FM 31-21 Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations

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A icpnni of ihe QTt^nal "^ 31-21

Field Manual") HEADQUARTERS,

y DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

No. SI-21J Washington 26. D.C., £9 September j 961

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND SPECIAL FORCES

OPERATIONS

ParArraplifl PBr«
Part Owt TNTBODUCTTON

Chafteii 1- FUNDAMENTALS 1-S S

2. RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA WAB-

FABE 1-8 S

Pabt Two. OBGANIZATION FOR THE SPTICIAL
FORCES EFFORT

ChapTbs 8, JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WAH-

FAHE TASK FOBCE <JUWTF) 9 Z U

4. AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

Section I. GfliiMfll — ,— , IB-lS 18

11. The special foirra aperatloiLal bue 19-21 26

ni. Control of operatlMii 22-27 29

IV. Control of administrative and train ii^

ActivitJM _„ 26-82 S9

CKAirfER fi, THEATER SUPPORT

Section I. LogiaticB .-. S3— 4A 4fl

IL Intsllljence 44-46 54

III. Commuriicationa 47-&2 Bft

TV, Initial contact ^ _^_ B3-&4 63

Part Three, OPERATIONS

Chapter 6. INFILTRATION . 56-60 64

7. OBGANIZATION AWD DEVELOPMENT
OF THE AREA COTaMAND,

Section I. OrffanizfltloiiBl canceptB , 61-6fl 69

II. RcBistance elements fi7-72 79

IIL Security __, 78-80 SB

IV, tot^Ulffance in jruerrilla warfare operaCiomil

ueu — -, 81-83 98

V. Conununicatjona In ^errllle warfare opera-
tional areas ^ 84-87 98

VI. LogiaticB in guerrilla warfare operational

areas _ _ — . — 88-04 9&

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IV.
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INDKI . . ..

COMBAT EHPLOYHEHT

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EDuilDyiDent of UW fons .after link-up __ I40-14T

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS Of
SUPPORT OF UNCONVENTIONAL

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PART ONE
INIRODUCnON

CHAPTBI 1
FUNDAMENTALS

1. Purpoaa and Scope

(b Tlib *wfiiiifti provides gniduHS in apedaJ forces and uncon-
veational varfare opetatloTiH for commaiideFS and staffs at aD
kv^ lite basic cooc^ita of imconTentional warfare are pre-
Boated in a mantwr deaiffned to acqaaint the Feader vith spedal
forces oiirH^il^atioa, coocepta, and methods of operatlonH to fulfin
the Army'B responwbility for the conduct of unconventional
warfare.

6. ThoroQ^ ondervtaridiiie ■>£ the ideas established within this
rrmnnsl will prepare the comnmider «id tiM pffiwr? for »ut-
sequent decisions and staff actions i^iich affect apedal force*
planning and opcrations-

e. D^ailed methods aixd techniquea of special fmi^es operations
are discussed below. Classified information pertaining to alJ leveb
of special forces operations is found in FM Sl-SIA-

2. Definition of Unconventional Wcvfoi*

Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of
guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversiDn a^^nst
hostile states (resistance). UnconveiitionaJ warfare operationa
are conducted in enemy or enemy controlled territory by pre-
dominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed
in varying degrees by an external source.

3. Do4inecrtion of RMpiHiabllilieft for Unconvtntional
Wfwfore

a. The respotisibility for certain of these activities has been
delegated to the service having primary concern. Goerrilla war-
fere U the responsibility of the United States Army.

b. Within certain designated geographic areas — called guerrilla
warfare operational areas— the United States Army is responsible
for the conduct of all three interrelated fMds of activity as they
affect guerrilla warfare operations.

e- The military operations of resistance movements are cus-
tomarily supported and accompanied by political and economic
activities — both overt and clandestine — of individuals and groups
integrated, or acting in conjunction with guerrillas. The several
types of activities are interlocking. The term unconventional
warfare is used in this manual to denote all of the United States
Army'fi associated responsibilities - in the conduct of guerrilla
warfare. The term guerrilla warfare is used to denote the primary
overt military activities of the guerrilla forces.

CHAPTER 2
RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

4. Resivlanw

a. General Resistance is the cornerstone of guernlla warfare.
Underground and guerrilla warfare stem from a resistance move-
ment,

h. Definition- ResistJince is defined as the act of opposition of
one individual or group to another- A resistance movement is the
organized element of a disaffected population which resists a
government or occupying power with means varying from passive
to violently active. Resistance movements begin to form when
disaatisfflction occurs among strongly motivated individuals who
cannot furtiier their cause by peaceful and legal means,

e. The Nature of Resistance-

(1) Resistance, rebellion or civil war begins in a nation
where political, sociological, economic or religious divi-
sion has occurred. Divisions of this nature are usually
caused by a violation of rights or privileges, the oppres-
sion of one group by the dominant or occupying force,
or the threat to the life and freedom of the populace.
Resistance also may develop in a nation where the once
welcomed liberators have failed to improve an intolerable
social or economic situation. Resistance cart also be
deliberately inspired from eittemal sources against an
assumed grievance. Resistance can be active or passive.
Passive resistance may be in the form of smoldering
resentment which needs only leadership or a means of
expression to mature to active resistance.

(2) Some people join a resistance movement because of an
innate desire to survive. Others may join the resistance
forces because of deep ideological convictions. But all,
regardless of initial motivation, are bound together to
fight against a common enemy. Part of the population
assists the resistance movement as fighters in the
guerrilla force; some assist as part-time guerrillas or in
civilian support agencies know as auxiliary unitf; while
others are members of the underground.

d. Infla^nt^ng Factors.

(1) EnviTOTtment.

(a) Terrain. The phyiaical location of the resistance move-
ment has a great inflpence upon its organiaation and
tacticA. Because they provide suitable areas for the
security of operations, mountains, swamps, large
foresta or jungles nurture overt or guerrilla type
resiatjince. Flat plains areas and large towns or dties
are more apt to lead to underground resistance activi-
ties although the posaibihty of organizing a guerrilla
force in these areas should not be overlooked.

(b) Ctilturui. A peoples' cultural environment also has its
effects on resistance movements. The urge to bear
arms, escape, and Aght the enemy is dependent on the
cultural background of the people. Men from rural
or peasant environment, not subjected to tight govern-
mental control, have more opportunity to show their
hatred of the ^nemy occupation by overt and violent
means such as guerrilFa warfare. People from an
industrialized and highly nrbaniied culture will resist
with such activities as sabotage, propaganda, passive
acts and espiouaf(«,

(c) Control of poptdation. When an occupying power is
able to exercise close and stringent control over the
population, the resistance movement is conducted pri-
marily in secrecy. When the police and military forces
of the occupying power are diverted or otherwise
ineiFectual, the resistance movement may be conducted
with primarily overt guerrilla actions.

(2) MotivatioH, Besides the geographical and cultural envir-
onment influencing guerrilla warfare, the sociological
climate produces many motivating factors which have
a profound effect upon the resistance movement. Strong
individual motivation is essential to the formation of a
resistance force. Altiioogh some individual motives are
not ideal and, if openly expressed, may do harm to the
goerrilla effort, the following are examples of what some
of the tnie motives may be.

(a) Ideology, In guerrilla units some individuals have
developed strong ideological motives for taking up
arms. These ideologies take root in two broad areas —
polities and religion. The individual tends to subordi-
nate his own personality to these ideologies and works
constantly and solely for the "cause." In some resist-
ance fl^tero, this motive is extremely strong.

(6) Economic. Many individuals join resistance move-
ments to keep from starving or to keep from losing
their livelihood. An organized resistance force may
exert economic influence on individuals who fail to
support tiieir movement.

(c) Personal ffotn. Personal gain is the motivating force
of some volunteers- An individual, so motivated, may
change sides if he believes he can gain more by fitting
for tJie opposing force.

(d) Hate. People who have lost loved ones due to enemy
actions may flght against that enemy as a result of
engendered hatred. Uncontrolled hatred can pose prob-
]eta& for the sponsor because it is difficult to curb
liie fanaticism of such individuals and properly direct
their efforts.

(e) Security^ If the resistance movement is strong or
gives the impression of being powerful, many indi-
viduals join out of a feeling of personal safety.
Usually, this situation occurs only after liie resistance
movement is well organized and the enemy has been
weakened by other actions. Others join in order to
escape recruitment into the service of the enemy.

(/) Ego. Personal motives such as power, pride, and
adventure operate to some extent in all individuals.
Depending upon the moral fibre of tJie individual,
these motives may sustain him in times of great stress.

(g) Fear. Some individuals become a part of the resistance
movement throu^ no personal desire of their own.
They join the movement out of fear of reprisals
against themselves or their families.

<3) Chance for auccesa. In addition to motivation and cir-
cumstances of environment, a population must feel that
there is ultimately a diance for success or there can be
no effective resistance movement developed. Active par-
ticipation in any resistance movement is influenced by
its chance for success.

<4) Guidance. Resistance movements stand or fall on the
caliber of the leaders and other individuals in the organ-
ization. An understanding of the environmental and
individaal motivating factors will assist greatly those
who desire to ofitain the optimum from a guerrilla
organization. An aoaly^s of these factors plays an
important part in evaluating potential resistance forces.

5, Guerrilla Warfare

GneniUa warfare comprises combat operations conducted in
enemy held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on a
military or para-nulitary basia to reduce the combat effectiveness,
industrial capacity, aod morale of the enemy. Guerilla operations
are conducted by relatively amaO groups employing offensive tac-
tics. Guerrilla warfare supports other military operations.

6. CharacteristH:& of Guemlla Warfare

a. General. Guerilla warfare is characterized by otfenaive
action. Guerrillas rely upon mobihty, eJusiveness and surprise.
In additJOQ to these traits, Aere are other characteristicH that
should be mentioned: civilian support, otitside sponsorship, politi-
cal aspects, legal aspects, tactics, and development aspects.

A. Support Factors.

(1) CivUian support. The SQCcess of guerrilla movements
depends apon continuous moral and material support
from the civilian population. The local community
usually is under intense pressure from anti-guerr[lla
factions. Punitive measures such as reprisals^ terrorism,
deportation, restriction of movement and seizure of
goods and property are conducted against supporters of
guerrilla activity, making this support dangerous and
difficult. If the local populace has a strong will to resist,
enemy repriBals cause an increase in underground activi-
ties. TTie civilian community may assist the guerrilla
force by furnishing supphes, recruits, information; by
giving early warning ; by supporting evasion and escape ;
and other activities. After the guerrilla force has estab-
lished itself and is suificiently strong, it may need to
exert force upon certain elements of the civilian popula-
tion to command their support, e, g, : coerce indifferent
or unresponsive portions of the population into support-
ing the guerrilla movement. Civilians participating in
such support activities, aside from underground opera-
tions, comprise what are known as the auxiliary forcea,

<2) Outside sponsorship. Guerrilla operations are more etfec-
tive when outside sponsorship is present. During a war-
time situation this support is political, psychological and
logistical as well as tactical. A sponsoring power decides
to support guerrilla forces when it feels ttiat the guer-
rillas can make a significant contribution toward the
achievement of national objeotivea.

e, PoUlwU AKpects.

(1) Guerrilla warfare has often been described as being
more political than military in nature. It is certainly
milit^T in the tactical sense, bnt it is also political since
a guariHa movement generally stems from a local power
stj^iggle. Gnerrillas usually fi^ for political gains^
although in gainii^ their own pohtical objectives they
may assist the sponsoring power to gain its mihtary
objective.

(2) The political dominance in guerrilla warfare can be seen
from another point of view. Guerrilla leaders with a
common enemy, but politically opposed, may dissipate
their efforts by fighting each other. ITie politicaUy
oriented guerrilla leader can cause trouble by withhold-
ing his cooperation until he extracts promises of political
significance from his sponsor. The pohtical imprint on
guerrilla warfare is but another aspect that must be
closely studied.

d. Legal Aspects. Guerrilla warfare is bound by the rules of
the Geneva Conventions as much as is conventional warfare. As
outlined in appropriate international agreements and FH 27-10,
four importaht foetors give a guerrilla l(!gal status: (1) be com-
manded by a person responsible for the actions of his subordin-
ates; (2) wear a fixed and distinctive insignia or sign recognizable
at a distance; (3) conduct operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war; and (4) carry arms openly. If these four
factors are present, the guerrilla is entitled to the same treatment
from his captora as the regular soldier. During World War II,
General Eisenhower sent a proclamation to Nazis and Frenchmen
alike, formally recognizing the French Resistance Maqiuis as mem-
bers of the Allied Forces, and warned the Germans that all guer-
rillas were to be given the same honorable treatment as the
regular soldiers under him in the Allied Expeditionary Forces

e. Tactics.

(1) Primary consideratitnii. Guerrillas, because ttiey are
irregular soldiers, generally do not achieve uni^ of
action in the same manner as conventional units. Because
of this and two other factors — the logistical problem and
manpower requirements — guerrillas initially cannot hope
to meet and decisively defeat a conventional unit in a
pitched battle. Guerrilla operations are faeiUtated by
other military activities which distract pot«itial enemy
reinforcements. On the other hand, if the enemy is free
of other coTicems, he win eranbat the guerrillas with his
bat troops in order to protect vital installations. Gner-

rilla UDJU, therefore, muat coordinate their activitieB
with other friendly military forces and attack the enemy
at pointa moat disadvant^^voua to him . 1^i«se attacke
are normally conducted during periods of low viaibihty
and are directed againat isolated ontposts, weakly
defended locationa or the moving enaiOF, By recogniz-
ing- hia own limltationa and weaknesaes, the guerrilla
can hope for survival and eventual success. Initially, he
ia usually inferior to the enemy in firepower, manpower,
communicationa, logistics, and organization. He is equal,
and often superior, to the enemy in the collection of
intelligence information, cover and deception, and the
use of time.

(2) Offensive tac^cs. The basis of successful guerrilla com-
bat is offensive action combined with surprise. During
periods of low visibility, the guerrilla attacks, tries to
gain a momentary advantage of firepower, executes his
mission to capture or destroy personnel and equipment,
and leaves the scene of action as rapidly as possible^
Normally, the guerrilla does not consistently operate in
one area but varies his operations so that no pattern is
evident. Tf possible, he strikes two or three targets
simultaneously to divide the enemy pursuit and rein-
forcement effort

(3) Defensive tactics. Protective surveillance for the guer-
rilla is usually very good ; he haa civilian non-combatants
providing him with information on enemy garrisons,
troop movements, and counter guerrilla activities. This
advance warning gives the guerrilla time for proper
countermeasures. If, in any counter guerrilla move by
a superior enemy, the guerrillas are threatened or
encircled, they do not meet him on a showdown basi^
but withdraw, disperse or attempt a breakout.

/. Development Aspects. To complete the picture of guerrilb
warfare, a time-and-space frame of reference must b« understood.
That is, it is not anflicient merely to state certain principles of
guerrilla warfare, but it is neceflBary to fpjalify statements re-
garding guerrilla actions to fbt tfaem with regard to time and
space.

(1) Time etemeni. Guerrillas have proved th^nselves efifec-
tive during all stages of conflict from the outbreak of
hostilities until the end of fighting. However, in the early
stages of guerrilla development, when the enemy is still
strong, resistance operations normally tend to be con-

ducted less openly. During this period, security is a
prime concern. If tiie resistance movement is to survive
and develop — while surrounded by strong enemy forces
— security is a prime concern and precautions must be
eittenaive and effective. Activity is generally Umited to
information-gathering, recruiting, training, organisa-
tion, and small-scale operations.
{2) SitJtatiort, On the other hand, when the situation chains
to favor the guerrillafi either through enemy weakness or
resistance-created favorable circumstances, operations
become more overt making large-scale actions possible.
When the situation permits, guerrilla forces expand and
tend to adopt conventional organizations.

(3> Location. Guerrilla warfare takes on different aspects
according to its geographic location. In some areas of
the world guerrilla warfare haa preceded the entry of
regalar troops i while In other areas, guerrilla move-
ments have come into existence after the formal entry of
regular troops. Additionally, in swne areas the complex
social stmcture and economic organizations are cogs in
a vast system that is relatively easy to disrupt The
hi^er t^e degree to which a country has evolved in-
dustrially the more vulnerable it is to activities of tiie
guerrillas. In less industrialized areas of the world,
tliese complexities do not exisL The people are leas de-
pendent on one another for goods and services; disrup-
tion of one community does not necessarily cause extreme
hardship in another. Thus, the impact of guerrilb war-
fare upon the population ia not as great and guerrilla
fitting ia likely to be more prevalent. In judging the
potential for. and effects of, guerrilla warfare location
is an important consideration.

7. Special Forces Operotiom

The valjie of coordinating guerrilla activities with conventional
military operations and the need for peacetime planning and
training by the potential sponsor have been recognized by the
United States. The unit organized and trained to implement the
Army's responsibility in directing guerrilla operations is the
Airborne Special Forces Group. Special forces units may be
called upon to operate during a general, limited or cold war.

a. General War. The doctrine set forth in this manual is
structured around a general war situation. In a general war,
special forces organize guerrilla forces to support conventional

military operations under the direotion of the theater commander.
Their operationa generally are cy>ndQcted in denied (enemy con-
trolled) territory.

b. Limited War. Limited war operations by special forces could
be of the general type with inliltration of special forces detach-
ments or of a training nature conducted in a nondenied area with
infiltration of indigenous units only.

(?, Cold War. Special forces units can assist in training military
personnel in combatting guerrilla and terrorist activities and
subversion. Tn addition, they may train foreign military personnel
in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, thus enhancing the defense
capability of the nation concerned. When ao employed, special
forces units supplement the U.S. military assistance groups and
army missions,

8. Capabil Flies and Limitations

a. Caj}Bhititi*is. Special forces deployment gives reach to the

theater commander's operations. It permits him to influence

activities far in advance of the field forces and beyond the range

of army-controlled weapons systems. Special forces directed

guerrilla units (called UW forces) conduet operations which are
categorized as follows:

(1) MissioTis in support of iAeaier comTrumder. These
nussions include —

(a) Interdiction of lines of communications, key areas and
military and industrial installations.

(b) Psychological operations.

(d) Evasion and escape operations.

(e) Cover and deception operations.

(2) Missifrns to support emnbat operatioTta of tfictical com-
Tnanders. In addition to an intensification of the tasks
listed in (I) above, UW forces execute missions to
directly assist conventional forces engaged in combat
operations. Such missions may include

(a) Seizure of key terrain to facilitate airborne and
amphibious operations,

(b) Employment as a reconnaissance and security force,

(d) Diversionary attacks against enemy forces to support
cover and deception plans.

(*) Operatioiis which iflolate selected portiona of the
battle area, airborne objecUve area or beachhead.

(3) Miaions amdvcted after juncture with friendiy forces.
Id tiie event control of guerrilla imits is retained by the
United States, the fallowing mlsBJons may be assigned:

(a) ReconnaisAance and wcurity mis^ons.

<fr> Whoi properly trained and supported, conventional

combat operations-
{e) Rear area security mififlions.

(d) Connter-guerrilla operations.

(e) Suiqnrt of dvil affairs operations.

h. Lmitation*. It must be realized that there are certain limi-
tations in the use of gnerrilla fbnzea. Some of these limitations
are —

(1) limited capabilitie&fiff static defen^ve or holding opera-
tions.

(2) Initially, lack of formal training, equipment, weapons,
and supplies prtdiibit lar^e-acale combat operations.

(3) Depoidence upm the local civilian population and an
onbdde sponsoring power for eopplies and equipment

(4) Communications betweoi tiie guerrilla warfare opera-
tional area and higber headquarters in friendly territory
are often tenuous and frangfat with technical problems.

<5> DecQitralizaticHi of command and dispersion of forces
for security impedes reaction time to orders from theater

leveL

(6) BestrictioDS on friendly supporting fires into the opera-
tional area because of necesstt? for freqnoit moves by
the guerrillas as w^ as the necesvty for protecting the
friendly dvilian populatim so far as possible.

(7) From initiid contact until an operatiofi is comfdeted, tiie
entire project is dep^idmt upon predse^ tim^ and
accurate intdligeoee.

PART TWO
ORGANIZATION FOR THE SPECIAL FORCES EFFORT

CHAPTBt 3

JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TASK FORCE

(JUWTF)

9. Genera r

a. The theater commander ia respaneible for the conduct of
unconventiohal warfare in his area of operations,

6. As a part of this responsibility he deaiETiatea guerrilla war-
fare operational areas for the conduct of g:Herrilla warfare and
related unconventional warfare activitiea.

