Those interests will have to be overcome. In
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Congress, particularly, the same spokesmen who oppose social welfare
legislation generally oppose equal rights for minorities, and insist on
ever greater expenditures for military hardware. Those who seek to
overcome this resistance must recognize that the peace, civil rights, and
poverty issues are one. _
The time for the creation of a new force for social progress is
now. The civil rights movement has provided this nation with a moment
oi truth: The demand for human justice and dignity cannot be ful-
lled until jobs, adequate housing, and decent schools have been
achieved ior all Americans.
The trade union movement laces its own moment of truthalso
the job crisis. As champions of the underdog, unions cannot afford to
stagnate. They will not be content to see their memberships dwindling
as automation eliminates 200,000 production jobs every year. Unions
realize that their goals of iob security in the context of equal rights
can only be achieved if there are enough jobs or other sources of sul-
cient income. An alliance between Negro and white wage earners in
unions committed to civil rights, and between those unions and the
civil rights movement, is an essential step to the creation of a better
America.
The poor, not yet active in their own behalf, must be helped to
organize themselves. Trade unions, civil rights groups, and social wel-
fare organizations must help in this effort. In this way the poor them-
selves can be brought into American democracy as full participants,
helping to decide their own futures. The poor belong in the alliance to
shape a better society.
The peace organizations of this nation have pioneered for many
years in attempting to bring a just and disarmed world closer. They.
too, must realize that disarmament, civil rights, and full employment
are allied. It is their job to show how a better way of life is linked to
the need for world peace. and the solution of conicts between nations.
It is linked not only in terms of living standards but also in terms of
the moral goals of human brotherhood. This mnnot be demonstrated
from a distance. Peace workers must become full and active participants
in the everyday efforts of Americans to create a better life.
These groups constitute a. real "alliance for progress." By working
to begin the war on poverty, they can help to end the war on mankind.
Sooner or later this alliance will also have to work directly to bring
about world-wide disarmament. Only then can the resources for a real
war on poverty, for a better way of life at home and abroad, be found.
Martin Oppmheirm-r is a sociologist who has been active for some
years in pa-ace and civil rights organizations. including one year as
ossisront director of the Studies Program in the Peace Education
Division of the American Friends Service Committee.
11 it
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Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every 1-An].-,4 l.'......-J ..:.._.:.c-._ _'_. .i1_ .C_.__l ,_e. , , 4! J. :_, , .1run-nu. jIl't'U MgIu]l¬a, U1 I116 JUICE 88!!-S6, G U18]! [POM H1088
who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed
' . . . Is there no other way the world can live?"
- Dwrom D. EISENHOWEB
SUGGESTED FURTHER READING
llll POVERTY--Mi_chaeI Harrington
The Other America {paperback}
UN CIVIL RIGHTS-Marlin Luther King. Jr.
Letter trorn Birmingham City Jail {pamphlell
Triple Revolution la Liberation reprint!
ON l.AB0ll-Stewart Meacham
Labor and the Quid War lpamphlet!UN BISARMAMENT-Arthur WBSKOW
Unintended War pamphlet!
Mullord Sibley, Unilateral Initiatives
and Disarmament pamphlet!
Siclnehlens. Revolution andCold at pamphletl
The above can be ordered from your nearest
REGIONAL OFFICE
fl, §192av| non
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMhII'I'lEE
Cambridge 38. Mass.4-4-A Brattle St. -
PD. Box 247
Chicago 5, Ill.
431 So. Dearborn St.
Dayton 6, Ohio915 Salem Ave.
952 '.'L[oine_s 12. Iowall-I-1 urnn Ave.
High Point, N. C.
1818 S. Main St.
P.O. Box 1307
Seattle 5, Wash.
81! QDLI1 St.
Michigan Area Oioe
I222 Woodlawn
Ann Arbor. MichiganHouston 4, Texas
4717 Crawford St.
New York 11, N. Y.
Suite 220
2 W. 20th St.
Pnsadena 3. Calif.P.O. BOX 991 _
930 N. Fair Oaks Ave.!
Philadelphia 2, Pa.1500 Rce St.
San Francisco 21, Calif.2160 l4ke Si...
Portland Program Dftre.
4312 SE. S1-all! SLB__lI__.-I f92__fill I-lIDLl' 92JKU-
Denver Peace Progrlm1375 Delaware S1.
Denver 4, Colorado
Canadian Friends Service Committee
80 Lulwther Ave., Toronto 5, Ontario, Canada
Credits: <
38*" WWI Pbitruph. Edward Wnllovrilch
Driving. page 3. mm Liberation
Charla. PIC 5 and a. by Cm Andrew:
Printed by Mohicln Plels. USA Jvi-- _
13 !
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I Does American Prosperity Depend on Arms Production?
O Wliat Will We Make in Place of Weapons?
O How Can Military Suppliers Change to Civilian Work?
0 How Will Working Men and Women Meet the Change?
0 What Public Measures Would Help Smooth the Way?
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1. Does American Prosperity Depend on Arms Production?
There are suriace signs which help to spread this impression. Critics
in the Communist world proclaim it as fact. What is the truth about this?
America enjoys a relatively high standard oi living while devoting a
sizeable slice of national resources and energies to making weapons of war.
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surprising, for it is just here that the government spends a lions share of
the Federal budget. l'lov-ever, to believe that prosperity can be created
through arms production, or that this pattern oi spending is sacred and
uncbangeable, is to follow an illusion.
Standards oi living are measured by consumable goods and services. it
testies to the country's amazing productive power that we do reach such a
high standard. If all of that power were turned into the production of
consumable goods and service, or oi creative leisureand none into arma-
ments-our standard of living could be markedly higher!
American prosperity stems from our productiveness. To maintain general
prosperity is to keep a steady ow of the total volume oi things we turn
out, so that we as consumers receive a steady supply of the things we need.
It does not depend on how much is invested in one special eld, such as
weapons. In times oi transition, when the make-up oi some parts is shifting,
it is of utmost importance to keep the total national sper1ding-by consumers,
bttsiness and government c0mbinedat an even level. This can be done in
dierent ways, and naturally some ways are better than others. But we can
be certain oi this: li we stop channeling a great part of our resources into
the means of destroying human life and turn the same current into things
which people need and can use, real prosperity should increase.
ls it true, as many believe, that a cut in defense spending will cause
a depression, at least temporarily? It is not true ii sensible policies are
followed. Past experience does not show that defense cuts inevitably create
recessions. Actually, the biggest cut in military spending we ever had was
in 194-6 and 1947, when business and employment remained good. That
was partly, of course, because of a large backlog of wartime saving.
By contrast, in 1957 delense spending |'ncrett.sedmore than S3 billion
over the total for 'l956and yet industrial production declined the whole
year and unemployment mounted, leading into a quite denite recession.
As it happened, changes in the t¬ntp0_ oi delense spending helped to deepen
this recession; but, as before, the arms outlay was only one part of the
picture. What counts most is the whole picture.
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Three to ve billion dollars is a large sum compared with the family
budget. Even so, it is only about one per cent oi our total national produc-
tion each year. An annual cut of this size in military spending should not
pose a very dill-icult economic problem-il the transition is well planned.
In fact, there was such a cut in 1955. and this was one of the most
prosperous years we have ever had. In 1954, by contrast, defense spending
was cut and we did have a recession. The one fact was not the cause of the
other-although again it was part of the picture. The trouble in 1954- was
that the government cut non-defense spending at the same time, when logic
would have suggested an oflsetting increase in this area.
Econornists generally agree that when there is s reduction in one port of
our total national spending, both public and private, it needs to be balanced
by increased spending in other parts, so that the total outlay will remain
steady, or gradually increase with the countrys growth.
Under favorable conditions, it is often possible for an equilibrium to
be maintained largely by increased private spending. as in 1946-4?. Tax
reductions, if large enough and properly distributed, can encourage such
added spending. There is a pressing need for expansion of essential public
rograms such as education and public health, which are now held backliirgely because of the size of defense outlays. With a growing economy,
the-re should he opportunity both {or tax reduction and ior a continuing
expansion of public services. t
Clearly the nation's economy is geared at this time to large military
outlays. Not many people would argue that therefore we must go on makingweapons indenitelythat nothing else can keep up the level of yobs andI...__!____ 'TL_ _...._aI.._ ....L§a,L -I1.-... --§-Q 1- Lain - 1- nnavnrallnr In nllnnr "r:DLISIIICQS. INC l.luU!ll.lUll II'lu.92..ll UUCB anlac la nun an unun5s..un..s av v|.--92.- lllauu
of work can best be made, especially in the plants and communities where
defense industry is heavily concentrated.
These problems must be faced. See Questions 3, 4 and 6!. Luckily, a
good deal has been learned in recent years about how our economy works.
We can be certain that prosperity does NUT have to depend on making any
article that can't be used. Weapons oi war in our time have become far
too dangerous to be kept on as busy work .
2. What Will We Make in Place of Weapons?
We have only to ask this question to bring to mind many ways in which
we as a nation fall short oi our own standards. One compelling reason
why we {all short is that we spend so much on armies, missiles, nuclear
bombs and all oi the other paraphernalia oi war. in spite oi relative pros-
perity, we are far short oi meeting basic human needs.
. If peace were to break out" suddenly, would it nd us unprepared-
afraid to accept its bounty because we haven't _Iound out how to use it? The
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fabled Sorcerer: Apprentice had learned how to put some forces to_ worlcbut not how to stop them. Our challenge is to nd ways to bend our gigantic
productive forces to our own will, to meet our real needs.
Right now the U. S. is spending some $45 billion yearly on war prepara-
tion;'and concurrently, around seven and a half million oi our people are
employed in war-related work---including the armed forces. '
Now picture a ten-year period in which armaments would be reduced by
regular stages, down to a gure sufficient to cover internal security and
our share of a world-wide United Nations inspection and police systetn-say $5 billion a year. Reduction on this scale would release some $200
billion otherwise going into ar1namentsa.s shown below.
When we study the saving irom this ltind of ten-year disarmament plan
alongside some oi the nation's needs, many attractive uses e-an be seen. A
sample reapportionment of the money saved is shown below. How would
YOU recommend that the savings from disarmament be used?
HOW SAVINGS FROM
IO YEARS OF DISARMAMENT COULD BE USED
- ' $20 BILLION M w M . ' - to Devel-.-..- 5.. 1..-M _ ....- ....... M opmem
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,$25 Bill-l°N - Roads and Waterways--- - -1""-"AI-'.er:"."-* ::.-I.~;..-...---.4-r - - Recreation Areas
l'H-u_" """""""" " """"" ""' " ' ""-'.'T Old A e Benets-.320 Bltl.lON c».n§w¢n...=-. .;'-c.~..1r-u-mi ii--'-£:_§.i__:-.-..':-Y,'.-..-Q.-.;.... Q1191 Security
Tax Reduction 50 Individuals
Q if""" ""'" *- -""-':=rl"_":s1er:nr»-z'.-- 1-1-=*=-'~ 1. Mu E1110H 3 5ii_-Lig - Better Private ..!vir:g= . - - . |' . * I More Leisure-..-_ _ ..__....._. . .. .. -.._._-..- J Anitic Expression
fro-'0-qw-n--1---_.-..--.»-.,-1,-...-,',-D I 4.: 7- r#IiI_92 _ _ _ 7 Adequate School Buildingsy s -, $30 Blt.|.iOt§l l ' Better Teachers Salaries92 * - » ~------- -»-- --- 1-"-J'i-92--it-II»-I-'A __.¢..____.....,_;,,,, ._.,|_ 3 - SCl't0ll!'Sl'tl|7s H Research
"v-""""1 "" -"'- "'*|-qigass-f ---1 -v-u~-F i ll H " 3" -""5"" ' E ¥"*"""+' r. New Housin Pmlect:
' - $30 BILLION . -Slum Clearance
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In Education, for example, although Americans have been proud of their
public school system, these facts stare us in the lace:
1. Over 130,000 new classrooms urgently needed now
2. Even these would not eliminate overcrowding and double
sessions
. National shortage of teachers estimated at 220,000
More teachers leaving the profession than entering it
National average teaching salary 34650; many states less
Number of teachers receiving less than S25004-6,000
. Average income in many other proleaions 100 to 300 per
cent higher
Helping to meet the needs for classrooms, equipment, more teachers and
better salaries over the next ten years could easily absorb $15 - S20 billion
oi the armaments savings. Alter all, it is less than hall of our present
annual ex enditure for armament. An additional $10 billion could be in-vested in liigher education and research facilities. Once we get rid of the
arms race burden we may be able to afiord all of this--AT LAST!
? IT1,92-an7/ g_| i -i ,
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For Public Health, consider these two facts:
1. some 325,000 lives are lost each year through inadequate
medical care.
2. Over 1,200,000 more hospital beds are needed for adequate
atandards.
It large part oi the need for additional beds is in mental and chronic
disease hospitals and nursing homes. However, it was oliicially reported
in May, 1958 that there are still 2.5 million people residing in areas with
no acceptable general hospital beds, and another 25 million people in areas
with less than 2 acceptable beds per 1,000 population.
Here as in education the Federal Government can appropriately act to
equalize opportunity. An adequate building program alone could absorb
$15 billion. Beyond that. we need more public health clinics and more medi-
cal schools--more people in medical research, to wipe out such human
enemies as heart diseases. mental illness and cancer.
I261
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That Housing rates a high place needs no argument. But more than
slum clearance and new housing is needed. For the America oi the iuiure,
an area and urban development program of great size is a must. Rebuild-
ing the centers of cities to remove transportation blocks and to further a good
life for city and country will require huge amounts. Men who can probe
the reaches of outer space will not be content with slums on eart.h.
With an expanding economy go needs for better roads and communica-
tion, ood control and conservation. The vast lands now held by military
departmentsover 27 million acres in the Continental United Statescan
provide new public recreation areas, and help to conserve vital national re-
sources in water power, minerals, forests and wildlife.
Government-supported research, now largely military, can be reoriented
lo peacetime, space-age living. With this should go I genuine program of
world development, since we are members of a human family inhabiting a
shrinking planet, where our security rests in a large measure upon the sta-
bility and welfare of other people.
