Document text
V N AVy
ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINE CORPS
AVIATION
URBAN
OPERATIONS
MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS
AIR LAND SEA
APPLICATION
CENTER
FM 3-06.1
MCRP 3-35.3A
NTTP 3-01.04
AFTTP (I) 3-2.29
APRIL 2001
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved
for public release; distribution is unlimited.
MULTISERVICE TACTICS , TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
Report Documentation Page
Report Date
Report Type
Dates Covered (from... to)
00/04/2001
N/A
-
Title and Subtitle
Aviation Urban Operations Multiservice Procedures for
Aviation Urban Operations FM 3-06/1, MCRP 3-35/3 A,
NTTP 3-01.04, and AFTP(l)3-2.29
Author(s)
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)
US Army Training and Doctrine Cmd, Marine Corps
Combat Dev Cmd, Navy Warfare Dev Cmd, and HQ Air
Force Doctrine Center Washington.DC
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and
Address(es)
Distribution/ Availability Statement
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Supplementary Notes
Abstract
Subject Terms
Report Classification
unclassified
Classification of this page
unclassified
Classification of Abstract
unclassified
Limitation of Abstract
UU
Number of Pages
125
Contract Number
Grant Number
Program Element Number
Project Number
Task Number
Work Unit Number
Performing Organization Report Number
Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)
Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s)
FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective
commands and other commands as appropriate.
General, U.S. Army
Commanding General
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command
J. E. RHODES
Lieutenant General, USMC
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat
Development Command
B. J. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USN
Commander
Navy Warfare Development
Command
LANCE L. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters Air Force
Doctrine Center
This publication is available on the
General Dennis J. Reimer Training
and Doctrine Digital Library at
www.adtdl.army.mil
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication is a tactical level document for planning and conducting
aviation urban operations. This publication —
• Supplements established doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
• Provides reference material to assist aviation and ground personnel in planning
and coordinating tactical aviation urban operations.
• Applies to any personnel planning and conducting aviation urban operations,
including commanders, planners, aircrew, and ground personnel requiring
aviation support.
• Promotes an understanding of the complexities of urban terrain.
• Incorporates lessons learned, information from real world operations and
training exercises, and TTP from various sources applicable to the urban
environment.
2. Purpose
This publication provides multiservice TTP (MTTP) for planning and executing
fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations.
3. Applicability
a. The audience for this publication is any element of a force planning and
conducting aviation urban operations, including commanders, planners, aircrew,
and ground personnel requiring aviation support. This publication can serve as a
source document for developing Service and joint manuals, publications, and
curricula, as supplementary documentation or as a stand-alone document.
b. This publication does not address all functions of airpower employment that
may be used in urban operations (e.g. counterair, strategic attack, air interdiction,
etc.), as these topics are addressed in other appropriate joint and Service
publications.
4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will
review this publication, validate the information, reference, and incorporate it in
Service and command manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:
Army. The Army will incorporate this publication in United States (US) Army
training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, US Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with
Department of the Army (DA) Form 12-99-R.
Marine Corps: PCN 14400008800
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will incorporate these procedures in US
Marine Corps (USMC) training and doctrinal publications as directed by the
Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
(MCCDC). Distribution is in accordance with the Marine Corps publication
distribution system (MCPDS).
Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy (USN) training
and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare
Development Command (NWDC). Distribution is in accordance with the military
standard requisitioning and issue procedure (MILSTRIP) Desk Guide and naval
standing operating procedure (NAVSOP) Publication 409.
Air Force. The Air Force will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures
in accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance
with Air Force instruction (AFI) 33-360.
5. User Information
a. The TRADOC-MCCDC-NWDC-Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC)-Air Land
Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint
participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA reviews and updates this
publication as necessary.
b. This publication reflects current Service and joint doctrine, command and
control (C2) organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures.
Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in Service and joint
publications, will be incorporated.
c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key
your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendation directly to one of the
following services:
Army
Commander
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATDO-A
Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000
DSN 680-3153 COMM (757) 727-3153
Marine Corps
Commanding General
US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
ATTN: C42 (Director)
3300 Russell Road, Suite 318A
QuanticoVA 221 34-5021
DSN 278-6234 COMM (703) 784-6234
Navy
Commander
Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N5
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rl 02841-1207
DSN 948-4201 COMM (401) 841-4201
Air Force
HQ Air Force Doctrine Center
ATTN: DJ
216 Sweeney Boulevard Suite 109
Langley AFB VA 23665-2722
DSN 574-8091 COMM (757) 764-8091
E-mail Address: [email protected]
ALSA
ALSA Center
ATTN: Director
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB, VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902
E-mail: [email protected]
FM 3-06.1
MCRP 3-35.3A
NTTP 3-01.04
AFTTP(I) 3-2.29
FM 3-06.1 US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
MCRP 3-35. 3A Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
NTTP 3-01.04 Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island
AFTTP(I) 3-2.29 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
15 April 2001
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS
Multiservice Procedures for
Aviation Urban Operations
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . viii
CHAPTER I OVERVIEW
1. Introduction . 1-1
2. Historical Lessons . 1-2
3. Political and Civilian Considerations . 1-6
4. Law of War (LOW)/Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) . 1-7
5. Rules of Engagement . 1-8
6. Collateral Damage . 1-9
7. Fratricide Prevention . 1-9
8. Training Considerations . 1-10
CHAPTER II URBAN CHARACTERISTICS
1. Background . 11-1
2. Size . 11-1
3. Patterns . 11-1
4. Characteristics . 11-5
5. Population Density . 11-6
6. Structural Density . 11-6
iv
7. Building Construction . 11-10
8. Features of Special Consideration . 11-11
CHAPTER III FLIGHT OPERATIONS
1. Background . 111-1
2. Threat Considerations . 111-1
3. Weather . 111-2
4. Command, Control, and Communications . 111-3
5. Airspace Control . 111-4
6. Air-to-Ground Coordination . 111-4
7. Maps and Charts — Selection and Preparation . 111-4
8. Route Planning and Navigation . 111-7
9. Night Vision Devices . 111-9
10. Rotary-Wing Operations . 111-11
11. Fixed-Wing Operations . 111-12
12. Airfields . 111-14
13. Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ) . 111-15
14. Special Use Areas . 111-17
CHAPTER IV WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
1. Introduction . IV-1
2. Weapons Selection . IV-1
3. Tactical Target Development . IV-2
4. Targeting Grids and Reference Techniques . IV-4
5. Target Marking and Friendly Positions . IV-6
6. Television/Electro-optical (TV/EO) . IV-8
7. Electronic Beacons . IV-8
8. Laser Designation . IV-9
9. Clearance to Drop/Fire for CAS Missions . IV-9
10. Fixed-wing Targeting and Engagements (AV-8B, A- 10,
O/A-10, F-14, F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, and F-117) . IV-10
11. Fixed-wing Targeting and Engagements (AC- 130) . IV-1 3
12. Rotary-wing Targeting and Engagements (AH-1, AH-1W,
AH-6, AH-64, MH-60, OH-58D, UH-1N) . IV-1 5
13. Artillery, Motars, and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) .... IV-1 8
14. Close Air Support . IV-20
15. Munitions Effectiveness . IV-20
16. Munitions Delivery . IV-21
APPENDIXA Air Mission Planning Guidelines . A-1
1. Mission Analysis . A-1
2. Conduct Risk Assessment and Management . A-1
3. Friendly Situation . A-1
4. Threat . A-1
5. Terrain Analysis . A-1
6. Weather . A-1
7. Route Planning and Navigation . A-2
8. Terminal Area Procedures . A-2
9. Communications . A-2
v
10. Airspace Control . A-2
11. Rules of Engagement . A-2
12. Weapons Selection and Employment . A-2
13. Contingencies . A-2
APPENDIX B Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace . B-1
1. Process . B-1
2. Resources and Products . B-2
3. Imagery . B-7
APPENDIX C Munitions . C-1
1. Laser Guided Bomb . C-1
2. Maverick (AGM-65 Block B/D/E/G/K) . C-1
3. Cluster Munitions . C-2
4. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) (GBU-29, GBU-30,
GBU-31, GBU-32) . C-3
5. Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided (TOW) . C-4
6. Hellfire . C-4
7. 20mm Cannon . C-7
8. 25mm Cannon . C-7
9. 30mm Cannon . C-7
10. 40mm Cannon . C-8
11. 105mm Cannon . C-9
12. Rockets . C-9
13. Medium/heavy Machine-guns (7.62mm and .50 caliber) . C-10
APPENDIX D Personnel Recovery . D-1
1. Personnel Recovery . D-1
2. Evasion . D-1
3. Charts, Communications, and Signaling . D-2
4. Recovery . D-4
REFERENCES . References-1
GLOSSARY . Glossary-1
Part 1-Abbreviations and Acronyms . Glossary-1
Part 2-Terms and Definitions . Glossary-8
INDEX . Index-1
FIGURES II-l Hub . 11-2
II-2 Satellite . 11-2
II-3 Network . 11-2
II-4 Linear . 11-3
II-5 Segment/Pie Slice . 11-3
II-6 Rectangular . 11-3
II-7 Radial . 11-4
II-8 Concentric . 11-4
VI
II-9 Contour Conforming . 11-4
11-10 Irregular . 11-5
II- 11 Planned Irregular . 11-5
11-12 Type “A” . 11-7
11-13 Type “B” . 11-7
11-14 Type “C” . 11-8
11-15 Type “D” . 11-9
II- 16 Type “E” . 11-9
III- l Ground Unit Control Measures . 111-5
III- 2 Network Route Structure . 111-8
IV- 1 Urban Grid . IV-4
IV-2 Bullseye Targeting . IV-5
IV-3 Objective Area Reference Grid . IV-5
IV-4 Target Reference Points . IV-5
IV-5 Running/Diving Fire Engagement . IV-1 7
IV-6 Hover Fire Engagement . IV-1 8
IV-7 View Along Street (Low angle possible) . IV-22
IV-8 Look-Down View (Greater angle required) . IV-23
IV-9 Look-Down Angle . IV-23
B-l Combined UTOG/UTF Overlay (Simplified Example) . B-6
B-2 Roof Coverage . B-7
TABLES 1-1 20th Century Urban Operations . 1-3
IV-1 Target and Friendly Marking Methods . IV-7
IV-2 Fixed-wing Weapon Suites . IV-1 1
IV-3 AC-130H/U Weapons Suite . IV-14
IV-4 AC-130H/U Weapons Applicability . IV-1 5
IV-5 Rotary-wing Weapons Suites . IV-1 6
IV-6 Wall Thickness and Incidence of Occurrence of
Building Types . IV-21
IV-7 Munitions and Delivery Techniques . IV-24
IV-8 Munitions Advantages and Disadvantages . IV-25
IV-9 Delivery Methods Advantages and Disadvantages . IV-26
IV-10 Airborne and Ground Designators Advantages
and Disadvantages . IV-26
B-l General Sources . B-2
C-l Penetration Capabilities of the 7.62mm (Ball)
Round . C-11
C-2 Rounds (Rds) Needed to Penetrate Reinforced
Concrete Wall (At a 25-Degree Obliquity) . C-11
vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Aviation Urban Operations
This publication-
• Provides MTTP for tactical level planning and execution of fixed- and
rotary-wing aviation urban operations.
• Provides reference material to assist aircrew and ground personnel in
planning and coordinating tactical urban operations.
• Applies to all elements of a force planning and conducting aviation
urban operations, including commanders, planners, aircrew, and
ground personnel requiring aviation support.
• This publication does not address all functions of airpower employment
that may be used in urban operations (e.g. counterair, strategic attack,
air interdiction, etc.), as these topics are addressed in other appropriate
joint and Service publications.
Chapter I
Overview
Chapter One provides an overview of aviation urban operations including
lessons learned to show effective and ineffective techniques. This overview includes
discussion of political and civilian considerations, law of war, rules of engagement,
and collateral damage considerations. The chapter also addresses the importance of
fratricide prevention measures.
Chapter II
Urban Characteristics
Chapter Two describes characteristics of urban terrain including size, patterns,
and features. It describes building construction, building types, street patterns, roof
coverage, population density, and other features of special consideration.
Chapter III
Flight Operations
Chapter Three includes discussions concerning threat considerations, effects of
weather, command, control, and communications, and airspace control
considerations. The chapter includes information on aviation capabilities and
employment limitations. It discusses night vision devices, urban navigation,
landing zone selection, and other flight operations considerations unique to aviation
urban operations.
viii
Chapter IV
Weapons Employment
Chapter Four focuses on tactical urban targeting, and weapons selection. It
discusses target marking devices, friendly unit position marking, laser designation,
and positive control measures. The information provided includes aerial weapons
effects, ordnance delivery parameters, target tracking, and emergency close air
support considerations.
IX
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
Joint
Joint Warfighting Center Fenwick Rd Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000
HQ JSSA, Fort Belvoir, VA
HQ JCRA, Langley AFB, VA
Joint Combat ID Office (JCIDO), Washington, DC
HQ USSOCOM (SOOP-J/SORR-SCG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
Army
HQ TRADOC (ATDO-A), Ingalls Rd, Bldg 133 Room 7, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000
Combined Arms Center (CAC), Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), Fort
Leavenworth, KS
US Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA
CDR USAFAS, Fort Sill, OK
CDRUSAAVNCS, DOTDS, Fort Rucker, AL
101st Airborne Division (AASLT), Fort Campbell, KY
10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, NY
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Abn)
Marine Corps
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Joint Doctrine Branch (C427), 3300
Russell Rd, 3rd Floor Suite 318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021
HQ US Marine Corps Stategy and Plans Division, Room 5D 616, Washington, DC
20380-1775
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), P.O. Box 99200,
Yuma, AZ 85369-9200
Second Marine Aircraft Wing, Cherry Point, NC
Navy
Navy Warfare Development Command/Det N3, 1540 Gilbert Street, Norfolk, VA 23511
Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC), Fallon NAS, NV
COMPHIBGRU TWO, NAB Little Creek, Norfolk, VA 23521
Air Force
HQ Air Force Doctrine Center, 155 N. Twining Street, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112
AFDC Detachment 1, 216 Sweeny Bvld. Ste 109, Langley AFB, VA 23665
HQ ACC/ XOIP/XODT, Langley AFB, VA 23665
HQ AM C/D O/D OK/XP/D OKT, Scott AFB, IL 62225
HQ U SAF/XPXQ/XO O C , Washington DC
HQ USAFE/XPXD, Ramstein AFB, GE
HQ AFSOC/DO/DOXT/IN, Hurlburt Field, FL
USAFWS/WSR/WST, Nelhs AFB, NV
AC2ISRC/C2S, Langley AFB, VA
57 WG/DTW, Nelhs AFB, NV
AWFC/422 TE S/C C/DO A, Nelhs AFB, NV
720 STG/CC, Hurlburt Field, FL
x
Chapter I
OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
a. Background. Urban areas generally function as centers of social, economic,
industrial, and political power. These areas facilitate formal and informal civilian
and military interaction, and can offer ready access to important resources, such as
labor, water, technology, and information. Historically, United States (US) Forces
have operated within, or in close proximity to urban areas. Demographic and
population trends indicate that, in the future, a majority of the world’s population
will reside in urban areas. Trends toward increased urbanization increase the
potential for US forces to operate in urban areas.
b. Doctrine. US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) doctrine recommends
isolating and bypassing urban areas when possible due to the costs involved.
Former Soviet Union doctrine also recommended avoiding large cities in favor of
speed and maneuver. However, avoiding urban areas does not prevent an adversary
from exploiting its defensive advantages. US Air Force (USAF) doctrine maintains
that airpower’s versatility and responsiveness allows the simultaneous application
of mass and air maneuver, almost anywhere, from almost any direction. The speed,
range, precision weapons, communications, command and control (C2), information
gathering, and transportation capabilities of US military aircraft enable airpower to
play a major, if not decisive, role in urban operations when proper tactics are
employed. This is possible whether aviation operations are conducted
independently, or in conjunction with the operations of friendly ground forces.
Operations in Panama City, Baghdad, Mogadishu, Port Au Prince, Sarajevo, and
Pristina, are a few examples where airpower has been influential in urban
operations in the past.
c. Urban Considerations. Aviation urban operations can be planned and
conducted across the range of military operations. The two dominant characteristics
affecting aviation urban operations are the existence of manmade construction and
the presence of noncombatants. These operations may be conducted on or against
objectives on a complex urban topology and its adjacent natural terrain. The
compressed battlespace in the urban environment creates unique considerations for
planning and conducting aviation operations. These include:
(1) operations in urban canyons,
(2) deconfliction in confined airspace,
(3) restrictive rules of engagement (ROE),
(4) difficulty in threat analysis,
(5) an overload of visual cues,
1-1
(6) the presence of noncombatants,
(7) the potential for collateral damage, and
(8) the increased risk of fratricide.
These considerations and others, as well as some historical lessons will be discussed
in this publication.
2. Historical Lessons
a. Background. Urban operations have been conducted many times in the 20th
century. See Table 1-1. Familiarity with historical lessons is fundamental to
understanding the difficulties associated with conducting aviation urban operations.
In many conflicts throughout the 20th century, aviation (air power) has played an
important and sometimes decisive role in isolating and interdicting the flow of the
defender’s supplies and reinforcements into the urban areas. Advancements in
aircraft design and precision munitions in conjunction with specific training for
urban operations have increased effectiveness of these operations. For example, the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during operations in Beirut, successfully used aviation
in a compressed urban battlespace through bombing by fixed-wing aircraft, ground
attack by helicopters, and aerial medical evacuation of wounded personnel.
b. Tactical Challenges. Employment of aviation assets in urban operations
presents important tactical challenges. For example, one tactic used successfully by
both attackers and defenders for protection against air and artillery attack has been
to keep one’s forces deployed in close proximity to the enemy; thus deterring enemy
air or artillery support. This “hugging” tactic, whether by design or as a
consequence of close combat, was often effectively used in many modern urban
battles.
c. Planning and Conducting Operations. Due to the complexities and increased
challenges involved in conducting aviation urban operations, the following are some
of the important areas of consideration when planning for and conducting
operations in this environment.
(1) Physical limitations. Urban areas offer defenders several advantages.