10. Orgonizotion of the Joint Unconventional Warfare
Tosk Force UUWTF)

a. The theater commander has the authority to organiEe hia
command for unconventional warfare in the manner best suited to
accomplish his mission.

ft. The preferred organization is a joint subordinate headquar-
ters for unconventional warfare on the same lev^ as other aervice
component commands (Hg. 1).

This subordinate headquarters, known as a Joint Unoaiven-
tional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), is composed of representa-
tives from the service c<miponent convnands and appropriate
civilian personnel.

*c- A second possible or^nlzation \a an unconventional warfare

plans section within the J3 staff division of the unified or specified
command.

d. The internal staff organization of the JUWTF is joint, with
the principal staff officers being from any service, anij consisting
of a Jl, J2, J3, J4, J6 divisions and any required special ataif
officers (fifir. 2>. In the JUWTF the plans and policy functions of
J5 division are normally accomplished hy Ihe J3 division.

c. Units and individuala from the service components are
assigned or attached for operational conlaTsl to the JUWTF.

- SIbae >■ lUKiinTanUenitl r^tTtn t^tot tetioa -williia Iht J) hJIvIiIdii DbfanBm «BHiitiiEtj
tbe BDI4 foDctUrai u B B«puBl« JUWTF. Tqrtbar dlHuuian I* Hqlttd Eo Om trvmrwta JDWry-

lU EATER

ARHY

NAVT

AIR FORCE

JUrfF

FinHre I- A ihealer araanizatiim.

f. The airborne special forces group, the principal army element
of the JUWTF, establishes e. special forces operational base
<SFOB) to command and auppori; operational detachments before
and after commitment in designated guerrilla warfare operational
areas-

11. Functions of Ihe Joint Unconvenlional Worfaro
Task Force

a. The JUWTF commander and his staff make operational plans
for and direct the conduct of unconventional warfare. The prin-
cipal functions of the JUWTF are—

(1> Recommend geographical areas to be designated guerrilla
warfare operational areas.

(2) Procure and maintain intelligence materials in support
of unconventional warfare.

COMMANDING OFFICER
JUWTF

CHIEF OF STAFF

PERSOHHtL
Jl

INTELLLGEHCF

OPFRATIOMS
J3

LOGISTICS
U

COhtMUKI CATIONS
ELECTR0K1CS

Figure £- JUWTF organisalion^

(S) Dev^op operational, admiDbb-ative and logistical pJsJiB
And requiTEmentB for tlie mpport of anconTentioiial wsr^

fttPfS.

<4> Coordinate witA otiiCT tfieflter ageneiea in plamune for

(5) Devdop communication proeednres and reguinsnento to
support unconventional warfare plans,

(6) Plan and coDdnct joint traminfff^ftaad, aea and aiFumta
dwignatcd to partidpate in or Baivort onconrentiimal
warfara

(7) As directed, coordinate with allied military aothontka
Ear tile preparation and eveciitdim of ancanr^itional war-
fare [daiia,

(8) Maintain Haiaon with oth«r unconventional war&re
ag^idea or units.

(9) BeoHnmaid strenstiis of indieenous forces to be sop-
ported for onconveatjoiial warfare opcratunu.

(10) Maintain liaison at staff and operaticsial levd with
ap propri ate intelligience agencies; ooordinate require-
ments, collection and cranmnnicatimia witli otiier activi-
ties in denied areas; plan intellijiiaice operatjona in
support of cimventional forces whai dinxted by the
theat^ cmnmander.

(11) Maintain tiaison with theater dvil affoirs units with
respect to civil aSaurs (CA) aspects of unconventional
war&re^

h. The staff operations of a JUWTF are basically (^ same as
for ottier US militaFy sta&

12. OpemHonol Cotrtral of UnconvonlioiMil Worfbra Forcv*

a, Initi^r, operational control of US gponsored nnconvtntional
warfare ttmxa is retained br the theater connnander. Control is
ezo'dsed throu^ the JUWTF aaaigning miaaionfl to the special
forces group, which in turn directs dt^iloTed operaliofial detach-

6. Wfatsi guerrilla narfsre operatiiMiaJ areas f aD within the
area of inflnence of advandn^ [actieal CMumands, operational
ccsitTid of tf ected unconventional warfare forcee usuall? is tFaos-
f erred fran the unified c? specified command level throng theater
armr to the fidd am^ coDcemed, In conjunctimi with this trans-
f^, ^anoilB of the special forces ^rmp are attached to the army
headquartov to provide cc«itiDni^ ot supervlsiiHL

e. The field army commander in turn may assign operational
control of tiie unconventional warfare force to any of his snb-
ordinate tactical units. l>elegation of control generally is not made
lower than division. See chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion
of utilization of unconventional warfare forces by tactical ctmi-
mwnd*.

CHAPTER 4
AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

Secfion I. GENERAL

13. General

The Airborne Special Forces Group is the United States Anny'a
organization trained to conduct guerrilla warfare and related
unconventional warfare activities. Special forces ia a strategic
force employed under the direction of theater commanders.
Deployment of special' forces units allows the theater commander
to conduct ofEensive operations dtep in enemy territory.

14. Mission and Concept

a. Misswn. The mission of special forces is to develop, organize,
equip, train, and direct indigenous forces m the conduct of guer-
rilla warfare. Special forc&a may also advise, train and assist
indigenous forces in counter-insurgency operations,

b- Concept. Special forces is responsible for the conduct of
all unconventional warfare activities within guerrilla warfare
operational areas and may be called upon to perform other tasks
associated with or in support of guerrilla warfare.

15. Airborne Speciol Forces Group

a. Organization. The Airborne Special Forces Group conBiats
of a headquarters and headquarters company and four special
forces companies <fig. 3).

b. Capabilities. The special forces group is capable of —

(1) Deploying its operational detachments by air, sea or
land when provided with appropriate transportation.

(2) Organizing, training, and directing a number of varied-
size guerrilla units.

(3) Controlling, by long-range communicationB, the opera-
tions of UW forces in enemy or enemy occupied territory
to reduce his combat effectiveness, industrial capacity,
and morale.

<4) Performing specialized intelligence missions as directed
by higher commanders and when augmented by intel-
ligence specialists as required.

(5) Providing training and assistance to friendly foreign
armies in guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.

AIRBORNE

SPEQAL FORCES

GROUP

—

HEADQUARTERS

SPECIAL

AND

FORCES

HEADQUARTERS

COHPAHY

COMPANY

i_j

Fiffure Jr Airboryte epfcial forcoB prffKp.

(G) Establishing a special forr^ operational base when
augmented by support and service units.
c, AddUwtuLl Considerations.

(1) The special forces group requires augmentation by sup-
port and service units to conduct sustained operations
from the Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB). For
details of the support required, see paragraph 21.

(2) The reaction time of special forces detachments differs
from that of conventional infantry units because of com-
munications limitation^ and sweater distances to opera-
tional areas.

16. Headquarters and Headquorlers Company

(fig- 4)

a. Mission. To provide communications, administrative, Gain-
ing, inteUJgence, and logifitical support for assigned special forces
elements prior to and after deployment.

b^ Capabilities. Headquarters and headquarters company of the
special forces group has the foUowing capabilities :

(1) Provides comniand and staff control and planning for
speciaT forces elements prior to and after deployment,

<2) Provides logistical support (except delivery) to special
forces operational elements on a continuing basis.

.F
■u

r —

3°

l-H

uiSl

(3) ProTidefi 1ong-rans:e coronntnicatioTi between an SFOB
and assigned special forces operational elements.

<4) Provides unit level noedical and dental service.

(5) Provides third echelon maintenance in radio and small

arms.

e. Orgtaiizatum. For detailed organization, see the current
tables of organization and equii^ixent,

17. Speciol Forces Company

(fig. 5)

a. OrganiztUvm^ Tie special forc^ company cnnsista of an
administrative detachment, one operational detachment C, three
operational detachments B, and 12 operational detadmients A.

b. Administrative Detachftient. The administrative detachment
performs the normal adimnialrative functions of a company head-

SPEQAL

FORCES

COHPAHY

OPDET

I
I

Hotel

Kat#2

Hot* 3

_.i

HOTES:

t' Op DtlComd U olftoCoCond.

2. TtintOlptrSFCa.

3. Tw.Lv*(12)poiSFCo.

Ftfftir* E. Sptoial forvn compiattfw

QoarUrH. The detachment commander executes the directives and
orders of the commanding officer of the operational detachment C,
Tvho is the coimnander of the special fonKs company. During
operations, the administrative detachment reverts to the group
commander's control when its operational detachments have been
deployed,

c. Operational DeUichmmt C (% 6). Operational detachment
C IS the senior operational unit of the special forces company. It
is capable of —

<1) Conducting operationa with Euerrilla forces.

(2) Exercising operational control over designated subordi-
nate detachments-

(3) Providing the nucleus of a liaison detachment to field
flimy or other tactical elements when the operational
control of special foreea detaehmenta is passed to tactical
unit commanders. When so employed, the detachment
C is attached to the tactical unit headquarters.

d. OperaHonal Detachmertt B (fig. 7>, Operational detachment
B, like the detachment C, conducts operations with guerrilla
forces. When operating with other detachments, the B detach-
ment exercises operational control over subordinate detachments
and/or is subordinated to a senior detachment It also can provide
the nucleus of a liaison detachment at a tactical unit headquarters-

e. Operational Detachment A (fig. S). The operational detach-
ment A conducts operations with guerrilla forces, either unilat-
erally or in conjunction with other detachments. When operating
with other detachments, the A detachment is normally subordi-
nated to a senior detachment.

T8. AugmentdHon Detachment

a. The augmeniation detachment is identical in composition to
the operational detachment C (fig.6)-

6, The augmentation detachment is capable of:

(1) Assisting the commander in the control of operations,

(2) Forming the liaison detachment at a tactical unit head-
quarters when operational control of special forces
detachments is passed to the tactical unit.

(3) Forming the nucleus to establish an alternate SFOB
headquarters,

{4) Conducting operations in guerrilla warfare operational
areas-

c. For a detailed description of the employment of the aug-
mentation detachment, see paragraph 21.

2D. 4

0.
in

o>-

B. -^

-i
•^S

5S>

— ^

-5

A,'
O

*o.

HVWPN
LDR
E7

hCDSP

DMLSGT
17

CMBTDML

IP
es (THREE)

RAD OP

SUPV

E«

KADOP
es (FOUR)

OPSCT
C8

WPSGT
C7

ASSTSUP
SGT

ADMIN

SUPV

Eft

SI
LT

'^l0>Miv r OptrMfffnol -ditBdAmne B.

AttT
MEPSP
E6

RAP OP

SUPV

■6

RAP OP
ES

PMLSfiT
E«

GMST PML
SP
E5

LTWPH

LOR

HVWPM

LDR

MEDSP
E7

OPSCT
ES

Fiffv* a, OprraUpMl dtfaahowiC A.

Section II. THE SPECIAL FORCES OPEItATIONAL BASE

T9. General

a. The special farces operatiooal base (SFOB) ]s the opna-
tional and administrative focal poitit for guerrilla warfare activl-
tiea within a U.S. theater of operations. It ia located in territory
under friendly control, usually within the comniunicationA zone

<ComniZ). The location of the SFOB is d«£i?aated by tiie theater
commander.

b- The special forces group, supported by el^nents within the
CommZ, activates and operates the SFOB. Ideally, the SFOB is
established and activated prior to the commenconent of hostilities.
However, since preemergency activation nuty not be autJioriaed,
the base often is established on a standby l>;isis to include long-
range cmnmunication facilities, intratheater^ and intrabase coni-
munications, and emergency stockpiles of e<|uipment.

c. The SFOB may be physically ktfated nt one installation or
dispersed among a number of small sites, usually in the vicinity
of other installations such as an air base or CioramZ depot. Vari-
ous modifications are adopted to suit the ro<al situation.

20- Mission

The mission of the SFOB is to prepare operational detaehmenta
for deployment into guerrilla warfare are*^ and, after dti»loy-
ment, to direct, administer, and support guerrilla forces in fqthe^
ance of the theater mission.

The functions performed at the SFOB are~

n. Planning and direction of operations.

b. Communications support,

c. InleJlig^nce support.

d. Logistical support.
e- Briefing and staging.
/- Infiltration.

g. Liaison and coordination.

h. Training-

1. Administration.

21. Organization

(fig. 9)

fl. General. The SFOB is organized along functional lines into
two major groups: the operational elenients and the adminiatia-
tive and training dements.

COMMikNDIHG OFFICER
5F CP AND SFOB

EXECUTIVE
OFFICER

ADMIK
CEKTER

*S*iff nprtHflKititM hwli«l«l In hoth optrationi
and aibiinitlnMn c«l*n-

Figun 9. Sptcial forces ojuratioital base.

b. Operatvmal Elements. The operational elements of the SFOB
consist of —

(1) Operations center. The operations center is the facil-
ity within which are grouped representatives of unit
and special staff sections and other commands concerned
with current operations in guerrilla warfare areas- For
a detailed discussion, see paragraph 23.

(2) Briefing center. The briefing center is an isolation area
or areas where special forces detachments receive their
operational missions and conduct flnal preparation for
infiltration. For a detailed discussion, see paragraph 24.

(3) Commtaticatiorts complex- The communications complex
consists of llie communications facilities available to sup-
port the SFOB and guerrilla warfare operational areas-
It includes the special forces group communications pla-
toon, plus attached or supporiiing signal units and facili-
ties. The group signal of&cer is the staff supervisor. The
communications platoon leader is normally the operator
and supervises the signal installations. For a detailed
discussion, see paragraph 25.

(4) The Augrnentation detaefanent.

(a) When activated, the augmentation detachment pro-
vides additional flexibility to ihe special forces groop
commander-

(6) The augmentation detachment may he empbyed to
assist the commander in the control of operations.
When so employed the detachment commander becomes
a deputy for operations and supervises the operational
elements of the SFOB, Other detachment personnel
are assigned duties to operate the briefing center and
supplement staff elements of the base-

((?) The detachment may fonn the special forces liaison
detachment with a field army or other tactical com-
mand. Tn this situation the detachment is attached to
the tactical command and exerciaefi operational control
for the tactical commander over designated ^errilla
warfare operation areas (ch.S).

(d) The detachment can establish an alternate SFOB
headquarters. In this role additional personnel and
equipment are provided from headquarters and head-
quarters company and other sourcea as required.

(e) The detachment can be employed operationally to
accomplish tasks appropriate for a C detachment-

(/) More than one augmentation detachment may be acti-
vated for employment at the SFOB-

c. Administrative and Traini7i0 Elements. The administrative
and training elements of the SFOB consist of —

(1) Admhti^trative cerder. The adminifltrative center ia the
facility within which are grouped representatives of unit
and special staff sections and other commands concerned
with current administrative support operations, base
security, and area damage control. For further discus-
sions, see paragraph 29.

(2) Logistics support element. This is a non-TOE grouping
of special forces and supporting technical service units
from CommZ formed to support the SFOB and guerrilla
warfare operational areas. The group S4 supervises
operations of the logistics support element which
includes :

{a) Organic elements of the special forces group: Supply
Section, Motor Section, Parachute Rigging Platoon,
and the Medical Section,

(6) Supporting elements as required: Transportation
units. Engineer Utility Personnel, Ordnance 3d
Echelon Support, Civilian labor, QM Aerial Supply
Units, Medical Units, and a Liaisoa Section from
CommZ.

(3) Other euppoTtinff units. Although the gronp has peraoo-
nd to establish the SFOB, deploy detachments and pro-
vide limited logistical support, it requires augmentation
to conduct support activities on a sustained basis. CIC,
base security and logistical support elements are required
to support initial operations. As the number of opera-
tkinal areas increases with the subsequent Eniildup in
gnerrilla forces, the administrative support operations
eipand correspondingly. Units, such as those outlined in
paragraph (2) above, are required to augment the SFOB.
Military police security units and counterintelligence
corps teams are included and operate under the head-
quarters conunandant and S2, respectively. An army
aviation detachment may be attached to the SFOB to
provide army aviation support. An Army Security
Agency unit may monitor communications for securi^.
In srane instances technical service nnits or installations
are not located at the SFOB but provide general or direct
■npport as a part of their miseion. In fiiis situation, the
SFOB exercises no operational control over the units
concerned but is serviced as a "costomer" of the aupport-
ing unit or installation. An e^^ample is higher-echelon
ordnance and engineer support,

(4) Headqitartersaiut headquarters c<fmpany. The headquar-
ters and headquarters company, augmented by technica]
service and security units from CommZ, handles house-
keeping activities at the SFOB. The company commander
is flie headquarters commandant.

(5) Specud forces companies (uncomttatted unit«)' The
nnoommitted companies and detachments continue unit
preparation and training. These detachments are briefed
frequently on the situation in their projected operational

Scdion m. CONTROL OF OPERATIONS

■Tlie v^dal forces group organizes functionally to control opera-
in gnerriUa warfare operational areiis. The elements used
in tlK coiitrDi of opo^ons are —

(1) Operation center,

(2> Bri^nig center,

(3) CoaunnniGatuHis C(«nplex,

23. OfXrotionv Center

a. GeneraL The operations center- is a fuDctLomtl enrapiiiK of
TOE peTBDimel who coordinate and control operatioos for the
ctmimander of tJke SFOB.

b. Ftmciunu.

<1> Detailed planning fiir guerrilla warfare operatJonal
areas, to incJade preparation of the operation plan for
each operational detachment Tbi& planning ia based
npon the UW plans of Uie theater conunander.

(2) CMkducting briefings and snperrisins other preparation
1^ detachments assigned to the briefing center.

(3) Coordinating with, other servicoB and agencies as necea-
aary.

(4) Eserdsing operational supervision over ^erriUa war-
fare operational areaa.

(&) Making rec<HnniendatJons concerning anplt^ment of
guerrilla forces in support of railttary operatioDS. This
incltjdes reorganization as necessar?.

(G)- Acting as the control and coordinating center for guer-
rilla warfare operational areas.

c. CompoMtum (fig. 10).

<1) SS. The S3 exercises primary staff reaponaibility for
operations center and is the direetor.

(2) Pfofw eUm^nt The operations center plans element con-
ducts planning for future operations- The plans element
consists of the assistant S2 and assistant S3 plas enlisted
augmentation. The assistant S3 ia the officer^in-diarge
of plana elemenl Once plans are approved they are
implemented by the appropriate area specialist team.

(3) S^ operations element. The 52 operations element con-
sists of the S2, intelligence sergeant, intelligence editors^
analysts, and order-of -battle specialists. They assemble
and evaluate inteUigence information received from the
operational areas; prepare and disseminate intelligence
reporta based on evaluated information and intelligence
repOTlB from other headquarters; and conduct intelli-
gence briefings and debriefings. For a detailed discus-
sion, see paragraph 27.

(4) Awistant Si (planv). The Asaistant S4 (Plans) is the
lofnstical coordinator for the Operations Center. He
processes logistical requirements from the area specialist
teams and is reaponsibte for logistical activltiea in the

S3 - DIRECTOR OPERATIONS CENTER

52 S3 SIGNAL
OP ELM OP ELM

PLANS EL EM EN T ASST S4
A^T S2 (LOG PLANNER)
ASST S3

LIAISON
AREA SPEDALIST TEAMS U) OFFICERS

BRIEFING
CENTER

ADMIN
CENTER

—

AUGMENTATION
DETACHMB4T

COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLEX

...« COORDMATLON

STAFF SUPERVISION

Fiffure 10. Staff rriaiionMpB, the itperatiatia center,

briefing center. He prepares the administrative annex
to the guerrilla warfare area operation plans.

(&> Si&wjl officer. The signal olRcer is signal coordinator for
the operations center. He eoordinatea signal require-
ments from area specialist teams and is responsible for
operational signal mattera. He prepares the signal op-
erating instrocUons and signal annex for guerrilla war-
fare area operation plana.

(6) Area speeuxHat teams (ASTs). The ASTs are the food
point of the operations center. They assist in prccom-
ndtment planning, coordinate aetivities of their assigned

detachnKntfl in the brieAng: center, and act as the parents
of the CMnmitted detachments. The AST conaists of the
Area spedsJist officer {aBaistant S3) and an area super-
visor {senior NCO). This team most beeome expert on
(he ^Kcific area or coontrj it will supervise during op-
erations- The AST ads aa the oommitted detachment's
rear headqnarters, and is responsible for following
throng on all directives to snd messages from com-
mitted detachmenbL Dnrini? preinfiltration briefings^ a
close rapport is estabfished between die detachment and
the AST, The AST keeps the commander and staff in-
formed on the operational situation.