Clearly there is no lack of worthwhile things in which to invest. But
will these supply ernployment to replace various kinds of defense work? For
each S5 billion dollars reduction in military spending, it is likely that some-
where around 800,000 workers might need either new jobs or new markets for
their same output. However, technological changes requiring new machinery
and new equipment are taking place all the time. Totally new products will
no doubt create many new jobs, as have electronics, television and plastics
in the last fteen years.
The eld oi trade and development holds out a prospect oi expanded
employment in many trades, as docs the building of more schools, houses,
hospitals, parks and roads. New buildings mean new equipment. Higher
pay for teachers will supply new purchasing power for meeting a backlog
of unlled wants. Tax reductions will facilitate more private buying.
The owering of life, even national life, is in individual, family and
community living, and this expresses itseli nally in artistic and spiritual
life. How would this be furthered by disarmament? In very practical ways:
improvement oi the necessary material basis of life for those who lack it
through lower taxes, greater productive power, better health and educa-
tion}; the possibility of shorter working hours and thus more leisure time;
an atmosphere of faith and hope in a world at peace.
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3. Few Can Miiitary Suppiiers Change to Civiiian W0
To look at the large-scale picture rstwhat about such industries as
aircraft and electronics, which are largely built on military orders? And
what of the communities in which armament activity is concentrated? Some
large piants are now occupied 100 per cent with military contracts, especially
in such states as California, Washington, Kansas and Texas. ln a number
of communities across the nation more than a third of local payrolls are
tied to military spending.
Let ps _suppose that all these people have been planning-we know that
aome ot them have-on the possibility 01 sucoesstul world disarmament.
Planning, in a transition of such great importance, is a key with which to
unlock the future. And as a sound beginning, managers, workers and gov-
ernment must soberly face this fact: With disarmament, some industries
will either become unnecessary or will have a smaller market {or their prod-
ucts. They must nd new products, new markets, or new fields.
Most business men recognize the fact of constant change and they
expect some risks. Many communities enjoy a wide range oi industries and
so nd it easy to meet change. Such exibility is the ideal, but increasing
mechanization and specialization have made it very diicult for some indus-
tries and some communities to remain tiexihie. Government pressures on
industry to tool up for military production make the dilemma serious. Changes
in the market are taking place all the time-whether we disarm or not_
because of changes in technology and in public tastes and needs.
For instance, while the total military budget has been increasing, some
kinds oi military orders have been sharply curtailed due to new weapons
and new ideas of strategy. The Defense Department has cancelied or modi-
ed contracts without warning. presumably because of the need felt {or
secrecy in military matters. Disarmament, by contrast, would be a public
matter,_arranged by inter-_national agreement, publicly debated. Cutbacks
planned tor and announced in advance can make the transition easier.
Planning by industries and by organized labor calls for full and clear
information on which to base practical plans. Much vital information must
be collected locally and regionally, then sifted and put together in the national
or even international perspective, to provide a dependable guide for the locai
people who must make decisions for their own businesses and families. Then
various types of government aid or backing can come into play.
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Most materials used in making arms have corresponding peacetime uses.
Steel can go into bombers or buildings. Civilian use of aircraft may be
expected to expand, though not fast enough to take up all the productive
capacity now used for ghting planes. Peacetime uses for electronics will
doubtless increase for a long time. Nuclear energy oflers itself for many
constructive uses, more than we can yet grasp. In the eld of missiles, the
breathtaking vista of space exploration opens before us IF we can rid our-
selves of the threat of nuclear annihilation.
Substantial parts of military spending go not into bombs, bayonets, or
ballistic missiles, but into buildings, food and clothing, medical care, paper
and typewritersthe many things which parallel civilian life and will be
met in some way for the same people in the peacetime world. Also, if
large-scale economic aid is made available to developing countries, they willpplrchase needed equipment here and so extend the market for many lines.
is will also make for steadier world economic conditions.
In one large industrial city inquiries were made of ve military suppliers,
varying in scale from a working force of 250 to one oi 13,000, about their
plans for meeting Disarmament Day. One of the largest, a steel company,
replied that military work is such a small part of its business that cutbacks
would not seriously affect it. Another large rm reported that its business
is entirely on government contracts and it has no plans for a changeover;
that its work is with extremely high precision instruments and not suitable
to mass production for private use.
However, this rm's products are potentially of great usefulness for the
control oi cancer and other little-understood diseases, ior weather control
and for the exploration of outer space-all of which would help to qualify
it for continued public support. One company of medium size works pre-
ponderantly on military contracts but has three smaller departments which
work on civilian products, with a denite plan in reserve by which these
could be expanded to retain all employees, in a changeover to peacetime
economy. The two smallest rms reported no plans but agreed that dependence
on military contracts is unhealthy. Later one of them called the investigator
to report the start of some civilian contracts.
In any planned disarmament the transition is bound to be gradual-for
1:-conornic and practical reasons as "wcli as political ones. A nation cant in
a day switch production of S45 billion worth of military goods to other
things. But the time needed can be reduced by wise advance arrangements.
The real problem is not strictly one of disannament. It is the complex
and continuing problem of maintaining full production and full employment
in our high-powered 20th-century economy. Large-scale military production
has only helped to conceal the problem and to postpone facing it. Soon we
must come to grips with it in any case, or continue to court catastrophe. The
task is big enough to challenge the combined efl'orts of industry, labor and
government.
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4-. How Will Working Men and Women Meet the Change?
There is no doubt that defense workers, like other people, desire peace.
It is natural, however, that they should have questions about their job
prospects in the event oi disarmament. it job is a necessary and absorbing
daily concern. Right now, without disarmament, the change from one line
of military production to another is creating its own problems, possibly
more far-reaching than the shift from buggies to automobiles at the beginning
of the century. This shill causes cutbacks in certain kinds of armaments
and mav he nonlrrserl with real tll§5lt't'n.ltrhAr||_ f-v.. _-.iJ, __ ---.___-_ .._-.. ___- _-_._._-...-.-....-.
The worker employed in a specialized industry has fewer resources to
tide him over a readjustment period than do most businesses. His assets
consist in personal skills rather than in capital. Personal savings and invest-
ments should not be required sacrices for having worked in some industry
once considered vital to the national welfare but now reduced in importance.
The increased prosperity oi peacetime must apply to all, and the hazards of
the transition period must be shared by all.
What is the size of our problem? Currently more than one dollar in
ten ol the national income is going for military purposes. A comparable pro-
portion of the national labor force is employed on military orders, including
people who make parts and supplies on a subcontract basis and members
of the armed forces. As armament production disappears, workers need to
know what new jobs will be opening for them in replacement, and how the
changes will aect their daily lives.
Some jobs undoubtedly will be discontinued in the process ol gradual
disarmament, while others will change in nature, either in the present plants
or in transiers. Both new and remodeled industries will be needed to keep
up employment through lling new needs, although some industrial workers
will nd their new opportunities in small business, ollice work, service trades
or professions. A national will to maintain iull production and full employ-
ment will be the worlzers best insurance; but there are some special knots
to he untied. The untying implements should include the following:
1. Extended and enlarged unemployment compensation
2. hiortgage payment insurance .
3. Retraining programs
4. Ex anded employment and placement services5. Reliacation and moving assistance '
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Americans do a good bit oi moving irom job to job and from one
locality to another in pursuit of personal advancement. When such moves
are made necessary by a change in public policy, however, the nation has a
responsibility to help.
Workers, too, have their responsibility, both as participants in the eco-
nomic process and as citizens. Anyone working on military orders, a eld
subject to sudden strategic changes as well as the change that would accom-
pany world disarmament, would be well advised to keep an eye on job
alternatives, to make personal plans to retrain, and to press actively for
whatever public measures he feels are needed.
Keeping a constant Flow oi accurate, up-to-date job information, with
special reierence to coming changes, would do much to ease individual ad-
justments. This is a permanent need, along with unemployment benets
and insurance on a realistic .rcalefor suihcient time periods to cover job
changes. These steps call for cooperation among many agencies and all
sections oi the country. Denite plans have to be made and carried out,
but this is not likely to happen unless the people most directly concerned-
organized labor and management associationsrealiy go to work on it.
All oi the steps suggested are quite practical in the framework oi a national
policy ior the iullest use oi national resources.
More than once people in local communities have put pressure on their
representatives in Washington to defeat cutbacks that would aect local
industries, taking this way to try to protect their family and community
interests. I] the Government hm! o program, known to all, ior helping people
in key industries and communities to make necessary adjustments, they would
not feel the same urge to ght military cutbacks, when these could be seen
as actual steps to security and peace.
What about the people released from the armed iorces? Will they be
able to nd jobs? Large numbers were released at the end oi the Second
World War and they were quite readily absorbed into civilian liie. Under
similar conditions, the smaller number now in the forces should present no
problem. Alter the war there existed a backlog oi unlled jobs just as there
was a backlog oi unlled consumer wants. Here again, the best guarantee
lies in brisk economic activity, with plenty oi forward-looking projects, both
public and private.
The Government must not push its military personnel out into civilian
liie without due provision ior their readjustment. Severance pay plus oppor-
tunities ior education and vocational training are essential. Many oi the
older veterans should be made irnmediately eligible ior pensions. The valu-
able civil projects now carried on by the Corps oi Anny Engineers-recla
mation, ilood control and tlte like-could be expanded during the transition,
with openings ior army veterans who have worked in these areas. Today's
iorces are increasingly made up oi technically trained people who can nd
opportunities in civilian air transport. electronics. machine repair, computer
and automation work. '
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It is well to remember that numbers in the armed forces are being reduced
whether we have disarmament or not, because of the development of l11gher-
powered weapons and military machinery, requiring relatively less manpower.After every war, plans have had to be made for veterans. There have been
pensions and bonuses, loans for housing and business, and various kinds of
educational aid. lf such costs can be met now as part of the price of
abolishing war, a real social saving! will result. Indeed it would be far less
costly to pension each present soldier than to continue the present military
establishment throughout his lifetime. A needless extreme. P¢fl1P5-ll"! "01
so extreme as the World War ill" which stares us in the face every day!
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on how to de-mobilize, or re-mobilize for peace. Some overall supervisory
agency is indicated, which can pull together information from public and
private sources and coordinate national, state and local eorts.
The Small Business Administration is one resource for smaller rms in
need of nancial backing to convert their plants to peacetime pursuits. Other
government measures that might be studied are selective tax benets during
I specied period of change. Tax credits could be allowed for losses during
I period of reconversion, and tax carry-forward provisions liberalized to
encourage plants to hold onto their workers even if output were small for
I time. Careful study is needed of possible graduated tax reduction as an
aid to private buying and investment.
The California Legislature in April 1958 adopted and sent to Congress
I Joint Resolution requesting a complete study oi the economic problems oi
disarmament. This, it said, should cover ways of providing Federal aid
to areas depressed by a reduction in defense expenditures," and also the
strengthening of government employment services and compensation sys-
tems, and the possible methods for retraining and relocating workers facing
major readjustments.
The resolution quoted research ndings that a 50 per cent cut in our
defense spending could result in layoffs of 120,000 people in Southern Cali-
fornia alone. It emphasized that all the facts should be brought together as
to the numbers of people employed in various defense industries, where
those industries are, and how they could be helped to change their plants
and resources over to non-defense industry-all of this with the cooperation
of Federal, State and local agencies.
The sample disarmament timetable which we suggested earlier would
take over ve years to bring about a reduction of SO per cent below 1958
levels. Meanwhile, some economists point out that present losses in produc-
tivit and employment, simply from letting the economic machinery runfar below capacity, would equal a 100 per cent cut in armaments. They
insist that by bringing production up to its full potential the country could
have bombs AND butler if it wished-- butter meaning all the desirable
civilian programs, including foreign aid, which are denied or cut back.
On this point oicial opinion is not convinced. Congress, while voting
more money for arms than is asked for by the military departments, uses
the economy plea to pare civilian programs and appropriations for foreign
economic aid and technical assistance; and our Government states that we
cannot aord to talce part in a world plan such as SUNFED Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development! until we get disarmament.
The overall problem of nancing the transition will not be serious if any
savings from disarmament are immediately used to nance other needed
government programs or tax cuts. The danger of a depression will be mini-
mized ii we avoid trying to reduce defense expenditure and the national debt
at the same time. . -
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6. Wiiat Can WE Do to Prepare for Disarmament?
First oi allWe can start. Get discussion going-in labor unions
and Chambers of Commerce, in churches and civic organizations, with the
neighbors. Help make plans in your community for other employment for
defense workers, to prevent hardship ior individuals. Make it a matter of
pride that the American people can plan intelligently for peace.
We can keep informed. Try to gather an interested groupeven if
only two or three--to collect and share information, divide up work and
consider local plans. Such a group can carry on friendly interviews with
local industries managers. employees and agencies, and assemble for the
]OC3i lfa l.l'lB Of 5DECiC knnwlmltre Wl'|itl'92 is nnerinrl lint nnf nnw avnil_ _ __ _r ______ _____..____|:_ ._____.. ... _.__..---.- ....... "vs "v-- --an
able. Uicial papers, such as the Annual Economic Report of the President,
can be found in many libraries or ordered from the Government Printing
Oice in Washington. The Friends Committee on National Legislation will
recommend other materials to interested groups.
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We can see lo it that the economic machinery we have is well
used. l-low does your local employment ofce function? Does your com-
munity have extensive contacts with the Small Business Administration?
with the FHA? Do local rms make use oi government research? What is
your central labor union doing to help build a stable economy in your
region? Local business or management groups? Your state government?
We can work for improved legislation. Become familiar with votes
and views of your local representatives in the State Legislature and in the
Congress. Tell them your views, in personal interviews where possible, and
in clear, to-the-point letters on issues calling for legislation. And of course,
search out and support good candidates for oflice.
The Employment Act oi 1946 should be strengthened. Some such legis-
lation as the Area Redevelopment Bill needs to be passed. Unemployment
compensation systems need overhauling; they need appropriations and more
liberal regulations providing for realistic time periods in which satisfactory
job changes can be made.
We can encourage the mobilization and coordination of all gov-
ernment agencies, national and regionalto plan for and assist in carry-
ing out the retraining and relocation oi workers affected; to encourage
research for the development of new products which can create new employ-
ment; and ior the transler to programs ior the common welfare oi productive
capacity and labor now going into the arms race.
we can urge our government to give rst priority to the search
for political agreements and the basis for international disarmament
under law so that the world may be rescued from the {ear of war and the
burden of armaments lifted forever from the backs of mankind.
