Coed Arms for Air Defense FM 44 8

Document text

HEADQUARTERS 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 



FM 44-8 




DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 





FM 44-8 



Field Manual Headquarters 

Number 44-8 Department of the Army 

Washington, D. C, 1 June 1999 



COMBINED ARMS FOR AIR DEFENSE 

Contents 



Page 



PREFACE iii 

INTRODUCTION iv 

Chapter 1 EVALUATE THE BATTLEFIELD 1-1 

The Battlefield Environment 1-1 

The Battlefield Effects 1-2 

Threat Evaluation 1-4 

The Aerial Threat 1-7 

Threat Application 1-11 

Threat Courses of Action 1-13 

Chapter 2 TECHNIQUES FOR SELF-DEFENSE WARNINGS 2-1 

Air Defense Early Warning Nets 2-1 

Local Air Defense Warnings 2-2 

Rules of Engagement 2-2 

Directed Early Warning 2-3 

Sample Early Warning Scenario 2-4 

Unit Warning 2-4 

Chapter 3 AERIAL SEARCH 3-1 

Air Guard Responsibilities 3-1 

Aerial Search in a Convoy 3-1 

Search Techniques 3-1 

Systematic Methods of Search 3-3 

Visual Aerial Platform Recognition 3-4 

Chapter 4 PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES 4-1 

Types of Passive Air Defense Measures 4-1 

Passive Air Defense Measures in Convoy 4-4 

Convoy Self-Defense Measures 4-7 

Chapter 5 ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES 5-1 

Active Air Defense 5-1 

Small Arms Used for Air Defense 5-2 



DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
*This publication supersedes FM 44-8, 30 December 1981. 




FM44-8 

Contents (continued) 

Page 

Aircraft Engagement Techniques for the M2/M3 Bradiey .... 5-6 

Aircraft Engagement Techniques for Tanks 5-7 

Practice Sequence of Engagement 5-8 

Chapter 6 TRACER OBSERVATION 6-1 

Tracer Observation of Fast-Moving Aircraft 6-1 

Tracer Observation of Siow-Moving Aircraft 6-4 

APPENDIX A UNIT TRAINING A-1 

GLOSSARY Giossary-1 

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bibiiography-1 

INDEX Index-1 




Preface 



Air defense artillery units are a limited resource on the battlefield. Available ADA resources will 
be dedicated to the protection of assets deemed by commanders to be critical to the success of the 
tactical plan, leaving other assets without dedicated ADA coverage. All units with or without 
dedicated ADA support must contribute to their own defense against air attack. This manual is 
addressed to all unit commanders. It explains the air threat to units on the ground and places 
the threat in its proper perspective. It also explains how ground commanders can protect their 
units from air attack through the use of passive and active air defense measures. 



This publication implements the following international standardization agreements: 



STANAG 


TITLE 


EDITION 


2014 


Operation Orders, Warning, and Administrative/Logistics Orders 


7 


2019 


Military Symbols for Land Based Systems — ^APP-6 


3 


2034 


Land Forces Procedures for Allied Supply Transactions 


4 


2041 


Operations Orders, Tables and Graphs for Road Movement 


4 


2047 


Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only) 


6 


2079 


Rear Air Security and Rear Area Damage Control 


4 


2150 


NBC-NATO Standards of Proficiency for NBC Defence 


5 


2868 


Land Force Tactical Doctrine — ^ATP-35(B) 


5 


3700 


NATO Tactical Air Doctrine — ^ATP-33(B) 


5 


3736 


Offensive Air Support Operations — ^ATP-27(B) 


8 


3805 


Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis 
and War— ATP-40 (A) 


4 


3880 


Counter Air Operations — ^ATP-42 (B) D 


3 


QSTAG 


509 


Military Symbols 





The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes to improve this manual on 
DA Form 2028 and forward to Commandant, US Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: 
ATSA-DOT-SH, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802. 



Unless this publication states otherwise, the masculine gender applies to both men and women. 




INTRODUCTION 



Force-projection operations doctrine reflects the shift towards stronger joint operations. Army 
operations have evolved into a variety of choices for a battlefield framework and a wider 
interservice arena, allowing for the increasing incidence of combined operations. 

Army participation in air defense is no longer the sole responsibility of army air defense assets. 
Members of the combined arms team can use their organic firepower along with air defense 
assets to provide self-defense, suppress enemy air defenses, and provide maneuver force 
protection. 

The table below outlines the Army’s participation in air defense operations. It describes the 
assets of the combined arms team as well as the contributions of each member’s organic weapons 
capabilities to air defense. Army units can use their organic firepower to destroy attacking 
aircraft and drive others away. Field Artillery, Infantry, Armor, and Aviation contribute to the 
air defense fight by engaging enemy aircraft in self-defense and by making attacks on enemy 
airfields and logistics assets that support their aviation units. 



ARMY PARTICIPATION IN AIR DEFENSE 


ARMY ELEMENTS 


AIR DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS 


AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY: 


Maneuver force protection 


• THAAD System 


High-value asset protection 


• Patriot System 

• SHORAD Systems: 

•• Avenger 

•• MANPAD System 
•• BSFV Linebacker 


Counter-RISTA 


FIELD ARTILLERY: 


Attack critical air assets 


• Missiles 


FARPs 


• Cannons 


Transporter-erector-launchers 


• Rockets 


SEAD 


ARMY AVIATION: 


Self-defense/AD on order 


• Helicopters 


Maneuver force protection 
SEAD 


CHEMICAL: 


Concealment 


• Smoke Units 


Deception/denial 


OTHER COMBINED ARMS: 


Self-defense 


• Organic Weapons 


Attack critical air assets 
SEAD 


SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: 


Provide surveillance, intelligence, and targeting 


• Skilled Soldiers 


Attack critical air assets 





Chapter 1 

Evaluate the Battlefield 



This chapter describes how the unit uses the IPB process to assist in 
executing and integrating air defense into comhat operations. This is 
especially true in special staff sections and units outside the comhat arms. 

The particular needs of these elements require a slightly different focus in 
the application of the IPB process due to their mission requirements. At 
the very least, these products must he refined to meet the particular 
needs of staff or unit that will use them. Primarily, the S2 is responsible 
for IPB. 

THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT 

1-1. In defining the battlefield environment, one must take into account the 
actual and possible limitations of the third dimension — the element of 
altitude. Some areas to consider are — 

• Location of threat airfields and launching points. 

• Range of aircraft and missiles. 

• Physical constraints in the friendly AO. 

• Buildings and other structures. 

• Power lines and antennas. 

• Hills, trees, and other natural barriers to movement and observation. 

• Weather. 

1-2. The overall structure of the battlefield, at the tactical level of war, 
consists of the area of interest, battlespace, the area of operations, and 
battlefield organization. This provides the commanders a way to associate 
their forces to the enemy in terms of time, space, and purpose. 

AREA OF INTEREST 

1-3. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander. It is the 
geographic area and airspace above it from which information and 
intelligence are required to successfully conduct the commander’s operation. 
This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize 
accomplishment of the mission. 



BATTLESPACE 

1-4. Battlespace is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to 
the ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It varies in width, depth, and 
height as the commander positions and moves assets over time. Battlespace 
is not assigned by a higher commander and can extend beyond the 
commander's area of operations. 



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AREA OF OPERATIONS 

1-5. The area of operations is the geographic area, including the airspace 
above, assigned to a commander in which he has responsibility and the 
authority to conduct military operations. It is usually defined by lateral, 
forward, and rear boundaries assigned by a higher commander. 

BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION 

1-6. The commander arranges and synchronizes the battlefield activities 
throughout his AO to accomplish deep, close, and rear operations 
simultaneously. The objective is to attack the enemy simultaneously 
throughout the depth of the battlefield. As a result of battlefield 
organization, the commander can accomplish the mission more effectively 
and efficiently. 



THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS 

1-7. Identify the effects of the battlefield on friendly and enemy courses of 
action. Specific considerations include — 

• Likely air avenues of approach. 

• Target areas or installations. 

• Possible LZs and DZs. 

• Location of ADA weapons and radars. 

• Standoff ranges. 

DETERMINE AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH 

1-8. A good air avenue of approach will permit maneuver while providing 
terrain masking from surface-to-air weapon systems. Some common air 
avenues of approach are valleys, direct lines from the enemy point of origin, 
and riverbeds. Determine air courses of action by acquiring the supported 
command's basic IPB products, including situation templates. Evaluate the 
general course of action they portray and determine how the threat might 
support them with air power. Do not attempt to determine air course of 
action in isolation from the maneuver forces they support. Use the following 
factors to determine air avenues of approach, both ingress and egress: 



Type of Air Threat, Attack Profile, and Ordnance 

1-9. UAVs are small and elusive. They usually fly low, but the altitude can 
vary. Once in the target area, they may fiy an orbit attempting to stay out of 
engagement range of ADA. Most surface-launched cruise missiles follow the 
terrain and use terrain masking. Due to their range, they may take indirect 
approach routes. Ballistic missiles are not terrain-dependent. They fiy from 
launch point to objective. Their flight is not restricted by terrain. Tactical air- 
to-surface missiles usually fiy direct routes from launch platform to the 
target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow 
ridgelines and military crests, using the terrain to mask their approach to the 



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target area. Fixed-wing aircraft usually follow major terrain or man-made 
features. Depending on range, they may fly a straight line to the target. 
Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude of the air system and, 
thus, influence the selection of avenues of approach for airborne and air 
assault operations. 

Air Threat Point of Origin and Ground Control Radar Positions 

1-10. When determining air avenues, the staff looks at the commander's 
entire area of interest. Analysis begins at the threat airfield, UAV, or missile 
launch site and works toward the probable enemy objective. This allows the 
commander to look at the big picture. The staff considers the range of the air 
systems and location of navigation aids and ground control sites. 

Probable Threat Objective 

1-11. Each avenue of approach must end at a target, drop zone, landing zone, 
or within reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance or target acquisition 
range of a target. Reverse IPB is used to pick threat objectives. 

Potential to Support Maneuver Forces 

1-12. Air assets, which are used to achieve ground objectives, will seek to use 
air avenues of approach coincident with ground avenues of approach. Air 
assets attacking deep are not limited to these ground avenues. Ground 
corridors do not limit missiles and RISTA UAVs. 



Freedom to Maneuver 

1-13. Does the avenue of approach — 

• Canalize the air system? 

• Have access to adjacent avenues? 

• Provide the ability to acquire a target and use available munitions? 

• Assist in navigation? 

Protection for the Air System and Pilot 

1-14. Does the avenue provide the following: 

• Terrain masking (cover and concealment)? 

• Full use of air system speed? 

• Protection against radar detection? 

• Protection from air defense weapon systems and tactical air support? 

• A standoff orbit location? 

• A standoff orbit? 

Air Threat and Pilot Capabilities 

1-15. Can the air system or pilot do the following: 

• Perform contour flying? 

• Fly at night? 



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• Fly in all weather conditions? 

• Range the targets? 

Cloud Cover and Ceilings 

1-16. Cloud cover and ceilings may restrict operations by setting low 
operational ceilings and restricting visibility and target engagement. Low 
ceilings, overcast, and clouds may restrict visually-directed ADA weapons' 
detection and acquisition ranges. 



Temperature 

1-17. Extreme temperature and humidity have a severe effect on aircraft and 
UAVs by decreasing combat range, altitude (particularly rotary-wing 
aircraft), and ordnance loads. 

CONDUCT TARGET VALUE EVALUATION 

1-18. Evaluating target value determines what targets are to be labeled as 
high-value targets. High-value targets are assets the enemy or friendly 
commander has deemed as important for the successful accomplishment of 
his mission. High-value targets are determined by operational necessity and 
weapon system capability. 

THREAT EVALUATION 

1-19. Threat evaluation for air operations consists of a detailed study of 
enemy air capabilities, organization, and doctrine. The following steps should 
be used when evaluating the threat: 

COLLECT AND ANALYZE DOCTRINAL THREAT DATA 

1-20. When analyzing threat doctrine data, include the commander's critical 
information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Use the 
following questions as a guide in establishing threat information: 

• What are the major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of 
the enemy's air operations? 

• Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression? 

• Where do friendly air defense assets fit into the enemy's objectives? 
Do they need to be destroyed or suppressed for the enemy plan to 
work? (Answers to these two questions may result in modification to 
air avenues of approach.) 

• What is the enemy's air order of battle? How are the assets 
organized? (Knowledge of threat organization and who has 
operational control will indicate the importance of the area of 
operations. For example, if the enemy's bombers are at theater level 
and are in the area of operations, then that area is probably receiving 
the theater's main attack.) What is the size of the enemy’s ballistic 
missile brigade, battalion, and battery? Does it fire as a unit? Does 
the threat have mobile, fixed, or both types of launchers? 

• Who has tactical control of aircraft at the point of attack? 



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• How will UAVs and cruise missiles be used; for example, RISTA, 
attack, or battle damage assessment? What are the associated 
profiles? 

