Document text
FM 7-98
OPERATIONS IN A
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FIELD MANUAL *FM 7-98
NO. 7-98 Fleadquarters
Department Of The Army
Washington, DC, 19 October 1992
Operations In A Low-Intensity Conflict
Table Of Contents
Page
Preface viii
Chapter 1. Introduction 1-1
Section I. Background 1-1
1-1. Nature Of Low-Intensity Conflict 1-1
1-2. Environmental Considerations 1-1
1-3. Military Role In Low-Intensity Conflict 1-1
Section II Imperatives 1-2
1-4. Political Dominance 1-2
1-5. Unity Of Effort 1-2
1-6. Adaptability 1-2
1 -7. Legitimacy 1-3
1 -8. Perseverance 1-3
Section III. Operational Categories 1-3
1-9. Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency 1-3
1-10. Combatting Terrorism 1-3
1-11. Peacekeeping Operations 1 -3
1-12. Peacetime Contingency Operations 1-4
Section IV. Leadership Challenges 1-4
1-13. Force Protection 1-4
1-14. Force Sustainment 1-4
1-15. Discipline Maintenance 1-5
1- 16. Fratricide Prevention 1-6
Chapter 2. Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency 2-1
Section I. The Nature Of Insurgency 2-1
2- 1. Goals 2-1
2-2. Environment 2-2
2-3. Characteristics 2-3
2-4. Popular And Logistic Support 2-4
2-5. Guerrilla Tactics 2-5
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uniimited.
1
2-6. Development Phases 2-6
Section II. Brigade And Battalion Task Force In Counterinsurgency 2-7
2-7. Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force Operations 2-7
2-8. Conduct Of Tactical Operations 2-8
2-9. Planning 2-8
2-10. Operation Principles 2-10
2-1 1 . Task Organization 2-12
Section III. Offensive Operations 2-13
2-12. Phase I - Latent And Incipient Insurgency 2-13
2-13. Phase II - Guerrilla Warfare 2-17
2-1 4. Phase III - War Of Movement 2-1 9
Section IV. Defensive Operations 2-19
2-15. Base Defense 2-20
2-16. Fundamentals Of Base Defense 2-21
2-17. Patrols 2-25
2-18. Security Of Lines Of Communication 2-26
2-19. Defense Against Guerrilla Offensive 2-27
Section V. Common Operations 2-27
2-20. Movement Security 2-27
2-21 . Motor Movement 2-29
2-22. Rail Movement 2-30
2-23. Water Movement And Riverine Operations 2-30
2-24. Foot Movement 2-32
2-25. Air Movement 2-32
2-26. Border Operations 2-32
2- 27. Urban Operations 2-34
Chapter 3. Combatting Terrorism 3-1
Section I. Terrorism 3-1
3- 1 . Definition 3-1
3-2. Nature Of Terrorism 3-1
3-3. Common Strategies And Tactics 3-1
3-4. International Network 3-3
3-5. Categories Of Terrorist Groups 3-4
3-6. Terrorist Objectives 3-4
3-7. Terrorist Targets 3-5
Section II. Antiterrorism And Counterterrorism 3-5
3-8. Antiterrorism 3-5
3-9. Terrorist Threat Conditions 3-9
3-10. Counterterrorism 3-12
Section III. Combatting Terrorism In LIC 3-13
3-11. Deployment In Contingencies 3-13
3-12. Priority Intelligence Requirements And Local Terrorism
Indicators 3-17
3-13. Operations Security Measures 3-19
ii
Chapter 4. Peacekeeping 4-1
Section I. Establishment Of A Peacekeeping Operation 4-1
4-1 . Environment 4-1
4-2. Principles 4-2
4-3. Organization 4-3
4-4. Legal Status 4-4
4-5. Use Of Force 4-6
4-6. United States Response 4-7
4-7. Coordination Steps 4-9
4-8. Command And Control 4-1 1
Section II. Missions Of A Peacekeeping Force 4-1 3
4-9. Types Of Peacekeeping Operations 4-13
4-10. Peacekeeping Tasks 4-14
Section III. Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures 4-14
4-1 1 . Observation 4-14
4-12. Patrolling 4-17
4-13. Traffic Control 4-19
4-14. Surveillance And Supervision 4-19