(7) ComnwtwtUwn center. The oHiimijnications center, op-
erated hf the command operatioiis craiter team of Uke
ccnununications platoon, is located in the vidnit^ of liw
operatJons center since it provides the commmiications
center support for the operations center and other ele-
ments of the SFOB.

(8> lAaittm o^^ert. Although not an integral part of the

operations center, the liaison ofTiceFB frotn the varions

services, Geld armiesi and allied countries are located
(here- They coordinate matters of common interest witli
Uidr services and nations and arrange support when
required. The; keep the special forces group commander
and staff abreast of the situation of their respective or-
gamzations as tiiese organizations infloence guerrilla
warfare areas of interest.

24. Briefing Centvr
A. Gener^ The briefing center provides for the following:
<1) Hoosing-

(2) Hesnng.

(3) Briefing and dd>riefinE'

(4) Detadiment study,
(&) Dispensary service.
(6) Special tnuning.

(T) Storage and packaging of acconqranying supplies.

(8) Limited morale services.

(9) Staging of drtachmefxts to departure sites.

h. OpertitUm. The entire area (areas) is a manmnm-secnri^
Bite accessible only to those personnd irtio have a requiranoit to
be there. Hie operations of Uie center are supervised by the S3,
llw headquarters comrnandant is rvponsilide for the administra-

tive functioniTig and security of the area. Personnel from the
augmentation detachment and special forces company administra-
tive detachment operate the briefing center-

e, Ftmctwrdng,

(1) The director of the operations center (S3> coordinates
the briefing and staging activities of the center. He
schedules brieiinES and arranges for the staging of the
detaehmenta to the departure installation. Briefing per-
sonnel are the area apeciahst officers and the staff offi-
cers from the operations center, augmented, when re-
quired, by other members of the group staif and ap-
propriate liaison officers. Often, specialists from other
headfiuarters, services and allied governments partid-
pate.

(2) Detadunents prepare their own plans based upon the
operation plan for the guerrilla warfare area. Detach-
ments package their own equipment. Parachute rigging
support is provided as necessary. Detachments are af-
forded maximum time to study the material received
at briefings. Since much of this information is classi-
fied, it is committed to memory. Essentials ^riiidi do not
lend themselves to memorization are miniaturized.

(3) Debrieftngs are conducted in the same manner as brief-
ings, with recovered detachments remaining in isola-
tion in the briefing center until the debriefing is com-
plete.

(4) Detachment tr^ning conducted while in the briefing
center is Ihnited to that essential for the operation which
could not be conducted elsewhere. New items of equip-
ment or weapons issued at the last minute require famil-
iarization or test firing- Spedfic techniques relating to
infiltration may have to be taught. Identification and
recognition of new or specific items of enemy equipment
may be a requirement. If detachments are isolated for
relatively long periods of time, training programs are
expanded to maintain basic skills and physical fitness.

(&) Hospitalization of sick or injured members of detach-
ments preparing for commitment is done so far as pos-
sible witiiin the briefing center. A small dispensary
facility is established to care for those personnel whose
iUness is not serious enough to preclude partidpation
in their detachment's operational mission. The serious-
ly sick or injured are evacuated to CommZ medical in-
stallations. Arrangements are made to isolate sensitive

peFBoonel who are hospitalized outside the briefius
o«nt«r.

(6) The staging of detachments in the departure installa-
tion is arranged by the S3. "Oie ASTs are directly re-
sponsible for the operation and accompany their detach-
ments from the brielhig center to the departure installa-
tion. The requirements of the dehvery agency pertain-
ing to predight or embarkation brieAngs are coordinated
in advance, Jf necessary, arrangements are made for
secure housinip at the departure installation.

25. SFOB Communications Complex

a. Organizati'/n of ihe CommunifKitions Platoon (rtgs. 11
and 12).

(1) The communications platoon headquarters provides the
group signal oflicer with the necessary administratLve
and supply personnel for the operations of the platoon.

(2) The command operations center team operates the com-
munications center serving the SFOB. The forward op-

FWDOP
CEMTER
TEAM

COMMJNICATIONS
PLATOON

FWD REC

CENTER

TEAM

yM'>

PLATOON
HQ

'-TJL

FWDXMIT

CENTER

TEAM

-rl

COMDOP

CENTER

TEAM

FiffWf 11^ Cammuaiieatiotu platoon.

TEL oiifl TT ciicuiti
RAD Of RATT circuiH

'Op*nt*d by Comil Op C*n1« T«m

Fiffun It. SfOB <vnn>wn<ufian complsc.

erations center team provides a command and control
facility for the receiver and tranamitter sites. The for-
ward receiving center and the forward Iranamitting
center teama operate the receiver and transmitter sites,
respectively.

b. Capabilities.

(1) Operate teUphone service within tha SFOE. The platoon
installs the telephones to be used within the SFO& and
operates a telephone switchboard,

(2) Terminate tines from othar hetrdiiJiiirtcrs. The primaxy
means of cormnnnication to JUWTP* and other theater
a^ncies within friendly territory is telephone and tele-
type. Theater army signal troops install these long wire
lines. The comminLcations platoon terminates these
lines in teletype, on-line crypto, crypto, crypto speech
equipment, or telephone.

(3) Operate base receiver and tranamitter aites. The SFOB
receiver and transmitter sites may be separated from the
base by a considerable distance. The base proper is con-
nected to the receiver and transmitter sites by land line,
telephone and teletype. Such Hnes are provided by
theater signal agencies.

(4) Provide radio teletype back-up. The communications pla-
toon provides radio teletype back-up to the land lines
between the SFOB and the receiver and transmitter sites.

(5) Operate the cominunicatioTts center. The communications
platoon, encrypts and decrypts messages and acts as a
central and clearing center for the remote transmitter
and receiver sites.

c. ReBponBibilities of the sigjud officer. The group signal officer
is responsible for —

(1) Determining operating frequencies and communication
security measures necessary to insure rehable radio com-
munications with operational detachments.

(2) Obtaining frequencies as necessary and coordimtting the
use of all frequencies with the supporting signal officer.

(S) Signal planning and pubhshing necessary SOIs and S&Ia.

(4) Planning, requesting and coordinating the engineering
assistance necessary for the design of antenna farms
and keying lines.

(5) Requesting material nepceaaary to install these antenna
farms and keying hues.

!!■

(6) Requesting sigoAl sapport necessary to install long and
k>cal wire lines, e.g., SFOB to installations of Uie com-
munication complex.

<7) Requesting the telephone and teletype trunks necessary
for the operation of the SFOB,

<8) Advising the group S4 on signal supply matters.

(9) Supervising training of the group communications sec-
tion and when directed training of all communication
personnel in the group.

d. Signal Pianning.

(1) Advance planning is necessary to provide reliable com-
munications between the SFOB and guerrilla warfare
operational areas. The distances between the SFOB and
detachments, the communication security problems pre-
sented by operating from within enemy territory, and
the loW'power communication equipment used by the
detachments all present technical problems. Proper fre-
quencies must be chosen and the use of these frequencies
coordinated with the theater signal officer if communica-
tions are to be reliable. For farther discussion of com-
munications considerations, see chapters 5 and 7.

(2) The group signal officer insures that the JUWTF signal
officer is aware of all aspects of his pmblem to include
the e3rtent of signal support required.

(3) The [danning must be done as far in advance as possible;
the reliability of tiie communications will be directly
proportiooal to prior planning and supervisioD.

26. Pkiiu

Planning, particularly prior to commitment of operational
detachments, is one of the major fnnctions of the special forces
group, Tlie S3 plans group is the focal point of planning functions.
The ASTs, supervised by the assistant S3 (plans) and assisted by
oUier staff officers, accomplish operational planning. Considering
Hie location, the mission and the ultimate developmental objec-
tives, the ASTs prepare the operation plans for tiie guerrilla
warfare operational areas. Planning is continuous and plans are
revised as required. Wide latitude for the operational detachment
is the rule for guerrilla warfare operatioi] plans. The selection of
a detadim^it for a particular mission is based on several factors,
chief of which ore: training status of the detachment and the
ability and experience of the detachment commander. For secant
reasons, detachments do not have acc^s to operation plans until
assigned to the briefing center. However, to facilitate area studies,

e«0£TAphica1 reffTQQj (which [nclude the detachments' spcdiic
g^uemllfl warfare operationa! areas) are aBsigued m advance.

27. Intelligence Section

a. GeneraL The intelligence section of Ihe apecial forces sjoup
ia reaponsible for the following:

(1) Intelllfrence training.

(2) Fumishing intelligence to detachments prior to and
after conmiitment.

(3) Conducting intelligence briefings and debriefings.

(4) Field evaluation of intelligence information received
from guerrilla warfare operational areas-

(5) Counterintelligence.

(6) Supervisor; responsihilities In coordination with the SI
for the exterior and interior security of the operational
base and impittoentation of a security-education pro-
gram.

h. Orgaruzatuyn tmd FunctioM,

(1) SS. The S2 fluperviaea the activities of the intelligence
section, keeps the commander and staff informed of the
intelligence situation, and coordinates with other ataff
sections and agenciea.

(2) Adtninistration and traininff. Intellig^ence administration
and training ia under the supervision of the training
officer. He plans and supervises intelligence training
and conduda routine administration for the section such
as — processing security clearances, handling clasaitied
dociunents, and diatribution of intelligence material with-
in the SFOB.

(3) InteUigewie pUaming^ The assistant S2 ia the principal
intelligence planner at the SFOB. He represents the S2
aection in the tactical operations center plana element
He conducts intelligence planning, prepares the intel-
ligence annexes for the operation plans* and coordlnatea
with other personnel of the intelligence aection for spe-
dfic intelligence support required.

(4) InteUigenee operatifms. The S2 directs the activities of
the intelligence sergeants, intelhgaice editor and analysts
and the orda- of battle specialists to provide the intel-
ligence support to ga^rilla warfare operational areas
and other headquarters. These personnd prepare esti-
mates, plans* and summariea, routine and apecial intd-

ligence reporta, process information received from and

furnish intelligence to committed detachments, prepare

and maintain order of battle flies, coordinate intelligence

matters with other units and headiluarters, and prepare

and conduct hriefings and debriefings.

c. Attached or Supporting Intetiigence Elevtenta. The special

forces group operating from an SFOB requires additional military

intelligence support than that which is organically available. The

group has no counterintelligence capability and requires ClC

augmentation. Additional military intelligence speciaUsts may be

attached to assist in briefing det^^^hments.

Section IV. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
TRAINING ACTIVITIES

28. General

a- The special forces group establishes an administrative cen-
ter at the SFOB to control administrative and training activities.

b. The apecial forces group executive officer superviaea the
administrative center and other elements located at the SFOB
thflt are engaged in administrative and training activities,

29. AdmlnisiraHve Center

(flg^ 13)

o. Compomiion. The administrative center conaiats of —
(1) The executive officer who is the director.

12) Group SI.

43) Group S4.

<4) Training officer, S2 Section.

<6) Trainingofficer. S3 Section.

(6) Enlisted epecialiata as required.

5. Fiaictuming. The administrative center plans and controls
administrative and trahiing activity at the base and directs the
various sections, units and attached elements in execution of their
support tasks. Through coordinated planning the administrative
colter insures that guerriUa warfare operational areas and the
SFOB receive the administrative support they require and that
uncommitted operational detachments are trained for their nus-
Biona.

3(K Traming

Training at the SFOB is aceompUsked under two conditions —
that conducted prior to isolation in the brieflng center and that

EXECUTIVE OFFICER
DIRECTOR ADMIH CENTER

S2
TNGO

S3
THGO

HEADQUARTERS
COMMAHDAH

PERSONNEL
SECTION

ERsL

T
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

OP
CENTER

UNCOMMITTED
SF UNITS

LOG SPT
ELEMENT'

. . _ . COORDINATION
^■Miii STAFF SUPERVISION

•STAFF RESPONSIBILITY OF S4

Figure J3. Staff relatiotiahipM, adiaitMtrative eenter.

conduolfld in the briefing center. Training ^rior to receipt of an
operational nussion ia intended to keep the detachment at its peak,
to teach apedfic techniqueg applicable to projected operations and
to familiarize peraonnel with new e^^uipment. Training conducted
after assignment to the briefing center may include any or all of
these, time permitting. Training areas include range facilities for
tefit-firing and zeroing weapons and training with new equipment
In addition, plana are prepared to train replacements and/or
replacement detachments. Training superviaioo is accomplished
through the normal chain of command. The S3 training ofllcer
exercises staff sapervision of training.

3T, AdmlnistrotTon

a. Si. 'Hie functions of any unit Si are applicable to the special
forces group SI ; however, they must be modified to meet the situ-
ation which eiistfl after deployment of operational detachments.
Obviously the actions which are normal in other mihtary units
are difficult or impossible to accomplish when dealing with com-
mitted special forces personnel. The Si prepares SOPs to cover
foreseeable contingencies and takes steps to accomplish routine
personnel matters prior to commitmeni Personnel actions requir-
ing a soldier's approval after he is in the operational area should
be prepared in brevity codes to reduce radio transmisaions. The
Si conducts portions of the predeployment briefing in the briefing
center. Certain functions of the special forces group Si are dis-
cussed wherein Ihey are peculiar to deployed personnel.

(1) Strengths. Status of personnel is reported only when a
change takes place, i.e, wounded, missing, captured, or
killed

(2) KeplacementB. The provisions of replacements depends
upon the capability of the operational detachment to
receive them and theater service components to deliver
thenx Replacemente are provided on an individual or
detachment basis.

(3) Discipline, law and order. Commanders of committed
detadmients are given a clear statement of their dis-
ciplinary authority as delegated by the higher com-
roander.

(4) FOWs. The handhng of prisoners will depend upon the
exigencies of the situation and is governed by the fact
that the U,S. is firmly committed to humane treatment
and care of POWs-

(5J Biaidta and gTaves Tegi^T<iii<n. Theater army pre-
scribes guidance for reporting and/or marking graves
within guerrilla warfare operational areas.

(6) Morale and personnel services. Detachment commanders'
recommendations for awards are processed promptly or
authority to award certain decorations is given the
detachment conunanders. Mail is handled by a preestab-
lished system; automatic answers are dispatched when
desired by individuals ; periodic delivery may be possible
witit reaupply drops if securiiy considerations permit.
Persoxial necessities are provided automatically with
reaupply. These normally are procured from indigenous

sources or specialJy^ packaged to preserve eeeurity and
are provided for both detachment and guerrilta personnel,

(7) Personnel procedwes. Promotion recommendations are
prepared in advance to be implemented when recom-
mended by the detachment commander. Demotion author-
ity delegated to detachment commandera is outHned by
the theater army commander.

(S) MisceUtaieom^ Policies covering pay or recognition for
indigenous troops are outlined by the theater commander.
When required, confidential funds are iaaued to the
detachment commander. Barter items^ such as medicine,
gold, or other scarce items, are issued or held for delivery
on order. Credit systems for services rendered may be
estabhshed. The Si insures that, prior to the departure
of detachments for guerrilla warfare operational areas,
each man is given a complete personnel processing in
accordance with the SOP-

h- Distribution center. The SI establishes and supervises a
distribution center for the orderly handling of correspondence
into, within and out of the headquarters. This center controls all
mesMgea except those originating: from committed detachments or
TOC. The commnnication center operated by the communications
platoon controls messages to and from committed detachmenla.

32. Logitfics

fL GeneraJ.. The logistical responsibilities of the SFOE are two-
fold: first, support of the gizerrilla warfare operational areas;
second, support of the SFOB and other unconventional warfare
elements as designated. To this end, the special forces group
organises a logistical support element

The logistical support element includes organic special forces
group logistics sections plus any attached or supporting logistical
units from other headquarters and/or CommZ. The special foices
group S4 normally controls tJie operations of the logistical support
element. When the logistical support of the SFOB reaches such
magnitude that numerous attached or supporting service elements
are required, then a separate commander of the logistical support
element is appointed from CommZ sources to assist the special
forces group S4,

b, Orffanizatum. For a typical logistical organisation in the
SFOB, see ligure 14-

e. PUiiminff. The assistant 34 functions as the logistical planner
for the S4 section. The assistant S4 prepares the administrative
annexes for the guerrilla warfare areas operation plans. He

LOGISTICAL
SUPPORT
ELEMENT

Noi*1

SECTION

MOTOR
SECTION

PHCHT

RIGGING

PLATOON

MEDICAl
SECTION

HDt«2

ATTACHED

LIAISON

SECTION

ATTACH ED

LOG

UNITS

Nol»3

NOTES:

1- 9. R*G*rv*t and fHwordt iw|uinaianti fioin Aih Cammand

{riirau^ Op Coitw) and Aiknin Cwtor.
b. R*e*(pt, packoging, limiltd ftoragt, vtd thlfment of
tMppfl*t to dapartvr* initallotfan; or coardinafoft d«(iv*ryi
Ivadlng and iii«v«aHif la dtfumr* Mitlallatloa.

2- Lftgiftlical Hpadltofs fiwn CofnniZ'

3- Logiifical «upp*rt unitm wuth oi;
QM Atiial Sup, QyitlK Labcr,

Tnnt, Engr, Ord, M<d,

Fisure It- SFOB logistieal snyport tlmtent^

coordinates with S3 plana group in liie preparation of these admin-
istrative annexes. 'Die aasiatant 54 is the S4 representative in
TOC.

d. Loffittical OperationA at the SFOB. The logistical support
element coordinates logistical support for alt efements of the base
and the guerrilla warfare operational areas- The following are
provided for:

(1) Requirements. A continuing review of requirements and
submission of tiiese requirements to the appropriate
supply agency,

(2) Limited storage. The SPOB is prepared to provide short-
term storage for supphes. This storage is only temporary

until aiipplies are packaged and shipped to the delivery
agency. Lai^e stocks of supplies are not desirable at
the SFOB; however, nonstandard or special items are
stored there for bnger perioda of time.

(3) Preparation of fuppUet. Normally, supplies are specially
packaged for aerial delivery. Packaf(ing is initially
accomplished under the supervision of the parachute'
rigging platoon assisted by uncommitted detachments.
As soon as possible, QH aerial supply units asaome
responsibility for packaging, taking advantage of depot
capabiHties. Civilian labor may be employed in this
operation. Packaging may expand to a sizeat^ operatioQ
and is accomplished in an area near the SFOB or adja-
cent to tlie departure installation. When air superiority
is achieved and regular supply schedules for bulk sup-
plies are established, the emphasis shifts from amaB,
man-portable bundles to large packages which are heavy-
dropped or airlanded. When the packaging eapabilily
exists in CommZ depots, the SFOB does not require an
extensive packaging activity.

(4) CoordituUum. A liaison section attached to logistical

sapport element coordinates with theater logistical agen-
cies. This section, composed of CommZ and other serv-
vices' logistical repreaoitatives, eipedites logistical
matters for the SFOB.

(5) SuppCfrt of other uncimventutnal warfare vnits and
attached suppoTiing units. The SFOB supports additional
units and elements designated in plana. This may include
technical service and support elements at the base plus
other unconventional warfare units such as the JUWTF,

(6) SMjmient of ouppUea to the deliverg agency. This is
normally the responaibility of the SFOB. Because of
the packagii^ required, it usually is not feasible to ship
supplies directly from depots to departure installations.
If a packaging facility is located at the departure point,
then supplies may be delivered direct from depot to
departure tnstallatioa by CommZ. If packaging can be
accomplished at the depots, the flow of supplies to the
departure installation bypasses the SFOB.

•^

ii.

^ ^

*£

Jt-£

I- t Ml

£ HI D.
^ D£ ^

OD L U

II
'1

CHAPTER 5
THEATER SUPPORT

Seclion U LOGISTICS

33. Generar

a. Support Aspects. Within a theater of operations one or more
special forces groups may be available to support the theater
commander's mission. Aside from the organization precepts
which were set forth in chapters 3 and i, there are certain sup-
port aspects which are discussed from the point of view of the
theater and SFOB planners. These support concepts are dis-
cussed under the general headings of loiriatica, intelligence, com-
munioatJons, and initial contact-

b. Loffiatics. One of the primary means used by an outside
power to assist a guerrilla movement is logistical support. While
guerrilla forces are expected to be able to provide a major portion
of their logistical requirements from local sources, certain special-
ized equipment must be obtained from the sponsor. Numerous
problems may be encountered in providing adequate support to
guerriUa units which usually are located great distances from
friendly support installations. The physical problems of transports
ing and delivering undetected, relatively lax^ quantities of sup-
plies increase in proportion to the distance into enemy-dominated
territory. However, guerrilla logistical requirements are smaller
in quantity and less complex than those found in a conventional
force of comparable size. This tends to offset some of the dis-
advantages,

34. JUWTF

The JUWTF is responsible to the theater commander for the
conduct of unconventional warfare, but each component service
is responsible for the logistical support of ila own forces assigned
to JUWTF. The JUWTF prepares, or assists in preparing, the
unconventional warfare annex to theater war plans, and plans
and coordinates all logistical support for unconventional warfare
operations in the theater. Service component commanders under
the JUWTF are designated but are not in the chain of command
until the JUWTF becomes operational. For this reason, JUWTF
has to work directly with the logistical headquarters of each

theater service component and insure the support of Army, Navy,
or Air Force units that may be attached to JUWTF- The special
forces group commanding officer, as commander of the SFOB, is
usually the Army component commander, JUWTF headquarters
provides theater army communications, zone (CommZ) with
logistical estimates for support of the SFOB, the committed
special forces detachments and the guerrilla forces to be gener-
ated. This type of planning entails a myriad of detail and is
made more complex by the many different requirements resulting
from the varied geographic locations of guerrilla warfare oper-
ational areas and the va^rying sizes of potential guerrilla forces.

