Document text
X
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of infonriation is estimated to average 1 hour per response, Including the time for reviev/ing instructions, searching existing data sources
gaihsnng and maintaining the dota needed, ar^d completing and revtev/ing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden ostimale or any other asps«::t of this'
wllect^n of information, including suggestions for reducino this burdon, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704*0188), Washington. DC 20503.
1 . AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
_ monograph
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
DOCTRINAL DOGMA: A COMPARISON OF OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS BETWEEN FM 100-5 OPERATIONS (DRAFT)
AND JOINT PUB 3-0
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJ Craig H. Bird
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADORESS(ES)
School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Command and Genera! Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
10. SPONSORING /MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
distribution unlimited.
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
SEE ATTACHED
14, SUBJECT TERMS
17.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
18
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
19
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE CODE
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFffiD
UNCLASSMED
UNCLASSIFIED
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
UNLIMITED
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-1 8 298-102
USAPPC V1.00
DOCTRINAL DOGMA: A COMPARISON
OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BETWEEN
FM 100-5 (DRAFT) AND JOINT PUB 3-0
A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Craig H. Bird
Aviation
School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
SECOND TERM AY 96-97
Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL
Major Craig H. Bird
Title of Monograph: Doctrinal Dogma: A Comparison of Offensive
Operations Between FM 100-5 (Draft) and
Joint Pub 3-0
Approved by:
Monograph Director
CDR Richard W. Durham, MSME
Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Director, Graduate
Degree Program
Accepted this 22d Day of May 1997
ABSTRACT
This monograph suggests that Army doctrine does not
support Joint doctrine in the direct approach to attacking
the enemy's operational centers of gravity (COGs). It
expresses the belief that there are phases of an operation
in which air power should become the main effort, and ground
forces the supporting effort. The doctrinal concepts listed
in Joint doctrine have the potential to produce decisive
victory, at a considerably lower cost than existing or
proposed Army doctrine.
The doctrines of the Air Force and Navy have influenced
Joint doctrine's position in favor of the direct approach,
and in using air or sea, power as the main effort in some
phases of the campaign for achieving operational objectives.
Potential enemies in the MRC regions are vulnerable to
operations involving U.S. and coalition militaries' ability
to dominate the air and sea dimensions, in consonance with
amphibious and/or vertical turning movements.
The tremendous loss of life, and destruction of
infrastructure so prevalent in ground intensive warfare
impedes the NSS goals of security, and prosperity. Ground
intensive wars that attack and maneuver through a series of
decisive points, and then on to the COGs themselves, tend to
take longer and wreak greater destruction. The existing
conflict between Army doctrine and Joint doctrine holds at
risk the nation's commitment to fight and win two regional
conflicts, near simultaneously, as expressed in the NSS and
NMS.
DOCTRINAL DOQIA: A COMPARISON OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
BETWEEN FM 100-5 OPERATIONS (DRAFT) AND JOINT PUB 3-0
A Monograph
by
Major Craig H. Bird
Aviation
School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth , Kansas
Second Term AY 96-97
Table of Contents
I . Introduction . 1
II . Formation of Joint and Army Doctrine . 6
A. Overview . 6
B. U.S. Army Doctrine Development . 8
C. U.S. Air Force Doctrine Development . 12
D. U.S. Navy Doctrine Development . 15
E. National Security and National Military Strategy 18
III. Strategic Considerations for Joint and Army Doctrine 20
A. The Strategic Environment as it Relates
to Doctrine . 20
B . The Military Strategic Environment . 23
IV. A Comparison of Joint and Army Offensive Operations
Doctrine at the Operational Level . 29
A. Contrast of Joint and Army operational scope . 29
B. Defeating enemy operational C06s, the
direct and indirect approaches . 30
C. Decisiveness of offensive operations . 31
D . The nature of offensive operations in either
of the MRCs is likely to be nonlinear . 32
V. Implications for the Future . 36
A. Breaking the dogma . 36
B . Institutional challenges . 38
VI . Conclusions . 39
VII . Bibliography
48
I . Introduction
In consideration of the changing world of technology,
political objectives and threats to American interests,
there is an increasing requirement levied by political
leaders, the American population and the military themselves
that contemporary wars can be won more quickly, and with
less bloodshed. In the post cold-war era, with the major
world powers considerably reducing their militaries, this is
a reasonable expectation. However, this is only one of the
pressing reasons for changing the way the nation' s military
conducts operations and fights wars.
Although contemporary conventional threats from
countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq are significant
military challenges, these countries could be quickly
defeated by the U.S. and coalition forces, if fought one at
a time. The more serious military challenge is that these
two vital regions could become embroiled in military
conflicts nearly simultaneously; as outlined in the National
Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy
(NMS) In order for the United States to form a winning
strategy in both regions, it must have (within the means
available) the military capability to win in one region
decisively and quickly, before shifting the weight of its
combat power to the second region.
1
This requirement to win two conflicts nearly
simultaneously, in operational environments very different
from the one planned for in Europe, implies an opportunity
for the U.S. military to conduct offensive operations more
boldly, and with greater results today, and in the years
ahead. Joint doctrine writers have realized this
opportunity and made a significant shift in the ways of
conducting the operational art of warfare by recognizing the
increasing role of air power (Air Force, Navy, and Army
Aviation) . This opportunity may be missed, however, if the
U.S. Army insists on holding onto the operational ideology
that decisive combat operations are only won by ground
maneuver forces, and supported by air and sea forces.^
This monograph will provide insights that address the
question. Is FM 100-5 (Draft) January 1997, concept of
decisive offensive operations consistent with Joint Pub 3-0?
This paper will suggest that Army doctrine does not support
Joint doctrine in the direct approach to attacking the
enemy's operational centers of gravity (COGs) , which is the
Joint doctrine's preferred method of decisive offensive
operations. This paper expresses the belief that there are
phases of an operation in which air power should become the
main effort, and ground forces the supporting effort. The
doctrinal concepts listed in Joint doctrine have the
potential to produce decisive victory, at a considerably
lower cost than existing or proposed Army doctrine. The
2
existing conflict between Army doctrine and Joint doctrine
holds at risk the nation's commitment to fight and win two
regional conflicts, near simultaneously, as expressed in the
NSS and NMS . ^
This monograph will evaluate the above conflict in
doctrines by comparing and contrasting the formation of
Joint doctrine and Army doctrine, examining the influence of
the NSS and NMS on military art, and comparing doctrines for
offensive operations at the operational level. It will then
synthesize the information to consider the employment
options for the use of air power as the main effort and
ground forces as the supporting effort in decisive offensive
operations. Finally it will assess the contribution of
decisive warfare using air power in the context of a
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) .
Joint doctrine and Army doctrine are written by senior
military officers who are influenced in their thinking by
their particular institutional traditions and doctrine,
service histories and experiences and their previous
instruction in military theory. These influences shape
their knowledge base and value lens, which they use to
formulate and evaluate doctrinal concepts that will likely
be executed within, an as yet obscure operational
environment. The doctrine they formulate must function in
an environment which is identified and described in part by
evolving world events and in part by the NSS and NMS.
3
The NSS defines the operational environment by
identifying where America's vital interests lay. It
provides guidance to the military as to vital geographic
regions and the types of operations that the military may be
expected to execute. The NMS refines the implied missions
into a strategy which describes the kind of operations the
military must be able to perform in order to support the
NSS. This in turn provides guidance to military leaders
regarding the capabilities that the military must have to
achieve desired political aims. These capabilities are the
combination of available forces (means) and a plan (enabled
by a functioning doctrine) to use those forces effectively
and efficiently (ways) .
In comparing doctrine, one discovers that Joint doctrine
is concerned primarily with the strategic to operational
levels of warfare, and Army doctrine with the operational to
tactical levels of warfare. This creates a dependence
between the doctrines that implies if there is to be
doctrinal cohesion, there must be a common, pragmatic
methodology to conducting offensive operations. This
methodology includes a common understanding of:
1. The direct and indirect approaches to defeating
an enemy's operational COG.
2. The direct aspects that constitute decisive
operations in a conventional war.
3. The characteristics of operations in the
battlefield environment.
4 . The ways in which services should work together
to accomplish the military's mission.
4
If the methodology followed in devising doctrine is not
consistent, the military machine will not work effectively
or efficiently, or perhaps it will not work at all.
This monograph will assume that the NSS and NMS provide
sufficient guidance to military leaders to develop doctrine,
that ongoing developments in Air Force and Navy doctrine
will not alter the overall relationship between the Army and
Joint doctrine, and that the Army is able to organize, equip
and train its soldiers to accomplish the tasks listed in FM
100-5 (draft) and those proposed by this paper. This paper
will focus on the operational level of war, and in
particular, decisive offensive operations in the two major
regional contingencies identified in the February 1996
National Security Strategy. The criteria for consistent
Joint doctrine and Army doctrine is a common understanding
of :
1. Military missions that are derived from the NSS
and NMS.