4-15. Prohibited Demonstrations 4-20
4-16. Negotiation And Mediation 4-20
4-17. Handover Of Prisoners Of War 4-21
4-18. Receipt Of Remains 4-21
4-19. Humanitarian Assistance 4-22
4-20. Information Gathering 4-22
4-21 . Minefield Clearing 4-23
4-22. Investigation Of Complaints 4-23
4-23. Observer Techniques 4-24
4-24. Manning Of Checkpoints 4-25
Section IV. Planning 4-26
4-25. Political Factors 4-26
4-26. Guidelines 4-26
4-27. Technology 4-27
4-28. Estimate Of The Mission Area 4-28
4-29. Force Structure 4-28
4-30. Force Protection 4-29
4-31 . Deployment Of Peacekeeping Force 4-30
Section V. Training 4-31
4-32. Personnel Selection 4-31
4-33. Predeployment Training 4-32
4-34. Tactical Skills Enhancement 4-33
4-35. Observation And Reporting 4-34
4-36. Communications Procedures 4-35
4-37. Language Instruction 4-35
4-38. Explosive Ordnance Training 4-35
4-39. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Training Methods 4-35
iii
4-40. Mission Sustainment Training 4-35
4-41 . Morale, Discipline, And Administration 4-36
4- 42. Post-Peacekeeping Mission Training 4-37
Chapter 5. Peacetime Contingency Operations 5-1
Section I. Conduct Of Peacetime Contingency Operations 5-1
5- 1 . Characteristics 5-1
5-2. Requirement For Rapid Response 5-2
5-3. Importance Of A Credible Response 5-2
5-4. Phases Of Contingency Operations 5-2
Section II. Planning 5-4
5-5. Coordination 5-4
5-6. Balance Of Forces 5-5
5-7. Planning For Uncertainty 5-6
Section III. Types Of Operations 5-7
5-8. Show Of Force/Demonstration 5-7
5-9. Offensive Operations 5-8
5-10. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 5-9
5-1 1 . Peacemaking Operations 5-10
5-12. Unconventional Warfare Support 5-1 1
5-13. Rescue And Recovery Operations 5-1 1
5-14. Support To Us Civil Authority 5-12
5-15. Disaster Relief Operations 5-13
Section IV. Operational Considerations 5-14
5-16. Execution By Planners 5-14
5-17. Psychological Operations 5-14
5-18. Logistics 5-14
5-19. Deception Plan 5-14
5-20. Command And Control 5-15
5-21. Operational Constraints 5-15
5-22. Principles 5-15
Section V. Introduction Of Forces Into A High-Threat Environment 5-16
5-23. Initial Assault 5-16
5-24. Development Of The Airhead 5-17
5- 25. Defensive Operations 5-18
Chapter 6. Command, Control, Communications, And Intelligence 6-1
Section I. Command And Control System 6-1
6- 1 . Elements Of Command And Control 6-1
6-2. Command 6-2
6-3. Control 6-2
6-4. Commander's Authority 6-2
6-5. Commander's Presence 6-2
6-6. Commander's Leadership 6-3
6-7. Commander's Intent 6-3
6-8. Mission Tactics 6-4
IV
6-9. Mission Orders 6-4
6-10. Command Relationships 6-5
Section II. Task Force Organization 6-6
6-1 1 . Planning A Task Force 6-6
6-12. Brigade Task Force Organization 6-7
Section III. Communications 6-11
6-13. Communication Priority 6-11
6-14. Planning 6-11
6-15. Communications Means And Characteristics 6-13
6-16. Frequency Support 6-14
6-17. Predeployment Communications 6-15
6-18. Deployment Communications 6-15
6-19. Employment Communications 6-16
6-20. Sustainment Of Operations Communication 6-16
Section IV. Intelligence Preparation Of The Battlefield 6-1 7
6-21. Critical Factors 6-17
6-22. Requirements 6-18
6-23. Battlefield Area Evaluation 6-18
6-24. Terrain Analysis 6-18
6-25. Weather Analysis 6-20
6-26. Threat Evaluation 6-21
6- 27. Threat Integration 6-23
Chapter 7. Combat Support 7-1
Section I. Fire Support 7-1
7- 1 . Planning 7-1
7-2. Artillery Units 7-4
