Court Proceeding — UT v. Tyler Robinson | Charlie Kirk Killing Hearing | Full Closings

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Court Proceeding — UT v. Tyler Robinson | Charlie Kirk Killing Hearing | Full Closings
Court proceeding — State of Utah v. Tyler James Robinson (Case 251403576, 4th Judicial Dist. Ct., Utah County). Transcript is the YouTube auto-caption track of the Court TV feed (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdcFgeFqlTs) — verbatim ASR, not a certified court transcript.

Noting the presence of council we left off. Before we begin, does either side need the benefit of the record? >> All right. Thank you. All right. Mr. like the press. I'm going to be using Your honor, on September 10th of 2025, the defendant, this man Tyler James Robinson, shot and killed old Charlie Kirk because he disagreed with him. And he did it by firing a high-powered which created a great risk of death that anyone would know about. Your honor, [clears throat] turning to count one, starting with uh aggravated murder, we know that the defendant, Tyler James Robinson, is the shooter. There is a mountain of evidence that proves that he is the shooter. As I look at the evidence, I see four categories of evidence that prove that the defendant, Tyler Robinson, is the In any case, any one of those four categories of evidence would provide evidence prob certainly probable cause and possibly proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the man who shot Charlie Kirk. And in this case, we have all four categories of evidence. First, we know that the defendant is the shooter because we have video evidence. Exhibit 12.4 is on the screen in front of you, [clears throat] Ron. I noticed that the the television is not facing the gallery. >> All right. So 12.4 is one that I did authorize to be published to uh the courtroom and I believe on uh video. Is that correct? >> That's correct. >> All right. >> And your honor, I have edited my presentation so that every exhibit that is not authorized to be published outside of the courtroom um has a slide before it that expressly states as much. >> Thank you, Mr. McBride. >> We know that the defendant uh killed Charlie Kirk because he because of the video evidence. 12.4 shows the defendant arriving at 8:29 a.m. driving that distinctive gray Dodge Challenger onto campus into the UVU parking lot. We have video evidence of the defendant walking through campus with no effort to disguise himself. He's wearing the same hurly hat, maroon t-shirt, Converse shoes that he was later wearing when he turned himself in. He walked through campus, scouting campus that morning from approximately 8:30 until 9:30. We know that he was on video uh looking at the courtyard where the Turning Point event took place. We know he spoke with members of the Turning Point USA organization. And we know he laughed after after this first scouting mission at about 9:33 driving again his distinctive gray Dodge Challenger. He went off campus, parked his car somewhere off campus, and returned at 10:09 a.m. wearing the same hat, same shirt, same shorts, and same Converse shoes. This time, he came in through the north parking lot, the same route he would later take when he came back in different clothing. Once again, he scouted campus. He came through the tunnel underneath Campus Drive, went up the stairs, and out into campus. And we know in this visit he once again gathered information um looked at the scene, looked at possible vantage points. He had Chick-fil-A uh for lunch. The Chick-fil-A the testimony was that is bordering right on the courtyard uh where the Turning Point USA event took place. He then went and scouted his drop point in the trees northeast of campus where the rifle was later found. And then he made his way up onto the low sea center roof where he scouted the v the the vantage point from the from the shooter's perch. >> All right, Jeeoff, if you would, are you going to still I just want to make sure that since we're um are we just doing to the gallery the next >> Yeah, you'll see the slides that say where there's been uh where the next slide is not to be published outside. >> I see. Thank you, Mr. McBride. I appreciate that information. Yes, we'll leave it like this and then uh Mr. McBride, if you'll let us know before. >> In fact, your honor, there are no exhibits. I took the exhibit out that was not allowed to be published even to the courtroom. So, all exhibits are permitted to be published to the courtroom. Some of them cannot be recorded by the camera, and there's a note on the slides before those exhibits. >> Thank you. The defendant then returned at 11:54 a.m. This time dressed to kill, black shirt, long pants to obscure the rifle he had concealed down his pants. Um, and he made his way through campus, the same route of ingress into campus that he had taken during his second scouting mission, coming through the north parking lot, making his way through that tunnel, and then going up the stairs. We know that he then made his way and he's recorded on camera making his way up to the Losi center roof where he comes to the railing, does a Fazbury flop over the railing and is out of the camera camera view for about five minutes. that time period. He removes the rifle from his pants, uh uses the screwdriver that he left behind with his DNA on it to reassemble a portion of that rifle, and then he made his way to the edge of the Losi center roof. There he laid down in a prone position and he would have seen this mass of people of 3,000 plus people there for the event. took aim, put his crosshairs on Charlie Kirk, and fired at 12:23 and 28 seconds. We know that's the moment that he fired because several different cameras record the the bullet striking Charlie Kirk at that moment. From the autopsy, we know that that bullet entered Charlie Kirk slightly downhill, slightly at a downward angle, slightly left to right, consistent with the vantage point that the defendant had on the Losi center rooftop. The bullet struck Charlie Kirk's spine and fragmented, killing him. As we know from the medical examiner's report, [clears throat] at that precise moment, 1223 and 28 seconds after firing a shot, the defendant gets up and is recorded running to the northeast of the Losi cent's rooftop, dropping down from the Losi center, and making his way into his predetermined drop point in the wooded area where we later find the gun. The defendant is then next recorded on camera returning to campus to Campus Drive at 12:36 a.m. We know he was returning from his text messages to his lover Lance Twigs to rec to to recover the gun. Campus Drive borders that wooded area. When the defendant approached Campus Drive again in that distinctive gray Dodge Challenger, he tried to turn right there, but Officer Goforth with the Spanish Fork Police Department was on watch there and stopped him and told him he could not drive down that that street because it was closed. That interaction with the defendant at 12:36 in the morning was so unusual to officer Goforth that he took note of the of the car's partial license plate, looked that up, and found that it was registered to the defendant and his mother. He looked up the defendant's driver's license from that registration and determined it was the same man he had interacted with. Not to be deterred, the defendant then entered the residential area, the residential side of that wooded area, and was recorded on doorbell camera, parking again his gray Dodge Challenger, leaving his car to look for that gun and returning. We know that the defendant is the shooter first because of all the video evidence. Second, we know the defendant is the shooter because of the DNA evidence. The defendant's DNA was found all over that gun. It was on the scope, the grips, the stock, and even the trigger. It was on the cartridge cases found within the gun. And make no mistake, your honor, this was the murder weapon. This was the rifle that killed Charlie Kirk. We know that because it was found in the woods, right to the area where that shooter ran after taking the shot and dropping off of the Losi Center. We know it because that rifle contained four rounds in it. Only one had been spent. Only one had been fired, consistent with what we know happened at the amphitheater. A single shot was fired. In addition, we know from the ballistics testimony from Samantha Carer from the ATF that that uh weapon or that round that was recovered from Charlie Kirk was consistent with having been fired from that gun. A report shows that exhibit six, the recovered jacket fragment from autopsy, consists of a 30 caliber class round, consistent with having been fired with a 306. We know it had the same rifling pattern of six, right, as this rifle had as she compared the damaged fragment with a test fire that she conducted. And she also walked us through many of the consistencies that she saw. We were able to see those photographs of the comparisons between the the damage fragment that was recovered from Charlie Kirk and the the test fire that she conducted and she showed us many of those consistencies. In addition, we know that this was the firearm because the defendant admitted it. Exhibit 16.1, he texted his lover, "Judging from today, I'd say grandpa's done gun does just fine. Idk." And that leads me to the third reason why we know the defendant is a shooter. >> Jeff, if you wouldn't mind uh flipping the monitor against the wall. >> And your and your honor. I >> I'm sorry. Uh flipping it so it's viewable, but it's flush against the wall so the camera can't pick it up. >> And I would make a record. I see the camera is faced away from the gallery right now. >> Okay. Give me one moment. I just I have um attention on that matter and it looks like uh we're just taking diligence to ensure that uh it's not inadvertently broadcast for exhibits that aren't to be broadcast. Mr. McBride, thank you for your patience. may continue. >> Sure. This the the first reason we know the defendant is the shooter is because of the video evidence. The second reason we know is because of the DNA on the on the firearm. And make no mistake, your honor, this is the firearm that killed Charlie Kirk. And we know that because of the evidence I've gone through, including the single round that was fired from that firearm, the ballistics testing that is consistent with that with being fired from that firearm, as well as the defend defendant's admission that he fired that firearm to kill Charlie Kirk. In addition, we know that the defendant, the third reason we know that the defendant is the shooter is because he admitted to it that morning. Before he left, he left a note for his boyfriend stating that he left on a mission. He had the opportunity to take out Charlie Kirk. And then after he had shot and killed Charlie Kirk, the defendant texted that same boyfriend uh in exhibit 16.3 and admitted to doing this. You weren't the one who did it, right? I am. Sorry. And then after that, he also claimed credit to all of his friends on the Discord app. Exhibit 16.2. You have seen this. Um, it was me at UVU yesterday No, it wasn't. The defendant did the same thing that I have asked you to do, your honor, is he pointed his friends to the surveillance ev evidence and said, Fourth, [clears throat] we know that the defendant is the shooter. Again, first because of the video evidence, second because of the DNA, third because of his admissions, and fourth because of the circumstantial evidence. We have in this case the classic circumstantial evidence of motive, means, and opportunity and then some. First motive, and I'll talk about this later when we talk about the victim targeting enhancement. But Charlie Kirk was an outspoken critic of homosexuality and uh transgenderism and was an outspo outspoken advocate for traditional conservative values including uh traditional families and marriage. The defendant was living in a homosexual relationship with a man who was considering transgender or transitioning his gender and who went by the name of Luna. It's not difficult to understand the motive here. The defendant's views were repugnant to the positions that Charlie Kirk famously took. >> Means let me stop you right there, Mr. um McBride, and just and so just so there's clarity that the camera can broadcast. Um, I I believe all the attorneys have taken measures to ensure that be broadcast on the monitors and I'm assuming that monitor uh to my right is not visible on camera. Is that correct? All right. So, you can continue. Council, if anytime you have concerns about the camera or want to be extra cautious, please let me know. Mr. McBr McBride, I apologize to interrupt you. I just wanted to clarify