These include the availability of obstacles, cover, concealment, and potential
strongpoints. City layouts limit traditional methods of military operations. The
vertical nature of this environment and subterranean infrastructure limit line of
sight (LOS).
(2) Surprise. Surprise can help shift the balance of combat power by
overcoming other disadvantages and may be critical to success in urban
operations. Surprise was achieved by the attacker at Aachen and Ban Me Thout
and by the defender at Suez City. Without the element of surprise, friendly
forces may encounter strong, well-prepared defenses without adequate warning.
Rapid, accurate, intelligence analysis and dissemination is a key to the element of
surprise.
1-2
Table 1-1. 20th Century Urban Operations
EBROIN
1938
WARSAW
1939
ROTTERDAM
1940
MOSCOW
1942
STALINGRAD
1942
LENINGRAD
1942
WARSAW
1943
PALERMO
1944
TOKYO
1944
DRESDEN
1944
BREST
1944
WARSAW
1944
AACHEN
1944
ORTONA
1944
CHERBOURG
1944
BRESLAU
1945
WEISSENFELS
1945
BERLIN
1945
MANILA
1945
SAN MANUEL
1945
BERLIN AIRLIFT
1948-49
SEOUL
1950
BUDAPEST
1956
BEIRUT
1958
SANTO DOMINGO
1965
SAIGON
1968
KONTUM
1968
HUE
1968
BELFAST
1972
MONTEVIDEO
1972
QUANGTRI CITY
1972
AN LOC
1972
XUAN LOC
1975
SAIGON
1975
BEIRUT
1975-78
MANAGUA
1978
SIDON
1982
KABUL
1978-87
TYRE
1982
PANAMA CITY
1989
KHAFJI
1991
BAGHDAD
1991-98
MOGADISHU
1992-94
PORT AU PRINCE
1994
SARAJEVO
1994-98
GROZNY
1994-95
MONROVIA
1996
FREETOWN
1997
BELGRADE
1999
PRISTINA
1999
NOTE: Bold type denotes direct US involvement
(3) Isolation. Sustained isolation of a defending force has often afforded the
attacker a tremendous combat advantage. Conversely, minimizing or overcoming
the effects of isolation has often enabled victory by defending forces. The offensive
use of airpower by the attacking force has often significantly influenced the isolation
of defending forces by stemming what could otherwise be an unimpeded flow of
manpower, supplies, and weapons to replace their losses. The battle at Khafji is one
example, where, during fierce ground fighting in and around the city, coalition air
forces destroyed Iraqi reinforcements from the air. However, airpower’s influence on
isolation is not limited to aerial bombardment. For example, the employment of
airlift and special operations aircraft has helped attacking forces initiate and/or
sustain attacks to isolate defending forces by massing friendly ground troops into
urban areas. Operations in Panama City and Port Au Prince are two examples
where this was the case. Additionally, airpower has also helped defending or
occupying friendly forces and populations in urban areas overcome the effects of
isolation through resupply and humanitarian relief efforts, such as operations in
Berlin, Mogadishu, and Sarajevo.
(4) Time. In most cases, the time required for successful conclusion of an
urban operation exceeded the initial estimates. Two operations where time played a
critical role in the attacker’s strategic timetable (and this role was not anticipated)
were Aachen and Stalingrad. In these operations, the defenders delayed the
1-3
attackers longer than was estimated, resulting in the modification of operational
or strategic plans. A well-planned urban defense, even if the defender is isolated
or lacking aviation, armor, or artillery, can consume inordinate amounts of the
attacker’s time and resources. This time can permit the defender to reorganize,
redeploy, or otherwise effectively marshal resources in other areas.
(5) Intelligence. Many defeats can be attributed to errors in the initial
intelligence assessments. The operation at Arnhem in World War II might not have
occurred if the Allies had been aware of the strength and locations of the German
forces. At Stalingrad, the attacking Germans were aware of the defending forces
facing them in the Sixth Army’s zone. However, they incorrectly analyzed the build¬
up of Soviet forces in other areas; thus resulting in tactical surprise at those points,
and diluting their offensive to seize the city. Aviation forces are uniquely suited to
provide timely, thorough, and on-demand intelligence, although the urban
environment poses some unique challenges to aerial and space reconnaissance.
(6) Forces. Whether attacking or defending, the size of the force relative to
the enemy’s can be a critical determinant of success or failure. Historically, when
the attacker outnumbered the defender and/or the quality of defending forces was
inferior, the defeat of the force defending the city was almost certain. The average
attacker to defender ratio in the battles referenced in Table 1-1 was four-to-one.
Nevertheless, regardless of the size or quality of the defensive forces, the defender
can exact enormous costs on the attacker in time, resources, and casualties. As was
seen at Khorramshahr, the defensive Iranian forces, which were outnumbered four
to one, still held the city for approximately twenty-six days. Another consideration
for both attacker and defender is the inversely proportional relationship between
force strength and combat duration. Historically, the stronger the attacker, the
shorter the duration of the fight. Aircraft and their unique capabilities provide a
significant force multiplier to either an attacker or defender.
(7) Command, Control, and Communications (C3). C3 is often difficult in
the urban environment. In particular, controlling airspace and air to ground
coordination may be hampered by physical and technical limitations. The urban
environment may adversely affect friendly-force communications, with LOS
communications severely limited at times. Effective communications requires
planning and clear orders.
(a) Planning must address redundant and alternate means of
communications. Visual signaling, while difficult, has proven to be effective when
other means of communication are unavailable. The use of commercial telephone
systems or landlines may be also appropriate, but are susceptible to damage,
sabotage, and monitoring. Airborne platforms or rooftop retransmission systems
can help alleviate these problems by providing the “high ground” for
communications relay. The IDF for example, employed unmanned aerial vehicles
as retransmission platforms during the War in Lebanon (1982) with considerable
success. In addition to enhancing operations by serving as communications
relays, airborne platforms may also provide commanders real or near-real time
intelligence.
1-4
(b) There is always the possibility some subordinate units may be out of
contact with higher headquarters during much of their mission execution.
Therefore, clear orders to subordinate commands, and a thorough understanding
of the commander’s intent is essential in helping subordinates understand the
larger context of their actions. This allows them to exercise judgement and
initiative When situations change, making a task obsolete, an understanding of
intent is more lasting and continues to guide subordinate commanders’ actions.
General Chuikov of the 62nd Russian Army summed up the concept of
commander’s intent when speaking of the battle of Stalingrad: “Fighting in a
city... is much more involved than fighting in the field. Here, the ‘big chiefs’ have
practically no influence on the officers and squad leaders commanding units and
subunits and into those of the soldiers themselves.”
(8) Weather. Weather may adversely affect aviation operations. Over¬
reliance on aviation forces may render a force, particularly in the high intensity
environment of urban combat, susceptible to the uncertainties of weather. In the
battle for Hue City for example, US Marines were unable to effectively employ
aviation because of low cloud ceilings. Consequently, only one flight of A-4s was able
to employ ordnance in support of the Marines fighting in Hue City during the entire
battle.
(9) Logistics and medical. Urban operations require a responsive logistical
support system. Of particular importance is a responsive and robust treatment
and evacuation plan for casualties. To meet casualty and evacuation needs, plan
to establish aid stations and landing zones as far forward as the situation allows.
(10) ROE. Because aviation urban operations normally pose a high risk of
civilian collateral damage and fratricide, operations-specific ROE must be crafted
carefully to allow flexibility in fulfillment of the mission. At the same time, ROE
must limit the danger to noncombatants and friendly forces. Because this is such
a crucial issue in the context of urban operations, some historical examples are
instructive.
(a) Manila-1945. Before the battle of Manila in 1945, General
MacArthur prohibited aerial bombardment. “The inaccuracy of this type of
bombardment would result beyond question in the death of thousands of innocent
civilians.” He further confined artillery support to observed fire on confirmed
point targets. However, the artillery restrictions were removed after the first
few days because of growing US casualties. Furthermore, in apparent disregard
for the ROE, cases of air bombardment and strafing in support of US forces
occurred in the latter stages of the battle. During this operation, much of the city
was destroyed, or damaged and an estimated 100,000 civilians died.
(b) Seoul-1950. At the outset of the battle, US Marines entered the fight
under very restrictive ROE. Both damage to the city and civilian casualties were
to be held to a minimum. There was to be no close air support (CAS) at all.
However, this restriction was lifted in the face of heavy enemy opposition. In the
aftermath of the US victory over the defending North Korean forces, 65% of the
city was destroyed and thousands of South Korean civilians were killed.
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(c) Hue City-1968. As US Marines entered Hue City in 1968, the use of
heavy artillery, bombs, and napalm was prohibited. The Army of the Republic of
Vietnam corps commander’s request to spare civilians and reduce destruction to
the historic city drove these restrictions. However, as the battle’s progress
slowed with significant US Marine casualties, this policy was abandoned and
artillery and tanks became a crucial factor in the ultimate success of the battle.
In the aftermath of the US victory over the defending North Vietnamese forces,
“the estimates tallied ten thousand houses either destroyed or damaged, roughly
forty percent of the city.”
3. Political and Civilian Considerations
a. Collateral Damage. One of the risks in urban operations is the possibility
of widespread collateral damage. While this damage is unintended, the resulting
images of destroyed homes, damaged churches, and injured civilian casualties
may have severe operational consequences. This damage is exacerbated by world
wide media reports and enemy attempts to characterize such damage as unlawful.
These media reports and claims may affect strategic decision making and lead to
the loss of international and public support. Commanders and planning staffs
must keep these considerations in mind at all times when planning or conducting
urban aviation operations. One of the ways in which these issues can be managed
is through the careful drafting and management of ROE. However, paramount to
the drafting of these ROE is the need to emphasize the right and obligation of
self-defense, force protection, and military necessity.
b. Military/Civilian Interaction. During urban aviation operations, US forces
should expect that many civilians and civilian objects would be intermingled with
military objectives. Some civilians will pose risks because they may be hostile to
US Forces. This may involve civilians committing hostile acts against US or
friendly forces. On the other hand, the majority of civilians will act strictly in
accordance with their status as non-combatants. Non-combatants should be
protected and respected at all times. Therefore, efforts must be made to protect
non-combatants and civilian objects, which by definition are not military
objectives. Military objectives are those objects, which by their nature, location,
purpose, or use effectively contribute to the enemy’s war fighting or war
sustaining capability. However, the will of the population can be targeted by non¬
violent measures including offensive information operations (10). 10 can
persuade civilians to avoid any involvement in combat operations. 10 can also
inform non-combatants of the likely location of combat operations. This
information assists them in avoiding any accidental involvement, and in
minimizing the likelihood of incidental injuries. However, these kinds of 10
should be consistent with operations security (OPSEC) requirements and fully
integrated with other 10 actions.
c. Post-Hostilities Support. After hostilities cease, military forces may be
required under international law to take on the burden of providing support to
the civilian population in any occupied territory until civilian authority is
restored. Accordingly, commanders must keep in mind that destruction of
essential urban infrastructure can complicate this post combat transition period.
Therefore, air planners and commanders conducting aviation urban operations
must be mindful of all the issues associated with civilian presence.
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4. Law of War (LOW)/Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
It is US policy that our forces will abide by LOW/LOAC in all their military
operations, no matter how characterized. Urban aviation operations present unique
challenges, but these too must be conducted in compliance with LOW/LOAC.
Commanders and planners must seek the advice of judge advocates at all stages of
planning to ensure compliance with LOW/LOAC. The two most fundamental and
important LOW/LOAC concepts are distinction and proportionality.
a. Distinction.
(1) The concept of distinction requires that combatants make every effort to
distinguish between military targets and civilian persons or objects. The
principle of distinction prohibits intentional attacks on non-combatants or non¬
military objects. Urban operations require accurate targeting, precision weapons,
and realistic training to distinguish successfully between military and civilian
targets.
(2) It is extremely important to distinguish between non-combatants and
combatants. This task can be greatly complicated by the urban environment.
Valid military targets or combatants belong to any of the following categories:
(a) members of armed forces,
(b) members of organized militia,
(c) members of resistance movements,
(d) inhabitants of a non-occupied area who take up arms on the
approach of the attacking force,
(e) any civilian who actively poses a direct threat to US forces,
(f) any structure that produces services or warfighting equipment for
the fighting force.
(3) In urban areas, it is often impossible to distinguish adequately between
combatants and non-combatants or between military targets and civilian objects.
LOW/LOAC attempts to ameliorate this dilemma by requiring defending forces to
remove the civilian population from the vicinity of military objectives and not to
locate military objectives within or near densely populated areas. Although
strictly prohibited by LOW/LOAC, recent experience demonstrates that
defenders may attempt to render military forces and objectives immune from
attack by mixing their soldiers among non-combatants and using civilian
structures for overtly military purposes. A failure by an adversary to adequately
safeguard the civilian population does not relieve the attacking commander from
his obligation to consider civilian collateral damage and injury — any attack must
still be proportionate.
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(4) US forces will face similar dilemmas in future operations. When an
unscrupulous enemy uses members of the civilian population as “human shields”,
US forces are under no legal obligation to assume all responsibility for their
safety, nor to place US lives at undue risk. While US forces may attack lawful
targets consistent with the principle of proportionality, the enemy may exploit
civilian casualties resulting from their use of human shields. Therefore,
commanders should be prepared to provide information to counter enemy
misinformation.
b. Proportionality .
(1) The concept of proportionality requires that any application of combat
power against a lawful military target and any resulting damage to noncombatant
life and/or property not be disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated.
For example, under most circumstances leveling an entire city block to kill a single
sniper is disproportionate.
(2) The concept of proportionality as applied to the high population density
urban environment implies the need for weapons with precise and controllable
effects. Particularly in the urban environment, excessive weapons effects can result
in disproportionate civilian collateral damage.
5. Rules of Engagement
a. Background. Drafting and implementing ROE is a challenging but vital issue
when planning and executing urban operations. As in any operation, ROE must be
liberal enough to allow commanders operational flexibility while ensuring friendly
forces stay within the mission’s legal, political, and operational boundaries.
Although tension exists between operational efficiency and necessary constraints in
all ROE, the close proximity and intermingling of civilian persons and objects in the
urban combat environment greatly magnifies this tension. When drafting air ROE,
this problem is even more acute. Careful consideration must be given to weapon
system capabilities and C3 assets when crafting air ROE for the urban
environment. The degree of positive control of air assets and surety of target
identification that is both desirable and possible must be carefully considered.
b. Developing ROE. During planning, ROE must be carefully drafted and
thoroughly reviewed in the context of scenarios likely to be encountered by friendly
forces — “chair flying” and “what-iffing” is essential at this time. Operational
planners should seek guidance and advice from legal and civil affairs (CA) personnel
to ensure proposed ROE are consistent with LOW/LOAC, national directives, and
the mission’s political mandate. During deployment and execution, commanders
must continually evaluate the ROE and make recommendations for modifications as
required by mission exigencies. The ROE must be practical, realistic, enforceable,
flexible, and clearly stated. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) standing
ROE (SROE) found in CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121. 01A, and other applicable
theater ROE must be analyzed and incorporated during planning.
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c. ROE Guidance. LOW/LOAC and the SROE provide authoritative guidance
when drafting operation-specific ROE. With SROE, a system is in place to ensure
authoritative ROE guidance at all times, and to develop mission specific rules.
Units must ensure that the ROE are available and conduct periodic ROE training.
d. Publish and disseminate ROE to all levels. Commanders must ensure
training facilitates a thorough understanding of the ROE by all members of the
force. When the ROE changes, there must be a system established to ensure the
changes are disseminated and implemented. Mission rehearsals should include
ROE exercises during which individuals apply the ROE in realistic situations.
Remember, failure to comply with ROE is punishable under the uniform code of
military justice (UCMJ) and may in extreme instances constitute a war crime, so
commanders have a moral obligation to ensure all their personnel are thoroughly
familiar with mission ROE.
6. Collateral Damage
Collateral damage is the unavoidable or unplanned damage to civilian
personnel or property resulting from an attack on a military target. An important
fact to keep in mind is that civilian collateral damage is not illegal under LOW/
LOAC; excessive civilian collateral damage is. Generally, the incidental loss of
civilian life or damage to civilian property must not be excessive relative to expected
military damage to be gained from the attack. This is the concept of proportionality
in military attacks. During urban operations, civilian collateral damage may be
significant, and the goal should be to minimize collateral damage and the inherent
risk to non-combatants to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances. The
risk to non-combatants can be mitigated by:
a. appropriate weapon selection,
b. carefully drafted ROE,
c. positive tactical control of offensive air assets, thorough training in urban
tactics,
d. moving non-combatants to a safer location whenever possible.
7. Fratricide Prevention
a. Background. Fratricide is the employment of friendly weapons and
munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities,
which results in unforeseen and unintentional deaths or injury to friendly
personnel. Fratricide prevention is a matter of concern in all operations. In
urban operations, the characteristics of the terrain create an environment posing
additional challenges. The challenge is minimizing fratricide without
unreasonably restricting the friendly force’s ability to accomplish the mission.
Reducing fratricide requires accurate information pertaining to the location of
friendly, neutral, and hostile personnel. This is facilitated through our training,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), C3, and sensor employment.
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b. Fratricide Potential. Urban terrain increases the potential for fratricide
because of the likelihood of close quarters, location and identification (ID)
problems, and unintentional secondary weapons effects. During operations in
Panama City in Operation JUST CAUSE, infantry units operating in limited
visibility participated in a coordinated attack with aviation assets. Smoke
resulting from preparatory fires began to obscure much of the area.
Consequently, the fire control officer of an AC- 130 aircraft switched from the low-
light level television (LLLTV) to the infrared (IR) sensor. This improved the
gunship’s acquisition capability, but the gated laser intensifier (GLINT) tape on
friendly forces was not visible in the thermal sensor. In the course of orbiting the
objective, the gunner’s orientation of the perimeter became confused. Without
the confirmation of the GLINT tape, he acquired a friendly vehicle outside the
position and reported it inside the position. In accordance with the fire support
coordination measures, the gunship was cleared to engage. Mistaking the
friendly fire for enemy mortar fire, the ground unit suffered several casualties
before transmitting the appropriate alarm. In many ways, this incident
reinforces the need for thoroughly planned and executed ROE in an urban
environment to prevent fratricide.
c. Recognizing Friendly Forces. Aviation units must know the locations of
friendly ground forces. In Operation JUST CAUSE, units providing fire support
were informed that another unit had cleared a building to the second floor. In fact,
the unit had cleared to the tenth floor and was still conducting operations in the
building. Supporting units, observing fire and protruding weapons began
suppressive fires. This drew return fire from the friendly unit in the building for
several seconds. All units must have standardized, clearly understood procedures
for marking cleared rooms, floors, and buildings in an urban area. These procedures
must be practiced and discernible even in periods of limited visibility so friendly
aviation units will recognize them.