35. J4

Since JUWTF has no subordinate headquarters, troops, or
logistical support capability until operations start, the JUWTF
J4 usually does not supervise the physical functions of logistical
support, but he is the primary staff planner and coordinator who
insures that adequate means are provided. The recommendations
and requests of JUWTF are incorporated into theater headquar-
ters' plans or directives. This starts the physical process of pro-
viding the needed logistical support.

36. Theater Army

The commander of the theater army CommZ is responsible for
providing administrative and logistical support to special forces
units located in the theater and to other theater unconventional
warfare forces as directed- The actual mechanics of procure-
ment, receipt, storage, maintenance, distribution of supplies and
equipment, and the providing of services and facilities that are
needed to support the Army portion of unconventional warfare
operations, differ little, if an>', from the mechanics of conven-
tional unit logistical support. Any necessary deviations arc deter-
mined by direct planning and coordination between CommZ and
JUWTF or the special forces group.

37- Special Forces Group

a. The special forces group or groups assigned to a theater are
responsible for planning logistical support for the commitment
of operational detachments and for assisting JUWTF in planning
for the establishment of the SFOB. Before its attachment to
JUWTF. the group is responsible for recommending that special
and non-standard supplies and equipment be included in uncon-
ventional warfare plans.

b. The closest possible liaison between JUWTF and special
forces group is mandatory in the following areas:

(1) Operational rcduirementa for:

<a) QuantLtEes of supplies and equipment.

(b) Medical support.

(2) Submission of erosH-servicing requirements to JUWTP.

(3) Coordination of plana for detiverj of the supplies and
equipment into operational areaa.

38. LogisMcol Doctrtne and Policies

a. General. The application of logistieal operations in support
of unconventional warfare differs from that normally considered
in support of other theater forces.

b. AppUcation,

(1) The five operations of logistioa are —

(a) Transportation.

(b) Evacuation and hospitalization,

(d) Service,

(e) ManitE^ment.

(2) Their special application to the unconventional warfare
situation is described in the following paragraphs.

39. Transportation

Unconventional warfare operations can be supported by land,
sea or air transportation means. As a practical matter, however,
the majortty of operations and situations require support hy air.
Because of the depth of penetration, the cargo weight to be
earned and tiie speed with which the operation is to be executed,
the Air Force has the greatest capability for this support. In
certain situations, the Navy may possess a more appropriate
capability for a particular operation, especially with earner-based
aircraft This capability is utiHzed by»the theater commander
allocating the needed naval forces to provide support requested.
Successful sorties with special forces detachments or cargoes re-
quire ni^t flighte of long-range and at low altitudes (50-400 feet)
in order to escape electronic detection^ Training of airerews in
low-level flying and navigation techniques jointiy with special
forces units is mandatory.

40. Evocuotion

Evacuation for medical attention or other reasons from a guer-
rtlla wartare operational area is considered only for kef person-

nel. Even for tiiis Umited number the difficulties involved make
aach planning tenuous. The ability of the theater to provide
transportation and the capability of guerrillas to temporarily
secure evacuation sites are the governing factors.

41. Supply

a. Determmaiion of Requirements. Proper preparation for un-
conventional wartare operations places a responsibility on all
headquarters from special forces group level up- Initiative to com-
mence logistical planning must be exercised at every level. A free
flow of recommendations and planning guidance between all in^
terested commands and agencies must take place. The process of
determining requirements will tiegin when two fundamental de-
cisions are made by theater: (1) The designation of geographical
locations of guerrilla wartare operational areas, and (2) the size
of the guerrilla force to be sponsored. Detailed requirements are
based on the operational war plans, current logistical planning
factors and miscellaneous factors such as cultural^ seasonal and
climatic conditions, and logistical support that may exist within
guerrilla warfare operational areas. The sperial forces detach-
ment commander, group staff officers, and JUWTF staff officers
in particular must be alert to determine those items of standard
or non-standard supplies or equipment needed to support opera-
tional missions. Once requirements have been determined and
priorities established, requests are processed in the normal man-
ner through army logistical channels. Local purchase procedures
can hasten the procurement of non-standard or substitute items.
The determination of requirements and their inclusion in ap-
propriate war plans is a major step toward insuring adequate
logistical support.

b- SioekpUtng.

(1) Stockpiling is the accumulation of mobilization reserve
stocks in support of strategic plans and contemplated
special forces operations in guerrilla warfare opera-
tional areas. Except in unusual circumstances, items
stockpiled for unconventional wartare use are stored
by theater army for needs expected during the first sixty
days of operations. Accessible stockpiles in adequate
amounts, content, and convenient location result from
thorough and detailed planning commencing with the
clear determination of requirements, inclusion of these
requirements in approved war plans, and the availability
of funds. The creation of stockpiles for unconventional
warfare operations is accomplished through the same

logistical procesa && for other army materiel require-
ments. Limited stockpiling; of obsolete supplies and
equipment is considered appropriate for the support of
unconventional warfare. Such, items 'should receive mini-
mum maintenance with the risk that only a small per-
centage of the materiel will not be serviceable when
needed, ZI stocks of obsolete equipment should be kept
on the same basis. Parts resupply will be dependent
upon stockpihng.

(2) In general, unconventional warfare stockpiles are not
segregated, but the items are earmarked and stored in
depots alon^ with all other similar items for theater
army. Definite priorities are established by theater J4
for delivery of materiel. The problems of in-storage
maintenance and inspection, as well as that of deter-
mining the best location for separate storage sites, make
it a better practice to keep unconventional warfare stock-
piles in CommZ depots. Logistical plana include the
delivery schedule to specific locations. For exceptions to
stockpiling supplies in CommZ depots, see paragraph e
below,

(3) While the formation of such reserves is the responsibility
of the theater commander, the content of stockpiles from
the standpoints of quality and suitability must be deter-
mined by personnel in the special forces group. Small
stockpiles containing only the materiel which will accom-
pany detachments on infiltration, or be included in the
initial resupply, are maintained separately and are
available for emergency use-

C' Prepackaifitig. Prepackaging for unconventional warfare
operations means that supplies and equipment destined for both
initjal and subsequent resupply loads are stockpiled in pacltages
for final distribution. All of the standard supplies and equipment
delivered to the operational area are packaged in one-man-portable
loads of fifty pounds. Each package should contain balanced items,
be complete kits for immediate use (weapon with ammunition,
etc), be safe from hazards of weather, handiing, and deteriora-
tion, and have a packboard or carrying straps. Skillful use of
items, such as clothing, for internal packaging material will pro-
duce savings in weight and bulk. The goal is to have packages
ready for delivery. As a practical matter, however, the greater
the time between packaging and actual use, the more uncertain
it is that the contents will be serviceable when opened.

d. Preemergen^ Caches. The placement, timing, and location
of preemergency caches of essential supplies to support projected
operations is planned by the theater commander based upon the
recommendations of the JUWTF. These caches are established
when a particular need exists, adequate security can Iw provided,
and the packaging provides end-use serviceability of a rtaaonable
percentage of the supplies. The many variabk'S, such as time of
use, location, security, deterioration, and the initial expense, make
the establishment of each cache a matter of individual considera-
tion.

e. AceomjMLnying Supj>ty Loads. Accompanying supply and
initial resupply loads to support unconventional warfare opera-
tions are planned on a basis of austfrity. The loads consist of
items in quantities essential for combat operations and detach-
ment survival for thirty days. Specific quantities of demolition
materials, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies are deter-
mined by special forces ^oup planners from an examination of
the stated mission contained in approved war plans. Once the
accompanying and initial resupply equipment has been procured,
it is packaged and prepared for delivery. Such materiel should
not be maintained as general stock in existing CommZ depots, but
located in the vicinity of departure instariations.

/. Accmmtabitity. Formal accountability for supplies and
equipment accompanies the materiel to the departure installation.
All supplies and equipment leaving the departure installation for
operational use are considered to be expended. No salvage or
recovery operations aro considered in logistical planning. Although
all commanders concerned art? responsible for the security and
proper use of the materiel, the heaviest responsibility rests upon
the special forces detachment commanders, SFOB will keep
informal accountability for all materiel in order to report the
amounts of critical items, such as weapons, committed to a guer-
rilla warfare operational area. Supply and distribution of critical
items are controlled to assist an orderly post-war transition to
peacetime pursuits.

g. Resupply Techni(iites. To reduce the impact of equipment
losses which may occur during infiltration and subsequent opera-
tions, the SFOB schedules both automatic resupply and emergency
resupply,

(1) Ajitojnatw resupply. Automatic resupply is scheduled
for delivery shortly after the detachment has been com-
mitted. It is prearranged as to time, delivery site, and
composition of load.

This resuppLy is delivered aiitoniaticall; unless the de-
tAchment cancels or modifies the ori^mil plan.

Antomatic resupply is planned to replace lost or damaged
itemis of ^uipment or to augment tile detachment with
eqiiiiBnent wliidi could not be carried in on the infiltra-
tion.

(2) Emergency reeupply^ Emergency resupply is scheduled
for delivery after the detachment has been committed
and prearranged as to time and composition of load. The
delivery site ta selected and reported by the detachment
after infiltration. The delivery of emergency resupply
is conlangent upon and initiated when communications
from the operational detachment are interrupted for a
predetermined period of time. The content of emergency
resupply is normally communications and survival equip-
ment to restore the detachment operational capability.

(3) FrequeTicy rate of resupply. The number of resupply
missions \s limited until it can be determined that the
delichment will not be compromised by flights over tile
guerrilla warfare operational area, and/or until air
superiority can be established at a preselected time and
place- A minimum of one resupply misfiion per thirty
daja per committed detachment ie planned during this
initial period. The frequency of missions increasea with
the degree of air superiority established by friendly
forces, until resupply missions are flown as required.

(4) Cataioffue supply system (app. II). In order to expedite
requests, insure accuracy in identification of types and
amounts of supplies and equipment, and to facilitate
communications transmission security, special forces
units employ a brevity code system for requesting sup-
plies. This brevity code is known as a catalogue supply
system (CSS) and its preparation is the responsibility of
the CO, SFOB, The CSS is appUcable to all special forces
and guerrilla units. The CSS is used for three categories
ofsupplies: (a) Those critical items of supply essential
to combat operations, e.g., arms, ammunition, and demo-
litions i (b> Those critical items of supply essential for
individual survival, e.g., rations, medidne and clothing;
(c) Increased amounts of the critical it^ns contained rn
categories <a) and (b), but packaged in bulk for use in
a rapid buildup phase of guerrilla force development,

(a) Supply bundles for categories (a) and (b) are deliv-
ered primarily during the initial phase of operations

whereas category ^c) bundles are delivered when the
growing resistance force or tempo of combat requires
increased amounts of essential combat supplies.

(&) Characteristics of an efficient catalogue supply syston
are — critical items of supply packed in packages of
fifty pounds or less; packages which are man-portable
and protected from handling and weather damage;
packages the composition of which is such that in-
storage handling and maintenance are simple; an
identification code designed for accuracy in trans-
mission when encrypted.

42. ServJcov

Theater army emergency and war plans clearly define the
responsibilities of specific CommZ service and support units in
assisting the special forces group to establish the SFOB. These
designated units may be attached directly to the SFOB or be
aasigned missions in direct support of the SFOB. Examples of
service support that may be required by the SFOB are —

a. Engineer (installation support).

ft. Ordnance (3d echelon).

e. Medical (above dispensary level).

d. Signal (3d echelon and Installation support).

e. Transportation.
/. Army aviation,

g. Ck>unterintelligeQce corps,
h. Military Police (security),
t. Army Security Agency.
/. Civilian labor.
k. QM aerial supply.

43. Management

The functions of logistics management are performed in gen-
erally the same manner at SFOB as in other military units. Man-
agement includes —

a. Supervision of the logistical operation.

b. Logistical estimates and plans.

c. Administrative annexes to orders,

d. Logistical records and reports.

e. Coordination with tlieater logistical agencies.

Section H. INTELLIGENCE

44. General

a. A thorough knowledge of the enemy, terrain and resistance
potential, coupled with an intimate understanding of the indige-
nous population within operational areas, is essential to the sue-
cess of unconventional warfare operations. Prior to deployment,
special forces operational detachments complete detailed area
studies and receive comprehensive intelligence briefings at the
SFOB. After deployment, the detachment continues to add to its
background knovkrledee by a thorough and continuing afisessment
of the area, using intelligence developed within the area. Thus,
armed with intelligence acquired before and after infiltration, the
detachment is better able to weld elements of the area command
into a coordinated and effective force capable of supporting
thaater military operations-

b. Paragraphs 45 and 46 provide commanders with an under-
standing of the special forces intelligence requirements for uncon-
ventional warfare operations in general and guerrilla warfare in
I>articular.

c. Details of procedures and techniques related to combat intel-
ligence which are contained in the 30-series and basic branch
manuals are omitted from this manual.

45. Requirements

a. Gen^raL

(1) Intelligence requirements at all command levels con-
cerned with the conduct of unconventional warfare oper-
ations encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence.
Prior to operations, the JUWTF and the special forces
group both depend on strategic intelligence. As opera-
tions are initiated and special forces detachments are
deployed into enemy occupied territory, combat intel-
ligence Eupplemenls strategic intelligence. Although the
area command is more often the user of combat intel-
ligence, the SFOB and the JUWTF both use combat
intelligence applicable to their level.

(2) In order to improve the chances for success in combat
operations, the special forces detachment requires a
greater degree of preparation in predeployjnent intel-
ligence than army units of battle group or comparable
size. It is desirable for the detachment to acquire this
intelligence background well in advance of operations

by intensive area study of predesignated regions of the
world-

(3) Coordination for intelligence and counterintelligence
activities in support of projected special forces opera-
tions is accomplished in peacetii^ by the theater army
commander in accordance with joint unconven^onal
warfare plans. During hostilities coordination for intel-
Hgence and counterintelligence activities in support of
pierrilla forces is accompUshed through the JUWTF.

b. Pr€-Infiltratwn ReffuireTttents.

(I) Operationai detachments. Special forces detachments
require a thcrou^ background knowledge of their opera-
tional area prior to deployment. This background knowl-
edge, accomplished through the medium of area studies,
IB divided into two phases —

(a) General area study^ This is the broad background
knowledge of an area, region or country. See appendix
III for a type general area study format.

(b) Operational Area IntelUgeTice. This is the detailed
intelligence of a designated guerilla warfare opera-
tional area including that information becesaat^ for
the detachment to —

1. 'InfiEtratj! the operational area.

£. Contact resistance elements.

J, Initiate operations. See appendix IH for an opera-
tional aiea intelligence format

(2> Special forces group. The special forces group requires
current intelligence of its assigned guerrilla warfare
operational areas in order to conduct preeraergency plan-
ning for the employment of the operational detachmenta.
Althou^ area studies are prepared and provided by
special research agencies, the detachment studies are
reorganized into a more appropriate format for opera-
tional use. Ilie S2 section procures the necessary intel-
ligence documents from which detachment area studies
are prepare<L Coordination through prescribed chan-
nels is effected with all appropriate theater intelligence
agencies for the continuouB procurranent of timely area
and operaticnal intelligence. Several methods of area
study preparation are feasible,

(a) The detachments prepare the general area study and
as much of the operational area intelligence as is com-
patible with security. From the point of view of

detachment knowledge, this method \s the most advan-
tageous. Disadvantagea are time, secarity, and lack
of stability in personnel assignmenta.

(b) The group S2 section prepares the general area study
and operational area intellfgence.

(d) Various combinations of the above methods. The S£
section constantly revises area studies based upon the
latest inteUigenee. In particular, the S2 maintains
operational area intelligence as accurately and cur-
rently as possible.

(3) Joint vncanventiimdl learf are task force.

(a) The JUWTF reqnires area studies of the entire theater
area of operations. Material for these area studies is
provided by the theater commander. This intelligence
provides the JUWTF commander with a basis for
recommendations as to the selection of guerrilla war-
fare operational areas that best support theater war
plans. Once these areas have been approved by the
theater commander, the JUWTF assigns certain areas,
baaed upon priorities, to the special fowea group.

(b) The JUWTF coordinates procurement of intelligence
material needed by the special forces group to accom-
plish its operation missions. It requests from other
theater component forces intelligence material and
insures that requirements of the special forces group
are satisfied,

c. Pogt-InfUtration Requirements.
(1) Special forces operati&nai base.

{a) The SFOB is primarily concerned with intelligence
wiiich—

1. Sapports the expansion of operations within active or
potential operational areas,

S. Aids in determining current pohtical trends in opera-
tional areas.

S. Aids in determininff major enemy activities which
influence operations within the area concerned and
in other portions of the theater,

■*. Aids in determining weather conditions in or en route
to the area which affects external support

5, Sapports guerrilla warfare area psychological warfare
operations.

6. Aids in determining enemy capabilities which could

interfere with the operations of the SFOB.

7. Support cover and deception.

(b) The SFOB has a requirement for combat intelligence,
which it reinterprets and reevaluates in light of proj-
ected theater operations.

(c) After deployment of special forces detachments into
operational areas, tiie SFOB becomes an intelligence
information collection agency available to all services
and agencies within the theater.

(rf) The SFOB furnishes intelligence to committed detach-
ments as required. Much of this intelligence is pro-
vided from other theater forces.
(2) Joint vTKonventional war fsTfi task force.

(d) Intelligence requirements of the JUWTF stem from
planning and coordinating unconventional warfare
activities within the theater. Such requirements close-
ly resemble those of the theater commander by being
broad in scope and having long-range apphcation,

(ft) Much of tJie intelligence used by the JUWTF is pro-
vided by other forces of the theater. JUWTF. through
its subordinate units, is a major coliection agency of
strategic intelligence for the theater. It coordinates
closely with the theater intelligence division and ap-
propriate intelhgence agencies of other service com-
ponents for an integrated collection effort within
enemy rear areas.

46. Intelligence Activities Wilhin Guerrilla Warfare
Operational Area

The deployed special forces detachment is ideally situated to
contribute to the theater intelligence plan. Utilizing indigenous
agencies and sources subordinate to the area command, it can
gather and relay to the SFOB intelligence information of valuft
to the theater and component force commanders. However, cer-
tain practical limitations exist as to the volume of transmission
from within guernlla warfare operational areas to higher head-
quarters. The security of the special forces detachment and ths
resistance effort restricts radio traffic and consequently the
amount of intelligence information which can be expected. Higher
commanders prescribe those elements of information required
of spedal forces detachments and provide the necessary code
systems to reduce the length of intelligence reports transmitted
by radio. EEI assigned to spedal forces detachments are kept

to the minimum-

5«ction III. COMMUNICATIONS

47. General

The communlcationa system established for the support of un-
conventionAl warfare ivithln a theater is designed to provide the
theater eoramander with means to control widespread unconven-
tional warfare forces located in denied areas- The eyatem must
aJso support the activities of the base eleme^its of unconventional
warfare units located in friendly territory. The JUWTF is re-
sponsible for planning and coordinating the theater unconven-
tional warfare communications system. The special forces com-
municfltiona system, with its hub located at the SFOB, provides
communicationB for special forces eiementa of the theater uncon-
ventional warfare effort.

48- Type Systems

a. SFOB: Theater System.

(1) The purpose of this system is to provide communica-
tions between the SFOB and other theater agenciea, and
between elements of the SFOB, Since the base is located
in friendly territory, this conwiunisfltion system ia com-
parable to the communication system of any conventional
headquarters. A telephone and teletype switchboard is
provided at the base. This switchboard is connected to
the area flignal center and through the facilities of area
signal system to all other theater and army headquarters.
The special forces group has the facilities to terminate
these communication lines with both telephone or tele-
type, either plain or encrypted.