• How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne, 
air assault, or special operations forces in conjunction with an air or 
ground attack? What sizes are these forces and to what depth are 
they used? Will the enemy synchronize the air attack? Does the 
enemy have the capability to coordinate an air attack (possibly with 
varied air threat platforms that can overmatch friendly air defense 
capability)? 

• What are air system combat ingress and egress speeds? 

• Where are missile and UAV launch points? What are the range, 
endurance, and profile of these systems? 

• What are the doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling 
points? If the enemy's maximum range falls short of the area of 
operations, where is the enemy likely to stop and refuel or be aerially 
refueled? Does the enemy possess an aerial refueling capability? 

• How and where will the enemy attack ground targets for interdiction? 

• At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver 
munitions, and exit the target area? 

• What is the release authority of certain types of ordnance? This is 
particularly important when dealing with NBC threats. 

• How does the enemy employ reconnaissance assets? 

• How has the enemy historically fought? What has the enemy learned 
from our most recent adversary? 

ANALYZE THREAT AIR CAPABILITIES 

1-21. ADA units analyze and evaluate air threat capabilities by providing 
answers to the following questions. 



Aircraft 

1-22. What are the enemy’s capabilities regarding — 

• Coordination of air-to-ground attacks? 

• Coordination of air and artillery operations? Are ground forward air 
controllers used? 

• Suppression of friendly air defense? 

• Performance (speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, troop and weapon 
load capacity)? 

• Endurance and range (ingress and egress altitudes and speeds)? 

• Levels of combat readiness and sortie generation rate? 

• Ability to conduct pop-up maneuvers. What is the standoff range? 

• Target acquisition capability, night and adverse-weather capability, 
and identification ranges? 

• Standoff ranges for cruise and tactical air-to-surface missiles? 

• Ordnance load (maximum weight, type, load mixture, and level of 
sophistication)? 



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• Combat personnel load? 

• Navigational capability (type of radar; can it fly at night or in adverse 
conditions)? 

• Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, and 
location of staging bases)? 

• Loiter time (how long will it have on station over the target area)? 

• Countermeasures. For example, will standoff jammers, ground-based 
jammers, reconnaissance or chaff laying UAVs, or aircraft degrade 
friendly air defense systems? 

• Type, quantity, and quality of training the pilot received? 

• How much they conform to doctrine? 

• Ability of pilots to fly at night or perform contour flying? During 
peacetime, did the pilot conduct the type of mission expected to be 
conducted during war? 

• Type of threat ordnance evaluated as follows: 

■ Range: Assume engagement at maximum range and two-thirds 
maximum range. 

■ Accuracy. 

■ Release altitude. How high or low must the aircraft fly? 

■ Reload and retire time. What is the number of missiles available? 

■ Warhead type (for example, mass casualty, conventional, and 
submunitions). 

■ Release altitude. 

■ Guidance modes. How does the pilot acquire and engage? 



UAVs 

1-23. What are the capabilities of threat UAVs regarding — 

• Performance (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)? 

• Endurance and range? 

• Contour flying or terrain-limiting factors? 

• Target acquisition and standoff range? 

• Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load 
mixture)? 

• Loiter time (how long can the UAV stay on station)? 

• Visibility affects on acquisition? 

• Modes of recovery and turnaround time? 

• Real-time, data-link capability? 

• Guidance modes (ground-controlled and preprogrammed)? 

• Crew proficiency? 



TBMs 

1-24. What are the capabilities of threat TBM systems regarding — 

• Performance (flight time, speed, trajectory and launch restrictions)? 

• Maximum and minimum ranges? 



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FM 44-8 



• Circular error of probability? 

• Crew proficiency? 

• Reload and retire time? What is the number of TBMs available per 
transporter erector launcher? 

• Warhead type and size? 

• Guidance modes? 

• Location of surveyed launch sites? 



Cruise Missiles 

1-25. What are the capabilities of threat cruise missiles regarding — 

• Performance (flight time, speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)? 

• Maximum and minimum ranges? 

• Circular error of probability? 

• Targeting capabilities and type? 

• Contour flying capability? 

• Vulnerability to countermeasures? 

• Guidance modes? 

• Warhead type and size? 

THE AERIAL THREAT 

1-26. The primary aerial threats that must be countered include UAVs such 
as the Shmel-1, DR-3 Reys, and D-4 NPU in addition to cruise missiles like 
the AS-4 Kitchen, AS-15 Kent, and C-101. Also, rotary-wing attack 
helicopters including the Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Hind D/E, and Mi-28 Havoc; close 
air support, ground-attack, fixed-wing aircraft such as the Su-25 Frogfoot, 
MiG-27 Flogger D,J, and MiG-29 Fulcrum. These aircraft will conduct 
reconnaissance, surveillance, interdiction, antiarmor, and troop support 
missions. Only occasional attack by high-performance aircraft can be 
expected along the line of contact. Elements in the division and corps rear, 
command and control facilities, and reserve forces, can expect repeated 
attacks by high-performance aircraft. Surveillance for threat aircraft is a 24- 
hour mission. The enemy's order of battle, combat capability, readiness, and 
will to fight are some of the factors that will determine the times and rates of 
sorties. Convoys of troops, as well as supply trains, will always be vulnerable 
targets, especially as they concentrate at choke points along the convoy route. 
The threat generally will consist of attack helicopters and close air support 
aircraft in the forward area near lines of contact, and ground attack fighter- 
bombers in the rear areas and against convoys. Because these types of 
aircraft differ in their capabilities and in the manner in which they conduct 
tactical operations, they present distinctly different threat profiles. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 

1-27. Because UAVs are inexpensive, easily procured or manufactured, and 
versatile, UAVs may one day be the most common threat. There are over 100 
UAV programs being pursued by at least 35 countries. Their small radar 
cross sections make them very difficult to detect and track. Payloads may 



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consist of radar seekers, high-explosive warheads, forward-looking infrared 
cameras, laser designators, television, thermal to imaging devices, chaff, 
decoy, and electronic attack capabilities. Ranges vary from 25 to 800 kilometers, 
and the upper limit of night endurance reaches 72 hours. They perform a wide variety 
of missions including RISTA, suppression of enemy air defense, ground attack, decoy, 
communications relay, and chemical detection. The RISTA mission, which uses 
enemy UAVs to locate friendly maneuver forces and key assets with the 
ability to pass real-time information back to enemy long-range attack 
systems, is the greatest near-term concern for short-range air defense and 
the force commander. Three potential threat UAVs, the Shmel-1, DR-3 Reys, 
and D-4 NPU are shown in Figure 1-1. 




ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT 

1-28. Rotary-wing versatility and survivability make it ideal for logistics 
resupply, air assault, command and control, and heavily armed weapons 
platforms for attack roles. Rotary-wing aircraft currently exist in every 
potential theater that US forces may enter. Many countries around the world 
possess attack helicopters. Armed with stand-off antitank guided missiles, 
helicopters can inflict heavy casualties on the force and destroy critical 
assets. The proliferation of helicopters is also of concern. Utility helicopters, 
combined with stand-off munitions and state-of-the-art target acquisition 
technology, can produce less expensive, robust helicopter capabilities for any 
country. Figure 1-2 shows potential threat helicopters, the Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 
Hind, and the Mi-28 Havoc. 



1-8 





FM 44-8 




Figure 1-2. Potential Threat Helicopters. 



1-29. Threat helicopter forces supporting ground operations operate nearly the 
same as a US helicopter force. For example, CIS (formerly Soviet Union) 
helicopters are agile and make good use of cover and concealment offered hy folds 
in the earth and trees (Figure 1-3). Their armament includes antitank guided 
missiles, free-flight air-to-air missiles, and radar-directed 12.7-millimeter nose or 
chin-mounted machine- or Gatling-type guns. CIS ATGMs are electronically 
controlled or laser-guided and can engage and destroy any armored vehicle at 
standoff ranges of more than 3 kilometers (Figure 1-4). Using sneak-and-peek 
techniques, attack helicopters can deliver a devastating blow against exposed 
maneuver units. Their lethality is somewhat softened hy practical considerations. 
They must detect a target to engage it and remain in the open long enough to aim 
and fire their weapons. For some ATGMs, attack helicopters must maintain 
track on both the missile and target throughout the missile's flight, which 
can be as long as 23.2 seconds. The 57-millimeter FFAR is an area weapon 
and is effective against exposed troops and lightly armored vehicles at ranges 
greater than 1,000 meters. 




1-9 









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STAND-OFF RANGES 




Figure 1-4. Threat Helicopter (Mi-24 Hind) Weapons Range. 



FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT 

1-30. Although theater missile threats have taken the place of FW aircraft as 
the principal air threat to ground forces, the following types of FW aircraft may 
he employed hy the enemy against friendly forces: homhers, fighter-homhers, 
fighters, and close air support aircraft. Any of the FW family may carry 
TASMs, while only the larger ones will carry cruise missiles. Improvements to 
FW aircraft will include increased survivability and improved fire control 
accuracy. Figure 1-5 shows examples of three potentially threat aircraft — the 
Su-25 Frogfoot, MiG-27 Flogger D, and MiG-29 Fulcrum. 




Figure 1-5. Potential Threat Fixed-Wing Aircraft. 



1-10 







FM 44-8 



1-31. High-performance aircraft, operating in a ground attack role, attack at 
relatively high speeds. They normally operate under centralized control and 
are directed against preplanned targets. These aircraft target the division 
and corps rear area where they deliver ordnance selected to optimize 
destruction effects on the target. If they have ordnance remaining after 
completing their primary mission, the aircraft may be released to attack 
targets of opportunity on their return flight. Whether against preselected 
targets or against targets of opportunity, the attack will usually include a 
high-speed, low-level penetration run to a point near the target area to avoid 
low- and medium-altitude air defenses. Ground attack aircraft are effective 
against preplanned targets. The pilot generally knows the target location and 
will carry the correct ordnance for the target. Effectiveness decreases against 
targets of opportunity. Pilots must locate their targets, plan their attack, and 
deliver their ordnance in a short time. As a result, accuracy and effectiveness 
are degraded. The use of area type weapons such as CBUs or FFARs can be 
expected on the initial attack run, while cannon and machine-gun fire will 
likely be used in the follow-on attack. 



THREAT APPLICATION 

1-32. Air threat employment against US ground forces may vary from 
country to country. Threat equipment, capabilities, organizational structures, 
and military political goals will drive this employment. By understanding air 
threat proliferation and equipment, the commander can make assumptions 
on how a threat may employ air assets to interdict US operations. The 
following information describes the type of threat to be countered with each 
stage of force protection operations. 



ENTRY PHASE 

1-33. Early entry forces may deploy into air inferiority or air parity 
environment. We can expect the threat to use his entire aerial assets (use or 
lose) against lucrative targets in the areas of debarkation. Low-altitude aerial 
threats (RW, CM, and FW) will probably be employed in attack operations 
against APODs or SPODs, assembly areas, and supply points. 

EXPANSION AND BUILDUP 

1-34. During this phase, most potential threats will focus on conducting 
RISTA operations to locate friendly unit movements, assess unit sizes and 
strengths, and determine their ultimate position. UAVs will be the most 
challenging aerial RISTA and, therefore, a logical choice for threat use. 
Information obtained by aerial RISTA will be relayed back to the enemy who 
can be expected to use any attack means necessary to inflict maximum 
casualties, slow momentum, and destroy forces. These aerial attack systems 
could be RW or FW aircraft, CMs, and lethal UAVs. 



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OPERATIONS 

1-35. We can expect the threat to attempt to counter US defensive and 
offensive operations with a myriad of aerial platforms. RISTA UAVs will 
provide the threat commander the necessary information to determine 
friendly unit locations, movements, and objectives. Aerial and artillery 
strikes can be generated from the intelligence gathered against the following 
targets: 

• Maneuver force. 

• FARPs. 

• Aviation FOBs. 

• Command and control nodes. 

• Reserve troop concentrations. 

• Logistical support areas. 

• Terrain features. 

• Obstacles constricting unit movements as US forces advance to close 
with the enemy forces. 

1-36. Lethal UAVs can be effective in disabling C^I or destroying armored 
vehicles. CMs will probably be used against logistical concentration, 
command and control nodes, or with submunitions for area denial. RW 
aircraft will be used to attack forward elements and the flanks of the 
advancing enemy maneuver force to slow their tempo, cause confusion and, 
thereby, inflict maximum casualties. They can also be expected to conduct 
operations across FLOT, CAS, and air insertion operations. These armed 
attack helicopters constitute the most widespread and capable air threats to 
friendly ground forces in the close battle. 



Defensive Operations 

1-37. During defensive operations, friendly forces are vulnerable to the full 
spectrum of threat aerial platforms. The enemy will attempt to use aerial 
platforms to monitor friendly forces for targeting. We can expect the enemy to 
use UAVs, RW, and possibly FW aircraft, to determine locations of friendly 
artillery, command and control, ADA assets, and logistical sites and troop 
concentration areas. Once these sites are located, threat forces will likely 
disrupt or destroy these sites with the use of artillery and rocket fire, air 
attacks, and air insertion. 