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- IF WORLD DISARMAMENT WERE ACHIEVED,
W HAT IS THE SIZE OF THE TASK OF TRANSITION P
§ IN THE UNITED STATES? I
, Appropriations for military defense, Atomic
Energy Commission, military aid and defense sup-
port abroad voted by Congress in 1960 were more
than -if-.-.--:____------ii-:::___ _ -__ - -----~ 4'7gw0g000|O00 92
Personnel in the Armed Forces, June 30, 1960,
not including Reserves .__-______...._____.______. 2,439,000 ;
The value of lands, buildings, and movable
, property now held by the Department of Defense . $169,939,000,000
,1 In continental United States, the Department of
Defense owns or controls.-____..-..---__-__._.._.._........ 28,734,259 acres
This is a greater area than that 0] any one
of the following states: Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 1}
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, t
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Vermont, Virginia, I-Vest Virginia! 92
For Further Information, see: The Big Hand in Your Pocket,
I booklet of current facts on the extent of the military estab-
lishment in the United States, available from the ofees listed
below, 25¢ each.
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ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS PAMPHLET MAY I! OBTAINED FIQM THE
EIIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION _
NATIONAL OFFICE
E45 IND STREET, N.E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.
ACEA OFFICIE
T2? N. HUDSON AVENUE 2160 LAKE STIEEI - $153 SOUTH WOODLAWN
PASADENA 4, CALIF. SAN FRANCISCO II, CALIF. CHICAGO I5, ILL.
Single I-Opirl IO:50 eopuu ..........._..._._...._.........fpIus shipping! S 4.50I00 copies _. ptuu shipping! S 8.50
I000 copies .. ...................................... plus shippinil$7.5.00
2-61-P2--10M--3rd Prtg. '6 '§
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THE MORALS
;792 1 ;
,1-"-~.:-. O F
EXTERMINATION
BY
LEWIS MUMFORD
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SINCE 1945, the American government has de-
voted the better part of our national energies to
preparations for wholesale human extermination-
This curious enterprise has been disguised as a
scientically sound method of ensuring world
peace and national security, but it has obviously
failed at every point on both counts. Our reckless
experimental explosion of nuclear weapons is only
a persuasive salesmans sample of what a nuclear
War would produce, but even this has already
done signicant damage to the human race. With
poetic justice, the earliest victims of our experi-
merits toward "enocidesharinw honors with u ' 0 -' -
the South Pacic islanders and the Japanese
shermenhave been our own children, and
even more, our ehildrens prospective children.
Almost from the beginning, our investment in
nuclear weapons has been openly directed against
a single country, Soviet Russia. In our govern-
ment: concern with the self-imposed problem of
containing Russia and restricting by force alone
the "area of Communist penetration, we have
turned our back on more vita! human objectives.
Today the political and military strategy our
leaders framed on_the supposition that our country
had a permanent superiority in nuclear power is
bankrupt, so completely that the business probably
cannot be liquidated without serious losses. '
As things stand now, we are not able to conduct
even a justifiable police action, as a representative
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1of the United Nations, with the backing of a
majority of the nations, without the permission of
Russia and China. When they refuse permission,
ls they did in Korea, the limited war our strategists
fancy is still open to us turns into an unlimited
humiliation, as the painful truce that continues in
Korea should remind us, for every original issue
remains unsettled. But if we challenge that veto,
our only recourse is to our absolute weapons, now
as fatal to ourselves and the rest of mankind as
they would be to Russia and China. The dis-
tinguished army combat generals who have pub-
licly recognized this state of impotence have been
forced out of the armed services.
This situation should give us pause. While
every scientic advance in nuclear weapons and
intercontinental missiles only widens to planetary
dimensions the catastrophe we have been pre-
paring, our leaders still concentrate the nation's
efforts on hastening these advances. Why, then,
do we still listen to those mistaken counsels that
committed us to the Cold War, though. our own
military plans have wiped out the possibility of
war itself and replaced it by total annihilation as
the only foreseeable terminus of the tensions we
have done our full share to produce? By what
standard of prudence do we trust our lives to
political, military, and scientic advisers who have
staked our national existence on a single set of
weapons and have already lost that shortsighted
gamble, even if they become desperate enough to
use these weapons or remain blind enough to be-
lieve that they can conceal that loss by not using
them?
What was it that set in motion the chain re-
action of errors, miscalculations, delusions, and
compulsions that have pushed us into the im-
possible situation we now occupy? Every day
that we delay in facing our national mistakes
adds to both the cumulative dangers that threaten
us and the difliculty of undoing them.
TlE rst step toward framing a new policy is
to trace our path back to the point whcrc we
adopted our fatal commitment to weapons of
mass extermination. This moral debacle, it is
important to remember, was not a response to any
threat by Russia or by Communism; still less was
it imposed by Russias possession of similar
weapons. Actually, the acceptance of extermina-
O. C'!__ -../
Ition antedated the invention of the atom bomb.
The principles upon which the strategy of ex-
termination was based were rst enunciated by
fascist military theorists, notably General Douhet,
who believed, like our own Major Severslty, that
a small air force could take the place of a large
army by conning its e'orts to mass attacks on
civilians and undermining the national will to
resist. This reversion to the vicious Bronze Age
practice of total war was a natural extension of
l'aseisms readiness to reintroduce terrorism and
torture as instruments of government. When
these methods were rst carried into action, by
Mussolini in Abyssinia, by Hitler in Warsaw and
Rotterdam, they awakened horror in our still
morally sensitive breasts. The crccd that could
justify such actions was, we thought correctly, not
merely antidemocratic but anlihuman.
In lit! l'l1il'i.l:I r 92Vnrlrl War Ii 2 'rnnral rnunreni
took place among the English-speaking Allies,
such a transposition as happened by accident in
the nal duel in Harald, when Hamlet picks up
the weapon Laertes had poisoned in advance in
order to make sure of his encmys death. The
fascist powers became the victims of their own
strategy, for both the United States and Britain
adopted what was politely called obliteration
bombing, which had as its object the total de-
struction of great cities and the terrorization and
massacre of their inhabitants.
By taking over this method as a cheap substi-
tute for conventional warfare -- cheap in soldiers
lives, costly in its expenditure of other human lives
and in the irreplaceable historic accumulations
of countless lifetimes these democratic govern-
ments sanctioned the dehumanized techniques
of fascism. This was Nazidoms rmest victory
and democraeys most servile surrender. That
moral reversal undermined the eventual military
triumph of the democracies, and it has poisoned
our political and military policies ever since.
Civilized warfare has always been an atrocity
per se, even when practiced by gallant men ghting
in a just cause. But in the course of ve thousand
years certain inhibitions and moral safeguards
had been set up. Thus, poisoning the water
supply and slaying the unarmed inhabitants of a
city were no longer within the modern soidiei-s
code, however gratifying they might once have
been to an Ashurbanipal or a Genghis Khan,
moral monsters whose names have become in-
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famous in history. Overnight, as it were, our own
countrymen became such moral monsters. In
principle, the extermination camps where the
Nazis incinerated, over six million helpless Jews
were no different from the urban erematoriums
our air force improvised in its attacks by napalm
bombs on Tokyo. By these means, in a single
night, we roasted alive more people than were
killed by atom bombs in either Hiroshima or
Nagasaki. Our aims were different, but our
methods were those of rnankinds worst enemy.
Up to this point, war had been an operation
conducted by military forces against military tar-
gets. By long-established convention, a token
part, the army, stood for the greater whole, the na-
tion. Even when an army was totally defeated
and wiped out, the nation it represented lived to
tell the tale; neither unarmed prisoners nor civil-
ians were killed to seal a defeat or celebrate a
victory. Even our air force, the chief shaper of our
present policy, once prided itself on its pin-point
bombing, done in daylight to ensure that only
military targets would be hit.
As late as the spring of 1942, as I know by
personal observation, a memorandum was cir-
culated among military advisers in Washington
propounding this dilemma: If by ghting the
war against Japan by orthodox methods it might
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while with incendiary air attacks on Japanese
cities _[apans resistance might be broken in a year
or two, would it be morally justiable to use the
second means? Now it is hard to say which is
more astonishing, that the morality of total exter-
mination was then seriously debated in military
circles or that today its morality is taken for
granted, as outside debate, even among a. large
part of the clergy.
More than any other event that has taken place
in modern times this sudden radical ch'angeover
from war to collective extermination reversed the
whole course of human history.
Plainly, the acceptance of mass extermination
as a normal outcome of war undermined all the
moral inhibitions that have kept mans murderous
fantasies from active expression. War, however
brutal and devastating, had a formal beginning
and could some to an end by some formal process
of compromise or surrender. But no one has
the faintest notion how nuclear extcrtnination,
once begun, could be brought to an end. Still less
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can anyone guess what purpose would be accom-
plished by it, except a release by death from in-
tolerable anxiety and fear. But this is to anticipate.
9292'hat is important to bear in mind is that atomic
weapons did not bring about this rst decisive
change; they merely gave our already de-moral-
izcd strategy a more effective means of expression.
Once extermination became acceptable, the
conned tumor of war, itself an atavistie pseudo-
organ, turned into a cancer that would invade
the blood stream of civilization. Now the smallest
sore of conict or hostility might fatally spread
through the whole organism, immune to all those
protective moral and political restraints that a
healthy body can mobilize for such occasions.
By the time the atom bomb was invented our
authorities needed no special justication for us-
ing it. The humane pleas for withholding the
weapon, made by the atomic scientists, suddeniy
awakened to a moral crisis they had not foreseen
while working on the bomb, were automatically
disposed of by well-established precedent, already
three years in operation. Still, the dramatic
nature of the explosions at Hiroshima and Naga-
saki threw a white light of horror and doubt
over the whole process; for a moment a sense of
moral guilt counteracted our exorbitant pride.
This reaction proved as short-lived as it was be-
lated. Yet it prompted Henry L. Stimson, a
public servant whose admirable personal conduct
had never been open to question, to publish a
magazine article defending the oieial decision
to use the atom bomb.
The argument Mr. Stimson advanced in favor
of atomic genocide-a name invented later but
ltudiously reserved for the acts of our enemies
was that it shortened the war and saved perhaps
more than a million precious American lives.
There is no need here to debate that highly dc-
batable point. But on those same practical, hu-
manitarian grounds, systematic torture might be
employed by an advancing army to deter guerrilla
lighters and to blackmail the remaining popula-
tion into accepting promptly the tot-tut-crs terms.
That only a handful of people ventured to make
this criticism indicates the depth of moral apathy
to which our countrymen had sunk in less than
a dozen years. Those who used this illustration,
however, were not surprised to nd that the
French, themselves the victims of Hitlcrs carefully
devised plans of torture and mass extermination,
would authorize the use of military torture in
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Algeria a decade later. Our own country had
forecast that depravity by our national conduct.
This conduct still remains without public e.92arnina-
tion or repentance, but, unfortunately, retribu-
tion may not lie far away. Should it come, Civil
Defense estimates have estahlished that it will
at once wipe out forty million American lives for
the one million we once supposedly saved.
Let us be clear about cause and effect. It was
not our nuclear weapons that committed us to the
strategy of e.92'tertnination; it was rather our de-
cision to concentrate on the methods of extermi-
nation that lcel to our one-sided, obsessive pre-
occupation with nuclear weapons. Even before
Russia had achieved a single nuclear weapon,
we had so dismantled our military establishment
that we lacked suicient equipment and muni-
tions to ght successfully such a minor action as
that in Korea.
Tie total nature of our moral breakdown,
accurately predicted a half century ago --along
with the atorn hom'o~'oy Henry Adams, can
be gauged by a single fact: most Americans do
not realize that this change has taken place or,
worse, that it makes any difference. They have
no consciousness of either the magnitude of their
collective sin or the fact that, by their silence,»
they have individually condoned it. It is precisely
as if the Secretary of Agriculture had licensed
the sale of human esh as a wartime emergency
measure and people had taken to cannibalism
when the war was over as a clever dodge for
lowering the cost of living -- a mere extension of
everyday butchery. Many of our professed rc-
ligious and moral leaders have steadily shrunk
from touching this subject; or, if they have done
$0, they have naively equated mass extermination
with war and have too often given their blessing
to it, for reasons just as specious as those our gov-
ernment has used. .
it is in relation to this gigantic moral collapse
that our present devotion to nuclear weapons and
their equally dcliumanizcd bacterial and cltetnicnl
counterparts must be gauged.
When we abandoned the basic moral restraints
against random killing and mass extermination
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inverted fashion by our identifying our safety and
welfare with the one-sided expansion of our weap-
ons systern. Thus we surrendered the initiative
to our instruments, confusing physical power with
rational human purpose, forgetting that machines
and weapons have no values and no goals, above
all, no limits and no restraints except those that
human beings superirnpose on them.
The one thing that might have rectied our
governments premature exploitation of atomic
power would have been a public assizc of its
manifold dangers, even for wider industrial and
medical use. As early as the winter of 1945-1946
the Senate Atomic Energy Committee made the
rst full inquiry into these matters, and the
physicists who appeared before this Committee
gave forecasts whose accuracy was fully conrmed
in the tardy hearings that have just taken place
before a joint congressional committee. Almost
with one voice, these scientists predicted that
Soviet Russia would be able to produce a nuclear
bomb within ve years, possibly within three. On
that basis, the nations of the world had three
safe years to create through the United Nations
the necessary political and moral safeguards
against the misuse of this new power.
There was no salvation, the more alert leaders
of science wisely pointed out, on purely national
terms. Naturally, Russias totalitarian isolation-
ism and suspicion made it difeult to arrive at a
basis for rational agreement, but our own sense
Of holding all the trump cards did not lessen this
diiculty. All too quickly, after the Russian re-
jection of our generous but politically unsound
Baruch proposal, our country used Russian hos-
tility as an excuse for abandoning all further effort.
Even before we had openly committed ourselves
to the Cold War itself -a now obsolete pre-
atomic military eoncept-our leaders preferred
to build a threatening ring of air bases around
Russia rather than to pursue with patient circum-
spection a course directed toward securing even-
tual understanding and cooperation. So the diffi-
cult became the impossible.