7-3. Mortar Platoons/Sections 7-5
7-4. Antitank Companies/Platoons 7-5
7-5. Air Defense Units 7-6
7-6. Attack Flelicopter Units 7-6
7-7. Tactical Air Support 7-6
7-8. Naval Gunfire Support 7-7
Section II. Engineer Support 7-8
7-9. Missions 7-8
7-10. Organization 7-8
7-1 1 . Security 7-8
7-12. Engineers Used As Infantry 7-8
Section III. Army Aviation Support 7-8
7-13. Missions 7-10
7-14. Organization 7-10
Section IV. Military Intelligence 7-1 1
7-15. Missions 7-1 1
7-1 6. Organization 7-1 1
7-17. Categories Of Information 7-1 1
7-18. Data Disciplines 7-12
7-19. Synchronization Of Intelligence Information 7-12
7-20. Intelligence And Electronic Warfare 7-12
7-21. Intelligence Interaction 7-13
Section V. Special Environments 7-14
7-22. Jungles 7-14
7-23. Deserts 7-14
7-24. Mountains 7-14
7-25. Arctic Conditions 7-15
Section VI. Military Police Support 7-15
7-26. Missions 7-15
7-27. Organization 7-16
7-28. Military Working Dogs 7-17
Section VII. Psychological Operations 7-19
7-29. Integration 7-19
7-30. Unit Responsibilities 7-19
Section VIII. Civil Affairs Operations 7-20
7-31 . Civil Affairs Support 7-21
7-32. Mission Accomplishment 7-21
Section IX. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Operations 7-22
7-33. Smoke And Riot-Control Munitions 7-22
7-34. Organization 7-23
7-35. Operations 7-23
7- 36. Decontamination 7-24
Chapter 8. Combat Service Support 8-1
Section I. Combat Service Support Guidelines 8-1
8- 1 . Fundamental Principles Of Support 8-1
8-2. Support Planning 8-2
8-3. Logistics Intelligence 8-2
8-4. Security 8-2
8-5. Combat Service Support Tailoring 8-3
8-6. Requirements 8-3
8-7. Categories Of Support 8-4
Section II. Support For Insurgency And Counterinsurgency Operations 8-5
8-8. Support Levels 8-5
8-9. Combat Service Support Units 8-5
8-10. Operational Bases 8-6
8-1 1 . Maintenance 8-7
8-12. Transportation Planning 8-7
8-13. Medical Units 8-8
8-14. Personnel Service Support 8-8
Section III. Peacekeeping Operations 8-9
8-15. Logistical Civil Augmentation Program 8-10
8-16. Planning 8-10
Section IV. Peacetime Contingency Operations 8-1 1
8-17. Planning 8-11
VI
8-18 Critical Tasks
8-11
Appendix A. The Urban Insurgent A-1
Appendix B. Smoke, Flame, Herbicides, And Riot Control Agents B-1
Appendix C. Operations And Techniques C-1
Appendix D. Related Operations D-1
Appendix E. Combined Operations E-1
Appendix F. Uses Of Mission-Oriented Protective Posture F-1
Glossary Glossary-1
References References-1
Authorization Letter Authorization Letter
vii
US NATIONAL POLICY
US NATIONAL POLICY
ON
ANTIPERSONNEL LAND MINES
On 16 May 96, The President of the United States announced a national policy that eliminates or
restricts the use of antipersonnel land mines, beginning with those that do not self-destruct but
eventually including all types. This policy is in effect now. It applies to all Infantry units either
engaged in, or training for, operations worldwide.
Current US policy allows the use of non- self-destructing antipersonnel land mines only along
internationally recognized national borders or in established demilitarized zones, specifically for
the defense of Korea. Such mines must be within an area having a clearly marked perimeter. They
must be monitored by military personnel and protected by adequate means to ensure the exclusion
of civilians.
US national policy also forbids US forces from using standard or improvised explosive devices as
booby traps.