2. The military capabilities of potential regional
threats .
3. U.S. military ways and means to achieve
operational ends.
4 . Military theory and how actions on the
battlefield produce desired results.
5. Services roles and missions in decisive offensive
operations .
The following definitions, taken from Joint doctrine,
will be useful throughout this paper:
Operational Art — The employment of military forces to
attain strategic and/or operational objectives
through the design, organization, integration, and
conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations.
5
and battles. Operational art translates the joint
force commander's strategy into operational design,
and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the
key activities at all levels of war.^
Operational Level of War — The level of war of which
campaigns and major operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic
objectives within theaters or areas of operations.
Activities at this level link tactics and strategy
by establishing operational objectives needed to
accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing
events to achieve the operational objectives,
initiating actions, and applying resources to bring
about and sustain these events. These activities
imply a broader dimension of time or space than do
tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative
support of tactical forces, and provide the means by
which tactical successes are exploited to achieve
strategic objectives.^
COGs -- Those characteristics, capabilities, or
localities from which a military force derives its
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to
fight . ^
Decisive Points -- (Usually geographic in nature)
Correctly identifying and controlling decisive
points can gain a marked advantage over the enemy
and greatly influence the outcome of an action.^
II . Formation of Joint and Army Doctrine
Some futurists have postulated that national strategy
drives doctrinal change. They also postulate that
geopolitical realities, evolving military art (articulated
in doctrine) , technology and human and organizational
behavior combine to shape the character of the military as
well.® As noted in the introduction, the military leaders
who write and approve doctrine are greatly influenced by
6
their professional knowledge and values gained through the
study of military theory, the practice of past doctrine and
their service histories and personal experiences in combat
and training. Thus the nature of doctrinal evolution and
development is determined by a broad and often diverging
spectrum of outside forces combined with the dynamics of
national strategy, military character and military
leadership.
A . Overview
Theory is the foundation for developing military art and
the lens for interpreting lessons from history. Without a
common theoretical foundation. Joint and Army doctrine
cannot be consistent.® Theory helps to explain the
anticipated conditions of combat, and postulates what is
possible in future conflicts. Until recently, the theories
regarding air, land and sea power have tended to explain
their respective environments, relatively independent of one
another .
The institutional traditions and doctrine of each service
vary dramatically, and historically, they have different
patterns of change. In general, service doctrines, like
their theories, developed independently of one another
despite a common history.^® These contrasting doctrines and
traditions brought an element of creative diversity to the
formation of Joint doctrine. Additionally, a new challenge
7
emerged out of necessity, that of attaining compatibility
when service systems and doctrine operate together on the
battlefield .
Senior military leaders use applicable, but often very
selective, historical examples and their collective
experiences to assist in accepting or rejecting different
military theories to form institutional doctrine. Within
this foundation process they must decide what new concepts
and ideas of warfare to implement, and which ones to ignore.
This section will look at the respective services'
central theories, doctrines and histories in large scale
conventional wars, including the Cold War, and how each
service's unique doctrine influenced the current Joint
doctrine. It will then sketch the NSS and NMS strategies
and the guidance they provide military leaders for the
missions they must accomplish in war, and for which doctrine
must support.
B . U . S . Army Doctrine Development
(1) U.S. Army Theory
Theoretically the Army is an advocate of the military
theoretician Carl von Clausewitz' premise that the highest
aim in war is the disarming or destruction of the enemy.
This is achieved based on the idea of operational COGs
(attacking the enemy's greatest concentration of combat
power) and its place in the operational planning process.
8
The Army indoctrinates its leaders with an understanding of
the wartime environment, one characterized by the effects of
friction (countless minor incidents ) that hasten the onset
of culmination (the inability to achieve what was planned) .
The corresponding effect of friction on operational
objectives and battle tempo (altering the plan to
accommodate the effects of friction) are taught to a lesser
degree .
Other significant military theoreticians studied by Army
leaders include Antoine-Henri Jomini, Colonel Ardant du
Picq, J.F.C. Fuller, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Certain
concepts introduced by these military theoreticians have
made a significant impact on the development of Army and
Joint doctrine. Jomini' s concept of decisive points to
achieve positional advantage with respect to an enemy's COG,
and the use of interior lines of operations to move more
quickly in relation to the enemy influenced Army, as well as
Navy operational maneuver doctrine.^® Du Picq showed U.S.
military thinkers that moral force is the most important
factor in combat; technologies advance, but they require
the moral effect to use them in times of personal danger.^®
Fuller and Hart strongly advocated the use of armored
maneuver warfare, the mechanization of all military forces
and the use of close air support to achieve mobility on the
9
battlefield — influences more strongly felt today than ever
by U.S. military planners.^®
(2) Army Doctrine and Traditions
In the past. Army doctrine and traditions focused on the
destruction of enemy forces through fire and maneuver
tactics, as a subordinate part of operational art. Indirect
attacks on enemy decisive points gain a positional advantage
over the enemy, from which attacks on the COGs are
possible.^® This exposure makes the enemy susceptible to
exploitation and pursuit operations where decisive combat
and the destruction of the enemy's forces take place.
In FM 100-5 (draft) Army doctrine appears to change very
little from the past. There is an increased emphasis on
exploitation^^ and the need to include Army and Air Force
air power to isolate the battlefield.^^ These concepts,
however, are not new. One concept that appears to be
evolving is the idea of attacking multiple decisive points
simultaneously with multiple main efforts.^^ This concept
is not discussed in Joint doctrine, but it appears similar
to what the Air Force refers to as parallel warfare.^^
(3) Army History
U.S. Army history and its effects on senior leadership
have centered on the idea of operational decisive points and
the indirect attack. This idea, expressed by Clausewitz,
Fuller and Hart, was central during the planning for the
10
breakout from Normandy in August 1944. The allies conducted
a double envelopment maneuver meant to encircle
approximately nineteen German divisions.^'’ The attacks were
oriented on the towns of Argentan and Falaise (decisive
points) from which allied forces could gain a positional
advantage to destroy the German divisions (COG).^^ Although
the gap was never sealed off, an exploitation ensued which
destroyed or captured approximately 60,000 German soldiers
and the equipment of an Army Group.
The Army's leadership manual, FM 22-100, is instructive
in how history validates Ardant du Picq' s emphasis on moral
forces in war. A cited example is how one regimental
commander, Joshua Chamberlain, influenced the outcome of the
battle of Gettysburg by his individual bravery and cool
leadership on Little Roundtop. As FM 22-100 points out,
"For a few moments, the fate of an Army and a nation rested
on the shoulders of 358 farmers, woodsmen, and fishermen
from Maine... led by a seminary graduate..."^®
Perhaps just as important to note, are the examples of
history that the Army does not think validate theory. The
Inchon landing and Pusan perimeter breakout during the
Korean War involved nonlinear operations along multiple
lines of operation.^® The campaign was considered risky by
many senior commanders at the time, perhaps even reckless,
and it appears that the Army' s senior leaders today feel the
/
11
same way because there is no doctrine to support this kind
of thinking today.
The Army also appears to discredit the idea of vertical
envelopment, so prevalent during the Vietnam Kar.
Operational aerial pursuit operations like DAVY CROCKETT and
CRAZY HORSE, oriented on North Vietnamese and Vietcong
supply base areas (decisive points), were clearly focused on
defeating North Vietnamese and Vietcong offensive forces
(COG) Vertical envelopment through air assault and/or
aerial fires was the main effort, while ground attacks were
generally the supporting efforts.
C . U . S . Air Force Doctrine Development
(1) U.S. Air Force Theoiry
Early on, air power theoreticians saw the opportunity for
air forces to achieve military victory, independently of
ground forces, by operating as a separate service. The
first of these was Guilio Douhet who proposed using air
power to terrorize an enemy's population by an attack
directly upon their will, through the use of a combination
of high explosive, incendiary, and poison gases. William
(Billy) Mitchell modified Douhet' s methods to the
neutralization and/or destruction of the enemy' s means to
wage war by attacking the enemy's vital centers . In the
late 1980s and early 1990s Air Force Colonel John A. Warden
12
Ill proposed directing decisive air power attacks upon the
vulnerabilities of an enemy using a system' s targeting
technique not unlike that used in WWII . Colonel Warden' s
premise is that those vulnerabilities closest to the
country's leadership are strategic in nature and lead to the
quickest victory, and those that are related to the fielded
army are operational in nature and lead to victory more
slowly .