As late as 1947 this situation, though grave,
was not disastrous. our very mistakes in turning
to mass extermination were capable, if openly
and honestly faced, of leading both ourselves and
the world back to the right path. Up to then,
our totalitarian weapons system had not yet con-
solidated its position or threatened our lrcc in-
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stitutions; the organs of democratic society, in-
vigorated rather than depressed by the war, had
not yet been enfeebled by ofcial secrecy, repres-
sion, suspicion, craven conformism, or the cor-
ruptions of absolute power, shielded from public
criticism. Meanwhile, unfortunately, the strategy
oi mass extermination, which did not hear public
discussion or open assessment, was rapidly taking
shape.
For a brief moment, nevertheless, our leaders
seized the political initiative, though they were
handicapped by ambivalent intentions and con-
tradictory goals. Our contribution to organizing
the United Nations, though it had been originally
proposed by the United States, was as eagcy
and inept as Russias, for the frustrating Council
veto was an American conception. Under a more
imaginative leadership two other, admirable
American proposals came forward, UNRRA and
the Marshall Plan. Both these agencies had great
potentialities, for at rst we had the intelligence
to offer their benets even to Communist coun-
tries.
Had we followed these efforts through, they
might have permanently increased the whole
range of international cooperation. in wiser exec-
utive hands, these initiatives would not have been
prematurely terminated. Rather, they would have
been employed to reduce world tensions and to
win general assent to a program for giving all
nations the prefatory exercises in rnagnanimity
and understanding essential to the re-establish-
ment of moral order and the control of our de-
moralizing weapons. But even in their brief,
limited application these agencies did far more to
fortify the assisted nations against oppressive Com-
munist dictatorship than all the billions we poured
into NATO and SEATO to build up futile ar-
maments for wars neither we nor our allies
were capable of ghting. Witness our long series
of baekdowns and lctdowns: Czechoslovakia,
Korea, Vietnam, Poland, East Germany, Hun-
saw. Egypt -
IN oua commitment .to the strategy of extermi-
nation, under a decision made when General
Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, the United States
rejected the timely warnings of the world's lead-
ing scientists and the common counsels of human-
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lity. Instead of holding a series of world confer-
ences in which the dangers of nuclear energy
could be fully canvased, not alone by physicists
but by thinkers in every threatened eld, our
ofcial agencies deliberately played down these
dangers and used every available mode of cen-
sorship to restrict the circulation of the knowledge
needed for such an appraisal. In this obstinate
desire to exploit nuclear power solely for our
national advantage, our government relied upon
insistent publicity and indoctrination to build up
a false sense of security. Instead of regaining
our moral position by ceasing the reckless ex-
periments whose mounting pollution justied a
world-wide apprehension, we flatly denied the
need for any such cessation and allowed Russia,
after it had come abreast of us, to take the moral
lead here. Even at a recent United Nations
conference, which clearly demonstrated the dan-
gers, our own representatives helped vote clown
the Russian preamble to the conclusions of the
conference, which called for a cessation of all
further nuclear testing.
To explain this obstinate commitment to the
infamous policy of mass extermination one must
understand that its side reactions have proved
as demoralizing as its central purpose. Within
a bare decade, the United States has built up a
huge vested interest in mass extermination -in
the weapons themselves and in the highly prot-
able manufacture of electronic equipment, planes,
and missiles designed to carry them to their
destination. There are tens of thousands of in-
dividnal scientists and technicians engaged in
nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical research
to increase the range and ellectiveness of these
lethal agents, though we boast we already have
a stockpile of nuclear weapons capable of wiping
out the entire planet. There are also corporate
bodies the air force, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, great industrial corporations, and ex-
travagantly endowed centers of research - whose
powers and pIeS1lmptlOI15 have been constantly
widened along with their prolit and prestige.
While the show lasts, their careers depend on our
aeeepting the fallacious assumptions to which they
have committed us.
All these agents now operate in secret totali-
tarian enclaves, perfecting their secret totalitarian
weapons, functioning outside the processes of
democratic government, immune to public chal-
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lenge and criticism or to public correction. What-
ever the scientic or technical competence of the
men working in this eld, their sedulous restric-
tion of interest and the limited conditions under
which they work and have contact with other
human beings do not foster wisdom in the con-
duct of life. By vocational commitment they live
in an underdimensioned and distorted world.
The sum of their combined judgments is still an
unbalanced judgment, for moral criteria have,
from the start, been left out of their general direc-
tives.
ls it any wonder that cven- in the narrow seg-
ments of science where they claim mastery our
nuclear officials have made error after error?
They have again and again been forced to reduce
their estimate of the permissible limit of ex-
posure to radiation, and on the basis of knowledge
already available they will have to reduce these
estimates still further. Thus, too, they made an
error that startled themselves, in their undercalcu-
lating the range and the lethal fall-out of the
hydrogen bomb, and they sought to cover that
error by concealment and calumny, at rst deny-
ing the plight of the japanese shermen they had
injured. Some have even used their authority as
scientists to give pseudo-scientic assurances about
biological changes that no one will be able to
verify until half a century has passed. Further-
more, in matters falling within their province of
exact knowledge, the judgment of these authorities
has repeatedly proved erroneous and mischievous.
All this should not surprise us: neither science
nor nuclear energy endows its users with super-
human powers. But what should surprise us is
the {act that the American nation has entrusted
its welfare, safety, and future existence to these
imprudent, falliblc men and to those who have
sanctioned their de-moralized plans. Under the
guise of a calculated risk, our nuclear strategists
have prepared to bring on a calculated catastro-
phe. At some unpredictable momenrtheir sick
fantasies may become unspeakable realities.
Does anyone really think that, unless a miracle
supervenes, there can be a more favorable out-
come to .the overall policy we have been pursu-
ing? If this policy had a color of excuse before
Russia haclachicvcd her rst nuclear weapon in
1949, it became thoroughly discredited in Korea
in 1950 and became suicidal as soon as Russias
superiority in rocket missiles was established.
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The fact that Russia now has equal or better
weapons of extermination and has joined'us in
these same insane preparations doubles our dan-
ger but does not halve our original guilt. Neither
does it nullify our willful stupidity in now clinging
to an obsolete, discredited strategy, based on a
negation of morality and a deance of common
lense.
The only possible justification of our continued
reliance upon weapons of total extermination
would be that they do no present harm and would
never be used by either side under any extremity
of provocation. Can any mature mind comfort
itself with either hope? Even our experimental
explosion of nuclear bombs, at a rate of more
man two for Rns$ias one, has poisoned our babies
milk, upset the delicate ecological balance of
nature, and, still worse, deled our genetic heri-
tage. As for the possibility that nuclear weapons
will never be used, our children in school know
better than this every time they are put through
the sadistic rnumrnery of an air-raid drill and
learn to play disaster. Such baths of fear and
hostility are gratuitous assaults against the young,
whose psychological damage is already incalcul-
able; their only service is to bar more tightly the
exits that would permit a real escape.
There are people who would defend these plans
on the grounds that it is better to die nobly,
defending democracy and freedom, than to sur-
vive under Communist oppression. Such apolo-
gists perhaps exaggerate the differences that now
exist between our two systems, but they err even
more seriously in applying to mass extermination
a moral standard that was defensible only as long
as this death was a symbolic one conned to a
restricted number of people on a small portion
of the earth. Such a disaster, as in the bitter-end
resistance of the Southern Confederacy, was still
relatively minor and retrievablc; if the original
resolve to die were in fact an erroneous one, in a
few generations it could be corrected. Nuclear
damage, in contrast, is cumulative and irretriev-
able; it admits no belated confession of error, no
repentance and absolution.
Under what canon of sanity, then, can any
government, or any "generation, with its limited
perspectives, its fallible judgment, its obvious
proneness to self-deception, delusion, and error,
make a decision for all future ages about the very
existence of even El single country? Still more,
how can any one nation treat as a purely private
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2right its decision on at matter that will affect the
life and health and continued existence of the
rest of mankind?
There are no words to describe the magnitude of
such insolence in thought or the magnitude of
criminality involved in carrying it out. Those
who believe that any country has the right to
make such a decision share the madness of Cap-
tain Ahab in Jlloby Didi. For them Russia is the
White Whale that must be hunted down and
grappled with. Like Ahab in that mad pursuit,
they will listen to no reminders of love, home,
family obligation; in order to kill the object of
their fear and hate they are ready to throw away
the sextant and compass that might give them
back their moral direction, and in the end they
will sink their own ship and drown their crew.
To such unbalanced men, to such desnoralized
ebrts, to such dchumanized purposes, our gov-
ernment has entrusted. in an easily conceivable
extremity, our lives. liven an accident, these men
have confessed, might produce the dire results
they have planned. and rnore than once has
almost done so. To accept their plans and ensu-
ing decisions, we have deliberately anesthetized
the normal feelings, emotions, anxieties, and hopes
that could alone bring us to our senses.
No out-; can guess how a sullicicntly wide re-
covery of moral responsibility and initiative might
he brought amut. Neither can one predict at
what moment our nation will see that there is no
permissible sacrice of life, either in experimental
preparation of these vile weapons or in a nal
conict whose very method would nullify every
rational end. Certainly it seems doubtful that
popular pressure would bring about such a change
in government policy, except under the emotion
of a shattering crisis, when it might well be too
late. But great leadership, exerted at_ the right
moment, might clear the air and illuminate the
territory ahead. Until we actually use our weap-
ons of extermination, there is nothing that we
have yet done that cannot be undone, except
for the existing pollution of our food and our
genetic heritage with strontium 90 and carbon
I4. But we must make a moral about-face before
we can command a political forward march.
' Yet if once the American nation made such
evaluation of the morality of extermination, new
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policies and appropriate decisions would quickly
suggest themselves. This would do more to e'eet
an immediate improvement in the relations be-
tween the two powers now committed to prepar-
ing for mutual extermination than endless parleys
between their heads of government.
A moral about-iace.does not demand, as those
whose minds are congealed by the Cold War
suppose, either a surrender to Russian Commu-
nism or a series of futile appeasements; neither
does it mean any increase in the dangers under
which we now live: just the contrary. Those
who see no other alternatives are still living in the
pre-nuclear world; they do not understand that
our greatest enemy is not Russia but our treacher-
ous weapons, and that our commitment to these
weapons is what has prevented us from con-
ceiving and proposing the necessary means for
extending the area of effective freedom and,
above all, for safeguarding mankind from mean-
ingless mutilation and massacre.
No dangers we might face once we abandoned
the very possibility of using mass extermination
would be as great as those under which we now
live; yet this is not to say that a bold change of
policy would be immediately successful, or that
before it had time to register its full effects in
other countries it might not tempt Russia to risk
measures to extend over other areas its own mon-
olithic System of minority single-party government.
But need I emphasize that these possible penalties
could hardly be worse than those our government
meekly accepted in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Korea, at a time when we still hugged the illu-
sion of wielding absolute power through our
monopoly of nuclear weapons? While sober judg-
ment nced not minimize these transitional diffi-
culties and possible losses, one must not under-
estimate, cithcr, the impact of a new policy,
wholly concerned to re-establish the moral con-
trols and political cooperations necessary to enable
mankind to halt the threatening misuse of the ex-
traordinary powers that it now commands.
Even in a purely military sense, this changed
orientation might produce the greatest dilliculties
for those Communist governments who misunder-
stood its intention and sought to turn it to their
private national advantage. Russia would no
more be able to escape the impact of our huma nc
plans and moralizcd proposals than it was able
to avoid the impact and challenge of our nuclear
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weapons. I I we rallied the forces of mercy, httma n-
heartcdness, and morality with the vigor with
which we have marshaled the dt'humt92192izcd
forces of destruction. what government could stand
against us and face its own people, however strong
its cynical suspicions and misgivings?
This is not the place or the moment to spell
out a new policy which would start with the com~
plete renunciation of weapons of mass extermi-
nation and go on to build constructive measures
addressed to all those tasks which the Cold War
has caused us to leave in abcyance. Fortunately,
George Kennan, the only ofeial or ex-ollieiiil who
has yet had the courage to admit our earlier
miscaleulations, has already sketched in, with
some boldness, the outlines of a better policy, and
his proposals might be amplied and enlarged
in many directions once we had overcome our
oieial obsession with Russia and our xation
on mass extermination as an ultimate resource.
But the key to all practical proposals lies in
a return to human feelings and sensitivities, to
moral values, and to life-regarding procedures as
controlling factors in the operation of intelli-
gence. The problems our nation has tried to
solve by mechanical weapons alone, operated by
a detached and dc-moralized mechanical intelli-
gence, have proved insoluble by those means. A
great leader would know that the time has come
to reinstate the missing human lactor and bring
forth generously imaginative proposals addressed
to mankinds survival and working toward its
further development.
-4-
STEPS TOWARD
DISARMAMENT
R E P R I N T E D FROM
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN
APRIL I962
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J Steps toward Disarmament
0
' A British physicist and World War H military
operations analyst discusses the problems that
underlie the present disarmament negotiations
I N 1he representatives of 17 nations-the two main nuclear powers,
seven nations allied with one or
the other of them, and eight uncom-
mitted nations-have convened at Gene-
va for the third formal, full-dress at-
tempt since the end of World War II to
negotiate disarmament. It must be con-
ceded that the circumstances are not
entirely favorable to agreement. During
1961 the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reversed
the trend of nearly a decade and in-
creased their military expenditures by
something on the order of 25 per cent.
The three-year moratorium on the test-
ing of nuclear weapons was terminated
by the series oi Soviet tests in the fall;
on the eve of the Geneva meeting the
U.S. annoonwd its intention to move
its present series of underground tests
into the atmosphere it the U.S.S.P92. did
not immediately agree to a test ban.
On the other hand, both the Soviet
and the 92Vcstern bloc are committed by
categorical public statements to the ob-
jective of complete and general disarma-
ment under strict inspection and control.
What ls morc, practical military consid-
eration.-s, arising irom the stature of
nuclear weapons, commend substantial
reduction in armaments to the great
powers as a measure that will increase
their security in the rst step toward dis-
armament.
