9-11-fbi-report-2004-04(apr)

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9 11 Commission Report
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9 11 Fbi Report 2004 04(Apr)
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U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Invesugzxuon
Report to .
the National Commission
orz Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States:
The F_BIs
Counterterrorlsm Program
Since September 9001
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1 -,.1, i&#39;=i;,;e-xi Ql EXECUTlVE SUMMARY ............................................................... ..1
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151; 4 Combat Public Corruption at all Levels, ............................................... ..
 5 Protect Civil Rights ..................................... ..
  6 Combat Trainsnational/National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises
 7 Combat Major White-Collar Crime .................................... ..
i I: &#39;~_ .1 ,¢i=~»>-~ ,ii .. keg - _A _{_ 9 Support Federal, State, Municipal, and international Partners.....,...,, ...... ..
1 Communication of Priorities...., .......................................................... ..
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., . ;l~ I . I - 3 Enforcement of Priorities ....................................................................... ..
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tttashe rll FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART ............................................ .. 3
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lNlTlATi92/ES SINCE 9/11/O1 ...................................................... .1 ,,._,..1 Q  _ _,_.,». _. ,_ 1 .. ill Tll92/lELlNE OF SlGNlFlCANT REFORMS AND,.
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iv INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... .. 6
v PRlORlTlZATlON .............................................................................. ,1
I The New Priorities ................................  ...........................  ..................... .. 7
1 2 Protect the United States Against Foreign intelligence Operations and
 Espionage ....................................  .............................................. .. 7
- 3 Protect the United States Against Cyber-based Attacks and
 High~Technology Crimes ..............  ........................... ..
8 Combat Signicant Violent Crime ............................................. ..
ii 92/l l92/lOBlLlZATlON .................................................................................... ..12
E Personnel Mobilized ............  ................................................................. .. 12
Expanded Operational Capabilities ..................................................... ..13
1 Counterterrorism Watch ......................................................................... .. 13
I 2 National Joint Terrorism Task Force... ................................................. _. 14
1&#39; 3 Terrorism Financing Operations Section ................................................ 1. 15
Q 4 Evidence Exploitation ............................................................................ .. 16
5 Fly-Away/Rapid Deployment Teams" ................................................ .. 16
6 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force ....  ............................................ .. 16
7 Bioterrorism Risk AssessmentGroup.-. .................................................. .. 17
~  8 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Unit .............................................. .. 17
1;; 9 Language Translation ............................................................................ .. 17
10 Special Technologies and Applications Section ..................................... .. 18
F 11 investigative Technology Division ......................................................... .. 19
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92/II CENTRALIZATION ........................................................................ .. 20
Investigative Operations Branch ................................................................ .. 21
Operational Support Branch..- .................................................................... .. 22
Counterterrorism Analysis Branch... .................................................... .. 22
VIII INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION ........................................... .. 23
Integrating Criminal and Intelligence Operations ............................... .. 23
Integrating intelligence Processes in our Operations ........................ .. 24
1 Initial Deployment of Analysts ..............................................................  25
2 Office of intelligence ......  ....................................................................... .. 25
3 Intelligence Program ..........................................................................  ..... .. 25
EAD intelligence ............................................................................. .. 26
Concepts of Operations ................................................................. .. 26
Field Office Intelligence Operations ................................................. ., 25
Requirements Process ................................................................. .. 28
Baselining of Sources ..................................................................... .. 29
Analytical Assets... ....................................................................... I0 29
Intelligence Production Board ......................................................... vi 30
4 intelligence Workforce ............................................................................. .. 31
Recruitment .............  .................  ............................................... .. 31
Special Agents CareerTrack..... .................................................... .. 31
Training ........................................................................................... .. 32
Program Evaluations .....  .............................................................. .. 34
Special Agent Evaluations ............................................................ .. . 35
Evaluation of Special Agents in Charge..- .................................... .. 36
IX COORDINATION ............................................................................... .. 37
State and Municipal Law Enforcement .............................................. .. 37
1 Task Forces .......  .................................................................................... .. 38
2 Office of Law Enforcement Cloordination ................................................. .. 39
3 Terrorist Screening Center ...................................................................... .. 39
4 Law Enforcement Online .............  ........................................................ .. 40
5 Alert Notication System ......................................................................... .. 41
6 Intelligence Bulletins ...................  .......................................................... .. 41
7 information Sharing Pilot Projects... ....  .................................................. .. 41
8 Security Clearances ........................................................................... ..  41
9 New Counterterrorisrn Training initiatives ........................................  .... .. 42
10 Behavior Analysis Unit ........................................................................  43
11 Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program ................................. .. 43
intelligence Community ................................................................................. .. 43
1 Terrorist Threat integration Center .......................................................... . . . 43
2 Exchange of Personnel .................................................................................. .. 44
3 Joint Briefings ................................................................................................... .. 44
4 Secure Networks .......................................................................................... .. 44
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 Centralized Management ..........  .......................................................... ..
f XI ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM .....  .......................................  575 Cornpatability of information Technology Systems..- ................. .. 44
6 Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center .............................. .. 45
Department of Homeland Security ....................................................... .. 45
Foreign Governments .............................................................................. .. 46
1 International Investigations ......................................................... .. 46
2 Expansion of Legal Attache Offices ........................................... .. 46
3 Joint Task Forces and Operations .............................................. .. 47
4 Fingerprint/identication Initiatives ............................................. .. 47
5 international Training initiatives .................................................. .. 48
* Private Sector .........  ............................................................................... .. 49
I Community Outreach... ............................................................ .. 49
2 lnfragard ..................................................................................... .. 49
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X INFORIVIATIONTECHNOLOGY ........................................ .. 51
Trilogy ........................................................................................................ .. 52
_f Datawarehousing .................................................................................... .. 53
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; Putting it All Together ............................................................................. .. 56
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Realigning the Workforce ..................................................................... .. 57
1 Revised Personnel Selection Process ....................................... .. 58
2 Streamlined Hiring Process ........................................................ .. 59
Training .....................................  .............................................................. .. 59
Executive Leadership Initiatives ......................................................... .. 59
Records Management .........................................................................  60
1 Centralizing Records Management ........................................... .. 60
2 Turning Paper into Searchable Data ......................................... .. 60
I 3 New Records Control Schedule .................................................. .. 61
 4 improving Efficiency .................................................................... .. 61
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1 information Assurance Plan ................................................................ .. 6&#39;1
2 Enterprise Operations Center ............................................................ .. 61
3 Audits and Reviews ........................................................................... .. 62
4 Security Officers ................................................................................. .. 62
5 Security Education ............................................................................. .. 62
6 Disaster Recovery Planning ................................................................ .. 62
Xll ASSESSMENT OF OUR PROGRESS ............................... .. 63
Development of Human Assets ...................  ............................ .. 53
Number Of FlSAs .....  ................................................................ .. 64
Number of intelligence Reports Generated ........................  54
Quality of Daily Counterterrorism Briefings ............................. .. 65
Effecntiveness of Counterterrorism Operations ........................ .. 67
Respect for Civil Liberties ................................................................... ._ 70
1 Statutory Limitations ............................................................................ .. 71
2 Oversight Mechanisrns .....  ................................................................. .. 71
3 Self Regulaticn and Enforcement ................................................. .. 72
Xlll CONCLUSION... ................................................................................ ,. 14
DIRECTORSNOTE ............................................................  ...........  14
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Executive Summary
since the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the men and women of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation  FBI! have implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transforms the
 organization to enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism. We overhauled our
counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our business
practices and technology. and improved coordination with our partners
Our plan consists of seven basic elements:
1 Prioritization
- We replaced a priority system that allowed supervisors a great deal of exibility with a set of 10
priorities that strictly govern the allocation of personnel and resources in every FBl program and
eld ofce. Countenerrorism is now our overriding priority, and every terrorism lead is addressed,
even if it requires a diversion of resources from other priority areas.
2 Mobilization
implement these new priorities, we increased the number of Special Agents assigned to
matters and hired hundreds of intelligence analysts and translators. We also established
number of operational units that give us new or improved capabilities to address the terrorist
threat. These include the 24/7 Counterterrorism Watch and the National Joint Terrorism Task
to manage and share threat information; the Terrorism Financing Operation Section to
centralize efforts to stop terrorist financing; document/media exploitation squads to exploit
found overseas for its intelligence value; deployable Fly Teams" to lend counterterrorisrn
wherever it is needed; and the Terrorist Screening Center and Foreign Terrorist Tracking
ask Force to help identify terrorists and keep them out of the United States  U. S. !.
Centralization
centralized management of our Counterterrorism Program at Headquarters to limit stove-
of information, to ensure consistency of counterterrorisrn priorities and strategy across
organization, to integrate counterterrorism operations here and overseas, to improve
with other agencies and governments, and to make senior managers accountable
overall development and success of our counterterrorism efforts.
Integration
are building an enterprise-wide intelligence program that has substantially improved our
to strategically direct our intelligence collection and to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our
intelligence. After the USA PATRlOT Act, related Attorney General Guidelines,
the ensuing opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review removed the
to sharing information between intelligence and criminal investigations, we quickly
a plan to integrate all our capabilities to better prevent terrorist attacks- We then
#5 1 000000340
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elevated intelligence to program-level status, putting in place a formal structure and concepts
of operations to govern F Bl-wide intelligence functions, and establishing Field intelligence Groups
in every eld ofce. We recently issued a series of new procedures that fundamentally transform
our approach to hiring, training, and career development to cultivate and instill a capacity and
understanding of intelligence processes and objectives within the entire Bureau workforce.
5 Coordination
Understanding that we cannot defeat terrorism without strong partnerships, we have enhanced
the level of coordination and information sharing with state and municipal law enforcement
personnel We expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, increased technological
connectivity with our partners, and implemented new ways of sharing information through vehicles
such as the intelligence Bulletin, the Alert System, and the Terrorist Screening Center. To
improve coordination with other federal agencies and members of the intelligence Community,
we jOll"l¬d with our federal partners to establish the Terrorist Threat integration Center, exchanged
personnel, instituted ioint briefings, and started using secure netvvorks to share information. We
also improved our relationships with foreign governments by building on the overseas expansion
started under Director LOUIS Freeh; by offering investigative and forensic support and training;
and by working together on task forces and joint operations. Finally, we expanded outreach to
minority communities, and improved coordination with private businesses involved in critical
infrastructure and finance.
6 information Technology
We are making substantial progress in upgrading our information technology to streamline our
business processes and to improve our ability to search for and analyze information, draw
connectio.ns, and share it both inside the Bureau and out. We deployed a secure high-speed
network, put new or upgraded computers on desktops, and consolidated terrorist information
in a searchable central database. We developed, and are preparing to launch, the Virtual Case
File, a state-of-the-art case management system that will revolutionize how the FBI does business
7 Administrative Reform
Re-engineering efforts are making our bureaucracy more efficient and more responsive to
operational needs We revised our approach to strategic planning, and we refocused our
recruiting and hiring to attract individuals with skills critical to ourcounterterrorism and intelligence
missions We developed a more comprehensive training program and instituted new leadership
initiatives to keep our workforce exible. We are modernizing the storage and management of
FBl records. We also built, and continue to improve, an extensive security program with
centralized leadership, professional security personnel, more rigorous security measures, and
improved security education and training.
Theses improvements have produced tangible and measurable results. We significantly increased
the number of human sources and the amount of surveillance coverage to support our counterterrorism
efforts. We developed and rened a process for brieng daily threat information, and we considerably
increased the number of FBl intelligence reports produced and disseminated. Perhaps most
important, since September 11, 2001, we have participated in disrupting dozens of terrorist
operations by developing actionable intelligence and better coordinating our counterterronsm
efforts.
it is a testament to the character and dedication of the men and Women of the FBI that they ii892&#39;6
implemented these reforms and realized this progress, while continuing to carry out their responsibility
to investigate and protect America from criminal, counterlntelligence, and terrorist threats of virtually
unprecedented dimensions.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past 31 months, the FBI has undergone a transformation in all areas of its operations.
The transformation has involved both the institution of new functions and capacities as well as
renements of existing processes and programs to modernize our operations. This report provides
an overview of that reform process
We have always had responsibility for the counterterrorism mission, and the Bureau has a history
of impressive accomplishments in the war against terrorism. From the apprehension of Unabomber
Theodore Kaczynski, to the investigation and prosecution oi those responsible for the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1998 East Africa Embassy
bombings, the FBI has investigated terrorist acts and helped to bring many of those reslwnslble to
iustice. In addition, the Bureau has participated in preventing many terrorist acts before their
commission, as evidenced by the foiling of the Millennium Plot to plant explosives at Lois Angeles
International Airport, the apprehension and prosecution of Ramzi Youseftand others for conspiracy
to bomb United States commercial airliners, and the arrest and prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel
Rarhman and his co-conspirators before they could carry out their plan to bomb office buildings,
bridges, and tunnels in New York City
Throughout his tenure, Director Louis Freeh and his executives took steps to build that preventive
capacity within the Bureau. They established an Intelligence Section within the Investigative Services
Division and staffed it with analysts who were tasked with identifying and predicting criminal and
terrorist threats. They greatly enhanced our ability to coordinate investigations with our counterparts
in other countries by nearly doubling the number of Legal Attache offices overseas. Also, they
devised and implemented a strategy for developing a counterterrorism capability in each FBI field
office.
The FBI responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with a clear recognition that we needed
both to build on the progress of the past decade and to enhance our operations and focus to meet
the deadly challenge ofmodern terrorism. in a process that started on September 11, 2001, we
have been reforming our organization, operations, and long-term objectives to make the prevention
of terrorist attacks the Bureatfs overricling priority.
This new operational focus required that we fundamentally transform our organization to
enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism. We have followed a plan for this
transformation that has seven basic elements:
- Prioritization
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. = >1.»-PRIORITIZATION
in 1998, the FBI established a five~year strategic plan to set investigative priorities in line
with a three-tiered structure. Tier 1 included those crimes or intelligence matters ~ including
terrorism - that threaten our national or economic security. Tier 2 included offenses involving
criminal enterprises. public corruption, and violations of civil rights Tier 3 included violations that
affect individuals or property. This priority structure allowed supen/isors substantial flexibility in
applying the priorities to their decision making. Consequently, though a top-tier priority, the
Counterterrorism Program did not receive a sufficiently signicant increase in focus or resources.
On September 11, 2001, the prevention of further terrorism became the Bureau&#39;s dominant priority.
On May 29, 2002, we formalized this prioritization by issuing a new hierarchy of programmatic
priorities, with counterterrorism at the top. We developed these priorities by evaluating each
criminal and national security threat within the Bureaus Jurisdiction according to three factors:
1! the significance of the threat to the security of the United States, as expressed by the President
in Nationai Security Presidential Directive 26; 2! the priority the American public places on the
threat; and 3! the degree to which addressing the threat falls most exclusively within the FBl&#39;s
iurisdiction.
The New Priorities
The FBI has ten top priorities. Priorities one through eight are program areas, and they
are listed in the order in which they must be addressed. Priorities nine and ten are objectives that
are key to the accomplishment of the programmatic priorities. The priorities are:
1 Protect the United States from Terrorist Attack
Every FBI manager, Special Agent, and support employee understands that the prevention
of terrorist attacks is the FBl&#39;s overriding priority and that every terrorism~related lead. must be
addressed. Counterterrorismi is the top priority in the allocation of funding, personnel, physical
space, and resources, as well as in hiring and training. No matter their program assignment,
all FBI field, operational, and support personnel stand ready to assist in our counterterrorism
efforts.
Q Protect the United States Against Foreign lnteiligence Operations
and Espionage
The FBl is the lead federal agency with a mandate to investigate foreign counterintelligence
threats within our borders. During the past 31 months, we have created a nationally~direi:ted
program for counterintelligence, staffed by a highly trained specialized workforce with enhanced
analytical support, and with closer ties to the intelligence Community. The programs focus
is on: &#39;l! preventing hostile groups and countries from acquiring technology to produce weapons
of mass destruction; 2! preventing the compromise of personnel, information, technoiogy, and
economic interests vital to our nationai security; and 3! producing intelligence on the plans and
intentions of our adversaries.
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Protect the United States Against Cyber-Based Attacks
and High-Technology Crimes
We continue to see a dramatic rise in both cyber crimes, such as denial of service attacks, and
traditional crimes that have migrated on-line, such as identity theft and child pornography. The
FBl is the only government entity with the wide-ranging jurisdiction, technical resources,
personnel, and network of relationships necessary to address the threat from l&#39;ilUliljUFlSi IllCtlOl&#39;lEi.l
cyber crimes and cyber terrorism. Accordingly, the FBI created a national cyber program with
ea Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and cyber squads in the field offices The program
focuses on identifying and pursuing: 1! individuals or groups who conduct computer intrusions
and spread malicious code, 2! intellectual property thieves, 3! lnternet fraudsters; and
4! on-line predators who sexually exploit or endanger children
Combat Public Corruption at All Levels
The FBl has extensive experience investigating public corruption Our public corruption
investigatioris focus on all levels of government  local, state, and federal! and address all types
ofjudicial, legislative, regulatory, and law enforcement corruption
Protect Civil Rights
The FBl is the federal agency with responsibility for investigating allegations of federal civil
rights violations and abuses in pursuit of this mission, the FBI investigates allegations of
brutality and related misconduct by law enforcement ofcers as well as hate crimes Recently,
our civil rights program has focused particularly on hate crime cases related to Muslim, Sikh,
and Arab-American communities that suffered threats and attacks in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, and Operation lraqi Freedom.
Combat Transnational and National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises
As the world grows smaller and investigations become more international, the FBI increasingly
uses its expertise and relationships with foreign counterparts to dismantle or disrupt those
lTi8jOl criminal enterprises that are responsible for crossl:iorder criminal activity.
Combat Major White-Collar Crime
The FBI has expertise in the investigation of white-collar criminal activities that are international,
national, or regional in scope. During the past two years, we have dedicated scores of agents
to the investigation of corporate scandals involving Enron, Worldtlom, and others, and focused
our criminal analytical capabilities on major health care fraud and bank fraud threats. At the
same time, we are scaling back our investigations into smaller bank frauds and embezzlements
that are ably handled by other agencies and our state and municipal partners.
Combat Signicant Violent Crime
Most violent crime in the U.S lS investigated and prosecuted by state or municipal authorities.
While federal statutes give the FBI jurisdiction over many types of violent crime, we choose
our investigations carefully so as not to duplicate the tremendous job being done by our state
and municipal partners. We concentrate our efforts on those criminal targets  such as
organized criminal enterprises and violent narcotics gangs ~ that pose a significant threat to
our society. We participate in the fight against violent crime wherever we bring something
special to the mix, whether it is special capabilities, resources, or OUFjUllSdlClllOl&#39;l to enforce
applicable federal statutes.
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9 Support Federal, State, Municipal, and international Partners
Our preventive mission requires a high level of engagement with state and municipal law
enforcement, other federal agencies, members of the intelligence Community, and our
international counterparts. Accordingly, we have made it a top priority to improve information
sharing and coordination, and to provide training and other support to our partners.
1U Upgrade Technology to Successfully Perform the FBl&#39;s Mission
We are upgrading our technology by deploying a state-of-the-art secure nehivork, putting
new computers with new software on desktops, and building centralized databases. We are
expanding our capabilities to fully exploit digital information and to share the results internally
and externally. We also are educating our workforce to ensure that everyone understands
how technology can help us do our jOb better
implementing the New Priorities
To ensure adherence to the new priorities, we reduced the exibility that was built into
the old three-tiered system. instead of allowing field ofces to choose how to allocate
resources within broad priority areas, the new system dictates that managers satisfy
operational needs in the strict order of their priority. Special Agents in Charge  SACs! making
deployment decisions must rst dedicate sufcient resources to handle priority one before handling
priority two, and so forth. Similarly, Headquarters managers must provide services  such as
training, hiring, and technology improvements - to operational programs in order of priority
Communication of Priorities
Understanding that successful implementation of the new priorities requires universal
commitment to them, we embarked on a multi-faceted education campaign. We signicantly
increased the number of SAC conferences where we discuss the new priorities and task
the S/92Cs to communicate the message to their personnel in the eld. Senior l-leadquarters
executives regularly discuss the priorities in speeches, congressional testimony, published
articles, employee e~maiIs and meetings. The FBls intranet and employee publications,
such as The investigator magazine, provide continued updates and guidance on the new
priorities to our employees. Also, a number of senior executives have begun traveling
to each eld office to deliver a multimedia presentation that educates employees about
the current status of our new priorities and associated organizational reforms.
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Priorities in the Budgetary Process
Our comrnitment to these PFi0"i19$ is reected in our budget and resource management.
Counterterrcirism and intelligence-related funding and personnel needs have been the top
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since the events of September 11, 2001 ln Fiscal Year  FY! 2001, approxirnsately 32
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Enforcement of Priorities
Senior managers at Headquarters and in the field have been instructed that they must
address and resolve every counterterrorism lead, even if it requires a diversion of personnel
or resources from other priority areas. On two occasions, Headquarters received indications
that a eld oices operations appeared inconsistent with this directive. inspectors were
sent to these eld offices to conduct ea thorough audit and to determine whether the office
was complying with the new priorities. ln the one instance where a problem was found,
inspectors made recommendations for correcting the problem, and these recommendations
were promptly implemented.
We are revising our performance metrics and inspection criteria to better evaluate
performance and resource allocation in accordance with the new priorities. These measures
are discussed in more detail under intelligence integration  page 34!.
DOC. #5 11 000000350
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_-___.._Mobilization
in accordance with the new priorities, we mobilized and substantially reallocated resources and
personnel to the counterterrorisrn mission. We increased the number of counterterrorism agents,
intelligence analysts, and translators, and established a number of new operational components
dedicated to the couriterterrorism mission. Each of these components represents a new capacity,
or an enhanced capacity, for the Bureau in the war against terrorism. ln addition, FBl personnel
who do not work on counterterrorism matters full-time stand by to support our number one priority
as needed
As of February 29, 2004, the FBI has just over 28,000 employees, of which 11,881 are Special
Agents. These men and women provide a surge capacity that enables the FBI to respond to
terrorism threats and to ensure that every terrorism lead is followed to its resolution. in the autumn
of 2001, approximately 67 percent, or more than 4,000 of our agents in the field who previously
worked on criminal investigative matters were diverted to investigate the September 11, 2001,
attacks or the subsequent anthrax attacks Analysts from the Counterintelligence and Criminal
investigative Divisions also were deployed to assist in these counterterrorism efforts
Today, all Special Agents are adept in the use oi the investigative tools used in counterterrorism
investigations and can be mobilized to assist counterterrorism efforts when needed. The fact that
counterterrorism is the top priority for the Criminal investigative Division ensures that all of its
personnel will be made available when this surge capacity is required. Standardized processes
for conducting analysis and producing intelligence products allow for all FBI analysts to lend
assistance to the Counterterrorism Program. The exibility to leverage and mobilize all our
personnel in this manner is critical to our ability to respond quickly to evolving threats.
Counterterrorism Agents3000    e T Personnel Mobilized
Special AgentsSince September 11, 2001, we have 2590 ~~  " &#39; ~~  i - &#39; i r
increased the number of Special Agents
working terrorism matters from 1,351 to 2°09
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We have increased the number of analysts
supporting Our counteiterrorism mission.
immediately after September 11, 2001, we
transferred analysts from other divisions to
counterterrorism and integrated analysts detailed
from other agencies - including 25 analysts and
an analyst supervisor detailed from the Central
intelligence Agency  CIA!. Since then, we have
made progress toward building a strong
analytical cadre through targeted recruitment
and enhanced training and career development.
TranslatorsFBI ANALYSTS A
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Our Couriterterrorism Program relies heavily on linguistic capabilities for translation services,
interview support, and surveillance activities, and these needs are growing. Since September
11, 2001, electronic surveillance collection in Arabic, Urdu, Pashtc, and various other Middle
Eastern languages has increased by 75 percent or rnore. To meet this growing need, since
the beginning of FY 2001, we have recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator
applicants. These efforts have resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators, including
both FBI employees and contract linguists.
More than 95 percent of our translators are native speakers of the foreign language. Their
native prociencies equip them with both a rm grasp of colloquial and idiomatic speech, and
an understanding of the religious, cultural, and historical references needed to effectively
perform the wide range of services required of an FBI linguist. To further ensure the quality
of translations, on December 1, 2003, we instituted a national quality control program. All
material produced by translators on board for
less than three months is subject to accuracy
and content reviews by senior staff, and their
products are subject to periodic audits thereafter.
Our translator corps is complemented by well
over 1,000 Special Agents and intelligence
analysts with foreign language proticiencies at
the minimum working level or higher.
Expanded Operational
Capabilities
Counterterrorism Watch
On September 11, 2001 , we formed the Executive
Watch, later renamed the Counteiterrorism Watch
Unit  CT Watch!. CT Watch receives threat
information from a variety of sources, including , f g _INCREASED LANGUAGE V
TRANSLATION CAPABILITIES 
to Support Counterterrorism 
MIUQR
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FBI Headquarters divisions, eld offices, Joint " T
Terrorism Task Forces  JTTFs!, the intelligence and homeland security communities, and state
and municipal law enforcement. CT Watch assesses information for credibility and urgency,
and tasks appropriate FBI divisions to take action on or further investigate that information,