8. Training Considerations
a. Background. Aviation missions cross the spectrum of operations. Even a
benign environment, such as disaster relief or civilian assistance requires focused
training to minimize mission risks. Baseline training requirements must address
navigating on urban terrain. It must also address locating and evaluating drop
zones (DZ), locating and evaluating landing zones/pickup zones (LZ/PZ), and safely
negotiating manmade obstacles during a confined area takeoff, or landing.
b. Training Programs. Frequent, realistic training is required to overcome the
difficulties associated with aviation urban operations. This environment requires
achieving and maintaining a high degree of aircrew proficiency. The following areas
should be included in unit training programs:
(1) centralized control, decentralized execution,
(2) application of ROE,
(3) low level flight and navigation,
1-10
(4) night operations,
(5) and live fire training exercises focused on target ID, terminal control, and
fratricide prevention.
c. Video and simulation. These aids can enhance planning. Available sources
and types of video simulation vary. Video footage may augment information
regarding hazards, lighting, and human intelligence (HUMINT). The capability to
“fly” a route in planning and/or rehearsal with a video or computer simulation
provides advantages in mission planning and execution. Check with the military
installation or urban training facility manager to determine a site’s availability and
capability.
1-11
Chapter il
URBAN CHARACTERISTICS
1. Background
a. Urban Characteristics. The phrases “urban terrain”, “urban areas”, and
“built-up areas”, refer to concentrations of manmade structures and associated
population that alter the natural landscape. The characteristics of the urban
environment are important to identify because they influence operations. Aircrew
and mission planners must establish order and purpose from the apparent chaos of
an urban area. These areas range from old to new, large to small, and contain
populations from a few thousand to millions. Planners must make sense of this
environment for successful planning.
b. Common Characteristics. Understanding the common characteristics is
important to planning. These characteristics include size, patterns, population
density, structural density, and building construction. One of the most significant
characteristics affecting urban operations is the structural density - how close the
buildings are to each other. Generally, population density is directly proportional to
structural density except in cities where most of the people live in the suburbs or
outskirts. When planning urban operations, the general disposition and attitude of
the local population are integral to assessments regarding the population density.
As experienced in Somalia, crowds can gather quickly and may interfere with
operations.
2. Size
The following categories commonly are used for classifying the size of urban
areas.
a. Villages. Population less than 3,000.
b. Towns and small cities (not part of a major urban complex). Population 3,000
to 100,000.
c. Large cities with associated urban sprawl. Population 100,000 to the
millions. Covers hundreds of square kilometers.
d. Strip areas. Urban areas built along roads connecting towns or cities.
3. Patterns
a. Urban Patterns. Urban patterns reflect the nature of the surrounding terrain
and the relationships between different areas. Classifying urban areas into
patterns aids in navigation, route and LZ selection, and observation techniques.
The following patterns represent the common classification patterns.
11-1
(1) Hub. The hub effect refers to an urban area’s effect on maneuver. The
“hub” is the central built-up area and the main city around which outlying urban
areas are arrayed. The hub acts as an obstacle to surface maneuver within the
sector. See Figure II-l.
(2) Satellite. It is common to find smaller, dependent built-up areas around a
hub. This relationship between the primary urban area and its associated smaller
towns or villages is referred to as a satellite pattern. Lines of communications
(LOCs) within a satellite pattern converge on the hub. See Figure II-2.
(3) Network. Network patterns are complex arrays based on the basic satel¬
lite pattern. They consist of interlocking primary hubs and subordinate satellites.
LOCs within a network are more extensive than those in a simple satellite pattern
and may exhibit a rectangular, rather than convergent pattern. See Figure II-3.
11-2
(4) Linear. Built-up areas often follow a linear feature or LOC. These built-
up areas are commonly found along interconnecting LOCs within a satellite or
network pattern. Buildings extending along major and urban strips or along the
banks of a river or along a coastline are also examples of linear patterns. See Figure
II-4.
□□□□□DD~aD pl — '
Figure 11-4. Linear
(5) Segment or Pie Slice. When an urban pattern is divided by a dominant
natural or manmade terrain feature, it creates a segmented pattern. Rivers, canals,
major roadways, or railways can create a division of the urban area or pattern. If
these features converge within the hub or urban pattern, it can create multiple
segments or “pie slice” characteristics. See Figure II-5.
Figure 11-5. Segment/Pie Slice
b. Street Patterns. Another common set of patterns in urban areas is street
patterns. Streets vary in pattern and in width. Outside the US, street widths vary
from 7 to 15 meters while boulevards range from 25 to 50 meters. In the US, street
widths normally range from 15 to 25 meters. The following represent common
street classifications.
(1) Rectangular. Streets are grid-like in pattern, with parallel streets
intersected by perpendicular streets. See Figure II- 6.
Figure 11-6. Rectangular
11-3
(2) Radial. Primary thoroughfares radiate out from a central point. These
streets may extend outward 360 degrees around the central point or within an arc
from a point along a natural barrier, such as a coastline. See Figure II-7.
(3) Concentric. A pattern of successively larger loops or rings with a common
center point. This street pattern is found in conjunction with larger radial patterns.
See Figure II-8.
(4) Contour Conforming. Pronounced terrain relief influences construction of
roadways along lines of elevation. Primary streets run parallel to the ground
contour with intersecting roads connecting them. See Figure II-9.
Figure 11-9 Contour Conforming
(5) Irregular. Little or no discernible pattern resulting from unplanned
expansion and modernization of population centers. Older European cities
frequently contain an “old city” section, which characterizes this lack of pattern.
See Figure II- 10.
11-4
Figure 11-10. Irregular
(6) Planned Irregular. Street patterns that are specifically engineered
without geometric patterns for aesthetic or functional reasons. US subdivisions
with curving streets and numerous cul-de-sacs are examples. See Figure II- 11.
4. Characteristics
a. Background. The urban patterns have characteristics affecting military
operations. These characteristics can be classified as:
(1) city core,
(2) outlying high-rise,
(3) commercial ribbon,
(4) core periphery,
(5) residential sprawl,
(6) outlying industrial areas.
b. City Core and Outlying High-rise. In many cities, the core has undergone
more recent development than the core periphery. As a result, the two regions are
often quite different. Typical city cores consist of high-rise buildings, varying
greatly in height. Modern planning for built-up areas allows for more open spaces
between buildings than in old city cores or in the core peripheries. Outlying high-
rise areas are dominated by this open construction style more than city cores.
11-5
c. Commercial Ribbons. These areas are characterized by rows of stores,
shops, and restaurants built along both sides of major streets through built-up
areas. Usually, such streets are 25 meters wide or more. The buildings are
uniformly 2 to 3 stories tall, about one story taller than the dwellings on the
streets behind them.
d. Core Periphery. This area consists of streets 12 to 20 meters wide with
continuous fronts of brick or concrete buildings. The building heights are
uniform, 2 or 3 stories in small towns, 5 to 10 stories in large cities.
e. Residential Sprawl and Outlying Industrial. These areas consist of low
buildings that are 1 to 3 stories tall. Buildings are detached and arranged in
irregular patterns along the streets with many open areas.
5. Population Density
a. Background. The physical characteristics of an urban area influence its
population density. Population density is influenced by such urban features as
roadways, public transportation, utilities, and building construction. Other
factors that determine the population density include available land resources,
economic resources, and cultural characteristics.
b. Land Resources. Areas with little land available for human occupation
tend to be more densely populated. Geographical limitations such as mountains,
waterways, or islands also tend to concentrate population.
c. Economic Resources. Economics influence population density, even with
severe limitations on available land. A wealthier nation can build tall vertical
structures; thus overcoming a shortage of land.
d. Cultural Characteristics. Another set of factors influencing population
density is the cultural and social traits of its people. These characteristics can
influence the number of civilians who choose to remain in the area, affecting the
population density. If a large number of civilians leave the urban center and
decrease the population density, a great concern is refugee control. If a large
number of civilians remain, then the greater concern is civilian collateral damage.
6. Structural Density
a. Background. Structural density is proportional to the population density.
While the following categories refer primarily to the spatial relationships
between structures, the titles imply the function of an area. Building
construction is assessed using these categories during the joint intelligence
preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process. See Appendix B for details.
Remember that the specific type of structural density can be used for a quick
direction reference, which aids situational awareness.
b. Dense, Random Construction (Type A). This type of construction is found
in lesser-developed and nondeveloping nations. Close groupings of older
11-6
buildings are found in the center of villages, towns, and cities. A high density of
close or adjoining structures along narrow streets characterizes the oldest
sections of many cities. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, with its narrow twisting roads, is
good example of this construction type. A variety of construction types and
materials may be present with little or no setback of structures from the street
itself. In the downtown areas, buildings are often connected to each other,
making ID of specific target sites extremely difficult. This construction type
considerably limits LOS and fields of fire. Navigation is difficult and aircrews can
become disoriented quickly without easily discernable references. See Figure II-
12.
Figure 11-12. Type “A”
c. Closed-Orderly Block Construction (Type B). Type B characterizes
medium-size towns and large cities like Las Vegas, Nevada. These areas consist
of residential and commercial buildings that often form continuous street fronts.
Inner courtyards may be-contained within the block structure. See Figure 11-13.
Type B construction typically consists of residential and commercial buildings,
small factories, and wider roads. The average street width is 26 meters allowing
greater vehicle movement and possible low hover operations. This allows better
fields of view and longer LOS distances. Distinct building types make identifying
the objective area easier than in a dense random type of development but locating
friendly forces remains difficult.
Figure 11-13. Type “B”
11-7
d. Residential Area Construction (Type C). Type C areas are often contiguous
to Type B areas. Residential areas are normally located on the outskirts of cities
and can pose several problems for aircrews. Residential areas normally consist of
rowhouses or single dwellings with yards, trees, gardens, and fences. The street
widths average 14 meters, with building setback distances of 6-8 meters. This
provides an effective street width or visibility corridor of up to 30 meters. Older
European or colonial urban residential areas may have more narrow streets and
little or no setback of the dwellings. See Figure 11-14. Closely spaced houses and
narrow roads may limit the availability of a suitable LZ. Suburban areas may be
obstacle rich environments. Power poles, wires, and communications towers are
generally numerous. Cultural lighting may affect the performance of some night
vision devices (NVD). Dense concentration of buildings and civilians in these areas
may significantly hamper ability to visually or electronically acquire and track
ground forces. LOS communications for aviation assets should not be affected since
structures tend to be limited to 1 and 2 stories.
Figure 11-14. Type “C”
e. High-Rise Area Construction (Type D). Type D construction is found in
medium-size and large city residential developments and business parks. High-rise
cities such as Houston, Texas and Ankara, Turkey are examples. These cities
contain multi-story apartment or office buildings separated by large open areas such
as parking lots, parks, and individual one-story buildings. See Figure 11-15. High-
rise cities tend to have a stereotypical downtown area with an elevated skyline and
development. These multi- storied buildings offer many challenges to the aircrew.
These large, significant terrain features may simplify navigation, but tall buildings
and narrow roads severely limit the ability to fly between buildings. Large open
areas for LZs or DZs, such as parks and parking lots, are often adjacent to these
buildings. If extremely steep ingress/approach and egress/departure angles are
required for LZ/DZ access, utility may be limited. Open rooftops offer easy access to
insert ground teams and extract isolated personnel, but the very nature of these
multi-storied buildings may require out of ground effect hover or aircraft operating
near maximum power available limitations. Depending on weather conditions,
aircraft limitations may exclude this type of maneuver. The threat level coupled
11-8
with the ability to gain access to rooftops and their structural integrity will
influence their use. Enemy access to upper levels and rooftops may allow them to
fire down on aircraft and ground forces below.
Figure 11-15. Type “D”
f. Industrial/Transportation Construction (Type E). Type E areas are the
most open and dispersed types. Newer industrial or transportation areas are
generally located on or near the edge of towns and cities. They typically consist
of low, flat-roofed factory buildings, warehouses, and railway facilities. Industrial
buildings are large, functionally designed, and normally have large parking lots
or work yards suitable for LZ operations. See Figure 11-16. Aircraft can operate
more effectively due to the low building profiles, better LOS, and reliable
communications. There are some disadvantages to industrial areas. One concern
is heightened exposure to secondary explosions from ordnance. Another is the
flammable and explosive hazard normally found with petroleum, oil, and
lubricant tanks, refineries, and factories.
7. Building Construction
a. Background. The construction and types of buildings within an area further
define its characteristics. When looking at a city composition, planners should
analyze building types, construction materials and area density. Urban areas are
composed of two types of building composition, framed and mass. Knowing the
difference assists in determining the effectiveness of munitions and the cover offered
to personnel. In many industrialized nations with modern cities, most buildings are
framed. Examples of framed buildings are the residential home with 2 x 4 (or
larger) construction, numerous non load-bearing walls, and large windows.
Commercial offices and high rise buildings are generally framed with steel girders.
Mass buildings are built so exterior walls bear the weight of the structure. The
walls of mass structures are usually thick and constructed of masonry materials
such as stone, brick, or reinforced concrete. Approximately 62 percent of buildings
outside the US consist of mass construction technique. Mass structures provide
more protection for ground forces than framed buildings. For a more detailed
discussion on the link between weapons effects and the type of building
construction, reference the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM).
b. Construction Types. Individual building construction is analyzed during the
JIPB process. See Appendix B for more information. The definition of each type
emphasizes the construction and materials of the structure. A particular single
family dwelling, for example, may be more properly classified as Type 1, not Type 3
or 4. The following is a description of each type of construction:
(1) Wood and Timber Frame Construction (Type 1) (Framed Construction).
Type 1 buildings have wooden rafters and weak exterior walls, offering little
protection from fires. Farm buildings, older city dwellings and inexpensive
private storage buildings are examples. The fire hazard for Type 1 buildings is
high.
(2) Masonry Construction (Type 2) (Mass Construction). Type 2 buildings
have strong stone or brick walls, and are more suitable for defense than Type 1.
Older governmental or institutional buildings, such as courthouses and schools are
often Type 2 construction. The fire hazard for Type 2 buildings is low.
(3) One or Two-Family Dwelling (Type 3) (Mass Construction). Type 3
buildings have walls of solid or insulating brick or cinder blocks with ceilings of
reinforced concrete. They offer significant protection and require little
reinforcement. Type 3 buildings often contain strongly constructed basements and
are low fire hazards.
(4) Prefabricated One-Family Dwelling (Type 4) (Framed Construction). Type
4 buildings are pre-cast of light building materials and offer less protection and
greater fire hazard than Type 3 buildings. These buildings frequently contain
strongly constructed basements.
11-10
(5) Low-Rise Office Building (Type 5) (Framed Construction). Type 5
buildings have multi- story steel frame and reinforced concrete construction.
They are frequently characterized by large expanses of glass, offering little
protection from direct fire.
(6) High-rise office building (Type 6) (Framed Construction). Type 6
buildings are similar in construction and characteristics to Type 5 office
buildings, but consist of six or more stories.
(7) Low-Rise Apartment Building (Type 7) (Framed Construction). Type 6
buildings are similar in size to Type 5 office buildings, but with less glass and
with load-bearing reinforced concrete walls. They offer greater protection from
direct fire.
(8) High-rise apartment building (Type 8) (Framed Construction). Type 8
buildings are similar in construction and characteristics to Type 7 apartment
buildings, but consist of six or more stories.
(9) Industrial/Warehouse Complexes (Type 9) (Framed Construction). Type
9 building construction varies considerably, but is generally steel frame with
lightweight exterior walls. Reinforced concrete floors and ceilings are found in
multistory Type 9 buildings.
8. Features of Special Consideration
a. Coastal Features and Waterways.
(1) Background. All hydrography associated with urban terrain warrants
careful analysis. Water features represent possible mobility obstacles to surface
forces, and are a potential LOC. The presence of a coastline or major waterway is
often the reason that a population center came into existence in a particular
place.
(2) Port Facilities. Port facilities represent a focal point for commerce and
logistics. They hold strategic significance in many cases. Control of docks and
associated facilities accommodates large-scale transport functions into or out of a
city. Port seizures may be a primary objective for attacking forces.
(3) Rivers and Canals. Rivers and canals can divide urban areas and
represent significant physical obstacles to surface maneuver. Control of bridges
and crossing sites is critical to ground mobility and security of an urban area.
Major rivers are primary LOCs at a national level. Rivers can be used to
transport commodities, raw materials, and finished products. Similarly, military
logistics requirements can be supported by the use of rivers and canals. Aircrews
should minimize exposure time over major LOCs.
11-11
b. Airfields. Airfields and other landing sites are major urban commerce and
logistic centers. The flow of commercial and/or military traffic is vital to an
operation. The control of these areas and the airspace around them could be a
decisive factor in an operation. Airfields and improved landing areas such as
wide, multi-lane, straight highways can accommodate large-scale transport
aircraft. Size, load bearing capability, and aircraft parking areas figure greatly
into the value of an airfield. Seizure of an airfield is often a primary objective.
c. Subterranean Features.
(1) Background. Larger cities feature a variety of subterranean systems of
military significance. A complex network of tunnels and passageways may exist
below the surface. While not visible or directly influencing aviation operations,
subterranean features figure prominently into urban operations.
(2) Public Transport. Underground public transport systems, such as
subways, represent major LOCs within the urban environment. Tunnels
associated with these systems can accommodate vehicular traffic and large
numbers of troops.
(3) Passageways. Some cities contain sophisticated underground
pedestrian passageways and shopping “malls” in the central business district.
While generally not large enough to support vehicular traffic, these complexes
can be exploited for troop mobility and assembly, logistical operations, and C2.