that. So, continue. >> Understood. Motive means an opportunity. I've talked about motive means we know that the defendant had his grandfather's hunt hunting rifle in exhibit 16.1. The defendant and uh his boyfriend uh to a great extent went over uh the defendant's worries about that hunting rifle and not being able to return that to his father or his grandfather. Motive means an opportunity. We know that the defendant left his home in St. George early the morning of September 10th. early enough to arrive at the campus of Utah Valley University by 8:30 and then he didn't return until the next morning, September 11th. In addition to the classic circumstantial evidence of motive, means, and opportunity, there's significant other evidence. For example, um the rifle had four rounds in it. Those those rounds had some very weird etchings. Those etchings were consistent with another round that was found in the defendant's apartment, right? And that round, the evidence was had an etching in it that said test shot. Police also found the very Dremel tool that they were able to determine through tool marks analysis that etched those rounds found in the gun. And finally, when it comes to circumstantial evidence, after the images of the shooter had been published, the defendant turned himself in. Your honor, as to identity, there is a mountain of evidence here. The evidence is overwhelming. Any one of these four categories I've talked about is adequate, certainly for probable cause and likely for proof There can be no doubt that the defendant is the man who shot and killed Charlie Kirk, and the evidence clearly surpasses the hurdle of probable cause at this stage of the proceeding. I now want to turn to the aggravating circumstance, great risk of death. [clears throat] Before I get into the evidence here though, your honor, it's worth taking a moment and talking about the standard. The standard first I want to talk about is common sense. Right? We tell juries before they go into deliberations, don't check your common sense at the door. Right? It's the greatest asset any of us have is our minds, our common sense, our common human experience, bringing the knowledge and experience we have into our judgments. And certainly that's true here for your honor, for this court. Um, [clears throat] common sense is the first standard. When we talk about mental state, the jury instruction and the case law makes clear we we don't read each other's minds. We don't know what someone is thinking. As a result, we have to rely on things like what a person says, what a person does, and other circumstantial evidence to determine what someone's mental state is. And finally, I want to talk about the legal standards that apply to this hearing. The standard is probable cause. That means a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the crime in this circumstance that he knowingly created a great risk of death to another besides himself or Charlie Kirk. And when determining probable cause, the law is very clear on this. There are very few standards in the law that are more clear. Frankly, you view all you are required as the magistrate to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the state. This court is required to draw all inferences in the state's favor. I know you know that, judge. I know that you handle uh multiple preliminary hearings every single week. None of these standards is new to you, but I emphasize those because defense council has cited to an an antiquated old standard that has been explicitly overruled in the case law, which is that drawing inferences is no more than speculation. They they take this position by citing the 2010 court of appel appeals case The Supreme Court of Utah in Ashcraft overturned the logic that drawing one inference over another is speculation. And the Utah Court of Appeals has explicitly stated, "We no longer view Kristoal's statement regarding equally plausible inferences as valid." That's state v law 2020 Utah appellet court decision. I know you know the standard, but it's important that you you apply the correct standard here and not the standard that has been repudiated explicitly and which the defense asks you to use. In addition to misrepresenting the standard, the defense also misrepresents the law on a great risk of death. He states that there is a requirement of a minimum set of factual circumstances and also states as a factual matter, the defendant must actually discharge multiple rounds hitting and or killing individuals other than the murder victim. And that's from the defendant's motion at page five. No, no, that's not what the statute says. In fact, killing a second victim is a separate aggravating factor under the statute. and Sooso Ortado footnote 9 makes clear that the court is not establishing a multifactoring balancing test and I'm quoting we are simply identifying a range of factors of possible relevance to the statutory inquiry as elaborated in our case law the ultimate test is the statutory test right that's what we're looking at is what are the statutory elements meant as you synthesize the case law out there you can synthesize it into one statement It is that when a person other than the target is in the zone of danger, which includes the line of fire as well as within the reach of ricochets, errant shots, and pass through shots, it's sufficient to That's the takeaway of all those cases. Now, your honor, I want to turn uh to the facts of this case. And starting with the first and I think the most obvious and most important standard in the law, which is common sense, you can't shoot a rifle into a crowd of 3,000 people without knowing that you create a great risk of death to all those around your target. Just can't do it. It's common sense. Shooting ranges have a line of fire. You can't go in front of the line of fire. And there's a reason for that. And we all understand the reason for that because you create a great risk of death to anyone who crosses in front of you when you're shooting a rifle or any gun for that matter. [clears throat] Remember the testimony was that Charlie Kirk was 400 ft approximately 400 feet away from the defendant. at that distance, a variance of simply one degree. If the defendant is one degree off, that's a matter of millimeters for the barrel of his gun, that bullet would have struck 7 feet away from his target. Your honor, going to what the defendant actually saw, [clears throat] looking here at exhibit 3.2, the defendant was not a foot was only a football field away. He was not miles away. He could clearly see as he approached the edge of the Losi center, he clearly could see this mass of people. He could clearly see um Charlie Kirk. He could clearly see not only Charlie Kirk, but the people behind his tent and of course all the people in front of him. He would have seen all Following exhibit is only for courtroom We know what what uh what that event looked like, what that venue looked like on that day. There were people everywhere. people on the railings, people in that amphitheater, people in front of Charlie as he laid down and as he approached that rooftop on the Losi center roof, as he approached the edge of that rooftop, he would have seen this mass of thousands of people As he laid down and took up aim, he would have seen all of those people. As he looked through that scope, his scope likely passed over the faces and heads and bodies of multiple Not notwithstanding all of the people around Charlie Kirk, the defendant chose to fire. He knew, as anybody would know, that that creates a great risk of death, not only to Charlie Kirk, but the people And this is what uh the scene looked like. There are people moving around behind uh Charlie Kirk. You see in the minutes leading up to to the shooting, there are people moving behind Charlie Kirk, moving in front of the the uh st the uh popup tent there from behind from in front and moving around freely just 5 seconds before the shot. There is woman directly behind Charlie Kirk in the line of fire. And we know the defendant would have seen all these people and of course the people in front of Charlie Kirk and especially that questioner who is only feet away the security detail immediately to Charlie Kirk's right looking at that image probably two feet away but the defendant took chose to take What do we know about the defendant's mental state? We all know people can miss, right? Michael Jordan didn't hit every single three-pointer he took, right? Major League pitchers don't throw strikes every time, and the defendant knew he could miss, too. Exhibit 25, I count 28 rounds that are fired through these targets. And only one, two, three, four of those 28 rounds hit the red. The defendant knew he could miss. Not only did he know he could miss, he planned for it. He planned for it because he came loaded with four rounds in that magazine, not just the round that he shot. He knew could he could miss. And the only reason he took other rounds is because he knew he could miss and he came prepared to shoot again. Now, your honor, in all the case law, we don't see um we don't see uh appellet cases anywhere, frankly, throughout the country of assassinations like this, of public assassinations. And so, the cases are only as helpful as the applicability of the facts that they deal with. Um, but we do have factual precedent in addition to common sense. you know that if you shoot into a a crowd, you're going to if you miss, you're going to hit someone else. That's not just a possibility. That's a great risk of death to someone else. When we're talking about firing a high-powered rifle, we remember uh Butler, Pennsylvania, when President Trump was shot, his life was saved because he turned his head and the bullet went through his ear. And what happened in that miss and other misses? Well, three of those errant shots hit people, one of which fatally. Not only is there common sense, but there's recent precedent. you shoot at someone in a public assassination temp attempt, you have a great risk of these are not just possibilities, but known risks. What are the consequences of missing? Death. It's not that the defendant didn't see all these people. He obviously did. He had to. It's that he didn't care. He came on a mission to kill Charlie Kirk. And if he missed, so be it. and he was prepared to take other shots and let the casualties be what they may. The evidence that the defendant is of probable cause in this case, that the defendant is the shooter and knowingly created a great risk of death is overwhelming and we'd ask the court to As to count two, felony [clears throat] discharge of a firearm, your honor, it's the same evidence that applies. I'm not going to go over that evidence again here for count two. >> [clears throat] >> Count three, obstruction of justice. This involves hiding the rifle. Um, we know that the defendant hid the rifle one because we see him after he jumps off the Loy Center run into the woods. The rifle was found hidden under a bush and the defendant admitted to his boyfriend that he had to leave it in a bush. Count four deals with disposing of the clothing. In exhibit 14, which is the written statement of Mike Mitchell, Mike Mitchell recounts his conversation with the defendant where uh the defendant Count five, witness tampering. This deals with the defendant telling Lance Twigs to delete the text messages after the defendant had admitted to killing Charlie Kirk. Count six, witness tampering. This is telling Twigs to stay silent. Now, defense council in their pleading state [clears throat] states that no, this is altruistic. This is not uh witness tampering because it's not telling um Lance Twigs to avoid giving information or testimony for the defendant's benefit. It's just telling him his rights in essence. Well, that requires you to draw the inferences in the defendant's favor, which is improper at this stage. Moreover, it it requires you to ignore the circumstances here. Um, you have to remember the defendant had just shot and killed someone. He' just hidden the rifle. He' just gotten rid of his clothing. He just asked Lance Twigs to delete the text messages and incriminating messages. And of course, so he told Lance Twigs also to avoid giving him up. Don't talk to police when they come to ask you questions. Furthermore, as it relates relates to the fifth amendment, Lance Twigs did not have a fifth amendment right against incriminating the defendant. The fifth amendment right only applies to incriminating himself. And there's no evidence that Lance Twigs would have incriminated himself by speaking with the police. Finally, your honor, we get to count seven. Now, at this juncture, um I want to talk a little bit about the aggravating and