National Joint Terrorism Task Force
immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, an ad hoc group Of representativesfr g . . . . . .om federal agencies began meeting, sharing information, and WOl&#39;i ll&#39;l§ together in the
FBls Strategic information Operations Center  S100! at Headquarters. On July 18, 2002,
we formally created the National Joint Terrorism Task Force  NJTTF! to act as a liaison
and conduit for information on threats and leads from FBl Headquarters to the local JTTFs
and to 38 participating agencies. The NJTTF now includes representatives from members
of the intelligence Community; components of the Departments of Homeland Security,
Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and the interior;
the City of New York Police Department; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Railroad
Police, U.S. Capitol Police; and others.
All members are provided with access to the FBl intranet, including its internal e-mail
system, and to the FBl&#39;s investigative database for purposes of counterterrorism investigations
l t &#39; &#39; n urn, members provide access to their organizations respective databases in addition,Daily Secure Video Conferences, coordinated by the National Security Council, are held
within SIOC and attended by NJTTF members, ensuring that all member agencies of the
NJTTF receive the latest threat briefings.
The NJTTF also works with the F5/&#39;s Office of Intelligence to coordinate inter-agency
/ntel/i&#39;gence-gathering initiatives, such as the following:
Foreign Flight Crew Vetting
In September 2003, the Department of Homeland Security  DHS! requested assistance
in vetting certain foreign flight crew members who have access to commercial aircraft
cockpits white in U.S. airspace. The Transportation Security Administration  TSA!
provided 6,200 names and dates of birth to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force.
The NJTTF ran the names against a number of FBI and Intelligence Community
databases and identied 184 possible matches The NJTTF then assembled members
from several federal agencies to review the ndings and to determine if any possible
matches posed a threat to aviation using the TSA&#39;s baseline for a "No Fly List"
candidate. After a thorough review, 25 names were placed on the "No Fly" list.
Maritime initiatives
The NJTTF is spearheading the Maritime Threat Project  a multi-agency cooperative
tie ort to prevent or disrupt potential maritime attacks The Maritime Threat Project
consolidates information on suspicious activities  such as persons conducting
surv &#39;ll Tei ance around ports  and forwards appropriate leads to local .lTTFs and other
agencies for additional investigation. As a part of this Maritime Threat Project, for
example, the NJTTF sent leads to all JTTFS with instructions for them to canvass
diving schools in their areas to identify suspicious activity and potential leads.
A related effort is Operation Drydock," in which the Coast Guard investigative Seniiceand the NJTTF collaborated to identify and appropriately res ond to nat  tp iona securi.y
concerns related to merchant marine documents and licenses This initiative addresses
_ _ . - ie use of fraudulent credentials by individuals seeking to work" aboard commercial
ships, and recently identified 11 individuals with ties to terrorist organizations.
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so DOC- #5 ,5 000000354Operation TRIPWIRE
Operation TRlFWlRE is designed to improve the FBls intelligeme ba5@192iih 3 Spei
goal to aid in identifying potential terrorist sleeper cells within the U.S, it puts in place a
roadmap for developing intelligence and collection requirements targeting terrorist training,
nancing, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack preparation within the Ll.S
Examples of TRIPWIRE operations are as follows
Agricultural Aviation Threat Project
The FBI, through the NJTTF, identied and interviewed agricultural aviation owners
and operators throughout the country. The FBl reviewed a list of over 11,000
aircraft provided by the Federal Aviation Administration  FAA!, and interviewed
3,028 crop duster owners and operators. To date, this effort has led to the initiation
of several counteiterrorism investigations.
Correctional intelligence Initiative
Another initiative being coordinated through the NJTTF aims to detect and iriterclict
efforts by at-Qaida and other terrorist groups to recruit within the U.S. prison inmate
population, All JTTFs have been tasked to coordinate with the conectional agencies
within their respective geographic regions to exchange intelligence and recruit
human sources. JTTF members are identifying existing or former sources who
are now incarcerated and reactivating them to infiltrate any radical elements. To
date, these efforts have identied approximately 370 connections between particular
inmates and domestic and international terrorism investigations, and have identied
a number of instances of potential terrorism-related activity within the prisons.
Terrorism Financing Operations Section
On September 13, 2001, we created the Financial Review Group, later renamed the Terrorism
Financing Operations Section  TFOS!, to consolidate our approach to dismantling terrorist
nancing operations. TFOS works not only to identify and track nancial transactions and links
after a terrorist act has occurred; it exploits nancial information to identify previously unknown
terrorist cells, to recognize potential terrorist activity or planning, and to predict and prevent
potential terrorist acts
TFOS is both an operational and coordinating entity. Operationally, TFOS has been involved
in the nancial investigations of more than 3,000 individuals and groups suspected of nancially
supporting terrorist organizations, and joint efforts with its partners have resulted in the blocking
or freezing of millions of dollars. in assets. TFOS works closely with our experts in criminal
money laundering, and leverages the resources of our Financial Crimes Section in the Criminal
Investigative Division as needed.
As a coordinating entity, TFOS ensures that a unied approach is pursued in investigating
terrorist nancing networks. TFOS coordinates nancial aspects of FBI terrorism investigations,
establishes overall initiatives and policies on terrorist financing matters, and coordinates with
the National Security Council&#39;s Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorist Financing, the
Department of Justice  DOJ!, and the nancial services sector. Also, terrorist nance coordinators
participate in every JTTF Through TFOS, the FBI has succeeded in building strong working
relationships with all law enforcement and intelligence agencies that are ghting the war on
terror.
A » - i zt-E irtz. < sex»;-as it