Smaller utility passageways may be quite extensive and optimal for use as
infiltration routes by small forces.
(4) Waterways and Tunnels. Special operations forces (SOF), sappers,
terrorists, or partisans may use underground waterways or communications
tunnels. Storm sewers are generally large enough to allow troop movement. The
passageways, accessed generally through manholes, may be almost as extensive as
the street pattern. Sanitary sewers are usually much smaller, less accessible, and
less suitable for use by troops than are storm sewers.
d. Cultural Sites. Cultural and historical sites such as churches, museums,
and mausoleums, also are found routinely in urban areas. International law
provides special protections for many of these landmarks. These areas may be
designated in appropriate plans such as the airspace control plan. The areas may
be designated as a no fly area (NFA), restricted fire area, restricted operating
zone (ROZ), etc. Fire control measures for other areas such as medical treatment
facilities, water purification plants, nongovernmental organization (NGO)
operating locations, or other structures or areas may be designated.
11-12
Chapter III
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
1. Background
This chapter details the unique considerations of aviation urban operations.
Urban operations may include combat, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
humanitarian support in non-combat environments, as well as combinations of all
types. Regardless of the type of operation, detailed planning and a thorough JIPB
are required. See Appendix B.
2. Threat Considerations
a. Threat Analysis. Intelligence on the threat will be difficult to obtain and more
difficult to accurately update. Areas of control can change rapidly and may be
confusing. Planners must anticipate rapid changes in the threat and incomplete
information. Every building and structure in an urban area is a potential enemy
position. The presence of snipers, vulnerability to ambush, and difficulty in
distinguishing combatants from non-combatants places participants under
additional psychological stress.
b. Reconnaissance. Commanders must establish reconnaissance operations
early, using all available assets. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with data linked
video are useful assets. Manned aircraft with multiple reconnaissance systems such
as LLLTV, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), and NVDs can provide focused
concentration of specific areas. These visual systems, coupled with space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (ISR) assets, electronic
intelligence systems, voice interceptions, direction finding (DF) platforms networked
with ground-based systems, CA, SOF, and ground forces provide a picture of the
urban environment. HUMINT can provide information on threat intent and forces,
as well as information about city infrastructure and status. Gathering detailed
information during the planning phase of an aviation operation provides planners
and aircrew with information about threat positions, movements, routes, and
weapons.
c. Civilian Population. A defending enemy force normally has the advantage of
familiarity with the terrain. The civilian population of the area can play an active
role in the defense. Regardless of its activity, the larger the civilian population
remaining within the area, the more influences it has on military operations.
Enemy or friendly forces can have the support of the remaining people. Their
support provides significant intelligence, logistics, and security, as well as a
potential paramilitary capability.
d. Ground Threat. Urban operations often magnify the threat to aircraft. Light
to medium antiaircraft artillery (AAA) may be employed from ground sites, the tops
of buildings, in or near otherwise protected (attack prohibited by ROE, operational
planning, etc.,) structures, or mounted on civilian vehicles, thus providing aircrews
with a very complex threat picture. A man-portable air defense system
MI-1
(MANPADS), with its small size, light weight, rapid engagement capability, and
ease of concealment, is an excellent weapon for operating in close proximity to or on
top of buildings and other structures. Heavy AAA and surface-to-air missiles (SAM)
require open terrain due to radar or siting requirements. However, this does not
prevent their employment within urban boundaries. The obstructions and crowded
airspace of cities limit aircraft defensive maneuvering options, increasing the
effectiveness of AAA, MANPADS, and SAMs while at the same time providing
excellent opportunities for the establishment of ambush sites. Urban terrain
provides virtually unlimited concealment, thus complicating escort missions,
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and counter attack. Restricted orbits,
weapons employment, and rotary-wing landing approaches increase aircraft
vulnerability and limit defensive options. The terrain may also limit suppression
options. The cluttered environment (e.g., lights, fires, smoke, dust, etc.) makes
identification of missile launches or ground fire more difficult. Aircrews and
planners should also consider the effects of fixation and visual confusion. Missions
requiring landing operations must also consider ground threats such as artillery,
mortars, or snipers. Planners must expand their view of what constitutes a threat
to aviation operations in the urban environment.
3. Weather
a. Background. The aviation commander must establish minimum weather
requirements before conducting operations. Weather conditions affect the employment
of all aircraft and weapons systems. Adverse weather will hinder the employment of
UAVs, radar, FLIR, laser, optical systems, NVDs, and IR weapons.
b. Ceilings. Low ceilings affect all aviation assets, especially fixed-wing aircraft.
Low ceilings can obscure high rise rooftops, and other obstructions such as power
lines, towers, and smokestacks. Low ceilings can also deny fixed-wing aircraft the
required time and altitude to obtain a satisfactory ordnance delivery solution. The
presence of high rise buildings and low ceilings decreases the effective above ground
level (AGL) operating area. Low ceilings will also affect the performance of laser-
guided weapons. In addition, artificial lighting against a low overcast will highlight
aircraft flying under the overcast to ground observers.
c. Visibility. Smog buildup from industrial areas and vehicle exhausts also
reduce visibility. Smoke from fires and dust from damage and destruction may
reduce the visibility in otherwise clear conditions. Reduction in visibility can
significantly degrade the performance of weapons sensors and laser or optically
guided munitions.
d. Winds. In urban areas, the city structure affects wind patterns. Wind
patterns are “broken up” and tunneled down streets and alleys. While the wind may
be calm along one end of a block, it can be turbulent at another. City structure also
influences the location of turbulent areas. Therefore, predicting turbulent areas is
difficult. Turbulence affects aircraft performance and weapons delivery.
e. Temperatures. IR signatures are affected by the proximity of other buildings
and structures (for example, shadowing and winds). Times of thermal crossover
MI-2
occur when objects viewed through IR sensors may be indistinguishable due to their
temperature similarities with their backgrounds. Thermal crossover in urban areas
may be relatively insignificant due to shadowing effects of structures and the types
of materials (e.g., asphalt, concrete, etc.) making up the background. However,
when using a FLIR, aircrews must pay particular attention during this period.
Furthermore, during this period, thermal crossover is particularly sensitive to wind,
which can affect differences in target and background temperatures. Urban
temperatures are generally higher than those in rural areas and can be 10 to 20
degrees higher than the surrounding environment. High thermal contrast can
adversely affect thermal sight performance.
4. Command, Control, and Communications
a. Commander’s Intent. A clear understanding of the commander’s intent is an
imperative for all operations, facilitating initiative in harmony with the
commander’s desires. Through a mission type or operation order (OPORD), the
commander states his intent, allowing subordinates the initiative to achieve
objectives in whatever method the subordinate deems appropriate. In the complex
urban environment, maintaining communications can be difficult because of
interference caused by structures restricting LOS systems. This increases reliance
on decentralized execution. Detailed mission orders and briefings aid in conducting
operations.
b. C3 Planning. A detailed, flexible, and redundant C3 plan is essential. Aerial
or rooftop retransmission systems and the use of remote antennas may overcome
some of these problems. Airborne C3 support systems (e.g., airborne battlefield
command and control center (ABCCC), Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), joint surveillance target, attack, radar system (JSTARS), and joint
airborne communications center/command post (JACC/CP) equipped C-130/Cl41s)
may alleviate some of these difficulties. Another option is an appropriately
equipped UH-60 or UH-1 helicopter. Each of these platforms has inherent
capabilities and weaknesses that may make them more or less desirable for
operations in urban environments. Reference system publications and joint
planning publications for more detailed information on capabilities.
c. Air Asset Control. Although all air assets should remain under positive
control to the greatest extent possible, procedural control measures may be required
for air operations in the objective area. This is especially true in situations where
airborne C3 assets are unavailable or unable to communicate due to interference.
Visual signaling may also be affected by vertical development in urban areas.
Normal urban clutter makes it harder to differentiate these signals from their
background.
d. Common Frequency. A common frequency for all units facilitates rapid
transfer and understanding of information. Specific information concerning multi-
Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for air-to-air, air-to- surface, and
surface-to-air brevity codes is found in Service manuals, Field Manual (FM) 90-38,
Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-25B, Naval Warfare Publication
(NWP) 6-02.1, and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Interservice)
MI-3
(AFTTP(I)) 3-2.5. The issue of common frequency use, particularly for encrypted
transmission, can be greatly complicated in multinational operations. Planners
should consider this issue and develop methods for in-the-clear communications if
necessary.
5. Airspace Control
a. Compressed Airspace. Compressed airspace and a unique three-dimensional
environment characterize aviation urban operations. These factors increase
planning and execution problems, especially when in close proximity to friendly
forces and non-combatants. The compressed urban airspace brings separate and
diverse missions into close proximity. For example, an airdrop of supplies could be
performed simultaneously with CAS missions protecting the unit being supplied.
Knowledge of other missions tasked for the same area is vital to avoid interference.
b. Control Measures. Develop positive and procedural control measures for
specific airspace. This will assist in eliminating mission conflicts. These measures
must also consider ongoing host nation (HN) or foreign military airspace
requirements. A useful method of implementing positive control is execution of a
joint air tasking order (ATO) through the Theater Air Ground System (TAGS). The
joint ATO assures deconfliction and synchronization of aviation assets.
Multinational air assets may also be included in the joint ATO. A combination of
positive and procedural control measures may be appropriate because of the
potential for high volumes of air traffic over urban areas. For example, establishing
a ROZ or high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) over the area of operations is
one means to facilitate the simultaneous employment of aerial platforms.
Heightened awareness of support missions operating in and throughout the general
area must be maintained. Detailed information concerning multi-Service
procedures for integrated combat airspace command and control (ICAC2) is provided
in Service manuals, FM 100-103-1, MCRP 5-61, NWP 3-52.1, and AFTTP(I) 3-2.16.
6. Air-to-Ground Coordination
Air-to-ground coordination is improved using overlays and pictures. Figure
III- 1 depicts an example of a ground unit’s control measures. The sketch numbers
major structures and labels building corners (A-D) providing a legend to identify
each building. Establishing objectives and phase lines assists in understanding the
ground scheme of maneuver and is one method to integrate both air and ground
operations. Specific information concerning multi-Service procedures for a TAGS is
provided in Service manuals, FM 100-103-2, MCWP 3-25.2, NWP 3-56.2, and
AFTTP(I) 3-2.17.
7. Maps and Charts — Selection and Preparation
a. General Considerations. Consider all types of geospatial products ranging
from paper maps and charts to digital mapping databases including commercial as
well as government products. Maps with a larger scale than 1:50,000 (i.e., 1:24,000
or 1:12,500) provide greater detail for urban mission planning and execution.
Numerous large-scale maps exist to assist aircrews.
MI-4
LEGEND
51 Factory
52 Warehouse
53 Private Home
54 Town House
55 Private Home
56 Church
57 Municipal Building
58 Power Station
59 Private Home
60 Town House
61 Radio Station
62 School
63 Private Home
64 Private Home
65 Bank ■ Generator/Box
66 Vet Clinic
67 Office Building " " Fence
68 Gas Station
69 Post Office
70 City Hall
71 Water Tower
72 health Clinic
73 Private Home
74 Hotel
75 store
76 Fire Station
77 Police Station
Figure MI-1. Ground Unit Control Measures
b. Government Products. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
produces 1:12,500 scale maps for specific urban areas as specified by the customer.
A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) intelligence support handbook (NISH)
is also available for every American Embassy (classified SECRET). The NISH is
intended to augment the planning for NEO or hostage recovery operations and
MI-5
contains information such as pre-surveyed LZ listings. Planners must consider
currency of terrain information during planning.
c. Civilian Maps. Commercially available civilian or tourist maps may show
greater and more current urban detail than military maps. While street maps and
tourist maps do not normally show terrain, they often provide useful information on
current street and bridge locations, street names, shapes of prominent buildings,
and cultural features. Civilian maps usually have a reference grid overlay that, if
available in sufficient quantities, may be useful as a supplemental terrain reference
during urban operations. However, these maps do not come marked with the
Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) or universal transverse mercator (UTM)
references. Although marked with a common reference grid, commercial maps or
charts should not be used as a reference for employing munitions. Ensure all units
disseminate any approved non-standard reference systems to enable proper target
ID and fratricide prevention.
WARNING: Check the reference system used to prepare a map or chart (i.e.,
World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84), Tokyo Special, etc.). Different datum
can cause significant confusion and errors.
d. Geospatial Products. Units must maintain accurate geospatial products for
their operational area and continuously update them as new features and hazards
are identified. This is a shared responsibility for aircrews, intelligence personnel,
and operations sections. For example, the intelligence staff, as part of the JIPB
process, should conduct initial preparation of the maps and charts since intelligence
sources may be the only source of hazard information before mission execution.
Other sources of hazards include the airspace authority that publishes known flight
hazards, such as the notice to airmen. Detailed analysis of flight hazards during
mission planning is critical to safe flight operations in urban terrain. Many hazards
may be unlit and difficult to discern amongst the bright ground lights. Several
types of flight hazards exist:
(1) Physical Hazards. The majority of physical hazards within an urban area
are manmade. These include antennas, wires, power lines, Tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile wires, and other obstructions.
(2) Environmental Hazards. Environmental hazards include meteorological
effects, extremes in artificial illumination, and unpredictable wind effects.
(3) Natural Hazards. Natural hazards include tall trees, and areas of high
bird concentration.
(4) Air Traffic Hazards. The high volume of air traffic over and within urban
areas is another significant hazard.
(5) Other Hazards. Other hazards include high intensity radio transmission
areas. All known radio emitters should be assessed for potentially adverse effects
on aircraft systems.
MI-6
8. Route Planning and Navigation
a. Planning Factors. Appropriate flight profile and route selection are perhaps
the most difficult planning factors. A dynamic flight profile offers the best
survivability and responsiveness. Aircrews should base their flight profile on
traditional factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, and time available. Special consideration must be given to the unique
characteristics of urban terrain. Plan appropriate routes and altitudes to consider
known threats and exploit environmental factors such as wind direction, moon angle
and azimuth, and urban noise.
b. Navigation Techniques. In an urban environment, a small navigational error
(i.e., a couple of city blocks) can rapidly evolve into disorientation. Although natural
land features (rivers, lakes, etc.) are preferable landmarks, they may not be useable
during various flight profiles. Manmade features may provide the majority of
available navigation aids. If possible, pick large recognizable features for
navigation. Examples include cemeteries, stadiums, cathedrals, and major roads.
Linear features, such as major highways, rivers, railways, canals, and coastlines
provide easily recognizable boundaries and references to assist aircrews in
maintaining orientation. Prominent rail and highway interchanges are useful as en
route checkpoints. However, remember that in enemy-held areas, these same
prominent features might be protected by anti-air weapon systems. As aircrews
become more familiar with the operational area, more use is made of local
landmarks during flight.
c. Enhancing Survivability. Low-level flight techniques, adapted for urban
terrain, may be employed to enhance survivability. Remaining unseen visually and
electronically is the most effective method of preventing an engagement by hostile
forces. Obviously, if there is no tactical reason to operate in low profiles (i.e.,
disaster assistance operations), higher profiles are more suitable and safer. “High”
versus “low” is matter of carefully weighing the factors, making an informed
decision, and remaining flexible if the situation dictates a profile change. The
navigation techniques employed and the use of night systems will factor greatly into
the degree of risk and effectiveness of a particular profile. Distilled to its most basic
elements, the issue is this: “do aircrews want brief exposure to hostile weapons at
close range, or continuous enemy observation and exposure to weapons at extended
slant range?”
d. Route Planning. A network route structure of air control points (ACP) and
routes (preferably surveyed) may be used to facilitate route planning, navigation
and C3. See Figure III-2. ACPs are especially useful for aircraft navigation systems
that require visual updates. Different sequences of ACPs appropriate to the mission
may be assigned code words to facilitate operational security, control, and route
changes in flight. For example, “Broadway” may be a route with ACP sequence 2, 7,
and 8; “Wall Street,” ACPs 1, 6, and 3; “Bourbon”, ACPs 4, and 9; etc. Before ever
being used in a tactical environment, a clearly defined initial point (IP) should be
verified by aircrews of high performance aircraft to ensure that both IP data and
aircraft systems are correct and reliable. Offset aimpoints may also facilitate target
ID. The location of these points should be published in all applicable plans and
Figure MI-2. Network Route Structure
orders. In situations where enemy forces are present, great care must be taken to
avoid predictability of routes. Whenever possible, plan to use routes, battle
positions, attack by fire positions, airspace coordination areas (ACA), holding areas,
and orbits over friendly held terrain that do not expose aircraft to threats. Terrain
and congested airspace may force repeated use of ACPs, LZs and flight profiles. The
habitual flying of routes from one obvious feature to the next, or along LOCs, is
strongly discouraged in the presence of enemy forces or potentially hostile civilians.
Avoid predictability of flight routing in all but the most benign of operational
environments. Track the frequency that each ACP is used to better control route
over-use. Route names and “call signs” should not be re-used repetitively with the
same ACP sequence. Flight profiles must take into consideration small arms, AAA,
MANPAD, and SAM weapon ranges and communications.
MI-8
e. Effective Navigation. Navigation over urban terrain can be more difficult
than over natural terrain due to an over-abundance of cues. Navigation is also more
difficult for rotary-wing aircraft because most maps do not show the vertical
development of urban terrain. The high density of structures, variety of
geographical references, and high light levels can create “visual saturation.” Rapid
displacement from position to position can sometimes create confusion between
aerial and ground observers as to cardinal directions or locations. Familiarity with
the characteristics of urban terrain allows aircrews to discern key features in this
environment. Navigational aids, such as the global positioning system (GPS), have
reduced but not eliminated this problem. Effective navigation over large towns and
cities can require the use of a variety of navigational systems and techniques. The
use of GPS eases the problems associated with night navigation and orientation;
whereas, handheld laser pointers or designators ease the problems associated with
orientation and target ID. Aircrews must monitor their equipment closely and
crosscheck their position by all available means. Navigation systems may be
degraded due to interference induced by buildings. Aircrews should perform
detailed mission planning to maximize the effectiveness of all available assets.