(2) U.S. Air Force Doctrine and Traditions
Air Force doctrine writers have been influenced by the
belief that airpower by itself can attain a decisive
military victory. This in turn would lead to a favorable
diplomatic settlement . This tradition is still reflected
in the Air Force doctrinal manual AFM 1-1: "Any enemy with
the capacity to be a threat is likely to have strategic
vulnerabilities susceptible to air attack..."^® Since the
Vietnam war, however, the Air Force along with some Army
airland battle advocates began to develop an air power
doctrine around the idea of shaping or isolating the close
battle with an air interdiction effort.^^ With
technological improvements in aircraft and precision
munitions, the Air Force is once again focusing its
doctrinal sights on the strategic attack.^®
(3) U.S. Air Force History
13
U.S. Air Force history indicates three evolutionary
phases of military art for attacking the enemy's COG:
conventional strategic bombing, preparation for nuclear war
and precision munitions and refined targeting techniques.
These phases took place in conjunction with technological
advancements in military aircraft and air dropped munitions.
The conventional strategic bombing campaigns in W.W.II^^
and North Vietnam, using high altitude bombers and dumb
bombs, was considered successful, but not decisive. Air
power did not possess the capabilities for achieving
decisive victory, independently of the other services
efforts .
Preparation, technological advancements and training for
nuclear war against the Soviet Union were core themes in the
Air Force and diplomatic community during the Cold War.
This was partially to offset the ground force power
imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union, and to economize the
arms' race by using the specter of nuclear annihilation as a
deterrent to war.^^
Precision munitions, air supremacy and refined targeting
techniques were the hallmarks of the Gulf War air
campaign.'’^ In spite of these refinements, and an intense
six week bombing campaign, air power failed to produce
victory.'*^ What air power did accomplish was a significant
contribution to the ground operational offensive.'*^ This
assessment has caused some air power advocates to raise
14
their sights to the opportunities and capabilities of air
and ground forces in a non-linear battlefield environment;
airland battle on an operational level.
D. U.S. Navy Doctrine Development
(1) U.S. Navy Theory
The theoreticians of interest to the Navy include Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Herbert Rosinski.
Mahan's concept of decisive battle, and the relationship
between command of the sea and a nation's commerce was
underscored by the Napoleonic wars. Mahan attributed the
success of the coalition arrayed against France to the
battle of Trafalgar, the end result being the blockade which
cut off resources to Napoleon's Army.'’® The writings of
Mahan were instrumental in justifying a large U.S. naval
buildup, and the types of ships constituting this buildup,
in the late 19th century. Corbett has not been nearly as
influential as Mahan, although his ideas have found new
support in the Navy's concept of littoral operations.
Corbett reveals that in war the contention of the sea is the
normal condition, and that naval support to army operations
is a significant objective.’^ Rosinski, postulated that the
effects of sea and land power were complementary, but their
doctrine should remain separate because their operational
art was not complimentary.’® He argued that in the event of
15
total nuclear war the U.S. would depend on the nuclear
retaliation capabilities of an independent Navy to win/®
(2) U.S. Navy Doctrine and Traditions
The Navy tradition is that doctrine existed in a
relatively informal form from the Spanish - American War of
1898 until shortly before World War II. There was an
overwhelming consensus of professional thought centered on
the understanding that naval warfare was largely a blue
water enterprise that sought climactic battles between
fleets on the high seas, such as those witnessed at Midway
and the Coral Sea in World War II. This core belief
permeated Navy doctrine throughout the 1980s, culminating in
the 1988 Maritime Strategy which stated that in the event of
conflict with the Soviet Union, Naval forces would focus on
keeping the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open between
the United States and Europe. Since the publication of
the 1992 Navy - Marine Corps white paper. From the Sea, the
Navy has shifted its doctrinal focus towards littoral
operations, requiring the ability to secure advanced bases,
airfields, and seaports, and serve as the transition force
to the Army and Air Force forces arriving into a regional
theater .
(3) U.S. Navy History
Following the loss of a significant part of its
battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S.
16
Navy modified its campaign plan in the Pacific to rely on
aircraft carrier operations.^'’ Believing that the Japanese
Navy had reached their offensive culmination point in early
1942, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King opted for a strategy of
limited offensive operations and only accepted battle at
Coral Sea and at Midway out of necessity. These were
attempts to prevent the Japanese from gaining command of the
seas, more tending towards Corbett's theory that command of
the sea is normally in dispute rather than Mahan' s idea of
climactic battle.^®
By late 1943, Admiral King, along with Admiral Chester
Nimitz, concluded that the U.S. Navy was strong enough to
seek decisive battle with the Japanese fleet. Thus, the
U.S. Navy proceeded with the strategically offensive, and
operationally decisive phase of the campaign.
Unfortunately, the Navy missed opportunities to annihilate
the Japanese fleet at Eniwetok in February 1944,^® and again
in the Marianas battles in June 1944.®® Admiral Nimitz
conferred with Admiral William F. Halsey and they determined
not to let the opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet
slip away again.®®
The Leyte invasion was planned- by General MacArthur and
executed by Army and Navy forces, but the commanders of each
force failed to notice that they did not share the same
vision of decisive operational objectives. To General
17
MacArthur it was the ground invasion and ultimate liberation
of the Philippines. He ordered Admiral Halsey to support
the Leyte operations by either, "Containing or destroying
the Japanese Fleet. To Halsey, the objective of the
campaign was the destruction of the Japanese fleet alone.
While Halsey sought his objective, a Japanese surface force
was able to sail through the San Bernadino Straits and
threaten the U.S. landings on the Leyte beaches. The
disaster was narrowly averted by a small U.S. naval force
which sacrificed two destroyers, an escort destroyer and an
escort carrier to defeat the Japanese attack.®^ This
potential disaster could have been avoided had the
commanders shared the same vision, and unity of effort.
E. National Security and National Military Strategy
(1) National Security Strategy
The impact of the NSS and NMS on the formation of Joint
and Army doctrine begins with the identification of the
vital interests to the United States.®^ These interests
identify the most likely geographical areas of intervention
and types of missions the military must perform. To
military leaders and planners, the most likely areas of
intervention for conventional operations are the two major
regional contingency (MRC) areas. These regions present
politically and militarily complex environments, and
18
military doctrine must establish a process for fighting and
winning in them. Preparations for the two MRC scenario also
has collateral benefits in preparing for unforeseen threats
in the near future.®®
One of the end states of the NSS is a growing economy for
the U.S.®^ This creates a requirement for world markets to
be able to trade with the United States, which in turn
requires secure and stable societies to ensure sustained
progressive growth. The overarching political aim of
security and stability can only be achieved with the
combined efforts of the military, and the other elements of
national power.
(2) National Military Strategy
The NMS identifies eight basic strategic - operational
principles for accomplishing the military' s responsibilities
identified in the NSS. These principles apply to the full
spectrum of military actions. Those that are most closely
associated with decisive offensive operations include:
Clear Objectives - Decisive Force
Wartime Power Projection
Fight Combined and Fight Joint
Win the Information War
Win the Peace®®
The NMS does not specify how the military must achieve
these basic principles. They describe, not prescribe the
military strategic and operational environment, and they
allow for flexibility and adaptation to accommodate a
variety of possible situations.®®
19
This method of guidance does not provide military leaders
specific instructions on how they are to accomplish their
tasks, but instead allows for creative solutions in response
to complex situations . The NMS does not cite service
traditions, doctrines, histories or theory as precedent
setting. It is receptive to changes in doctrine as long as
the military objectives are met.
As an example of harmonizing complexity, heads of state
often form political coalitions to generate military force,
and to assist the diplomatic and military elements of
national power make the transition from conflict to peace.
The NMS recognizes and enables military commanders to
harmonize the challenges of a complex and rapidly changing
world using a capabilities based force. The effectiveness of
Joint and Army doctrine in support of the NSS - NMS will be
explored in the next section.
III. Strategic Considerations for Joint and Army Doctrine
A. The Strategic Environment as it Relates to Doctrine
The conventional military threats to the U.S. political
objectives of enhancing security and promoting prosperity
are identified in the two MRC scenario. For this and many
other scenarios, U.S. military doctrine must consider what
the military element of national power can do about the
effects of:
20
1. Sustaining the support of the U.S. population
2. Sustaining coalition cohesion
3. Securing the political aims of global security
and economic growth
4 . Overcoming the threats
The support of the American public is important to any
national endeavor, and perhaps none more so than in military
operations. Historically, however, the will of the American
public has been adversely affected by ill defined political
and military objectives, protracted attrition warfare and
needless bloodshed and destruction. The political failure
to sustain American public support during the Vietnam war,
and the resulting collapse of U.S. policy in Vietnam stands
as a stark reminder that wars overseas cannot be won without
the support of the people at home.