Evidence Exploitation
Prior to September 1.1, 2001, the FBI and its partners lacked sufficient procedures for
systematically exploiting paper documents, electronic media, and forensic evidence for its
intelligence value. The National Media Exploitation Center was established in late 2001 to
coordinate FBI, CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency  DIA!, and National Security Agency
 A/SA} efforts to analyze and disseminate information gleaned from millions of pages of paper
documents, electronic media, videotapes, audiotapes, and electronic equipment seized by the
US military and Intelligence Community in Afghanistan and other foreign lands. These
exploitation efforts have produced approximately 20,000 investigative leads, and forensic
evidence such as fingerprints and DNA from documents and items recovered from suspects
Overseas have proven critical to a number of terrorist apprehensions and disruptions
We have since established groups that specialize in the analysis of particular types of information
On December 4, 2002, we created as Communications Exploitation Section to coordinate the
analysis of documents, electronic media, and forensic evidence, as well as telephone and
electronic communications. Soon thereafter, we established a specialized Document Exploitation
Unit to exploit terrorist-related documentary material and to extract threat and intelligence
information for the FBl and the Intelligence Community. In December 2003, we began
preliminary operations at the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center at the FBI Laboratory
in Quantico, Virginia. This new center, described in more detail on page 45, coordinates the
efforts of multiple federal agencies to collect, analyze, forensically exploit, and disseminate
intelligence related to improvised explosive devices.
Fly-Away/Rapid Deployment Teams
On June 6, 2002, the FBI created the Fly Away/Rapid Deployment Team Unit to manage and
support the eld office-based Rapid Deployment Teams and the newly created Headquarters-
based "Fly Squads. These specialized teams and squads lend countenerrorism knowledge
and experience, language capabilities, and intelligence analysis support to F8! field offices
and Legal Attaches whenever they are needed. Since September I1, 2001, the H¬-8dClLl8_FtE:FS-
based Fly Squads have been deployed on 38 different occasions, and have assisted in
operations from Buffalo, New York, to the Gaza Strip.
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
On October 20, 2001, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive
No. 2, directing the Attorney General to create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
 FTTTF! to keep foreign terrorists and their supporters out of the U.S. through entry denial,
removal, or prosecution. FTFTF participants include the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of
Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy The FTTTF also maintains a close liaison
with intelligence and law enforcement services in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and
other countries. On August 6, 2002, the Attorney General directed the consolidation of the
Fl I F Into the FBE.
To fulll its mission, the FTTTF implemented information sharing agreements among participating
agencies to assist it in locating suspected terrorists and their supporters. It now has access
to over 40 sources of data containing lists of l l&#39;lOWi&#39;l and suspected foreign terrorists and their
supporters, including the FBls Violent Gang and Terrorist Offenders File  I/GTOF! and the
State Departments TIPOFF watch list.:
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age.t .,tRelying on this base of information, the FTTTF performs two prirnary analytical functions:
Tracking and Detection The FTTTF analyzes immigration records, other law enforcement
data, and public and proprietary source information to detect the presence of terrorists in
the l_i.S. This service supports the activities of JTiFs and other counterterrorism investigators
by helping identify the current and previous locations of suspected terrorists in the US.
To date, this process has generated more than 200 leads to -the potential location of
terrorists
Risk Assessment The FTTTF uses human analysis and analytical software to assess
the risk of specific categories of foreign nationals attempting to enter the U.S. in
compliance with the Aviation Transportation and Security Act, the FTTTF also conducts
background records checks and risk assessments on foreign nationals seeking flight
training on aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more. As of December 2003, the FTTTF
has done more than 58,000 such checks. in accordance with the Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, passed on December l2, 2003, we will soon be transferring this
function to the DHSs Transportation Security Administration
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Group
Pursuant to the Public Health Security and Bioterronsrn Preparedness Act of 2002, the
FBls Criminal Justice information Services Division  CJIS! now conducts background
checks and risk assessments on individuals who have or seek access to specic biological
agents and toxins. To meet this new mandate, CJIS established procedures for completing
the assessments, set up a database for tracking the assessments, and reassigned and
hired additional personnel. As of January 26, 2004, assessments were nalized for 7,848
individuals, and 41 were determined to be restricted persons" as dened by the Bioterrorism

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iFBl otce to work on projects tor any other office. We implemented network
to ensure that collected inteliigence can be transmitted to the appropriate translator on
near real-time basis, and we developed work flow management software to track,
and account for any collected data and the corresponding translation product,
Language Services Translation Center
Shortly after September 11, 2001, we established the Language Sen/ices Translation
Center  LSTC! at FBI Headquarters to help ensure that translation services are
whenever and wherever they are needed The LSTC acts as a command and control
center to coordinate translator assignments, and to ensure that our translator resources
are aligned strategically with operational and intelligence priorities. In addition, the
has an on-site population of 20 FBI translators and 29 contract translators who render
immediate translation assistance to eld offices and Legal Attache offices when required
National Virtual Translation Center
To provide similar capabilities to the larger intelligence Community, in accordance with
Section 907 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Director of Central Intelligence established the
National 92/irtual Translation Center  Ni/TC! on February 11, 2003, and designated the FBi
as its Executive Agent. Like the FBls LSTC, the N92/TC serves as a clearinghouse to
provide timely and accurate translation oi foreign intelligence for intelligence Community
agencies. The NVTC taps into the FBls pool of contract linguists and matches excess
translation capacity with the translation needs of other intelligence Community agencies.
The FBl further supports the N92/TC by handling recruiting and applicant processing for
N92/TC linguists.
Although it will not be fully virtual until later this spring, the N92/TC has already successfully
completed translation tasks for CIA, DIA, and the FBl. With its Director from NBA, and
its Deputy Directors from ClA and the FBl, the NVTC is truly a Community-wide effort.
Special Technologies and Applications Section
in November 2002, we created a Sipecial Technologies and Applications Section Within the
new Cyber Division to support counterterrorisrn, counterintelligence, and criminal investigations
involving computer intrusions and digital or electronic media evidence. The Section provides
technical investigative analysis, helping to extract and decrypt volumes of data and making it
easily searchable by investigators and intelligence analysts The Section also designs automated
tools, acts as a clearinghouse for new technologies developed by other agencies and the
private sector, and coordinates with research and development entities inside and outside
government. These efforts help ensure that the FBI is prepared to fully exploit digital evidence
for its intelligence value and to respond to new computer intrusion-related threats and incidents
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investigative Technology Division
Recognizing that the effective and focused use of applied science and engineering resources
is critical to our efforts, especially our efforts to protect the U S from a terrorist attack, we
created the Investigative Technology Division  /TD! out of components of the Laboratory
Division in August 2002. The mission of iTD is to develop and provide state-of-the-art technical
support and expertise to enhance the FBls investigative efforts. lTD also oversees forensic
services related to the collection and processing of computer, audio, and visual media to ensure
such evidence IS fully exploited for its intelligence vatue.
The ITD develops, procures, and supports technologies which are broadly applicable to all FBI
investigative programs within lTD&#39;s designated teichncology program areas  namely, Electronic
Sun/eillance, Physical Surveillance, Digital Forensics, Surreptitrous Entry: Tacticaf
Communications, and Defensive Programs!.
The refocusing of the Fl-3l&#39;s efforts to proactively
address terrorism and foreign intelligenceDISTRIBUTION or
TACTICAL WORKLOADl
threats has resulted in a 64 percent increase
in, and a substantial realignment of, lTDrs
workload. This chart depicts the alignment
of the tactical workload of ITD entities in
FY 1996  historical! and FY 2003  current!.FY1996 rvzooa
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CENTRALIZATION
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Bureau had no centralized structure for the national management
of its Counterterrorism Program, and terrorism cases were routinely managed out of individual
eld oices. An al-Qaida case, for example, might have been run out of the New York Field Otice;
a HAMAS case might have been managed by the Washington Fieid Office. This arrangement
functioned for years, and produced a numberof impressive prosecutions
Once counteiterrorism became our overriding priority, however, it became clear that this arrangement
had a number of failings. it stove-piped" investigative intelligence information among eld offices
lt diffused responsibility and accountability between counteiterrorism officials at FBI Headquarters
and the SACs who had primary responsibility for the individual terrorism investigations. it allowed
for eld offices to assign varying priorities and resource leveis to terrorist groups and threats. lt
impeded oversight by FBI leadership, and it cornplicated coordination with other federal agencies
and entities involved in the war against terrorism For alt these reasons, we decided that the
Counterterrorism Program needed centralized leadership.
In December 2001, we reorganized and expanded the Counterterrorism Division  CTD! at
Headquarters and created the position of Executive Assistant Director  EAD! for Counterterrorism
and Couriterinteilligence.   The Assistant Director of CTD reports to the EAD.! We now have the
centralized management to run a truiy national program  to coordinate counterterrorism operations
and inteiligence production domestically and overseas; to conduct liaison with other agencies and
governments; and to establish clear tines of accountability for the overall development and success
of our Counterterrorism Program. With this management structure in place, we are driving the
fundamental changes that are necessary to accompiish our counterterrorism mission.
We divided the operations of the Counterterrorism Division into branches, sections, and units,
each of which focuses on a different aspect of the current terrorism threat facing the U.S. These
components are staffed with intelligence analysts and subject matter experts who work closely
with investigators in the field and integrate intelligence across component tines. This integration
allows for real-time responses to threat information and quick communication with decision~makers
and investigators in the eld.
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Operational Support Branch
The Operational Support Branch handles administrative responsibilities for CTD, and
administers the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the
Terrorist Financing Operations Section  all of which are described in c/eta/i elsewhere in this report!
This branch also runs two critical components of our couniterterrorism operations,
National Threat Center Section
The National Threat Center Section administers CT Watch and other units related to threat
management: 1! the Public Access Center Unit that receives threat information from the public
and tonivards it to the appropriate unit; 2! the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit that produces
nished intelligence products for the law enforcement. community  such as Intelligence Bulietins
and Special Event Threat Assessments!; and 3! the Threat Monitoring Unit that collects threat
information, looks for patterns and connections, and provides "raw" threat-related intelligence
reports. This Section also runs SlOC, the 24/7 command and crisis response center at FBI
Headquarters.
Counterterrorism Operational Response Section
The Counterterrorism Operational Response Section lends critical support in three areas. lt
supports the National Joint Terrorism Task Force; it coordinates deployment of the l-leadquarters-
based Fly Teams" and the eld otce-based Rapid Deployment Teams; and it conducts liaison
with the Department of Defense  DOD! and manages FBI personnel working with the military
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Afghanistan.
Counterterrorism Analysis Branch
The Counteiterrorisrn Analysis Branch oversees the bulk of the CTDs intelligence functions,
including analysis, evidence exploitation, and the preparation and dissemination of finished
iriteliigence products and brieng materials. Today, the Counterterrorism Analysis Branch operates
with the guidance and oversight of the FBl&#39;s Office of Intelligence and is a vital part of the FBls
enterprise-wide intelligence program it is comprised of two sections.
Counterterrorism Analysis Section
The Counterterrorism Analysis Section includes ve units whose areas of focus mirror those
of the units in the investigative Operations Section. These units examine the composition,
activities, tradecra, ideology, and linkages of terrorist groups, and they assess terrorist activities
and threats to assist FBI managers in making decisions about deployments and the allocation
of resources.
Communications Exploitation Section
The Communications Exploitation Section processes information and disseminates information
derived from the full range of media. lt is an integral participant in the National Document
Exploitation Center process.
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J »..>» ~2; VvvINTELLIGENCE
INTEGRATION
The Bureau is designed, and has always operated, as both a law enforcement and an intelligence
agency. lt has the dual mission 1! to investigate and arrest perpetrators of completed crimes  the
law enforcement mission!; and 2! to collect intelligence that will help prevent future crimes and
assist policy makers in their decision making  the intelligence mission!. l-iistory has shown that
we are most effective in protecting the U.S. when we perform these two missions in tandem
Agents long ago recognized that investigations could produce intelligence benefits beyond arrestand prosecution Starting with the Ku Klux Klan cases in the 196Os and the Mafia cases of the
1970&#39;s, our agents began to view criminal investigations not only as a means of arresting and
prosecuting someone for a completed crime, but also as a means of obtaining information to
prevent future crime. Their goal was not simply to arrest individual members of the Klan or the
l92/iafia, but to penetrate and dismantle the whole criminal organization.
As agents adopted this approach, they further developed the intelligence tools - such as electronic
surveillance and the cultivation of human sources ~ that are critical to predicting and preventing
criminal activity. They also learned to think strategically before making arrests, sometimes opting
to delay a suspects arrest to allow more opportunity for surveillance that might disclose other
conspirators or other criminal plans. We have used this approach to great effect in organized
crime cases and espionage investigations, and members of our Safe Streets Task Forces use it
in their fight against street gangs.
This is the approach that is needed to prevent terrorism. As of September 11, 2001, however,
we were handicapped in our ability to implement this approach in the counterterrorisrn arena for
two primary reasons.
- First, judicial rules and DQJ internal procedures prohibited our counterterrorism
agents working intelligence cases from coordinating and sharing information with
criminal agents who often were working investigations against the same targets.
- Second, we had not developed the institutional structure and processes necessary
for a fully functioning intelligence operation.
We started to address each of these problems immediately after the September ii, 2001, attacks.
Integrating Criminal and Intelligence Operations
By denition, investigations of international terrorism are both intelligence" and crimirial"
investigations. They are intelligence investigations because their objective, pursuant to Executive
Order 120333, is the detection and countering of international terrorist activities," and because
they employ the authorities and investigative tools - such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
warrants  that are designed for the intelligence mission of protecting the U.S. against attack or
other harm by foreign entities. They are criminal investigations since international terrorism against
the U.S constitutes a violation of the federal criminal code.
Over the past two decades, a regime of court rules and internal DOJ procedures developed