9. Night Vision Devices
a. Considerations. When planning for and employing NVDs, aircrews must pay
careful attention to the color, location, and intensity of urban lights, in addition to
the moon angle and lunar illumination along the flight route and in the objective
area. Night imagery of the area is an important tool for effective analysis and
mission planning. To determine when and where to use NVD, image intensifiers, or
IR sensors, a detailed analysis of the area is necessary. Aircrews should prepare to
make frequent and rapid transitions from aided to unaided flight during urban
flights.
b. Characteristics. Night vision goggles (NVG), and FLIR/Integrated Display
System (IDS) are affected by the composition and surface conditions of urban
terrain. A rural battlefield has a somewhat homogeneous composition where man¬
made objects contrast sharply. However, in an environment that consists primarily
of manmade objects there is very little consistency in the thermal/visual scene.
High light levels in urban areas create special problems. The volume and irregular
patterns of ground lights in urban areas affect NVG operations. The FLIR/IDS is an
excellent identification aid for terrain features and hazards in brightly-lighted night
urban environments as it is not susceptible to blooming effects from overt lighting
as are NVG. Brightly lit cities can be navigated without NVDs, but discerning
detail in darkened areas or shadows requires using image intensifiers or IR sensors.
Relatively dark areas, such as large city parks, are readily identified and make good
navigation references at night. Cultural lighting will often washout NVG,
decreasing their effectiveness.
c. Environmental Concerns.
(1) Lighting Condition. Operations conducted during twilight, dawn, or dusk
may present problems. The rapid changes in the illumination during these periods
and the inability of the eyes to quickly adjust make it difficult for aircrews to
MI-9
observe terrain features and see other aircraft. FLIR devices are not affected by
artificial light and are generally effective navigation and targeting systems during
this period. However, they are subject to being overpowered by intense heat sources
within their field of view. Very hot areas, such as factory smoke stacks or fires,
make the details of objects with lower thermal contrast difficult to discern. Hostile
forces may attempt to degrade the effectiveness of thermal systems by lighting
bonfires, buildings, cars, tires, etc. in the area of operations. If a supported ground
unit is using laser pointers, aircrews using FLIR will not be able to detect the spot.
The laser pointer is detectable with NVG.
(2) Thermal Clutter. FLIR/IDS thermal clutter occurs when there are a
number of objects in the sensor’s field of view with approximately the same thermal
signature. These objects can be “cool”, leading to an overall dark image, or “hot”
enough to result in an image saturated with bright spots. Overlapping hot spots
results in overall reduced image quality. Using the gain and/or polarity functions
can enhance FLIR/IDS imagery enough to highlight cultural features. Smoke from
a smoke grenade and/or burning diesel fuel will not affect the FLIR/IDSs
performance. A good rule of thumb is that if you can detect a target with a FLIR/
IDS and consistently employ the laser ranging and designation functions, then you
can most likely designate and lase the target satisfactorily for a laser-guided
weapon. Generally all buildings will be seen and recognizable on the FLIR/IDS.
Building roofs will present a different signature from walls due to the material
emissivity, and this may act as another cue aiding target acquisition. If aircraft are
forced to operate below 200’ AGL, then the low slant angle will make building
acquisition difficult and personnel/vehicle target acquisition more difficult. Slight
variations in construction material for either roads or structures can alter the image
enough to inhibit target acquisition and tracking. For example, while the terminal
guidance controller may see an NVG image of two contrasting materials around a
target, the aircrews using a FLIR/IDS may not see the same contrast due to the
differences in temperature and emissivity. Furthermore, airspeed and altitude can
have the same affect.
(3) Thermal Reflection. Thermal reflections can produce odd signatures,
making target ID difficult. Smooth or glassy surfaces such as windshields,
unpainted metal surfaces, or water are examples of thermal reflectors. They can
reflect IR radiation images, like a mirror, of other nearby sources. They can appear
very dark because they reflect the low radiant temperatures from the night sky.
Most buildings constructed from concrete or brick will have high thermal mass,
meaning their rate of temperature gain will be slow during the day (until noontime)
and rate of loss will be slow during the night. Urban structures viewed mid-day can
be distinctly different from a late afternoon view after having been heated
throughout the day; structures of plywood or aluminum lose heat quickly and
provide high thermal contrast with backgrounds that cool more slowly. As late
afternoon approaches, heat dissipates quickly. In the morning, objects facing the
sunrise will heat more quickly, appearing hotter than objects that face away from
sunrise. Air conditioning or heating units on buildings can produce localized hot
spots. Windows will appear very dark when reflecting the night sky temperature.
However in a combat zone, as was seen in Bosnia, many building windows may be
broken out.
111-10
(4) Smoke/Fog. FLIR/IDS visibility through fog or smoke is very good.
However, smoke from burning phosphorous or flares significantly hinder thermal
transmission. The atmosphere can attenuate transmission of IR energy through
refraction, absorption or scattering. High water vapor concentrations, which occur
at high humidity, are responsible for the majority of IR absorption. Urban areas can
have significant concentrations of carbon dioxide, which is also an IR absorber, can
potentially degrade FLIR/IDS performance. In practice, carbon dioxide absorption
does not usually impact FLIR performance.
10. Rotary-Wing Operations
a. Background. A typical rotary-wing urban flight profile consists of modified
low-level and contour techniques. Aircrews must evaluate obstacles, ambient light
levels, and available navigation cues as well as types and locations of threat sources
to determine the optimum altitude and airspeed. Maintaining higher airspeeds can
minimize exposure time. To limit exposure to antiaircraft weapons, the preferred
method of ingress and egress is a low, swift flight profile. However, slower flight
speeds may be necessary to allow enough time to precisely identify and navigate to
the objective area. Avoid true nap-of-the-earth flight as it exposes the aircraft to a
greater potential for engagements. Slow speeds coupled with low altitudes can put
the aircraft and aircrews at greater ground threat risk (small arms, rocket-propelled
grenades, etc.). A low density of structures or extensive enemy use of high rooftops
diminishes the masking advantages of low flight profiles. To buffer obstacle and
hazard clearance, a higher flight altitude (300 to 500 feet AGL) over a city, day or
night may be necessary. However, flight at higher en route altitudes exposes the
aircraft to observation as it approaches the objective and makes it far more
vulnerable to engagement during the descent for landing. This exposes aircraft to
shoulder-launched or radar-guided SAM threats. However, the trade-off provides a
better margin of safety from the hazards of unlit towers, cranes, and power-lines
that blend into the urban landscape and are more difficult to detect.
b. Flight Profile. Areas of consideration when determining flight profiles
include:
(1) The mission requirements.
(2) The hazards to flight.
(3) The integrated air defense system (IADS) in use by adversary forces.
(4) The small arms threat.
(5) The terrain relief and building height in and around the area.
(6) The density of structures.
(7) The accessibility/security of high, dominant rooftops.
(8) The dominant natural terrain around the urban area.
111-11
(9) The SAM threat.
c. Multi-ship Operations. Multi-ship rotary-wing operations are challenging
and can require application of unique formation techniques, especially when
operating with NVDs. To prevent the loss of visual contact with other aircraft
among ground lights, a non-traditional vertical “stack-down” formation positioning
may be required. Planning must include formation break-up and rendezvous
procedures if visual contact is lost within the flight or evasive maneuvering is
executed. When multiple aircraft are operating together, consider greater formation
spacing to facilitate more flexible maneuvering while still providing mutual support.
A wingman flying in a vertical “stack down” position from the preceding helicopter
will not have the flexibility of maneuver normally enjoyed in the traditional vertical
“stack up” position. Maintain a position that compensates for the illumination
pollution, but avoids jeopardizing the aircraft by greater exposure to obstacle
hazards or increased formation collision potential.
WARNING: If stacking down, pay strict attention to disk spacing and have a
pre-briefed formation break-up plan. Formation break-up from a stack-low
position is more dangerous than from a stack-high position.
d. Aircraft Lighting. For both day and night operations, Aircrew should
experiment with aircraft external lighting to best accommodate the mission,
otherwise follow standing operating procedures (SOP). If overt external lighting is
mandated, use the flash position to better distinguish aircraft from static light
sources. In brightly-lighted areas, covert lights may not be visible. Aircrew should
weigh mission lighting needs against the possibility of visual detection by the
enemy. During Operation JUST CAUSE, reflective tape was placed on all friendly
aircraft to assist in identification during ingress and egress. Bright ambient
illumination can be favorable at times. During Operation EASTERN EXIT, the
1991 NEO operations in Somalia, evacuees commented that in the darkened landing
zone, they could hear the helicopters but did not see them until they were already on
the ground.
11. Fixed-Wing Operations
a. AC- 130 Gunship Operations. Due to AC- 130 characteristics and their
requirement to fly under the protection of darkness in higher threat environments,
special consideration must be given to the threat. Commanders and planners must
consider the threat determined in the JIPB process before tasking the AC- 130
because its effectiveness in interdiction or ground support missions could be limited
by a number of factors unique to the urban environment. Using a wide range of
altitude and orbit patterns, the AC- 130 is a versatile platform and can perform
missions ranging from C3 to CAS. If employed correctly, the AC- 130 can provide
commanders with excellent situational awareness. The AC-130H and the AC-130U
currently employed generally operate in the same manner but have some
differences. The AC-130U is all weather capable for interdiction and can predict
impact points of fired ordnance. Reconnaissance in instrument meteorological
conditions is degraded due to the ability to detect only radar significant targets (i.e.,
111-12
buildings, LOCs, vehicles, etc.), but not enemy personnel. In visual meteorological
conditions, both the “H” model and the “U” model are effective. While in the
weather, use of radar beacons along with a target reference points (TRP), grid,
UTM, or latitude/longitude are highly desirable to identify friendly positions and
initiate calls for fire. During night operations, the AC- 130 can provide excellent
covert illumination with its IR spotlight.
b. Fighter/Attack Operations (AV-8, A-10, F-16, F/A-18, etc.). Missions involving
these aircraft take into consideration en route threat status, weather, and airspace
restrictions in much the same manner as missions in non-urban environments. If
friendly ground forces or non-combatants are a factor, aircrews will conduct the
mission as a CAS mission. If friendly ground forces or non-combatants are not a
factor, then it may be conducted as a strike mission. For example, this method was
used during operations in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. Once in the target area,
terminal procedures are governed by target area threats, location of friendly forces
or civilians, onboard sensor and weapon availability, and specific target geometry.
For example, in a low threat environment status, aircraft can orbit the objective
overhead for target acquisition in support of the ground element. As the threat level
increases, aircrew may elect to offset from the threat while keeping sensors on the
target area. They may also choose to climb or employ contact point to IP ingress
tactics.
c. Airlift Operations. Airlift missions, in general, can be broadly categorized as
either airland or airdrop. By far, the vast majority of airlift missions are airland.
Consequently, since most airfields are in or near cities, most airlift missions will
involve some planning for urban environments. Airdrop missions may be conducted
in conjunction with humanitarian and disaster-relief efforts and often will be
performed in or near urban environments. Direct airdrop support of ground forces
operating in urban areas, while relatively rare, will require precise navigation and
considerable pre-mission planning/coordination. In the event of humanitarian or
disaster-relief missions, aircrews and planners may be required to coordinate with
numerous NGO relief agencies, many of which are unfamiliar with airlift and
military operations. Prior coordination and direct control of these personnel during
drop and on/off load operations will greatly aid in safe mission performance.
(1) En Route Operations. Basic planning considerations for en route portions
of both airland and airdrop missions in urban areas should be the same as for
operations in other environments. The nature of urban terrain, however, can limit
the flexibility of how these considerations are applied. For instance, formation
airdrop operations increase mass on target and shorten the time required to secure
drop zones. Urban areas, however, may not allow the use of large formations due to
confined airspace, obstacle altitudes, and the requirement for verbally initiated
release system (VIRS) drops. These limitations drive planners to the use of multiple
small formations or single ship operations. Likewise, the nature of urban threats
and the inability to positively secure airfields 24 hours a day can severely limit
route and altitude selection for airland missions. Humanitarian and disaster-relief
missions, as well as normal logistics support missions, can involve considerable
threat to aircrews due to political sensitivities and the possibility of terrorist
activities. The capability to use aircraft defensive systems over or near urban areas
111-13
for either airland or airdrop missions, particularly if those missions are considered
“non-combat” in nature, may need to be coordinated in advance.
(2) Airland. Approach and departure operations at urban airfields where
threats have been identified or are suspected cause planners significant problems.
Aircraft are most vulnerable during approach and departure due to their slow speed,
configuration, predictability, and lack of maneuverability. Close proximity of
buildings and LOCs to flight paths will require either the use of security measures
(e.g., helicopter or foot patrols of the area at random intervals) or specific aircraft
tactics (e.g., random steep or shallow approaches/departures) to lessen the
possibility of attack. These efforts will be less effective if structural density
increases near the airfield. Tactical approach selection must be based on threat,
terrain, obstacles, and the proximity of the airfield to significant urban features not
under the control of security forces. The use of overt aircraft external lighting
should be carefully considered when MANPADS threats are a possibility.
Coordination with air traffic control (ATC) and airfield defense forces is mandatory
to ensure safety and prevent fratricide. This may involve considerable coordination
with HN personnel. Aircrews should be aware that control of civilians on runways
has been a problem in past humanitarian operations. Vigilance during approaches
to minimally controlled airfields in urban areas must be practiced to ensure go-
arounds can be performed in the event civilians cross or enter runway areas.
(3) Airdrop. As with all airdrops, primary considerations for urban airdrop
missions will revolve around drop and escape procedures, locations and markings of
DZs, run-ins, IP selection, and aircraft/formation tactics. The unique aspects of
urban terrain and their effects on airdrop missions must be considered to ensure
success. The large numbers of visual cues found in urban terrain (e.g., buildings,
lights, vehicles, etc.) will complicate DZ marking and route visual turn point ID.
Positive radio contact with DZ personnel may be more difficult and take longer to
establish due to interference from structures/electronic sources. The possibility of
unapproved personnel on the DZ must be considered and additional no-drop
procedures should be coordinated. Be aware that DZ control personnel may offset
from the proposed DZ area to avoid giving away its position and, consequently,
enable civilians to “rush” the airdrop loads.
12. Airfields
a. Background. Many airfields are located in or near urban areas. Planning for
aviation urban operations should include an assessment of available airfield
facilities. Urban airfield operations are a challenge for forces tasked with operating
and securing them. The airfield location is known and easily identified. Aircraft
may be vulnerable during approach, landing, hover, and departure operations even
to low technology threat systems.
b. Airfield Operations. On the ground, aircraft are susceptible to surface-to-
surface threats such as artillery, mines, booby traps, mortars, rockets, missiles, and
weapons of mass destruction. Planners should also anticipate and include in their
assessment the presence of major roads and the proximity of urban structures and
111-14
industrial facilities in and around the airfield approach/departure routes. As a
minimum, consider the following when planning airfield operations:
(1) Arrival and departure routing and maneuver limitations,
(2) Size of useable runways (length/width/obstructions),
(3) Turnaround areas and the capability for emergency departure,
(4) Taxiways and obstructions to taxi routes,
(5) Aircraft and vehicle parking areas, on/offload sites, access to each,
(6) Ground access routes and securing them,
(7) Security of airfield buildings and the perimeter,
(8) Hazardous terrain, towers, buildings, wires, etc. near flight areas,
(9) Instrument/visual procedures,
(10) Terminal area threats,
(11) Weather,
(12) Base infrastructure and billeting for aerial port of debarkation personnel,
(13) Security of approach and departure corridors,
(14) Fuel and fuel transfer support.
13. Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ)
a. Background. Studying city composition, imagery, and maps provides a good
foundation for choosing HLZs. Updated imagery should be reviewed to accurately
assess HLZ size and hazards. If possible, imagery should be taken at the same time
of day that the HLZs are to be used. This allows analysis of illumination and
shadow conditions to be encountered during the actual mission. Ground photos can
provide valuable hazard information and terrain reference. Carefully examine HLZ/
PZ reports and diagrams from reconnaissance assets and make these available to all
participants. Annotate all images and diagrams with magnetic north and
navigation references.
b. Selection. Consider selecting an urban HLZ that is readily identifiable and
accessible. Most major cities have urban parks near the central business district
that may provide a suitable HLZ. Other potential HLZs include athletic stadiums,
parking lots, and rooftops. Alternate HLZs in the objective area and emergency
HLZs en route should be planned to the same degree of detail as primary HLZ.
Some structures can accommodate helicopters landing on the rooftop. In cases
111-15
where the load bearing capacity can be readily evaluated, (such as with existing
rooftop helipads or with the availability of building design data), rooftops constitute
viable HLZs. Some major cities have codes requiring rooftop helipads for buildings
taller than a certain number of stories. These pads may have the maximum weight
bearing capacity painted on the pad. The load bearing capacity of a rooftop cannot
be accurately determined by simple observation. Roof clutter, such as antennas,
lightning rods, and wires, can obstruct the landing area. Aircrews must also be
aware of the unpredictable wind and venturi effects associated with flight in close
proximity to very tall buildings, as well as out-of-ground-effect operating
requirements. These effects can require additional power during operations to and
from high rise rooftops.
c. Quality. HLZs, particularly those suitable for large multi-ship formations, are
often limited in urban terrain. A careful balance must be made between the limited
availability of suitable HLZs and exposure to observation, direct fire, or an ambush.
Consider whether the mission is conducted during daylight or darkness. Daylight
allows rapid ingress, egress, and facilitates navigation, but also allows for easier
observation and engagement by the enemy. Night or NVG missions offer improved
concealment and HLZ security, but require slower airspeeds and increase the
difficulty of navigation.
d. Tactical Considerations. The tactical considerations for HLZ/PZ selection,
including mission, location, and security, are exacerbated in urban terrain. If there
are more aircraft than a single HLZ can accommodate, select multiple HLZs in
proximity to the objective. Control measures must be adequate to deconflict the
movement of all elements. Formations of assault helicopters should be no larger
than will be able to land at the HLZ simultaneously. All secondary or alternate
HLZs should be at least the same size to prevent unnecessary exposure to aircraft
waiting to land. Give special consideration to the possibility that threats from
multistory buildings can be above the vertical fields of fire of the aircraft gunners.
e. Alternate Insertion/Extraction (AIE). Aircrews can use a variety of
techniques for AIEs onto rooftops. These methods include:
(1) remaining light on the landing gear after touchdown,
(2) hovering with a single skid or landing gear touching the structure,
(3) rappelling,
(4) fast rope,
(5) rope ladders,
(6) hoist operations.