enhancers, right? So counts one and two uh have an aggravating factor of committing homicide in the presence of a child and an a victim targeting enhancement for the motive. With regard to counts one and two, the court does not need to enter any order binding over those allegations. Appreny states that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. Right, the prescribed statutory maximum. what appears in the law that must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense council misstates the law here and says anything that increases the punishment. That's not what appreny says. It it says what I've quoted here on the screen. Anything that enhances the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. And so let's look do these aggravating factors do. So 763 203.9 says this. The sentencing judge or the board of pardons and parole shall considering shall consider as an aggravating factor in their deliberations that the defendant committed the violent offense in the presence of the child as an aggravating factor. Right? That does not increase the the pen the statutory maximum penalty. So we don't have to bind it over victim targeting. Now victim targeting can under certain circumstance enhance the statutory maximum and it does with count seven by the way. But with regards to count one and counts two, it does not. Under 203.14 sub3b, it states the sentencing judge or the bar of pardons and parole shall consider defendant selection of the victim as an aggravating factor. An aggravating factor does not increase the statutory maximum. It's considered just like the aggravating circumstances on the PSI Now, with regard to um with regard to count seven, it does, right? I go back going back to the statute. A class B is enhanced to a class A if there's victim targeting. Count seven is violence in the presence of a child. It's a class B misdemeanor. It's increased to a class A because of the victim targeting enhancement. Now, regardless if you agree with me on any of these things, [clears throat] um, as far as the aggravator and enhancing uh, circumstance go, the the facts still satisfy both of these elements. And I have to address them both anyway because count seven is the evidence that supports count seven is the same evidence that supports the that is that the defendant knew children were present. Right? That's count seven and and also the aggravating circumstance. How do we know the defendant knew that children were present? Defense council is right. We don't have any direct evidence of what the defendant saw. But what we do know several things. One thing we know is that um Oram city's motto is family city USA. You can't go anywhere in Oram and you can't go anywhere in Utah County without seeing kids all over the place. And UVU on September 10th that morning was no different. There were children around and no one was hiding the children. It's a reasonable inference to believe that the defendant would have seen these children in one of two of his scouting missions or when he was on the roof. In I stopped the video in um exhibit 8 at one spot where that panning video slows down enough to have a clear view. And in one frame, I'm able to find three babies in arms, right? They're circled there on count eight. In addition to that, we know there are other children who are present. Through exhibit six, we know there are two children present with Your honor, the inference is the defendant would have known that children were present when he shot and killed Charlie Kirk. Was he focusing on them on them? No, of course not. He was focusing on his target, but he would have known and he didn't care and he conducted committed the offense in their presence anyway. Finally, to enhance count seven to a class A misdemeanor, you also have to find probable cause that the defendant targeted Charlie Kirk because of his political views. Charlie Kirk was famous. He was a famous political activist. And in exhibit 5.1, we learn a little bit about what he stood for and what his organization stood for. Charlie Kirk would engage attendees, most often students, in civil debates and discussion on traditional family values, orthodox Christian views on sexuality, marriage, and gender and sex, as well as other political doctrines. Charlie Kirk and Tup USA speakers often specifically attempted to persuade attendees to follow a mindset rooted in orthodox Christian and politically conservative values. >> We know what Charlie Kirk stood for and those ideas were repugnant to the defendant who was in a homosexual relationship with a man who was considering transitioning genders. It doesn't take a lot to connect the dots. We know what the defendant's mental state was and why he did what he did right? We remember the note to his uh I went on a mission to take out Charlie Kirk. I wish we could have lived in a place I wish I could have stayed for you and lived our lives together. We've got to think about the context there. When he was asked by his boyfriend, why why did I do it? Yeah, I had enough of his hatred. Some hate can't be negotiated out. And then most clearly we have the etchings on the rounds found in the gun. Right. Exhibit 19. Uh Twigs explained what this means. Notice bulge ow surprise uh surprise face. What's this? Right. This is a furry meme. Um the surprise someone has in discovering that another individual unexpectedly has male genitalia. Exhibit 20 is probably the most clear political statement here. Hey, fascist catch, right? We know what that means from just knowledge of current events. Fascist is a common derogatory label that those on the left give to those on the right to try and categorize them and group them with the famous evil dictators and fascists of the 20th century. And then exhibit 2022, if you read this, you are gay lmao. So these etchings show a clear political and sexual motivation connected with a political stance that Your honor, in summary, on September 10th, 2025, the defendant, Tyler James Robinson, shot and killed Charlie Kirk because he disagreed with him. And he did it by firing a high-powered rifle into a group of thousands who surrounded Charlie Kirk, literally on all sides. And he, like any rational person, knew that that would create a great risk of death to all those around Charlie Kirk in the event of any one of a number of likely possibilities that he created a great risk of death, that he could miss, a ricochet, a pass through, or any number of things could happen and kill any other of those people around Charlie Kirk. We'd ask the court to bind over the defendant on all charges. All right. To defense, uh, do you want to take a break, move forward, and then take a break in the middle or what's your preference? >> Let's do it. Thank you, your honor. Um, as I stated before, we're going to split this up a little bit, the defense presentation, and kind of focus on um, three potential areas depending on the court's questions. So, if the court does have questions about the aggravator specifically, I would be the one to ask those questions, too. Um, as I stated before, Mr. Bert is available to answer questions about the forensic evidence should the court have questions about that. And then Mr. Novak will comment about upon count six, seven and the enhancement issues there at the end. Um I want to start out by stating your honor that my focus is primarily on the legal framework and the constitutional issue that's been presented. I will at times discuss the state's evidence. Of course, um these are not concessions of facts. This is the evidence that's before the court. We do understand we're in a probable cause hearing. We understand what the standard is. We understand the law. Um we're all on the same page about that there. And I do want to address briefly um the error that I made in the briefing about uh crystal ball and uh not citing the additional law that came after it. I do want to provide a little context to the court about that uh case in particular that is cited by other cases. It's really just that one sentence that was overruled and I absolutely should have put that into the brief and I apologize to the court for that mistake. Um these cases deal with the standard of review and reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. It is a different scenario. Um, and the discussion of speculation in Crystal Ball is still endorsed by uh the Supreme Court and State v. Prisbee in particular. They do not cite to that specific sentence to be very clear. Um, but the rest of it is still good law and it's still cited by Prisb. So with that clarification, I'm going to address um one more issue before I get into this too much and that is the state's effort in the briefing and here now an oral argument to add to the evidence. In the reply brief, for example, the state sites to standards like safety standards of a Provo shooting range, that wasn't evidence at the prelim. The state had five days to present evidence. The state had ample opportunity to present evidence about guns, gun safety, specifics, about physics, about probabilities, about whatever it wanted to admit. It did not. It cannot now add to that both in argument and in its briefing. So we [clears throat] would ask the court to stick to the evidence in making its determination. So turning to the aggravator, um there is a tendency when we talk about the aggravator to kind of use synonyms and maybe get caught up in semantics. So, I'm going to start with the standard and I'm going to end with the standard. And the standard is the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to another individual other than the deceased individual. Here, Mr. Kirk and the actor. The question before the court is whether Utah's aggravator as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court applies to the circumstances as presented to the state. And as we've argued in our brief, it does not. So I'm going to address this in three kind of bleeding into four parts. Uh the first is the constitutional framework that is a fundamental issue here that's going to follow this case. Frankly, discussing how Utah has defined the aggravator and how the state is trying to shoehorn this case into that aggravator. uh by discussing some of the evidence that it relies on particularly as to knowledge. So the constitutional base that we're talking about here is going back to the cases we cited in our brief Greg and Profett. These cases looked at the statutory schemes in Georgia and Florida to determine if they met the requirements to be constitutional after Ferman. And they look specifically at the aggravator knowingly created great risk of death to more than one person. And in Greg, the United States Supreme Court said explicitly, while such a phrase ma might be susceptible of an overly broad interpretation, the Supreme Court of Georgia has not so construed it. So the state's claim in its brief that the legislature narrowed the circumstances adequately just by adding knowing to this aggravator is simply not true. This is a phrase that is susceptible to overly broad interpretations and we know that because the state is trying to apply it here. Similarly, in profit, the United States Supreme Court found the Florida Supreme Court pro properly construed the aggravator narrowly. That statute also had a knowing requirement. It was still reviewed and it wasn't upheld based off of the knowing requirement. It was based off of how the courts construed it narrowly. So, that's the foundation. That's the floor for the aggravator. Now, we look at how the Utah courts have applied it. And there are three cases that are really on point here that we have to look at. We look at Pierre, we look at Johnson, and we look at Sosa Herertado. And in these cases, there is discussion of three factors. Those are well spelled out in the brief, but I will again state them here. This is from paragraph two which is where the court will find the actual finding ruling from Sosa Herertado. The temporal relationship between the murderous act and any acts endangering a third person. The spatial relationship between the third party, the murder victim and the defendant at the time of the acts constituting the murder. and whether and to what extent the third party was actually threatened by the asalent. These are the three factors that inform the question that was identified in So examining these three factors here, they're clearly not met. There is no temporal relationship for this court to evaluate because there is one act, there is one shot, there is one bullet, there is one victim. There is no temporal relationship for this court to evaluate. This factor is not met. There were no actual threats by the asalent to the third party. There was no evidence that