1-38. The enemy's preferred weapons against air defense assets and US 
forces will be artillery and rocket attacks. These systems are usually 
numerous, inexpensive, survivable, and highly effective. UAVs will be 
employed to provide targeting data during this phase of operations. UAVs are 
extremely effective in this role due to their small size, small radar cross 
section, and standoff capability. RW and FW attacks are less likely during 
this phase due to the poor survivability of these systems. In most cases, they 
are limited to daylight operations. These attacks will be supported with 
preattack and postattack reconnaissance. 

1-39. Enemy forces will more than likely conduct threat air insertion 
operations with either FW or RW assets and probably during the hours of 
limited visibility. The threat will likely conduct daytime reconnaissance of 



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landing sites and target areas within 24 hours prior to attack. These 
operations will fly at low levels attempting to infiltrate into friendly rear 
areas. 

Offensive Operations 

1-40. During offensive operations, enemy forces will attempt to use maneuver 
and fire support assets to regain the initiative. Threat air activity will most 
likely be categorized by RISTA operations in support of artillery and 
maneuver. UAVs are best suited for these types of operations, especially if 
threat forces have developed effective CPI. Secondary weapon systems the 
enemy will use are helicopters, either as dedicated attack assets or as armed 
utility helicopters. Helicopter assets can be used in attack, air insertion, or 
reconnaissance. Helicopters in the reconnaissance role will operate in the 
same manner as UAVs to support artillery targeting and maneuver. In the 
attack, the unit can expect spoiling attacks that usually consist of at least 
two helicopters or more (taking full advantage of cover and concealment) with 
the mission of disrupting friendly operations. 

1-41. In some cases, the enemy will use helicopters in conjunction with threat 
armored forces to deter friendly penetrations. However, it is unlikely the 
friendly commander will see large numbers of helicopters in this role. The 
enemy will use ground forces first to neutralize friendly air defense assets. 
Helicopters will be used as the primary CAS aerial platform against 
maneuver forces. 

1-42. Threat FW assets will be limited and their use will be hampered by 
friendly FW aircraft. Use of enemy FW aircraft cannot be entirely ruled out. 
If used by the enemy, the ground commander can expect to see no more than 
one or two aircraft in a spoiling attack, normally not coordinated with enemy 
ground operations. 



THREAT COURSES OF ACTION 

1-43. Determine both the threat air and ground courses of action and 
integrate the results of the previous information into a meaningful 
conclusion. Given what threat air and missile forces prefer to do and the 
effects of the operational environment, what are the enemy's likely objectives 
and what COAs are available to him? The G2/S2 develops enemy threat 
models that depict the threat's air and missile COAs. They also prepare event 
templates and matrices that focus intelligence collection on identifying which 
CO A the threat will execute. The process of developing these templates and 
matrices is covered in depth in FM 34-130. 



1-13 




Chapter 2 

Techniques for Self-Defense Warnings 



This chapter implements STANAG 2047 



This chapter explains how to use proven techniques to accomplish self- 
defense against air attack. In the past, US forces have had air superiority 
and the US Army has fought on the battlefield with little concern about 
surveillance or attack from the air. However, we could face a significant 
air threat in our next war or military operation. Potential enemies could 
have significant air capabilities. We can expect that friendly units will be 
targeted and attacked from the air as well as from the ground. Because 
air defense artillery has limited resources, many Army units and facilities 
will not receive dedicated air defense protection. These units and facilities 
must be prepared to protect themselves. All units must reduce their 
vulnerability to air action by implementing passive and active air defense 
measures. 



AIR DEFENSE EARLY WARNING NETS 

2-1. The air defense command and control structure uses air defense 
warnings, local air defense warnings, and directed early warning to alert all 
members of the force of hostile air activities. Non-ADA units may monitor 
ADA early warning nets. These nets contain additional information for ADA 
units to include more detailed track information. However, the format of 
directed early warning does not necessarily follow the SALUTE format. Track 
location will be reported using the same systems as directed early warning. 
Consult unit SOI to find the appropriate frequencies to monitor. 

2-2. Ar defense warnings represent the area air defense commander's 
evaluation of the probability of air surveillance or attack. The AADC issues 
air defense warnings throughout the entire theater of operations. The three 
ADWs are red, yellow, and white. 

• ADW Red. Attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms is 
imminent or in progress. This means that hostile aerial platforms are 
within a respective area of operations or in the immediate vicinity of 
a respective area of operations with a high probability of entry. 

• ADW Yellow. Attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms is 
probable. This means that hostile or unknown aerial platforms are en 
route toward a respective area of operations. 

• ADW White. Attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms is 
improbable. ADW White can be declared either before or after ADW 
Yellow or ADW Red. 



2-1 





FM 44-8 



2-3. The AADC routinely issues ADWs for dissemination throughout the 
entire theater of operations. ADWs describe the general state of the probable 
air threat and apply to the entire area. Any commander, after coordination 
and approval from the AADC, may issue a higher level of warning for his 
command but not a lower level. The chain of command must ensure that 
every soldier knows the current ADW. ADWs will be sent out on ADA 
command nets and ADA early warning nets at every level. It is the 
responsibility of air defense officers at every level to inform their respective 
supported commanders of the current ADW. Army commanders must then 
inform their subordinate units of the ADW. 



LOCAL AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS 

2-4. While ADWs describe the probability of hostile air action over the entire 
theater of operations, LADWs tell with certainty what the air threat is for a 
specific part of the battlefield. LADWs are designed to alert a particular unit, 
several units, or an area of the battlefield of an impending air attack. ADA 
units use LADWs to alert Army units about the state of the air threat in 
terms of “right here and right now” and can be used in conjunction with 
ADWs. Examples of LADWS are described below: 

• DYNAMITE — Attack is imminent or in progress. 

• LOOKOUT — Attack is likely. 

• SNOWMAN — Attack is not likely. 

LADWs do more than describe the current level of air threat in the 
immediate area. They also require specific air defense reactions from 
receiving units. Unit commanders must establish in their TSOPs what they 
want their units to do when an LADW is received. 



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

2-5. Rules of engagement are the positive and procedural management 
directives which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces 
will initiate or continue combat engagement with encountered forces. 

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 

2-6. Commanders at all echelons have the responsibility to take whatever 
action is necessary to protect their forces and equipment against air or 
missile attack. When under attack, the right of self-defense takes precedence 
over any other established rules and procedures which normally govern 
engagements. 

HOSTILE CRITERIA 

2-7. Hostile criteria is the description of conditions under which an aerial 
platform may be identified as hostile for engagement purposes. They are the 
basic rules for identification of friendly or hostile aerial platforms, 
established by the appropriate commander. The commander may consider 
speed and altitude, among other requirements, within a specified airspace 



2-2 




FM 44-8 



when he establishes the hostile criteria. He may also consider specific enemy 
characteristics or hostile acts. 

WEAPON CONTROL STATUS 

2-8. Weapon control statuses— WEAPONS FREE, WEAPONS TIGHT, or 
WEAPONS HOLD — describe the relative degree of control of air defense 
fires. Weapon control statuses apply to weapon systems, volumes of airspace, 
or types of air platforms. The degree or extent of control varies depending on 
the tactical situation. Establishment of separate weapon control statuses for 
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, UAVs, and for missiles is normal. Air defense 
forces must have the ability to receive and disseminate weapon control 
statuses for all classes of air platforms. 

• WEAPONS FREE: Weapons can fire at any air target not positively 
identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control 
status. 

• WEAPONS TIGHT: Fire only at air targets positively identified as 
hostile according to the prevailing hostile criteria. Positive 
identification can be effected by a number of means to include visual 
identification (aided or unaided) and meeting other designated hostile 
criteria supported by track correlation. 

• WEAPONS HOLD: Do not fire except in self-defense or in response 
to a formal order. This is the most restrictive weapon control status. 



DIRECTED EARLY WARNING 

2-9. Directed early warning is designed to alert a non-ADA-supported unit, 
units, or an area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is 
passed over the supported unit command net or a net designated by the 
maneuver unit commander as flash precedence traffic. Directed early 
warning defines the LADW and states whether the aerial platform is friendly 
or unknown, a cardinal direction, and, if known, the most likely affected 
asset! s) within the supported force. For example, if an early warning source 
reports four enemy rotary -wing aircraft inbound from the east, and 1st Brigade 
is attacking along the eastern axis during a division attack, the ADO reports 
an LADW and directed early warning message: "Dynamite! Dynamite! Four 
Hinds from the east against Axis Blue!" Dynamite is the LADW that alerts 
the division to attack, and the response according to the local SOP must be 
immediate. The SHORAD battalion TOC will broadcast directed early 
warning on the division command or O/I net and to the SHORAD battalion. 

2-10. When a threat to the supported force is identified, the AD A^C^ will 
transmit LADW on the supported force command net. When the brigade AD 
LNO receives early warning from the ABMOC or from the ADA sensors, they 
will direct early warning down on the battery command nets. The AD LNO 
will transmit directed early warning on the platoon nets and supported force 
command nets. 

2-11. Directed early warning must be quick, simple, and redundant in nature. 
It is imperative that all units, to include maneuver units, receive early 



2-3 




FM 44-8 



warning, especially those units that have only minimal air defense coverage. 
Unit SOP will determine the exact procedures; however, the following 
elements should be included: 

• Preface — method used to differentiate tracks. 

• Identification — ^Type of aerial platform, location, and time. 

• Local air defense warning — Self-explanatory. 

• Direction — Self-explanatory. 

• Size — ^Few, many, or actual number. 

• Affected asset — ^Not sent "in the clear" on unsecured nets. 



SAMPLE EARLY WARNING SCENARIO 

2-12. The following scenario illustrates the use of ADWs, LADWs, and the 
directed early warning system: The corps commander, based on the 
recommendation of his ADA brigade commander, declares ADW Yellow to be 
in effect for the entire corps area of operations as the corps begins its attack. 
ADA units inform the units they are supporting that the LADW is Snowman. 
All units assume the appropriate posture for LADW Snowman according to 
their TSOPs. After a period of time, an aerial platform is spotted in the 
battlespace but is not threatening, or is inbound and there is time to react. 
The LADW “Lookout” is sent out to all affected units which heightens the 
readiness state. Several hours into the corps attack, a maneuver brigade with 
a direct support ADA battery is making substantial progress along Axis Blue. 
Suddenly, the ADA battery receives information from air defense channels of 
an inbound enemy air attack heading for the brigade. The battery 
commander gets on the maneuver brigade command net and announces, 
"Dynamite! Dynamite!" When units in the brigade hear "Dynamite!" they 
should immediately react according to their TSOPs. Responding to the 
situation, the maneuver brigade commander may increase his ADW to Red. 
The division and corps commanders may also increase their ADWs to Red. As 
the air attack approaches, the battery commander would pass on the 
following DEW message to the affected task force: "Dynamite! Dynamite! 
Four Hinds attacking from the east against Axis Blue!" 

2-13. LADWs may be disseminated in any of several ways in addition to the 
method described in the preceding scenario. Under ideal circumstances, the 
ADA battalion or brigade will receive word of inbound enemy air in time to 
send LADWs to the affected units via the early warning system. 



UNIT WARNING 

2-14. Air defense, passive or active, is more effective if it is known beforehand 
that an air attack is imminent. The initial warning should come from the 
supporting ADA unit or higher headquarters, but the likelihood of a timely 
alert is increased when an air threat warning system is established within 
each unit. 



2-4 




FM 44-8 



AIR THREAT 



2-15. Assign air guard personnel and set up a system of TSOP alarms to warn 
against an impending air threat. Figure 2-1 shows the hand-and-arm signal 
for air threat. 




Figure 2-1 . Hand-and-Arm Signal for Air Threat. 



EMERGENCY AIR ATTACK ALARMS 

2-16. To provide a standard method of disseminating emergency warnings 
within NATO forces, the US armed forces have concurred in the provisions of 
STANAG 2047. The air attack warning system is included in the unit TSOP. 
The actual form of a visual signal and method of display are left to the 
discretion of the local commander. Pertinent extracts are shown in Table 2-1. 
Only the “red” visual warning in Table 2-1 is mandatory. 

Table 2-1 . Emergency Air Attack Alarms (NATO). 



VISUAL WARNING 


AUDIBLE WARNING 


Red — imminent air attack 
(Preferably square in shape) 


1 . Unbroken warbling siren for 1 minute duration. 

2. Succession of long blasts on vehicle horns, whistles, 
bugles, or other wind instruments in a ratio of 3 to 1 ; about 3 
seconds on and 1 second off. 