Coalition operations have the benefits of providing
additional combat power and enhanced legitimacy of their
collective goals and objectives, but also have some inherent
weaknesses. Weaknesses unique to coalitions may be
political and personality oriented, however, many of the
conditions that contribute to the breakdown of coalitions
mirror those that erode U.S. public support of military
operations .
The U.S. political objectives of enhancing security and
promoting prosperity must be observed during the conduct of
military operations. Paramount to military operations in
support of these objectives are the establishment and
maintenance of regional security and stability. Global
21
security is at risk whenever the U.S. military is decisively
engaged in a regional conflict. This may occur if the
leaders of nations or groups hostile to the U.S. become
belligerent because they perceive that the U.S. military is
unable to cope with a regional conflict and another crisis
simultaneously. The U.S. and global economies may be
adversely affected by a protracted war or massive
destruction of a belligerent's infrastructure.
The military characteristics common to Iran, Iraq and
North Korea are the power of their land based militaries,
limited but capable air forces and navies, and almost total
lack of space-based intelligence assets The nature of
their military operations is characterized by a centralized
command and control structure, non-professional conscript
armies and high petroleum consumption rates during mobile
warfare .
Within this strategic environment, and within the
capabilities of the military instrument of power, doctrine
must strive to create the conditions necessary to sustain
will of the American public and coalition cohesion.
Doctrine must also try to prevent conditions which could
undermine the political aims of security and economic
growth. As such, doctrine must create a process which
enables military forces to achieve rapid and decisive
victory, while minimizing casualties, to create conditions
that maintain public support and coalition cohesion. With
22
the current capabilities of the perceived military threats,
doctrine should enable military forces to achieve the
desired endstates, yet minimize unnecessary destruction of
an enemy's economic infrastructure. Finally, to create
conditions which contribute to a lasting peace, doctrine
must enable the military to conduct its operations while
retaining the moral high ground.
Creating the conditions for a lasting peace extends from
doctrinal principles of operational military art to the
tactical battlefield in terms of the way American forces
fight. Historically, the heinous treatment of defeated
armies and their civilian populations, perpetrated at the
hands of callous victors, engendered animosity and hatred
which produce the seeds for future war. For this reason, if
no other, it is imperative that military operations reflect
a sense of morality. In practice, military doctrine must
embrace the concepts and methods described in the Geneva -
Hague conventions, law of land warfare and the rules of
engagement (ROE) applied to the particular campaign.
B. The Military Strategic Environment
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Shalikashvili, identifies the military's first priority in
the National Military Strategy: "Being ready to fight and
win the nation' s wars remains our foremost responsibility
23
and the prime considerations governing all our military
activities . This is accomplished through the employment
of U.S. forces using eight basic principles:
1. Clear Objectives - Decisive Force
2. Wartime Power Projection
3. Fight Combined and Fight Joint
4. Win the Information War
5. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
6. Two Major Regional Contingency Focus
7. Force Generation
8. Win the Peace.
This paper will explore the five principles most relevant to
offensive operational doctrine,
(1) Clear Objectives - Decisive Force is the first
basic principle in the NMS and stresses that "....in any
application of force, military objectives will be clearly
defined... We intend to commit sufficient force to achieve
these objectives in a prompt and decisive manner.
Joint doctrine focuses on the chain of command as the
operative link between political and military strategic
objectives and operational level military objectives. As
Joint Pub 3-0 explains, "Directives flow from the NCA
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
combatant commanders, who plan and conduct the operations
that achieve national and alliance and/or coalition
strategic objectives."^® A common military doctrine serves
as the foundation for the operational planning process. The
planning process translates strategic guidance, and is used
to continuously develop and communicate clear objectives so
24
they remain relevant and consistent throughout the chain of
command, from the strategic to the tactical level.
Array doctrine uses the term, objective, to define the
focus of the efforts of all forces towards a common goal.
It nests objectives from the strategic through the
operational and tactical levels of war to ensure unity of
effort in support of the strategic endstate. Army doctrine
has developed patterns of operations, which can function as
an outline for phasing operational objectives:
1. Project the force
2. Protect the force
3. Gain information dominance
4. Shape the battlespace
5. Decisive operations
6. Sustain the force^®
The Army intends to achieve the conditions conducive for a
favorable termination of hostilities from military
operations conducted during the decisive phase of
operations .
Decisive Force is achieved by massing combat power, and
by using that combined power to achieve decisive effects on
the battlefield. The means to deliver the force are
generated through the reserve and active components
(including: air, land, sea and special operations forces),
the other elements of national power (diplomatic, economic
and informational) and from the coalitions that are formed
with other governments.^® Joint doctrine prescribes the
ways of generating decisive force through:
25
1 . Synergy
2. Simultaneity and Depth
3. Anticipation
4 . Balance
5 . Leverage
6. Timing and Tempo®°
Synergy is achieved by attacking the enemy' s physical
capabilities, moral and will. This is accomplished through
symmetric and asymmetric combinations of forces and actions
in the air, land and sea dimensions to achieve an
overwhelming concentration of combat power.
Simultaneity and depth are achieved through the
concurrent application of operations at the tactical,
operational and strategic levels against the enemy' s full
array of capabilities and sources of strength.®^ This is
possible with the synergy achieved across the multiple
dimensions of the battlefield environment.
Anticipation is used by the commander to plan and exploit
developing situations. By gathering information and
conducting a continuous intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB), commanders can anticipate which course of
action the enemy is likely to make, and then use that
information in his planning.®^
Balance refers to the commander's employment and use of
the correct combinations of friendly forces to disrupt the
enemy's balance of capabilities, while protecting his own.®^
If, for example, the theater commander can overwhelm an
26
enemy's air force and still retain his own, then he has
created an imbalance of force capabilities.
Leverage is the exploitation of the imbalances of combat
power across the dimensions of air, land, sea and space.
If, continuing the example above, the theater commander uses
his dominance in air power to begin the destruction of the
enemy's ground forces, he is using the air dimension in an
asymmetric fashion to leverage the enemy.
Timing and tempo are the synchronization of friendly
capabilities to maximize combat effects at a pace too rapid
for the enemy to react. It refers to timing of the
application of force and combat effects so they are felt by
the enemy at the desired time.®^
(2) Wartime Power Projection — Strategic mobility
constraints will force doctrine in a direction that achieves
decisive offensive objectives with lighter forces (equipment
and size of the force) . Fewer armored and mechanized forces
will be available, resulting in a greater reliance on air
and sea power projection because of their strategic
mobility. This composition of forces will require the Army
to fight with a greater reliance on joint and combined
forces than any previous time in history.®®
(3) Fight Combined and Fight Joint — This implies
that commanders at every level must develop a joint vision
of the battlefield to ensure unity of effort. An Army
doctrine consistent with Joint doctrine ensures commanders
27
and planners have a common ideology for understanding how
the service components can work together. From this common
ideology, the joint campaign plan provides clear objectives
and synchronization of assets to implement joint
operability.®’' This doctrinal consistency and common
ideology should help to prevent the problems of dissimilar
visions which led to the missteps at Leyte Gulf in World War
II.
(4) Win the Information War — Controlling the
information domain encompasses structures, systems,
procedures and products intended for use by the enemy.®® It
is in the interests of commanders to defeat the enemy's
command and control process, and take away his ability to
operate in a coordinated way. Separating an enemy's force
from their commander, helps to break down the enemy' s unit
moral and cohesion, and his will to fight.
(5) Win the Peace.
The strategic goal of any military objective is conflict
termination and a lasting peace on favorable terms to the
U.S. and its allies. It is important to begin to win the
peace at the outset of the conflict, not as an afterthought.
As such, doctrine must support military operations in
conjunction with the work of non-governmental organizations,
and other elements of national power, throughout the
8 9
campaign, to aid in the transition to peace.
28
IV. A Comparison of Joint and Army Offensive Operations
Doctrine at the Operational Level .
A. Contrast of Joint and Army operational scope
Joint doctrine looks at the battlefield from a wider
operational vantage point than Army doctrine, and with good
reason. Joint doctrine must combine the capabilities of
air, sea, space and special operations to attain required
operational and strategic objectives . In war the aim is
to defeat the enemy' s operational COGs as directly and
rapidly as possible, in order to ultimately expose and
defeat his strategic COG.®^ To defeat the enemy's
operational COGs, Joint doctrine uses the most appropriate
armed service as its main effort, and the other services as
supporting efforts.®^
The Army' s operational scope is focused on the close
fight — where ground forces are in contact with the enemy,
and in the areas of an operation that can influence the
close fight. From this point of view. Army doctrine does
not consider the possibility of ground forces becoming a
supporting effort to another service fighting the deep fight
as the main effort. At both the tactical and operational
levels of war. Army doctrine espouses the belief that the
capabilities of the other services are only to be used to
help ground forces win their battles.®^
29
B. Defeating enemy operational COGs, the direct and
indirect approaches
Joint doctrine is very clear about its preferred method
of attacking an enemy's COG, "To the extent possible, JFCs
[Joint Force Commanders] attack enemy COGs directly."®^ It
further elaborates that Joint commanders should designate
the most appropriate element (land, sea or air) as the main
effort to attack the enemy COGs. Only if attacking the
enemy COG directly causes a commander to attack into the
enemy's strength, should the commander use an indirect
approach.