(2) For both technical and operational reasons, the radio
transmitter and receiver sites serving the base may be
located at considerable distances f :om the base proper.
Communications are provided between the operations
center and the radio transmitters and receivers. The
facilities of the area signal system may be used for this.

(3) Telephone service within the has*' proper is provided
by the communications platoon of hijadquarters company,
apeciaJ forces group, but the platooi has neither the per-
sonnel nor facilities to provide long distance wire com-
munications. The long-line wire communications are
provided by the area signal center. The communications
platoon does have radio and radio-teletype equipment to
backup the long-line wire commuidcatioTis provided by
the area signal system.

6. Ease CotttTnand System. This system fumiahes communica-
tion between the base and a detachment in an operational area.
This is the communications system through which the commander
coordinates and controls the guerrilla effort. It is, normally, the
only link between a committed detachment and a regular military
force- Since the committed detachments may be up to 2,500 miles
from the base, this system must depend on radio. The radio at the
SFOB can be as elaborate and as powerful as necessary. The
committed detachments, however, have rigid restrictions on the
size and weight of their radios. Because of this, and because of the
extended distances, successful communications require more
detailed planning and a higher standard of operator training
than is usually the case. Since the detachment is located within
a denied area, greater emphasis than normal is placed on com-
munications security,

e. Area Intertuil Systetn. This system provides the area com-
mander with communications to subordinate elements when —
(1) a single special forces detachment is located in a guerrilla
warfare operational area, and <2) the special forces detachment
involved is a sector command subordinate to an area command.
Cgmmunications in this system will initially depend on non-
technical techniques with electronic means used only in an emer-
gency. As the area laecomes more secure, the use of electronic
means of communicating may be increased-

d. Area Cotnnmnd Syatem. This system is established between
the area command and subordinate sector commandsr When the
area and sector commands are separated so as to make the use
of non-technical techniques impractical, radio is used. This system
can be organized in any of the following ways:

(1) The sector command communicates only with the area
command. The area command then communicates with
the base (1, fig. 16), Emergency communication with the
base is still available to the sector command.

<2) The area and sector commands have no direct communi-
cations between them. Both transmit to the JDase. The
base relays to the field all information necessary to effect
coordination (2, fig, 16),

(3) The area and sector commands have a direct communica-
tions link on operational matters- The area and sector
command both communicate directly with the base on
administrative matters (3, fig, 16).

e. Air-Grojvnd System. The primary means of communication
between an operational detachment and supporting aircraft is

visual' Uaually it is by meana of a prearranged system of markiiis
the D2. Thia visual Bystem may be supplemented, however, by
dectrooic and/or other means.

/. Spedal-ParpoBe SystemB, A special-purpose system is any
system of commumcatioiis established to satisfy a particular need
for a definite period of time. An example of this mi^t be the
radio net established between a committed detachment and a
friendly tactical unit prior to juncture.

49. Means Available

a. Within the theater of operations the communication means
available to special forces are those available t^ otiier military
imila-

b. Between the SFOB and committed operational detachments
the primary means is the radio. Other means available mig^it
include messengers, air drop of messages or a combination of
messen^fers, and communications faciUties locally available to the
area of operations.

50. Factors Affecting Communications

The eommonicAtiona systems established to satisfy special
forces requirements must be flexible. Special forces requirements
can never be satisfied by a rigidly fijied system. As the operational
detachments are committed and as these delAchments progress
in their activities, the extent and type of communications neces-
sarily will change. Factors which must be considered are—

a. The natnre and extent of the resistance movement.

b. Organisation of the guerrilla units.

c. "Die location of the gnerrilla units.

d. Special forces or^nization of the guerrilla warfare opera-
tional area.

e. The need for commnnication security.

/. Secondary missions of the special forces detachment.

51. G>mnnimcation Security

Commanders must learn and accept a concept of communica-
tions based on security and dependability, rather than speed and
ease of communication. A detachment normally operates under a
maximum-security type SOI. This SOI does not provide for full-
time two-way communications between the detachments and the
SFOB. The SOI provides for periodic, scheduled contacts and
bhnd transmission broadcasts (BTBs) from the SFOB to detach-
ments, and emersency contacts with the SFOB at any time. Tlie

enemy can be expected to make every effort to intercept and
analyze detachment cmimnimicatioos. The detachment must spend
a minimmn time on the air. The SOI is designed to confuse
enemy intercept operators and make his intercept task as difficult
as possible.

52. Radio Curator Training

The pro&Jems faced by the radio operator aasigned to special
forces are somewhat different than those faced by most mihtary
radio operators. A committed detachment must send messages
from enemy-occupied territory. These messages travel long dis-
tances with only low-powered equipment available to the detach-
ment. If successful communications are to be established and
maintained, the radio operator mvst be well trained. For a soldier
with no previoua training as a radio operator, this training
requires a long period of fomaal schooling. Radio operators should
have the following capabilities:

0- A thorough knowledge of radio-telegraph procedures and the
more commonly used operating signaK

b. A thorough knowledge of the operating procedures peculiar
to speciaJ forces operations. Furthermore, he must understand
how to prepare a special forces SOI and how this SOI differs
from others.

c. Be capable of sending Morse Code at eighteen words per
minute and receiving at twenty words per minute, using spedal
forces operating procedures.

d. Understand the principles of cryptography and he capable
of devising a relatively secure system for guerrilla use. He must
be proficient in the use of the primary and alternate cryptographic
systems used by special forces.

fl. Have a basic understandmg of the theory of radio trans-
mitters and receivers and be capable of making oi^anizational
maintenance type repairs.

/- Understand the principles of radio transmission in the HF
and UHF band.

ff. Understand the construction and principles of operation of
neld radio antennas.

h. Understand the need for communicHtion security Know Uie
principles of radio direction-finding traffic analysis and crvnto-
analysis. ^^

i. Have a sufficient understanding of other means of communi-
cation to be able to advise tiie detadiment commander in their
«nployment.

Section iV. INITIAL CONTACT

53. Contact Prior lo Inflltrction

a. Prior to infiltration, contact should be made with the reBist-
ance movement. It consists of the first contacts between the
sponsoring power and the resistance forces. Initial contact may
take place at any point in the development of the resistance force.
However, to be most effective, infiltration should take place as
soon as possible after the guerrilla nucleus is formed in order that
special forces personnel might exert an early influence over the
development of the orj^anization.

6. The major purpose of initial contact is to arrange for infil-
tration of special forces detachments and for cooperation of the
resistance forces with the sponsor. It permits arrangements to
be made for such things as marking drop zones or coastal landing
sites.

54. Contact Coincident with Inflltrafion

When no contact can be made in advance of infiltration but
where there is evidence of guerrilla activity in an area, it may be
necessary to send a detachment in "blind." In such cases, there is
no reception party on the drop zone and the detachment may have
only the most general idea of where to find the guerrillas. This
method is the least desirable and is only used where no other
alternative exists.

PART THREE
OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 6
rNFILTRATION

55. Generol

a. The active role of special forces iti the development of A
guerrilla organization begins with infiltration. la^tratdoa is the
entrance of personnel and supplies into a denied area making
fnajtimum nse of deception to avoid detection. Dnring this stage,
spedal forces detachments leave the SFOB and are transported or
moved into the guerrilla warfare operational area. Inliltratton is
not coxr^lete until the special forces detachoieat eatablldiea com-
munications with the SFOB from within th« guerrilla waifare
<q>eratLonal area.

6- The four means of infiltration for special f(^\:eo are —

(1) Air.

(2) WatCT.

(3) Land.

(4) SUr-behind.

InfiHratioD operations may include oonbinations of these means.

56. Air

a. Air is usnaUr the most practical and rapid means of infiltra-
tion. Pra^onnd and sappHes can be airlifted to virtuallr any
place in the world.

b. The air force has the primary responsiWfity for providing
air delivery. In most cases standard troop carrier aircraft are
used. Assault type aircraft, as well as amphibioos types nomially
associated with air-sea rescne opersti<Mis, m^ be available and
have tiie capatMlity of using relaWvdy sh<»t, onprepared air-
sbnps. Under certain circumstances, long-range btnnber aircraft
is osed.

ft Ttie army can provide both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft;
however, Iheir operating ranges as well as load capadtim are
limited.

d. Advantages of Air.

(1) Flexibility

(2) Speed of delivery.

(3) Accuracy of delivery.

<4> Relatively short exposure to enemy action.

<5) Ability to perform concurrent missiona.

e. Disadvantages of Air.

(1) Navigation precision.

(2) VulnerabiUty to enemy air defenses.

(3) Dependence upon favorable weatiier conditions,

(4) Possible injury to personnel and breakage of equipment
^5) Possible compromise of DZ through observation of drop

or electronic detection.

f. Desirable Capabilities of Aircraft. Although special forces
personnel must be prepared to utilise any type of aircraft, the
following characteristics and capabilities are desired i

{ 1 ) Paradrop a minimum of fifteen persons and 5,000 pounds
of cargo slmultaoeouflly-

(2) Operate at varying altitudes during darkness or adverse
weather conditions.

(3) Possess the required navigational aids to insure locating
the drop site with a minimum of difficulty.

(4) Sufficient combat radius to reach the operational area.
(B) Land and take off from unprepared airstrips with mini-
mum useable runways of 1,000 feet,

(6) In ctrtain situations, land and take off from water.

57. WoteT

a. General. Infiltration by water includes the use of surface
and underwater craft. It is considered the most secure and
economical means up to the point of debarkation from the parent
craft.

b. Advantages of Water.

(1) Long-range of operations.

(2> Weather has little or no effect up to point of debarka-
tion from parent craft.

(3) Evacuation is possible with each mission,

(4) Operational briefings can continue while en route.

(5) Concentration and control of personnel and supplies-

(6) Large quantities of supplies can be dehvered.

c- DisadvaTttages of Water.

(1) Transshipment and offahore utJoadintr are frequently
required.

(2) Posaibility of the loss of personnel and suppKea during
ship to shore movement.

(3) Movement of supplies from landing site to flnal destina-
tion is subject to limitations of land inAltratioiL

(4) Additional pacltagine precautions are required to protect
equipment from salt water corrosion-

(5) Special training ia neecsaary.

(6) Vulnerability to enemy shore defenses during landing
operations.

58. Land

a. General Land is generally the least desirable means of
inHltration and is usually limited to short movements by individ-
uals or small detachments. Land infiltration is best accomplished
under conditions of limited visibility over difficult terrain. Land
infileration has its greatest chance of success when the enemy's
lines are over-extended, the combat zone fluid, or portions of his
country's borders are inadequately secured. On the other hind, a
well organized, stable and closely-knit defense in depth may
prohibit land infiltration.

6. Advantages of Laiid.

(!) Requires minimum of inter-service support-

(2) Provides an opportunity for concurrent gathering of
intelligence information.

(3) Provides the ability to change routes frequently, con-
Bistent with the local aituation.

c. Disadvantages of Land.

(1) Slowness with which infiltration is accomphahed,

(2) I/>ng exposure to enemy and greater probability of
capture.

(3) Limitation on amount of supplies and equipment that
can be carried.

59. Stay-Behind

a. General. Stay-behind infiltration involves pra-positioning
special forces operational detadimente within their proposed
operational areas and remaining hidden while the enemy advances
through and/or occupies these areas. Stay-behind operations may
be considered when the enemy has the capability of overrunning

friendly areas and the attitude of the civil popalace will support
such operations,

b. Advantages of Stay-Behind Operation).

(1) No infiltration support required.

<2) Maximum aeeurity is obtained,

(3) Civilian contacts are already established.

(4) Caches of supplies and equipment are pre-placed.

(5) Personnel are familiar with operational area,
e. Disadvantages of Stay-Behind Operations.

(1) Proximity to enemy combat troopa during their initial
occupation of the operational area.

(2) Freedom of movement and communications are initially
restricted.

60- Factors Inflvencing Choice of Means

a. Mission. The mission is the first consideration in the selec-
tion of inflltration means. A requirement for immediate inter-
diction will emphasize the need for apeed. On the other hand, if a
slower, buildup type mission is ordered, a more deliberate means
of infiltration may be acceptable.

b. Enemy Situation. The enemy situation affects the means
used for infiltration. For example, a heavily-guarded border may
nullify land infiltration. Similarly, a atrongly-def ended and
patrolled coastline may eliminate water as a possible choiee.

C. Weather. Adverse weather conditions seriously afl^ect air
and certain phases of water operations. Conversely, bad weather
may favor land infiltration.

d. Topography. land formations must be conaidered in deeid-
will have a better chance for success if the choaen routes pass
ing on the means of infiltration to be used. Land infiltration
through mountainous or heavily-forested areas ; on the other
hand, theae aanie mountains could force aircraft to fly at hi^er
altitudes reaulting in greater exposure to enemy detection and
air-defense syatems.

fi. Hydrography. Hydrographic factors— tide data, depth of
off-shore water, and the location of reefs and sandbars — infiuence
the selection of water as a means of infiltration.

/. PersiynTtel. The number of personnel to infiltrate may be a
limiting factor. The type training possessed by special forces
personnel is a further consideration. In addition, if other individ-
uals are to accompany the operational detachment, special training
for these personnel may be necessary prior to infiltration,

g. Distance. The distance to be covered during infrltration may
eliminate consideration of certain means available.

A. EttaipTnent AvaHabU- TheoperaUonal cApabilitiesof airand
water craft available for iniiltration and the amount and types of
special equipment — waterproolins: kits, aerial delivery containers,
etc. — are major factors to be considered, limited availability in
types of air or water craft will limit the number of peraonnel that
can be infiltrated.

CHAPTES 7

(MGANIZAHON AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA

COMMAND

SvcHoit I. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

61. G«n«r<il

The organisation of a ^errilla warfare operational area
involves initi^d orfranization oi the area and buildup of the
resistance forces. Initial ot^anization includes establishing the
required command and administrative structure, taking necessary
security precautions and training a nucleus of euerrilla person-
nel. Buildup is tbe expansion of the original tiucleua into an
operational unit capable of accomplifihing the assigned mission.
Spedal forces detachmenta may infiltrate the operational area
either before or after initial organization has taken place.

62. Arttas oF ltnp<>nsibi}ify

a. GuerriUa Warfare (yperatvmal Area,

(1) Degignatum. The plana foe organization are started
when the theater commander designates certain areas
within denied territory as guerrilla wai fare operational
areaa. The guerrilla warfare operational area is the
name given to a geographic area in which the army,
through special forces, is responsible for the conduct
of guerrilla warfare and oth«r unconventional warfare
activities.

(Z) InfiltraliOTi. Any type of detachment A, B, or C may be
infiltrated first. Initially, one detachment is given
reaponaibility for the entire guerrilla warfare opera-
tional area-

b, Gu^rriila Warfare Operatwnal Sector. With the develop-
ment of Ihe area and an increase in detachments, subdivision
into sectors is necessary. The sector has the same characteristics
as an operational area but remains a subdivision of tiie area. An
operational detachment becomes responsible for each sector.

63. Organ Jiotran and Buildup

a. (yrganizatituvil Objectives, After infiltration, the major task
is to develop resistance element* into an effective force. To

fadliUte this devdopment, several tasks must be perfonned
including:

<I) Establishment of a workiiig command relatioiiflhip be-
tween the various resiatance elements and special forces
personneL

(2) Eatablishment of security, iiite11is:ence collection and
m mmiin i patinna ^stems,

(3) Organizatiob of a logistical syst^n.

{4) ProTision for other adminifitratiYe services.

(5) Establishment of a training program,

(6) P lnnning and execotion of tadicaJ t^ieralioDs attn-
Dtensurate viih the stale of training of guerrilla units.

(7) Expansion of forces so they are able to support the^er
objectives,

<S) Civilian support.

b. Area AsBegtment The special forces detachment commander
commences an area assessment immediateir on reaching his area.
In verifying information acquired throng previous area stady
and briefings, he revises his plans as necessary to r^ect the local
fiitoation. The u^a assessment serves as the ccaumAnder'fl eati<
mate of the situation and is the basis for plans to carry oat his
mis^on. It considers all the major factors involved, including
the enemy situation and security measures, the political back-
ground of the resistance movement, and the attitude of the civilian
population. There are no rigid formulae for making area assess^
ments ; each commander has to decide for himself what should be
included and what conclusions may be drawn from the infratna-
tion he coDects. The assessment is shaped by many variables
inclnding the detachment^s mission, the commander's personahty,
and the thoroufimess of Hie pre-infiltration study. For some
detailed considerations c^ an area assessment, see appendix IV.

64, CfHiunand and Control

a. Orgamzatitm and CimtroL

(I) The spedal forces detachment's primarr concern is the
develt^iment and control of the guerrilla forces in an
area. Because the gnerrilla nnit is only one part of the
fcvees gena^ted by a resiatance movement and, since
the mission of special Soroea includes conduct of other
unconvenlional warfare activities, other resistance
forces — BQxiliarr and ondergroand — moat be considered.
However, the organizatitm and eonb-ol of a guerrilla
force are the essential matters for special forces. The

oth^ aspects of the total resistance movement are
bnrat^t in only as fliey bear upon the special forces
mission,
(2) In its early stag^ a guerrilla movement often is highly
miorganized- Generally, the people who become guer-
rillas have suffered a reduction of their livitkg standards.
The nuun concern is grouping together for food, lahelter,
and mutual protection. Oftentimes several groaps
begin independent opcratJMis with very little concern
for coordination among them. Special forces may find
that guerrillaa are not cooperating and may even be
working at cross purposes. The special forces detach-
ment moat obtain control of tile guerrilla groups and
coordinate their actions to insure tJiat missions assigned
by the theater commander are accomplished. The degree
of control varies in different parts of the world and with
the specific personalities involved. As the scope of opera-
tions increases, closer coordination betwesi guerrilla
units is required.

b. Ptoblemg of CimtroL

(1) AJthou^ tiie military advantages of close cooperation
between guerrilla units are obvious* a special forces
commander may find that guerrillas resist his efforts to
unify them. ITiis opposition may be based on personal
antagoniams or political or ethnic differences,

(2) A means available to the special forces commander to
persnade guerrillas to form a united force is control of
supplies. A detachment commander can use the sponsor
provided supplies as a lever in convincing guerrillas to
cooperate. The commander should not openly threaten
to use this power, except as a last resort; but, since the
gnerrilla commanders are aware of its existence, it can
reinforce hia suggestions for unity^

(3) In his conferences witii tJie resistance leadership, a
ddiBchment commander is careful not to become involved
in thdr political differences. There a no surer way to
lose tJie respect and cooperation of the gaerrillas than
to take sides in their internal disputes.

(4) Once guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages
of dose cooperation, the special forces commander must
dedde on a command structure. While he must adapt
to local conditions, there are certain factors whidi he
considers in any situation. He most have auffident con-
tnJ over the guerrillas to insure that they carry out

assigned miasiona. At the same t[me, the nature of
guerrilla operations requires that individual units be
given a large measure of freedom in carrying out their
missions.

(6) Perhapa the most delicate part of a detachment com-
mander's job ia insuring that competent leaders occupy
command positions. If leaders of the original groups
are not capable of filhng the positions they hold, the
detachment commander should arrange for their removal
without creating dissension which could endanger the
success of his mission,

65. Area Command

a. General. The area command is the formal organization inte-
grating the special forces detachment(s) and the reaistance forces
within a guerrilla warfare operational area. It is established as
soon as the development process requires such a step. There can
be no rigid pattern for the organization of an area command.
It must carry out the basic functions for which it is responsible^
tailored in strength and composition to fit the situation and mis-
sion. When a guerrilla warfare operational area is subdivided,
the subdivisions are called sector commands.

b. Composition. The area command basically is composed of a
command group and three types of resistance forces — guerrillas,
auxiliaries, and underground.

(1) ComTtuiTid grnup. The command group is made up of
the special forces detachment, the local resistance leader
and representatives from the resistance forces in the
area. It organizes a staff as necessary. Normally, the
command group is located with the guerrilla force. It is
located where it can best control tiie resistance move-
meiit. See FH S1-21A.

(2> Resis^nce Forces- The three organizational divisions
of an area command are the gxtferrilla force, auxiliary
and underground. All three types may not be ^tablished
in a guerrilla warfare operational area. Jhe guerrilla
force is the element with which special forces has pri-
mary concern. ■^,..,.l .,

e. Concept.