In considering possible rst steps that
would lead to increased security for botli
sides, partisans of each side should try
to understand how the present militaryby P. M. S. Blaclrett
situation must loolc to the other. A mili-
tary commander, in planning a cam-
paign or a battle, attempts to do this as a
matter of course. He has rst to nd out
all he can about the material facts oi his
opponent: military deployment and
secondly to assess the probable inten-
tions of his opponent for its use. This is
the process that has been described as
guessing what is happening on the oth-
er side of the hill." A similar obligation
rests on those who plan a disarmament
negotiation. A military planner, it is
true, can much more easily put himself
mentally in the position of his military
opponent than a statesman can think
himself into the position of his opposite
number, because a statesman must enter
imaginatively into the political as well as
the military thought processes of his
opponent. This is hard to do at a time
oi acute ideological struggle. It is none-
theless essential that the military and
political leaders of both sides do just
this. No small part of the present crisis,
concerning armaments in general and
nuclear weapons in particular, has been
due to a tendency in the West to at-
tribute to ideological motives actions
by the U.S.S.R. that seem to have been
motivated mainly by military considera-
tions. Convetsely, much of the West's de-
fense policy appears to have been inu-
enced by political and economic factors.
It may be useful to start by describing
the most important elements in the
military capabilities of the Soviet blocand the 92Vestern alliance. In recent
months there have been signicant dis-
closures about the nuclear weapons and
their means of delivery possessed by
both sides. On November 12 of last year
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of De-
fense of the U.S., said that the U.S.
nuclear-strike force consists of 1,700 in-
teroontinental bombers, including 630
B-52's, 55 B-58's and 1,000 B-47's. He
said that the U.S. possesses in addition
several dozen operational intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles lCBM's!, some 80
Polaris missiles in nuclear-powered sub-
marines, about the same number of Thor
and jupiter intermediate-range missiles,
some 300 carrier-borne aircraft armed
with rnegaton war heads and nearly
1,900 supersonic land-based ghters
Witli nuclear warheads. According to his
deputy. Boswell L. Cilpatric, "the total
number of our nuclear delivery vehicles,
tactical as 92vell as strategic, is in the
tens of thousands, and of course we have
more than one war head for each vehi-
cle. .. . We have a second-strilte capabil-
ity that is at least as extensive as what the
Soviets can deliver by striking rst,
thereloro we can be coritlcnt that the
Soviets will not provoke a major con-
flict." The U.S. stockpile of nuclear
weapons is most often estimated as
around 30,000 megatons, that is, enough
for some 30,000 one-mcgaton bombs.
Naturally no such precise gures for
Soviet strength are available. I have seen
no reliable estimates of the U.S.S.R.'s
nuclear stockpile, nor oi its possible nu-
_clear-arrned s_ubmarine stren gr]-r, rror oi its
nucleanartned ghter-bomber strength
the last, of course, would not have suf-
cient range to contribute to the Soviet
strike power against the U.S.!. But re-
cent semioliicial estimates from Wash-
ington give the U.S.S.'B. some 50 lCBM's,
name 151'! intercontinental bombers and
some 400 medium-range missiles the
last able to cover Europe but not the
U.S.!. The same sources indicate that
the U.S. may have a small lead over
the U.S.S.R. in the number oi lCBI92i's.
That such estimates should issue from
Washington may seem surprising in
view of the role that an alleged "missile
gap played in the 1960 presidential
election campaign. That the estimates
are realistic. however, is indicated by
the statement of Senator Stuart Syming-
tori that the U.S. intelligence estimate
of the missile force available to the
U.S.S.R. at the middle of 1961 was only
3.5 per cent of the number predicted a
few years ago. The corresponding esti-
mate of Soviet bomber strength, he re-
vealed, was 19 per cent ol the number
predicted in I956 [see illustrations on
page 10!. Mr. Syrnington explained that
the new figures are predicated on intelli-
gence about Soviet "intentions" as well as
capability and expressed his own dis-
quiet at the tentativeness at best of our
intelligence estimates." It is one of the
purposes of this article to attempt to elu-
cidate some of these Soviet intentions.
At rst sight there appears to be a con-
tradiction between Washingtons
claim of a marked over-all nuclear su-
periority and the recent statement by
Marshal Ecdion Y. Malincvslzy, the So-
viet Minister of Defense, that the
U.S.S.R. has the power to destroy all the
important industrial, administrative and
political centers of the U.S. and "whole
countries that have provided their terri-
tories for the siting; of American war
bases. The explanation may be as fol-
lows. To carry out such destruction
would require not more than 1,000
iiaegitons of nuclear destructive power,
my ve rnegatons for each of 100 key
targets tn the U.S. and another 500
rnegatons for Western Europe and U.S.
bases overseas. At only 100.000 dead
per rnegaton such an attack would ltili
100 million people. The U.S. stockpile,
estimated at 30,000 rnegatons, is 30
times greater than the U.S.S.R. would
need to carry out the retaliatory blow
described by alinovslcy.
There is, oi course, the possibility that
the new U.S. estimates oi Soviet nu-
clear strength are too low. After all, rmital .ration about Soviet military prepa-
rations is notoriously hard to come by.
It seems certain, however, that the U.S.
Department of Defense must believe the
estimates to be roughly correct. It would
be politically disastrous for the Adminis-
tration to be found guilty of underesti-
mating 3ovici nuclear strength. Eui even
assuming that the estimates of the relat-
tive strength of the two sides are only
approximately correct, they show that
the possibility of a rationaIl_v planned
surprise nuclear attack by the U.S.5.Ft.
on the nuclear delivery system of the
9292est must be quite negligible. The ques-
tion of why the U.S.S.R. has built such
a small nuclear delivery system should
perhaps be replaced by the question of
why the U.S. has built such an enormous
striking capacity. -
In order to understand the possible mo-
1 tives behind Soviet defense policy,
it is necessary to consider the histoi-_92' of
the growth of nuclear-weapon power.
During the period of U.S. atomic mo-
nopoly or overwhelming numerical su-
periority, say from 1947 to 1954, the
role of the U.S. Strategic Air Command
was to attack and destroy Soviet cities in
case of war. This countercity policy, like
most traditional military doctrines, had
l!Oth an oensive and a defensive aspect.
From the Westem viewpoint, under the
doctrine of "massive retaliation," this
nuclear striking power was seen to be
both a deterrent to the possibility of at-
tad: by Soviet laud forces and, in the
extreme roll back," or "liberation,"
statement of the doctrine, an offensive
weapon to obtain political concessions
by threat of its use. By 19-34 the threat
was implemented by more than 1,000
intercontinental B-47 bombers, plus
larger numbers of shorter range vehicles
deployed around the U.5.S.P92.
ll-non Obs; if C Q D c nrsinl B ninur ii:I luau sllu vruru-an. .1 I-V511!!! vs -cw--, -
land forces were the only available coun-
ter to the Western nuclear monopoly
during this period. The answer to the
threat of nuclear attack was the threat
of taking over Europe on the ground. in
retrospect the military reaction of the
U.S.S.Il. seems understanclable. It start-
ed a crash program to produce its own
nuclear weapons. It also embarlzcd on a
huge air defense program; by ii:-53 it
was credited vrltlt an operational lighter
strength of some 10,000 aircralt. As
Western nuclear strength grew, the
U.S.S.R. gradually built up its laud
torces so as robe able to rnvauc |:.urope.
even alter a U.S. nuclear attack. At the
political level the U.S.S.R. consolidated
its forward military line by the politicalcoup in 1' Jr .»I¬l'.'l10$lUVtl.h.lli'l and in-
tegrated r..: other satellite countries
more closely into the Soviet defense sys-
tem. Since the main military threat then
to the U.S.S.R. was from manned nu-
clear bombers, the greatest possible
depth for,air defense was vital. During
Worlcl War ll it was found that the
efficacy of a ghter defense system in-
creased steeply with the depth of the
defense zone. Finally, the U.S.S.H. main-
tained strict geographical secrecy over
its land area so as to deny target irrior-
mation to the U.S. Strategic Air Com-
mand.
The doctrine of massive retaliation
became less and less plausible as thel
llll
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hllNlhrlUhl DETEBRENT strategy of n mt-
elear opponent oi the U.S. could logically
Soviet miclear stockpile grew. It had to
be abandoned after 1954, when hydro-
gen bombs became available to both
East and West. When the U.S.S.B. pro-
ceeded to build up a eet of long-range
bombers to deliver its hydrogen bombs,
the U.S. became vulnerable to nuclear
oounteraaclc. Some Iorrn of nuclear
stalemate by balance of terror seemed
to have arrived.
This balance seemed still further
Strengthened about 1957, when rapid
progress in the technology of nuclear
weapons and missiles made it possible
to carry multimegaton hydrogen bombs
in lCBM's. Because such missiles are
most dilcult, if not impossible, to de-stroy in ight, a nuclear aggressor would
have to leave no enemy missiles unde-
stroyed ii it wanted to keep its own
major cities from being wiped out by a
retaliatory attack. The advent of long-
range missiles therefore made the bal-
ance of terror more stable. '
Two contrasting systems oi military
theory evolved in response to this
new situation. The rst led oil from the
premise that a rather stable kind of mili-
tary balance had been reached, in which
neither side could make use of its stra-
tegic nuclear power without ensuring
its own destruction. In other words, the
balance of terror was likely to be ratherJ
stable against rational action, even
though the actual nuclear strengths of
the two sides were markedly diilcrent,
as indeed they were in the middle 1950's,
when the U.S. was already vastly strong-
er in over-all deployed nuclear strength.
This view rested on the assumption that
neither side could hope to knock out the
other's nuclear system entirely. Since
some power to retaliate would survive
attack, a rational government would be
nearly as much, if not just as much, de-
terred from a first strike by the expecta-
tion that it would suffer, say, 10 million
deatns as it would be if the expectation
were 100 million.
This view led to the practical conclu-
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MILES
AIR BURST of a-nuclear bomb would maximize lla eects on a city, the most widespread
of which would be due to heat. This drawing outlines the eilet-ts oi a ll}-mepaton bomb set
Oll It 29.000 Ieet. At 12 miles Iinner colored circle! lrom ground zero" the reball, 3.4
miles in diameter, would deliver 30 calories per square centimeter at a rate sullirient to
ignite virtually all ammable building materials. At 20 miles outer colored circle] from
ground eero the heat would he 12 calories per square centimeter. enough to eeuee third=
degree burns and start many res. Arr extending upward It-om ground below the burst is a
reected shock wave that would umplily blast eects of the explosion Isee drawing belowl.-
I
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t , i
--_ ., Ll ,
ll- /ll!
. . lli ii i l T I
MILES 10 O I0 20
RADII OF EFFECTS ol a l0-rnegalon air burst ure superimposed on I map ol St. Louis and
lhe surrounding area. The the rolered circles ecrre=;>ond to the colored circles in the draw-
ing at the top ol the page. The blarli circles com-rrn eerts due to blast. At a distance ol ve
miles linnbr lalm-lr circle! lrorn around arro virtually all ht1il|li|t|:s would be destroyed.
At eight miles louter black circle! virtually all wooden buildings would be destroyed.F21
sion that enough is enough. In today's
jargon this is the policy of the minimum
deterrentthat is, the possession of at nu-
clear force adequate only for a retalia-
tory attack on enemy cities but incapa-
ble of successful attack on the enemys
nuclear delivery system. It is clear that
only a small nuclear delivery system is
necessary for a minimum detenent. One
big hydrogen bomb dropped on a big
city could kill several millions. The small
delivery system must, however, be high-
ly invulncrable. Otherwise the enemy
might think it possible to bring off a
successful counterforce rst strike,
at the destruction of the system.
Little operational intelligence is needed
for such a minimum deterrent policy
because this involves attack on cities,
whose locations are known, and does not
involve surprise attack on nuclear bases,
whose locations therefore do not need
to be known.
On the political plane, it was thought,
the resulting period of relative stability
would be favorable for a serious attempt
to negotiate a substantial measure of
disarmament, both nuclear and conven-
tional. Far-reaching disarmament was
seen to be highly desirable, if only be-
cause such u balance of terror is stable
solely against rational acts of responsible
govemments. It is not stable against ir-
responsible actions of individuals or dis-
sident groups or technical accidents. A
few suitably placed individuals-a mis-
sile crew or the crew of a nuclear bomber
on a routine llightcould kill a few mil-
lion enemy city dwellers on their own
initiative. The best way to reduce this
danger is to reduce drastically the num-
oer of nuclear weapons on both sides.
The second and quite different doc-
trine was that the balance of terror
was not even stable against rational acts
oi raponsible governments. This was
based on the view that a determined
nuclear power might be able to launch
it surprise cotmterforce attack on the
enemy: nuclear delivery system of such
strength that the enemy would not be
able to retaliate. The aggressor, without
suliering unacceptable casualties, would
then have the enemy at its mercy. The
practical consequence of this doctrine
is to strive for maximum superiority in
number of weapons, maximum invulner-
ability ol one: own nuclear delivery sys-
tem and maximum intelligence about the
enemy's nuclear system.
Plainly a successful counlerforcc at-
tack woultl rut-|uire knowledge of the lo~
cation of all the enemy's nuclear missilt
and air buses and the power to dispatch
several weapons against each, so as to
ensure that lat least one reached its tar-
get. A coiinterforce strategy thus implies
the necessity for a many-fold nuclear
superiority over the enemy. Moreover,
to have the slightest chance of success
such an attack must come as a complete
surprise to the enemy: it must be a rst
strike. This policy has various pseu-
donyrhs: maximum deterrent posture,
first-counterforce-strike capability, or, in
plain English, preparation for nuclear
aggression.
Since the possession of nuclear arma-
ment raises the possibility that either side
could adopt either one of these strate-
gies, both of them must have been dis-
cussed in military circles in Moscow and
VVashington during the years after the
explosion of the first hydrogen bombs
in 1954. Let us try to nd out how the
discussions went by studying what shape
t.he nuclear-defense policies of the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S. took in the subsc-
quent years.