would suggest that anyone else was threatened. In the other cases talking about threats to the third party, we're looking at multiple gunshots. We're looking at verbal threats. We're looking at pointing a firearm at someone. We're looking at using a device that is more likely to cause injury to multiple people. Um, for example, in Florida, there was a case involving a saw off shotgun that was found to be more likely to cause injury to people in surrounding areas. bombs. Those are the types of weapons that would cause injury to more people than the actual victim. And I will acknowledge, we acknowledge that the Sosa Herado court was careful to say that these are not a checklist, right? These are factors for this court to consider in deciding whether or not the conduct here falls within the statute. And the fact that maybe one of these factors is met but the other two are not should be something that this court weighs. It's interesting in um Sosa Herertado when I was rereading it in preparation um they describe Johnson itself the Johnson case as like a single act case. So although most of the cases talk about the series of events and the issue in Sosa Herertado was essentially whether or not um Johnson overruled Pierre. Um, that's one of the issues that it raised and and the court explicitly found no because Johnson was a single act case. So the court looked closely at those factors in examining whether in that single act case And that's also why we spent quite a bit of time in the briefing talking about the cases that were relied upon in the Johnson decision. Um, these cases are Chenalt v State, a Georgia case. This is a case of a mass shooting in a church. State v. Mcmmerry in Arizona. Multiple shots fired in a bar full of patrons. State v. Sonier, Louisiana. Victims made to lie down side by side on the ground and shot them rapid fire with a rifle. State v. Doss, Arizona. Defendant fired multiple shots into a crowded auditorium, killing the victim and hitting another. State v. Price, a case relied on heavily by the court in Johnson. The defendant unloaded six rounds of his Colt 38 revolver at the intended murder victim while the other person was sitting close to the victim on the couch. Several of the bullets struck the victim on the side next to which the other person was sitting. Um the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson emphasized the language from state v. Price and Price is an interesting case because it actually grapples with the constitutional question, right, of how do we construe this aggravator? And they state the facts must include a knowing or purpose purposeful state of mind visa via the creation of great risk of death and that there be a likelihood or high probability of great risk of death created, not just a mere possibility. and that there be at least one person within the zone of danger created by the defendant's conduct. Price goes on to talk about the various circumstances under which this may apply and it specifically states certainly constitutional concern would arise where the aggravating factor construed to apply where only one person the murder victim is murdered. And that's what we have here. That's the expanding the aggravator [sighs] to conduct involving one person, the murder victim. And no other conduct is alleged endangering anyone. And that's why the court cannot adopt the state's interpretation without running a foul of the Constitution. And what's interesting about the state's if the state really believed that Sosa Herertado was enough, if these factors were enough, it wouldn't need to pull case law from another jurisdiction and ask this court to adopt language that no Utah court has Um the anyone near argument similarly relies only on one factor right spatial proximity. Now we can get into the nitty-gritty of the spatial proximity issue. um here the state didn't really provide a lot of evidence about the spatial proximity issue and I don't want to get into this tit for tat about feet about measurements that don't exist in the record. I think the videos speak for themselves. I think the state's reliance on some videos over other videos is a little misleading. For example, the state's emphasis on exhibit 8, which is a camera angle pointed downward, is perhaps not appropriate when calculating distance or estimating dis distance for the purpose, excuse [clears throat] me, But the idea, the fundamental idea that the state is propounding here is that But if the court adopts that reasoning, the court is unconstitutionally expanding the aggravator. This is how we run into the eth amendment in Utah I do want to briefly mention the issues in the evidence about the state speculating. Um, the state asks the court to draw inferences from evidence that appear to have been admitted primarily for the purpose of establishing identity but is now trying to construe it in such a way that it shows knowledge. For example, the screwdriver on the roof. The screwdriver on the roof, according to the state's evidence, has a DNA that is similar to Mr. Robinson's. I would imagine that is intended to show that it was allegedly Mr. Robinson on the roof. Now, we're going to deal with that evidence in the future. We're going to have hearings about the DNA evidence for sure. But the state goes on to ask this court to infer that the rifle was taken apart and put put back together with the screwdriver. The state didn't show actually how that would happen with the screwdriver. The rifle wasn't even here. Um, this is just speculation. But on top of that speculation, the state is also asking the court to speculate that with this configuration of gun, that would impact the reliability of the shot, the accuracy of the shot, [clears throat] and then speculate that this individual, the shooter, knew about that. These are not inferences. This is speculation. This is a prime example of speculation. The same is true of the targets. The state provided very about the targets other than they were found in Mr. Robinson's shared apartment in a closet on the first floor. They provided evidence through testimony that the um perforations in the targets are from a gun. They didn't say what kind of gun. We don't know when those were shot. We don't know who shot them. And we don't know the conditions under which those were shot at. They are just targets. The state didn't provide any other evidence from this court to draw an inference. Anything else is just speculation. The four bullets in the gun is an interesting argument um that I think ultimately cuts against the state's position because we know this was a bolt-action rifle. In order to reload it, the spent cartridge had to be removed and it wasn't. So it actually cuts against this idea that maybe other people were endangered, that there was an intent or knowledge that other people might be killed. There is zero evidence that there was any action taken towards other people. When we talk about the um spatial proximity issue, [clears throat] I think it's important to look at what that means in other contexts. For example, the state v Price case where it talks about how this individual was next to the victim on the couch and the bullets were fired on the same side. So when the court evaluates the evidence here, examining who was present in the presence of Mr. Kirk when he was shot, the court should pay attention to that. This bullet entered the left side of the neck at a downward angle. That's what The only other individual you really see is the individual to Mr. Kirk's right, not the same side. But even if spatial proximity, even if presence is established, again, that is simply not enough because enveloping all of these factors, all of this analysis that we see from the Utah Supreme Court is the issue of intent. the other acts committed by the defendant in the course of committing the murder inform knowledge. So like in Sosa Herertado, the court found it was strong evidence of intent of knowledge that the individual shot at the other prior to shooting at the victim. We don't have any other acts to inform knowledge. That's why the state is pulling is grasping at these facts, asking the court to speculate about pieces of evidence it just picked because there's nothing from the facts to inform this knowledge question. And that's where we come back to this issue knowingly creating a great risk of death to another. The state has not met its burden as to the aggravator here. We are asking the court to strike the aggravator. The facts at their c at their core are that the shooter shot a high-powered rifle from a roof at a downward angle, hitting the victim in the left side of the neck at a distance of 415 ft. The angle is 415 ft. It's not 410 ft. It had a telescopic scope on it. The shooter did not fire any more shots and in fact did not even reload. The shooter is not alleged to have engaged with anyone else, is not alleged to have pointed the rifle at anyone else, threatened anyone else, or done anything other than shoot that gun and run away. There was no ricochet. The only other individual under the tent, excuse me, [clears throat] with Mr. Kirk, like I described, was on the opposite side of him. This was an open air environment. This was not an enclosed space. And contrary to the screenshots that the state pulled from exhibit 9, no one was behind the tent when Mr. Kirk was shot. even assuming that the shooter might have some knowledge about that, which I think is a real stretch because it's not like the tent was see-through. No one was behind Mr. Kirk when that shot was fired. And Mr. Kirk was seated in an elevated position. This is clearly visible in So, there's nothing in this evidence showing that there was a great risk that someone else was going to be killed, let alone that the shooter would have knowledge of that risk. It's not just the shot fired, it's what happened around it. That's what we know from Pierre Johnson and Sosa Herado. And my final comment, your honor, is we did spill much ink in our briefing about other cases describing the circumstances. We did discuss in some depth the Pennsylvania cases upon which the state relied. And we did that for a reason. We did that to show the court that the court first of all shouldn't be adopting standards from another jurisdiction that hasn't already been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, but also that that standard in that state is fuzzy. It's not clear based off of their own case law. And there are a plenery of jurisdictions that have interpreted this aggravator the way that Utah does considering these factors. So this court isn't doing something revolutionary. Striking the aggravator is the only conclusion supported by Utah law and by the constitution. Does the court have any questions for me? Judge, with the court's permission, I'm going to be narrowly focused on the comments that were made in the uh state's pleading and just by Mr. McBride about the uh forensic evidence in the case and specifically the DNA and firearms evidence. And the pleadings say very little about either one of those topics. There's a sentence that about the firearm evidence and there's I think one or two sentences about the DNA reports. Nothing is said about the testimony of the three experts who testified here in front of the court. And that focus, I think, is consistent with the state's position throughout this hearing, which is that the court shouldn't look underneath the reports that the state chose to put in front of you, the expert reports, and specifically exhibits 30 through 34. And their position, as they argued to you during the hearing, was that uh by law, those reports constitute reliable hearsay evidence that this court must credit. And pursuant to that theory, they attempted throughout the preliminary examination to cut off any questions about the reliability of the evidence that was offered through those reports. And as the court knows, the uh the court rejected that theory uh in its ruling on our challenge to the admissibility of the uh hearsay evidence in the case. And I want to just remind the court of what the court said uh in in its ruling. This is a document 631, the court's ruling on the admissibility of the hearsay challenge that we brought. And I'm quoting here, the presumption of reliability is confined to the presumption that the hearsay evidence is admissible. The presumption does not require the magistrate to find the evidence credible or that it supports a finding improbable cause. The magistrate still retains the ultimate decision-making authority on whether probable cause has been established. Admissibility and evidentary weight remain distinct concepts. Although article 1 section 12 and rule 1102 permit the admission of reliable