(1) Genertd. Special forces detachments may infiltrate a
guerrilla warfare operational area in different seqnence
to establish an area command. The order and com-
position of detachment Inffltration depend upon many
factors, some of the more important of which are

iir:

characteriistics of the resistance movement, capabilities
of special forces and needs of the theater commander.
Listed below are some of the patterns that might be
followed in establishing type area commands,

(2) Initiid infiitration.

(a) On& detachynenL One detachment — A. B, or C — may
be infiltrated when the situation is not well known,
the guerrilla movement ia not extensive, or the guer-
rilla force is so well organized that minimum coordi-
nation is needed.

(b) Multiple deta^hTiients. Another possible solution is for
two or more detachments to infiltrate concurrently,
eadi setting up a separate sector command. This
solution is adopted when topography, the enemy situa-
tion or problems pecuhar to the resistance movement,
prohibit the initial establishment of an effective area
command 4 fig. 17)-

(3) SvbBe<iueTd iniiUTti^on.

(o) Expansion from one detachment. After an area com-
mand has been established, other detachments can be
infiltrated to set up sector commands within the area
(fig, 18). Either a B or C detachment is infiltrated or
the initial A detachment is redesignated a B detach-
ment. With a B or C detachment initially in the area.
A detachments may be infiltrated to establish the
sector commands- Subsequent infiltration of other
operational detachments takes place with the expan-
sion of the guerrilla forces, increase in operations or
for political reasons.

(fr) Bipanjum from several detachments. After separate
commands have been established, a detachment B or
C may be infiltrated to establish an area command
for the same reasons as (a) above (fig. 19).

d. Cimtrof Cnfmd. Because of the nature of operations and
the distances involved, control measures are not as effective within
an area command as they are in a conventional mihtary organiza-
tion- Thus, certain criteria are established to increase effective
control

(1) Openttiim order . Sufficient guidance to subordinate units
is outhned in the operation order to cover extended
periods of time. This is especially true when operations
preclude frequent and regular contact Operation orders
include long-term guidance on such matters as psycho- ,

?■.

SECTOR
HATTY

NOTEi Both «pMatlMal d*Mfihmanti conduct vptratlen* und« eqntrol «fSFOB>

FiffHTt If. Two ndiptiKffltC HoCt>r eommamtU.

OMRATIOHAL AREA HOMER

DPI RATIONAL ARIA HOMER

OROJkHIZATIOH OF THt AREA COhMAHO AFTER
INFILTRATION.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AREA COHdlAND INTO
lUtORENNATI SECTOR COMMAhlDS SUBiEOUENT
TO INFILTRATION Of APDITIONAL DETACHMENTS.

&■-

Fiffurt JS. GutrriUa *parfar4 oparatiDnal ana tapmitd fnm *n*

dmtaelmmt.

<
at

a ^ 4

l||

OSS

H u P^

Ill

o <

logical operationSp intetli^ence, t^r^t attach^ &ir support^
extenml logistical support, evasion and escape, and
political and military relationships vie-a-via the re-
HiataQce.

(2) SOP'S. Another technique nsed to maintain control ia
the use of Standing Operating Procedures, SOP'a
standardize recurring procedures and allow the detach-
ment and SFOB to anticipate prescribed actions when
communications have been interrupted,

66. Organization on ffie Ground

a. GeneraL The physical organization of the areSp together
with the command structure, is a priority task of the special
forces commander after infiltration. Tn some situations the organ-
ization of the area is well establishedp but in others, organisation
\e lacking or incomplete^ In all cases^ however, some improvement
in the physical dispositions probably are necessary. Organization
is dictated by a number of requirements and depends more on
local conditions than upon any fiKed set of rules, Anu>ng the
factors considered are — degree of guerrilla unit organization^
extent of cooperation among resistance forces^ amount of civilian
support^ enemy activity^ and topography. In practicGp the detach-
ment commander can expect to make compromises in organization
because it is difficult to bring together in one area an ideal set of
circumstances,

h. Guerrilla B^e (fi?. 2D). The Emslc establishment within the
guerrilla warfare operational area is the ^errilla base.

(1) Definition. A guerrilla base is a temporary site where
installations, headquarters^ and units are located. There
is usually more than one guerrilla base within an area
complex,

(2) Ctuiracteristic^. From a base, lines of communication
stretch out connecting other bases and various elements
of the area complex* Installations normally found at a
guerrilla base are — command posts, training and bivouac
areaSp supply caches^ communications and medical facili-
ties- In spite of the impression of permanence of the
installations^ a guerrilla base is considered temporary
and tenant guerrilla units must be able to rapidly
abandon the base when required,

(1) Definitifyn, An area complex consists of guerrilla bases
and various supporting f acilit[es and elements. The activ-
ities normally included in the area comply are — security

and intelli^eiiee ayatans; Minimunicatioiu BystraiiB; mifr-
Bicm support sites; reception sites; sppply inalAllations;
training arraa; and Other supporting faolittes.

(2) CJuimeteristus. The comjrfei is not a continuous pattern
of tangible installatiDniB* but ma^ be visualized as a series
of intangible lines of cranmunicatioika, emanating from
guerrilla basea and connecting all resistance elementa.
Hie main guerrilla base ia the bob of Uie spider web-like
complex. The complex is not static but is a conatantJr
changing apparatus within the operational area.

(3) Locatwn. By virtue of their knowledge of Uie terrain,
guerrillaa should be able to recommend the best areaa
for locating installationa. Whereas inaccessible areas are
best for the physical location of guerrilla camps* the
lade of these remote areas does not preclode guerrilla
operations. For instance, there may be times when
guerrillas are able to fight dfectiTely in towns and on
the plains. Approaches to the t>ase are well guarded and
concealed. The locations of guerrilla inst^lationa are
dissaninated on a need-to-know basis. Since gneirilla
forces Beldom defend Axed poeitlons for extended periods
of time, alternate areas are otaUished to Adiich the
guerrillas withdraw if their primary area is threatened
or occupied by the enemy.

Sedlon II. RESISTANCE BEMENTS

67. Guerrilla F«n»

«, General. Paragraph G5 refers to the three main reaistance
et^nents— guerrilla force, auxiliary, and underground — that a
special forces detachment will likely encounter or organize in a
guerrilla warfare operational area. The primary concern is the
guerrilla force. The auxiliary and undergroond organizations,
from the point of view of the guerrilla organization, are aupport
donenta. Frran the point of view of the total resistance move-
mCTt, however, the gnerrilla force may be supporting the under-
ground. For (he purpose of this nutin ial, the guerrilla force is
considered the supported element.

b. OrfforuzaHonal GoaL The ultimate organizational goal is to
intergrate the guerrilla unit and the detachment into a unified
force. The degree of uniflcation depends upon mai^ factora. The
OTganiEation iriucfa combines the special forces detadmient and
the guerrilla unit* regardkos of the d^ree of cohoion, is called

the area or aector command, hereafter referred to as area
command.

c. DefiniHon. The guemlla force ia the overt, militarily organ-
ized element of the area command.

d. EatabUshmenL The guerrilla force is eatabliBhed when the
guerrilla commander agreea to accept United States Eponaorship.
Once the guerriila force Es officially recognized, it ia the detach-
ment commander's responBibility to anite and control it to the
befit of his ability.

68. Auxiljory Force*

a. Active supi>ort from aome of the civilian population and
passive support from moat of the remainder is essential to
extended guerrilla operationa. To insure that both active and
passive support is responsive to the area command, some form
of organization and control is required. Control of civiUan sup-
port is accomplished primarily through the auxiliaries. Auxiliary
forces compose that element of the area command established to
provide for and organize civilian support of the resistance move-
tnent.

6. "AuitiJiary" is a term used to denote people enifaged in a
variety of activities. It is applied to those people who are not
membera of other resistance elements, but who knowingly and
willingly support the common cause. It includes the occasional
supporter as welt as the hard-core leadership. Individuals or
groups \eho furnish support, either unwittingly or against their
will, are not considered auxiliaries. Auxiliaries may be organized
in groups or operate as individuals.

69. Characteristka of Auxiliaries

Auxiliary forces are characterized by location, organization and
pietiiod of operation.

o. Location. Auxiliary units are composed of local dvihans
normally living in the smaller towns, villages, and rural areas.
Unlike guerrilla units, the auxiliaries are not expected to move
from place to place to conduct operations. The fact that the
au^dliary forces are local and static is highly desirable from the
area command viewpoint in that it provides support for the mobile
guerrilla forces throughout most of the operational area.

ft, Organiaition.

(1) AuxiUary forces normally organize to coincide with or
parallel the existing political administrative divisions
of the countiy. This method of organization insures that
each community and the surrounding countryside is the

(2)

responsibility of an auxiliary unit. It is relatively simple
to initiate since auxiliary commands may be established
at each administrative level, for example — regional,
county, district or local (communities and villages). This
organization varies from country to country depending
upon the existing pohtical structure. Organization of
auxiliary units can commence at any level or at several
levels simultaneously and is either centralized (fig. 21)
or decentralized (fig. 22).

The basic organization at each level is the command
committee. This committee controls and coordinates
aoxiliary activities within its area of responsibility. In
thja respect it resembles the command group and staff
of a military unit. Members of the command committee
are assigned specific duties such as — supply, recruiting.

AREA

COMMAND

AUXILIARY
REGIONAL

COMMAND

AUXIUARY

COUNTY

COMMAND

AUXILIARY
COUNTY

COMMAND

AUXILIARY

DISTRICT

COMMANDS

AUXILIARY

DISTRICT

COMMANDS

■

LOCAL AUXILIARY UNITS AT COMMUNITY/ VILLAGE LEVEL

Fiffiire SI. CentraiiXfd atixtiiaty orffORisation-

AREA
COMMAND

AUXILIARY

COUHTT

COMMANDS

AUXILIARY -,
Di&YRICT
COMMANDS

AUXILIARY

COUNTY

COMMAND

Ftgure ft. Dee^atraiizeA muffifBOfv orponuafwit.

transportation, comtDonicatiDns, security, inteUigence,
and operations (fig. 23). At the lowefit level, one
individual may perform two or three of these dutiEs.

(3) The command committee may organize civHtan sympa-
thizera into subordioate elements or employ them
individually. When possible, these subordinate elements
are organized functionally into a eompattmented strQc-
ture. However, because of a shortage of loyal peiBoimel,
it is often necessary for eadi subordinate amdllaFy ele-
ment to perform several functions,

(4) The home guard is the paramilitary arm of the auxiliary
force. Home guards are controlled by tlie various com-
mand committees. All auxiliary elements do not neces-
sarily organize home guards, Hofue guards perform
many missions for the local auxiliary force, such as —
tactical missions, guarding of cadies, and training of
recruits. Their degree of organization and training
depends upon the extent of eflfective enemy control in
the area.

c. Method of Operation,

(I) Auxiliary units derive their protection in two principal
ways — a cranparbnented structure and operating under

COMMAHD
COMMITTEE

PSY
WAK

U€D

HOME
GUARD

COMM

ES.E

RCT

TRANS

NOTE: Thli »pfw-i*» ■ lii^^ilT «g«"i««l "ii **poraf«l into hincHonal

cover. While enemy counter guerrilla activities often
force the guerrillas to move temporarily away from
£iven areas, the auxiliaries survive by remaining in
place and conductiiig their activitiefl so as to avoid
detection. Individual auxiliary members carry on their
normal, day-to-day mutine. while secretly carrying out
the many facets of resistance action.

(2) Auxiliary units frequently utilize the passive or neutral
elem^ita of the population to provide active support
to the common cause. Usually this is done on a one-time
basis because of the security risks involved in repeated
use of such people. The ability of auxiliary forces to
manipulate large segments of the neutral population
is further enhanced by the demonstrated success of
friendly forces.

70. Support Miuiont f»f Auxiliaries

The support missions discussed herein are the principal ones
performed 1^ auxiliary forces to support the area command.
Scone of these tasks are coordinated directly with guerrilla units
while others are controlled by their own higher headquarters.
Normally, auxiliary untts are assigned direct support missions
for guerrilla units in their areas^

a. Seaaity and Warning. Auxiliary unHs provide a physical
security and warning system for guerrilla forces. They organize
extensive B3rsten!ts of civilian sympathizers who keep enemy forces
under surveillance and who warn the guerrillas of enemy moves.

Th^M civilian,3 are selected as part of the security system because
of their advantageous location which permits th«n to monitor
enemy movement towards Eucrrilla bases.

b. InteUige-nct. Auxiliary units collect information to support
their own operations and those of the area command. The auxil-
iary force provides direct intelligence support to guerrilla units
operating within their area of responsibility,

c. CounteHnteltigence- The auxiliary unit aaaiala the area
conunand counterintelligence effort by mamtaining watch over
transitory civilians, by screening recruits for gucrriUa units, and
by monitoring refugees and other non-inhabitants of the area.
Because of their intimate knowledge of local people, auxiliaries
Should be able to report atten^pts by enemy agents to infiltrate the
area. They can also name those inhabitants whose loyalty to the
resistance might be suspect.

rf. Logistics. The auxiliary unit Hupporta guerrillas in ail
phases of logistical operations. They provide transportation
and/or porters for the mjivement of supplies and equipment.
Auxiliaries often care for sick and wounded guerrillas, provide
medical itupplies and arrange for doctors and other medical per-
sonnel. They establish and secure caches. They collect food,
clothing, and o^er supplies for guerrilla units through a con-
trolled system of levy, barter, or contribution- Sometimes
auxiliaries provide essential services to guernllas such as —
repair of clothing, shoes, and certain items of equipment. Auxil-
iary units furnish personnel to assist at drop and landing zones-
They distribute supphea tbtouffhout the area. The extent of
logistical support furnished by the auxiliary force depends upon
the resources of the area, the degree of influence the auxiliaries
exert ofl the population, and enemy activities- For a further
discussion of logistics, see section VI.

e- RecruUaig. The guerrilla units depend upon the local popula-
tion for recruits to replace operational losses and to expand their
forces. Auxihartea spot, screen, and recruit personnel for active
guerrilla units- If recruits are provided through rehable auxiliary
elements, the enemy's chances for placing agents in the guerrilla
force are greatly reduced. In some instances, auxiliary units
provide rudimentary tr^ning for guerrilla recruits-

/. Psyckolagical Warfare. A very important mission in which
auxiliary units assist Is psydujlogical warfare. The spreading
of rumors, leaflets, and posters is timed with guerrilla tactical
missions to deceive the enemy. Leaflets can mislead the enemy
as to guerrilla Intenticsis, capabilities, and location. The spread-

ing of this propaganda usually involves little risk to the dis-
seminator and is very dithcult for the enemy to controlr

fl, CivUian Control. To control the population and give the
^emy an impression of guerrilla pow^er, the auxiliary unite
establish a rudimentary legal control system. This system can
control black-marketing and profiteering for the benefit of the
guerrilla force. Collaborators may be terrorized or eliminated by
the auxiliaries. In addition, control of large numbers of refugees
in the area is assumed for the guerrilla force by the auxiliary
Units.

h. Evasion and Escape. Auxiliary units are ideally suited for
tiie support of evasion and escape mechanisms. Their contact wi^
and control over segments of the civilian population provide the
area commander with a means of assisting evaders.

i- Other Miasiona. Auxiliary units may be called upon to per-
form a number of other missions to support guerrilla operations-
Some of these are —

(1) Activity in conjunction with tile guerrillas against other
targets. Cutting of telephone lines between an enemy
installation and its reserve force prior to a guerrilla
attack is an example of such support.

(2) Operation of drop or landing zones-

(3) Operation of courier systems between widely dispersed
guerrilla units.

(4) Furnishing guides to guerrilla units-

(5) Under some circumstances, they conduct active guerrilla
operations in their areas of responsibility on a part-time
basis-

71. The Underground

a. Enemy security measures and/or the antipathy of certain
segments of the population often deny selected portions of an
operational area to the guerrilla force or the auxiliaries. Since
these areas are usually essential to the support of enemy opera-
tions, the resistance force attempts to extend its influence into
them. The element used to conduct operations in such areas is the
underground. The underground, then, is that element of the
resistance force established to reach targets not vulnerable to
other elements. The underground is employed to achieve objec-
tives which would otherwise be unattainable.

b. In many respects the underground closely resaobles the
auxihary force. They conduct operations in a sinular manner and

perfonn many of the Aome functions. The major djffer»ic«8, tben,
are twofold—

(1) Tlio underground is tailored to craiduct operations in
areas which are nonnaliy denied to tJie auxiliary force
and guerrillas,

(2) The underground is not as depoideiit upon ccmtrol or
influence over the civilian populatloii for its success.
The degree to which the undergromid achieves this
objective is a byproduct of other operatioa& Craitrol of

the population is not the primary underground objectiTe.

e. For a detailed diKUSsion of the eharacteriaticav organizaticffl
and miesioos of the underground, see FH 31-21 A.

72. Command Group

The ecfflunand group provides a means to control and coordmate
all resistance acti^tiea in a guerrilla warfare operational area.
The group nonnaliy is located with the guerrilla force. In some
Instances the command group niay be located with the auxiliaries
or the underground. For examples of the type command gronpe,
see FH 31-21A.

Sodion m. SECUMTY

73. G«iwitri

Coioddeat with establishing a command organization in the
guerrilla warfare operational area is the organization of an
adequate security systoiL Security of all elements of the area
ccmnmnd i« baised npon the principle of preventing the enemy
from ^ther knowing of the existence of resistance forces or
beiii£ able to locate these forces when their existence is tnowix.
Secnrily is achieved by a cfTObination of active and passive
means to indude —

a. The physical securi^ waminK syston.

b. Dispersion,

c Mobility of onltfl and iitftallatimis.

d, C9nio4jflage discipline.

& Uarch securl^.

/. Communication aecurhr.

ff. Counterintelligence activities.

h. fiecords security.

i. Cover and deceplJon.

Since the nnderground and aoxiliaTy forces adiieve security
by ronaining undetected and through their basic cdlular atmc-

.'"-*■■

turOr this section deals only with the security meaaorea apptic^le
to the guerrilla force.

74. Bi-Zonal Seoiriry System

a. GenertU. Gnerrilla nnits normally anploy a bi-ional (inner
and onter zones) secnrity system (fig, 24). there ia necessarily
an overlap where security responsibility devolves to two or more
elements,

b. Inner Security Zone. TMa zone is the responsibility of gn^-
rilla units. In this zone, the secnrity system depends upon stand-
ard military techniques such as —

(1) Patrols,

(2) Ootguards and outposts.

(3) A sentinel ^stem.

(4) Warning devices.

(5) Cover and deception.

e. Outer Security Z<me. In this zone the auxiliary force and
the underground provide security for the guerrillas by furnishing
timely information of enemy activity.

75. Principles of Secuiity
a. Dispertum.

(1) Guerrilla forces avoid large concentrations of troops in
camps or bivouacs. Even thou^ the loj^stical situation
may permit sizeable troop eoncentraidons. commanda are
generally organized Into amaller nnila and diaperaed.
Dispersion facilitates concealment, mobility, and secrecy,
large forces may be concentrated to perform a spedfic
operation but. upon completion of the operation, they
quickly disperse.

(2) The principle of dispersion ia applied to twth command
and support installations. A large gnernlla faeadqnarten,
for examplCf is divided into several echelons and
deployed over a large area.

(3) In the event of well-coaducted, large scale enemy opera-
tions against the guerrilla force, the area commander
may divide units into even smaller groups to achieve
greater dispersion and fadhtate escape from aicircle-
ment. Splitting the gnerriUa force into small gronpa is
oaed only when all other means of evaaive action are
exhausted. Extreme dispemon redncea the effectiveneas
of the force for a con^derable period of iune. This
action abo lowers the morale of the guerrillas, and

SENTINELS

PATROLS

OUTPOSTS AHD OUT GUARDS

Figare ii- Bi-Zonat teeuritu ayBtem.

AUKILIAHIFS hiAlHTAlW.
LAHCE OF THE EHEUY Qk]
S ACTIONS AN DUO VEUi

lUOUS SURVEJU

^BJCCJ AHO REPORT®

t&THE CUtfifilLLtS

OmUt Ztmm

Fiffure ti — CoJitiiiii«d

veakena the vill of the ciTiliaoB to resist To increase
the probability of succeBafnl reasBcmbly of dispersed
nnite, phMis include attemate Aasembly areas.

b. MobiUty-

(1) Gaerrilla instalbiioiia and forces maintain a hi^ degree

of owbility. Evacuation plans for installations and
formi include elimination of all traces of gnerrila
activi^ prior to abandonment of tile area.