If rooftop insertions are attempted, planners must consider enemy line of sight to
the rooftop and potential exposure of helicopters and troops to enemy fire while in
critical flight profiles. If more than one insertion/extr action element is required,
111-16
consider utilizing multiple insertion flight profiles to remain unpredictable and to
avoid objective area congestion. In general, fast ropes and hoist cables are
manufactured in fixed lengths. Planners must ensure that AIE equipment
requirements and availability are determined and that missions are not assigned
that exceed current inventories and configurations.
14. Special Use Areas
a. Drop Zone. The availability of usable DZs may be limited. Parks, roads,
railroad yards, airfields, athletic stadiums, and industrial storage sites are the most
likely locations for airdrops. DZ operations in urban terrain are difficult due to
surface obstructions, navigation, and positive ID of the DZ. Communications
limitations, positive marking, DZ control, and the availability of accurate, timely
intelligence also affect airdrop accuracy. Lessons learned from recent operations
emphasize the importance of positively controlling personnel near the DZ, or
concealing DZ locations until immediately before airdrops occur. This reduces the
possibility of situations where civilians are injured by the airdrop. One exception to
this is the airdrop of meals ready to eat (MRE), which have been conducted directly
over urban areas using the tri-wall aerial distribution system that free-falls and
spreads individual packets over a wide area.
b. Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). Assessment of potential FARP
locations is similar to the basic considerations for LZ/PZ selection. Consider the
location’s ability to accommodate the refueling/rearming element, the number of
points required, whether the landing and holding area is adequately sized for the
number and type of aircraft to be used, and if there is sufficient movement area.
Aircraft in an urban FARP are vulnerable during refuel/rearm operations due to the
proximity of concealment for threat forces. FARP locations should provide
concealment from the surrounding terrain, buildings, and facilitate securing
potential ground entry and exit routes. Sports stadiums may be suitable for this
purpose.
c. Contingency Areas. Loitering in-flight over urban terrain is very dangerous,
especially during day combat operations. Planning for in-flight contingencies may
require use of assembly areas (AA) or holding areas. When necessary, plan to loiter
or hold at control points well away from the urban area. The selection of AAs or
holding areas requires the same consideration of technical and tactical factors as
HLZs and FARPs. Selection of the proposed area(s) requires a security assessment.
Concealment, the presence of friendly ground forces for security, and protective or
covered facilities for personnel and equipment also must be considered. The
communications plan must ensure an adequate communications capability with
elements in the holding area. This can involve the use of an airborne command and
control asset or retransmission platform.
111-17
Chapter IV
WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
“We cannot destroy or significantly damage the infrastructure of a foreign urban
center in pursuit of mission attainment and expect the population to remain
friendly to either US forces or those we support. Neither can we indiscriminately
use force in imprecise ways that cause unnecessary non-combatant casualties.”
The Defense Science Board Report on MOUT
1. Introduction
Aviation urban operations require extensive intelligence collection and a
flexible and capable targeting capability. Weapons requirements for urban
operations can be different from those for open terrain operations. Planners
must consider military necessity, proportionality, collateral damage, non-
combatant casualties, and precision engagement weapons. The ordnance
requirements for a specific mission must focus on the target, employment
techniques, minimum collateral damage, and the capability to safely employ in
proximity to friendly ground forces.
2. Weapons Selection
a. Background. The focus of weapons selection is to produce a desired
weapons effect on a target while avoiding fratricide and minimizing collateral
damage. Other factors influencing weapons selection are commander’s intent,
LOW/LOAC, ROE, day or night employment, target type, proximity of buildings,
and friendly/non-combatant positions. In the urban environment, some type of
precision munitions is often the first choice. Non-precision munitions may be
used depending on the situation.
b. Collateral Damage. Minimizing collateral damage protects non-combatants
and property, facilitates future operations, and reduces the costs of rebuilding.
The presence and proximity of friendly ground forces and the effects of rubble can
be essential considerations in weapons selection. To achieve the desired level of
damage, it is necessary to carefully select the weapons load (Appendix C). For
example, cluster and general purpose munitions are effective against troops and
vehicles in the open. On the other hand, hardened, mobile, or pinpoint targets
may require precision munitions. In all cases, the requesting commander should
know the type of munitions scheduled for delivery, and the residual effects caused
by these munitions (e.g., unexploded ordnance).
c. Considerations. Planners and aircrew must consider the following when
choosing weapons.
(1) Hard, smooth, flat surfaces with 90-degree angles are characteristic of
man-made targets. Due to aviation delivery parameters, munitions will normally
IV-1
strike a target at an angle less than 90 degrees. This can reduce the effect of
munitions and increase the chance of ricochets. The tendency of rounds to strike
glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25 percent of impact-fuzed
rounds do not detonate when fired onto rubbled areas.
(2) Engagement times are short. Enemy personnel can present fleeting
targets of opportunity; thus, the actual amount of time from target discovery to
identification as hostile to weapons application can be very limited.
(3) Depression and elevation limits create dead space. Tall buildings form
deep canyons that are often safe from indirect fire. Target engagement from
oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, must be considered.
(4) Smoke, dust, and shadows mask targets. Additionally, rubble and man¬
made structures can mask fires. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be
indistinct.
(5) Urban fighting often involves units attacking on converging routes. The
risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during the
planning of operations. During operations, control measures must be continually
adjusted to reduce risks. Ground units must clearly mark their positions to avoid
fratricide.
(6) Friendly and enemy ground forces might be inside, outside, or around
the same building. The surrounding environment in urban operations means that
the effect of the weapon and the position of friendly/enemy personnel with
relation to structures must be considered. Usually the man-made structure must
be attacked before enemy personnel inside can be attacked. Therefore, choose
weapons and demolitions for employment based on their effects against the
buildings material composition rather than against enemy personnel.
(7) Munitions can produce secondary effects, such as fires.
3. Tactical Target Development
NOTE: The urban environment presents a variety of potential targets. In
addition to military target types, staffs and aircrews must train to effectively
analyze all potential targets, determine if they are suitable for engagement, and
select the type and quantity of weapons required to achieve the desired results.
a. This section focuses on urban target development. For specific guidance on
targeting, planners should refer to FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. Criticality, accessibility,
recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) is one method
that may be used by tactical targeting planners to analyze urban tactical
targeting.
IV-2
(1) Criticality. A target is critical when its damage or destruction has
significant influence on the enemy’s ability to conduct or support operations.
Consider each target in relative importance to other targets of the same complex
designated for attack. The criticality of a target is dependant on the situation.
For example, when an enemy has few locomotives, railroad bridges may be less
critical as targets; however, safeguarding bridges may be critical when friendly
forces require using them later.
(2) Accessibility. A target is accessible when it can be occupied physically
or covered by direct or indirect weapons fire.
(3) Recoverability. Target recoverability is measured in time; i.e., how long
it takes the enemy to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction/damage inflicted
on the target.
(4) Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if a force has the means to attack
it.
(5) Effect. The possible military, political, economic, and/or sociological
impacts of target attack, for example, enemy reprisals against local civilians,
must be considered.
(6) Recognizability. A target or target component is recognizable if it can
be identified under varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions without
confusion with other targets or components.
b. Tactical aviation operations involve targeting structures, vehicles, roads,
personnel, and underground objects dispersed in the urban infrastructure. Refer
to the JMEM for appropriate weapons recommendations to achieve desired
results.
(1) Structures. Structures can be grouped into those that may or may not
be destroyed. Situations will occur where both friendly and enemy troops are in
the same building. Eliminating the enemy without causing harm to friendly
troops can be achieved with careful weapons selection and placement.
(2) Vehicles. Vehicles are another element of consideration in an urban
environment. Confined spaces and unpredictable routes make targeting moving
vehicles difficult. Since urban operations inherently generate close quarters
engagements, an aircraft simply may not have time to achieve a firing solution on
a moving vehicle. Passing a fire mission request to an aircraft as early as possible
is a necessity.
(3) Roads and bridges. These restricted avenues of movement can work in
favor of the friendly forces. Air assets can destroy, or make impassible, roads or
bridges to impede the enemy’s progress. A destroyed roadway can isolate an
enemy unit or force them to abandon their vehicles, both of which could be to the
benefit of the friendly ground forces. However, once an obstacle is created, it
becomes an obstacle to both sides.
IV-3
(4) Personnel. Engaging personnel in urban terrain is difficult due to the
abundance of cover. If limiting collateral damage is also a consideration, the
problem is compounded. Ground force assistance in tracking and target ID is
critical. Aircrews will have to select appropriate weapons to get the desired
results.
(5) Underground. Underground targets, such as basements, subways, and
bunkers, require careful weapon consideration. Although many of the types of
weapons used in urban CAS do not have the ability to penetrate underground
targets, damaging their access could be the only results required. Ground forces
identifying entrances and exits to underground sites will allow air assets to
destroy these and effectively remove them as a potential threat to ground forces
or as a useable sanctuary for enemy forces.
4. Targeting Grids and Reference Techniques
Ground maneuver elements generally use a terrain-based reference system
during urban operations. MGRS coordinates have little meaning at street level.
Common control methods include urban grid (Figure IV-1), bullseye targeting
(Figure IV-2), objective area reference grid (Figure IV-3), and TRPs (Figure IV-4).
These techniques are based on the street and structure pattern present, without
regard to the MGRS grid pattern. Aircrew must plan to transition to the system
in use by the ground element upon arrival in the objective area. For example,
references to the objective or target may include local landmarks such as, “The
third floor of the Hotel Caviar, south-east corner.” This transition should be
facilitated by using a “big to small” acquisition technique.
Bravo- 1 , south
corner. Sniper top
floor window.”
IV-4
Figure IV-4. Target Reference Points
IV-5
5. Target Marking and Friendly Positions
The close proximity of friendly forces to targets makes positively locating
and marking of both friendly units and targets critical. Procedures must be
clearly understood and all participants must be issued the appropriate devices.
All fire support assets should be familiar with the friendly marking system. The
methods to do this are limited only by the creativity of the ground forces and
aircrews. Commanders should use this section as a reference and not limit
themselves to only these methods. Aircrews require positive location of the
target and friendly positions before expending ordnance. Methods employed
must be adapted to the existing conditions. Positive air to ground
communications are essential to coordinate and authenticate markings. Table IV-
1 lists some common marking methods and describes their merits and
shortcomings. All personnel must understand both the strengths and weaknesses
of available methods and equipment and how they pertain to urban conditions.
They need to choose the appropriate method, equipment or equipment
combination for the conditions at hand. The following sections address several
factors to consider when using target marking methods and equipment.
a. Aircrews and terminal controllers must become familiar with the roof
characteristics of buildings before a mission since this often will be the first
characteristic used for identification by aircrew. Flat roofs, pitched roofs, domed
roofs, roofs with towers or air conditioning units on top will aid in visual and
thermal acquisition. Additional structural features revealed in imagery will aid
in confirmation. This method of terrain association will prove invaluable for
visual engagement or reconnaissance since structures are often too close for
relying on mere grid coordinates.
b. The visual signaling or marking of positions allows more ease in
determining the location of friendly forces. During building clearing operations,
the progress of friendly units (both horizontally and vertically) may be marked
with spray paint or bed sheets hung out of windows. Often, the simplest methods
are the best. Traditional signaling devices, such as flares, strobes, and signaling
mirrors may be effective as well. Target marking or an orientation on enemy
positions may also be accomplished using signaling procedures. Common
techniques include the use of smoke, laser pointer devices, or tracers (Table IV- 1).
Devices are available which aid in the recognition of friendly forces under
difficult battlefield conditions. Fluid tactical situations, intermingling of forces,
and urban terrain all contribute to difficulty in identifying friendly troops and
equipment. The use of GLINT tape, combat ID panels, and IR beacons assist in
the ID of friendly ground forces on urban terrain. Standardized usage of ground
lighting, thermal contrast, and interposition of structures influence the
effectiveness of these devices.
IV-6
Table IV-1. Target and Friendly Marking Methods
METHOD
DAY /
NIGHT
ASSETS
FRIENDLY
MARKS
TARGET
MARKS
REMARKS
SMOKE
D/N
ALL
GOOD
GOOD
Easily identifiable, may compromise friendly position,
obscure target, or warn of fire support employment.
Placement may be difficult due to structures.
SMOKE (IR)
D/N
ALL
NVD AT
NIGHT
GOOD
GOOD
Easily identifiable, may compromise friendly position,
obscure target, or warn of fire support employment.
Placement may be difficult due to structures. Night marking
is greatly enhanced by the use of IR reflective smoke
ILLUM, GROUND
BURST
D/N
ALL
N/A
GOOD
Easily identified, may wash out NVD’s.
SIGNAL MIRROR
D
ALL
GOOD
N/A
Avoids compromise of friendly location. Dependent on
weather and available light and may be lost in reflections
from other reflective surfaces (windshields, windows, water,
etc.)
SPOT LIGHT
N
ALL
GOOD
MARGINAL
Highly visible to all. Compromises friendly position and
warns of fire support employment. Effectiveness is
dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
IR SPOT LIGHT
N
ALL NVD
GOOD
MARGINAL
Visible to all with NVG’s. Less likely to compromise than
overt light. Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban
lighting.
IR LASER
POINTER
(below .4 watts)
N
ALL NVD
GOOD
MARGINAL
Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
IR LASER
POINTER (above
.4 watts)
N
ALL NVD
GOOD
GOOD
Less affected by ambient light and weather conditions.
Highly effective under all but the most highly lit or worst
weather conditions. IZLID-2 is the current example.
VISUAL LASER
N
ALL
GOOD
MARGINAL
Highly visible to all. Risk of compromise is high.
Effectiveness dependant upon degree of urban lighting.
LASER
DESIGNATOR
D/N
PGM OR
LST
EQUIPED
N/A
GOOD
Highly effective with PGM. Very restrictive laser acguisition
cone and requires line of sight to target. May require pre¬
coordination of laser codes
TRACER
D/N
ALL
N/A
MARGINAL
May compromise position. May be difficult to distinguish
mark from other gunfire. During daytime use, may be more
effective to kick up dust surrounding target.
ELECTRONIC
BEACON
D/N
SEE
REMARKS
EXCELLENT
GOOD
Ideal friendly marking device for AC-130 and some USAF
fixed wing (not compatible with Navy or Marine aircraft).
Least impeded by urban terrain. Can be used as a TRP for
target identification. Coordination with aircrews essential to
ensure equipment and training compatibility.
STROBE
(OVERT)
N
ALL
MARGINAL
N/A
Visible by all. Effectiveness dependent upon degree of
urban lighting.
STROBE (IR)
N
ALL NVD
GOOD
N/A
Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness dependent upon degree
of urban lightinq. Coded strobes aid in acquisition
FLARE (OVERT)
D/N
ALL
GOOD
N/A
Visible by all. Easily identified by aircrew.
FLARE (IR)
N
ALL NVD
GOOD
N/A
Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified by aircrew.
GLINT/IR PANEL
N
ALL NVD
GOOD
N/A
Not readily detectable by enemy. Very effective except in
highly lit areas.
COMBAT
IDENTIFICATION
PANEL
D/N
ALL FLIR
GOOD
N/A
Provides temperature contrast on vehicles or building. May
be obscured by urban terrain.
VS-17 PANEL
D
ALL
MARGINAL
N/A
Only visible during daylight. Easily obscured by structures.
CHEMICAL HEAT
SOURCES
D/N
ALL FLIR
POOR
N/A
Easily masked by urban structures and lost in thermal
clutter. Difficult to acquire, can be effective when used to
contrast cold background or when a/c knows general
location.
SPINNING CHEM
LIGHT
(OVERT)
N
ALL
MARGINAL
N/A
Provides unique signature. May be obscured by structures.
Provides a distinct signature easily recognized.
Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
SPINNING CHEM
LIGHT (IR)
N
ALL NVD
MARGINAL
N/A
Provides unique signature. May be obscured by structures.
Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
IV-7
c. During both high and low ambient light conditions, expect to see significant
urban shadowing from buildings when cultural lights are present. Shadows will
hide personnel and/or vehicular targets from both the terminal guidance
controller and the aircrew like the shadows that hide small hills against the
background of larger mountains. Shadows will hide non-thermally significant
targets, but thermal targets still can be seen. When a combination of sensors has
to be used to acquire and identify the target, a sensor hand-off plan must be
briefed thoroughly. The use of aircraft with integrated GPS will reduce the
amount of time spent finding the target area. Time permitting, inputting a target
grid into the GPS or inertial navigation system (INS) will provide fire control
cues (range, heading, time) to the target that will aid in quicker target acquisition
and help distinguish friendly forces from enemy forces. Because CAS missions
may involve short firing ranges, expect a minimum tracking time, and thus,
minimum time to optimize the sensor.
6. Television/Electro-optical (TV/EO)
TV/EO sensors are subject to many of the same limitations as the naked
eye, particularly TV with no low light capability. Aircrews will encounter
difficulties in acquiring a target and achieving lock-on if smoke, buildings, or
other urban factors repeatedly interrupt LOS. Low light or all light TV/EO
sensors may require frequent gain and filter changes to accommodate varying
light levels in urban areas. Normal means of target and friendly ID are likely to
prove ineffective. IR strobes, overt strobes, and laser pointers normally visible to
TV/EO sensors can be lost in the light clutter. Typical TV/EO resolution is not
sufficient at medium and extended ranges to discriminate between a friendly
position or a target and its surrounding urban features. Ground personnel need
to utilize more aggressive and overt means of identifying their position and that
of the target if TV/EO sensors are to be used to identify, track and engage targets
on urban terrain.