In contrast. Army doctrine focuses on attacking enemy
COGs through successive decisive points.®^ This method is
accomplished when ground forces attack those enemy
weaknesses which lead to a position of advantage for
subsequent attacks on his operational COGs.^® Army doctrine
stresses repeatedly, that all other efforts (deep
operations, interdiction, etc.) in a campaign, battle or
engagement are in support of the ground force that is
designated to rupture the enemy' s defenses and exploit him
9 9
to fullest advantage.
30
C. Decisiveness of offensive operations.
Army doctrine is consistent with Joint doctrine in that
only offensive operations can produce decisive results, and
that the operational ends establish conditions that support
the political aim.^°° Joint Pub 3-0 and FM 100-5 point out
that the purpose of decisive offensive operations is to
cause the enemy to conform to our will, and to overcome his
ability to resist. The military ways and means that are
best suited to accomplishing this purpose should, in most
cases, become the main effort of the attack. All
supporting efforts should contribute to the success of the
main effort. Some military leaders have termed this concept
as nesting.
Unfortunately, Army doctrine is not consistent with
Joint doctrine regarding who can be selected as the main
effort for accomplishing the destruction of the enemy's
operational COGs . Joint doctrine states that in some
situations, air or sea power may become the main effort,
with the Army in support. Army doctrine, however, insists
that decisive operations only occur in the close fight with
ground maneuver forces, and all other elements of military
power are in support. If Army doctrine remains
inconsistent, it could adversely affect the coherence of the
JFC's campaign and operational plan.
The purpose of the main effort is to accomplish the goal
of the operational objective. If it is the destruction or
31
defeat of a mobile reserve, and this can be accomplished by
air power, then air power must become the main effort, with
ground forces in support. The supporting effort missions
are nested in the operational mission by the tasks and
purposes given to create conditions which contribute to the
success of the main effort.
If the mission of the main effort (air) is to destroy
the enemy's operational reserve, the task given to the
ground component commander may be to seize an objective (an
enemy's decisive point) to cause his reserve to
counterattack. This purpose is nested in the mission of the
main effort, because it exposes the enemy to the effects of
air power; enabling the main effort to accomplish its
mission. The absence of this possible approach in Army
doctrine could inhibit a joint vision of the campaign, and
endanger the operational endstate.
D . The nature of offensive operations in either of the MRCs
is likely to be nonlinear.
Both Joint and Army doctrine recognize that nonlinear
operations are possible in future wars.^°'’ Unfortunately,
only Joint doctrine indicates that the U.S. military should
expect a future experience similar to that of Operation Just
Cause in Panama. It is an example of how rapid, decisive
and complex nonlinear operations are likely to occur in the
future. Joint doctrine suggests that the freedom of action
32
to conduct nonlinear ground operations can be achieved by
dominating the air and sea dimensions . Army doctrine
recognizes that the potential for nonlinear operations may
exist and that these operations give commanders additional
flexibility, but doctrine does not indicate how the
commander can operate in a nonlinear environment.^”^
Joint Pub 3-0 observes that the synchronization of
maneuver and interdiction synchronize in a complimentary
fashion and can achieve the Joint Force Commander' s campaign
objectives.^”” The combined effects of maneuver and
interdiction serve to mutually enhance security and weapon
systems effects, and to create a decisive force by massing
effects through the multiple dimensions of combat (e.g.,
air, sea and land) .
The inconsistency of doctrines in the concept of
operations in a nonlinear environment is highlighted when
Joint Pub 3-0 states, "...JFCs may employ a scheme of
maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice
versa. FM 100-5' s chapter on Conduct of Operations does
not contain methods for conducting nonlinear operations, but
it does offer some possibilities for attacking the enemy' s
operational COG more directly. JFCs could use the Army's
forte of conducting operational maneuver warfare in a fast
paced linear environment to enhance interdiction operations.
Furthermore, the Army could modify its doctrine to address
33
the kinds of operations that would enhance its planning
flexibility.
Before Army doctrine can grasp the art of operations in a
consistent way with Joint doctrine, it must accept two
aspects of maneuver. First, that the JFCs' preferred method
of attacking an enemy' s COG is directly, and it can be
accomplished through air power. Second, that when air power
dominates the air dimension, it is a form of maneuver. It
is the effect of dominating the air space that allows air
power to gain positional advantage over ground forces.
This definition violates the Army' s traditional
interpretations of maneuver, but meets the spirit of the
effects of maneuver which is to "Place the enemy in a
position of disadvantage through the flexible application of
combat power .
With a new understanding of Joint maneuver, the Army's
operational concepts of Forms of Offensive Maneuver could be
used to achieve the kind of synchronization of maneuver
described in Joint doctrine. The forms of offensive
maneuver, penetration and turning movement, contained in the
FM 100-5 (draft) could be used in consonance with air power
to cause the enemy to react in ways that make him vulnerable
to aerial attack. Turning movements, using amphibious,
airborne and/or air assault forces identified in FM 100-5
(May 1986) could be used to exploit the advantages of
34
nonlinear warfare by opening up a second operational front
in a theater of operations .
Deep penetrations, designed to seize or destroy an
enemy's operational decisive point, would likely cause the
enemy to become vulnerable to air attacks when reacting to
the penetration. Turning movements could be used not only
for the traditional purpose of causing the enemy' s front
line units to abandon their prepared defensive positions,
but also to establish conditions for an attack directly on
an enemy' s operational COG when it moves to counterattack or
withdrawal. Aerial turning movements which include elements
of Army air and ground assets, in conjunction with air
interdiction could be used to rapidly gain a positional
advantage over the enemy's COG, or to strike the COG
directly.
If Army doctrine becomes consistent with Joint doctrine,
it would give the JFC and his staff another approach to the
operational art of war. Commanders and staffs should not
look at the battlefield only from the perspective of what
support operations do to enhance the close fight, but in
terms of how all aspects of battlespace can be managed to
defeat the enemy's COG. In the regions of the world
containing the two MRCs, offensive operational maneuver
could be decisive in the deep battle as well as the close
battle, and the main effort for some phases of the operation
should belong to air power.
35
V. Implications for the Future
A. Breaking the dogma
Before the U.S. military can achieve a significant
improvement in the performance of joint operations, the Army
must adopt a vision consistent with Joint doctrine. The
Army must accept in its doctrine the direct approach as a
means to defeating an enemy's COG, and it must also accept
the role as a supporting effort to one of its sister
services when required. This fundamental change in vision
can lead to a more creative and integrated planning
capability, and to an operational art with greater potential
than presently exists.
This consistent doctrinal vision of the battlefield that
includes a better appreciation of friendly capabilities and
how to integrate their effects will lead to an improved
planning ability for Army and Joint staffs. It will provide
commanders and their staffs greater flexibility for
identifying potential problems and finding sound solutions
in dynamic, complex environments and for developing courses
of action that fully exploit enemy vulnerabilities.
Great leaders like Generals Douglas MacArthur and George
S. Patton possessed a genius for joint operational art.
They broke away from purely ground schemes of maneuver as a
way to greatly increase the scale and speed of offensive
operations. A consistent Army - Joint doctrine would
36
contain the operational art concepts that enable commanders
and their staffs to reach their full potential, performing
nonlinear operations on the scale of OPERATION CHROMITE for
the Inchon invasion, and joint exploitation and pursuit
operations on the scale and speed of 3rd Army's race across
France during World War II. The planning and execution of
these types of operations could produce the speed and
decisiveness necessary to support the political realities
that come into play of when U.S. forces are committed to a
theater of conflict.
The U.S. military will ultimately move towards more
integrated joint operations to attack and defeat enemy
operational COGs in future conflicts. The successful
coordination and cooperation in future operations will
depend on commanders and their staffs using a single
doctrinal vision. The Army may continue to write doctrine
to address those operations that are primarily executed by
the Army, however, a single unified doctrine is required to
standardize the planning and execution of joint operations
in the deep battle area.
Doctrine alone may well not change the thinking and
professional convictions of commanders and their staffs. An
integrated Army doctrine that is consistent with Joint
doctrine must have imbedded into its vision, a common
understanding of:
37
1. Military theory of how military actions on
the battlefield are used to produce a desired
result .