3. Vocal “Air Attack” or corresponding national term when one 
nation is involved. 


All clear 

Removal of appropriate 
warning sign 


1 . Steady siren note for 1 minute or sustained blast on a 
vehicle horn, whistle, bugle, or other instrument to indicate 
absence of all NBC and air attack hazards. 

2. Vocal “All Clear Air Attack” or corresponding national term 
when only one nation is involved. 











Chapter 3 

Aerial Search 



This chapter describes search techniques and systematic methods of 
search that an observer will use when searching the skies to detect 
aircraft. An air attack will be sudden and swift. Air guards must learn the 
techniques of search and how to quickly recognize aircraft performing 
hostile acts. The use of optical devices such as binoculars and the sighting 
systems of the Ml and M2 family of vehicles will greatly enhance the air 
guard’s ability to detect and observe enemy aircraft. Air guards can then 
give the air attack warning immediately to allow maximum reaction time 
or seek cover and concealment and to prepare their weapons for firing. 



AIR GUARD RESPONSIBILITIES 

3-1. Assign air guards to be on the lookout at all times for enemy threats. A 
map reconnaissance of each unit's AO will help locate likely areas from which 
air targets can attack. Air guards should watch for air threats attempting to 
take advantage of masking terrain like woodlines, ridgelines, and significant 
folds in the terrain out to about 5,000 meters. Local OP personnel should 
incorporate air guard responsibilities into their duties. If an OP does not have 
a good view of the airspace in his area, position a special sentry to search that 
sector. Establish a systematic procedure for searching all sectors. Air guards 
should be rotated frequently, because searching for long periods of time dulls 
the ability to spot air platforms. 

AERIAL SEARCH IN A CONVOY 

3-2. In a convoy, every vehicle should have at least one individual assigned as 
an air guard. Anyone on the vehicle other than the driver may perform this 
duty. Check the map and mark narrow valleys or other terrain features that 
may force a unit to bunch together. Then, assign specific search sectors to 
each air guard keeping those trouble spots in mind. Ensure an air guard 
watches the rear of the convoy to prevent a surprise attack from this blind 
side. If the road march lasts more than an hour, have the troops take turns 
being air guards so that they remain alert. 



SEARCH TECHNIQUES 

3-3. When searching, especially above the horizon, the eyes will tend to relax 
and distant objects may become blurred. Focusing the eyes frequently on a 
distant object such as a terrain feature can prevent blurring. Squinting of the 
eyes will aid in focusing at long ranges. Squinting changes the eyes' focal 
length and aids in bringing distant targets into focus. Soldiers should keep 
their eyes on an air target that they have detected. If they look away, they 
may lose the target and have to look for it again. If they must look away, they 



3-1 




FM 44-8 



should try to remember exactly where the air target was and its heading from 
a specific point such as a terrain feature. Define the search sector size 
horizontally and vertically, and establish the upper and lower limits of 
search. 

DEFINE THE SEARCH SECTOR SIZE 

3-4. The size of a search sector directly affects air platform detection. Air 
platforms can be detected easier if the search sector is narrow. If assigned a 
search sector size of 360 degrees, the chances of detecting air platforms are 
greatly reduced. When supported by an alert warning system, then a fairly 
large sector of about 90 degrees can be observed. After receiving a warning, 
narrow the search sector to about 30 degrees and center the search on the air 
platform’s approach azimuth (Figure 3-1). 



APPARENT HORIZON 




Figure 3-1 . Sector Surveillance. 



ESTABLISH UPPER AND LOWER LIMITS 

3-5. Vertical search limits are helpful in detecting air platforms. When 
searching the sky for targets, searching too near the horizon will miss higher 
flying air platforms, while searching too high above the horizon will miss 
those flying lower. Establish the search area 20 degrees above and 20 degrees 
below the horizon. This will ensure that targets are detected within the 
search parameters. To estimate 20 degrees, extend one hand straight in front 
of the face with fingers fully spread. Point the little finger at the ground and 
the thumb in the air. With the little finger touching the apparent horizon, the 
thumb will be at about 20 degrees. The tip of the thumb is the upper search 
limit (Figure 3-2). 




Figure 3-2. One Method of Estimating 20 Degrees. 



3-2 









FM 44-8 



SYSTEMATIC METHODS OF SEARCH 

3-6. There are two systematic methods of search to look for air platforms in 
any type of terrain. Horizontal and vertical searching are described below. 

HORIZONTAL SEARCH 



3-7. Search the horizon by moving the eyes in short movements across the 
sky, working up and across. Continue the searching and search pattern below 
the horizon to detect air platforms contour flying (Figure 3-3). 




Figure 3-3. Horizontal Searching. 



VERTICAL SEARCH 

3-8. Search the sky using the horizon as a starting point and prominent 
terrain features as reference points. Move the eyes in short movements up 
the sky, then back down, continuing the movement across the terrain. Search 
in the same pattern below the horizon to detect air platforms contour flying 
(Figure 3-4). 




Figure 3-4. Vertical Searching. 



3-3 






FM 44-8 



VARIATIONS 

3-9. With experience, soldiers who possess above average vision may use 
nonsystematic methods of search. From the following, select one that works 
best: 

• Combination of the two systematic methods. 

• Search of the horizon in the shape of an oval to 20 degrees above the 
horizon. 

• General or random search of the horizon. 

3-10. Air guards should look for sun reflections from canopies or cockpit 
windows, blade flash from rotating propeller blades, smoke trails and dust, 
and excessive movement of treetops and bushes in a particular area. They 
should listen for noise from propeller blades or aircraft engines. It is likely 
that these indications will be detectable before the aircraft is plainly visible. 
The sooner the aircraft is detected, the more time the unit will have to react 
to an air threat warning. 



VISUAL AERIAL PLATFORM RECOGNITION 

3-11. All soldiers must be able to visually recognize which aerial platforms 
are friendly and which are hostile. Depending on where in the world US 
forces are committed, soldiers may see many different types of friendly and 
hostile aerial platforms. Regional powers that the US may one day be at war 
against, or allied with, obtain their air assets from many sources. US forces 
may encounter air assets originally designed and built in Germany, Britain, 
Italy, France, or other countries fighting with us or against us. We may even 
encounter aerial platforms originally built in the US being used and Soviet- 
built aircraft as allies. Therefore, it is imperative that commanders train 
their troops in recognizing different types of aerial platforms. If the aerial 
platform is not positively recognized as hostile, it should be engaged only in 
self-defense. Soldiers should consult FM 44-80, GTA 44-2-17/18/19 (reference 
cards), and ACCP Subcourse IS 4400 for this purpose. 



3-4 




Chapter 4 



Passive Air Defense Measures 

This chapter focuses on types of passive air defense measures, to include 
self-defense measures in a convoy. Units may he exposed, hunched up, or 
in a situation where they are vulnerable to taking unnecessary casualties. 
If attacked under these conditions, the unit has the option of fighting 
hack. The decision to engage hostile air must consider the unit's assigned 
mission and the tactical situation. In cases where the enemy aerial 
platforms are outside the range of the unit's weapons, a unit's most 
attractive option can he to seek cover. In other cases, commanders may 
decide to place the enemy aerial platform under fire with organic weapons 
with the intent to frighten them off. 



TYPES OF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES 

4-1. Passive air defense measures are all measures other than active defense 
taken to minimize the effects of the hostile air action. Passive defense 
measures are of two types: attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures. 
Both include the use of cover, concealment, and camouflage; protective cover; 
and deception. 

4-2. Accept as a foregone conclusion that the enemy has the capability to 
attack from the air and that they will exercise that capability. Air attack is 
not a probability — ^it is a certainty. Small units do not stand helpless before 
this threat. Simple, commonsense measures can be taken by a small unit to 
avoid attack and to limit damage if attacked. Passive air defense measures, if 
routinely followed, will reduce the probability of attack and will limit damage 
if an attack cannot be avoided. 

4-3. The first line of defense against air attack is to constantly apply passive 
air defense measures. If the aerial platform is not attacking the unit, the unit 
commander has a decision to make. First, the commander may not want to 
fire and disclose the position. Secondly, to engage a nonattacking aerial 
platform, it must be positively identifled as hostile. This may be difficult 
unless unit personnel have had aircraft recognition training. Remember, if 
not under attack, the unit commander must give the order to fire at the aerial 
platform. 

ATTACK AVOIDANCE MEASURES 

4-4. Attack avoidance means taking the actions necessary to avoid being seen 
by the enemy — concealment and, lacking concealment, camouflage. What can 
be seen can be hit, and if you cannot be seen, the probability of being hit 
diminishes to near zero. The techniques, procedures, and materials used for 
concealment from aerial observation are the same as used for concealment 
from ground observation (see Figure 4-1). 



4-1 




FM 44-8 




4-1 . Attack Avoidance. 



Concealment 

4-5. There are three eoneealment prineiples employed (siting, discipline, 
and construction) to eliminate the factors of recognition: 

• Siting. Siting means selecting the most advantageous position in 
which to hide a man, an object, or an activity. 

• Discipline. Success in any concealment effort is the strict 
maintenance of concealment discipline by both the unit and by the 
individual soldier. All activities should be avoided that change the 
appearance of an area or reveal the presence of military equipment. 
Laxness and carelessness will undoubtedly reveal a position. Tracks, 
spoil, and debris are the most common signs of military activity, 
which indicate concealed objects. Ensure new tracks follow existing 
paths, roads, fences, or natural lines in the terrain pattern. Do not 
end exposed routes at a position, but extend them to another logical 
termination. If practical, tracks should be brushed out, camouflaged, 
or covered. Spoil and debris must be covered or placed to blend with 
the surroundings. Artificial camoufiage is added when the terrain 
and natural vegetation are such that natural concealment is not 
possible. 

• Construction. Adding natural materials to blend with the 
surrounding terrain augments this type of concealment. 

4-6. There are three fundamental methods of concealing installations and 
activities: hiding; blending, and disguising. They are explained as follows: 

• Hiding. Hiding is the complete concealment of an object by some 
form of physical screen. For example, sod over mines in a minefield 
hides the mines; the overhead canopy of trees hides the objects 
beneath from aerial observation; a net hides objects beneath it; a 
defilade position hides objects from ground observation. In some 
cases, the screen itself may be invisible. In other instances, the screen 
may be visible, but it hides the activity behind it. 



4-2 





FM 44-8 



• Blending. Blending is the arrangement or application of camouflage 
materials on, over, and around the object so that it appears to be part 
of the background. For example, applying face paint to the exposed 
areas of skin; adding burlap, paint, and live vegetation to helmets 
and clothing to closely resemble or blend into the background. The 
same technique can be applied for equipment or structures. 

• Disguising. Clever disguises can often mislead the enemy 
concerning identity, strength, and intention, and may draw his fire 
from real assets. Therefore, the simulation of objects, pieces of 
equipment, or activities may have a worthwhile military significance. 
Rubber tanks, tents, and buildings filled with air can look like the 
real thing to an aerial observer. 

Camouflage 

4-7. The difference between concealment and camouflage is that concealment 
is using natural terrain to hide, and camouflage is constructing concealment. 
In addition to hiding equipment, detection can be avoided by using mud for 
glassy surfaces and unfilled sandbags over windshields (Figure 4-2). 
Camouflage is one of the basic weapons of war. The importance, the 
principles, and the techniques of camouflage must be completely understood. 
All personnel must ensure the effectiveness of all camouflage measures, and 
must maintain the strict enforcement of camouflage discipline. 




Figure 4-2. Detection Avoidance. 

DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES 

4-8. Another type of passive air defense, damage-limiting, is also used for 
survival. The measures are an attempt to limit any damages if the enemy 
detects the position. If the enemy is to destroy any equipment, he is forced to 
do it one piece at a time. A unit should not be in a position to be put out of 
action with just a single attack. The same measures taken to limit damage 
from artillery attack are used — dispersion, protective construction, and cover. 

• Dispersion. Dispersed troops, vehicles, and equipment will force the 
attacker to concentrate on a single small target that will likely be 
missed. The wider the dispersion, the greater the potential is for 
limiting damage. 



4-3 





FM 44-8 



• Protective Construction. The use of cover, natural or manmade, 
acts to reduce damage and casualties. Folds in the earth, natural 
depressions, trees, buildings, and walls offer damage-limiting cover, 
which should be sought out and used habitually. If deployment is in 
flat terrain lacking cover, digging in or sandbagging can offer some 
protection. Smoke is used if the unit is moving and cannot use 
natural cover or cannot build fortiflcations. Smoke makes target 
acquisition much more difficult for the attacker. 

• Cover. The intent here is to emphasize the importance of passive 
defense against an air attack. Everything must be done to avoid an 
attack in the first place. Not succeeding in that aim, then cover and 
dispersion should be used to limit the amount of damage to the unit. 