and criminal agents working on a terrorist target had to proceed without knowing what the other
may have been doing about that same target. in short, we were fighting international terrorism
with one arm tied behind our back
The USA PATRlOT Act, enacted on October 26, 2001, eliminated this wall and authorized
coordination among agents working criminal matters and those working intelligence investigations
On i92/larch 6, 2002, the Attorney General issued new intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign
intelligence and Foreign Counterinteiiigence investigations Conducted by the FBl  intelligence
Sharing Procedures! to capitalize on this legislative change The new procedures specifically
authorized agents working intelligence cases to disseminate to criminal prosecutors and investigators
all relevant foreign intelligence inforrnation, including information obtained from FISA, in accordance
with applicable minimization standards and other specific restrictions  originator controls!.
Correspondingiy, they authorized prosecutors and criminal agents to advise FBI agents working
intelligence cases on all aspects of foreign intelligence investigations, including the use of FISA.
On November 18, 2002, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issued an
opinion approving the intelligence Sharing Procedures, thereby authorizing us to share information,
including FISA-derived information, between our criminal and intelligence investigations. With this
opinion, we nally were free to conduct our terrorism investigations with the full use and coordination
of our criminal and intelligence tools and personnel.
To formalize this merger of intelligence and criminal operations, we have abandoned the
separate case classications for "criminal" international terrorism investigations  with the classication
number 265! and "intelligence" international terrorism investigations  classication number 199!,
and we have consolidated them into a single classification for "international terrorism" {new
classification number 315!. This reclassification officially designates an international terrorism
investigation as one that can employ intelligence tools as well as criminal processes and procedures.
in July 2003, we codied this approach in our Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy, which
was issued to all eld offices and has been the subject of extensive eld training.
With the disrnantiing of the legal "wall" and the integration of our criminal and intelligence
personnel and operations, we now have the latitude to coordinate our intelligence and criminal
investigations and to use the full range of investigative tools against a suspected terrorist. On the
intelligence side, we can conduct surveillance on the suspect-ed terrorist to learn about his
movements and identify possible confederates; we can obtain FlSA authority to monitor his
conversations; andior we can approach and attempt to cultivate him as a source or an operational
asset. On the criminal side, we have the option of incapacitating him through arrest, detention,
and prosecution We decide among these options by continuously balancing the opportunity to
develop intelligence against the need to apprehend the suspect and prevent him from carrying
out his terrorist plans. This integrated approach has guided our operations during the past 31
months, and it has successfully foiled terr0rist~re-lated operations and cells from Seattle, Washington,
to Detroit, Michigan, to Lackawanna, New York.
integrating intelligence Processes in our Operations
Although we are now able to coordinate our intelligence collection and criminal law
enforcement operations, we can only realize our full potential as a terrorism prevention agency
by developing the intelligence structure, capabilities, and processes to direct those operations.
Without an effective intelligence capacity, we cannot expect to defeat a sophisticated and
opportunistic adversary like ai~Qaida.
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For a variety of historical reasons, the Bureau had not developed this inteliigence capacity
prior to September 11, 2001. While the FE3i has always been the world&#39;s best collector of information,
we never established the infrastructure to exploit that information fuliy for its inteiligence value.
individual FBl agents have always analyzed the evidence in their particular cases, and then used
that analysis to guide their investigations. But the FBI, as an institution, had not elevated that
analytical process above the individual case or investigation to an overall effort to analyze intelligence
and strategically direct intelligence collection against threats across all of our programs.
The attacks of September 11, 2001. highlighted the need to develop an intelligence process
forthe Counterterrorism Program and the rest of the Bureau. Since then, we have undertaken
to build the capacity to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our terrorism~related intelligence, and to
direct investigation activities based on our analysis of gaps in our collection against national
intelligence l&#39;8QUiF8TTl8l&#39;liS, That effort has proceeded in four stages.
Stage 1 initial Deployment of Analysts
Our rst step was to increase the number of analysts working on counterterrorism. Immediately
after the Septernber 11,2001, attacks, we temporarily reassigned analysts from the Criminal
Investigative Division and Counterintelligence Division to various units in the Counterterrorism
Division. ln July 2002, 25 analysts were detailed from the ClA to assist our counterterrorism
efforts. Many of these analysts provided tactical intelligence analysis; others provided strategic
"big picture" analysis. All of them worked exceptionally hard and helped us analyze the masses
of data generated in the aftermath of the September 11,. 2001, attacks. These deployments
were a temporary measure, but the progress made, the confidence gained, and the lessons
learned during this period started us down the road toward a functioning intelligence analysis
operation. We also established the College of Analytical Studies to help train and develop our
own cadre of analysts. M
Stage 2 Ofce of intelligence
On December 3, 2001, we established the Office of intelligence  O!! within the Counterterrorism
Division. The Ol was responsible for establishing and executing standards for recruiting, hiring,
training, and developing the intelligence analytic workforce, and ensuring that analysts are
assigned to operational and field divisions based on intelligence priorities. Recognizing that
intelligence and analysis are integral to all of the Bureaus programs, in February 2003, we
moved the Oi out of the Counterterrorism Division and created a stand-alone Oi, headed by
an Executive Assistant Director, to provide centralized support and guidance for the Bureaus
intelligence functions.
Stage 3 intelligence Program
The next step in our intelligence integration was to elevate intelligence functions to program-
level status, instituting centralized management and implementing a detailed blueprint for the
Intelligence Program.
We articulated a clear mission for the intelligence Program - to position the FBI to meet current
and emerging national security and criminal threats by: 1! aiming investigative work proactively
against threats; 2! building and sustaining enterprise-wide intelligence policies and capabilities;
and 3! providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security,
homeland security, and law enforcement communities. We then set out to embed intelligence
processes into the day-to~day work of the FEM, from the initiation of a preliminary investigation
to the development of F Bl-wide strategies.
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iThe intelligence Program has the following elements:
EAD intelligence
in ii/lay 2003, our rst Executive Assistant Director for intelligence  EAD-i!, an intelligence
expert with 25 years of experience in the intelligence Community, joined the three other
Executive Assistant Directors in the top tier of FBl management. The EAD-l lS responsible
for managing the national Intelligence Program, and for institutionalizirig intelligence
processes in all areas of FBI operations
Primary responsibilities of the EAD-i are to:
- Establish, administer, and evaluate policies, guidelines, and standards governing all
processes and products of the FBI Intelligence Program
&#39; Oversee the FBl&#39;s national collection requirements process; prioritize intelligence
requirements; and evaluate field office performance against these priorities
- Serve as the FBl&#39;s primary interface for the sharing of information with members of
the intelligence, law enforcement, and international communities
The EAD~l and the Assistant Director for the Office of intelligence run the OI. The Oi has
two sections divided into units" the Intelligence Operations Section based at Headquarters,
and the FBI contingent at the Terrorist Threat integration Center  TTIC!, currently operating
out of Ci/A Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. TTlC is discussed in more detail in the
section on Coordination  page 43!.
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Concepts of Operations
Between June and October 2003, we deveioped Concepts of Operations  CONOPs! for
the various functions of the intelligence Program. As these functions already were integral
parts of established divisions, the Ol brought together representatives from all parts of
the FBI to assist in deveiopirig documents that satisfy needs throughout the Bureau.
MISC DOC. #5 26 0000003605
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Field Office intelligence Operations
in order to ensure that FBl-wide collection plans and directives  requirements, collection
tasking, analysis, and dissemination! are incorporated into eld offices, on September l2,
2003, we directed all field ofces to establish a Field intelligence Group  FIG!. We followed
up that directive with the issuance of formal guidelines for implementation and operation
of FlGs on October 18, 2003. All field offices have established and are now operating
FlGs
The FIG is the centralized intelligence component in each eld office, responsible for the
management, execution, and coordination of intelligence functions. FlGs vary in size and
structure according to the size of the division and other factors. An Assistant Special
Agent in Charge  ASAC! in each field office is assigned responsibility for intelligence-
related functions and has oversight of the FlG. The three field offices headed by an
Assistant Director in Charge  the New York, Los Arigeles, and Washington Field Offices!
must have hoth an SAC and an ASAC so designated
FiG personnel analyze and disseminate the intelligence collected in their field office. They
conduct intelligence assessments and generate intelligence products in accordance with
the FBl&#39;s intelligence Assessment Process CONOP and other intelligence production
guidelines. They also support the 24-hour intelligence cycle of the FBI by employing all
appropriate resources to drive the collection and dissemination of threat information,
investigative developments  urgent reports!, and other significant intelligence to meet the
information needs of all consumers
Requirements Process
FBI agents have always been excellent collectors of information, but this ability to gather
information was never fully integrated into an FBl~wide process for identifying and collecting
needed intelligence. The Counterintelligence Division has long operated according to a
centralized requirernentsdriven process for the collection and analysis of intelligence,
and that capacity has been critical to its successes over the years against Soviet spying,
economic espionage, and other efforts to steal our national secrets and penetrate our
institutions. However, because counterintelligence traditionally was conducted without
signicant overlap with other Bureau programs, that intelligence capacity largely remained
limited to the Counterintelligence Program.
Since September ll, 2001, we have expanded this requirements process by establishing
a formal FBl-wide process for promulgating intelligence requirements and issuing appropriate
collection taskings to operational divisions both at Headquarters and in the eld. These
requirements derive from the National intelligence Priorities Framework as approved by
the National Security and Homeland Security Councils. The new requirements process
ensures that at continuing cycle for deterrnining where we have intelligence gaps and
targeting our information collection activities to ll those gaps. This cycle takes place at
both the field and Headquarters levels and has four steps
Step 1  Finding out what we know and don&#39;t know
First, we survey all available intelligence across the organization, including
intelligence from outside partners, to determine where we have intelligence gaps.
These gaps, also known as intelligence requirements, are unanswered questions
that we need to answer if we are to have a complete picture of threats in priority
areas. The Ol consolidates these gaps and communicates them to supervisors
and analysts throughout the Bureau. Analysts in Headquarters operational divisions
and in each FlG, tap into all available sources to try to resolve the gaps.
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After the analysts have completed this process, the next step is to collect the
information we need to resolve the intelligence gaps that remain. At Headquarters,
the Oi issues reports listing the remaining gaps. Based on these lists, investigators
on squads, in resident agencies, and on task forces are then tasked to collect the
needed information using all available investigative tools, including cultivation of
new sources. lri instances where a national information gathering effort is required,
collection may be coordinated through the NJTFF, bringing the signicant resources
of our federal, state, and municipal partners to bear on the problem.
Step 3  Answering the questions
Once we have gathered sufficient information to resolve a particular gap, agents
and analysts consolidate and analyze the information collected and generate
intelligence products for the widest possible audience. intelligence lniormation
Reports  /lRs! are issued to share raw intelligence. intelligence Assessments
are issued to share value-added assessments of criminal or national security
threats.
Step 4 - Ensuring the answers get to the right people
The nal step is to share those intelligence products as widely as possible.
Dissemination is coordinated by Headquarters intelligence entities and by FlGs
in the field
Baselining of Sources
On December 15, 2003, we directed all eld ofces to enter information into a database
on every collection source they have, the source&#39;s history and motivation for working with
us, and what information that source is providing. This effort is helping us to know what
sources we have, what we should be reporting in intelligence products from those sources,
and where we have key gaps in our collection capability that must be lled through targeted
collection strategies
Analytical AssetsSince September 11, 2001, we have taken a number of important steps to build an analytic
workforce capable of addressing the new threat environment.
l-liringWe have hired 460 analysts, and we are working to hire hundreds more
in 2004 We also implemented a comprehensive recruitment strategy for analysts
that includes a targeted marketing plan, development of ateam of 20 analysts
trained to serve as analyst recruiters, and a new tuition reimbursement plan.
TrainingWe created the College of Analytical Studies to provide analysts with
a formal training program. The curriculum was developed with recommendations
and participation from the ClAs Sherman Kent School, the Joint Military
intelligence College and private educational institutions. ln FY 2003, the College
of Analytical Studies trained Q32 FBl and 14 DOJ personnel. The training
consisted oi basic and advanced courses at Quantico, as well as ClA courses
for FEM personnel in the field.
O 0 O Q Q O 3 6 8