2. The military missions that are derived from
the NSS and NMS
3. The blurring of service roles and missions
in the deep battle area
4. Sister service technical capabilities and
operational methods
These areas of common understanding should be integrated
into all academic military curriculums that include
instruction in operational art.
B. Institutional challenges
The increased integration of the joint deep-battle area
places a greater emphasis on the purchase of equipment that
is fully interoperable between the services. Commanders and
their staffs require common command, control,
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) for common
• 117
situational awareness and operational cooperation.
Soldiers, sailors and airmen require common target
acquisition/designation and sensor/shooter systems to
enhance their integration on the battlefield.^^®
Challenges for senior military leaders loom in the form
of service budget cuts and intense inner-service rivalry.
These leaders must resist the rationale that if one service
allows another to encroach upon its roles and missions, it
will lose funding. It will take a great deal of moral
courage on the part of the senior army leadership to make
the changes required to move towards a truly joint
38
environment. It can be done, and it must be done, if the
U.S. military plans to remain relevant in the twenty first
century.
VI . Conclusions
This paper has looked at several issues in answering the
question Is FM 100-5 (draft) January 1997, concept of
decisive offensive operations consistent with Joint Pub 3-0?
It is apparent that in operations involving an indirect
approach against a succession of enemy decisive points, the
two doctrines are consistent. In the event that enemy COGs
are vulnerable to a direct approach of attack. Army doctrine
is not in unison with Joint doctrine.
The doctrines of the Air Force and the Navy have
influenced Joint doctrine's position in favor of the direct
approach, and in using air or sea power as the main effort
in some phases of the campaign for achieving operational
objectives. The Air Force posits that an attack on the
operational COGs is the most preferred operational method of
achieving political aims.“® This is best achieved through
asymmetric attacks on ground targets from the air in
consonance with supporting ground attacks. The Navy's
influence on Joint doctrine has been on the capabilities of
nonlinear warfare and force projection from the sea.^^^ The
ability to open up a second operational front poses a
39
dilemma for the enemy, and significantly increases
operational tempo. The adoption of these concepts into Joint
doctrine increases the complexity of operational art and
challenges the Army to adapt to a variant form of (air and
sea) maneuver.
Potential enemies in the MRC regions are vulnerable to
the kinds of military campaigns that Joint doctrine prefers,
"To the extent possible, JFCs [Joint Force Commanders]
attack enemy COGs directly . This is possible with U.S.
and coalition militaries' ability to dominate the air and
sea dimensions. The enemy's operational COGs are exposed to
air attacks as suggested by AFM l-l^^^ and by amphibious and
vertical turning movements identified in the 1986 version of
FM 100-5.^^^ In these kinds of operations, ground maneuver
missions would support air and/or amphibious operations.
The direct approach in operational warfare, when
possible, supports the NSS and NMS desire for a rapid and
decisive conclusion to hostilities, and for a smooth
transition to a lasting peace. Ground intensive wars that
attack and maneuver through a series of decisive points, and
then on to the COGs themselves, tend to take longer and
wreak greater destruction. The tremendous loss of life, and
destruction of infrastructure so prevalent in ground
intensive warfare impedes the NSS goals of security and
■ 125
prosperity .
40
These findings suggest that U.S. Army doctrine should
include operational concepts for how ground forces could
support air
operational
theoretical
attacks are
approach is
operations .
and sea forces in a direct attack on enemy
COGs . Included in these concepts should be the
and historical underpinnings as to how direct
possible, and to understand when the direct
not the preferred method of offensive
^ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C.,
February 1996, 14 and National Military Strategy, 1995, pg.
ii
^ FM 100-5, Operations , (Draft) , Headquarters, Department of
the Army, Ft. Monroe, VA, January 1997, I-l-l
^ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement , The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C.,
February 1996, 14 and National Military Strategy, 1995, pg.
ii
^ Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington D.C., March 1994, 300
^ Ibid. , 302
® Ibid., 65
^ Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 1994, xii
® Colonel Michael Starry, (comments at the School of
Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS) 29 April
1997
® Dr. James J. Schneider, "How War Works" (School of
Advanced Military Studies, Syllabus, Course 1, Ft.
Leavenworth, KS) Academic Year 96-97, 5
41
10
Dr. James J. Tritten, "Naval doctrine ... From the Sea"
(Naval doctrine Command information paper # 3-00-008),
December 1994, 5
Dr. Robert M. Epstein, (Introduction to Course four:
Historical Perspectives, School of Advanced Military-
Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS) , Academic Year 96-97, 2
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by:
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press,
1989) , 77 & 99
Ibid., 485-486
Ibid., 119-121
Ibid., 528
Antoine Henri Jomini, Roots of Strategy, translated by
Brigadier General J. D. Hittle, Stackpole Books, 1987, 467,
468
Fieldmarshal Ferdinand Foch, (letter to Major General A.
W. Greely, October 23, 1920) as quoted in Roots of Strategy,
Stackpole Books, 1987, 10
Colonel Ardant du Picq, Roots of Strategy, translated by
Colonel John M, Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton, Stackpole
Books, 1987, 149-152
Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, Makers of Modern
Strategy, edited by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press,
1986, 601, 602
FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the
Army, Ft. Monroe, VA, May 1986, 32
FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the
Army, Ft. Monroe, VA, May 1986, 116
FM 100-5 (Draft), II-1-3
Ibid. , IV-1-9
Ibid.,. IV-1-7
Warden, 54
Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, Volume 1,
Indiana University Press, 1981, 304
42
Ibid., 298
Ibid., 314
FM 22-100 Military Leadership, Headquarters, Department
of the Army, July 1990, 10-14
Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War;
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Center of Military
History, United States Army, Washington D.C., 1986, 488,
489, 542, 543
Shelby L. Stanton, Anatomy of a Division, Warner Books,
1987, 78-83
Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, translated by Dino
Ferrari, reprinted by the Office of Air Force History,
Washington D.C., 1983, 23, 35
William Mitchell, Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics,
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1930, 255, 256, as quoted in The
American Way of War, by Russell Weigley, Indiana University
Press, 1977, 223
Colonel John A. Warden III, "The Enemy as a System"
Airpower Journal, Spring 1995, 41-47
Guilio Douhet, The command of the Air, Office of Air
Force History, Washington D.C., reprinted in 1983, 23
Department of the Air Force AF Manual 1-1, Headquarters,
U.S. Air Force, Washington D.C., March 1992, 22
MAJ Robert J. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Army and Air
Force Airpower Thinking" (Thesis, School of Advanced
Airpower Studies, 1993), 54-55
ibid., 56
Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton, To
Command the Sky, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991, 245
David Macisaac, in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by
Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986, 645
Weigley, 402, 436
43
42
Thomas A. Kearney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power
Survey Summary, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington
D.C., 65
Ibid., 90
Ibid., 116
Hamilton, 59
Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval
Historian" in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter
Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986, 452-456
Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,
Naval Institute Press, 1988, 94, 317
Herbert Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought,
edited by B. Mitchell Simpson, naval War College Press, 64,
139
Ibid.
Dr. James J. Tritten, "Naval doctrine ... From the Sea"
(Naval doctrine Command information paper # 3-00-008),
December 1994, 1
Bernard E. Trainor, LTG USMC (RET), "Anchors Awry: How to
Fix the Sinking Navy", The Washington Post, May 26, 1996
Richard W. Durham, Commander USN, "Naval Forces as the
Holding Force in a Win-Hold-Win Military Strategy (Thesis,
Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship, Ft.
Leavenworth, KS) , 1997, 11
John Dalton Secretary of the Navy; Admiral J. M. Boorda,
USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.,
USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, (Information paper.
Navy Public Affairs Library, Internet: navpalibOopnav-
emh.navy.mil) November 1994, 1-5
54
Weigley,
271
55
Ibid . ,
274
56
Corbett,
91
57
Weigley,
285, 286
58
Ibid . ,
288
44
59
Ibid
295-299
Ibid., 302
M. Hamlin Cannon, "Leyete, The Return to the Philippines"
United States Naval War College, 1954, 371
Weigley, 302, 303
Ibid., 303, 304
National Security Strategy, 18
Ibid., 14
National Security Strategy, 14
Ibid., 11
National Military Strategy of the United States of
America, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington
D.C., 1995, 13-16
Ibid., iii
Ibid., 17
NSS, 14
Ibid., 21
NMS, ii
Ibid., 13-16
Ibid., 13
Joint Pub 3-0, 1-5
Ibid., III-l
FM 100-5, 1-2-11, 1-2-12
Joint Pub 3-0, 1-5, 1-6
Ibid., III-9 through III-15
Ibid., III-9, III-IO
45
Ibid., III-ll
Ibid. , III-12,
III-13
Ibid., III-13
Ibid., III-15,
III-16
NMS, 7, 13
Joint Pub 3-0,
III-4, III-
•5
®® FM 100-5 (draft)
, 1-2-8
NMS, 16
Joint Pub 3-0,
X, III-4,
III-5
Joint Pub 3-0,
xii
Joint Pub 3-0,
IV-7
FM 100-5 (draft) ,
IV-1-9
FM 100-5 (draft)
, II-5-7,
II-5-8, IV-1-9
Joint Pub 3-0,
III-21
Ibid.