7. Electronic Beacons
Electronic beacons can be an effective tool for friendly ID in an urban
environment, especially when friendly troops are on the move. However, a
significant drawback to beacons is that only a few aircraft can track them. When
other means of ID prove time consuming, a beacon may help locate a friendly
position quickly. When a friendly ground team is on the move, no matter whether
on foot or in a vehicle, a beacon offers a good way to track the movement. When
LOS is repeatedly interrupted, a beacon tracking radar can temporarily break
lock from the friendly position. However, when LOS is reestablished, the beacon
tracking radar can reacquire the friendly troops. Further, when urban terrain
prevents visual contact with a friendly position, target location can be passed via
reference to a beacon. If necessary, an aircraft can attack a target with nothing
more than an offset from the beacon. This method should only be employed as a
last resort since it will not provide the precision normally desired in an urban
environment.
IV-8
8. Laser Designation
a. Background. One of the greatest challenges for an aircraft in urban terrain
is achieving and maintaining LOS with a target or friendly position. Laser
designation requires uninterrupted LOS to identify and engage a target. Rotary¬
wing aircraft may use their hover capabilities, but only in the most permissive
environments. This may mean a rotary- wing lasing platform has to be very near
the target to keep the spot on the target until ordnance impact. Smoke from
burning buildings or other fires can drift across the laser to target line causing
beam attenuation. While this is also true on an open battlefield, urban areas
typically contain more potential smoke sources than found in natural terrain.
b. Lasers. Most laser designating platforms cannot actually see their laser
spot on a target. Lasers are often boresighted to other supporting sensors like
FLIR/IDS or TV/EO. If the supporting sensor cannot see a target, then the laser
cannot effectively mark the target. Furthermore, although a FLIR/IDS can “see” a
target, the laser may not be capable of guiding ordnance against it since smoke,
invisible to the FLIR/IDS, can effectively attenuate the laser energy. The most
important factor affecting FLIR performance is water vapor concentration, which
is indicated by high relative humidity, and expressed by absolute humidity. The
impact of high water vapor concentration (indicated by high humidity) is greater
on FLIR/IDS performance than its impact on laser performance. In other words,
if the target can be detected with a FLIR in clear air, then the laser should
provide sufficient energy for seeker acquisition. As a rule of thumb, if a target
can be detected with a supporting sensor and consistently ranged to with a laser,
it is likely that the laser will designate satisfactorily for a laser-guided weapon.
As an additional consideration, many targets are relatively small and can only be
acquired at relatively short range. For low and medium threats, where a great
amount of time is available to use the FLIR/IDS to point the laser, target
acquisition methods are simple. As the threat escalates and the time available for
target acquisition shrinks, targeting with the FLIR/IDS becomes more difficult.
9. Clearance to Drop/Fire for CAS Missions
a. Background. The responsibility for ordnance delivery rests with the
maneuver force commander. The terminal controller has the authority to clear
aircraft to release weapons after specific or general release approval from the
maneuver force commander. For specific guidance see Joint Publication (JP) 3-
09.3, JTTP for Close Air Support, Chapter 5. Additional references are the MTTP
found in FM 90-20, MCRP 3-16. 8B, NWP 3-09.2, and AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, J-Fire,
Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.
b. Positive control. Positive control will be used to the maximum extent
possible. For specific guidance, refer to JP 3-09.3, Chapter 5. Additional
references are the MTTP found in FM 90-20, MCRP 3-16. 8B, NWP 3-09.2, and
AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, J-Fire, Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower.
IV-9
c. Reasonable Assurance. Aircrews normally operate under positive control
and receive a “cleared hot” before releasing ordnance in a CAS environment.
During combat operations, low altitude flight, and deteriorating battlefield
conditions, such as communications jamming, can prevent the receipt of positive
clearance. JP 3-09.3 recommends that a joint force commander (JFC) establish
guidelines that allow CAS missions to be conducted utilizing reasonable
assurance. Reasonable assurance is not a routine procedure but a set of specific
guidelines. It is not a “comm out” method of attack. The JFC establishes the
conditions for reasonable assurance and when they will be in effect.
d. Risk-Estimate Distances. Risk-estimate distances are based on
fragmentation patterns and allow the ground forces commander or combat air
commander to estimate the risk in terms of the percent of friendly casualties that
may result from an air strike against an enemy threat along the forward line of
own troops. First and foremost, all aircrews must understand their aircraft
weapons’ capabilities and limitations. Secondly, the ground commander must
have a clearly defined intent and ROE that is understood by all aircrews to
ensure the proper matching of weapons to targets.
NOTE: The recommended probability of incapacitation (Pi) distances from
friendly troops assumes flat open terrain, not urban terrain with buildings
for cover and vertical structures that may mask the effects of ordnance
fragment patterns. In some cases, closer delivery can be made if terrain
(friendly cover) permits or if the tactical situation is urgent. The forward
air controller (FAC) shall inform the ground unit commander of the risks
involved before commencing such a strike.
10. Fixed-wing Targeting and Engagements (AV-8B, A-10, O/A-10, F-14,
F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, and F-117)
a. Targeting and engagements. The standard 9 line, CAS control brief will be
the preferred method of controlling fixed-wing aircraft when conducting CAS.
The available weapons suites for selected fixed-wing aircraft are shown in Table
IV-2.
IV-10
Table IV-2. Fixed-wing Weapons Suites
Aircraft
M/D/S
Using
Service
Ordnance
Laser C
LST
apability
LTD
Marking Capability
Beacon
Capability
Other
Systems
AV-8B
USMC
LGBs
Maverick
GP Bombs
CBUs
2.75” Rockets
5.00” Rockets
Napalm
25mm cannon
AGM-122 Sidearm
YES
NO
Rockets
25mm HEI rounds
LUU-2 Flares
None
TV
GPS
NVG
AV-8B “Plus”
USMC
As Above
YES
NO
Rockets
None
NVG
FUR
Radar
A/OA-IOA
USAF
Maverick
GP Bombs
CBUs
HE rockets
30mm cannon
YES
NO
WP Rockets
30mm HEI
IR pointer
LUU-1/2
LUU-5/6
LUU-19
M257 IR Rockets
M278 Covert Rockets
None
NVG
F-14
USN
LGBs
GP Bombs
CBUs
20mm cannon
Aerial mines
NO
YES
Laser
WP
LUU-2 Flares
None
NVG
Radar
TGP
LLTV
F-15E
USAF
LGBs
AGM-130
GBU-15
Maverick
GP Bombs
CBUs
20mm cannon
NO
YES
Laser
20mm HEI rounds
PPN-19
PPN-20
UPN-25/34
TPN-23/26
SST-181
X/XE
PRD-78/80
SMP-1000
NVG
FUR
TGP
Radar
F-16C
(less
LANTIRN)
USAF
LGBs
Maverick
GP Bombs
CBUs
20mm cannon
YES
(Some)
NO
Laser (some)
WP rockets
20mm HEI rounds
PPN-19
PPN-20
UPN-25/34
TPN-23/26
SST-181
X/XE
PRD-78/80
SMP-1000
Radar
NVG
TGP (some)
SADL (some)
F-16CG
(with
LANTIRN)
USAF
LGBs
Maverick
GP Bombs
CBUs
20mm cannon
NO
YES
Laser
WP Rockets
20mm HEI rounds
PPN-19
PPN-20
UPN-25/34
TPN-23/26
SST-181
X/XE
PRD-78/80
SMP-1000
NVG
FUR
TGP
Radar
GPS
IDM
F-16CJ
USAF
HARM
JDAM
Maverick
GP Bombs
CBUs
20mm cannon
JSOW
NO
NO
20mm HEI
PPN-19
PPN-20
UPN-25/34
TPN-23/26
SST-181
X/XE
PRD-78/80
SMP-1000
NVG
Radar
GPS
IDM
HTS
F/A-18
USN (A/C)
USMC (A/C/D)
LGBs
Maverick
SLAM
HARM
GP Bombs
CBUs
2.75” Rockets
5.00” Rockets
Napalm/FAE
20mm cannon
Laser Maverick
JSOW
JDAM
YES
YES
Laser
WP Rockets
HE Rockets
LUU-2 Flares
20mm HEI rounds
IR Pointer (F/A-18D
only)
None
FUR
GPS
NVG
Radar
Notes:
1 . All fixed-wing aircraft shown also have aerial missiles
2. All aircraft that drop CBUs can also drop aerial mines
IV-11
b. Roles. Fixed-wing aircraft can be employed in the following roles:
(1) Offensive Counter Air (OCA),
(2) Defensive Counter Air (DCA),
(3) Strategic Attack,
(4) CAS,
(5) Interdiction,
(6) Armed Reconnaissance,
(7) Escort,
(8) Airborne FAC [FAC (A)],
(9) SEAD,
(10) Supporting Arms Coordinator, Airborne [SAC(A)].
c. Employment. Not all of the previously mentioned fixed-wing employment
missions will be used in all urban operations. More information on OCA and DCA
missions can be found in JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile
Threats; furthermore, strategic attack, interdiction, and escort may be found in
JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. Lastly SEAD missions are
discussed in JP 3-01.4, Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. The fixed-wing
missions addressed in this section are armed reconnaissance, FAC(A), and CAS.
(1) Armed Reconnaissance. In the armed reconnaissance mission, the
tasked aircraft take off with no assigned target to attack. Instead, they are given
a designated sector. They conduct the reconnaissance in advance of ground
forces. Potential targets might include reserves, logistic centers, C2 facilities,
bridges, and railroads.
(2) FAC(A). The FAC(A) mission has advantages because of the potentially
restricted LOS that a ground FAC encounters. The FAC(A) may be able to better
position himself to mark a target for attacking aircraft. The FAC(A) also has the
same vantage point of the target area as the attacking aircraft.
(3) CAS. Fixed-wing aircraft tasked with CAS provide timely, precision-
delivered ordnance that can mean the difference between victory and defeat.
CAS has a devastating effect upon the enemy. Both his morale and will to fight
are affected. Target acquisition and location will be the most difficult aspects of
urban fixed-wing CAS.
IV-12
11. Fixed-wing Targeting and Engagements (AC-130)
a. Background. In a typical AC- 130 CAS mission, the aircraft places fire
against targets in close proximity to friendly forces. CAS engagement distances
may be reduced to “danger close,” which is that distance producing a 0.1 percent
Pi based on USAF 61A1-3-4, JMEM data. For the AC-130’s weapons, danger close
is 200 meters (m) for the 105 millimeter (mm) and 125 m for the 40mm and 25mm.
For engagements inside danger close, the ground commander must accept
responsibility for the increased potential for injury to his troops. Engagements
on urban terrain may be well inside danger close distances. In fact, many may be
at less than 50 m.
b. Marking Friendly Forces. The most important step in any CAS engagement
is to locate the friendly forces. This is doctrinally accomplished with some type of
marking that can be seen visually from the aircraft or observed using the aircraft
sensors. In an urban environment, the ambient lighting may obscure the marking.
This makes some other form of marking necessary, such as IR sensors or
electronic beacons.
(1) IR Sensors. IR chemlights, MRE heaters, space blankets, and
temperature absorbing panels provide markings significant to IDS or low light
level TV systems.
(2) Electronic Beacons. The currently fielded PPN-19 radar beacon is large
and heavy, making it burdensome for lightly equipped, fast moving troops.
However, a new micro-transponder, the smaller selectable strike (SST)-201, is
being fielded to provide a usable radar beacon that is lightweight and easily
employed. This capability can be used to locate the friendly forces and orient the
sensors to the target for a direct engagement. It can also be used as a fire control
offset to engage the target.
c. Locating the Target. Locating the target usually is accomplished by
locating the friendly forces first. From the friendly location, a bearing and range
offset is often used to orient the AC-130 to the target area. From the target
description, the gunship attempts to positively identify the target. In urban
terrain, a detailed talk-on with reference points expedites target acquisition.
Another very effective technique is for the friendly team to designate the target
with an IR target designator, like the laser pointer long range (LPL)-30. This is
the most expeditious and accurate method of target confirmation. Again, ambient
lights in the urban environment may obscure the marker. The HC-130H gunship
is equipped with an infrared zoom laser illuminator designator (IZLID) to aid in
target confirmation. The gated laser illuminator casts a very large and diffused
IR spot on the target area. Whatever the method, target confirmation is crucial
to eliminate fratricide and collateral damage.
d. Roles. The AC-130H/U is ideally suited for fire support in low threat urban
environments. Within permissive environments, the AC-130H/U is effective in
the following roles:
IV-13
(1) CAS-primary mission,
(2) Interdiction,
(3) Armed reconnaissance,
(4) Point defense,
(5) Escort,
(6) Surveillance,
(7) LZ/PZ/DZ security support,
(8) Airborne C2 (limited),
(9) Search and rescue (SAR) support.
e. Aircraft Systems. A full array of imaging and target designation systems,
precision navigation and secure communications equipment, and a defensive
avionics suite is standard. Additionally, the APQ-180 navigation/fire control
radar (AC-130U) offers adverse weather delivery capability. The weapons suite
aboard the AC-130H/U includes items in the Table IV-3.
Table IV-3. AC-130H/U Weapons Suite
Aircraft
M/D/S
Using
Service
Ordnance
Laser C
LST
apability
LTD
Marking
Capability
Beacon
Capability
Other
Systems
AC-130H
USAF
M2A1 Modified 40mm
M-102 105mm
NO
YES
1688
ONLY
LTD/R
GLINT
IZLID-2
40mm
105mm
PPN-19
UPN-25
SST-181
SST-201
NVG
FLIR
LLLTV
GPS
INS
APQ-150
AC-130U
USAF
GAU-12U 25mm
M2A1 Modified 40mm
M-102 105mm
NO
YES
LTD/R
GLINT
40mm
105mm
PPN-19
UPN-25
SST-181
SST-201
NVG
FLIR
ALLTV
GPS
INS
APQ-180
IV-14
f. Weapons Data. Weapons applicability, delivery altitude, munitions data
are included in Table IV-4.
Table IV-4. AC-130H/U Weapons Applicability
Weapon
Target Types
Min/Max Alt
(AGL)
Rds/Min
Combat Load
Remarks
25mm
Pers under light cover & light
vehicles
3000/15000'
1800
3000
HEI
40mm
Pers under medium cover & all
light vehicles
4500/18000'
100
256/500*
HEI
API
HEI-P
105mm
Pers, light vehicles, & buildings
4500/20000'
10-Jun
100/174*
HE (point
detonate or
delay)
HEHF
* If equipped with additional ammunition rack. (AC-130H)
g. Call For Fire. The call for fire method for AC-130s differs from the
standard CAS “nine-line”. Five lines of data are passed, as follows:
(1) Observer/warning order,
(2) Friendly location/mark,
(3) Target location,
(4) Target description/mark,
(5) Remarks (Include threats to gunship).
12. Rotary-wing Targeting and Engagements (AH-1, AH-1W, AH-6, AH-64,
MH-60, OH-58D, UH-1N )
a. Targeting and engagements. The standard 9 line, CAS control brief will be
the preferred method of controlling rotary-wing aircraft when conducting CAS
engagements. The available weapons suites for selected rotary-wing aircraft are
shown in Table IV- 5.
IV-15
Table IV-5. Rotary-wing Weapons Suites
Aircraft
Using
Ordnance
Laser Capability
Marking
Beacon
Other
M/D/S
Service
LST
LTD
Capability
Capability
Systems
AH-1
USA
TOW
YES
NO
WP Rockets
None
NVG
2.75” Rockets
20mm
AH-1W
USMC
Flellfire
NO
YES
Rockets
None
NVG
TOW
WP
CCDTV
Sidewinder
LASER
FLIR (with
Sidearm
5” Rockets
2.75” Rockets
organic CCDTV
system)
GPS
20mm
DVO
AH-6
USA (SOF)
Flellfire
NO
YES
WP
None
NVG
2.75” Rockets
Smoke
FLIR
.50 Caliber
LASER
GPS
7.62mm Minigun
AH-64
USA
Flellfire
YES
YES
WP
None
NVG
2.75” Rockets
Smoke
FLIR
30mm HEDP
LASER
GPS
Stinger
DTV
MH-60
USA (SOF)
Flellfire
NO
YES
None
None
NVG
30mm HEDP
Smoke
FLIR
2.75” Rockets
LASER
GPS
.50 Caliber
7.62mm Minigun
OH-58D
USA
Hellfire
NO
YES
WP
None
NVG
2.75” Rockets
Smoke
FLIR
.50 Caliber
LASER
GPS
Stinger
DTV
UH-1N
USMC
2.75” Rockets
NO
NO
WP
None
NVG
.50 Caliber
FLIR
7.62mm minigun
GPS
MH-53
USAF (SOF)
.50 Caliber
NO
NO
None
None
NVG
7.62 Minigun
FLIR
GPS
TFTA
HH-60
USAF
7.62mm Minigun
NO
NO
None
None
NVG
FLIR
GPS
b. Roles. Rotary-wing aircraft can be employed in the following roles:
(1) CAS,
(2) Interdiction,
(3) Armed reconnaissance,
(4) Escort,
(5) FAC (A),
(6) SEAD,
(7) Assault support,
(8) Logistic support,
(9) C2,
IV-16
(10) Combat SAR (CSAR),
(11) Airmobile assault,
(12) Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).
c. Running/diving fire. Rotary- wing aircraft should make running and diving
fire engagements along corridors of visibility. These engagements require
continuous movement to minimize exposure time. Before unmasking, all weapons
should be configured and armed. In situations where only one aircraft at a time is
in a position to engage, the lead aircraft fires as soon as possible after achieving a
firing solution, then a break turn is made toward masking terrain immediately
after firing. The wingman provides suppression when lead makes the break.
Avoid flight into other target visibility corridors during the egress. Re-attacks
should be from alternate directions to avoid predictability. (Figure IV-5)
Figure IV-5. Running/Diving Fire Engagement
d. Hover Fire. Hovering fire engagements are not recommended, but may be
made. The normal considerations apply for the selection of firing positions.
Buildings and structures, which offer cover and concealment from the target area,
are treated like natural terrain. It must again be emphasized, however, that all
urban features are potential enemy positions. Features selected for vertical
unmasking should not be significantly taller than surrounding structures. They
should be selected to provide target visibility at the lowest possible altitude.
Many rotary-wing engagements will be conducted at very close ranges (<500m),
often inside the minimum range for the Hellfire missile. At such close ranges, use
of the cannon is highly recommended. Minimize the time spent stationary in the
position. Plan multiple firing points and egress routes providing maximum cover
and concealment. (Figure IV-6) Second to enemy fire, wire and tower obstacles
will present the biggest hazard to flight when pulling off a target run in the urban
environment.