The Analyst PositionThere are three separate roles for the analyst position:
- Operations Specialists provide critical front line intelligence support to
investigations in the field and at FBI Headquarters, as well as case
management assistance
Reports Officers identify and extract essential information and analysis
from FBI Investigations and intelligence products, and they synthesize
the information into disseminable reports that are shared with appropriate
FBI entities, law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community
This new position in the FBI is vital to our efforts to maximize the amount
of information shared with our partners
All-Source Analysts examine data to find patterns and associations,
use that knowledge to predict threats, and generate products to help
investigators and decision-makers better understand and respond to
present and future threats.
The Analyst Career Track-We instituted an analyst career track that offers analysts
three choices. After analysts reach a certain level of seniority  the GS-71 level!, they
are asked if they are interested in: 1! building expertise in a specic program area  such
as al-Qaida!; 2! gaining broader experience that will prepare them to work in a number
of program areas; or 3! working toward becoming a supervisor or manager iri theI . .g. . .ntelligence Program. Training and temporary assignments appropriate to a particular
track are rst offered to analysts in that track.
Supervision--The OI establishes and implements standards for recruiting, hiring,
training, and developing our analysts, and ensures that they are assigned to operational
and eld divisions based on intelligence priorities Operational and field divisions are
responsible tor day-to-day supervision of analysts and for adhering to the standards
for analyst development established by the OI.
On February 1, 2004, we established a reporting structure that institutionallzes this
shared responsibility, ensuring that the OI has sufficient supervisory authority over
analysts, and particularly over the analyst supervisors. Under this structure, analysts
report to and receive their annual evaluations from their operational supervisors, and
the OI reviews and signs off on those evaluations. Section Chiefs who oversee analysts
at Headquarters report to and receive their annual evaluations from otcials in the OI
and their evaluations are reviewed by supervisors in the Headquarters investigative
division into which they are integrated.
This reporting structure ensures that analysts remain embedded in their investigative
units and responsive to operational needs while also being subject to supervision and
deployment in accordance with the Bureaus overall intelligence requirements process.I . .talso gives the Oi the necessary authority to implement its intelligence processes
through the analyst supervisors.
Intelligence Production Board
We established an FBI Intelligence Production Board to ensure that timely decisions are
made regarding the production and dissemination of all analytical products. The Board
is made up of representatives from each Headquarters operational division, the Ol, the FBI
Laboratory, the Otiice of Law Enforcement Coordination, and Di-IS representatives, and
IS chaired by the EAD-I The Board holds daily meetings to review significant threats
developments, and issues emerging in each investigative priority area, and to identify topics
for intelligence products.
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i-,5; reStage 4 intelligence Workforce
Now that the intelligence Program is established and developing, we are turning to the next
stage of transforming the Bureau into an intelligence agency » reforrnulating our personnel and
administrative procedures to instill within our workforce an expertise in the processes and
opiectives of intelligence work.
We recently issued ve directives that will fundamentally reorient the development of our entire
workforce toward the intelligence mission. From recruitment to training to career advancement
to the evaluation of personnel and programs, these initiatives will transform our administrative
and personnel systems to ensure that intelligence objectives are paramount in our plans and
performance Some components of these initiatives have already been implemented, some
are in advanced stages of development; and others are in the early planning stages
The following summarizes these initiatives:
Recruitment
We are targeting our recruitment efforts to attract agent and analyst candidates with
intelligence Community or other intelligence experience, or with backgrounds in international
studies and international nance. We sought input from other intelligence Community
agencies to determine best practices" for successfully recruiting individuals with intelligence
related skills, and we incorporated these best practices into new recruiting plans for Special
Agents and analysts. We are recruiting at colleges and universities with outstanding
academic programs in intelligence-related disciplines. In addition, since one of the richest
elds tor intelligence backgrounds is military intelligence, we are soliciting the services
of an experienced contractor who specializes in placing military officers and enlisted
candidates who possess intelligence expertise.
Special Agent Career Tracks
Traditionally, the Bureau has recruited, trained, rewarded, and promoted its agents primarily
for law enforcement work. This approach was adequate so long as the Bureaus mission
was perceived largely as law enforcement. It is no longer adequate now that intelligence
work has assumed such a central role in our efforts to prevent terrorism.
On l92/larch 22, 2004, we established a new career path for Special Agents designed with
three ObjGCUV8S. First, the career path will give all agents experience with intelligence
and analysis. Second, the career path will give agents an opportunity to develop specialized
skills, experience, and aptitudes in one of the four program areas: 1! Intelligence;
2! Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence; 3! Cyber; or 4! Criminal. Third. it makes intelligence

give them exposure to a wide range of training and experiences and help them develop
core investigative and intelligence competencies under the guidance of experienced
agents. This initial tourof duty will ensure that all agents have strong intelligence
backgrounds and are well versed in ail of the FBls operational programs.
As part of their broad training during the rst three years, new agents will be required
to complete an assignment in a FlG or ca Headquarters intelligence entity This will be
an important step in an agents development. It will sensitize them to the importance
of analysis and analysts, and it will give them an understanding of the tools and
processes of intelligence analysis and production.
Second Assignment
After approximately three years, agents will be transferred to one of the I5 largest FBI
field offices with primary assignment to an area of specialization. They will receive
continuing advanced training tailored to their areas of specialization and become familiar
with handling the substantial threats we encounter in large metropolitan areas. An
increasing number of these agents will specialize in intelligence or counterintelligencel
counterterrorism.
Intelligence Officer Certification
We will also develop and implement a process for Special Agents to receive a formal
intelligence Officer Certification. Drawing on the model in the intelligence Community,
this process will grant certification to Special Agents who complete a set of minimum
requirements related to advanced training, assignments and experience, and/or formal
education. The experience requirement can be met through a combination of intelligence
training and a detail assignment with another member of the intelligence Community,
assignments to the Ol or FlGs, or prior intelligence experience or education. This
certification can be earned by any agent who meets the requirements, regardless of
their primary areas of specialization. For example, an agent on the criminal career path
can complete the requirements for intelligence Officer Certication and use the knowledge
and expertise he or she QSITIS to integrate intelligence into criminal investigations.
Promotion to Upper-Level Management
Once the intelligence Officer Certication process is established, this certification will
become a prerequisite for promotion to the rank of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
or to a Section Chief position in any investigative division at FBI Headquarters or the
OI - entry positions to the Fl3ls upper-management. This requirement constitutes a
revolutionary change in our promotion policies, and will ensure that all future entrants
&#39; to the Fl3ls upper management are fully trained intelligence officers.
Training
Training programs that focus on the skills and knowledge necessary for counterterrorism
and counterintelligence investigations and intelligence functions are a critical element of
the FBls transformation. With numerous initiatives either already implemented or in the
works, we are making intelligencebased training at partof FBI agents and support
employees careers from their first day on the job to their last.
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Training initiatives to date include the following:
New Agents Training
We extended new agents training from 16 weeks to more than 17 weeks to allow for the
expansion of classroom instruction in counterterrorism and counierintelligence from 55
hours to 110 hours. We reworked the traditionally law enforcement-focused program to
emphasize how intelligence and criminal investigative techniques are used in tandem as
part of the FBls reordered strategic mission. We are emphasizing development of an
intelligence base through the operation of human sources and liaison with other agencies.
We are inserting the following areas of instruction into the new agents training
curriculum:
- FBl intelligence mandates and authorities
- Overview of the intelligence cycle
- Introduction to the U.S. Intelligence Community
- Intelligence reporting and dissemination
&#39; FBI intelligence requirements and the collection management process
- Role of intelligence analysts
- Validating human sources
in addition, advanced intelligence and national security training integrated with the
College of Analytical Studies will be required for agents with intelligence and
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence skill designations.
In-Service Training
We have developed a number oi training programs for on~boari:l employees, including the
following:
F ISA/USA PATRIQT Act. Training
The FBi partnered with the DO.! and the CIA to develop and present a multimedia
curriculum that has trained approximately 3,800 FBP agents and analysts, members
of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and Assistant United States Attorneys on new legal
and operational requirements, processes, and tools related to counterterrorisrn and
other national security investigations.
Language Training
ln scal year 2003, the FBls Foreign Language Training Program provided training
and/or self-study materials to almost 1,800 employees in 32 languages We also
partnered with the Foreign Service institute to develop and sponsor language training
and foreign-duty instruction that has provided 6,200 hours of training to 172 FBI
employees over the past two years.
Human Source Recruitment
All FBl Special Agents recently received a mandatory three-hour block of "Back to
Basics refresher training on human source recruitment, development, and management.
University Education Program
The FBl established a tuition l&#39;E§llTi.bLJlS8l"l&#39;l¬lii program to enable qualified employees in the
Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Security Programs to get advanced
degrees.
DOC. #5 33 000000372
9.» ».."»,ia~....<e;¢   » ». V. . s k 1 . we -

Looking forward, we are in the process of implementing the following:
~ We are incorporating into new agent training more practical exercises in which trainees
task intelligence analysts and use intelligence products in the course of their mock
investigations.
- We are developing specialized and advanced training for Special Agents, tied to
Intelligence, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Criminal career paths.
This training is being developed and presented on a phased-in basis, with the
intelligence career path training as the first priority.
- We are designing a training development plan for advanced and specialized intelligence
training necessary for Intelligence Officer Certification.
- We are working to integrate iritelligence~related topics throughout all in-service agent
training.
- We are developing computer-based training on the integration of intelligence and
policing. This effort is a collaboration among federal, state, and municipal law
enforcement representatives, who will put forth a "model" to be used by all law
enforcement as the benchmark for intelligence and policing. The planned CD/DVD
Wl|| be a key distance learning resource for agents and other FBI employees, as well
as for the FBls partners in state and municipal law enforcement,
- We are developing new courses supporting counterterrorisrn operations that will be
delivered through a combination of classroom instruction and web-based training on
our intranet. Classes currently under development include
Developing Sources
Understanding islam and the Arab Culture
Reports Officers and Counterterrorism
Advanced Surveillance and Counter~surveillance Techniques
National Security investigation Attorney General Guidelines
National Security Investigation Tools and Techniques
Terrorism Screening Center Tools
Program Evaluations
If the FBl&#39;s continuing transformation is to succeed, it is vital that we provide not only the
necessary tools, but also appropriate guidance and motivation. We can no longer evaluate
our programs solely on the basis of case-focused measures such as the number of indictments
and convictions. Accordingiy, we have developed new standardized metrics to evaluate the
performance of the Couriterterrorisrn, Counterinteiligence, Cyber, and Criminals investigative
Programs. The new metrics will encourage the proactive activities, information gathering, and
coordination with partners needed to build a strong intelligence base. For example, the
Counterterrorism Program now will be evaluated, in part, on the quality of its threat assessments,
the development of human and other sources of information that contribute to the intelligence
base, and its information sharing and liaison activities. Beginning in October 2004, program
coordinators in each eld office will be required to conduct semi-annual program reviews using
the new metrics, &#39;
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ISC DOC .The new semi-annual program reviews will be used in several ways. Field ofce and program
managers will use them to assess their performance and to identify the strengths and weaknesses
of their programs so that they can institute improvements. Program managers at Headquarters
will examine the results of these reviews, identify national or individual eld office performance
issues, and recommend corrective action as needed The inspection Division will analyze the
semi-annual reviews in preparation for regularly scheduled inspections. The inspection Division
also will use the reviews to determine if there are any performance anomalies that may require
an unscheduled inspection.
Similarly, we modified the inspection criteria for field offices to include performance metrics
for their intelligence programs The intelligence components in each eld oice will be monitored
to ensure that intelligence information is managed and disseminated quickly and in a format
for use by other members of the intelligence Community.
Special Agent Evaluations
Special Agents currently are evaluated according to specified performance criteria related to
eight "critical elements." These elements provide guidance and dene the activities we expect
an agent to undertake and master.
On ll/larch 22, 2004, the Director approved a proposal to revise the evaluation criteria for all
Special Agents to emphasize intelligence objectives. The proposal would create a new Critical
Element 7, intelligence Collection and Reporting," to require that each agent demonstrate and
effectively apply knowledge, authorities and mandates governing intelligence functions. We
also propose revising Critical Element 8, Developing an intelligence Base, to ensure that
agents effectively cultivate and exploit intelligence sources.
Proposed Critical Element 7: intelligence Collection and Reporting
- Demonstrates and independently applies effective knowledge of authorities
and mandates governing the intelligence functions of the FBl
~ Demonstrates and independently applies broad knowledge and awareness of
the needs of FBI intelligence customers and partners in other federal law
enforcement agencies; the state, local, and tribal law enforcement communities;
the U.S. intelligence Community; andfor friendly foreign sen/ices, and serves
these needs effectively.
r independently collects intelligence of value in accordance with prevailing sets
of intelligence requirements, using all appropriate investigative and intelligence
collection techniques
- independently ensures that collected raw intelligence is reported in accordance
with established guidelines to relevant customers, both internally and externally,
through all appropriate means, to include effective interaction with the Field
intelligence Group.
- Independently ensures that intelligence analysts receive all relevant collected
intelligence to effectively support the FBl&#39;s intelligence analysis and production
re:sponsibilitie.s.
Proposed Critical Element 8: Developing an intelligence Base
- independently identies and effectively operates human sources in accordance
with prevailing sets of intelligence requirements, and makes sound iudgments
regarding the value of their contributions.
#5 35 000000374