FM 100-5 (draft)
, IV-1-7
FM 100-5 (draft)
, IV-1-4
FM 100-5 (draft)
IV-1-2 through IV-
, II-1-3,
1-9
II-1-4, II-5-7, II-5-8,
Joint Pub 3-0,
ix, FM 100-5, i
Joint Pub 3-0,
1-2-4, 1-2-7
IV-7, FM
100-5 (draft), IV-overview-1 ,
Joint Pub 3-0,
IV-7
FM 100-5 (draft
), II-1-4,
Joint Pub 3-0,
2-15
IV- 8, FM
100-5 (draft), III-2-7, III-
Joint Pub 3-0,
IV-8
46
106
Joint Pub 3-0, IV-9
47
Books :
Appleman, Roy E. United States Army in the Korean War; South
to the Naktonq^ North to the Yalu, Center of Military
History, United States Army, Washington D.C., 1986
Bond, Brian and Alexander, Martin Makers of Modern Strategy,
edited by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986
Clausewitz, Carl On War, edited and translated by: Michael
Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, 1989)
Corbett, Julian Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Naval
Institute Press, 1988
Crowl, Philip A. "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian"
in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret,
Princeton University Press, 1986
Douhet, Guilio The Command of the Air, translated by Dino
Ferrari, reprinted by the Office of Air Force History,
Washington D.C., 1983
Du Picq, Ardant Roots of Strategy Book 2, translated by
Colonel John M, Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton, Stackpole
Books, 1987
Jomini, Antoine Henri Roots of Strategy Book 2, translated
by Brigadier General J. D. Hittle, Stackpole Books, 1987
Macisaac, David Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter
Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986
McFarland, Stephen L. and Newton, Wesley Phillips To Command
the Sky, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991
Kearney, Thomas A. and Cohen, Eliot A. Gulf War Air Power
Survey Summary, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington
D.C.
Mitchell, William Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics,
Philadelphia: Lippincott, as quoted in The American Way of
War, by Russell Weigley, Indiana University Press
Rosinski, Herbert The Development of Naval Thought, edited
by B. Mitchell Simpson, naval War College Press, 1977
Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division, Warner Books,
1987
Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower's Lieutenants, Volume 1,
Indiana University Press, 1981
Articles :
Dalton, John Information paper. Navy Public Affairs
Library, Internet: [email protected] November
1994
48
Cannon, Hamlin M. "Leyete, The Return to the Philippines"
United States Naval War College, 1954
Alberts, Maj Donald J. "A Call From the Wilderness." Air
University Review (November - December 1976): 35-45.
Allen, Gen Lew Jr. "The Chief's Views on Key Issues."
Address to 1981 Air Force Association National Convention,
Washington, D.C., 15 September 1981. Text in Air Force
Policy Letter for Commanders, Sup 2 (September 1981): 2-7.
Angelucci, Enzo. Rand-McNally Encyclopedia of Military
Aircraft. New Yorlc: Crescent Boolcs, 1990.
Babiasz, Maj Franlc E. "The Fighter/Interceptor Helicopter: A
Concept for Today and Tomorrow." US Army Aviation Digest
(January 1982): 30-32.
Berry, Clifton F. Jr., (ed) . "USAF Doctrine Comes Alive."
Air Force Magazine (July 1983): 34-36.
Bird, Julie. "McPeak Lays Out Rationale for Composite Wing."
Air Force Times (29 April 1991): 4.
Boyd, Lt . Gen Charles G. and Westenhoff, Lt. Col Charles M.
"Airpower Thinking: Request Unrestricted Climb." Airpower
Journal (Fall 1991): 4-15.
Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co, 1973.
Canby, Steven L. "Tactical Air Power in Armored Warfare —
The Divergence Within Nato." Air University Review (May -
June 1979) : 2-20 .
Canan, James W. "The Watchword is Flexibility." Air Force
Magazine (February 1990) : 56-61
Canan, James W. "Global Power From American Shores." Air
Force Magazine (October 1989): 38-44.
Cardwell, Col Thomas A. "One Step Beyond -- AirLand Battle,
Doctrine not Dogma." Military Review (April 1984): 45-53.
Cardwell, Col Thomas A. "Extending the Battlefield: An
Airman's Point of View." Air University Review (March -
April 1983): 86-93.
Chain, Gen John T. Jr. "Strategic Bonders in Conventional
Warfare." Strategic Review (Spring 1986): 23-32.
Cignatta, John V. "A U.S. Pilot Looks at the Order of
Battle, Bekaa Valley Operations." Military
Electronics/Countermeasures (February 1983): 108.
Clodfelter, Maj Mark A. The Limits of Airpower. New York:
The Free Press, 1989.
49
Creech, Gen W. L. "Commitment to Excellence" address to the
Aviation Hall of Fame Induction Dinner, Cleveland, Ohio, 4
September 1981. Text in Air Force Policy Letter for
Commanders, Sup 2 (1981): 12-15.
Davis, Gen Bennie L. "Indivisible Airpower." Air Force
Magazine (March 1984): 46-50.
Davis, Richard G. The 31 Initiatives. Air Staff Historical
Study, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987.
Dembosky, Lt Andrew D. "Meeting the Challenge: United States
Air Force Basic Doctrine Through 1992." Master's thesis.
North Carolina State University, 1993.
Deptula, LtC David A. "The Air Campaign: The Planning
Process." Lecture. School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
Maxwell AFB, Ala., 13 May 1993.
Dodd, Col Norman. "Helicopters in Modern Warfare." Asian
Defense Journal (October 1982): 72-76.
Donnelly, Gen Charles L. Jr., (Ret). "A Theater-Level View
of Airpower." Airpower Journal (Summer 1987): 3-8.
Donnelly, Gen Charles L. Jr., (Ret). "An Air Commander's
View of the Operational Art." Military Review (September
1990) : 79-84.
Downer, Brig Gen Lee A. "The Composite Wing in Combat."
Airpower Journal (Winter 1991) : 4-16.
Drew, Col Dennis M. "Two Decades in the Air Power
Wilderness: Do We Know Where We Are?" Air University Review
( September-October 1986): 2-13.
Drew, Col Dennis M. Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a
Failure. Maxwell AFB, Ala: Center for Aerospace Doctrine,
Research and Education, Air University, 1986.
Drew, Col Dennis M. "The Airpower Imperative; Hard Truths
for an Uncertain World." Strategic Review (Spring 1991): 24-
31.
Dugan, Gen Micheal J. "Air Power: Concentration,
Responsiveness and the Operational Art." Military Review
(July 1989) : 12-21.
Durham, Richard W. "Naval Forces as the Holding Force in a
Win-Hold-Win Military Strategy (Thesis, Advanced Operational
Arts Studies Fellowship, Ft. Leavenworth, KS) , 1997
Epstein, Robert M. (Introduction to Course four: Historical
Perspectives, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft.
Leavenworth, KS) , Academic Year 96-97
50
Fabyanic, Col Thomas A. "War, Doctrine, and the Air War
College." Air University Review ( January-February 1986): 2-
29.
Foch, Ferdinand - Fieldmarshal ( letter to Major General A. W.
Greely, October 23, 1920) as quoted in Roots of Strategy
Book 2, Stackpole Books, 1987
Futrell, Robert Frank. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic
Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1961-1984. Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989.
Foss, Gen John W. "Airland Battle Future." Army (February
1991) : 21-24.
Gessert, Robert A. "The Airland Battle and NATO's New
Doctrinal Debate." RUSI J for Def Studies (June 1984): 52-
60.
Gulf War Air Power Survey. Unclassified. 22 March 1993.
Gilson, Charles. "Can the A-10 Thunderbolt II Survive in
Europe?" International Defense Review (No. 2, 1979) : 184-
189.
Hallion, Richard P. Storm over Iraq. Washington D.C.:
Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992.
Hamilton, Robert J. "The Evolution of Army and Air Force
Airpower Thinking" (Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower
Studies, 1993)
Holder, Etc L. D. "Maneuver in the Deep Battle." Parameters
(May 1982) : 54-61 .
Horner, Lt Gen Charles A. "The Air Campaign." Military
Review (September 1991): 17-27.
Hosmer, Lt Gen Bradley C. "American Air Power and Grand
Tactics." Airpower Journal (Summer 1987): 9-14.
Jones, Gen David C. "The Quiet Revolution in USAF' s
Capabilities." Interview. Air Force Magazine (September
1975) : 38-44 .