If the lashington gures for Soviet
nuclear strength are valid, it is clear that
the U.S.S.R. has planned for a purely
retaliatory nuclear role and has definitely
not planned for a surprise attack on the
U.S. delivery system. As long ago as
1956 the U.S-S.R. was believed to have
the capability of making 25 long-range
bombers a month. It appears today to
have only some 150, compared with the
1,700 U.S. long-range bombers able to
reach the U.-S.S.R. Even though Soviet
medium-range bombers could reach the
U.S. on a one-way ight, this is much
more than counterbalanced the 1,500
or so 92Vestern fighter bombers, carrier-
borne aircraft and medium-range mis-
siles able to reach the U.S.S.R. lt is also
probable that the U.S.S.R. could have
made many more than the 50 or so
ICBM's with which it is now credited,
since its space program indicates sub-
stantial industrial resources for mak-
ing missiles. The evidence is that the
U.S.S.R. has based its safety on the re-
tnlialory power of a small number of
missiles and aircraft operating from
bases whose exact locations are kept as
secret as possible. The deterrent value
of its missiles is certainly enhanced by
the prestige of its space program.
That the U.S.S.l'l. believed the danger
of a major war, intentionally initiated,
had been reduced by the advent of hy-
drogen bombs seems indicated by the
fact that it reduced the total number of
men in its armed forces from 5.8 million
in 1955 to 3.6 million in 1959. In ]anu-
ary, 1960, Premier Khrushchev an-
nounced the U.S.S.R.'s intention to re-duce this to 2.4 million by the end of
I961. The U.S.S.H. needed fewer troops
because it no longer had to rely on a
retaliatory land blow in Europe to coun-
ter a Western nuclear attack. its concern
about the danger of accidental, irre-
sponsible or escalated war is probably
one of the reasons for its strong espousal
in I955 of a drastic measure of compre-
hensive and general disarmament.
Tuming to the history of U.S. defense
policy over this period, it is to be
noted that the total service manpower
fell slowly from 2.9 million in 1955 to
2.6 million in 1960. The development of
improved nuclear weapons, missiles and
aircraft continued, but not at a great
rate, even after the Soviet launching of
an articial satellite in 1957 and much
boasting by the U.S.S.R. of its missile
prowess. Although subjected to consid-
erable public pressure to engage in a
crash program to close the alleged mis-
sile' gap, President Eisenhower main-
tained that the existing program was
adequate for the safety of the nation. In
his last State of the Union Message in
january, 1961, he declared: The bomb-
er gap of several years ago was always
a ction and the missile gap shows
every sign of being the same.
As 1954 was the year of the hydrogen
bomb, so 1961 was for both sides in the
cold war the year of the Great Rearran-
rnent. In the U.S.S.R. the decrease of
total armed forces to 2.4 million pro-
jected for 1961 was deferred and the
arms budget was markedly increased. In
July the Soviet Government went on the
diplomatic offensive to bring about
changes in the status of Berlin and to get
the division of Germany recognized. In
August it began testing nuclear weapons
again, in spite of a promise in ]-anuary,
I960, by Premier Khrushchev that the
U.S.S.R. would not be the first to do so.
No doubt there were some political mo-
tives behind these drastic moves. Pos-
sibly heavy pressure was put on Khru-
shchev from China and from the opposi-
tion elements in the U.S.S.R. to admit
that his policy of coexistence had not pro-
duced political gains commensurate with
its possible military risks. But such dras-
tic changes, yvith the inevitable adverse
reaction of much of world opinion,
would hardly have been made unless
there were strong military reasons for
them. To get at these reasons it is neces-
sary to recall in more detail the circum-
stances in which the changes took place.
In the first place the flights of the U.S.
reconnaissance U-2 ..ircraft must have
had decisive importance in shaping theattitudes lit Soviet military leaders. Al-
though the over-all nuclear strength of
the U.S. is now, and was then, much
greater than that of the U.S.S.R., Soviet
leaders could reckon that one vital factor
would make a U.S. nuclear attack on
the U.S.S.R. exceedingly risky: the se-
crecy as to the location of the Soviet nu-
clear bases. Obviously one of the main
objectives of the U-2 ights was to locate
those nuclear bases. The Soviet com-
mand knew that the U-2 ights had
been going on for some years before the
rst aircraft was shot down in the spring
of 1960; presumably they reacted by
greater dispersal and camouage. What
must have disturbed the Soviet military
stall was President Eisenhower's justifi-
cation of the ights as essential for U.S.
security. This implied that U.S. security
could only be maintained if the U.S. had
sufficient information as to the location
of Soviet nuclear sites to make possible
a successful surprise attack on the So-
viet retaliatory force.
If these were the Soviet fears, the rejec-
tion by the U.S.S.ll. early in I961 of
the British-American draft of a treaty to
ban the testing of nuclear weapons nds
explanation in the same jealous military
concern to protect the country's geo-
graphical Security. A detailed study of
this document makes it clear that the
elaborate international inspection system
proposed for the prevention of under-
ground tests could conceivably have
served to reveal the location of at least
some of the Soviet missile sites. It would
be hard to convince a military staff offi-
cer of any nationality that this possibility
vvas negligible. If the West had been
content to monitor only the atmosphere
against test violations, a much less com-
prehensive inspection system would
have sufficed and a test-ban treaty might
well have been signed. The Soviet fear
of inspection may have been the more
acute because there was so little in the
U.S.S.R. to inspect.
The resumption of testing by the
U.S.S.R. in September, 1961, would
seem to fall into the same pattern of mo-
tivation. Although its timing may have
been inuenced by the Berlin crisis,
which Khrushchev himself brought to a
head, the testing of war heads with an
explosive force of up to 60 megatons
and the simultaneous well-publicized
success of putting seven lCBM's on their
target in the Pacic at a range of some
7,000 miles was an effective way of re-
establishing the U.S.S.R.'s condence in
the few deployed lCIlM's that formed its
main retaliatory force. Soviet spokesmen
were at pains to promote the credibility
of the U.S.S.B.'s deterrent by emphasiz-
ing to the U.S. the accuracy of its mis-
siles and_ the possible power of the war
heads demonstrated in these tests.
ln the redirection of Soviet military
policy considerable weight must also
have been carried by the fear that ii the
NATO rearmament continued, the time
could not be far distant when West Cirr-
many would get de facto control of its
own nuclear weapons. In Soviet eyes the
refusal of the West to take disarmament
seriously at the Committee of Ten"
conference in 1960 was evidently deci-
sive. As early as November, 1960, the
Russians stated that if the West con-
tinued to terriporize on disarrnament, the
U.S.S.R. would be forced into massive
rearmament.
Sometime in the latter half of 1960
or early in 1961 it seems probable that
the Soviet military stall began to have
doubts as to the adequacy of the mini-
mum deterrent posture in relation to the
near-maximum deterrent posture of the
U.S. It must have been later than ]anu-
ary of 1960, for in that month Khru-
shchev announced a drastic cutback of
both long-range bombers and conven-
tional forces. Since the effectiveness of
the Soviet minimum deterrent rested so
heavily on geographical secrecy, the
U.S.S.R. command may have feared that
the U.S., by further air or satellite recon-
naissance, or by espionage or defections,
would ultimately acquire the intelli-
gence necessary to make a successful
nuclear attack on Soviet nuclear bases.
Probably the main fear of the Soviet
Government was that circumstances
might arise in which the U.S. Coven1-
ment would be pushed by irresponsible
or fanatical groups into reckless action.
The Russians certainly noted the doc-
trine of some civilian analysts that it
would be quite rational to make a "pre-
emptive first strike" even at the cost of
ii] million deaths to the attacking side,
and the doctrine of others that the U.S.
should prepare itself mentally and ma-
terially to sulfer such casualties.
In the U.S. the program for the Great
Rearmament was projected as early
as 1959 by the Democratic National
Committee. In preparation for the im-
pending presidential election the party
leadership published a detailed study of
defense problems and recommended a
$7 billion increase 6 per cont! in the
$43 billion defense budget proposed by
President Eisenhower. The funds were
to go partly for increased conventional
forces and partly to increase the strengthind reduce the vulnerability of the U.S.
nuclear striking power. In january, 1961,
almost immediately after taking office,
the Administration authorized an in-
crease of $3 billion and later in the
year another $4 billion, thus carrying out
the program in full. The present plans
include the provision oi up io 800
ICBMs of the solid-fuel Minuteman
type in underground hardened bases
by 1965.
The Democratic Party's campaign for
increased nuclear armaments was closely
linked with the theoretical doctrine of
the instability of the balance of terror,
derived from the alleged overwhelming
advantage accruing to the nuclear ag-
gressor. This was ably argued by civilian
analysts closely associated with the U.S.
Air Force. The U.S.S.R. was said to have
both the capability and the intention to
launch a surprise nuclear attack on the
U.S. In retrospect, it would seem that
these "looking-glass strategists" endowed
the U.S.S.R. with a capability that it
did not have and that the U.S. had once
had and had now lost.
That the Soviet military staff had
reason to take this element in U.S. opin-
ion seriously may be judgecl by the
fact that President Kennedy himself
found it necessary to launch in the fall
of 1961 a vigorous campaign against all
those in the U.S. who urge total war
and total victory over communism...
who seek to nd an American solution
for all problems"-against those who
were living in the long-past era of the
U.S. nuclear monopoly. In this campaign
President Kennedy has been vigorously
supported by ex-President Eisenhower.
Very possibly the U.S.S.H. may have
overestimated the potential influence of
the proponents of aggressive nuclear
strategy and the ultra-right-wing groups
that yearn "to get it over with. None-
theless, the fact that both Kennedy and
Eisenhower have felt it necessary to
combat them must also imply that the
Soviet military planners could not afford
to ignore their existence.
The Kennedy Administrations recent
vigorous emphasis on the overwhelming
nuclear superiority of the U.S. over the
U.S.S.i92., and the assertion that the U.S.
possesses a second strike that is as strong
as the Soviet first strike might perhaps
be held in the U.S.S.R. to suggest a
_.____ L_. st... Ir c a.'l....:_:..r.-..|:.... rm...-..-AIIIUVK: Dy ults U.a. l92U-]HlIlI3l.l92lUUll tuwmu
a preventive war posture. Undoubtedly
the exact reverse is the case. The Ad-
ministration's statements are designed to
bury officially the fear of a Soviet rst
strike, sedulously propagated by those
who believe that the U.S.S.fl. hasplar. !for, and in fact no92v has, a first-
counterforte capability, and so at a time
of crisis might use it. if this were in
truth the situation, the argument that
the U.S. must forestall the Soviet blow
might seem strong. The Kennedy Ad-
ministration evidently foresaw this dan-
ger arising and effectively rernrrvr-d it
by denying that the U.S.S.fl. has ever
had an eliective rst-strike capacity;
thus there would be no reason for a
forestalling blow in a crisis. The Prcsi-
dent, by emphasizing U.S. nuclear su-
periority over the U.S.S.R., has fore-
stalled the potential forestallers, or. in
the current jargon, has pre-emptcd the
potential pre-empters. At the same time
he has refuted of the arguments
on which the Democratic Party based
much of its election campaign, and in-
deed rnany of the arguments for his own
present rearmament program.
It is, for instance, hard to see the mili-
tnry jnstication for the program of up
to 800 Minuteman lCl3.92l's in the nest
few years. If these are, as claimed, rea-
sonably invulnerable, this number is at
least 10 times larger than is necessary
for an effective retaliatory force to attack
Soviet cities.
The only military circumstance that
could justify such a continuous build-up
of nuclear striking force would be that
the other party could adequately protect
its cities or succeed in perfecting an anti-
missile defense system. Recently Soviet
generals have boasted that the complex
and important problems of destroying
enemy rockets in flight have been
solved." This must refer to the scientific
and technical problems; these have also
been solved in the U.S. A complete anti-
missile defense system that is of any
operational signicance certainly does
not exist today and, in my view, will not
exist in the foreseeable future. Suppose,
however, that I am wrong and that :1
system can eventually be constructed
capable of destroying, say, 56 per cent
of a retaliatory missile attack by 50
lCBM's, so reducing the number reach-
ing the target to 25. Even this reduced
blow would kill tens of millions of peo-
ple. Moreover, it would only be neces-
sary to increase the strength of the re-
taliatory force from 50 to 100 t't'tiS5ilt'S to
cancel out the nntimissile missile. This
illustrates the general conclusion that
since a purely retaliatory nuclear force
can be quite small, any possible dclcnsc
system, either active or passive, can be
cancclcd out by a small number of addi-
tional missiles. Thc fact that a purely
rt-talinl_o1'y posture is little -nflcclctl by
technological innovation, whereas a
counter-force posture is very much aflect-i
ed, may prove a vital factor in disarma-
ment negotiations.
It cannot be seriously believed now
that the U.S.S.R. has either the capabil-
ity or the intention of making an all-out
lttaclt on U.S. missile sites and bomber
be-res. Much genuine alarm in the 92Vest
might have been alloyed if the U.S.S.R.
bad been more successful in making
cleer its disbelief in the military possi-
bility of a successful rst-counterforce
strike and its intention not to plan for
such a possibility. After the brutality of
Soviet action in Hungary in 1956 and
the technological triumph of the arti-
cial satellite the following year. there
may have been legitimate grounds in the
West for fearing that the U.S.S.R. might
adopt the Western policy of massive re-
taliation, which, against a nuclear power,
requires a counterforce capability. In
january, 1960, however, Khrushchev ex-
plicitly deciared the Soviet commitment
to a purely retaliatory strategy. The
Soviet second-strike force was strong
enough, he said, to wipe the country or
countries which attack us oil the face of
the earth. To his own rhetorical ques-
tion, 92'92ill they not, possibly, show per-
dy and attack us first . ..and thus have
an advantage to achieve victory?" he
replied: No. Contemporary means of
waging war do not give any eountry
such advantages. In addition to freeing
resources for capital development, the
Soviet minimum-deterrent strategy has
avoided the greatest military danger:
that the U.S. might attack the U.S.S.R.
because of a belief that the U.S.S.R. was
about to attack the U.S.
If the analysis given here is approxi-
mately correct, what are the prospects
of progress toward disarmament at the
present meeting in Geneva? Both blocs
ore fully committed by oicial pro-
nouncements to the goal of complete and
general disarmament under strict con-
trol and inspection-notably by the Brit-
ish Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
statement in the spring of 1961. b_v
President Kennedy's speech to the Cen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations and
by ihe Soviet-American joint Statement
of Principles, both in September of 1961.