<2) Hobilily for evacuation is achieved by preparing etpiip-
ment to be moved m one-man loads, by caching less
mobile equipment, by destroying: or hiding material of
inteHieence vatne to the enemy, by policing the area,
and by elimioalji^ sUsoa of the route of withdrawal

c. Cover and Deeeptum OpenUirmi. Another principle of pro-
viding aecDrit7 is the use of deception operations. These opera-
tions are planned to deceive the enemy as to location, intent or
strength of the gnerrillA force. They are conducted in congmio
tion with other reaistance operations in the area or with conven-
tional force operations.

76. Secuffiy DudpliiK

a. Saf^ffuarding Piang and Records.

{1> InformatioD concemii^ guerrilla operations is dissemi-
nated on a Deed-to-know basis. Hinimnm necessary
copies of docmnents are made or maintained. Each per-
son is given only that information he needs to acvranplish
his tasks. Special efforts are made to restrict the amount
of informatttm given to individuals who are exposed to
eaptnro.

(2) Administrative records are kept to a minimum and
cadked so that tlie location is known only by a required
few. Usually essential records are photographed,

(3) Whenever possible, reference to names and places are
coded and the h^ to the code is given on a need-to-know

(4) Records which are of no further vahie are desbi>yed.

(6) The guerrilla r^ea on his memory to a Ear greater
extent than the r^olar soldier. Installal^ona nre not
maj^ed on mapa or papers whidi are takai oat of the
base. GnerritlaB hatatDally nK^norize the location ikF
inataJlations and areas to which they have access.

b. Seeurity Meamrta.

(1) Strict secori^ meAsar» are eiifraced. Hiese inehide —

(a) Camoflflage discipline.

(6) Isolation of miits from each other,

((f) Police of camp sites and installationa.

{e) Movement control within and between guerrilla bases.

if) Isolatloii of guerrilla units from the civilian popula-
tion at large. Any necessary contact with dvihans
is Aceomplidied through auxiliary elements.

(p) llicQ-oush indoctrination of all unihi in re^stance to
interrogation.

(2) Security consciousness is impressed upon guerrilla
troops frcou tile inception of tbe force and eontinaes
diroughant operationB. Commanders at all levels con^
stantjy strive to improve security measures. Particular
attention is devoted to Ihflae units and elements that
have recently been inactive or are located in relativdy

77. Mordi Sflcwity

a, Securi^ on the mardi is based npon accurate knowledge of
the euony's location and strength. The intdligence section of the
area command provides this vital infonuation for secuHty of
movonent.

b. Once routes have been selected, units are briefed on enony
activity, primary and alternate routes, dispersal and reaasanbly
areas akm^ the way, and security measures to be observed oi
roat& Auxiliary units in the route area as^st \fs providing secur-
ity elements for the guerrillas,

e. While on the move, the guerrilla forces employ march seenr-
i^ techniques aach as advance, rear and flank guards. Preselected
Uvooacs are thoroughly screened by patrols prior to (hrar occupa-
ticHi by guerrilla units. Contact is established with ktcal auxiliary
units deugnated to support tbe guerilla movanent. The auxiH-
aries are tims able to furnish the latest enemy information to
goerrilla Hunmanders.

7Z. Covnterinfi»llig«n<«

a. Security measures used by guerrillas to safeguard informal
ticn, instaUationB and commnnlcaticais, are supplemented by an
active couuterintelligeDce program to neutralise the enemy's
Intdligenoe system and to prevent tbe penetration of goerrilla
forces hy eoBmy agenlfl-

b. Counterintelligence is a command responsibility under the
fltaff supervision of the intelligence section of the area command.
Selected peraonnel, specially trained in counterintelligence, care-
fully screen all members of the guerrilla organization as a pro-
tective measure against enemy infiltration. They also plan and
Bupervise an active campaign of deception.

(1) Counterintelligence petsonnel through the auxiliary
forces keep a constant check on the civiliaJi population
of the area to insure against the presence of enemy
agents within their midat. Civilians upon whom the
guerrillas depend heavily for support may compromise
the guerrilla w^j^are effort as easily as A disloyal
guerrilliu

(2) False rumors and false information concerning guer-
rilla strength, location, operations, training and equip-
ment can be disseminated by counterintelligence per-
sonnel. Facts are distorted intentionally to minimize or
exaggerate guerrilla capabilities at any ^ven time.

(3) Active measures are taken to determine enemy inten-
tions, methods of operation, EEI, and to identify enemy

intelligence personnel or local inhabitants who may be
used as enemy agents. These active measures include
penetration of enemy intelligence and counterintelHgence
organizations by selected personnel, and the manipula-
tion of defectors and double agents.

79, Security Role of the Auxilkiiy and Llnderground

Both the auxiliary forces and the underground contribute to
the security of the guerrilla force. Incidental to their everyday
operations, they uncover enemy activity or indications which,
when evaluated, disclose potential danger to the guerrilla force,
Tliey establish speciiic systems designed to provide warning of
the approach of enemy units. They intimidate any collaborators
and attempt to elicit information from enemy personnel, local
offldals and tlie poHce. They operate in -what is to the guerrillas
the outer security zone.

80. Reaction to Enemy Operations

Premature or unnecessary movement caused by the presence
of the enemy may expose guerrillas to greater nsks than remain-
ing concealed. Such moves disrupt operations and tend to reduce
security by exposing guerrillas to enemy agents, informants, and
colbborators. The decision by tiie guerrilla commander to move
is made only after a careful estimate of the situation.

Section IV. IhnailGENCE IN GUERRILIA WARFARE

OPERATIONAL AREAS

81. General

The location of the area command in enemy-controlled territory
makes available to the tiieater commander an additional means of
developing intelligence. The area command is able to exploit
sources generally unavailable to other theater forces. However,
the area command is not primarily an intellfgence agency but a
military force responsive to theater control As such, they pro-
vide intelligence information gathered incidental to their primary
mission.

B2. Agencies and Sources

a. The area command has available three principal agencies to
assist in gathering intelligence information- They are the guer-
rilla force, the auxiliary force and the underground-

5. For special intelligence collection missions, the special forces
detachment may be augmented by trained intelligence specialists.

83. Capabilities

The area command has the following intelligence capabilities:
o. Intelliffenee to Support Their Own Operations. The intelh-
gence system of the operational area is primarily geared to sup-
port the command. It produces intelhgence for the use of the
guerrillas^ the underground^ and the auxiliaries.

b. Intelligence Data to Support Theater Operations. The area
command in the course of operations acquires intelligence data
of value to other theater forces. Some examples are —

(1) Order-of-battle intelligence data.

(2) Information to support psychological warfare activities,
(8) Target information for tactical and strategic air forces

plus post-strike information.
(4) Information of political, sociological, and economic

intelhgence value.
(B) Intelligence data to support specific tactical operations

such as airborne, amphibious, or armored operations.

Section V. COMMUNICATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

OPERATIONAL AREAS

84. Generar

Communications within an area or sector furnish the com-
mander liie means to control his organization. Because it is

loaded in enony territory, thf commuiiication system w01 be
alower. When a pUn is fomnilated, more time must bo allowed
for tramunitting ordora tikan in conventiooAl military units.

85- Meciiti Available

Q nininnnira timia within a aootor of between the area and sootor
commands use nonelectronic techniques vlierever practieaL Un-
til the area la relatively Recure, electronic means should be used
only when absolotely necessary. Since the area command is an
integrated OTKanixation cousistinff of the special forces detach-
ment and tiie resistance forces, the same communications most
satisfy the requirements of both. Special forces communications
at the detachment level cannot be divorced from ^errilla ctao-
munications.

86, CommunicoHon Security

a. Communications are always vulnerable to interception. Ab-
solute security does not exifiL Interception of communicatioDs is
an excellent means of gathering intelligence information. Special
forces radio operators normally operate with a maximum-security
SOT, designed to make interceptjon of electronic communications
difficult If guerrilla radios are operated from tiw same general
area as the special forces radio, they operate using the same pre-
cautions.

b. During the early phases of guerrilla development, messengers
are the chief means of communication. Security is enhanced by
c^ular structure of the messenger organization, use of secure
cryptographic systems and proper authentication.

87. Focton Affecting Communicatioiu

Radio used between the area and sector commands is the radio

operated by trained special forces operators. Communications
within an area or a sector depend on the operational situation, the
lAywcal location of the area and sector commands, terrain bar-
riers, the training of the resistance force, the enemy capabili^
in electronie interceiition, the security of the area and the com-
munication equipment available^ Hie range of radios, which
operate in the high frequency band, is extremely difficult to
predict. Under certain conditions these transmissions can be in-
tercepted over great distances. The range of low-powered radios,
operating in the VHF band, rarely exceeds hne of sight. Until
the area is secure, the use of radios Is restricted to (hose opera-
tional missions from which littie intelligence data will accrue to
eneaty interceptors. Ehiemy capability to intercept either eleo<

tronic or nonelectronic communicaUons and the operational
situation are the two primary factors to be considered when plan-
ning coDomunications within an operational area.

Section VI. LOGISTICS IN GUBUIUA WARFARE
OPERATIONAL AREAS

88. Geneitil

A. The lo^stical support for guerrilla forces is derived fnan
tvro primary sources; the sponsor and the operational area.
Logistical planning of the area command is based upon resources
available from both of these sources.

6. The operational area is normally expected to provide the
bulk of the k^lstical support required by the area command. This
support includes kical transportation, care of the sick and
wounded, various services, and tJkose items of supply necessary
for day-to-day existence such as food, clothing, and shelter. During
the eourae of operations, (he area may be able to provide a certain
portion of arms and equipment. This materiel is usually procured
as a result of combat action against the enany or security and
pdice forces. In highly developed areas of the world, certain
amounts of technical equipment, such as radios, can be locally
obtained-

e. The sponsor provides those essential logistical services which
are not readily available within the operational area. Usually this
consists of arms, ammnnitioii, demolitions, and communications
equipment — the essentials to support combat operations- Under
certain conditions, sponsor logistical support is expanded. Tt then
includes evacuation of the ^ck and wounded, food, clothing, and
other essential survival items unav^latde in the area.

89. Logi&ticcil Requirefnenlv

logistical requirements of the area command are rudimentary
and simple when compared to a conventional force of similar
aze. These requironents, in general, consist of —

a. Necesutles to enable guerrillas to live; sudi as food, clothing
and shoes, shelter, and medical equipmeoL

b, Cknnbat equipment for the conduct of operations. Major
categories are — arms and ammunition, demolitions uid com-
munications equipment.

e. Sufficient transportation to enable guerrilla, units to disbi-
bate supplies.

d. A medical syston to care for aick and wounded.

fi. Eaaential services, for ejfample — the repair of shoes and
clothing,

90, Logisticol Organization

a. Area Commnnd. The area command organizes for logistical
support by assigning tasks to its subordinate elements.

b. The Guerrilla Force. Each ^errilla unit is assigned a por-
tion of the operational area lor logistical support. Usually
^errilla units are satellited on an auxiliary region and receive
direct logistical support from the auxiliary units within their
assigned portion of the operational area. In addition to the sup-
port from local auxiliaries, the guerrilla unit depends upon Its
own overt action to satisfy logistical requirements.

c. The Auxiliary FiyrcG. One of the primary roles assigned to
auxiliary units is logistical support of guerrilla units. Since the
auxiliaries themselves are largely self-sufficient because they live
at home, they establish local logistical systems designed to support
guerrilla units-

d. The Underground.

{!) The underground lo^tical role is largely one of self-
maintenance for its own members. This usually takes
the form of ration cards, documents* money, living
Quarters and special equipment. In the latter case, the
area command often supplies special equipment received
from the sponsor.

(2) In some situations, the underground provides selected
items of supply, which would otherwise be unobtainable,
to the area command. Examples are-— drugs and other
medicines, radios, raw materials for explosives, photo-
graphic materials, etc.

91. Supply

a. ExUrttai Supp^/.

(1) Supply of the area command from external sources is
normally limited to those items not readily obtainable in
the operational area. Depending on conditions within the
area, this varies from small* irregular deliveries to total
logistical support.

(2) As a general rule, sponsor-provided supplies are de-
livered directly to the individual user. For instance, if
two guerrilla battalions are separated by a distance of
twenty miles, the supplies for each are air-dropped on
separate drop zones selected to service each battalion.

(3) The situation may be such that direct delivery to the
user is not desirable or possible. In this case, supplies arc
delivered to a designated location and their contents
distributed to the various users. Although this system
takes much time and effort, it permits <:cntralized
control over sponsor-provided supplies and is the pre-
ferred method when the situation requires close super-
vision of subordinate elemenls.

&, Interval Supply. This system includes all the methods used
by the area command to obtain supplies and equipment from
within the operational area. In dealing with the civilian popula-
tion, the resistance elements must balance their re<]uirement for
supplies against the need to maintain cooperation of their civilian
supporters. A procurement program designed without regard to
the needs of the population may impose such heavy commitments
on the civilians that they refuse to cooperate and thus limit the
operations of the resistance force and increase the requirement
for external supply.

(1) O^ensive Operations and Battlefield Reeavery. By con-
ducting offensive operations against the enemy, the
guerrilla force is able to satisfy many of its logistipal
requirements and at the same time deny the use of
these suppUes to the enemy. Capturing supplies from
the enemy has the advantage of not alienating civilians.
With adequate intelligence and proper planning, raids
and ambushes are conducted against installations and
convoys containing the items needed by the guerrilla
force. Prior to an operation, each guerrilla is instructed
to secure those priority materials required by the
guerrilla force. In areas where conventional operations
have been conducted, guerrillas can obtain certain quan-
tities of supplies by collecting abandoned equipment,

(2) Levy. To ensure an equitable system for obtaining
supplies from the local population, a levy system based
on the ability of each family or group of families to
contribute may be organized. This system is established
and operated by the various auxiliary units. Such a
system provides a means whereby the burden of supply-
ing the guerrilla force is distributed equitably through-
out the civilian population. The population can be told
that payment will eventually be made for the supplies
taken. Receipts may be given to individuals or records
of the transactions kept by the area command supply
officer. In establishing the levy system, the commander

must consider a number of obat^les which mi^ht affect
procurement in his operational area. Among them —

(ffl) Chronic food shortages.

(b) Enemy interference and/or corapetEtion for supplii?s.

(d) Competition from rival guerrilla bands.

(3) Barter, It may not be desirable for the area command
to engage in outright barter with the civilian population
because of possible adverse effects upon the levy system.
However, in some cases it is mutuary beneficial to ex-
change critical items, such as medical supplies, for food,
clothing or services.

(4) Purchase. Special forces detachments may be given a
certain amount of negotiable currency in the form of
£o!d or paper money. This money is for the purchase
of critical items or services within the operational area.
There will not be enough for purchases to meet all supply
requirements. In addition, the uncontrolled injection of
large amounts of money may well disrupt the local
economy. Purchases are used to supplement rather than
replace the levy system,

(5) Confiscation. Confiscation is a method which may be used
to fqlfiJl those requirements which cannot be met by the
other methods of internal supply. Confiscation is often
employed ia cases where certain KTOUps refuse to co-
operate or are actively collaborating with the enemy.
NatoraHy, confiscation tends to alienate the civilian
population and therefore should be used only in emergen-
cies or to punish collaborators. In all cases, confiscation
muat be strictly controlled to Insure that it does not
deteriorate Into indiscriminate looting.

c. Storage

(1) ITie storage or caching of snpplies and equipment plays
an important role in the area command logistical plan.
The uncertainties of the weather and enemy action pre-
vent tmietable receipt of supplies from the sponsoring
power. The area command, therefore, must be prepared
to operate for eKtended periods without external re-
aupply. This necessitates stockpiling snpplies for later
use. Guerrilla units do not maintain excess stocks of
supphes since large rpjantities of equipment limit mobil-
ity without increasing combat effectiveness. Supplies

in excess of current requirements are cached in a number
of isolated locations to minimize lie risk of discovery
by the enemy^ These caches are established and secured
by both guerrilla and auxiliary units in support of the
guerrilla force. Items are carefully packaged so that
damage from weather and exposure is minimized. Spe-
cialized packaging of supplies is accomplished by the
sponsor,

(2) Caches may be located anywhere that material can be
hidden — caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries and lakes.
The cache should be readily accessible to the user. Dis-
persal of caches throughout the operational area permits
a high degree of operational fiexibihty for the guerrilla
force-

(3) Generally there are two types of caches — those contain-
ing items used on a day-to-day basis and those containing
items to t>e used In the future. Each unit caches excess
supplies and equipment and draws upon these as needed-
Only the unit commander and key personnel know the
location of caches. In the same fashion, commanders
establish caches containing supplies which represent a
reserve for emergency use throughout the area,

92. Tranvporiation

a. The transportation requirements of the area command are
met largely from within the area since it is usually impractical
for the sponsor to provide transportation support for operational
use. To fulfill its transportation requirements, the area command
utilizes any means available.

b- Movement by foot is usually the primary means, especially
in the initial stages of guerrilla development. In specific situa-
tions, this may be supplemented by locally-procured motor vehicles
or animals- The auxiliaries provide whatever local transportation
is available to guerrilla units. This transportation is normally
furnished on a mission basis. However, in some instances, the
guerrillas permanently acquire transportation and organize
supply trains.

93. Mmiioir Service

a. Area ComiTtand Medical Requiremetda. The area conunand
medical requirements vary widely between operational areas but
usually differ from the conventional medical pri^lem in two
respects. First, due to the nature of guerrilla operations, battle
casualties are normally lower in guerrilla units than in their

infantry counterparts^ Second, the incidence of diaease and
sickness is often higher in guerrilla forces than in comparable
conventional units.

b. Area Medical Support Systfijti^ The area medical support
system is based primarily upon local facilities supplemented by
sponsor-provided medical supplies^

c. Medical System in the OperaiiowU Area. The medical system
in the operational area featurea both organized guerrilla medical
units and auxiliary medical facilities for individuals and .small
groups. The former arc located in guerrilla base areas and staffed
by guerrilla medical detachments. The auxiliary facility is a loca-
tion in which one or a small number of patients are held in a
convalescent status,

d. Gii£rrit}a Medical Detochment.

(1) Regardleas of the varying size of guerrilla units, the
medical detachments retain essentially the same struc-
ture and functions. Their duties are to maintain a high
state of health in the command, to render eilicient treat-
ment and evacuation of casualties, and to insure the
earliest possible return to duty of those who are sick

or injured^ The detachment may also provide treatment
and drugs to auxiliary and underground elements.

(2) The organization of the medit^E detachment consists
essentially of three sections — the aid station, which is
charged with the immediate care and evacuation of
casualties ; the hospital, which, performs defensive treat-
ments of casulaties and coordinates medical resupply
and training; and lastly^ the convalescent section, which
cares for patients who require rest and a minimum of
active medical attention before their return to duty-
The convalescent section is not located near the hospital
area as this Increases the size of the installatjop and thus
the security risk. Instead, the patients are placed in
homes of local sympathizers or in isolated convalescent
camps.

{Z) During the early stages of development, the medical
organization is small and probably combines the aid
station and the hospital into one installation. The use
of auxiliary convalescent facilities is found at all stages
of development.

e. Evacuation.

(1) Every effort is made to evacuate wounded personnel
from the scene of action. The condition of wounded
guerrillas may preclude movement with the unit to the

base. Jn this event, the wounded are hidden in a covered
location and the local auxiliary unit notihed. The local
auxiliaries then care for and hide the wounded until they
can be returned to their own organizations.

(2) 'Hie evacuation of dead from the scene of action is most
important for security reasons. The identification of the
dead by the enemy may jeopardize the safety of their
families as well sts that of their units, 'Die bodies of
those killed in action are evacuated, cached until they
can be recovered for proper burial, or disposed of by
whatever means is consistent with the customs of the
local population.

(3) As the operational area develops and 1^e overall situa-
tion favors the sponsor, evacuation of the sick and
wounded to friendly areas may be feasible. This lightens
the burden upon the meager facilities avail^le to the
area command and provides a higher standard of medical
care for the patient.

/, Expansion of Medical Support,

<1) As the area command expands, it is more efficient from
a medical standpoint to establish s centralized system
to provide advanced medical care. Field hospitals permit
more flexibility because of their wider selection of
trained personnel, equipment to provide special treat-
ment, uid they relieve the aid stations of the responsi-
bihty for prolonged treatment of patients. Since this
type of installation may be fairly large and may have
sizeable amounts of equipment, its mobility will suffer.
For that reason it is located in a relatively isolated
area away from troop units, headquarters and other
sensitive areas but so as to receive the maximum pro-
tection from guerrilla units.

(2) To prevent the hospital from becoming so large that it
attracts undue attention, certain actions are taken.
Firstr as trained personnel, supplies and equipment
become available, additional hospitals are established^
Second, as soon as possible, a patient is transferred
to a convalescent home to complete his recovery. If the
individual Is placed in a civilian home, he is properly
documented.