Except for units in Korea or units going there for a designated exercise, this policy specifically
forbids all training on or actual employment of inert M14 and M16 antipersonnel land mines either
at the unit's home station or at a Combat Training Center except in the context of countermine or
de-mining training. No training with live M14 mines is authorized, and training with live M16
mines is authorized only for soldiers actually on Korean soil.
This policy does not affect the standard use of antivehicular mines. It does affect training and
use of the Ml 8 Claymore mine in the command detonated mode.
For the immediate future, units may still use self-destructing antipersonnel mines, such as the
ADAM, when authorized by the appropriate commander. Under proper command authority, units
may still emplace mixed minefields containing self-destructing antipersonnel land mines used to
protect antivehicular land mines, for example, MOPMS or Volcano.
Users of this manual should consider all references to antipersonnel mines and the employment of
minefields in the light of the national policy limiting the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel
land mines.
Readers should not construe any uses of the terms mines, antipersonnel obstacle, protective
minefield, or minefield contained in this manual to mean an obstacle that contains
non-self-destructing antipersonnel land mines, or booby traps.
VII
FM 7-98 Preface
PREFACE
This manual provides tactical-level guidance to brigade and battalion commanders and staff officers for
planning, controlling, and coordinating combined arms operations in a low-intensity environment. This
doctrine was derived from approved operational concepts. It contains tactics, techniques, and procedures
for conducting brigade and battalion operations within each category of LIC.
This manual is for use by training developers as a source document for the combat critical tasks and
missions of units operating in a low-intensity environment. It serves as a primary reference for both
resident and nonresident LIC instruction presented to precommissioned, commissioned, and
noncommissioned officers.
The proponent for this publication is US Army Infantry School. Send comments and recommendations
on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to the
Commander, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.
IX
FM 7-98 Chapter 1 - Introduction
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue
the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. "
Sun Tzu
The possibility of US troops becoming involved in a low-intensity conflict (LIC) is ever increasing. This
manual provides the framework for understanding LIC at the battalion and brigade levels to include the
definition and nature of LIC, the military's role, imperatives, and operational categories.
It also provides leadership considerations that affect low-intensity operations.
Section I.
BACKGROUND
Lie is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups. It is below general war and
above routine peaceful competition. It often involves protracted struggles of competing principles and
ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means,
employing political, economical, informational, and military instruments. LICs are often localized,
usually in the Third World, but they contain regional and global security implications.
1-1. NATURE OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
The four instruments of national power are political, economical, informational, and military. LICs are
politically dominated. Within the operational continuum, LIC overlaps peacetime competition, conflict,
and war. The US goal is to maintain or return to routine peaceful competition and to allow for the
development of democracy within the free world. This manual focuses on tactical units' tasks and
missions across the operational continuum just short of declared war.
1-2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
LIC is an environment that is characterized by the pursuit of national objectives in a political dimension.
The military supports the political, economical, and informational instruments of national power. Military
operations conducted in the LIC environment are also influenced by the physical and social environments
in which they occur.
1-3. MILITARY ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Military operations in LIC are normally joint in nature and are characterized by the indirect versus direct
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FM 7-98 Chapter 1 - Introduction
application of force.
a. The Army role in LIC is identified in JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20. The president sets policy, the
CINC establishes how to implement those policies operationally, and the commanders on the ground
establish how to execute them tactically. Unit contingency plans call for units to deploy to various
locations and to conduct tactical operations, which have the potential to change from peace or conflict to
war. However, the US intent in LIC is toprotect and advance its national interests without recourse of war.
b. The role of brigades and battalions across the operational continuum presents a unique challenge. No
matter what parameters have been established for the use of force, a disciplined unit, with soldiers
proficient at individual skills who are operating under a clear expression of the commander's intent, can
perform successfully at the tactical level in this environment.
c. Soldiers must be prepared to operate in a variety of geographical conditions— from jungles and
mountains to deserts and cities. These conditions, coupled with extremes in weather, can have a
significant affect on operations. The language, religious, and cultural differences between our society and
those that soldiers may come in contact with pose additional challenges. The basic values and beliefs that
are common to US soldiers are not universally embraced. Also, the continuing growth of urban
environments throughout the world makes operations in built-up areas significant in all types of human
conflicts.