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES IN CONVOY 

4-9. A convoy is vulnerable to air attack since it is easily seen from the air. 
Movements along a road are endangered by shoulders, ditches, and 
embankments which restrict freedom of maneuver. Additionally, since 
vehicles are stretched out in a long line, convoys represent high-value, hard- 
to-defend, but easy to hit targets to enemy ground attack aerial platforms. 
This linear array also makes command and control very difficult. A high 
probability of air attack must be assumed in planning a convoy, and all 
soldiers must know exactly what to do if attacked. Not all convoys will be 
provided dedicated air defense assets. Some convoys must rely on organic 
passive and active air defense measures for protection. As in defended areas, 
passive air defense includes attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures. 

ATTACK AVOIDANCE 

4-10. Reduce the visible signature to the point where the enemy cannot find 
the convoy. While it is not possible to become invisible, every step taken in 
that direction decreases the likelihood that the convoy will be spotted. Not 
much can be done to change the shape of a vehicle moving down the road, but 
the type of cargo being transported can be disguised or concealed by covering 
it with a tarp. By rigging tarps and bows over the cargo compartment, the 
nature of the cargo can be concealed from the enemy pilot. Other effective 
passive measures are — 

• Train operators, as they disperse, to look for a bush, tree, or some 
other means of concealment to break their vehicles' shapes as seen 
from the air. 

• If vehicles are not already painted in a pattern to blend with the 
terrain and to break the outline, use mud, camouflage nets, or cut 
vegetation to achieve this effect (see FM 20-3). 

• Try to reduce the dust clouds that almost always accompany a 
convoy. If possible, try to avoid unpaved secondary roads. Reduce 
speed to reduce dust on unpaved roads. 

• Try to eliminate glare by using mud, tape, cardboard, tarps, 
camouflage nets, or ponchos to cover headlights, window glass, and 
other glossy surfaces. See Figure 4-3. 



4-4 




FM 44-8 



• Use smoke or other obscurants to conceal positions and movements to 
deceive the enemy as to mission and intent (draw attention to 
deception operations). 

• Operate during periods of limited visibility as much as possible. 

• Position vehicles and facilities inside woodlines and erase vehicle 
tracks left outside woodlines. 




Figure 4-3. Eliminate Glare. 



DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES 

4-11. A convoy is highly visible, and you should plan the convoy to limit 
damage in case your signature reduction efforts are not successful. Cover is 
the best damage-limiting factor. 

Select Natural Cover 

4-12. Ditches and embankments to the sides of the road offer cover and 
should be used if the unit is attacked. See Figure 4-4. 




Figure 4-4. Selecting Natural Cover. 



4-5 







FM 44-8 



Dispersion 

4-13. One of your better damage-limiting measures is the use of dispersion to 
lessen target density and reduce the lethal effects of the ordnance used 
against you. Most of the munitions that aerial platforms deliver against 
vehicles must make a direct hit to be effective. Dispersion decreases target 
density and thus reduces the lethal effects of enemy ordnance. The wider the 
dispersion, the greater the potential for limiting damage. Even area weapons 
become less effective if the unit is dispersed. The commander must weigh the 
need for dispersion against the need to stay concentrated to accomplish the 
mission. To achieve dispersion — 

• Travel in an open column with 80 to 100 meters between vehicles. Air 
guards will be posted throughout the column, constantly watching the 
skies in their assigned areas, ready to give early warning of a 
detected hostile aerial platform. The sooner a threat aerial platform 
is detected, the more time you will have to react. Air guards will 
search and scan for approaching aerial platforms, observing their 
assigned sectors. Alert the vehicle commander after sighting an aerial 
platform by calling out “plane” and pointing to the aerial platform. 

• Divide a convoy into small units or about platoon size and send the 
units out separately with at least 1,000 meters between units. This 
procedure provides a smaller target and increases the level of control 
over each convoy element. 

• Do not park vehicles in a straight line; instead, stagger the vehicles to 
present a poor target. Park the vehicles under cover if available. 
Make arrangements with the drivers so that if an attack occurs, they 
can drive the vehicles to the opposite sides of the road to seek cover. 
For example, the lead vehicle (odd numbered) is driven to the left, the 
second vehicle (even numbered) pulls off to the right, and so on 
(Figure 4-5). 




Figure 4-5. Vehicle Dispersion. 



4-6 




FM 44-8 



Protective Construction and Use of Cover and Smoke/Obscurants 

4-14. The use of cover (natural or manmade) reduces the probability of 
detection, damage, and casualties. Cover can prevent the projectile from 
striking the target. It reduces the target area exposed to damage, and it 
absorbs part of the blow. Folds in the earth, natural depressions, trees, 
buildings, and walls offer damage-limiting cover and should be used 
whenever possible. Digging in or sandbagging can offer some protection. 
When moving or when natural cover is sporadic and fortifications cannot be 
built, use smoke for concealment. Smoke and other obscurants make target 
acquisition much more difficult for the air threat. They also defeat guidance 
and control of precision guided munitions. Smoke and other obscurants can 
be used to deny threat air the use of avenues of approach, LZs, DZs, air battle 
positions, and key terrain as navigational aids. 

4-15. If a hostile aircraft or a flight of hostile aircraft passes over your convoy 
and does not attack the convoy, you will still disperse the vehicles to the sides 
of the road. Stagger the convoy and prepare to return fire in case the aircraft 
returns. If the aircraft attacks, everyone will choose the correct aiming point 
and fire upon command until the aircraft is hit or flies out of effective range. 
Small arms alone can give coverage (Figure 4-6). 




CONVOY SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES 

4-16. In terms of vulnerability to air threats, a convoy of vehicles usually 
presents a lucrative target. Convoys are easily visible from the sky, and 
shoulders of a road, ditches, or embankments restrict their freedom of 
maneuver. The linear array of a convoy makes command and control difficult. 
Convoys are high-value, hard-to-defend, easy-to-see/hit targets for enemy air. 
The unit must assume there is a high probability of air attack when planning 
any convoy. 



4-7 




FM 44-8 



ROUTES 

4-17. Use routes that offer natural concealment. Trees and the shadows they 
cast offer concealment. The shadows cast by mountain ridgelines in the early 
morning and late afternoon also provide concealment. When crossing open 
country, travel should occur when the sun is high to avoid casting long, 
highly visible shadows. When possible, use multiple routes to reduce convoy 
lengths. 

DISPERSION INTERVAL 

4-18. Travel in an open column with 100 meters between vehicles. Vehicles 
stretched out in a long thin line in a convoy are less of a target than vehicles 
that are close together. 

SMALL CONVOY UNITS 

4-19. The convoy can also be broken into small platoon size units and 
dispatched separately with at least 1,000 meters between units (use separate 
march units). This procedure minimizes convoy size and increases the level of 
local control over each convoy element. 

BREAKOUT PLAN 

4-20. Make arrangements for an attack by moving the vehicles to opposite 
sides of the road to seek cover: The lead vehicle goes to the right, the second 
vehicle pulls to the left, and so on. This technique is called "Herringbone" (see 
Figure 4-7). If possible, have vehicles drive 45 degrees off the road and move 
to a covered and concealed position. Establish rally points for the convoy to 
reassemble after the attack. In cases where not all vehicles in the convoy 
have radios, the unit must develop a means to signal drivers that enemy 
aircraft are coming. The use of protective vehicle-launched or hand grenade 
smoke can cause the threat air to lose weapons lock or disrupt target 
acquisition long enough for convoy vehicles to find suitable concealed or 
dispersed positions. 




Figure 4-7. Herringbone. 



4-8 





INTEGRATION OF AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 



FM 44-8 



4-21. Vehicles with weapons that are effective against air threats should be 
integrated into the convoy every fourth or fifth vehicle if possible. Many 
simple, commonsense measures can be taken by a unit to avoid attack and to 
limit damage if attacked. Units should plan for the use of, and make 
coordination for, the integration of MANPAD or SHORAD systems from 
general support or direct support ADA units whenever possible. 



4-9 




Chapter 5 

Active Air Defense Measures 



This chapter discusses active air defense, to include aircraft engagement 
techniques for the M2/M3 Bradley. Active air defense is direct action 
taken to destroy enemy aerial platforms or reduce their effectiveness. 
While the first line of defense against enemy air is the constant 
application of passive air defense measures, commanders must prepare 
their units to actively engage air threats. If attacked, the unit has the 
option of fighting hack. The decision to engage hostile aerial platforms 
will include consideration of the unit’s mission and tactical situation. If 
the enemy aerial platforms are outside the engagement range of the unit’s 
weapons, a unit’s most attractive option could he to seek cover. 



ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE 

5-1. Fighting back is active air defense, but it is not undertaken as a one-on- 
one activity, that is, one soldier acting independently against one air threat. 
Rather, it is a coordinated group response either undertaken spontaneously 
or under command using prescribed engagement techniques. If a unit cannot 
coordinate its fire, it will be ineffective and waste ammunition. 

ENEMY AIR THREAT 

5-2. When passive air defense measures fail and enemy air threats are within 
range of organic weapons, units can conduct active air defense by shooting 
back. All Army units can engage enemy air threats to — 

• Destroy the threat. 

• Force the threat away from friendly positions. 

• Force the threat to fly higher, so that friendly aerial platforms or 
ADA can destroy them. 

• Spoil the hostile pilots’ aim as they engage friendly forces. 

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE 

5-3. Your right to fire at the attacking aerial platforms is derived from the 
doctrine of self-defense. You may defend your unit from direct attack but do 
not engage aerial platforms not attacking you except on the command of the 
next higher authority. Even if you are under direct attack, practical 
consideration bears on your decision to fire. It makes no sense at all to shoot 
at a helicopter attacking you from a standoff range of 3 kilometers, except 
perhaps with the main gun of a tank. Your decision to fire should be 
tempered by consideration of the capabilities of weapons you have available 
to you. However, there is another side to the fire decision. Although small 
arms have a low probability of kill against attacking aerial platform, the use 
of coordinated group firing, using all organic weapons to make the pilots 
aware that they are under fire, can disturb their concentration and cause 
them to miss their target or abandon their attack. The pilots should be made 



5-1 




FM 44-8 



aware that they are under fire from the ground. Nothing is more disturbing 
to a pilot’s concentration than fiying into a hail of tracers, and if practical, 
tracers should be used. 

SMALL ARMS FIRE AGAINST AERIAL PLATFORMS 

5-4. Small arms fire against aerial platforms can be effective. A quick review 
of the record shows this to be true. In the Korean War, our Air Force lost 259 
jet aircraft and 285 other aircraft to combined small arms and air defense 
fire, which is nearly five times as many aircraft that were lost in air-to-air 
combat. In South Vietnam, we lost 410 fixed-wing aircraft and 2,100 
helicopters. In the Mideast War, 36 coalition aircraft were shot down by 
ground fire. 



SMALL ARMS USED FOR AIR DEFENSE 

5-5. Small arms used in air defense incorporate the use of volume fire and 
proper aiming points according to the target. If your soldiers are trained to 
apply an appropriate sequence of engagement techniques for aircraft based 
on the rules for selecting an aiming point, the response will be automatic 
upon command. You will have effective air defense using the small arms 
available to your unit. 



VOLUME FIRE 

5-6. To engage aerial platforms effectively, you must follow some basic rules. 
The first rule to follow is to use a technique known as volume fire (Figure 5- 
1). The key to success in engaging enemy air is to put out a high volume of 
fire. The more bullets a unit can put in the sky, the greater the chance the 
enemy will fly into them. Even if these fires do not hit the enemy, throwing 
up a wall of lead in the sky can intimidate enemy pilots, ultimately breaking 
off their attack or distracting them from taking proper aim. One of the most 
important points about volume fire is that once the lead distance is 
estimated, you must aim at the estimated aiming point and fire at that 
single point until the aircraft has flown past that point. Maintain the 
aiming point, not the lead distanee. Once you start firing, do not adjust 
your weapon. 




Figure 5-1 . Volume Fire. 



5-2 





FM 44-8 



ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 

5-7. The decision to fire is the unit commander's and is based on his judgment 
of the situation. The techniques for delivering fire are standard. Volume fire 
is the key to effective small arms fire against aerial threats. Every weapon 
(M16, M60, M249, and M2) must be used to engage the target with the goal of 
placing as many bullets as possible in the enemy's flight path. That does not 
mean that everyone fires in some random direction. Instead, each individual 
selects an aiming point in front of the target and fires at that point. This 
aiming point is determined using the football field technique. 

Football Field Technique 

5-8. The football field technique is a simple method of estimating lead 
distance. The theory is that most people have played or watched football and 
have a concept of how long a football field is. When told to lead the target by 
one football field, everyone aims at approximately the same point in space. 
One person's error in making the football field estimate will be offset by 
another person's error. The variation in aiming points will ensure that 
massed fire is delivered into a volume of space in front of the target rather 
than on a small point. Also, the differing perspectives from which the soldiers 
view the target will act to further distribute the fire over a volume of space. 
See Figures 5-2 and 5-3. 




Figure 5-2. Jet Aiming Points. 



5-3 





9U»m.Y AT YOU 



FM 44-8 




FIRING AT SLOW AIRCRAFT WITH Ml 6. M60. AND .50 CAL. MACHINE GUN 



Figure 5-3. Helicopter Aiming Points. 