hearsay, they do not require the magistrate to accept that evidence as credible or sufficient to establish probable cause. And that's the court's ruling and that's the law of this case. And so when the when the state in its pleading and here before you uh gets up and argues that uh the defendant's DNA was all over the weapon. Uh, I think it ignores the court's ruling on this issue because the court has to consider not just the report which they're relying on to make those assertions, but it also has to consider the evidence that uh the defense was able to elicit over the over the government's or the state's objection that the court shouldn't even consider that. And if the court looks at the totality of the evidence uh that was submitted from the DNA experts and the ballistic experts, uh I I think the the court will and should conclude that the state's reliance on the DNA evidence and the ballistic evidence is not well taken. Uh Mr. McBride in his argument said the de the defendant's DNA was all over the weapon, but the weapon was tested by Miss Oliver from the ATF. And in her report, uh, if you just look at the report and not her testimony, what the report says, and this is exhibit 30, her ultimate conclusion was based on this calculation, there is evidentary support for the inclusion of Tyler Robinson as a possible contributor. And I want to emphas and end quote and that's it states exhibit 30 a possible contributor and she as well as Miss Baker uh from the FBI went out of their way to explain to the court that based on the current state of the science there is no basis to conclude that based on the DNA testing that was done in this case that a particular piece of DNA can be traced back to a source um based on any of the testing that was done in this case. And uh that uh point is made not only in the testimony but in the exhibits that were submitted to the court. specifically uh Carer I'm sorry uh Oliver exhibit number four which is the DNA uh policy by the Department of Justice stating that an analyst shall not make a source attribution as to any piece of DNA and also in uh Miss Baker's There's exhibit seven, uh, the DOJ policy again stating the same thing. Um, and the, uh, the long and short of it, I think, was summed up by Miss Oliver when she was asked, this is at page 51 of her testimony. question. So, from a scientific standpoint, you couldn't read the paragraph that sets out the likelihood ratio in your report, whatever the number, and then blast a headline in the media, quote, "Mr. Robinson is Mr. Robinson's DNA is found on this item." End quote. That's a source attribution, is it not? Answer: Correct. Yes. And that would not be scientifically defensible, would it? Answer correct. And she was consistent throughout her testimony on that point, as was Miss Baker from the FBI. So, the state is overreading the DNA evidence in this case when it when it asserts to the court that uh Mr. Robinson's DNA was found all over the weapon. What Miss Oliver and Miss Baker said was that it was a pos Mr. uh Robinson was a possible contributor to the DNA, not that he was a contributor. And there's a good quote from a Utah case, State versus Rogers, 202 Utah app 78. And in paragraph 35, the court says, "The fact that something is possible does not make it probable. It's a simple common sense proposition." Mr. McBride urge you to apply common sense. And here's a good common sense uh proposition. The fact that something is possible does not make it probable. The standard is probable cause, not possible cause. And the DNA evidence in this case uh goes to the issue of pos possibilities, not probabilities. And both experts were consistent in saying to the court that they couldn't reach a source attribution opinion. It was consistent in stating that that they could not state with any reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Mr. D that Mr. Robinson's DNA or anybody else's DNA was found on any of the items they tested. Um, and so it it simply is not the case that the court can leap to the conclusion based on the evidence as opposed to speculation that Mr. Robinson's DNA was all over the weapon or the screwdriver or anything else. Again, the experts spoke of possibilities, not probabilities, and certainly not in any way saying that they could identify DNA as coming from anybody. Mr. Robinson or anybody else in this case in terms of firearm and Dremel testing. Mr. McBride said that the determination was made that the Dremel tool made markings on the cartridge case. Again, he's attempting a source attribution there. And it's true that Miss Carner's report reads that way, but it also says that the conclusions she's reaching were made in compliance with the DOJ policy uh which in her case was in Carner exhibit number 11. And that policy like the policy DOJ's policy on DNA evidence says that an examiner based on the science cannot identify a tool mark as having made a particular mark or a cartridge case as coming from a particular weapon and she was clear that she subscribed to that policy and was doing so in this case. Um he also said that Mr. McBride that the uh bullet was consistent with the cartridge was consistent with the rifle that they are trying to connect to Mr. Robinson. And actually what Miss Carner testified and this is at page 177, there were several different 30 caliber class firearms that could have fired this bullet. And at page 47 of exhibit carer number six, she lists a dozen or more firearms, including rifles and pistols that she says could have fired this bullet. So again, the state is overreading that evidence when they say to the court that um the ballistics evidence in this case shows that uh the the bullet was fired from the rifle that they want to connect to Mr. Robinson. There is no such evidence. So um unless court has any questions about the forensic evidence, that's all I had to say. >> Thank you, Mr. B. Mr. Novak, Your honor, as uh Ms. Visser previewed, count six. I'm going to address count seven and I'm going to address the two alleged enhancements. I know the court has read our briefing on this uh and so I'm going to highlight the factual and legal principles that we think compelled this court um to find that the um state has not produced sufficient evidence to bind Mr. Robinson over on those two counts. um and um that the enhancements also to um proceed in this prosecution. I want to And I'm going to be very, if I may, um, focused on the text because the the the allegation itself is is really what we have to compare to the evidence. Count six charges Mr. Robinson with the felony offense of tampering with a witness. The [clears throat] information specifically says that the conduct he engaged in that constitutes tampering with a witness was now I'm quoting to wit directing his roommate to stay silent if police questioned the roommate. Now Mr. McBride sort of very um casually suggests that what Mr. Robinson was doing in that was trying to protect himself and not trying to protect Mr. twigs from what the state is now accusing Mr. Robinson of having done. And we need to look very very specifically at the statement attributed to Mr. Robinson that forms the basis for that specific allegation again to it directing his roommate to stay silent if police question the roommate. is what uh the state presents as text messages between Mr. Robinson and Lance Twigs. And if the court looks at exhibit 16.1, it is a series of screenshots of text messages. The testimony was that Lance Twigs was showing law enforcement these screen the text messages and law enforcement officers took screenshots of the phone that Lance Twigs was holding when showing law enforcement officers these text messages. the specific words that the information alleges constitute are and now I'm quoting from exhibit 16.1 if any police ask you questions ask for a lawyer and stay silent make sure the police follow the right procedures proper warrants and stuff, So, the first thing I want to point out is that this text message occurred, This is on page 18 of 18 of exhibit 16.1. is on page 10, which says yesterday So that would have been the day before Mr. Twigs was speaking with law enforcement. But at 5:55 p.m., if the court looks at the text messages that come just before it, what the court sees is somebody who the state alleges is Mr. Robinson saying to uh Mr. Twigs, quote, "I'm going to turn myself in willingly. One of my neighbors And then the text message goes on. Why is that important? That is important because what this court knows from the preliminary hearing testimony is that the person that the state says is Mr. Oram, had returned all the way to St. George. And the court knows this through Mr. Mitchell's 1102 had spoken with Mr. Robinson's father and had arranged for Mr. Mitchell to help Mr. Robinson surrender to the Washington County Sheriff. That has already occurred when Mr. Robinson, according to Mr. if any police ask you questions ask for a lawyer and stay silent. Just before that he says you are all I So the case law which we present basically requires this court to determine whether Mr. Robinson's statements to Mr. Twigs were intended to obstruct justice or were altruistic. What is more clear in terms of altruism than having already decided to surrender and saying you are all I worry about love. If any police ask you questions, ask for a lawyer and stay silent. That is actually a demonstration of altruism. That is a demonstration of caring for another person. That is a demonstration of what Mr. Robinson said to Mr. Twigs. You are all I worry about love. But he also tells him, "Make sure that the police follow the right procedures, proper warrants and stuff. Be polite and respectful, of course." So, I don't see how the court can accept Mr. McBride's suggestion that this is an effort to obstruct an investigation. There is a separate charge concerning what the state refers to as destruction of evidence. That's not what this charge is about. This charge is [clears throat] to directing his roommate to stay silent if police question the roommate. Now, Mr. McBride tries to say that, oh, it's not a Fifth Amendment issue because Mr. Robinson's the only person who has any Fifth Amendment issues. And that actually ignores this concept in the law that was embodied in Miranda versus Arizona. I think everybody in this courtroom who has a law degree knows that Miranda versus Arizona says that every person in this country has the right to remain silent and the right to ask for an attorney. And it's not just the fifth amendment, it's also the Sixth Amendment. That's the essence of that Supreme Court decision. So, not only is Mr. McBride misstating the law, but he's misapplying it. What Mr. Robinson is saying to Mr. twigs is you don't have to answer any questions. You have the right to ask for an attorney. You are all I worry about love. We cannot allow the state to make that statement in this context a criminal offense because it completely undermines wellestablished constitutional law that Again, it's after Mr. Robinson has said to Mr. Twigs, "I'm going to turn myself in willingly." [clears throat] Mr. Twigs asks, Before Mr. Robinson said that, "Is there any way you don't go to prison?" Mr. Robinson doesn't say, "Well, as long as you keep your mouth shut, I won't go to prison." He says, "I highly doubt it. You are all I worry about, love. So, I think it's clear that this c court needs to strike count six because what Mr. Robinson said to his roommate was not for the purpose of obstructing an investigation or a proceeding. It was, as the case law says, altruistic. Altruistic. I now would like to move on to count seven which is alleges a misdemeanor subject to the enhancement but it alleges initially a a misdemeanor um committing the charged homicide in the presence in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 with knowledge that a child was present and may have seen or heard the commission of the the evidence. Now, I'm going to echo what Ms. Visser said, the evidence that was actually presented at the preliminary hearing and not the evidence that Mr. McBride tried to testify about today, um, which wasn't presented at the hearing. Um, and and and has some inferential problems as well, which I address, was a single video taken by a single woman. We have her 1102 in evidence showing that her child was present. That is not evidence upon which this court can reasonably infer that Mr. Robinson knew that that child or any other child was present. Mr. McBride's comments about ORM and UVU welcoming children and being the the center of families, that's nice, but that's not evidence. And it's certainly not evidence that Mr. Robinson, if he was the shooter, knew that there were children present at this rally. What Mr. McBride showed this court was his careful analysis of photographs that had been previously introduced into evidence. And we don't know how long it took Mr. bride, but he eventually found and was able to circle for this court the um three children that he could find in a photograph that he studied in his office as he was preparing his opening statement. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was that the shooter was on the edge of that roof from 30 to 43 seconds. So, one cannot take Mr. McBride's careful analysis of photographs after the fact and import that into what somebody on the edge of the roof saw. The fact that somebody saw Mr. Robinson wandering around the campus before the rally occurred doesn't mean that Mr. Robinson knew that there were children present at the time of what the state says he did, which was to fire um his weapon from the has to be treated as a reasonable inference by the court just because the state says you can infer. That's not the same as reasonable inferences weighed against the defendant or in favor of the state's case. This court needs to decide what inferences are or not reasonable. And I think that the state is stretching considerably um the difference between evidence and inferences. So I think that count seven suffers from the same problem. And of course that would therefore apply to all of the victim targeting I'm sorry not the victim targeting enhancements but the in the presence of the child enhancements. The argument that this court doesn't need to determine whether or not there's any evidence let alone probable cause to support enhancements because they don't increase the punishment is actually not true. The there is a difference in the language between apprendy and what the Utah statute says but the effect is the same. What the Utah statute says is if you prove a certain fact the court shall consider that an aggravating circumstance. That means that the court shall create um on the scales as to whether or not there should be an enhanced sentence an aggravator. It's proven. The court is now told here's an aggravator and if there are no mitigators then the sentence is enhanced. So I don't think um it's as clear-cut as Mr. Mr. McBride would like the court to conclude and I think that this court needs to determine whether or not there's probable cause as to that enhancement and then the last enhancement which which I will address and and that of course is whether or not Mr. Kirk was targeted because of his political expressions from Mr. the question here really which the state can't answer with reasonable inferences from evidence is there's no evidence as to really what was in Mr. Robinson's mind, if in fact he was the shooter, about Charlie Kirk, because we have no testimony that Mr. Robinson had ever spoken about Charlie Kirk, that he'd ever heard anything he'd said, that he'd ever discussed anything. Mr. Twigs was asked during his recorded interview whether he'd ever discussed Mr. Kirk with Mr. Robinson. The answer was no. There is no evidence of Mr. Robinson having heard or seen anything specific from Mr. Kirk or having expressed any Mr. Kirk until the statement which basically says um some hatred can't be negotiated out. So what is it? Is it political expression? Which political expression? It is true that Mr. Kirk spoke hatefully of certain groups of people. He spoke hatefully of people who don't have traditional normcon conforming gender identities. He spoke hatefully of people who are not strictly heterosexual. He spoke hatefully of people who have sexual relationships out of marriage. And yes, it is true that the evidence from Mr. Twigs is that um he identified in a non-gender conforming way to his friends and that he was in a romantic relationship with Mr. Robinson. But that doesn't mean that those personal choices by Mr. Twigs and by Mr. Robinson equate with the hate that at least Mr. Robinson says he had toward Mr. Kirk. So, we don't know what that is. We don't know. There's a gap between what it is that Mr. uh Kirk said and stood for, the the phrase in the statute is political expression, and what it is that Mr. Robinson felt about him. And it's a significant gap because what it allows the state to do is to make it up. Oh, it must be about this relationship. It must be. It can't be about foreign policy. It can't be about immigration. It can't be about taxation or economics. It must be about this because look at these two young people and the way they live. And that's an inference without evidence. And it's a very inflammatory inference. And what makes it even more inflammatory is that the state chose to to wrap it in religion because now we can't now we can't really talk about it because we can't criticize somebody's religious views. But the the real problem is that there's this gap between this the way in which Mr. Robinson and Lance Twigs have a relationship and what it is about Mr. Kirk's political expression. And we don't really understand the the state didn't present any evidence as to what They are memes. They are something that comes from some digital games. There's some slightly immature expressions, but none of that really is explained by I mean like as M. Ver said, the state had a week to put on any evidence they wanted. The court didn't exclude any profered witness to explain what those things mean and how they may link up between something Mr. Kirk had said and something in Mr. Robinson's state of mind. And I think they didn't do it. And so I think that um the state has utterly failed to prove that there's a particular political expression that Mr. Robinson took issue with. We all know because of we live in the real world the kinds of things that Mr. Kirk said which some people find hateful. But that's not the same as the state producing evidence about what Mr. Robinson thought because it's about Mr. Robinson's state of mind as to the political expression. So I'm going to conclude by saying that both enhancements and count six and count 7 cannot go forward in this case because in addition to what Miss Visser has argued and what Mr. Bert has argued with respect to the aggravator because the state has failed to produce sufficient evidence. Thank you. >> Thank you, Mr. Novak. All right. Um, let's take a a 15minut break uh just uh so everyone can stretch and we'll then return to state's final argument and take it from there. Court is in a brief recessing the presence of all the parties. Uh we oral argument turning to the state for rebuttal. Judge, the law does not protect or better reward an assassin who shoots into a crowd of people and happens to The question of whether the aggravating factor applies here is not whether a third party was actually injured. It's a question of risk. And firing a gra a a gun into a crowd creates a zone of danger beyond that of a single intended target. Tyler Robinson doesn't get to hide behind the fact that on September 10th, 2025, he was true to his aim. Not when he shot into a crowd of people. and shot and killed Mr. Kirk with people immediate with a person immediately to his right within a couple of feet. The evidence speaks for itself with people to his left with people who were behind him and certainly people in front of him especially the questioner a few feet away from Charlie Kirk standing between I want to talk briefly about the margin of error, judge. The defendant's margin of error when he took that shot was occupied almost entirely by human lives. Innocent people that were there to either protect Mr. Kirk, debate Mr. Kirk, or watch and attend this event. Firing at someone in a crowd at a distance of approximately or at a distance of 415 feet is rife with peril, not only for the target, which it obviously was because Mr. Kirk was assassinated, but others as well in the immediate area surrounding him. At that distance, a micro movement of the barrel, a fraction of an inch caused by maybe a gust of wind, a nervous breath, or a flinch, translates into a difference of potentially several feet at the target point. Mr. McBride talked a little bit about what might happen if he if he had flinched and he was off by by one degree. Um, I'm going to talk a little bit more about that, but I'm going to talk about it in terms of inches, judge. And as attorneys, we get to talk about the evidence. We get to uh talk about the inferences of what would happen. And that's exactly what we're doing here. 139 yards or 138.33 yards is 415 ft. If the defendant had flinched even a quarter of an inch at that distance, math tells us at the target point, it would have been a difference of 41.7 in approx approximately 3 and 1/2 ft. That would have more than covered the security to Mr. Kirk's right. If he had flinched even a half an inch, that would have resulted in a difference of 83.4 4 in at the target point, a 7 foot difference, and that could have impacted Also, judge, the defendant's target, Mr. Kirk, as well as this zone of danger, this area around Mr. Kirk, it was fluid. It was full of people. People move. They shift. They step forward. They lean. And if your honor watches the videos that were submitted as part of evidence, you can see Mr. Kirk moving, others moving, shifting, turning, stepping forward, stepping back. This was a fluid target, and that adds to the danger, the great the risk of a stray or ricocheting bullet. Firing a weapon from an elevated rooftop into words into a courtyard full of people filled with concrete. There was a lot of concrete there as well in the steps in the amphitheater as well as temporary metal fencing. It's incredibly dangerous. If the bullet fired from the defendant's gun had struck a hard surface, it's reasonable to infer that it would have changed directions and/or broken into unpredictable fragments of I'd like to uh refer the court to states exhibit number two, and I'm going to bring this up on the screen. And the exhibits I'm going to show, judge, were all admitted into evidence and shown on all three levels. This is an overhead drone photo. Can we bring that up, Kimberly? >> And so, um, your requested, do you want it captured on all three levels here? >> That's correct, judge. That is correct. >> Let's go ahead and position. Well, before I do that, Miss Netor, any first do any objection or do you uh have a different recollection about the evidence being played in court? >> No, I think it was, but we just would like to stand on the standing objection we made during the preliminary hearing as well, your honor. >> Thank you, Miss Nester. All right, let's go ahead and position the monitor so it can be fa uh viewed by the camera and Mr. Gernando, I'll leave it to you as it relates to uh to double check the [clears throat] exhibit that's being uh and I have judge and just for the record um the three exhibits I will be showing are states exhibit number two which is which was a drone photo of UVU states exhibit 3.2 which was previously shown by Mr. McBride. That was the shooter's perch looking down into the courtyard. And then states exhibit um number four. I may have that one shown as well, which is a photograph of the perch at night at the nighttime where you can see the disturbance better in the gravel. >> All right. So, >> we can as it relates to those remaining exhibits uh being shown in court and on all three levels. I agree they were, your honor, and we just would reiterate our standing objection. >> Thank you. I'm going to overrule the standing objection as they were played in court, an open court uh to the media and everyone in court and obviously to myself. And so they are admitted over the objections cited today. And uh want to make sure if the media can see, do we need to angle it a little bit so you can see it or can you see it? Okay, just do but I'm assuming that now you guys can see it. Well, let's do it just a little bit. Maybe just a little bit more and and we'll just have to call it good. Yeah. All right. All right, Mr. Grunander, I'm turning to you. >> Thank you, Judge. So, if we could p publish states exhibit number two. And again, this is for the purpose of helping your honor orient yourself to >> So, just to help the court and I'm going to approach judge. Um, we have a >> Thank you. So, we're looking at states exhibit number two and judge, you you may recall from the testimony, but we're looking at the Losi building, which is the largest rooftop here in the center of the photograph. So, that corner um just to the left of the atrium area, that was where the shooters perch was. If we can move to states exhibit 3.2 that was previously shown. So, this was the shooter's perch right here. Judge, can we go to number four really quickly just to orient the court so we can see the evidence