IV-17
Figure IV-6. Hover Fire Engagement
13. Artillery, Mortars, and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
a. Background. Artillery, mortars, and NSFS are used in aviation urban
operations for target marking, illumination, and SEAD. Marking smoke may be
white phosphorus (WP), red phosphorus, or illumination rounds set for ground
burst. Illumination rounds provide additional light to aid in night operations.
They are used to illuminate areas of suspected enemy activity, provide direction,
mark targets, or “wash out” enemy passive NVD when used at ground level. IR
illumination rounds are especially effective in urban areas devoid of artificial
light sources. Planning must ensure that aircrews will be flying with NVG.
However, balance using illumination rounds for target marking with the high
potential for creating unwanted smoke and fires. Mortars are ideally suited for
SEAD because of their high angle fire. This is especially true against highly
mobile MANPADS that are often employed from rooftops.
(1) Artillery. Artillery can be effective in an urban environment because of
the capability for high trajectory firing. High-angle fire is required when firing
from or within built-up areas, or over high terrain features. However, positioning
artillery units in the urban environment creates additional airspace deconfliction
concerns due to the high-angle firing requirement. The observer must also
realize that there is increased dispersion during high-angle fire. Some of the
most effective types of projectiles and fuzes are as follows:
(a) Copperhead. Copperhead is a 155-mm cannon-launched guided
projectile with a shaped charge warhead and a laser seeker. Copperhead homes
in on laser energy reflected from the target during the final portion of its
trajectory. Copperhead should be used only when direct fire systems are unable
to engage. Fire planning for Copperhead should consider the engagement ranges
of the laser designator. Moving targets can normally be engaged out to
approximately 3 kilometers (km), while stationary targets can be engaged out to 5
km. Laser designation requires an uninterrupted line of sight between the
designator and the target. Any obstructions weaken the laser signal causing a
IV-18
decrease in the performance of the Copperhead round. Copperhead engagements
must be carefully analyzed for effects of the gun-target line, observer-target line,
and masking effects of surrounding structures during the terminal guidance
phase of trajectory.
(b) Delay fuzing. Required for penetration of reinforced or hardened
rooftops.
(c) Variable time (VT) fusing. Required for an airburst. Effective in
clearing rooftops, but has greater potential for collateral damage.
(2) Mortars. Mortars are generally very effective in urban terrain due to
their high angle trajectories. Several systems are available depending on the
ground units involved in the operation. These systems include:
(a) 60-mm Mortar. The (M224) 60-mm mortar is in Army airborne, air
assault, light infantry, and ranger companies and all Marine rifle companies. The
current family of ammunition consists of high explosive (HE), smoke,
illumination, and IR illumination.
(b) 81-mm Mortar. The (M252) 81-mm mortar is in all Marine infantry,
and Army light battalions. The current family of ammunition consists of HE,
smoke (Red phosphorus), illumination, and IR illumination.
(c) 120-mm Mortar. The 120-mm mortar is fielded in a heavy Army
battalion. The current family of ammunition consists of HE, smoke, and
illumination, and IR Illumination.
(3) NSFS. When available, NSFS provides effective fire support to forces
operating near coastal waters. However, equipment limitations, enemy
electronic warfare, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions can interrupt radio
communications to control NSFS. Naval guns are not normally suitable for high-
angle fire because of their high muzzle velocity.
(a) NSFS ships normally remain under control of the Commander,
Amphibious Task Force (CATF). Ship positioning and method of delivery remain
with the ship captain. When the ships are threatened, the target-attack
priorities of the ship may cause it to hold or cancel land force fire missions until
the threat is removed.
(b) NSFS ships are normally assigned one of two missions: direct
support or general support. A ship in direct support delivers both planned and
on-call fires. General support missions are assigned to ships supporting forces of
brigade size and larger. The supported force selects the targets, the timing of
fires, and the method of adjustment of fires.
(c) NSFS has a variety of weapons ranging from conventional armament
to missiles. NSFS ships also have a large variety of ammunition and high rates of
IV-19
fire, allowing them to attack a variety of targets. The ships are mobile, allowing
positioning to take advantage of their limited deflection pattern.
(d) Close supporting fire is most effective when the gun-target line is
parallel to friendly front lines. The relatively flat trajectory of naval gunfire
results in a large range probable error. Hydrographic conditions may cause the
ship to take up firing positions that cause the gun-target line to be perpendicular
to friendly front lines. When this change in the gun-target line happens, it makes
naval gunfire less suitable to engage targets close to friendly troops.
14. Close Air Support
CAS requests consist of two types: preplanned and immediate. Preplanned
CAS requests are further divided into scheduled and on-call, which are processed
in ample time to provide the munitions required. On the other hand, immediate
requests provide the munitions available, which may not be the most suitable.
Immediate CAS performed under the control of a non-qualified controller is
called Emergency CAS. Careful consideration and SOPs on how to conduct
emergency CAS are necessary. Decentralized execution is critical; however,
personnel at all levels need to be ready to assist and clarify whenever possible.
Ideally, match the simplest means available to control the aircraft with the
controllers’ requirements. Aircrews and other supporting personnel may need to
pull information from the controller. Taking the extra time to build a clear
picture of the situation increases the odds of mission success. For additional
guidance, refer to JP 3-09.3. Additional references are the MTTP found in FM 90-
20, MCRP 3-16.8B, NWP 3-09.2, and AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, J-Fire, Multiservice
Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.
15. Munitions Effectiveness
a. Background. Analyzing the effects that munitions will have on buildings is
an important consideration in urban operations. Modern construction and design
improvements provide many buildings with resiliency to the blast effects of bomb
and artillery attack. Although modern buildings may burn easily, they often
retain their structural integrity and remain standing. A large, modern structure
can take between 24 to 48 hours to burn out. Once buildings become skeletal,
they are still useful to the military. Table IV- 6 summarizes the general
characteristics of building materials worldwide and can be useful when
determining the proper munitions to employ.
IV-20
Table IV-6. Wall Thickness and Incidence of Occurrence of Building Types
Building Type
Wall Thickness
Centimeter (cm)
Occurrence
All Building Types (%)
Mass Construction (Load Bearing Outer
Walls) Stone
75
0.6
Brick
34-65
62.9
Reinforced concrete (Poured-in-Place Tilt-
Up Combination)
15-25
6.1
Bow-Wall Principle
15-25
0.8
Framed(Nonload-Bearing Walls) Wood
15
15.8
Steel/Concrete Heavy/Cladding
36
1.8
Steel/Concrete Light/Cladding
17
12.0
b. Weaponeering. The JMEM defines specific weaponeering procedures to
accomplish this analysis. The weaponeering process can be quite involved and
requires training. Expedient models can be developed based on preliminary
analysis of generic targets. Mission planners should be most concerned with the
factors of blast effects, fragmentation, and circular error probable (CEP). CEP is
an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system and is used as a factor in
determining the probable damage to a target. Information specific to all these
planning factors is found in the JMEM. Specifics of weapon penetration, accuracy
and performance can be calculated quickly and easily. In addition, rough
estimates of possible collateral damage can be determined using the target offset
portion of the JMEM algorithms. The JMEM does not produce collateral
weapons effects on friendly personnel in close proximity and shielded by some
form of structure. The Joint Warfare Assessment Center (JWAC) located at
Dahlgren, Virginia, performs classified computer simulations for these situations.
Although primarily tasked by the theater commander for deliberate targeting,
they can provide to any user the weapons effect characteristics in an urban area
for general-purpose bombs, laser-guided bombs, Maverick missiles, and high¬
speed anti-radiation missile (HARM). Send a request for information via Joint
Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) ([email protected]) or by
telephone, Defense Switched Network (DSN): 249-1992/4587. They require at a
minimum: scene composition, aimpoints, attack direction, weapon/fuze
combination, and time over target. Additionally, using the collateral damage
estimate tool (CDET), JWAC can provide glass breakage plots, eardrum rupture
plots (friendly, enemy, and non-combatant concerns), and panel damage versus
distance from impact point.
16. Munitions Delivery
a. Background. Urban terrain introduces a unique challenge to aircrews and
ground personnel alike with the notion of the urban canyon. Simply stated, an
urban canyon exists when a target or target set is shielded by vertical structures.
Unlike most natural terrain, the vertical characteristics of urban terrain can
greatly affect delivery options.
b. LOS. Urban terrain typically creates corridors of visibility running
between structures. Street level targets are only visible along the street axis or
IV-21
from high angles. The interposition of structures around a target interrupts LOS
from many directions. Rooftop targets may be approachable from a wider range
of azimuths. Targeting a specific face and story of a building can limit
engagement heading. The presence of buildings and other structures in urban
terrain creates corridors of visibility along streets, rivers, and railways.
Achieving LOS with an objective at street level is much easier along the axis of
the roadway as opposed to perpendicular. Large cities in particular create a
canyon effect in terms of visibility. Look down is required into areas surrounded
by tall structures if roadways do not create an adequate avenue of observation.
(Figure IV- 7)
c. Employment Range. The employment range for ordnance from both fixed-,
and rotary-wing aircraft is significantly reduced in urban areas. Delivery of
direct fire weapons is typically at medium to close range, due to masking effects
of city structures. The amount of sensor depression required to achieve LOS with
an objective is called look-down. The look-down angle required to achieve LOS
with an area is determined based on the lateral distance to masking structures
and the height of those structures. There may be an increase in minimum
engagement ranges because of high look down angles, thus making many close
engagements possible. The higher the aircraft above the intended target the
more stand off is needed. Fields of fire tend to be very narrow for the same
reason. Often only one aircraft at a time can be in a position suitable for
engagement of the target. Higher angle deliveries may provide better look angles
and visibility into a target area as well as a better ballistic trajectory when
delivering ordnance near tall structures. See Figures IV-8 and IV-9.
IV-22
z
X
OBJ
Figure IV-8. Look-Down View (Greater angle required)
Figure IV-9. Look-Down Angle
The central problem lies in maintaining LOS to the intended target with enough
time to acquire the target, achieve a weapons delivery solution, and fly to those
parameters. Visibility limitations on marking devices in the urban environment
are geometric in nature. The use of any pointer or laser requires LOS. In
addition, the aircraft must have LOS with the target to see the mark. Urban
terrain severely limits LOS opportunities. Due to the close proximity of
structures to one another, there may be very narrow fields of view and limited
axes of approach. The high number of reflective surfaces in an urban setting
presents an additional challenge. Laser energy can be reflected and present
multiple false returns. For these reasons, urban fire support can be expected to
be more time consuming and be much more dependent on good communications.
Combinations of marking devices and clear talk-on procedures will be essential to
safe and effective fire support.
d. Lasing Techniques. Aircrews should consider using buddy lasing or remote
lasing tactics for laser-guided munitions when urban effects preclude the
attacking aircraft from maintaining LOS with the target until ordnance impact.
IV-23
However, if designating with a ground based laser along a narrow street bounded
by tall buildings, LOS geometry may allow the weapon to receive reflected laser
energy only within the 20 degree safety zone; the area from which a weapon
should not be released normally. As in any delivery, aircrews must consider the
target, the threat, the weapon, and the weather. Aircrews must also consider the
potential miss distances for “precision” munitions when their guidance source is
interrupted or removed.
e. Delivery Parameters. Several factors will drive the aircrew’s selection of
delivery parameters for a given weapon in urban terrain. Many deliveries tend to
limit avenues of approach due to LOS requirements between the aircraft and
target. The presence of buildings and other structures in urban terrain creates
corridors of visibility along streets, rivers, and railways. Achieving LOS with an
objective at lower altitudes is much easier along the axis of the roadway rather
than perpendicular to it. Large cities, in particular, create a canyon effect in
terms of visibility. Areas surrounded by tall structures must be looked down into
if roadways do not create an adequate avenue of observation.
f. Run-in. When working with a FAC or tactical air control party/post
(TACP), suggested run-in headings should be given that allow the maximum
probability of target ID. The aircrew should build a mental image of the target
before ingress so that target and friendly location is facilitated. If possible, a dry
pass may be warranted to determine if proper LOS requirements can be met for
employment with the selected set of delivery parameters. Other factors such as
threats or weather may force the aircraft to deliver from low altitude. This
increases the importance of attacking from a sufficient avenue of approach to
allow target ID and weapons employment given the inherent LOS limitations.
g. Proximity of Friendly Troops/Non-Combatants. Urban operations increase
the potential for weapons employment close to friendly forces or non-combatants.
Weapons delivery in these situations must attempt to eliminate the possibility of
fratricide and minimize collateral damage.
h. Munitions Classes. Table IV- 7 provides a listing of classes of munitions
that may be considered for use on urban terrain.
Table IV-7. Munitions and Delivery Techniques
Munitions
Method
GP
Rocket
Gun
MAV
LGB Self
LGB Assisted
Level
X
X
X
X
X
X
Dive
X
X
X
X
X
X
Pop
X
X
X
X
X
X
Toss
X
Loft
X
X
X
X
IV-24
i. Advantages/Disadvantages.
(1) Each of the munitions and delivery techniques has unique advantages
and disadvantages. Table IV- 8 outlines some advantages and disadvantages of
selected munitions and the various delivery techniques associated with fixed-
wing aircraft.
Table IV-8. Munitions Advantages and Disadvantages
na
Advantage
Disadvantage
General Purpose Bombs
Multi-Service common,
Selectable fuzing options
Multi-target effective
Varying weapons effects
Good standoff
Non-precision
Rockets
Multi-Service common
Light armor effective
Varying weapons effects
Good marking device
Non-precision
Decreased standoff
Increased aircrew exposure
20mm/30mm Cannon
Multi-Service common
Light armor effective (20mm cannon)
All armor effective (30mm cannon)
Decreased standoff
Increased aircrew exposure
Maverick Missiles
Multi-Service common
Increased standoff
Precision capability
Mobile target effective
Decreased effectiveness in adverse weather and
non-optimal atmospheric conditions
Laser Guided Bombs
Increased standoff
Precision capability
Multi-target effective
Mobile target effective
Decreased effectiveness in adverse weather
and non-optimal atmospheric conditions
Requires guidance post release
JDAM
Multi-Service common
Selectable fuzing options
Multi-target effective
All weather capable
Accurate
Good standoff
Not compatible for moving targets
Requires precise target coordinates
JSOW / AGM-154
Multi-service common
Selectable fuzing options
Multi-target effective
All weather capable
Accurate
Good standoff
Compatible for some moving targets
Requires precise target coordinates
IV-25
(2) The advantages and disadvantages associated with fixed-wing delivery
methods and techniques are listed in Table IV-9.
Table IV-9. Delivery Methods Advantages and Disadvantages
Delivery
Method
Advantages
Disadvantages
Level
Increased Standoff
Decreased Accuracy (Non-PGM)
Dive
Good Standoff (Medium to High Altitude) Increasingly
Accurate Computed Deliveries Highly Accurate (PGM)
Axis Restrictive
Pop
Decreased Long to Medium Range Threat Acquisition
& Targeting Time
Increased exposure to target area threat arrays
Minimal target tracking time
Axis restrictive
Toss
Good Standoff
Decreased aircrew exposure
Decreased accuracy
Axis restrictive
Loft
Excellent Standoff
Decreased accuracy (Non-PGM)
(3) Buddy lasing of laser-guided bombs (LGB) can be executed from several
axes that are dictated by the designator (air or ground). A list of profiles with
associated advantages and disadvantages is in Table IV-10.
Table IV-10. Airborne and Ground Designators Advantages and Disadvantages
Type Designator
Advantages
Disadvantages
Airborne:
Increased Standoff
Larger laser spot size
Larger target area footprint
Increased susceptibility to podium effect
1. Trail Position
Increased probability of success (spot detection)
Axis restrictive
Increased standoff
Increased platform predictability
2. Overhead Wheel Position
Decreased platform predictability
Decreased effectiveness in target areas with
Good standoff
varying vertical developments (podium effect)
3. Offset or Opposing Wheel
Decreased platform predictability
Axis Restrictive
Position
Excellent Standoff
Increased susceptibility to podium effect,
coordination intensive
Ground
Smaller laser spot size
Axis restrictive
Decreased targeting ambiguity
Increased designator exposure
Rapid battle damage assessment (BDA)
Coordination intensive
IV-26
Appendix A
AIR MISSION PLANNING GUIDELINES
The following items are areas to review during mission planning. While these
topics may be common, they have increased applicability to aviation urban
operations.
1. Mission Analysis
a. Determine restrictions and constraints.
b. Determine number of aircraft required to accomplish mission (minimize, if
possible).
c. Update information before takeoff, en route, and as often as necessary
during the mission (urban air operations can become very fluid).
2. Conduct Risk Assessment and Management
3. Friendly Situation
a. Obtain current information regarding friendly forces.
b. Analyze the concept of operations.
4. Threat
a. Know enemy capabilities and limitations.
b. Review known enemy positions.
5. Terrain Analysis
a. Perform flight hazards assessment, physical and environmental.
b. Determine dominant terrain/structures.
c. Determine surface mobility, above ground, street level, and subterranean.
d. Determine degree of terrain relief and variations in building height.
6. Weather
a. Evaluate weather and illumination data.
b. Evaluate enemy’s weather capabilities.
A-1
7. Route Planning and Navigation
a. Plan ingress, egress, and contingency routes to minimize the duration of
flight over urban terrain.
b. Use alternate flight routes, be unpredictable. (Urban operations tend to
overuse routes)
8. Terminal Area Procedures
a. Plan terminal area actions in detail (airfields, HLZs, PZs, DZs, etc.).
b. Determine the effects of weather (urban specific) and enemy positions.
9. Communications
a. Determine communications limitations between aircrew and ground forces.
b. Include visual signals.
c. Create a solid alternate communications plan.
10. Airspace Control
a. Know the controlling agencies and required procedures.
b. Request additional measures as required.
11. Rules of Engagement
a. Ensure identification, friend, or foe (IFF) and aircraft survivability
equipment (ASE) is working.
b. Understand the purpose and demarcation lines for IFF and ASE. (more
complicated in urban operations)
12. Weapons Selection and Employment
a. Clearly mark and confirm targets; kno
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