Kitfield, James. "The Drive for 'Global Reach'." Government
Executive (December 1991): 10+.
Luttwak, Edward N. "Victory Through Air Power." Commentary
(August 1991): 27-30.
Mace, Don. "Facets of Aerospace Power." Air Force Times (10
December 1979): 22+.
Machos, Maj James A. "TACAIR Support For AirLand Battle."
Air University Review (May- June 1984): 16-24.
Machos, Maj James A. "Air-Land Battles or AirLand Battle?"
Military Review (July 1983): 33-40.
51
Manning, Capt . Stephen 0. III. "Its Power and its Punch."
Airman. (October 1975): 38-41.
McCoy, Tidal W. "'Full Strike' — The Myths and Realities of
AirLand Battle." Armed Forces Journal, International (June
1984) : 78+.
McNair, Maj Gen Carl H. "Army Aviation Forces in the Airland
Battle." US Army Aviation Digest (July 1981): 6-13.
McNair, Maj Gen Carl H. "Helicopter Air to Air Combat
Operations: The Big Picture." US Army Aviation Digest
(October 1981): 1-5.
McPeak, Gen Merrill A. "The Laurels of Excellence." Sea
Power (April 1991): 47-49.
McPeak, Gen Merrill A. "TACAIR Missions and the Fire Support
Coordination Line." Air University Review (September -
October 1985): 65-72.
McPeak, Gen Merrill A. "For the Composite Wing." Airpower
Journal (Fall 1990): 4-12.
Myers, Maj Grover E. Aerospace Power: The Case for
Indivisible Application. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University
Press, 1986.
Ostovich, Maj Gen Rudolph III. "Army Aviation in AirLand
Battle Future." Military Review (February 1991): 25-29.
Ostovich, Maj Gen Rudolph III. "AirLand Battle: Dramatic
Changes in Emerging Aviation Doctrine." U.S. Army Aviation
Digest (November 1986): 2-9.
Possehl, Col Wayne A. "To Fly and Fight at the Operational
Level." Airpower Journal (Winter 1988): 20-28.
Rasmussen, Col Robert D. "The Central Europe Battlefield:
Doctrinal Inplications for Counterair-Interdiction." Air
University Review (July - August 1978): 2-20.
Richardson, Lt Gen William R. "Airmobility in the 1980s." US
Army Aviation Digest (August 1981): 2-5.
Richardson, Lt Gen William R. "FM 100-5: The Airland Battle
in 1986," Military Review (March. 1986): 4-11.
Rippe, LTC Stephen T. "Army and Air Force Issue: Principles
and procedures for AirLand Warfare." Air University Review
(May - June 1986): 60-69.
RisCassi, Maj Gen Robert W. "Army Aviation in the 1980s: the
Success of the First 5 Years, The Challenges of the Second."
US Army Aviation Digest (January 1986): 2-8.
Roberts, Cynthia A. "Soviet Arms-Transfer Policy and the
Decision to Update Syrian Air Defenses." Survival (July-
August 1983): 154.
52
Rogers, Gen Bernard. "Follow-on Forces Attack." NATO's
Sixteen Nations (November - December 1984): 49-51.
Romjue, John L. "Airland Battle: the Historical Background."
Military Review (March 1986): 52-55.
Romjue, John L. "The Evolution of the Airland Battle
Concept. Air University Review (May-June 1984): 4-15.
Romjue, John L. From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The
Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982. Fort Monroe,
Virginia: Historical Office, United States
Ryan, Gen John D. "United States Strategic and Tactical Air
Forces: Today and Tommorow." NATO's Fifteen Nations (August
- September 1972): 16-19.
Schneider, James J. "How War Works" (School of Advanced
Military Studies, Syllabus, Course 1, Ft. leavenworth, KS)
Academic Year 96-97
Shiner, Col John F. "Reflections on Douhet . " Air University
Review ( January-February 1985): 68-78.
Sollinger, It. Col Jerry M. "Airland Battle: Implications
for the Infantry." Infantry (March - April 1982): 20-25.
Stanton, Shelby 1. "lessons learned or lost: Air Cavalry and
Airmobility . " Military Review (January 1989): 74-86.
Starry, Gen Donn A. "Extending the Battlefield." Military
Review (8 March 1981): 31-50.
Stiles, Maj Dennis W. "Air Power: A New look From and Old
Rooftop." Air University Review (November - December 1975):
49-59.
Stiles, Maj Dennis W. "Air Power: Medium or Message?"
Parameters (July 1977): 28-31.
Suit, William. "The logistics of Air Power Projection." Air
Power History (Vol 338, Fall 1991): 9-20.
TAC-TRADOC AIFA Air land Bulletin. Selected Articles, 19
July 1979.
TAC-TRADOC AIFA Air land Bulletin. Selected Articles, 20
April 1981.
TAC-TRADOC AIFA Air land Bulletin. Selected Articles, 25
September 1981.
TAC-TRADOC AIFA Air land Bulletin. Selected Articles, 28 May
1984.
The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach -
Global Power, A White Paper. Washington D.C., Department of
the Air Force, June 1990.
TIG Brief. 14 March 1975: 17.
53
Tilford, Earl H. Jr. Setup: What the Air Force Did in
Vietnam and Why. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,
June 1991.
Trainer, Bernard E. "Anchors Awry: How to Fix the Sinking
Navy", The Washington Post, May 26, 1996
Tritten, James J. "Naval doctrine ... From the Sea" (Naval
doctrine Command information paper # 3-00-008), December
1994
Ulsamer, Edgar, (ed) . "The Quiet Revolution in USAF' s
Capabilities." Air Force Magazine (September 1975): 38-44.
Ulsamer, Edgar. "Progress, Priorites, and Fantasies." Air
Force Magazine (January 1986): 86-91.
Warden, John A. III. The Air Campaign. New York: Pergamon-
Brassey' s Int'l Defense Publishers, 1989.
Warden, John A. III. "The Enemy as a System" Airpower
Journal, Spring 1995
Warrick, John. "Air Force Planning Intergrated 'Composite'
Wings." AF Times (8 April 1991): 4.
Wass de Czege, LtC Hubba and Holder, LtC L. D. "The new FM
100-5." Military Review (July 1982): 53-70.
Welch, Gen Larry D. "Airpower Journal: A Message from the
Chief of Staff." Air Power Journal (Summer 1987): 2.
Welch, Gen Larry D. "Aerospace Defense for the Future.
Defense 89 (1989): 27-33.
Report of the White House Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy. Washington D.C., 1988.
Woodmansee, Maj Gen John W. Jr. "Blitzkrieg and the Airland
Battle." Military Review (August 1984): 21-39.
"Yom Kippur Special." Defense Update 42 (August 1983):
Entire Issue.
Government Publications:
Annual Report to the President and the Congress Part 1, U . S .
DEFENSE STRATEGY, Chapter 1 [on line] ; available from
http://www.dtic.dla.mil/execsec/adr96/ chapt_l . HTML;
Internet, assessed December 5, 1996.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military
Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of
Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1995)
54
Fishel, John T. The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the
Restoration of Panama, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, April 1992.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1 Joint Warfare of
the US Armed Forces. Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1991.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-01.1 Compendium of Joint
Publications . Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for
Joint Operations. Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1995.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine
for Military Operations Other Than War. Washington D.C:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint
Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal
Defense . Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.2 Joint
Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism.
Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.3 Joint
Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping
Operations . Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.4 Joint
Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Joint Counterdruq
Operations . Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-01 Mobility System
Policies Procedures and Considerations (Change 2).
Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1986.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-03.1 Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies
and Procedures) . Washington D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
August 1993
The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement . Washington D.C.-: Government Printing
Office, February 1996
U.S. Air Force. AFM 1-1 Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine
of the United States Air Force, Washington D.C. : Department
of the Air Force, March 1992.
US Army. FM 1-100, Army Aviation in Combat Operations -
Final Draft. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1996.
US Army. FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades - Final Draft.
Washington D.C. : Department of the Army, 1996.
55
US Army. FM 1-113, Assault Helicopter Operations - Final
Draft. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1996.
US Army. FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations - Final
Draft. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1996.
US Army. FM 22-100, Military Leadership. Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army, July 1990
US Army. FM 25-100, Training the Force. Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1990.
US Army. FM 25-101, Training the Force, Battle Focused
Training. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990.
US Army. FM 100-5, Operations, Washington D.C.: Department
of the Army, June 1993.
US Army. FM 100-5, Operations, Washington D.C.: Department
of the Army, May 1986.
US Army. FM 100-20 and Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army, December 1990.
US Army. FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, Final
Draft, Washington D.C.: Department of the Army. April 1996.
U.S. Marines. FMFM 1, Warfighting, Washington D.C.:
Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989.