marker number two? You can see the disturbed gravel. That's the shooter's perch looking down into the courtyard which is um to the to the west which is up on the photograph. So we can go back to 3.2 Kimberly. So, in addition to the the concrete that's down, your honor, in the courtyard, as well as the metal fencing that a bullet could have ricocheted off, he is firing in between the rooftop overhang of the Sornson building to the right as well as a light pole right there. Those are two additional obstructions in the general line of fire that if there was a stray bullet, it could have impacted one of those hard fortunately for others, not Mr. Kirk, of course, because he was assassinated. But fortunately for others, that 30 caliber bullet did not pass through Mr. Kirk's neck or it didn't ricochet off of his spine and splinter and break into pieces and injure other people. But that is another risk that we're talking about here. The defendant, frankly, your honor, was gambling with innocent lives when he took that shot. He gambled on himself that he would make that shot, that he would be true to his aim, but in the process was gambling with the lives of others. He was playing in effect a game of ballistic roulette. When he pointed that weapon, that 30 odd six in the direction of Mr. Kirk and that crowd, he placed all of them at risk of death. And when he put his finger on that trigger and he pulled that trigger, firing that gun, he put those people at great risk of death. especially the questioner, especially the security detail to Mr. Kirk's right, Everyone knows you don't point a loaded weapon in the direction of others, especially you don't fire it. And that's exactly what he did. Those folks were at great risk of death. Knowing what we know now, judge, what rational person would dare stand within a few feet of Mr. Kirk that day when Tyler Robinson took that shot? I believe that rhetorical question speaks volumes about the risk here. Also, the video that was shown during the preliminary hearing of of the homicide, you see the crowd scream and drop immediately. That speaks volumes about was what was happening in that courtyard that day. Um before we continue, I just want to remind the court, and the court doesn't really need any reminding, but I feel like I need to because of the the defense's arguments. This is a probable cause hearing. All reasonable inferences are required to be viewed in the light most favorable to the state. The defense doesn't get to pick apart a case here and there and make all these nuanced arguments. They can do it, but it's not persuasive. It's not legally compelling at a preliminary hearing because of the stage we're at. To the extent there are questions, those are questions for a trial of fact at the time of trial. Not, your honor, to make rulings based upon um as a matter of law and not bind these charges over. I want to talk a little bit about Sosa Ertado which is a controlling case here in Utah which emphasizes the test for the aggravating factor. It's the statute. Did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to another individual other than the deceased individual and the actor? of course the defendant and Sosa Ortado identifies some factors and indicates they are considerations. They're not exhaustive because the and the ultimate test is in fact the statute itself. Um speaking of the SOSA or title factors, Miss Visser talked about these and I obviously have a different opinion because all three factors help the state judge. The first factor is the temporal relationship between the actions and the third party. Here we only have one shot unlike some of these other cases. But that's significant because we don't have one shot and then a significant break in time and a second shot or another break in time and a third shot and a fourth shot. That would all be taken into consideration if there were breaks in time. We have one shot that killed Mr. Kirk and put others at great risk of death. So that's factor number one. Number two, the spatial relationship between the actions and the third party. There in Sosa Ertado, Isabelle, the surviving uh victim, was only a few feet away when the defendant took a shot at the victim that ultimately died. And the court found that that that that Isabel was um at great risk of death because of his proximity to um the uh target at that point and it was within a few feet. Here we have the same thing. We have a number of people within a few feet of Mr. Kirk and especially the security detail to Mr. Kirk's right within probably a couple of feet. The third factor, and I'm quoting this directly from Sosa Ertado, because this speaks to the threat, whether it's direct or indirect towards others, towards a third party or third parties. Quote, whether and to what extent the third party was actually threatened, either by direct or indirect threats, such as the risk of stray or ricocheting bullets. The risk of a stray bullet. The risk of a ricochet bullet. And that is clear here as I've argued and talked about and as the reasonable inferences um amount to. I would also point out that Sosa Ortado judge it took place in a smoke shot, excuse me, a smoke shop. So the the the firearm when it was fired was in pretty close proximity to the victims there. We're talking 415 ft here. And there is a lot of things that can happen uh in that space, in that distance uh that I've already talked about, especially when you fire into a crowd of 3,000 The defense has talked about well a uh likelihood or high probability. First of all, that is not the test. The test is the statute in question. But here we have a likelihood. We have a high probability that others uh would be injured if just one little thing goes wrong there. Again, we're talking about risks, judge. This is a public policy determination. It doesn't require that that third party or a third party actually be injured. It's one of risks. Um and again to the extent there's questions is for a jury to resolve the factf finder at trial. Um defense council has cited to a number of cases and argued those facts and compared Most of those cases involve firing more than one one shot. But whether the facts of other cases where a defendant has been found to have created a great risk of death to to another when he commits murder precisely fit the facts of ours. It doesn't matter. The question is whether the evidence together with reasonable inferences viewed in the light most favorable to the state supports a reasonable belief that the defendant here knowingly created a great risk of death to at least one other person beyond Mr. Kirk and himself. And of course, we do have the case law from other jurisdictions where one shot um one shot did it created a great great risk to others. And it's very important to look carefully at the language of Sosa Ortado and look at what the court found there because the Utah Supreme Court, the controlling court here, found that the defendant there quote perpetrated two separate acts that created a great risk of death to Isabelle, who is the survivor. The first shot was actually directed at Isabelle, but missed him, shattering some glass, throwing some glass and wood into his leg. and the second shot when the defendant quote fired a shot at Steven which hit Steven's hand when Isabelle was only a few feet away close quote. The court found that quote a reasonable jury could conclude that both of these acts created a great risk of death to Isabel close quote. So in other words, our high court here in the state of Utah has held that even one shot can create that one shot that kills someone that injures someone intended for a target can create a great risk of death to a third party. And that's exactly what we have here. And we talk about the zone of danger that's reiterated in Soserado. The Johnson case talks about this zone of danger. the Crystal Ball case. Miss Visser uh spoke a little bit about Crystal Ball and and and the state appreciates her cander. Um but what's important is that the part that the defense relied on in Crystal Ball is bad law. judge. The fact that other parts of that opinion may be fine, it's irrelevant for our purposes in this case because of the Ashcraft case, because of State V. Wall. The defense has accused the state of speculating. Judge, speculation is a mere guess or a theory formed without firm evidence or supporting facts. Whereas a reasonable inference is a logical conclusion based on known evidence or facts. Speculation skips the evidence and jumps to possibility. A reasonable inference bridges the gap between what is seen and known and what is logically true. The state is not stretching in this case. [clears throat] Um our arguments are based on reasonable inferences, judge. And as Mr. McBride argued he categorized the evidence in four four different parts. Even one satisfies probable cause and in all likelihood can satisfy proof beyond a reasonable doubt as well when it's taken to a jury. um apprendy the United States Supreme Court held that quote any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. So it actually has to increase the penalty for appreny to ply when we're talking about the enhancements here. Um, one point with respect to Sosa Ortado, I want to circle back on that I just noticed that I forgot. Judge, we're at a preliminary hearing where I and I've indicated this twice now. The reasonable inferences go in favor of the state. Sosa was was reviewing a conviction um where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required where those same inferences are not >> [snorts] >> I want to talk a little bit about judge um some of the other counts and then also the uh enhancements here. Once again reminding the court that we're at a preliminary hearing. um this victim targeting aggravator um that was uh that's based upon Mr. Robinson's motive for taking out Charlie Kirk for assassinating him because of his political expression. First of all, the state takes great exception with Mr. Novak attributing all of this hate to Mr. Kirk during his argument today. None of that was presented during the preliminary hearing that he is hateful towards this group or hateful towards that group. He had an opinion that he would express on politics and religion. That doesn't make it hate. But the fact that Mr. Novak even considered it uh as hate makes the case for the state. In his client's own words, he hated what Mr. Kirk stood for. um on the shell casing that was found in the 30 odd 6, the defendant's gun, grandpa's gun, the murder weapon, quote, "Hey, fascist catch." Close quote. He's calling him a fascist. Um and of course in the text, which has been talked about twice already today, states exhibit 16.1, when the defendant texted Mr. Twigs, quote, "I had enough of his hatred. some hate can't be negotiated out. He hated Charlie Kirk. He hated what he stood for and he took him out because of it. And we presented evidence in states exhibit 5.1 about what who Charlie Kirk Tyler Robinson, the reasonable inference clearly from these facts given his own words was that he hated him because of his political expression. Um, I want to talk a little about how the defendant knew, judge, the reasonable inference is that he knew that he was creating a great risk of death to at least one other person. Mr. McBride talked about common sense. Common sense is incredibly important. Like he said, we ask our juries to not check their common sense at the door when they come into a trial and ultimately when they deliberate. The record clearly establishes, especially for probable cause purposes, that Tyler Robinson knew that his actions were creating a great risk of death to others. First, when Mr. Robinson was crawling towards and settling into his shooters perch that day on top of the Losi building and then set his sights on Charlie Kirk. He was looking down into a crowd of people, thousands of people. He not only could see the crowd but also the people standing within a short distance to Mr. Kirk. He was looking at Mr. Kirk um through a scope that magnified the area. He could see Mr. Kirk and he could see those standing right next to him. That's the reasonable inference. It is more than fair that to infer that Robinson knew and that what that he knew he was shooting into a crowd and that his margin of error that I've talked about was very tight. Very tight. This was a very purposeful act on his part. He knew what he was walking into. He had scoped the place out that day. He knew that Charlie Kirk was going to be speaking to a group of people that were going to be assembling right around him. And that's exactly what he saw when he got up onto that shooter's perch. He nonetheless purposefully pulled out that weapon and fired