Aiming Points 

5-9. Aiming points for jets and helicopters are depicted in Figures 5-2 and 5- 
3. Missiles, if detected, should be engaged using the jet aiming points. UAVs 
should be engaged using the helicopter aiming points. The rules for selecting 
aiming points are simple, and easily learned and retained. The various 
aiming points are summarized in Table 5-1. 



Table 5-1. Aiming Points. 



TYPE AERIAL 
PLATFORMS 


COURSE 


AIMING POINT 


JET/CRUISE MISSILE 


CROSSING 


TWO FOOTBALL FIELDS IN FRONT OF 
AERIAL PLATFORM NOSE 


JET/CRUISE MISSILE 


OVERHEAD 


TWO FOOTBALL FIELDS IN FRONT OF 
AERIAL PLATFORM NOSE 


JET/CRUISE MISSILE 


DIRECTLY AT YOU 


SLIGHTLY ABOVE AERIAL PLATFORM NOSE 


HELICOPTER 


HOVERING 


SLIGHTLY ABOVE HELICOPTER BODY 


HELICOPTER/UAV 


DIRECTLY AT YOU 


SLIGHTLY ABOVE HELICOPTER BODY 


HELICOPTER/UAV 


CROSSING 


ONE HALF FOOTBALL FIELD IN FRONT OF 
NOSE 



5-4 






FIRING POSITIONS FOR SMALL ARMS 



FM 44-8 



5-10. Except for the prone position, the rifleman’s basic firing positions stay 
the same (see Figure 5-4). Firing at aircraft when lying down means the 
individuals are lying on their backs (supine), aiming their rifles into the air. 
It will not take you long to learn to fire from some kind of cover and 
concealment, no matter how small. If you are in an individual fighting 
position (foxhole), stay there and return fire from the supported standing 
position. If you are not in an individual firing position, you should look for a 
tree, a large rock, or something to help support the weapon and provide 
protection. Use the following firing positions accordingly: 

• You can use all the basic firing positions for air defense except the 
prone position. Instead, use the reverse position; lie on your back 
(supine) and point your weapon upward. 

• Always take cover when available. If you are in an individual fighting 
position, stay there. Assume a supported standing position and 
return fire. A bipod on the M16 rifle assists you in firing your weapon 
more effectively at hostile aerial platforms. 

• If cover and concealment are fairly good, use the high-kneeling 
position. If cover and concealment are less substantial, use the low- 
kneeling position. 

• When using the M60 machine gun, the gunner will also fire from a protected 
position if possible. He needs to get the weapon up in the air. He can hold it up 
or use some support such as a tree limb. In an emergency, another soldier can 
act as a hasty firing support. 







FIGHTING 

POSITION, Ml 6 RIFLE 
WITH BIPOD 



EMERGENCY FIGHTING KNEELING 

SUPPORT POSITION STANDING HIGH 
IN SHELTER 






KNEELING 

LOW 



M60 MACHINE GUN 
ON IMPROVISED 
SUPPORT 



LYING ON THE 
BACK (SUPINE) 
POSITION 



Figure 5-4. Firing Positions. 



5-5 




FM 44-8 



HELIBORNE INFANTRY AND PARATROOPERS 

5-11. Infantry rappelling from a hovering helicopter should be engaged by 
first destroying the helicopter using volume fire. Airborne troops are more 
difficult to engage because of their rapid descent (approximately 10 feet per 
second). When engaging paratroopers, use machine guns by leading two body 
lengths below their feet. The Geneva Convention of 1949 and our rules of war 
prohibit engaging crewmen parachuting from disabled aircraft. 



AIRCRAFT ENGAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR THE M2/M3 BRADLEY 

5-12. The technique to obtain volume of fire is simple. All platoon vehicles 
engage with either the 25-mm gun or coaxial machine gun as designated by 
the platoon leader either by fire command or by TSOP. The TOW system 
should be used against helicopters only when necessary or as a last resort. 
Unit TSOPs should provide guidance for dismounted rifle fires in conjunction 
with supporting Bradley weapon systems in active air defense. All crews 
must be alerted to enemy air threat. 

AERIAL ENGAGEMENT WEAPONS 

5-13. Proper weapon and ammunition selection for the range and target is the 
key to success. Table 5-2 shows the weapons and the type of aerial targets 
that they can destroy. 



Table 5-2. Ammunition Employed Against Aerial Targets. 





FIXED-WING 


HELICOPTER 








SLOW FAST 


ARMORED UNARMORED 


UAV 


PARATROOPER 


COAXIAL 


YES 


YES 


NO 


YES 


YES 


YES 


HEI-T 


YES 


YES* 


YES 


YES 


YES* 


YES 


APDS-T 


YES 


YES* 


YES 


YES 


YES* 


YES 


APFSDS-T 


YES 


YES* 


YES 


YES 


YES* 


NO 


TOW 


YES 


NO 


YES 


YES 


NO 


NO 


1 ‘Secondary source if coaxial is not available or if out of coaxial range. I 



The 25-mm Gun 

5-14. The 25-mm gun is effective against slow-moving FW aircraft, UAVs, 
and helicopters. When using the ADR sight, the gunner indexes 1,800 meters. 
The APDS-T, APFSDS-T, or HEI-T can be used against slow-moving, FW 
aircraft, UAVs, and helicopters. A continuous burst of 20 to 25 rounds (high 
rate), using TOT to adjust rounds on target, will sustain the volume of fire 
and kill the target. The APDS-T/APFSDS-T has a higher probability of hit 
than HEI-T; however, HEI-T has a higher probability of kill. At ranges 
beyond 1,200 meters, the APDS-T is more effective against helicopters. At 
ranges less than 1,200 meters, HEI-T is more effective against helicopters. 



5-6 





The Coaxial Machine Gun 



FM 44-8 



5-15. The coaxial machine gun is used against FW aircraft, unarmored 
helicopters, UAVs, and airborne troops. It is ineffective against heavily 
armored helicopters. A continuous burst (50 to 100 rounds) at the aiming 
point is required, and TOT is used to bring rounds on target. The coaxial 
machine gun is effective out to 900 meters. 



The TOW 

5-16. The TOW weapon system should be used against stationary and slow- 
moving (up to 80 kilometers per hour) aerial targets beyond 1,700 meters. 
The Bradley must be stationary when engaging targets with the TOW. Before 
firing the TOW, the gunner must determine if there are any obstacles 
between the vehicle and the target that might interfere with the missile. If 
the target is moving, the gunner must determine if the target will be in sight 
long enough for the missile to reach it. 

ENGAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 

5-17. The crew’s goal is to engage and destroy or suppress targets as fast as 
possible. (Refer to FM 23-1 for details.) Basic engagement procedures used for 
all engagements are — 

1. The BC may be required to lay the gun for direction if the gunner’s 
scan is away from the target. He will release control to the gunner 
(target hand-off) and issue the fire command. 

2. Once the target is acquired, the gunner identifies and discriminates the target. 

3. The BC then confirms the target and gives the Fire command. 

4. The gunner completes his switch checks. 



AIRCRAFT ENGAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR TANKS 

5-18. Tank automatic weapons can be used effectively against UAVs, jets, 
and helicopters — especially when several tanks are firing at the same time. 
The tank main gun can be used with good results against helicopters. It 
cannot be used effectively against jets because of the difficulty of tracking 
high-speed targets. 

ENGAGING HELICOPTERS AND UAVS 

5-19. Engage hostile targets immediately with the tank commander's 
automatic weapon (caliber .50 on most tanks) or with the loader's M240 
machine gun on Ml- series tanks. Firing quickly will — 

• Alert other tanks that hostile targets are in the area. 

• Destroy the target or spoil the pilot's aim. 

• Give the tank commander time to engage the target with the main 
gun and coaxial, if desired. 



5-7 




FM 44-8 



Engaging with Tank Machine Guns 

5-20. The tank commander's machine guns (or loader’s machine gun on Mi- 
series tanks) are useful weapons against unarmored threats. They can be 
fired quickly with volume fire. Before firing, ensure that the firing fan is clear 
of friendly units. Do not fire into them! Use the following guidelines: 

• When the target is hovering or inbound, aim high with the machine 
gun and fire a continuous burst, adjusting onto target by observing 
the tracers. When firing against aerial targets with the M85 machine 
gun on M60- series tanks, use high rates of fire. Remember, at longer 
ranges tracers may appear to be striking the target when they are 
actually going under it. 

• If the target is moving, track along its flight path using a lead of 50 
meters — ^half a football field. Fire a continuous burst, forcing the 
target to fly through the cone of fire. 

Engaging Helicopters with the Tank Main Gun 

5-21. The main gun should be used against armored threat helicopters. Speed 
is essential in engaging an attack helicopter. If an attack helicopter is 
hovering, it is probably preparing to fire a missile. Time is essential; fire any 
round that is preloaded. The M830A1 multipurpose antitank round is, by 
design, the most accurate round for engaging helicopters and should be the 
next round fired after any preloaded round. When engaging moving 
helicopters with an Ml- series tank, smoothly track the target while aiming 
at the center of mass. Base to the target, wait for the automatic lead to be 
induced (about 2 seconds), and fire. Be prepared to fire a second round using 
the same technique used for the first round. 

ENGAGING FAST-MOVING AIRCRAFT 

5-22. Because of the speed of jets, the best technique to use against them is to 
fire all tank automatic weapons in continuous bursts. If the jets are inbound, 
aim slightly above the nose or fuselage and fire. If the jet is crossing, use a 
lead of 200 meters (two football fields) and fire — ^letting the jet fly through 
the cone of fire from the machine guns. Do not try to track or traverse your 
fire with the jet — it flies too fast. 



PRACTICE SEQUENCE OF ENGAGEMENT 

5-23. A coordinated, high volume of fire will get results; precision is not 
important. Fire is delivered on command and not at the option of the 
individual soldier. The sequence of engagement might be as follows: 

1. An aircraft commences an attack on your unit. 

2. You or the air sentries spot the attacker. In either event, you are 
alerted to the attack and decide to engage the target. 

3. You alert the unit. For example, “Air attack, inbound 5 o’clock, prepare to fire.” 
(Table 2-1 in Chapter 2 of this FM lists the methods of giving alarms.) 

4. Each member of the unit prepares his weapon to fire by placing the 
weapon in full automatic mode. He locates the target, finds his aim 



5-8 




FM 44-8 



reference point as determined by the rules (Table 5-1), and waits for 
the command to fire. 

5. The leaders estimate the right moment and give the command, “Fire.” 

6. Each individual fires at the aiming point until all ammunition is 
expended, or until ordered “Cease fire.” Everyone immediately 
reloads and prepares to engage follow-on attackers. 



5-9 




Chapter 6 

T racer Observation 

This chapter describes how to evaluate tracer ohservation. The 
information provided focuses on correctly reading the observations and 
applications. It is important to know how to sense tracers. The observer 
cannot properly sense the tracers if he cannot read them correctly. He will 
have to read the tracer the moment it is passing the target. Tracer 
sensing will play an important part when adjusting the air defense reticle 
sighting systems to obtain the correct line and lead to hit a target. 



TRACER OBSERVATION OF FAST-MOVING AIRCRAFT 

6-1. Proper observation and sensing of tracers provides the gunner and 
observer with information on the trajectories of rounds fired in relation to the 
target. Corrections can be made in the direction of fire by observing and 
making proper tracer sensing. The three basic principles of tracer observation 
are superimposed tracer on the target, localized vision, and tracer path on 
incoming and outgoing targets. 

SUPERIMPOSED TRACER ON THE TARGET 

6-2. Considerations in judging superimposed tracers on targets include 
apparent tracer path, path above or below, firing adjustment, and tracer 
silhouette and eclipse. 



Apparent Tracer Path 

6-3. The tracer path will appear to be curving. This is an optical illusion 
created by a target moving while an observer is moving his line of sight with 
the target. See Figure 6-1. 




6-1 





FM 44-8 



Path Above or Below 

6-4. If the tracer path is above or below the target, the observer cannot judge 
whether the tracer is at a greater or lesser range than the target. 



Firing Adjustment 

6-5. Always adjust rounds on line with the target first, and then adjust 
rounds to lead the target. 



Traeer Silhouette and Eelipse 

6-6. Figure 6-2 shows a “silhouette” and an “eclipse.” To sense a silhouette or 
an eclipse, either the tracer or the target must appear in front of the other 
(superimposed). The round will disappear into the target if it is a hit. To 
judge for lead, the observer must see a silhouette or an eclipse. 

6-7. Tracer Silhouette. In a tracer silhouette, the tracer appears to pass 
between the target and the gun when rounds are adjusted to be on line with 
the target. 

6-8. Eelipse Silhouette. An eclipse silhouette occurs when the target passes 
between the tracer and the gun with line-adjusted shots. 