(3) In some cases the local population may not be able to
support the area command with quaUfied medical per-
sonnel. As the requirement for doctors and specialized
personnel increases, the SFOB may have to provide

additional medical personnel over and above the detach-
ment's organic medical peraonneL

94. Services

In guerrilla warfare operational areaa, services are primarily
reatrioted to baaic maintenance and repair of equipment- The
dLiBculties in procuring supplies dictate the need for rigid supply
diacipline. AJl peraonnel must perform firat-echebn maintenance.
Plana provide for the nnnimnin utilization of available supplies
and the establishment of local repair facilities to prolong the life
of equipment. Necessary maintenance and repair items such as
armorers tools, small arms repair kits, sewing hits, oil and clean-
ing materials are included in sponsor-provided supply packages.
Clothing and footgear are repaired locally.

CHAPTIR 8
COMBAT EMPLOYMENT

SecHon I. INTRODUCTION

95. General

a. Although discussed separately from other operations, the
Cfflnbat employment of guerrilla forces commences early and con-
tinues throughout the entire span of guerrilla warfare develop-
ment. However, combat employment normally reaches its peak
just prior to the juncture between unconventional and conven-
tional forces.

b. Control and coordination of guerrilla units is assisted by
the designation of guerrilla warfare operational areas. The sub-
divisional concept of these areas is explained in paragraph 62.

e. Guerrilla forces have a much greater chance for success and
most effectively support conventional military operations when
their activities are coordinated with other theater forces. Coordi-
nation of the guerrilla effort with the service component com-
mands' plans of operations is executed throu^ normal command
channels — tiieater commander, JUWTF, SF06, and operational
detachment.

96- Arec ControT

Guerrnlla forces are rarely concerned with seizing and holding
terrain. However, they are concerned with establishing area con-
trol in order to expedite operations. Area control is claasified,
according to degree, as area superiority or area supremacy.

a. Area Superiority. Temporary control of a specific area is
attained throu^ maximum use of the principles of surprise, mass,
and maneuver. Area superiority is maintained only for the period
of time required to accomplish missions without prohibitive
interference by the enemy,

h. Area Suprejnacy. Complete area control is attained when-
ever the enemy is incapable of effective interference with guerrilla
operations. Area supremacy is seldom achieved through uncon-
ventional warfare efforts alone-

97. Nature of Guerrilla Warfare

a. No word describes the nature of guerrilla warfare better
than "fluid." In guerrilla warfare the situation is atvrays' ffuid.

Kuth enemy and guerrilla units move and change their relative
positions as the result of tactical maneuvers. The area of guer-
rilla activity is never static; the situation changes constantly as
the enemy reacts to guerrilla actions.

b- Maximum effective results are attained through offensive
operations of the giienljla force. Normally, the guerrilla force
is primarily intert^sted in the interdiction of lines of communica-
tion and destruction of critical enemy installations. Except in
those instances wher-oin the tactical advantages arc clearly with
the guenUla force, no effort is made to close with and destroy an
enemy. Conversely, the enemy force must provide security for his
critical installations and seek to contact and destroy the guerrilla
force. These apposing courses of action create an operational
environment that is fluid.

c. Guerrilla area superiority is more easily achieved in difficult
terrain that restricts enemy observation and movement. Theae
factors reduce the enemy capability to mount coordinated opera-
tions quickly against the guerrillas and alluwrs sufficient time for
guerrilla units to avoid becoming involved in static defensive
combat. The physical characteristics of these so-called "redoubt
areas" are usually such that critical enemy targets are not located
in areas of sustained guerrilla superiority.

d. The enemy can achieve area superiority or supremacy of a
particular region at any time he is willing and able to commit
sufficient forces to do so. Hoivcvej-, because the guerrilla force is
comparatively free to select the time and place of attack, success-
ful operations are conducted against target systems despite enemy
security measures-

e. In between those areas of enemy control and temporary
guerrilla foi'Co control is an area or twilight ^ne subject to perm-
anent control of neither. Because the area command can initiate
offensive operations employing a variety of methods of attack
against widespread target systems, complete security of the
twilight zone by the enemy is virtually impossible.

A While guerrillas and the enemy compete for overt control
throughout the twilight zone, guerrillas cannot hold any specific
area againat determined enemy attack. The enemy holds localities
which he occupies in force and the guerrillas conduct their opera-
tions in those regions where the enemy is weakest.

g. The auxiliary organization is more effective in the twilight
zone than it is in enemy-dominated areas. The guerrilla capability
of conducting offensive operations coupled with other activities
is increased. Intelligence organizations report everything that the
enemy does within the twilight zone- Throughout the twilight

zone, the enemy is made to feel that he is in hostile territory; he
may control a small segment by forte of arms, but be can never
relax hia guard lest he be surprised by guerrillas.

98. Effects

a. Guerrilla operations wear down and" inflict casualties upon
the enemy^ cause damage to supplies and facilities^ and hinder
and delay enemy operations. The success of guerrilla operations-
even the fact that the guerrillas continue to exist— lowers enemy
morale and prestige; disrupts the economy^ politics, and industry
of the enemy or enemy occupied areas; and maintains the morale
and will to resist of the native population,

h- Because guerrilla operations are primarily directed against
lines of communication, industrial facilities and key installations,
they impede or intei'dict the movement of men and materiel and
seriously afTect the enemy's capability to supply, control, and
communicate with his combat forces. In addition, the enemy is
compelled to divert manpower and equipment to combat guerrilla
activities.

99. Types of Operational Missions

Operational missions for guerrilla forces are categorized as —

a- Mi^siorm in Support of the Theater Commantler. These mis-
sions have their greatest impact on theater level plans. Special
forces detachments direct guerrilla forces located in enemy or
enemy occupied territory. Operational command of these uncon-
ventional warfare forces is retained by the theater commander
end exercised through the SFOB. For a further discussion see
paragraph I<JO.

b' Mix-^ions to Aaaiat Com-entiojuil Forces Engo^id in Combat
Operations. These missions are conducted to assist service com-
ponent tactical commands engaged in combat operations, usually
the field army and subordinate elements. Special forces detach-
ments direct guerrilla forces located in enemy occupied territory
and operational control of these forces is exercised by the tactical
commander through a special forces liaison detachment. Logistical
and administrative support of unconventional warfare forces
remains with the theater commander. For a further discussion
see paragraphs 133 through 139.

c. Miasiona Conducted After Link-Vp With Frievdiy Forcea.
Missions may be assigned guerrilla forces after link-up with
friendly forces has been accomplished. Operational control may
be exercised by tactical commanders or passed to other theater
army commands auch as Theater Army Logistical Command

(TALOG) or Theater Army Civil Affairs Command <TACA-
Comd). Spedal forFea deUchments may or may not direct the
guerrlEla force in the execution of these miasionK. For a further
discussion see paragraphs 140 through 147,

IDO. Millions in Support of the Theoter Commcinder

a. Gfneml. These missioiLE may be either strate^c or tactical
in nature and have both long-ran^ and immediate effects on the
enemy and his miJitar^^ forces. They consist of — interdiction of
Lines of commnnications, key areas, military targets, and indus-
trial facilities; psychological operations; special intelligence tasks;
and evasion and escape operations.

b. Interdiction. Major emphasis is placed upon interdiction
of lines of communications, key areas, industrial facilities, and
mihtary targets. Of all guerrilla operations, interdiction usually
has the widest impact on the enemy and his ability to wage war
and conse^juently is considered the tmsic guerrilla warfare opera-
tional mission- Interdiction hinders or interrupts the enemy's
use of lines of communications, denies him use of certain areas
and destroys industrial facilities, military installations, and
equipment Interdiction ranges from simple sabotage by an
individual to oonoert«d attaoks by guerrilla forces. Wh^ properly
coordinated with i>ther theater operations, interdiction can make
a signilieant contribution to the overall effectiveneas of theater
operations- For a discussion of interdiction techniques see para-
graphs 101 through 126 and FM 31-21A.

c. Pffyr/foloffieal Warfare. All opeiations are conducted in a
manner that ^^ill create a favoiable environment for psychological
control of the indigenous population in keeping with announced
postwar objectives. Often the psychological effects of guerrilla
operations far outweigh the tactical results. In the operational
area, psychological ^varfare is employed by the area command to
communicate with the enemy forces, security forces, active resist-
ance elements and segments of the dvillan popubtion supporting,
opposing, or indifferent to the resistance movement. Normally,
■eparate psychological operations conducted by guerrilla forces
are designed to support the needs of the operational area, and
are governed by overall theater objectives. The ^ility of guer-
rilla forces to control the population and elicit civiHan support is
largely dependent upon the psychological impact of the resistance
movement upon the populace. For a detailed discussion of phycho-
Loglcal operations in support of guerrilla forces, see chapter 9.

d- Special ItUeUigence Tasks.

(1) Although special forces detadunents are not intelligence

organizations they have the capability throu^ the use

of unconventional warfare resources to accomplish cer-
tain information gathering tasks. Intensive intelligence
and reconnaissance activities are conducted to support
current and future operations. Such efforts often pro-
duce intelligence information of value to other theater
forces. Dissemination is made as the situation permits
or as directed by SFOB. Specific information collection
designed to support other theater forces may be under-
taken as directed. These operations are accomplished
by either the auxiliary or underground forces under
supervision of the area command- Chief among these
are target acquisition and damage assessment-

(2) Basic target information can be determined and reported
to the SFOB^ Because of the tenuous nature of com-
munications between the operational area and the base,
target acquisition is usually limited to targets without
a hi^ degree of mobility but of vital importance to the
theater commander.

<3) Operational detachments can report the physical and
psychological effects of attacks conducted by other
theater forces against targets within guerrilla warfare

(4) If Uke importance, magnitude and complexity of intel-
ligence tasks in support of theater commands exceeds
the intelligence management capability of unconven-
tional warfare forces, additional intelligence personnel
are provided from interested service components. The
unconventional warfare force receives these intelligence
specialists and furnishes them a base of operations-
Although the parent intelligence organizations provide
separate a>mmunicatioDs links for their own personnel,
the area conunander coordinates their efforts in the
interest of security.

e. Evasion and Esca'pa. Evasion and escape mechanisms are
developed to assist in the re(3>very of friendly personnel. Although
guerrilla nnita assist evasion and escape activities, such operations
are crmducted primarily hy auxiliary forces.

Sadion IL OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPOATIONS

101. G«n«TOl

0. Combat employment of guerrilla forces requires special
forces ddachmeuts to direct the efforts of indigenous resistance
elements in combat operations. Int^rated wilii these combat

operationa are psychological warfare, evasion and escape and
intelligence activities. For details of psychological warfare, eva-
sion and efioipe, and intelligence operationa, see chapter 9,

b. Raids and ambushes are the principal offensive techniques
of the guerrilla force. Raids and ambushes may be combined with
other action, such as mining and sniping or these latter actions
may be conducted independently. When raids, ambushes, mining
and sniping, are directed against enemy lines of communications,
key areas, military installations and industrial facilities, the total
result is interdiction,

c. Detailed intelKgence of enemy dispositions, movements, and
tactics; thorough planning and preparation; and knowledge of
the terrain, are prerequisites of guerrilla offensive operations,

102- ClKiraderi^tics of Guerriflo Comlxil Operations

Combat operations of guerrilla forces take on certain charac-
teristics which must be understood by special forces personnel
who direct and coordinate the resistance effort. These charac-
teristics are discussed below.

a. Planning. Careful and detailed planning is a prerequisite
for guerrilla combat operations. Plans provide for the attack of
selected targets and subsequent operations designed to exploit the
advantage gained. Additionally, alternate targets are designated
to allow subordinate units a degree of flexibility in taking advant-
age of sudden changes in the tactical situation. Once committed
to an operation the area command has Tittle capability to rapidly
nianipulate subordinate units to other missions. This lack of
immediate response is due to the shortage or non-existence of
radio communications equipment within smaller guerrilla units
coupled with relatively large zones of action. Thus, plans must
be thorouf^ and flexible enough to aHow commanders who are
responsible for an operation or series of operations to adopt
alternate predetermined courses of action when contingencies
arise.

b. tnteUigence^ The basis of planning is accurate and up-to-
date Intelligence. Prior to initdating combat operations, a detailed
intelligence collection effort is made in the projected objective
area. This effort supplements the regular flow of intelligence.
Provisions are made for keeping the target or objective area
under surveillance up to the time of attack.

c. Decentralized Execution. Guerrilla comliat operations feature
centralized planning and decentralized execution. Action of all
resistance elements is directed and coordinated by the area com-
mand. However, within the guidance furnished by the area com-

mander, sutHirdinate units are allowed the widest possible
latitude in the conduct of operations,

d. Snrpiiitfi. Guerrilla combat operations stress surprise.
Attacks are executfd at unexpected times and places. Set p-it-
terns of action are avoided- Maximum .advantage is gained by
attacking enemy weaknesses. Low visibility and adverse weather
are exploited by guerrilla forces. Surprise may also be enhanced
by the conduct of concurrent diversionary activities.

e. Short Duration A€ti<fn.. Usually, combat operations of guer-
rilla forces are marked by action of short duration ag^-inst the
target followed by a rapid withdrawal of the attacking force.
Prolonged combat action from lixed positions is avoided.

/. M^dtiple Attacks (fig. 25). Another characteristic of guer-
rilla combat operations is the employment of multiple attacks
over a wide area by small units tailored to the individual mis-
sion. This is not piecemeal commitment of units against single
targets but a nurnber of attacks directed against several targets
or portions of the target system. Such action tends to deceive the
enemy as to the actual location of guerrilla bases, causes him to
over-estimate guerrilla strength and forces him to disperse his
rear area seturity and counter guerrilla efforts.

103^ Toctical Control Measures

a- Gcnpral. The area commander utilizes tactical control meas-
ures to aid him in directing and coordinating combat operations.
Common tactical control measures are —

(1) Targets (objectives).

(2) Zones of action.

(3) Axis of advance.

(4) Mission support sites.

b. Target {Objectives) . The area commander designates targets
or objectives for attack by subordinate units. These targets are
usually lines of communications, military installations and units
and industrial facilities- Normally, targets or objectves for
guerrilla forces are not held for any length of time nor are they
cleared of determined enemy resistence,

c. Zones of Action (tig, 26). Zones of action are used to
designate areas of responsibility for operations of subordinate
units. Within the zone of action the subordinate commander exer-
cises considerable freedom in the conduct of operations. Move-
ment of other guerrilla units through an adjacent zone of action is
coordinated by the area command- The auxiliary forces within a
zone of action provide support to the guerrilla unit responsible for

^
^

iJie aren- Boundaries of 7onta of action are chanj^d by the com-
mander who eatablished them as required.

d. Axix of AdvaTice. Guerrilla commanderg may prescribe axes
of advance for their unit or subordinate units in order to control
movement to tanjets. GuerriUa units move to the objective area
either by ain^rle or multiple routes.

e. ML^ion Support Sites (fig. 27). Mission support Bit«s are
utiliwd by guerrilla units to add reach to their operations and
enable them to remain away from pit-rrilla bases for longt-r
periods of time. The mission support site is a pre-selected area
used as a temporary stopover point and is located in areas not
controUed by the guerrilla force. Mission support sites are utilized
prior to and/or after an operation. They are occupied for short
periods of time, seldom ionger than a day. As in an assembly area,
the using unit prepares for further operations and may be
provided with supplies and intelligence by auxiliary forces.

/. Additional Tactical C<rTtJrol MeasTirei. Additional control
measures may be employed by smaller guerrilla units such as
raUying points, direction of attack, assault positions and lines of
departure. These control measures are employed in a manner
similar to Oioir usa by conventional military unita.

104. Targe4 Setcdion

0, The general mission assigned by tbe theater commander
determines the type target (objective) to be attacked, wiUi the
Anal selection of the specific target usually made by the detach-
ment eommander. Occasionally, the SFOB may select the target.
The important factors related to the target which influence its
final selection are :

(I) CTiticali/-y- A target is critieal when its destmction or
damage will exercise a significant influence upon the
enemy's ability to conduct or support operations. Such
targets as bridges, tunnels, ravines, and mountain
passes are critical to lines of communication; engines,
tires, and POT. stores are critical to transportation. Each
target is considered in relationship to other elements of
the target system.

(2> VuinerabiUty. Vulnerability is a target's susccptibihty
to attack 1:^ means available to UW forces. Vulner-
ability is influenced by the nature of the target, i^e..
type, size, disposition and composition.

(3) Accessibility. Accessibility is measured by the ability
of Oie attacker to infiltrate into the target area. In study-
ing a target for accessibility, security eontrola around

1 1

ZOH£ OF ACTION -LEFT Of RIVER

■/

Figure !fi, Tacjicn/ ^oTtirvi MCci^ures — z^n«« e/ a^/ion.

I r

ZONE OF ^TION - TtLQIT DP RR

Rtfnolnln MSS

dropllril nii^l

DLilrikvt* pnpwqJd

'Fig^u^^ ??. raeCicfl^ (?€jwJro^ frwaBurej — ^ii^ffiwi ff?^pporf 5Ttp+

the target area, locntion of th^ target, and means of
infiltration arc conaidered-

(4) Rccaperability. Rccuporahility is the enemy's ability to
i-estore a damaged facility to normal operating capacity.
It \s affected by the enemy capability to repair and
replace damaged portions of the target

b. Those factors are variables. As such, each target Ie con-
slantTy reevaluated for selection. The criticality of a target may
change from time to time. A railroad bridge is less critical when
the enemy has few locomotives. The vulnerability of a target
shifts with the means available tu attiicli it such as explosives,
incendiaries and special devices, A power plant, command post, or
supply depot is less accessible after the enemy has detailed addi-
tional security personnel to guard it. Recuperation is more certain
if reserve stocks ai-e plentiful,

c. Each, operation plan includes more than one target. This
enables the conunander to alter his plans to meet unforseen situa-
tions that may preclude attack of the primary target

105. Raids

a. A raid is a surprise attack against an enemy force or instal-
lation. Such attacks are characterized by secret movement to
the objective area; brief, violent combat; rapid disengagement
from action; and swift, deceptive withdrawal.

b. Raids are conducted by guerrilla units to — destroy or
damage supplies, equipment or installations such as command
posts, communication facilities, depots, radar sites, etc.; capture
supplies, equipment and key personnel; or cause casualties among
the enemy and his supporters. Other effects of raids are: to draw
attention away from other operations ; keep the enemy off balance
and force him to deploy additjonal units to protect his rear areas.

106. Organizalion of the Raid Force

a. GcneraL The size of the raid force depends upon the mis-
sion, nature and location of the target and the enemy ^tuation.
The raid force may vary from a squad attacking a police check-
point or unprotected rail lines, to a battalion attacking a large
supply depot. Regardless of size, the raid force consists of two
basic elen^ents; assault and security.

fr. Assault Element. The assault element is organized and
trained to accomplish the objectives of the raid. It consists of a
main actior group to execute the raid mission and may include
personnel detailed to execute special tasks.

(1) The main action group executes the major task, the
accomplishment of which insures the success of the
raid. For instance, if the raid fd>jective is to destroy
a critical inatallation such as a railroad bridge or tunnel,
the main action group emplaces and detonates the demo-
lition changes. In the event that the target can be
neutralized by fire, snch as enemy personnel, the main
action group conducts its attack with a high proportion
of automatic weapcms. In some instances the main action
group moves physically on or into the target; m others
they are able to accomplish their tash at a distance from
the target. The efforts of other dements of the raid
force are designed to allow the main action group access
to the target for the time required to accomplish the
raid mission,

(2) If required, special task details assist the main action
group to reach the target. They execute such comple-
mentary tasks as — eliminating guards, breaching and
removing obstacles, diversionary or holding tasks, and
fire snpport. The special task details may precede, act
concurrently with, or follow the main action group.

e^ Security Etement. The security element supports the raid
by preventing the enemy from reinforcing or escaping. Addi-
tionally, the security element covers the withdrawal of the assault
element and acts as a rear guard for the raid force. The sLse of
the security element depends upon the enemy's capability to inter-
vene in the operation.

107. Prgp or olion

a. Planning Considerationa^

(1) The hrst step is the selection of a target. In addition to
the target selection factors mentioned in paragraph 104,
other important considerations are in the nature of the
terrain and the combat efficiency of the guerrilla force.

(2) Additionally, the UW force commander must consider
possible adverse effects on his unit and the civilian
populace. The guerrillas' objective is to diminish the
enemy's military potential, but an improperly timed
operation may provoke counteract
…[truncated]

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