- Independently establishes and maintains effective liaison relationships with individuals
or organizations to facilitate the intelligence process, and in accordance with prevailing
sets of intelligence requirements.
independently obtains, analyzes, and reviews information  record checks! regarding
the suitability of individuals for use in intelligence collection and investigations
- independently submits accurate and timely documentation, reports, and communications
regarding human source operation and intelligence collection through liaison.
These new critical elements will go into effect only once they are reviewed and validated
according to the procedures governing our personnel evaluation process.
Evaluation of Special Agents in Charge
Historically, the Assistant Director of the Criminal investigative Division has sen/ed as the
rating official for SACS and Assistant Directors in Charge  ADiCs! of the Los Angeles, New
York and Washington Field Offices in February 2004, we issued a new policy whereby
the responsibility for rating ADiCs and SACs will rotate annually among the ADs of the
operational CilVlSlDi&#39;iS, with input provided from the AD of the Office of Intelligence. The
rating official for ADlCs and S/-92Cs will be the AD for Counterterrorism the first year; the
AD for Cyber the second year; the AD for Counterintelligence the third year; and the AD
i°OfCi&#39;lFTlii&#39;tE-1| investigations the fourth year. This change, scheduled to go into effect on
October 1, 2004, will afford more broad-based performance oversight and eliminate any
undue emphasis on any one investigative program.
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SCCOORDINATION
A major element of the Bureau&#39;s transformation is our increasing integration and coordination with
our partners in the U.Si and international law enforcement and intelligence communities. More
than any other type of enforcement mission, counterterrorism requires the participation of every
level oflocal, state, national, and international government A good example is the case of the
Lackawanna terrorist cell outside Buffalo, New York. From the police oflicers who helped to identify
and conduct surveillance on the cell members; to the CIA officers who provided information from
their sources overseas; to the diplomatic personnel who coordinated our efforts with foreign
governments, to the FBl agents and federal prosecutors who conducted the investigation leading
to the arrests and indictment, everyone played a signicant role.
We recognize that a prerequisite for any operational coordination is the full and free exchange
of information. Without procedures and mechanisms that allow information sharing on a regular
and timely basis, we and our partners cannot expect to align our operational efforts to best
accomplish our shared mission. Accordingly, we have taken steps to establish unified FBI-wide
policies for sharing information and intelligence.
The Role of the Executive Assistant Director for intelligence
To ensure a coordinated, enterprise-wide eapproach, the Director recently designated the
EAD~l to serve as the principal FEil ofcial for information and intelligence sharing policy. In
this capacity, the EAD-Fl serves as advisor to the Director and provides policy direction on
information and intelligence sharing within the FBl and outside the FBI with the law enforcement
and intelligence communities, as well as foreign governments.
Information Sharing Policy Group
On February 20, 2004, we formed an information sharing policy group, comprised of Executive
Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors and other senior executive managers. Under the
Direction of the EAD-l, this group is establishing Fl-3i information and intelligence sharing
policies.
Department of Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council
On Fetiruary 11, 2004, the Attorney General announced the creation of the DOJ intelligence
Coordinating Council. The Council is comprised of the heads of DOJ agencies with intelligence
responsibilities, and is currently chaired by the FBls EAD-l. The Council will work to improve
information sharing within DOJ and to ensure that DOJ meets the intelligence needs of outside
customers and acts in accordance with intelligence priorities. lt will also identify common
challenges  such as electronic connectivity, collaborative analytic tools, arid intelligence ski/is
training! and establish policies and programs to address them
Beyond these information sharing initiatives, we are increasing our operational coordination with
our state, federal, and international partners on a number of fronts
State and Municipal Law Enforcement
We have taken many steps to continue to improve our relationships with the approximately
750,000 men and women of state and municipal police departments around the country. ivlany
DQC. #5 37 00000037
_~  _ H  V i ~ ma-I 1*:  eeie-*=-»l~*~6

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lhave started to take note of these efforts. For example, New York City Police Commissioner
Raymond W Kelly testified at the Commissions March 31, 2003, public hearing as follows
l have been in law enforcement a long time, both on the federal and the
local level. And clearly there were some issues in the past with the flow
of information. lcan tell you that has changed significantly in the aftermath
of September 11th  There is a palpable difference in [the FBls and CIA &#39;5]
approach to doing business. They want to get that information out. They
are getting it out. 
This critical improvement is the direct result of new and expanded collaborative efforts,
innovative approaches to information sharing, new policies and technologies, and above all a
commitment to support our partners in law enforcement. We have worked closely with our partners
as we developed and implemented these changes, seeking input and feedback each step of the
way.
While there is still progress to be made, these efforts have produced a higher level of
coordination in our working relationship with state and municipal law enforcement. This coordination
is reflected in the following areas:
Task Forces
The FBI has long relied on strong operational relationships with state and municipal law
enforcement We work in partnership on a wide range of task forces, to include Safe Streets
Task Forces that fight violent street gangs, Crimes Against Children Task Forces, Financial
institution Fraud and Identity Theft Task Forces, Health Care Fraud Task Forces, OrganizedCrime Drug Enforcement Task Forces ~ F r ~ r  rr "mm y
lOCDETFl~ Mal" Theft Task F°i°e5i l JOINT TERRORlSM TASK FORCE MEMBERS l
Safe Trails Task Forces that ght violent
crime in Indian Country, and case specic i
task forces related to serial murders,
hate crimes, and other types of criminal
activity FBI personnel on these task
forces work side-by-side with their local
counterparts to solve crimes and improve
the level of safety and security in their
communities. This day~to~day interaction
has forged relationships that we rely on
in our joint efforts to combat terrorism.
Those established relationships have
been the foundation of our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, which are the keystone of
our counterterrorism efforts*iSiata8=LocaI _-retai
IFBI
Pref 9/1 1 FY 03 Present
JTTFs team up police officers, FBI agents, and officials from over 20 federal law enforcement
agencies to investigate terrorism cases Since September 11, 2001, we have expanded the
JTTFs to every field office in the country and to 28 resident agencies  increasing the total
number of JTTFs from 34 to 84. We have also established Executive Boards in each eld
office made up of F-Bl executive managers and the heads of law enforcement agencies
Fellresented on the JTTFs. These tlTTFs have been a resounding success, and they play ta
central role in virtually every terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the U S.
MISC ooc. #.f3_f 38 0000003771:1. u
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We established the Ofce of Law Enforcement Coordination  OLEC! in the spring of 2002 to
strengthen relationships between the FBl, state and municipal law enforcement, and other
federal law enforcement agencies The OLEC works closely with law enforcement groups
such as the international Association of Chiefs of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police,
provides a voice for these groups within the Bureau, and gives them a place at the decision
making table when law enforcement and prevention strategies are being developed.
We selected a former Chief of Police to be Assistant Director in charge of OLEC and located
him in an office near the Director The Assistant Director has decades of experience in law
enforcement and has earned a reputation for building bridges within the law enforcement
community. He has developed a number of initiatives to enhance coordination through his
office, including:
Director&#39;s Law Enforcement Advisory Group  DLEAG!
The DLEAG, comprised of the heads of the national law enforcement organizations,
meets regularly with senior FBI executives to provide input on various issues of common
concern issues discussed at recent meetings include: 1! the issuance of Homeland
Security "alerts" and the impact on state and local agencies when threat advisory levels
are raised; 2! the FBls investigative priorities; 3! state and local law enforcement
counterterrorism needs; 4! ways to enhance communication within law enforcement;
and 5! recommended improvements of the training at the National Academy.
FBI Police Executive Fellowship Program  EFF! &#39;
in 2002, OLEC started the EFP to give high~ranking state and local law enforcement
managers an opportunity to spend six months working in an FBI Headquarters program
such as the NJTTF or the Ofce of intelligence. The four officers who have participated
to date have brought vital law enforcement perspectives to Headquarters and have
made important contributions to our information and intelligence sharing efforts
Community Oriented Policing Training
OLEC has worked closely with the Training and Development Division to revise the new
agents training curriculum to incorporate Community Oriented Policing concepts. Agent
trainees learn that at high level of involvement with the community is expected and required
if they are to succeed in their jobs.
Terrorism Quick Reference Card  TQRC!
One small, but practical, initiative is our TQRC reference guide. The guide is designed
to fit into the overhead visor of police vehicles and lists suspicious factors that may indicate
ongoing terrorist activity, To date, 430,000 TQRCs have been distributed to state and
municipal law enforcement officers.
Terrorist Screening Center
On September 16, 2003, the President directed the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland
Security, Secretary of State, and Director of Central intelligence to develop the Terrorist
Screening Center  TSC! to consolidate information from terrorist watch lists and provide 24-
hour, seven-days-a-week operational support for law enforcement, consular officers and other
ofcials. The FBl was directed to lead this effort and to begin operations by December 1, 2003.
Thanks to signicant contributions by all participating agencies. operations began ~ and continue
to develop - on schedule.