Figure 6-2. Silhouette and Eclipse. 



LOCALIZED VISION 

6-9. Vision should be localized in the immediate vicinity of the target. See 
Figure 6-3. 



Sight Vision 

6-10. A large part of the tracer path can be viewed from the gun. Vision 
should be localized in the immediate vicinity of the target as mentioned 
above. 



6-2 





FM 44-8 




Tracer Path and Tracer Hump 

6-11. Read all tracers from nose to tail on all target courses. In Figure 6-4A, 
the tracer path appears to enter the nose of the target first and then proceed 
toward the tail. Locations where maximum curvature appears are called the 
tracer humps. 



Tracer Hump Field of Vision 

6-12. Although the observer will see the curve and the tracer hump in his 
field of vision, he must ignore it completely to make accurate tracer sensing. 



Tracer Sensing 

6-13. Many observers make tracer sensing at the hump. When this is done, 
the observer will always read the tracer sensing as ahead of the target, but 
the true sensing is to the rear of the target. See Figure 6-4B. 

TRACER PATH ON INCOMING AND OUTGOING TARGETS 

6-14. On incoming and outgoing targets, the tracer will appear to pass the 
target twice. Many observers make a tracer sensing on the first tracer pass. 
This is wrong because the tracer is not in the immediate vicinity of the 
target — ^the tracer is somewhere short of the target. The observer must read 
the tracer when it passes the target the second time. See Figure 6-5. 



6-3 






FM 44-8 





Figure 6-5. Tracer Passing Target Twice. 



TRACER OBSERVATION OF SLOW-MOVING AIRCRAFT 

6-15. Track slow-moving aircraft, and read and sense tracers in a manner 
similar to that for fast-moving aircraft. Slow movers are trickier to track than 
fast movers. Sometimes helicopters cross under cover or will pop up and 
disappear behind cover making it difficult to track. Consequently, the 
observer has to sense the tracer and apply corrections to the gun in the least 
amount of time. 



6-4 






LINE AND LEAD SENSING FOR CROSSING TARGETS 



FM 44-8 



Sensing Low 

6-16. In Figure 6-6A, the observer knows the tracer passed low of the target. 
He reads the sensing low. 

Sensing Ahead 

6-17. In Figure 6-6B, the tracer is on line and eclipses the target. The 
observer reads the sensing ahead. Too much lead has been applied. 




Figure 6-6. Observer — Low and Eclipse, Ahead. 



SENSING FOR INCOMING AND OUTGOING TARGETS 



Traeer Right 

6-18. Figure 6-7A shows the tracer sensing is read as right. Too much right 
lead has been applied. 

Tracer Left 

6-19. Figure 6-7B shows the tracer sensing is read as left. Too much left lead 
has been applied. 




Figure 6-7. Observer — Right and Left. 



6-5 






FM 44-8 



Tracer Passes Target Twiee 

6-20. In Figure 6-8, the observer sees the tracer pass the target twice. He 
reads the tracer when it passes the target from nose to tail. He senses the 
tracer as ahead because the tracer eclipsed the target. 




Figure 6-8. Observer — Eclipse, Silhouette. 



TARGET FLYING DIRECTLY AT SIGHT 

6-21. For a target coming directly at the gun as in Figure 6-9, the observer 
sees that the tracer passed the target twice. He reads the tracer from top to 
bottom. In other words, the tracer is read only after the tracer hump, 
regardless of the type of target and what direction it is flying. The tracer is 
sensed as ahead. 




Figure 6-9. Observer — Ahead and High. 



6-6 










FM 44-8 



POP-UP TARGET 



6-22. Line information for pop-up targets is read as the tracer passes the 
target. In Figure 6-10, the observer sees the tracer pass to the left of the 
target. The sensing is left. 




Figure 6-10. Observer — Sensing Left. 



LINE AND LEAD SENSING FOR TARGET CROSSING UNDER COVER 
Tracers in Rear 



6-23. In Figure 6-11, the observer sees that the round burst is to the rear of 
the target. The tracer sensing is astern. 




Figure 6-11. Observer — Burst Rear. 



6-7 






FM 44-8 



Tracers Ahead 

6-24. In Figure 6-12, the observer sees the round burst ahead of the target. 
The sensing is ahead. 




Figure 6-12. Observer — Burst Front. 



Tracers Low 

6-25. In Figure 6-13, the observer sees that the tracer passes low of the 
target. Sensing is low. 




Figure 6-13. Observer — Tracer Low. 



6-8 




FM 44-8 



Tracers High 



6-26. In Figure 6-14, the observer sees that the tracer passes high of the 
target. The sensing is high. 




Figure 6-14. Observer — Tracer High. 



SENSING TRACERS 

6-27. It is important to know how to sense tracers. The tracers cannot be 
properly sensed if they cannot be correctly read. The tracer will have to be 
read the moment it is passing the target. Tracer sensing will play an 
important part when adjusting the air defense reticle sighting systems to 
obtain the correct line and lead to hit a target. 



6-9 




Appendix A 

Unit Training 

This appendix addresses training as it pertains to a unit in preparation 
for active and passive air defense measures. Because self-defense against 
aerial platform attack is closely related to the defensive measures you 
take against ground attack, training can he conducted merely hy varying 
the perspective — attack from the air as opposed to attack from the 
ground. This is especially true for training in the application of passive 
air defense measures (camouflage, concealment, and the use of cover). 
Training in the application of active air defense measures presents a 
special problem, however. Soldiers must learn the techniques for 
delivering volume fire in the path of attacking aircraft. They must also he 
trained to overcome their natural tendency to track the target, not to fire 
directly at crossing targets, and not take Kentucky windage. The 
recommended leads have been computed to give the highest probability of 
engulfing the target with fire, and the soldier must adhere to the rules if 
the system is to be effective. 

A-1. Training in passive air defense measures is continuous and is integrated 
with other field training undertaken by the unit. The trainer should vary the 
training exercise occasionally by proclaiming an air attack situation. The unit 
should immediately disperse, seek cover, and prepare to engage the attacker. 
If available, use aircraft to fly simulated attack missions so that the troops 
can get an idea of the time element of an attack. See Table A-1 for a checklist 
of items the trainer should check before and during the attack. 



Table A-1 : Passive Air Defense Training Checklist 



BEFORE THE ATTACK 

Action 

1. Is an air watch being maintained? 

2. Are vehicies and equipment camoufiaged? 

3. Do the troops know the air attack warning signais? 

4. Is dispersion the maximum permitted by the terrain and the tacticai situation? 

5. Is the available cover used for maximum advantage? 


YES 

□ 

□ 

□ 

□ 

□ 


NO 

□ 

□ 

□ 

□ 

□ 


DURING THE ATTACK 

Action 

1 . Was the warning disseminated in time for the unit to take damage-limiting measures? 


□ 


□ 


2. Did all elements of the unit receive the warning? 


□ 


□ 


3. Was the available cover used effectively? 


□ 


□ 


4. Was dispersion used effectively? 


□ 


□ 


5. Did the commander maintain close control during the attack? 


□ 


□ 


6. Could the unit have engaged the aircraft had the order been given? 


□ 


□ 


Note: If the trainer must mark a “No” in any item under “Before the Attack,” stop the training exercise 
and take corrective action. If he marks a “No” in any item under “During the Attack,” he must then 
assess the unit accordingly. 







A-1 












FM 44-8 



A-2. When training in active air defense measures, the trainer assumes that 
the individual soldier knows how to fire his personal weapon. Therefore, 
training should concentrate on coordination of fire and on correct lead 
estimation. Fire coordination consists simply of ensuring that the unit acts as 
a group and in response to command and/or air attack alarms. This means 
that each individual knows what he is going to do in response to the 
command “air attack” and that he does it without further instructions. It also 
means that he holds fire until he receives the “fire” command. 

A-3. All members of the combined arms team can take it for granted that 
they will come under air attack in a future war. They need to train now to 
meet this threat. Units must integrate training for air defense into their 
tactical training. Units must practice the passive and active air defense skills 
they will employ while moving cross-country in tactical formations, moving in 
convoy, and while stationary. Units must practice and be evaluated on such 
skills as posting air guards; maintaining cover, concealment, and dispersion 
(or seeking cover and concealment if caught in the open); and proper 
employment of their weapon systems against air threats. Units must follow 
the guidance contained in their ARTEP MTP manuals. Some of these 
manuals are — 

• ARTEP 7-8-MTP Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and 
Squad 

• ARTEP 7-10-MTP Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company 

• ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon 

• ARTEP 71-1-MTP Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized 
Infantry Company and Company Team 



A-2 




Glossary 



A2C2 


Army airspace command and control 


AADC 


area air defense commander 


ABMOC 


air battle management operations center 


ACCP 


Army Correspondence Course Program 


active air defense 


Direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of 
hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air 
defense weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air defense role and 
electronic warfare. 


AD 


air defense 


ADA 


air defense artillery 


ADO 


air defense officer 


ADR 


air defense reticle 


ADW 


air defense warning 


air defense (AD) 


All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft or missiles 
in the earth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the 
effectiveness of such attack. 


air defense warning (ADW) Measures used to communicate levels of air threat to all 

subordinate units and soldiers. Key words are: Red — attack by hostile 
aircraft or missiles is imminent or in progress; Yellow — attack by hostile 
aircraft or missiles is probable; and White — attack by hostile aircraft or 
missiles is improbable. 


air guards 


Personnel assigned the duty of aerial search and scan for aerial platforms 
or aircraft of any type. 


AO 


area of operations 


APOD 


aerial port of debarkation 


APDS-T 


armor-piercing discarding sabot-tracer 


APFSDS-T 


armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot with tracer 


ARTEP 


Army Training and Evaluation Program 


ATOM 


antitank guided missile 



Glossary- 1 




FM 44-8 


BC 


Bradley commander 


BSFV 


Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle 


C^I 


command, control, communications, and intelligence 


cal 


caliber 


CAS 


close air support 


CBU 


cluster bomb unit 


chaff 


Thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths and frequency responses 
used to reflect electronic echoes for confusion purposes on radar screens. 


CIS 


Commonwealth of Independent States 


close air support (CAS) Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets 
which are in proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed 
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those 
forces. 


CM 


cruise missile 


COA 


course of action 


DA 


Department of the Army 


DEW 


directed early warning 


directed early warning (DEW) Early warning given to a specific unit or area of the battlefield 
about impending air attack. 


DZ 


drop zone 


FARP 


forward arming and refueling point 


FFAR 


free-fiight, air-to-air 


FLOT 


forward line of own troops 


FM 


field manual 


FOB 


forward operations base 


FW 


fixed-wing 


G-2 


intelligence staff officer (division or higher staff) 



Glossary-2 




FM 44-8 

GTA graphic training aid 

HEI-T high-explosive incendiary-tracer 

hostile criteria Description of conditions under which an aircraft or vehicle may be 

identified as hostile for engagement purposes. 

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

LADW local air defense warning 

LNO liaison officer 

local air defense warning (LADW) Measure used by ADA units to communicate the level of 

air threat to specific units and to recommend specific countermeasures. 

LZ landing zone 

MANPADS man-portable air defense system 

mm millimeter 

MTP mission training plan 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

Ofl operations and intelligence 

OP observation post 

passive air defense All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effects 
of hostile air action. They include cover, concealment, camouflage, 
dummy positions, dispersion, and protective construction. 

pop-up point The location at which aircraft quickly gain altitude for target acquisition 

and engagement. This point occurs at the end of low-level terrain flight 
to avoid detection or prevent effective engagement by the enemy. 

pull-up point The point at which an aircraft must start to climb from a low-level 

approach to gain sufficient height from which to execute the attack or 
retirement. 

QSTAG Quadripartite Standardization Agreement 

RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition 

ROE rules of engagement 



Glossary-3 




FM 44-8 



rules of engagement (ROE) Directives of the force headquarters that delineate the 

circumstances under which US forces will initiate and continue combat 
engagement with other forces encountered. In air defense, directives that 
delineate the circumstances under which weapons can fire at an aircraft. 
The right of self-defense is always preserved. 

RW rotary-wing 

S2 Intelligence Officer 

SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment 

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses 

SHORAD short-range air defense 

SOI signal operation instructions 

SOP standing operating procedure 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

STANAG Standardization Agreement (NATO) 

TASM tactical air-to-surface missile 

tactical ballistic missile; theater ballistic missile 

The tactic of employing helicopters in such a manner as to use the 
terrain, vegetation, and man-made objects to degrade the enemy’s ability 
to visually, optically, or electronically detect or locate the helicopter. This 
tactic involves a constant awareness of the capabilities and positions of 
the enemy weapons and detection means in relation to available masking 
terrain features and flight routes. Terrain flying involves flight close to 
the earth’s surface and includes the following flight techniques: 

• Contour flight. Flight at low altitude conforming generally to, 
and in the proximity of, the contours of the earth. It is 
characterized by varying airspeed and altitude as dictated by 
vegetation, obstacles, and ambient light. 