Moreover, both sides are committed to
attempting to work out rst steps of the
disarmament process that do not impair
the present strategic balance.
Clearly, conventional and nuclear dis-
armament must go in parallel. The fear
of the 9292'est of Soviet supc-riOrit_92' in
trained and deployetl land lorccs must
be rnct by o drastic rerlut-tiun during the- Nd!.
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MILES 1 -5
CRGUND BURST of i nuciear bomb would he required to neutralize 2 hardened thee
buried! missile site. Diameter of the crater dug by n 10-megaton ground burst in dry soil
would be 2.600 feet; the depth of the crater would be 250 feet. Radius of the underground
plastic sone tourer line below ground! would be 3.250 feel; the rdius of the rupture zone"
tinner line below ground! would be 2,000 feet. At a distance ol 1.1 miles from ground zero
the blast would exert an air pressure of some 300 pounds per square inch {inner Cirrle above
ground: ; at a distance oi [.5 miles footer circle above ground! . I00 pounds per eqltare indi-
t_92Q3! 1
@ 1
.
.
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l * | i n I | l
0 IO 20 30 40
MILES
PATTERN OF GROUND BURSTS would be required to neutralise I dispersed group of
hardened missile sites. ln this schematic drawing n circle ol probable error of one mile is
lssumed tor each of the attacking missiles; this implies that ll lent two missiles would be
directed at each oi the sites. There are ve sites. represented by duls. The smaller of each
of the 10 pairs ol com-eutrir circles represents the 2.600-l'ool diameter ol s HI-megaton bomb
crater; the larger of the circles. the Ll-mile radius nl which the oir pressure is 300
pounds per square inch. The lotal weight of the attack on the ve bases is llltl megntons. The
Q99!-.: e! the drawing is the mine es that e! the mop o! St. Louis at the bottom o! page 6.
H
'1oo- " ~~* *
I
U" Mr " "**' 7
ii 3 {
i ii 525 .m _ =. P" :1 _ .__h_..__ ;| 92
ll
, . 1 _,_l . _ _-ml! ix " l I ii ii val
I92 1 ~
i; ll 25 l 5! ~; rig i 922or 1+ e - - -;» x , as ri°r".r1°r
1956 $957 195$ 1959 I950 1961
U5. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET HEAVY-BOMBER STRENGTH by the middle of 1961, ae-
eording to an artiele by Senator Stuart Syrninglon in The Reporter, decreased by Bl per
cent between August, I956 bur at left!, and August, I96] right!. Senator Symington's
gures were given in percentages, rather than absolute numbers, {or security reasons.
100 - F7 - 1 ** -*
if .
wi _ . :_ . ...___
so ~--~ ~- 0 ~ -~~= -
1
20, -- - _ .__ ._ ."ml ll= r
~-aH 15' as 0 ___ I _ - l_il D
. 1959 1960 1961
US. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ICBM STRENGTH sinrilarty decreased, ar-
eording to Senator Symington. by 96.5 per rent between December. i959, and September, 1961.rst sta__ low levels such as those
suggested by the Anglo-French memo-
Ilndum of 1954: one million or at most
1.5 million men each for the U.S., the
U.S.S.R. and China. When the corre-
spondingly limited contributions to the
land forces of NATO from Great Britain,
France and West Germany are taken
into account, the armies of the Soviet
bloc would not have the capability of
overrunning Europe in a surprise land
attack.
The number of nuclear weapons in
existence on both sides, their explosive
power and the diversity of the delivery
systems are so overwhelming that no
small step in nuclear disarmament can
have much signicance. In a situation in
which the U.S. has 10,000 delivery vehi-
cles and a stockpile of 30,000 megatons
of explosive which is said to be increas-
ing at the fastest rate in its history!, a
rst disannarncnt step involving only a
small percentage reduction is not worth
negotiating. To justify the labor of nego-
tiating any agreed reduction, and to off-
set the undoubted strains and disputes
that will inevitably arise from the opera-
tion of any inspection and control sys-
tem, the negotiated reduction must be a
major one; in fact, of such magnitude
as to change qualitatively the nature of
the relative nuclear postures of the two-
Glssni nnwnreg...... l,.......-.
The simplest big rst step, and the
one most consistent with realistic mili-
tary considerations, is that both giant
powers should reduce their nuclear
forces to a very low and purely retalia-
tory role. That is, each should retain only
enough invulnerable long-range vehicles
to attack the other's cities if it is itself at-
taclted, say less than 100 lCBM's with
one-megaton war heads. This is still an
enormous force, capable of killing tens
of millions of people. A reduction to a
level of 20 ICB5i's or less would be
much preferable. Such a reduction
would at once prevent nuclear weapons
from being used by sane governments as
weapons of aggression or coercion. It
would not, of course, prevent them from
being used by irresponsible groups who
do not calculate the cost. It is only at a
later stage in disarmamenhwhen nuclear
weapons are completely destroyed, that
this danger will be excluded. It has al-
ways been clear that the ever present
danger of accidental or irresponsible
war is a cogent reason for big and rapid
steps in the disarmament process.
Detailed studies are needed of possible
ways in which both the U.S.S.R.
and the US. couici take such an impor-
92
taut rst nap without upsetting the
prent strategic balance. A major prob-
lem is how to phase the building up of a
system of general inspection while at the
lune time making a drastic reduction in
nuclear delivery systems by their actual
destruction under intemational verca-
tion. Taking military considerations only
into nccopnt, I believe that a procedure
acceptable to both blocs could be de-
vised.
The difference hitherto between the
proposed Western and Soviet rst steps
in relation to nuclear weapons has been
often simplied to the statement that
the U.S.S.R. wants disarmament with-
.. s .-t-.a-A1 .....,I at-..-. ill-» .......e, av...Yill LTIIISIKIC l¥Il92|| Illlr FUD! VUQJIIJ 92-92.I]I"
trol without disarmament. It would be
more accurate to say that the clash is on
the phasing of the stages of disarmament
lllil the stages of control.
In its 1960 proposals the U.S.S.R. sug-
gested that, in the rst step, international
teams should be dispatched to inspect
the destruction of all rocltet weapons,
military aircraft and other carriers of nu-
clear weapons. It did not propose the
inspection or control of those that re-
main waiting to be destroyed. Full in-
spection of a country was to be under-
talcen only when all weapons had been
destroyed. It is clear that the U.S.S.R.'s
rst steps of disarmament are consist-
ent with its presumed military policy
of relying for its safety from nuclear
attack on a relatively small force of
purely retaliatory nuclear weapons in
secret sites.
On the other hand, the U.S. proposals
in 1960 envisaged widespread_inspec-
tion in the rst stages and no actual dis-
armament until the second stage. This
proposal might make military sense if
Put by a weal: nuclear power to a much
stronger one. But when put by a strong
power to a wealrer one, rejection must
have been expected. If the U.S.S.R. had
accepted the proposal, the geographical
secrecy of its nuclear sites would have
been lost and it would have been vulner-
able to nuclear attack from the much
Istronger 9292 est.
Any realistic rst stage must start
from the fact that the present nuclear
balance, such as it is, has a highly asym-
metric character: the West's much great-
er nuclear puwcr is balanced by Soviet
geographical secrecy. Since iile military
balance is asymmetric, so must be any
mutually act1:pt:thlc first step. Conces-
sions must be made by both sides and
these must based on the rcnlitics of
the military postures of the two blocs.
The U.S.S.ll. should accept general
inspection n_ot, as in their proposals1 '
hitherto, when disarmament is complete
but at some intermediate stage on the
road to disarmament. Reciprocally, the
West should not demand widespread in-
spection before any disarmament has
taken place, as it has done hitherto, but
only alter substantial destruction of nu-
clear armaments has tal-zen place under
'international verication.
In the first stage, therefore, all parties
might supply to one another a list of
nuclear weapons and their delivery sys-
tems, together with research and produc-
tion facilities. The exact location of sites
would not be included at this stage. An
agreed number of weapons would then
be destroyed and their destruction would
be verified by on-site inspection by the
international control organization. When
this destruction has been veried, a gen-
eral inspection, using some sampling
technique, would begin. The object
would then be to verify the correctness
of the original declared inventories by
checking the numbers remaining after
the agreed reductions had been veried,
and to proceed to the elimination of the
arrnamcnt remaining.
A word must be said about the place
of a test-ban agreement in the stages of
It disarmament plan. If this agreement
did not involve a type of inspection that
might reveal the Soviet nuclear sites, it
would be advantageous for it to be in-
cluded in the rst stage, or preferably
agreed to at once. If, however, it in-
volved widcspread inspection that might
reveal these sites, Soviet military plan-
ners would certainly advise its rejection.
It would then have to wait for the second
stage of disarmament, when general in-
spection starts after the destruction of
agreed numbers of nuclear weapons in
the rst stage.
Some such compromise between
Western and Soviet proposals would
seem to meet many of the reciprocal cri-
ticisms made by the two parties of their
respective 1960 proposals without com-
promising thc military security of either.
The problem becomes more dillicult,
however, when nonmilitury considera-
tions are taken into account. Since non-
military considerations have played a
major role in shaping the defense poli-
cies of the great powers, they must in-
evitably also alfcct their disarmament
policies. For example, ii it is diiiicult to
find legitimate military reasons for the
vast number of U.S. nuclear weapons
and delivery vehicles, it is clear that
militnry arguments nlouc arc not lilzcly
to be dominant in U.S. discussion of it
possible drastic first step toward nuclear
tlisarmament. This is widely admitted inthe U.S., wnele the impediments to dis-
armament are being seen more and more
as economic, political and emotional in
origin rather than as based on opera-
tional military considerations. A vital as-
pect of the problem for the U.S. is the
effect that drastic disanament steps
would have not only on the economy as
a whole but also on those special sections
of high-grade, science-based and highly
localized industries that are now so over-
whelmingly involved in defense work. A
valuable step would be for both the U.S.
and Soviet governments to produce and
publish detailed and politically realistic
economic plans for the transition to a
purely retaliatory capacity.
It is fair to conclude that s realistic
military basis for an agreed drastic
rst step in disarmament may not be
impossible to nd. The urgency of the
situation was declared with eloquence
by President Kennedy in his speech to
the United Nations in September:
Today, every inhabitant of this
planet must contemplate the day when
this planet may no longer be habitable.
Every man, woman and child lives under
a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging
by the slenderest of threads, capable of
being cut at any moment by accident or
iniscalculation or by madness.... The
rislzs inherent in disarmament pale in
comparison to the risks inherent in an
unlimited arms race.
This great goal of disarmament will
be achieved only if the real nature of
the arguments against disarmament are
clearly identied and frankly faced.
The problems of disarmament must not
be obscured, as they sometimes have
been in the past, by ingenious but fulln-
cious military doctrine applied to false
intelligence estimates.
The growing power of China, and the
evidence of an ideological rift between
it and Russia, provide an added reason
for urgency in the drive for disarmament.
The U.$.S.R. and the U.S. will be wise
to limit drastically their nuclear arms
before China becomes :1 major nuclear
power. It is to be observed that what-
ever influence China may now be exert-
ing on the U.S.S.l'l. to adopt a harder
policy with the West certainly arises in
pant fmn the failure of Premier Khru-
shchcv's campaign for disnrmantcht.
This fziiure greatly weakens Khru-
shchevls argument for the feasibility of
peaceful coexistence of the Soviet and
the Western worlds. It would seem ur-
gently accessory to attempt to bring
China itio the tlis-armament negotiations
as soonas possible.
I I
n,,!
P. M. S. BLACKETT, professor of
physics at the Imperial College of
Science and Technology of the Univer-
sity of London since 1953, is distin-
guished both as a physicist and as an
adviser to the British Government on
military and scientic policy. A graduate
of the University of Cambridge and a
Fellow of the Royal Society, he won the
Nolacl prize in physics in 19-13. i-le went
into physics from the Royal Navy, a
graduate nl the Royal Naval College at
Dartmouth and a veteran of the Battle
of jutland. From 1934 to the begin-
ning of World War It Blaclaett served
on the Aeronautical Research Committee
headed by Sir Henry Tizard, which de-
veloped Britain's radar defense system;his work during the war was instrumen-
tal in defeating the German submarine
campaign. Since the war he has played
a leading role in public discussion of
military questions; his writings include
Atomic 92Veap0ns and East-West Rela-
tions, published by Cambridge Univer-
sity Press in 1956. Portions of the pres-
ent article appeared in the New States-
man for March 2, 1962.
Bilaliography J
Carnque or Sour-: CONTEMPORARY DE-
FENCE Tnmxmc. P. M. S. Blaclrett in
Encounter, Vol. 16, No. 4, pages
947; April, 1961.
Tn: Lmrrrs or DEFENSE. Arthur I. Was-
lcow. Doubleday 6: Company, Inc.,
1962.
Snow = SAC, Philadelphia V
ICAN. Q!
'-- ' V.
0 - -
UNITED STATES GUVERNMNT
'MEMORANDUM
mo = Director, FBI um; "~11/_;_o_b,
SUBJEC:- iH%i FRIENDS SERVICE OOMMTTEE
E who has - isheci reliable in-
formation he past, furnished to SA the Fall%964 issue of Quaker Service," a bulletin of the American
rie d S a n s ervice Committee. This issue has an article captioned,
Former Staff Serve In Government, which is being quoted herein
for the information of the Bureau:
IIMany Persons who have served with the American
Friends Service Gomittee have gone on to posi-
tions of service with other organizations both
private and governmental,
"It is significant to-note the names of several
of our former staff who are now or have in recent
years served in important positions with agencies
of the federal government.
. 1
"WILLIAM , who directed use rehabilita-
'¬Ion t6FR with.WestQ1irginia coal miners-in the
I
1
, _!
Q
II
¬
>C
1930's, has for a number of years been directorof the Federal Mediation and conciliation Serv-O8. _ .. V ; , .
' ¢
L !1- 92 .. .. ............ -,g 'A'4'l__fl'_3_IG'{'iE§S; Ilu ueJ.'v::d vu. SC '§'!0E",'I3-I-'38
of relief tEFBpanish Civil War refugees in the*Aé§é early 1940's, later represented the Service Com-QLQHJ4 mittee at the United Nations and took part in '
the Arab refugee relief program in Palestine.