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if.The TSC performs the following functions: 1! it receives identity information of potential
terrorists  name and identifying information! from different government agencies; 2! it merges
that identity information into the Terrorism Screening Database, which is used to assist the
police officer, border official, or consular official in making a positive identity match with a
known or suspected terrorist; and 3! if there is a potential match with a known or suspected
terrorist, the TSC passes the information to the Bureau&#39;s CT Watch, which then coordinates
the operational response through the local JTTF.
For example, when a police officer on patrol encounters an individual and runs his or her
name through the National Crime information Center  NCIC! system, the system now includes
a check against TSC&#39;s list of persons with known or suspected links to terrorism. lf that officer
gets a hit or match against the database, the officer receives prepared instructions such as
arrest detain, or question the individual " The ofcer is also instructed to call the TSCs
24/7 call center, which assists in the identity match of the person encountered, and connects
the officer to CT Watch and the appropriate JTTF for further actions and investigation.
From December 1, 2003, through March 23, 2004, the TSC received 2,045 calls from state,
federal, and local law einforcement personnel, based on potential matches with known or
suspected terrorists These calls resulted in 835 positive identifications, some of whom have
been apprehended on various charges while others have been developed into informants or
subjected to surveillance, The following two are ecxamples
&#39; A local department contacted the TSC following a an NCIC hit after an arrest
on a minor charge. TSC contacted the local JTTF, who interviewed the subject
regarding his involvement with a domestic terrorist group. The subject agreed
to cooperate with the FBI and is now an informant on domestic terrorism matters.
- Local police arrested the subject of a an NCIC hit and found evidence in his
vehicle that indicated surveillance of a possible terrorist target. They contacted
TSC, who conrmed the persons identity and contacted the local JTTF, which
then expanded its existing investigation.
Law Enforcement Online
Law Enforcement Online  LEO! is a 24 hours a day, seven days a week, real-time, interactive
computer communications and information service  an Internet for the law enforcement,
criminal }LlSllC¬, and public safety communities. Over the past 31 months, we have expanded
our use of l_EO to facilitate information sharing with state and municipal law enforcement and
first responders. For example, the NJTTF and all of the JTTFS have established Special
Interest Groups on LEO, accessible to all law enforcement personnel, to facilitate the exchange
of terrorism information nationally and locally. We also interfaced LEO with two other law
enforcement networl<s: 1! the National Law Enforcement Telecommiunications System  NLETS!,
an information sharing network that connects state, municipal, and federal law enforcement
and Justice agencies; and 2! the Regional information Sharing Systems Network  R/SS!, that
provides law enforcement users with database pointer systems, investigative leads bulletin
boards, and encrypted e-mail
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to share information with more law enforcement partners, more quickly, and with greater ease
than ever before.
Alert Notication System
in June 2003, we launched a new Alert Notification System to notify police chiefs or local
command centers of alerts, threats, or other Ci&#39;lllC8l. information. Push technology pops
messages up on computers - like instant messaging, but in a secure environment ~ and sends
alert notifications to the chiefs cell phones and pagers. The system can deliver the message
selectively to specific groups  as dictated by geography or function, such as border states or
airport security! or broadcast it to all possible recipients. Messages can include text, photos,
and maps.
intelligence Bulletins
Since September ti, 2001, the Counterterrorisrn Division has issued over 100 intelligence
Bulletins to state and municipal law enforcement agencies through the NLETS, ¬~iTlElll, or
facsimile These weekly intelligence Bulletins share information from all sources that may aid
the recipients in preparing for and responding to security threats in their areas The information
in the bulletins is primarily intended for use by patrol ofcers and other law enforcement
personnel who may encounter situations or information through their direct contact with the
general public.
information Sharing Pilot Projects
Ongoing pilot DFOJECTS are helping us test new concepts for improving information sharing and
coordination with our state and local partners around the country.
~ The Gateway information Sharing System integrates unclassified FBI criminal
information with various forms of data  including police reports and narratives and
calls for service records - from participating federal, state, and local agencies in the
St. Louis region. This effort provides participating law enforcement entities with a
single source for investigative lead material from a wide region, and the ability to
search the text of various records for names, addresses, phone numbers, vehicles,
and other data.
- The Law Enforcement National Data Exchange  N-DEX! is an information tool that
serves as an index and pointer to help investigators make the most of data in existing
repositories to examine relationships between criminal incidents. A prototype system
has been designed and is scheduled for delivery in June 2004.
- The Counterterrorisrn Reporting System on Suspicious Surveillance  CROSS!
is a new database being piloted in the National Capital Region. CROSS documents
instances where individuals appear to be engaged in suspicious surveillance. The
data is entered into the system via LEO and can then be analyzed and checked against
other intelligence information by the local JTTF.
Security Clearances
in most cases, the F Bl can provide information to our law enforcement partners in an unclassied
form that can be widely distributed- However, there remain instances where law enforcement
personnel require a Secret or Top Secret level clearance in order to perform their duties.
Secret and Top Secret security clearances can only be granted after a thorough bacl<ground
check is conducted. These checks are labor intensive and require the skills of experienced
investigators.
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established a new policy to grant
prospective JTTF members and
law enforcement executives an
interim security clearance while
the background check for
permanent clearance IS
conducted. To expedite the
background checks, in February
2003, we created a new unit
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focus on security clearance
processing for law enforcement
executives and JTTF members.
We also put new procedures
in place and reassigned
personnel from other FBI
security programs. These priority
requests for clearance are nowI
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Between September 11, 2001, and
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received and processed the following:
State and Local Law Enforcement Executives
2,707 security clearance requests received
2,351 successfully processed
 87 discontinued or administratively closed!
269 open cases currently pending
Joint Terrorism Task Force Members
1,589 requests for Top Secret clearance
1,414 successfully processed
175 open cases currently pending
completed, in most cases, within 180 days.
New Counterterrorism Training Initiatives
Following September 11, 2001, we recognized the need to train not only our own employees,
but also our state and municipal law enforcement partners, to meet the challenge of international
terrorism. Several new or updated training efforts are helping us share counterterrorisim
expertise and knowledge about terrorist activities.
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training  SLATT!--SLATT is a new training initiative
mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act. ln partnership with DOJs Bureau of Justice
Assistance and the institute for intergovernmental Research, we developed a national
counterterrorism Train the Trainer program, From February 2003 to May 2003,
institute instructor teams provided 200 FBI instructors with a counteiterrorism Train
the Trainer" course. These 200, in turn, trained 25,036 police officers from April 1,
2003, through December 31, 2003, with minimal cost. This highly successful initiative
not only raised the level of counterterrorisrn expertise among our state and municipal
partners; it also gave our eld agents an opportunity to interact with local officers and
improve their professionai relationships.
National Academy-Since 1935, the FBI has offered the National. Academy program
to experienced law enforcement managers nominated by their agency heads because
of their leadership qualities. Over the past 31 months, 2,220 state, municipal, and
federal law enforcement personnel have received training  including counterterrorisrn
instruction - through the National Academy.;
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individual eld oices to state and local law enforcement personnel in their regions.
Weapons of Mass Destruction  Wit/ID! Training FBI personnel are providing
training related to WMD at the DlISs Center for Domestic Preparedness.
Behavioral Analysis Unit
The FBI has long provided the law enforcement community with behavioral analysis support
and advice in a variety of investigative matters, such as child abduction cases and serial
murders. We are now lending similar expertise and assistance in terrorism~related matters.
In July 2003, we established a new behavioral assessment unit in the Critical Incident
Response Group at the National Center for Analysis of Violent Crime, to provide behavioral
analysis support on matters involving terrorism and threatening communications, bombings,
stalkings, arsons, and anticipated or active crisis situations It also provides training and
identies behaviorally focused anti-terrorism research pl&#39;Oj¬CtS to enhance operational,
investigative and preventive measures. In addition, we established a Communicated Threat
Assessment Database  CTAD! which, when populated with historical and current case
information, will serve as the repository for ail communicated threats submitted to the new
unit for analysis and as a resource to help evaluate new threats. Currently, the CTAD
contains approximately 1,000 communicated threats received for analysis.
Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program
The Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory  RCFL! Program is another ongoing initiative
designed to enhance our working relationships with state and municipal police departments
around the country. This program establishes laboratory facilities that conduct forensic
examinations of digital media to support investigations and prosecutions RCFLs aiso
conduct training. In FY 2003, the four operational RCF Ls conducted 68 separate classes
and trained 1,432 law enforcement ofcers. RCFLs are operated jointly by the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies operating within a geographic area. The FBI opened new
facilities in Chicago and Kansas City in 2003, and we have announced plans to establish
ve new RCFLs this year and three more in the near future, bringing the total number of
FBI-sponsored RCFLs to 14.
The Intelligence Community
We have established much stronger working relationships with the CIA and other members
of the Intelligence Community. From the Directors daily meetings with the Director of Central
Intelligence and CIA brieiers, to our regular exchange of personnel among agencies, to our joint
efforts in specic investigations and in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the Terrorist Screening
Center, and other multiagency entities, the FBI and its partners in the lnteliigence Community are
now integrated at virtually every level of our operations
Terrorist Threat Integration Center
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is a good example of our collaborative relationship with
the CIA and other federal partners. Established on May l, 2003, at the direction of President
Bush, TTICF coordinates strategic analysis of threats based on intelligence from the FBI, CIA,
MISC DOC. #5 43 000000382

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iDHS, and DOD. Analysts from each agency work side~oy-side in one location to piece together
the big picture of threats to the U.S. and our interests. Each day  except Sunday!, TTIC
analysts synthesize government-wide information regarding current terrorist threats and produce
the Fl8_Sld6l&#39;lllai Terrorism Threat Report for the President. The FBI personnel at TTIC are
part of the Office of Intelligence and work closely with analysts at Headquarters If TTlC sees
a gap in the intelligence it receives, it noties analysts at Headquarters, who in turn develop
appropriate collection taskings and pass them to appropriate FIGs for execution.
Exchange of Personnel
The FBI currently has 34 people detailed to CIA entities, including I6 in the ClAs Counter
Terrorism Center We also have FBI agents and intelligence analysts detailed to the NSA, the
National Security Council, DIA, the Defense Logistics Agency, DOD&#39;s Northern Command,
and the Department of Energy.
CIA personnel are working in key positions throughout the Bureau. The Associate Deputy
Assistant Director for Operations in the Counteiterrorism Division is a CIA detailee. Four CIA
officers are detailed to the Security Division, including the Assistant Director, the Chief of the
Personnel Security Section, and managers working with the SCl program and the FBI Police.
An experienced manager from the ClAs Directorate of Science and Technology now heads
the investigative Technologies Division, and as Section Chief in that division is on rotation from
CIA.
This exchange of personnel is taking place in our field offices as well. In 33 eld locations,
the CIA has ofcers co-located with FBI agents at JTTF sites, and there are plans to add CIA
officers to several additional sites. The NSA has analysts detailed to FBI Headquarters, the
Washington Field Ofce, the New York Field Ofce, and the Baltimore Field Office.
Joint Briengs &#39;
Each morning, the Director is briefed by a CIA briefer. The Director of Central Intelligence and
the FBI Director Jointly brief the President on current terrorism threats- In addition, CIA and
DHS personnel attend the Directors internal terrorism briengs every weekday morning and
afternoon.
Secure Networks
The FBI is now using secure systems to disseminate classied intelligence reports and analytical
products to the Intelligence Community and other federal agencies. The FBI hosts a web site
on the Top-Secret lntelink/Joint World-Wide Intelligence Community System  JWICS!, a fully-
encrypted system that connects more than 100 Department of Defense, CIA, and other
Intelligence Community sites. We also host a web site on SIPRNET, a similar system used
by DOD for sharing information classied at the Secret level. In addition, a new TS/SCI network
known as SCION is being piloted in several eld offices. SCION will connect FBI Headquarters
and eld offices to the CIA and other members of the Intelligence Community, and will increase
opportunities for inter-agency collaboration.
Compatibility of Information Technology Systems
Improving. the compatibility of information technology systems throughout the Intelligence
Community will increase the speed and ease of information sharing and collaboration.
Accordingly, the FBls inforrnation technology team has worked closely with the Chief Information
Ql°llCe&#39;$  C/OS! of DHS and other intelligence Community agencies, as we developed our
recent and ongoing technology upgrades This coordination has affected our decisions
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son several key technology upgrades For example, we chose an Oracle 9i Relational Database,
in part, because this is the system used by the ClA.
To facilitate further coordination, the FBI ClO sits on the intelligence Community CIO Executive
Council. The Council develops and recommends technical requirements, policies and procedures,
and coordinates initiatives to improve the interoperability oi information technology systems
within the intelligence Community it was established by Director of Central intelligence directive
and is chaired by the ClAs CIO.
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center
According to a recent State Department report, more than 85 percent of all terrorist attacks
against U.S. citizens and interests during the past five years involved improvised explosive
devices  /E135!, otherwise known as homemade bombs. Unlike manufactured military ordnance,
these bombs often reect the unique characteristics, or signature, of the terrorist organizations
or individuals who made them. A systematic examination of lEDs can help the Intelligence
Community draw linkages between terrorist devices and the individuals involved in their
construction, and thereby improve our chances of preventing a terrorist attack. Until recently,
there was no single federal agency responsible for the worldwide collection, complete forensic
analysis, and timely dissemination of intelligence about terrorist lEDs.
ln December 2003, the FBI Laboratory began preliminary operations of the Terrorist Explosive
Device Analytical Center  TEDAC! to coordinate and manage a unied national effort to gather
and exploit information on lEDs recovered both inside and outside the U.S. While the FBI
manages the TEDAC, the CIA, DIA, NSA, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives all contribute to its intelligence efforts.
TEDAC has several functions. lt collects unexploded lEDs, post blast debris, and bomb making
material recovered from bombing scenes and suspected terrorist caches from all over the
world. TEDAC personnel thoroughly examine this material to gather as much information as
possible regarding its design and components and any forensic evidence of the builder, such
as ngerprints, hairs, or DNA. TEDAC then analyzes and shares that information with domestic
law enforcement authorities, intelligence and homeland security agencies, and foreign law
enforcement and intelligence service counterparts. TEUAC also uses the knowledge gained
from its examinations and analysis to assist in the investigation of terrorist bombing attacks,
to develop new countermeasures to defeat lEDs, and to train rst responders on terrorist IED
techniques
Department of Homeland Security
DHS plays a critical role in assessing and protecting vulnerabilities in our national infrastructure
and at our borders, and in overseeing our response capabilities. We have worked closely with
DHS to ensure that we have the integration and comprehensive information sharing between our
agencies that are vital to the success of our missions. The FBI and Di-IS share database access
at the TTIC, in the National JTTF at FBI l-leadquarters, in the FTTTF and the TSC, and in local
JTTFs in our eld oftices around the country. We worked closely together to get the new Terrorist
Screening Center up and running. We hold weekly briefings in which our CTD analysts brief their
DHS counterparts on current terrorism developments, We coordinate all FBI warnings with DHS,
ISC Doc. #5 45 000099334,
X ,A§,~92:

and we now coordinate jOii warnings through the Homeland Security Advisory System to address
our customers concerns about multiple and duplicative warnings. We designated an experienced
executive from the Transportation Security Administration to run the TSC and detailed a senior
DHS executive to the FBls Office of Intelligence to ensure coordination and transparency between
the agencies.
On March 4, 2003, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of Central Intelligence signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding  ll/IOU}
estabiishing policies and procedures for information sharing, handling, and use. Pursuant to that
MOU, information related to terrorist threats and vulnerabilities is provided to DHS automatically
without DHS having to request it. Consistent with the protection of sensitive sources and methods
and the protection of privacy rights, we now share as a rule, and withhold by exception.
Foreign Governments
With terrorists traveling, communicating, and planning attacks all around the world,
coordination with our foreign partners has become more critical than ever before We have steadily
increased our overseas presence since September 11, 2001, and now routinely depioy agents
and crime scene experts to assist in the investigation of overseas attacks, such as the ivlay 2003
bombings in Saudi Arabia and lviorocco. As of January 7, 2004, 413 FBl personnel were assigned
overseas, over 200 of whom are permanently assigned. Their efforts, and the reiationships that
grow from them, have played a critical role in the successful international operations we have
conducted over the past 31 months.
International investigations
Bureau personnel have participated in numerous investigations of terrorist attacks in foreign
countries over the past 31 months. Our approach to those investigations differs from the
approach. we tradittorially have taken. Prior to September 11, 2001, our overseas investigations
primarily were focused on building cases for prosecution in the U.S. Today, our focus is more
broadly to provide our foreign partners with investigative, forensics, or whatever type of support
will enhance ourioint efforts to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. Our partners have
embraced this approach, and it is paying dividends with greater reciprocal cooperation and
more effective ioint investigations.
By way of an example, our Legal Attache office in Islamabad, Pakistan, was extensively involved
in the investigation of the abduction and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
The F Bl conducted a forensic examination of a tap top computer seized by the Pakistani police
that revealed a draft of the demand note for Pearl&#39;s release. FBI agents later returned to
Pakistan and testified in the trial of Omar Shaikh and his co-conspirators, resulting in their
convictions and a capital sentence for Shaikh.
Expansion of Legal Attaché Ofces
Director Freeh recognized the need for greater operational collaboration with foreign government
services, and during his tenure the FBI expanded the number of Legai Attache offices from
23 to 44. Since September 2001, we have opened three more Legal Attache offices, in Beijing,
China, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and Sanaa, Yemen. We plan to open an office in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with the arrival of the Legal Attache in May 2004. Construction and
certification of our oice in Tbilisi, Georgia, will soon be complete, and the office will open with
the arrival of our Legal Attache in June 2004. We also expect to open an office in the new
U.S. Embassy building in Sofia, Bulgaria, this fali. We have gained Congressional approvai
and appropriations for offices that are currently in the design or construction bidding phases
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,._..i_   .H V-_" »:i 4:&#39;4? "5! ~fin Rabat, Morocco, and Jakarta, Indonesia, and we expect to be in the design phase for a new
office in SEl&#39;Elj¬92/D, Bosnia, in April 2004 We are also in the design phase for sub-offices in
Bonn, Germany, and Milan, Italy
Joint Task. Forces and Operations
The FBI is working with its international partners in new ways, including task forces, new
information sharing initiatives and, in some cases, joint operations.
The following are a few examples:
U.S. I Saudi Joint Task Force~on Terrorist Financing - On August 3i, 2003, the
FBI, other federal agencies, and the Saudi It/Iabahith formed an unprecedented task
force to identify persons or entities suspected of providing nancial support to terrorist
groups overseas and to develop strategies to stem the tide of such support. Personnel
from the F Bl&#39;s Terrorist Financing Operations Section have been sent to Saudi Arabia
to participate.
Riyadh "Fusion Cell" - The bombings of three western residential compounds on
May 12, 2003, prompted a new and much improved level of cooperation between the
FBls Legal Attache in Riyadh, other elements of the U.S. government represented
in Riyadh, and the Saudi government. In May 2003, a team deployed from FBI
Headquarters; in concert with our Legal Attache in Riyadh, agreed to work jointly in
investigating the attacks and the threat to the U B. emanating from at-Qaida members
in the Arabian Peninsula.
The result was a fusion cell" that gave the Saudi government a single point of contact
for U.S. elements assisting in the investigation. The fusion cell coordinates requests
for information, concentrates resources for interviews and debriengs, and serves as
a coordination point for information from all sources.
Indonesian Joint Operation - The FBl&#39;s Counterterrorism Division, in conjunction
with the New York and Los Angeles Divisions, has deployed personnel to Indonesia
since October 2002 as part of an initiative with the Indonesian National Police and the
Australian Federal Police to investigate the October I2, 2002, Bali bombings and the
August 5, 2003, J.92/V. Marriott Hotel Bombing. The FBI participates in regular coordination
meetings with both agencies, and we are lending extensive investigative support to
the initiative, including technical assistance, laboratory testing, and forensic support.
Fingerprint/Identication Initiatives
Critical to our counterterrorisrn efforts is the use of biometric and biographical information to
establishi a person&#39;s identity conclusively Several new initiatives are helping us expand our
intelligence base with critical identiers, such as ngerprints, DNA, photographs, and biographical
information from foreign sources The FBls Criminal Justice Information Services Division
has ted several overseas deployments to gather and exchange ngerprints of known and
Suspected terrorists. CJIS has obtained fingerprints and other identifying information for more
than 10,000 terrorist suspects and detainees from more than 16 countries. DOD and CJIS are
adding selected enemy combatant ngerprints to existing ngerprintdatabases and making
them available for military, law enforcement, and homeland security needs. CJIS is also
working closely with DOD, the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps to provide identification services
and assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lastly, CJtS personnel have provided basic training
to foreign law enforcement entities on how to take viable and legible ngerprints that can be
used reliably by the FBI and our partners.
ooc. iis 47 oooooosse
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International Training initiatives
We are increasing training opportunities for our foreign partners at the FBl National Academy
and at the International Law Enforcement Academies  ILE/is! in Hungary and Thailand. Since
September 11, 2001, the Bureau has trained over 20,000 international law enforcement students
on topics ranging from management principles to law enforcement communications to forensic
science. ln addition, we have several new initiatives:
- At the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority in lraq, FBI, DHS, State Department,
and other DOJ personnel traveled to Baghdad, met with law enforcement and Coalition
Provisional Authority officials, assessed their needs, and developed a comprehensive
training plan. The plan includes training in counterterrorism and post~bla$t investigations,
major case management, fingerprinting, organized crime investigations, and the
development of an internal affairs apparatus. The plan is awaiting approval by the
Coalition Provisional Authority
- The Middle Eastern Law Enforcement Training Center  MELETC!, located at the Dubai
National Police Training Academy in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, is a bilateral
partnership between the Government of the Emirate of Dubai and the FBI. Through
the MELETC, the FBl provides training and assistance in counterterrorism and other
disciplines to officers from the Dubai National Police and other Gulf Cooperation
Council  GCC! countries. To date, over 400 police ofcials from the G-CC have
received training at MELETC.
- In a new program funded by the State Department, experts from our Terrorist Financing
Operations Section and the Internal Revenue Service offer a course on terrorist
financing and money laundering for foreign law enforcement ofcers and banking
regulators. The course has been offered to officials from 10 countries since February
2003, and training is planned for eight additional countries in 2004.
- The Cyber Division conducted 12 specialized courses outside the U.S.  involving
aimost 500 students! this past year to raise the expertise and analytical abilities of
foreign personnel involved in investigating computer intrusions and cyber crime matters
- The FBI-supported forensic training laboratory in the ILEA in Budapest opened in
January 2004. The FBI. provided laboratory equipment for this new training center,
and FBI Laboratory experts serve as instructors. The center will help raise the overall
level of forensic expertise in Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia as students
return to their home countries to combat crime and terrorism.
- The FBl&#39;s Training and Development Division is spearheading Leadership in the
Counteiterrorisrri Environment, an international training initiative for ceitain North
American and United Kingdom law enforcement agencies. The program is focused
on developing and rening strategic leadership skills for intelligence and counteiterrorisrn
missions. Training is tentatively scheduled for sites in Scotland and Northern lreland
this summer, and at the FBI Academy this fall.
The relationships fostered by these training initiatives have borne fruit in improved operational
coordination. in the aftermath of the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that killed
nine Americans, we received unprecedented cooperation from Saudi officials. One reason
was the fact that the FBI National Academy had recently trained more than 100 Saudi police
in the science of evidence collection. As a result, our forensic technicians and their Saudi
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Saudi partners told us, We were taught together, now we can work together.
The Private Sector
The FBl increasingly looks to partnerships with the private sector to enlist support for its law
enforcement and intelligence missions. Among those partnerships are the following:
Community Outreach
if the FBI is successfully to predict and prevent terrorist attacks, it is imperative that we build
and maintain close ties to key minority communities. The Muslim, iraqi, and Arab-American
communities have contributed a great deal to our successes to date, and we are grateful for
their assistance and for their ongoing commitment to preventing acts of terrorism.
Beginning in late 2001, Director Mueller has met bi-annually with a group of leaders from the
Arab American, Muslim American, and Sikh American communities to discuss issues including
counterterrorism efforts, terrorism-related money transactions, "no-fly" lists, training on cultural
awareness, and recruiting. in addition, each FBI field office was tasked with establishing
contacts with Arab-American, Muslim, and Sikh community organizations and leaders in their
territories. Since September ii, 2001, high-level eld managers have attended over 1,880
town hall, community, or association meetings; participated in over 900 meetings with Muslim,
Sikh, or Jewish groups; and attended over 300 meetings with civil rights leaders to address
their concerns. Field managers also sponsored over 130 sessions of training by representatives
of Middle Eastern groups in order to improve our agents cultural awareness and sensitivity.
These efforts to reach out to Muslim and Arab American communities assist our counterterrorism
efforts by improving the level of cooperation and the number of tips received from these
communities. Outreach efforts also support long-term recruitment goals and the overall public
understanding of terrorism.
lnfraGard
lnfraGard is a partnership between the FBl and the private sector designed to foster the
exchange of information between law enforcement and the owners and operators of our nations
critical infrastructure. Using a secure web site, infraGard members receive sensitive, but
unclassied, information such as Alerts, Advisories and information Bulletins from the FBI and
DHS. ln turn, members provide information relevant to FBl investigations.
lnfraGard currently has 10,000 members and 79 chapters throughout the 56 eld divisions.
These members primarily represent small and medium-sized businesses in all of the critical
infrastructure sectors. Over the past year lnfraGard membership increased by 44 percent.
lnfraGard chapters meet regularly to discuss cyber crime, terrorism, and criminal threats to
critical infrastructures, and often include representatives from state, municipal and federal
government, academia, and law enforcement agencies. At a time when the failure to report
cyber crimes remains a major obstacle to stopping these crimes, lnfraGard helps us build trust
and encourages reporting. The program allows us to alert companies to threats so they can
better protect themselves, and ultimately helps us identify and counter those groups and
individuals who threaten our critical infrastructures.l
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Expanding upon long established relationships between the FBls white-collar crime program
and the financial services industry, the Terrorist Financing Operations Section conducts
extensive liaison with the financial community through a series of nationai and international
initiatives  including the training efforts referenced above. in addition, in spring of 2003, we
established Special Agent Terrorism Financing Coordinators in each JTTF to share information
and improve relationships with nancial institutions in their areas.
Railroad initiative
As evidenced by the recent bombings in Madrid, Spain, Arnericas rail companies have signicant
critical assets that, if compromised, could cause a serious disruption to our national infrastructure
To enhance our liaison with this critical sector, we invited a railroad police ofcer, who represents
the nation&#39;s railroad police, to join our National Joint Terrorism Task Force. in August 2003,
a Supervisory Special Agent from the Noitoik Southern Railroad Police Department reported
to the NJTTF. Working through this representative, we now provide training to JTTFs that
have critical railroad assets in their areas, familiarizing them with those assets and the various
measures for their protection
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TECill92lOLOG/
The foundation of a centralized and effective counterterrorism operation is the capability to
assemble, assimilate, and disseminate investigative and operational information both internally
and with fellow intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This capability requires information
technology  ID that makes information easily accessible and usable by all personnel while protecting
the security of that information.
On September 11, 2001, the Bureau&#39;s information technology was inadequate to support its
counterterrorism mission. In preceding years, substantial investments were made to upgrade
technologies that directly supported investigations, such as surveillance equipment and forensic
services like the integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. insufficient attention was
paid, however, to technology related to the more undamerital tasks of records creation, maintenance,
dissemination, and retrieval. in 2001, many employees still used vintage 1987&#39; 386 desktop
computers, Some resident agencies could only access data in their eld office via a slow dial-
up connection. Many Bureau programs were using computer systems that operated independently
and did not interoperate with systems in other programs or other parts ofthe Bureau.
We also had a decient information management system. The FBls legacy investigative information
system, the Automated Case Support  AC8!, was not veiy effective in identifying information or
supporting investigations. Users navigated with the function keys instead of the point. and click"
method common to web-based applications. Simple tasks, such as storing an electronic version
of a document, required a user to perform 12 separate functions in a "green screen" environment.
Also, the system lacked multimedia functionality to allow for the storage of information in its original
form. Agents could not store many forms of digital evidence in an electronic format, instead having
to describe the evidence and indicate where the evidence was stored in a control room
Thanks to the character and resolve of its personnel, the FBl was abte to achieve numerous
investigative successes, in spite of these obstacles it was clear as of September 11, 2001,
however, that we needed an integrated IT infrastructure to manage our information. We brought
on~board a highly skilled team of experts and set out to create an IT infrastructure that is fast and
secure, and that ties together the applications and databases used throughout the Bureau. We
also designed usenfriendly, web-based software applications to reduce reliance on paper records
and to streamline investigative workflow. These improvements are enhancing our ability to collect,
store, search, analyze, and share information.
Centralized Management
The shortcomings of the FBl&#39;s IT prior to September 11, 2001, were due in part to a
lack of centralized management. Decisions related to IT were made at various levels and by
various divisions throughout the Bureau with no overarching strategy Or plan. To correct this
problem and ensure that future decisions related to IT are consistent with a clear plan to meet
DOC. #5 51 000000390
< §4,_vi1 &#39;4 ~ _1_:§>< we-_

FBI-wide needs, we have centralized decision-making related to lT. in July 2002, the
Director appointed the rst full-time Chief information Office  C/O! for the FBI The CIO is
responsible for the FBl&#39;s overall information technology efforts, including. 1! developing our
IT strategic plan and operating budget: 2! developing and maintaining the FBis technology
assets; and 3! providing technical direction for the re-engineering of FBi business processes.
in December 2003, Director Mueller appointed a Chief Technology Officer who is responsible
for guiding the information technology research and development functions of the FBl. He
is currently focused on centralizing our current lT development projects, ensuring the optimal
use and sharing of Bureau intelligence data on common platforms. We also created an
Enterprise Architecture Board made up of 14 representatives from eight FBI divisions The
Board meets regularly to review technical proposals for new FBI information systems.
Trilogy
The first step in our modernization efforts is the Trilogy Program, a rnulti-year effort
to enhance our effectiveness through technologies that allow us better to access, organize,
and analyze information. The Trilogy Program is aimed at providing all FBI offices, including
Legal Attache offices, with improved network communications, a common and current set
of office automation tools, and user-friendly web-based applications. Trilogy upgrades also
incorporate controls to provide an enhanced level of security for PB! information. Trilogy
has proceeded in three stages or components:
1 Transportation Network Component
We replaced old local area and wide area networks with a state-of-the-art, secure,
high-speed communications system that links desktops and databases throughout
the FBl. This component was completed on March 28, 2003, with deployment of a
new wide area network to 591 sites, 622 local area networks, and 1,202 local area
network switches. We launched a highly secure network connected to the nations
intelligence Community in order to facilitate the transmission and sharing of Top
Secret  TS! and Sensitive Cornpart
…[truncated]
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Epstein Files

EFTA01349313 — VI y. . .,.••••• • ,, ;..A-
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EFTA02361244 — From: Popular in your network <[email protected]>
From: Popular in your network <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, August 23, 2015 11:26 PM To: jeffrey epstein Subject: Mike Monteiro tweeted: On the left: a white man on a hoverboard at the airport. On the right: a black m…
EFTA02392049 — From: ROMERAL Stella
From: ROMERAL Stella Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 7:00 PM To: Jeffrey E. Cc: PASQUIER Fanny Subject: RE: Gardener Dear Sir, The CV is in the document attached I sent you earlier. I will ask about her nationality and …
Federal Writers' Project

[Boiled Ham]
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[Old Glendale]
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[Three Anecdotes]
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