• Low-level flight. Flight generally carried out above obstacles but 
at an altitude where detection by a threat force is avoided or 
minimized. It is, therefore, at a constant indicated altitude and 
airspeed. 

• Nap-of-the-earth flight. Flight at varying airspeeds as close to 
the earth’s surface as vegetation, obstacles, and ambient light will 
permit while generally following contours of the earth. 

THAAD Theater High-Altitude Area Defense 

TOC tactical operations center 



TBM 

terrain flight 



Glossary-4 




TOT 



tracer on target 



TOW 

TRADOC 

TSOP 

UAV 

WCS 



FM 44-8 



tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile) 
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
tactical standing operating procedure 
unmanned aerial vehicle 
weapon control status 



Glossary-5 




Bibliography 



SOURCES USED 

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication. 

AR 310-25. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. 15 October 1983 (Change 1, 21 May 1986). 
AR 310-50. Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. 15 November 1985. 

AR 385-10. Army Safety Program. 23 May 1988. 

AR 750-1. Army Materiel Maintenance Policy and Retail Maintenance Operations. 
1 August 1994 (Change 1, 01 July 1996). 

DA Form 581. Request for Issue and Turn-In of Ammunition. August 1989. 

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 01 February 1974. 

DA Form 2404. Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet. 01 April 1979. 

DA Pamphlet 385-1. Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide. 22 September 1993. 

FM 9-43-1. Maintenance Operations and Procedures. 21 February 1997. 

FM 20-3. Camouflage. 14 November 1990. 

FM 23-1. Bradley Gunnery. 18 March 1996. 

FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 08 July 1994. 

FM 44-44. Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations. 03 October 1995. 

FM 44-48. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon. 21 September 1993. 

FM 44-64. SHORAD Battalion and Battery Operations. 05 June 1997. 

FM 44-80. Visual Aircraft Recognition. 30 September 1996. 

FM 44-100. US Army Air Defense Operations. 15 June 1995. 

FM 63-3. Corps Support Command. 30 September 1993. 

FM 63-20. Forward Support Battalion. 26 February 1990. 

FM 71-2. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. 27 September 1988 
(Change 1, 17 August 1994). 

FM 90-13-1. Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 28 February 1991 (Change 1, 07 May 1993). 
FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993. 

FM 100-6. Information Operations. 27 August 1996. 

FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997. 

Joint Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
23 March 1994. 



Bibliography- 1 




FM 44-8 



These international agreements are available on request from the Naval Publications and Forms 
Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120-5099. Use DD Form 1425 to requisition 
documents. 

STANAG 2014. Operation Orders, Warning Orders, and Administrative/Logistics Orders. 
Edition 7. 

STANAG 2019. Military Symbols for Land Based Systems — APP-6. Edition 3. 

STANAG 2034. Land Forces Procedures for Allied Supply Transactions. Edition 4. 

STANAG 2041. Operation Orders, Tables and Graphs for Road Movement. Edition 4. 

STANAG 2047. Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only). Edition 6. 
STANAG 2079. Rear Air Security and Rear Area Damage Control. Edition 4. 

STANAG 2150. NATO Standards of Proficiency for NBC Defence. Edition 5. 

STANAG 2868. Land Force Tactical Doctrine — ATP-35(B). Edition 5. 

STANAG 3700. NATO Tactical Air Doctrine — ATP-33(B). Edition 5. 

STANAG 3736. Offensive Air Support Operations — ATP-27(B). Edition 8. 

STANAG 3805. Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War — ATP-40(A). Edition 4. 
STANAG 3880. Counter Air Operations — ATP-42(B). Edition 3. 

QSTAG 509. Military Symbols. 

READINGS RECOMMENDED 

These readings contain relevant supplemental information. 

ACCP Subcourse IS 4400. Visual Aircraft Recognition. 

AR 385-64. Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards. 22 May 1987. 

ARTEP 7-8-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifie Platoon and Squad. 
29 September 1994. 

ARTEP 7-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifie Company. 29 September 1994. 

ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon. 25 September 1996. 

ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and 
Company Team. 03 October 1988. 

ARTEP 44-117-30-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battery, Gun or Stinger. 
05 June 1992. 

ARTEP 44-117-31-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an Avenger Battery. 15 June 1992. 

ARTEP 44-135-MTP. Mission Training Plan for a FAAD Battalion (Light and Special Divisions). 
28 June 1996. 

ARTEP 44-175-MTP. Mission Training Plan for a FAAD Battalion (Heavy Division). 
08 May 1996. 

ARTEP 44-177-30-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battery, Bradley Stinger Fighting 
Vehicle. 29 September 1994. 



Bibliography-2 




FM 44-8 



ARTEP 44-435-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battalion, Avenger. 29 September 1994. 

DA Pamphlet 738-750. Functional Users Manual for the Army Maintenance Management 
System (TAMMS). 01 August 1994. 

FM 6-30. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire. 16 July 1991. 

FM 6-121. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition. 
25 September 1990. 

FM 8-10. Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations. 01 March 1991. 

FM 8-10-6. Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 
31 October 1991 (Change 1, 08 March 1994). 

FM 8-50. Prevention and Medical Management of Laser Injuries. 08 August 1990. 

FM 8-285. Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries. 
22 December 1995. 

FM 19-30. Physical Security. 01 March 1979. 

FM 21-76. Survival. 05 June 1992. 

FM 22-9. Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations. 12 December 1991. 

FM 22-100. Military Leadership. 31 July 1990. 

FM 24-1. Signal Support in the AirLand Battle. 15 October 1990. 

FM 24-33. Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. 17 July 1990. 

(S) FM 44- lA. Air Defense Artillery Operational Planning Data (U). 21 September 1984 
(Change 1, 01 May 1986). 

FM 100-103. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 07 October 1987. 

GTA 44-2-17. Combat Aircraft: CAS, Fighter-Bomber, and Air Superiority. 02 January 1996. 

GTA 44-2-18. Combat Aircraft: Helicopter. 02 January 1996. 

GTA 44-2-19. Combat Aircraft: UAV, Bomber, and Cargo/Utility. 02 January 1996. 

STP 21-1-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1. 01 October 1994. 

STP 21-24-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 2-4. 01 October 1992. 

STP 44-14R14-SM-TG. Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 14R, Line of Sight — 
Forward-Heavy Crew Member, Skill Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4. 03 October 1995. 

TM 9-2320-280-10. Operator's Manual for Truck, Utility: Cargo/Troop Carrier, P4-Ton, 4x4, 
M998; M998A1; Truck, Utility: Cargo/Troop Carrier, H4-Ton, 4x4, wAVinch, M1038; 
M1038A1; Truck, Utility: Heavy Variant, 4x4, M1097; M1097A1; M1097A2; Truck, 
Utility: Tow Carrier, Armored, 114-Ton, 4x4, M966; M966A1; Truck, Utility: Tow Carrier, 
Armored, 114-Ton, 4x4, wAVinch, M1036; Truck, Utility: Tow Carrier, w/Supplemental 
Armor, 114-Ton, 4x4, M1045; M1045A1; M1045A2 ; Truck, Utility: Tow Carrier, w/ 
Supplemental Armor, 114-Ton, 4x4, wAVinch, M1046; M1046A1; Truck, Utility: Armament 
Carrier, Armored, 114-Ton, 4x4, M1025; M1025A1; M1025A2; Truck, Utility: Armament 
Carrier, Armored, 114-Ton, 4x4, wAVinch, M1026; M1026A1; Truck, Utility: Armament 
Carrier, w/Supplemental Armor, 114-Ton, 4x4, M1043; M1043A1; M1043A2; Truck, 
Utility: Armament Carrier, w/Supplemental Armor, 114-Ton, 4x4, w/Winch, M1044; 
M1044A1; Truck, Utility: S250 Shelter Carrier, 4x4, M1037; Truck, Utility: S250 Shelter 



Bibliography-3 




FM 44-8 



Carrier, 4x4, wAVinch, M1042; Truck, Ambulance, 2-Litter, Armored, 4x4, M996; 
M996A1; Truck, Ambulance, 4-Litter, Armored, 4x4, M997; M997A1; M997A2; Truck, 
Ambulance, 2-Litter, Soft Top, 4x4, M1035; M1035A1; M1035A2. 31 January 1996. 



Bibliography-4 




A 

active air defense, 2-1 , 4-4, 

5-1 - 5-9, A-1 , A-2 

aerial engagement weapons, 5-6 

aerial platform/aircraft 
recognition, 3-4, 4-1 

aerial search 
convoy, 3-1 
horizontal search, 3-3 
techniques, 3-1 
variations, 3-4 
vertical search, 3-2, 3-3 

aerial threat, 1-7-1-11 

aiming points, 5-2 - 5-4 

air avenues of approach, 1-2 - 

1- 4 

air battle management 
operations center (ABMOC), 

2- 3 

air defense warning (ADW), 2-1 , 
2-2, 2-4 

air guards, 3-1, 3-4, 4-6, A-2 

air threat, 1-7-1-11,2-5 

ammunition, 5-6 

antitank guided missile (ATGM), 
1-9 

area air defense commander 
(AADC), 2-1 

area of interest, 1-1 

area of operations, 1-2 

Army airspace command and 
control (A^C^), 2-3 

attack avoidance measures, 

4-1 - 4-4 



Index 

attack profile, 1-2 

B 

ballistic missiles, 1-2 

battlefield 
effects, 1-2 
environment, 1-1 
organization, 1-2 

battlespace, 1 -1 

breakout plan, 4-8 

C 

camouflage, 4-3 

close air support (CAS), 1-12, 

1- 13 

coaxial, 5-6, 5-7 

command, control, 
communications, and 
intelligence (C®l), 1-12 

concealment, 4-2, 4-3 

contour flying, 1-2 

cover, 4-4, 4-5, 4-7 

cruise missiles, 1-2, 1-7, 1-11 

D 

damage-limiting measures, 4-3 - 
4-5 

defensive operations, 1-12, 1-13 

directed early warning (DEW), 

2- 1 , 2-3, 2-4 

dispersion, 4-3, 4-6, 4-8 

E 

early warning nets, 2-1 
emergency air attack alarms, 2-5 
enemy air threat, 5-1 



engagement principles, 5-3 

engagement techniques 
fast-moving aircraft, 5-8 
M2/M3 Bradley, 5-6 
tanks, 5-7, 5-8 

entry phase, 1-1 1 

expansion and buildup, 1-11 

F 

firing positions, 5-5 
fixed-wing aircraft, 1-10, 1-11 
football field technique, 5-3 
force-projection operations, iv 
free flight, air-to-air (FEAR), 1-9 
G 

G2, 1-13 

H 

herringbone, 4-8 
high-value target, 1-4 
hostile criteria, 2-2, 2-3 

I 

intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield (IPB), 1-1 

L 

local air defense warning (LADW), 
2-1 - 2-4 

O 

offensive operations, 1-12, 1-13 
ordnance, 1-2, 1-3 

P 

passive air defense, 4-1 - 4-9 
pop-up technique, 1-9 



Index-1 




FM 44-8 



protective construction, 4-4, 

4-7 

R 

reconnaissance, intelligence, 
surveillance, terrain, and target 
acquisition (RISTA), 1-3, 1-8, 
1-11 

rotary-wing aircraft, 1-8-1-10 

rules of engagement (ROE), 2-2, 
2-3 

S 

S2, 1-1, 1-13 

sector surveillance, 3-2 

self-defense, 2-1 - 2-5, 4-7, 5-1 

sensing tracers, 6-9 

small arms fire, 5-2 

suppression of enemy air 
defenses (SEAD), iv 

T 

tactical air-to-surface missile 
(TASM), 1-2, 1-10 

tactical ballistic missile (TBM), 

1- 6, 1-7 

tactical operations center (TOC), 

2- 3 

target value, 1-4 
terrain masking, 1-2 
threat 

aerial/air, 1-7-1-11,2-5 
air capabilities, 1-5- 1-7 
application, 1-11 - 1-13 
courses of action, 1-13 
enemy air, 5-1 
evaluation, 1-4 - 1-7 

TOW, 5-6, 5-7 

tracer observation 
fast-moving aircraft, 6-1 - 6-4 
slow-moving aircraft, 6-4 - 6-9 

tracer on target (TOT), 5-6, 5-7 



U 

unit training, A-1 , A-2 

unit warning, 2-4, 2-5 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 
1-2, 1-4, 1-6- 1-8, 1-11, 1-12 

V 

volume fire, 5-2 

W 

weapon control status (WCS), 2-3 



Index-2 




FM 44-8 
1 JUNE 1999 



By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 



DENNIS J. REIMER 
General, United States Army 
Chief of Staff 



Official: 

JU BjLlj 

^JOELB. HUDSON 
Administrative Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army 
05799 



DISTRIBUTION: 

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve. To be distributed in 
accordance with the initial distribution number 110357, requirements for FM 44-8. 




PIN: 050255-000