He is now a member of the Policy Planning Council
of the Department of State.__
"J0§§92EQsHI§O,_who directedour Chicago job oppor-
sssitr*p§tgsss, 195% through 1956, is not deputy9/ field director of Field Services for the President's_
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, according
to our latest information. ' -
JAoQt1E§"_ v_:1'm'1o_ss,,aeputy director of the Peace Corps
; In Rigefi§7in 1963, formerly held positions with
§"j the Service Committee in the early l950s. His
/ responsibilities included director of the Job Op-
portunities Program and assistant secretary for
Community Relations. - - H
"WILLIATDEI-mo, who served with the arse in Germany,
V l948'through l950, was general counsel for the"Peace
" Corps before leaving to become secretary general of
the International Secretariat for Volunteer Service-
. "Co-director of our village development program in_i/ Turan, israel, from 1953 through 1955,_§ILLIAM E.92;;:*§g%§ER is, according to our latest inform¬tIonT Ubm--V J3ydeve1opment adviser for the Agency for Inter-
-national Development AID! in Kenya.
. 1 0 Unite-:1 Nations Plazzning to the Assistazzt SecretaryLb V _of State for International Organizational Affairs.
!2
é92 " 92 fr!
92,-_ f~. sL*ao:Pl92l¢.ac1csor left the Service Committee in 1961id} to'sJe:=i< p'*.;921;1:»§* p-¢,sitio:1 of Special Assistant for f
,_ __ I' .
! M ..,/
92| a
92
I
He had served with the Comittee ar various inter-
vals over a period of 25 years. His responsibilities
included Work camp secretary, personnel secretary,
assistant executive secretary, director or Quaker
House and AFSC representative to the United Nations,
AFSC representative to the Arab Middle East, and as-
sociate executive secretary and director of the
Quaker Program at the Uhited Nations."
I-3-
I
UNI J STATES DEPARTMENT OF J; ICE .
V A FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
I..-. .
1 Repfflplut Rd-"M WASHINGTON 25, D.G.
Flt No. I
* November 12, 1964
iAS2=IIN§t1@N. Paw <=-*=1~I'r11= Y
About twelve members of the Washington Peace
Center will be "vigiling" at the White House from ll a.m. to
y 1 p.m. on November 13, 1964. This demonstration will be
conducted by the Washington Peace Center in sympathy with
the Committee for Non-Violent Action CNVA!. Thosepartici-
pating in this demonstration will be carrying signs which
will indicate sympathy on the part of the Washington Peace
Center for the CNVA.
The Washington Peace Center and the Committee for
Non-Violent Action are pacifist type of organizations. The
letterhead of the Washington Peace Center in a letter dated
May 19, 1964, contained the following:
?A local agency cooperating with the
.American Friends Service Committee -
Quakers." -
92
This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property oi
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.
Ias ..
, I~<5é1i », 92 _ i Z
U192'r1..i- STATES DEPARTMENT or JU::>l}'ICEilh '
_ *t$£%* FEDERAL BUREAU OFINYESTIGATION
1 Repbu P1 ... Rgfw no
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
December 16, 1965
_ Agmlaurspisrmsp sisstipcg ,co:_c~z:__T,_ O _ AFSO_!_
A source on December 1, l965fiunnished the following
report on the appearance of ARNOLD,JOHNSON, Staff Member, Communist
Party, USA CPUSA!, at Philadelphia, Pa., on November 21, 196M,
where he spoke at the "Saturday Opinion Forum" for high school
students in the Philadelphia area, held at Friends Select School,
17th and Parkway, Philadelphia, Pa., at a cost of $1.50 per person:
I. Background .
On November 21, 196b, ARNOLD JOHNSON spoke before
a group of students on the topic of peaceful coexistence.
The speech came as part of a program, "Communism -
Principle and Practice, which was one of a number of
Saturday Opinion Forums sponsored by the Friends Peace
Committee and the American Friends Service COWJ ttee.
Mr. JOHNSON was debating the question of "R olved -
that the United States of America cannot -aceful1y
coexist with Cpmmunism" with Mr. THOMAS OOD, JR. Mr.JOHNSON took the negative side in the ebate. fag
II. The Speech Itself -Z
Mr. JOHNSON opened the speech with the expressed
desire to "clear up some basic misconceptions" about the
American Communist Party:
+- i 3 92
t 92
~- _ *4 0?
EN CLOSURE. . _
I-*7 -- _ - _..-_..._u. .'1
1 K, _!
I1
sisslw Fmm sasirlvr i°'<>i1llIf1f1»lE_
a! The American Communist Party does not now
represent and has never represented any other political
party or any other country; _
b! The Party does not now advocate and has never
advocated the violent overthrow of the United States
Government;
c! Capitalism cannot be equated with democracy,
nor is Capitalism in the interests of the United States.
Mr. JOHNSON said that, for those reasons, he is a
Socialist. .
According to Mr. JOHNSON, the United States can and
must coexist with the Communist nations. He said that
peaceful coexistence represents for the first time in
modern history the prospect of world-wide peace. Before
1917 the date of the Russian Revolution!, Mr. JOHNSON
explained, war was the policy of the Capitalist governments
when they could not achieve their aims by any other means.
Their reasoning, he said, was of this order: "War is
not only inevitable, but necessary." Communists, however,
he stated, do not believe this. Since the Russian
Revolution of l917, the system of Socialism has existed
in the world and has presented the peoples of the world
with an alternative to Capitalism and, thus, an alternative
to war, according to Mr. JOHNSON. From the Socialist
conception of ownership of the workers, eto., and, therefore,
no desire to expand markets, engage in international
competition, eto., there arises the concept of peaceful
coexistence. Peaceful coexistence, according to Mr.
JOHNSON, means the absence of wars of competition, which
are the inevitable outgrowth of Capitalism and the -
Capitalist State. _ "
Diametrically opposed to the wars of Capitalist
competition, however, said Mr. JOHHSON, are wars of defense
and liberation the latter may be termed "People's Wars"!.
The position of the Socialist nations toward such wars
is twofold, according to JOHNSON: ~
. _ -2"-
L
0I
~ 92e* _!
Ansaicar FBIEND§ §EEY1C§_CQ§IITIEQ
a! Such wars are generally supported because they
are in the interests of the people;*
b! However, the advent of thermonuclear weapons
introduces a new element into the world picture - peaceful
coexistence becomes the policy not only for the Socialist
countries but for the whole world. In Mr. JOHNSON's words,
"It is a question of coexistence or no existence."
Mr. JOHNSON said that the Socialist countries feel
that it is necessary to be scientifically honest about
problems. This implies taking into account all factors
having an influence on the problem in question. Thus,
since 650 A.D., there have been 1,657 arms races and
balances of power Mr. JOHNSON's figures!. Of these,
1,6h9, or fully 99 per cent, have resulted in war.
According to Mr. JOHNSON, the conclusion reached by the
o Socialist nations from such figures is that arms races
and balances of power inevitably "flirt with war."
Thermonuclear war, Mr. JOHNSON said, is not a
war between soldiers," but rather "a war which spreadsto the peoples of the nations involved, a war with you
and me. There is continually the possibility of extinction
he said, of the whole human race.
Mr. JOHNSON said that there are many things possible
within peaceful coexistence. He said that among these
were peaceful_negotiations between nations and the
ultimate ideal and goal of all peace-loving nations,
general and complete disarmament. He said that peaceful
coexistence is not up to the governments alone, but
that the peoples of the nations of the world must show
their willingness to achieve such a goal. Peaceful"
coexistence, he said, does not eliminate struggle. e
Rather,-it opens new areas for struggle and encourages
such struggles as those for social advance, liberation,
and peaceful competition among the peoples of the world.
There is always a struggle for ideas, even within an
ideological system, JOHNSON said. ..
-3-
ll
I
- 92_ J
5.r£R,I,Cm7 s:?.*.':- *2 cpr_;'-;t111'-35,
U4 an-I8 1|-92-92n-F GA»!-In-92'lJas--. 0.01.1! -4-Jun i-I» 4-In; eul--ngn<~n"l.4-.[lg ¢Q|-I-.LJ UJIQU L!92J92r-I-QJ.-92.D -l IL;-L V!-L11. '-L_l U11: BUL
IIwith democracy. Indeed, he said, Socialism is more in
the interests of the United States than is democracy.
"Let's examine it thoroughly and determine what is
in the interests of our country," JOHNSON said. His
conclusion was that peaceful coexistence is most
assuredly in the interests of the United States in
this age of thermonuclear weapons.
Following Mr. WOOD's remarks, Mr. JOHNSON said
that Mr. WOOD had misrepresented Communism, but that even
those who believe the "slanders and misrepresentations"
must believe in peaceful coexistence. Ee said that
peaceful coexistence does not require the belief that
Communism will win out, as Mr. WOOD had stated.
Ir; rggnnnr-:0 in Nh-I WODTH: nknhnment that nnlv. 3..-...-_.. .... ...... .......... ... ....,......-........... W...-- -......,,
a minority of Russia's population belongs to the Comunist
Party, Mr. JOHNSON said that more than 70 per cent of
the United States is opposed to the current government.
"Clean up America first," was his comment.
In a continuation of his earlier statement in the
rebuttal, Mr. JOHNSON refuted Mr. WO0D's remark that
the Communist concept of peaceful coexistence really
meant "surrender - or be destroyed!" Mr. JOHNSON said
FAll I said was, Coexistence or no existence.'" He
said that the current buildup for war is a buildup forII
. J1
&1*E.1'92_IQ;°~lU"a1*-l3_-Eal@5, 555-Y;I9?-'3 Q9?"-'-"TI'l'+"F-E:
Socialist countries, but of the Capitalist countries
as well. ,
According to Mr. JOHNSON, this country must remain
at peace and advocate a policy cf peace. We must
engage in peaceful competition with the Socialist
countries.
IV. Questions and Answers
Mr. JOHNSON was asked about the position of the
Comunist Party toward religion. His reply was that
the Party felt that a man's religion "was his own
business." He then went on to say that Communists have
as high a view, if not higher, than anyone else. Heguoted the remark, for which he gave no source, that"
Comunists are stronger Christians than Christians.
He was asked how he reconciled his Bachelor of
Divinity Degree from Union Theological Seminary with his
statement that he was a materialistic atheist. He
said that after he took the Degree, he went into unemploy-
ment relief work during the depression and was forced
to re-examine those views.
He was asked how it was possible to peacefully
coexist with a nation, one of whose leaders had
said, "we will bury you," and with China, the most
aggressive nation in the world today. He stated in
reply that the expression on Mr. KHR3SHOHEV's part was
of the same order as the baseball fan's "Kill the ump!
As to China, he said that she has an entirely different
concept of peaceful coexistence. '
The question was asked, Mary Eealy...has said
that one of the aims of Communism is to see that the
worker receives most of the profit. How can you reconcile
this with the Soviet Union, whose standard of living
is so much lower than our own? According to Mr. JOHNSON,
Miss HEALI's statement is an unusual way of stating the
basic Communist concept of the ownership of the means
of production and distribution. As to the second part
-5-
1i
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M ' |
g @-
-E-J 331!-i-3"? I"?-I.E.-TDS_ SEEYICE C021? 1-1:".-.!aE.
of the question, he said that while it is true that
the United States has a higher standard of living,
there are more poor people here, Two-fifths of the
population of the United States - T?,OO0,000 people -
live in substandard conditions, he said, adding,
These are not m figures. He ascribed the poverty
to Capitalism, stating that under Socialism, with peaceful
competition among the workers, the Soviet Uhion has
advanced amazingly since 1917. "This country has grown
fat on war," he declared. We shouldgrant peaceful
coexistence and let the countries of the world compete
peaceably, he said.
To the question of why there is anti-Semitism in
the USSR, Mr. JOHNSON replied that anti=Semitism is
against the law. He said that the old society cannot
be completely uprooted by a "People's Revolution, and
that some vestiges of it still remain; thus, some Soviet
people are still antiSemitic. He commented parenthetically
that those of us who are white have not done nearly
enough to erase racism in this country.
In response to another question, Mr. JOHNSON said
that no country today has true Communism. Socialism,
yes, he said, but not Communism. Communism implies a
social attitude and discipline on the part of the people.
This must come from within the nation, he said. He
added that peaceful coexistence would lay the groundwork
for this attitude. _
When asked if it was necessary for the Communist
nations to take over the world in order to achieve true
Communism, Mr. JOHNSON replied that it was not necessary.
i He was asked about the treatment of the Tibetans
by the Chinese, and replied that it was not necessarily
genocide, as it had been termed, but rather the logical
result of the age-long will of the Tibetan people to be
a part of China. '
He was asked about the difference between the Communist
Party of the U. S. A. and the Comunist Party of the U. S. S
-6- S C
_,A 4 . 4 . .
l
IR
V r
!.?IRIC.Fa."_ l*"Rl'L'TI3$ SET-:"..="ICE COT-PETITE
His
tie
but
stated There has been
matter and still is hereply was that there has been_on internati
since the dissolution of the Third Interna
a great deal of debate
said
When asked about t
in the Soviet Union, he
-the artist is relative. The artist is a Socia
country has a certain social responsibility; h
---n-|- LA --_-n»92J .1510! A .-.1!,-I!-'| Iv-.!l.>9*4'92P!"~ l'."!92-II;-| -In 92|92nI92IHUDU DU Li.iJi.-U. J.U.'.' UULJ-GLJ. }-Li-1|-gJ_Jb=Q J.H.J. 4.3.: Ll-Ureplied that the freedthat the CPUSA would like to see such ties rein-
! I
h!
onal
tional,
on this
e limitations placed upon artists
om of
list
is talent
t the
case in the United States, he said because if "society
cannot convince, it cannot impose. He said that the -
freedom of the artist is gaining in the USSR,
here, although the barriers to truly free art
dropping over here.
A second source advised on January 13, l96h, tlosing over
are gradually
hat ARNOED
JOESON was Eational Legislative Director, CPUSA,
The first source also stated that THOMAS
member of the Board of Directors of the
Enterprise System and a lecturer on the
democracy, debated with JOHNSON and was
JOHNSON to a great extent.challenge o
effective i
The first source_furnished on December 1,
mimeographed sheet headed Saturday Opin
…[truncated]