it, killing Mr. Kirk and putting others at great risk of death. Um, third, as I stated before, his target, Mr. Kirk, as well as those around him were fluid. They were moving targets. They were shifting. They were leaning. And the defendant knew that because he saw it happening as he was looking through his scope, zeroing in on Mr. Kirk. That's the reasonable inference, judge. Fourth, as we've talked about, Tyler Robinson was no expert marksman, and he knew it. And we know it because, as Mr. McBride talked about earlier today, his target practice, law enforcement served a search warrant on his place a day or so after his arrest and seized those targets. And very few hit the bullseye, judge. Very few. And presumably, judge, those shots when he was taking target practice were not taken under the stress that he was likely feeling when he was about to take the life of an innocent man and shoot into a crowd of people. That's a reasonable inference. And I've already talked about what a what a flinch of maybe a quarter of quarter of an inch would have amounted to or maybe of a half of an inch. It could have been a much much different When they searched his residence, law enforcement, when they searched Mr. Robinson's residence, they found the test shot casing where he had inscribed test shot. And then there were the unspent rounds. And we can't minimize the significance of those unspent rounds, judge, that all had inscriptions he was prepared for and planning on taking more than one shot. And just because he didn't eject the first shell that remained there to take that second shot, he would have had to have ejected it. The inference is that he didn't need to. He watched as he took the life watching through the scope as he took the life of Charlie Kirk. He knew he hit him in the neck. He knew he had taken out his target. He didn't need to shoot anymore. So, he didn't need to eject the one and shoot the others, but he was prepared to do it. Why? Because he knew he wasn't an expert marksman. And we know that from the target practice and the test shot that he left behind. Your honor, it's reasonable to infer that Tyler knew he was putting others at great risk of death when he killed Charlie Kirk. the obstruction of justice. Um, I think there was some brief discussion about that today, but he he concealed the rifle in the towel and hid both of those in the woods. He admitted to concealing it to his boyfriend twigs and texts. He admitted to changing his clothes in the wooded area, and he likely knew that there was going to be incriminating evidence all over that towel. and that rifle, which there was, and he hid it, and he went back to try and retrieve it and was unsuccessful. He admitted to Mike Mitchell, the deputy sheriff friend that helped Mr. Robinson turn himself in, that he had discarded the clothing that he wore during the incident. He admitted to Twigs that he was hoping his crime would be kept secret if he were able to retrieve his rifle. In some he concealed and/or removed evidence for the purpose of hindering or delaying a criminal investigation. Tampering with a witness. Again, I would remind the court that we are here at a preliminary hearing, a probable cause hearing where all reasonable inferences are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the state. Mr. Novak got up and and tried to provide context and explain away um uh Mr. Robinson's direction to Twigs to not speak to the police. But earlier on, there was the text of delete this exchange after he had made several incriminating statements. That provides a lot of context about what they were talking about. It's a reasonable inference to believe that when he directed him not to speak to the police that it was part of a cover up here. Um, proof has been provided that there were a few children, at least younger than 14 years old, that were physically present when the defendant shot and killed Charlie Kirk. Again, Mr. Robinson was looking down into the crowd. He had scouted out the place before, making at least a couple of visits there, having lunch at the Sortson Center, which boarded the courtyard. It's therefore reasonable to to infer that he would have seen children at that event. But beyond that, the fact that he was looking down into a crowd of thousands of people, and there were children there, we know there were children there, but it's reasonable to infer that among those thousands of people would at least be one, if not more, children under the age of 14. And of course, there were. It's reasonable to infer that he would. He knew that. Um, I want to talk a little bit about the identity evidence here. It's very interesting that on the night of 2025, just a mere few hours after he assassinated Charlie Kirk, he texted his boyfriend. Tyler did. He texted Lance Twigs, quote, "If I am able to grab my rifle unseen, I will have left no evidence." Close quote. The defendant thought he had committed an almost perfect murder. But judge, nothing could be further from the truth. There is overwhelming and devastating evidence of his guilt. We've talked about the admissions he made. I'm just going to mention a few more. Of course, there was the letter that he left under the keyboard where he admitted to having the opportunity to take out Charlie Kirk and he took it. Again, you ask why? Because he hated him. He hated what he stood for. He hated his political expression. Um, and he's asked by Lance Twigs, "You weren't the one who did it, right? I'm sorry," he texted back. And then he adds this, "Why did I do it? I had enough of his hatred. Some hate kept being negotiated out." Mr. Twigs then asked him, "How how long have you been planning this?" And Robinson replied, "A bit over a week, I believe." So again, we have a premeditated killing here. And then he goes on to talk about, "I'm going to turn myself in willingly." One of my neighbors here is a deputy for the sheriff, and that's exactly what he did, turning himself in. And I'll talk about that sign the significance of that in just a moment. There were the Discord messages to his other friends. So it's not only admissions to Lance Twigs, his boyfriend, but he makes admissions to other friends on Discord, referring directly to the surveillance video footage that Mr. McBride talked about. He also admitted in person to Lance Twigs that um what he had said the night before was in fact true. and that came out in Mr. Twigs's interview that was played as part of the evidence in this case. And of course, we have the admission to Mike Mitchell that he had discarded the clothing. All of those are admissions some amount to straight up confessions to what he did. And then the defendant turned himself into the police judge for shooting Charlie Kirk. Actions speak louder than words. He actually turned himself in. We've talked about the video surveillance. Let's talk a little bit about the DNA. Uh Mr. um Burke took exception with how some of the DNA was characterized. And so I'm going to uh characterize the DNA as it actually is in the reports. Judge, I'm looking at States exhibit number 31. This is the FBI report and the FBI did the analysis on the towel and the screwdriver. When it comes to the towel, page three of the six-page report reads, "The DNA results from this item are 1.7 octillion times more likely if Twigs and Tyler Robinson are contributors than if Twigs and an unknown, unrelated person are contributors." one octillion. 1.7 octillion. An octillion is a one followed by 27 zeros. To get to an octillion, it requires 15 quadrillion trillions to just get to an octillion. We're talking about numbers that are just astronomical. We're talking about inferences, reasonable inferences that fall in favor of the state. The inference is that Tyler Robinson was a contributor to that DNA sample. Turning to the screwdriver, the DNA results from this item are 30 quintilion times more likely if Twigs and Tyler Robinson are contributors than if Twigs and an unknown unrelated person are contributors. 30 quintilion. One quintil quintilion is a one followed by 18 zeros. And it takes 1 million trillions to even equal one quintilion. States exhibit 30. This is the ATF report with respect to the DNA analysis And this is what the report says. This is what the hard evidence received by this court says speaking to exhibits 1.1 and 1.4 which were the stock and grips of the rifle and the bolt of the rifle. The DNA profiles are at least one trillion times more likely if they originated from Tyler Robinson as a contributor to the major components and three unrelated unknown individuals than if they originated from four unrelated unknown individuals. One trillion times more likely. the butt plate of the rifle. The DNA profile is at least one trillion times more likely if it originated from Tyler Robinson as the major component and four unrelated unknown individuals than if it originated from five unrelated unknown individuals. Again, one trillion times more likely. the trigger, the actual trigger to the gun and the trigger guard of the rifle. The DNA profile is at least one trillion times more likely if it originated from Tyler Robinson as the major component and three unrelated unknown individuals than if it originated from four unrelated unknown individuals. Again, one trillion times more likely. And the report goes on and on and speaks to the forend of the rifle, one of the 3006 cartridges, the barrel of the rifle, another 3006 cartridge, the optical accessory or the scope. That one is slightly different. For the record, the DNA profile is 6.28 28 billion times more likely on that item if it originated from Tyler Robinson as a contributor to the major component and three unrelated unknown individuals than if it originated from And then the report speaks to the underside of the receiver of the rifle after disassembly and another one of the 30 odd six cartridges. On those two items, the DNA profiles are at least one trillion times more likely if they originated from Tyler Robinson as the major as the major components and an unrelated unknown individual than if they originated from the two unrelated unknown individuals. again, one trillion times more likely on an area of the rifle that they didn't get to until after it was disassembled. Judge, um, we can understand better what a trillion means, I believe, judge, compared to octillion and quintilians, but it's still an incredibly large number. To give context to that likelihood, to that 1 trillion number, our world population is approximately 8.3 billion people. To equal a trillion would require replicating our world with the current population 120.48 times to get to that one trillion number. reasonable inference. The defendant's DNA was found all over that rifle, that towel, those [snorts] We're asking this court to stick to the evidence that was pre presented at the preliminary hearing. We're asking this court to make reasonable inferences based on the evidence. We're not trying to shoehorn the evidence into the aggravator. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to at least one other person. It was more than just one other person. supports the state's case. The factors help the state's case. Miss Visser took exception that that the state uses one piece of evidence for identity and now is trying to use it for knowledge. They can be used a piece of evidence can speak to both identity and knowledge. It's important also that the court look at the totality of the evidence. That's important. You don't we don't get to just pick one piece of evidence and try and attack it and render that meaningless from a certain perspective. It doesn't color everything else. We're asking the court to look at the totality Judge, the evidence and the clues the defendant left behind that day and his actions over the next day or so amount to overwhelming and devastating proof of his guilt. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing not only establishes probable cause that he committed the offenses, that he killed Charlie Kirk in cold blood, that he put others at great risk of death and committed the other offenses. It also satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The state would take this case to trial tomorrow if we could, judge. To the extent again that there remains any questions with respect to the charges, the facts that support these charges, the aggravating circumstance, the sentencing aggravators or enhancements, those are questions for the jury to resolve, not for this court as a matter of law to resolve by not binding over each and every count. It's been 356 days since Tyler Robinson assassinated Charlie Kirk. It's time for him, the defendant, to be bound over for trial and arraigned today. Thank you, your honor.