Section II.
IMPERATIVES
The tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine characterize successful conventional military operations and apply
equally in LIC. Success in LIC requires planning and conduct of operations based on the following
imperatives.
1-4. POLITICAL DOMINANCE
Political objectives affect military operations in conventional war. In LIC operations, they drive military
decisions at every level— from the strategic to the tactical. All commanders and staff officers must
understand these political objectives and the effect of military operations on them. They must adopt
courses of action that legally support those objectives even if the courses of action are beyond traditional
doctrine. For this reason, the planning and mission data analysis process in LIC should use the factors of
METT-T with considerations to political factors.
1-5. UNITY OF EFFORT
Military leaders must integrate their efforts with both military and civilian organizations of the US and of
countries we support to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Military planners must consider how their
actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economical, and psychological in nature. Unity of
effort calls for interagency, integration and cooperation. This permits effective action within our
governmental system. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or may employ the resources of civilian
agencies.
1-6. ADAPTABILITY
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FM 7-98 Chapter 1 - Introduction
Adaptability is the ability and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate
different situations. It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional
expertise. Adaptability is more than just tailoring or flexibility, which implies use of the same techniques
in different situations. Successful military operations in LIC require the Armed Forces to use adaptability,
not only to modify existing methods and structures but also to develop new ones for each situation.
1-7. LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy is the acceptance of the government's right to govern or of a group or agency to enforce
decisions. It is neither tangible nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect
legitimacy. Legitimacy comes from the idea that authority is genuine and effective, and it uses proper
agencies for good purposes. No group or force can create legitimacy itself, but it can encourage and
sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a
conflict.
1-8. PERSEVERANCE
LICs rarely have a clear beginning or ending marked by decisive actions that end in victory. They are, by
nature, protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency encounters that do occur are better
assessed in the context of their contribution to long-term objectives. Perseverance is critical to success but
does not preclude taking decisive action. It requires careful, informed analysis to select the right time and
place for action. Perseverance helps commanders reject minor, short-term successes in favor of actions in
pursuit of long-term goals. These imperatives apply in all four LIC operational categories (see Section
III).
Section III.
OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES
Military operations in LIC are divided into four operational categories. This section identifies the types of
operations and roles of maneuver units within each category.
1-9. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
US security interests may lie with an incumbent government or with an insurgency. The objective in
insurgency is to overthrow the legally constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. In
counterinsurgency (COIN), the objective is for the host government to defeat an insurgency through
military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic action. (See Chapter 2 .)
1-10. COMBATTING TERRORISM
The aim of combatting terrorism is to protect installations, units, and individuals from the threat of
terrorism. Combatting terrorism includes both antiterrorism and counterterrorism actions throughout the
operational continuum (see Chapter 3) . The program provides coordinated action before, during, and after
terrorist incidents.
1-11. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
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FM 7-98 Chapter 1 - Introduction
PKOs are military operations that maintain peace already obtained through diplomatic efforts. A
peacekeeping force supervises and implements a negotiated truce to which belligerent parties have agreed.
The force operates strictly within the parameters of its terms of reference (TORs). Normally, the
peacekeeping force is forbidden to use force, except for self-defense. (See Chapter 4 .)
1-12. PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
PCOs include such diverse actions as disaster relief; counter-narcotic operations; and land, sea, and air
strikes. The unifying feature of these actions is the rapid mobilization of effort to focus on a specific
problem, usually in a crisis. PCOs are guided at the national level by the crisis action system. (See JCS
Pub 5-02.4). Often, these operations take place away from customary facilities. They require deep
penetration and temporary establishment of long lines of communication (LOC) in a hostile environment.
PCOs may require restraint in the use of force or concentrated violent actions. (See Chapter 5 .)
Section IV.
LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES
Leaders must contend with disorientation caused by different cultures and values, unfamiliar and
discomforting levels of poverty, uncertainty of purpose, and problems in identifying the enemy. The
nature of the conflict requires restraint in the use of force. However, soldiers may be subject to severe
provocation or the threat of death from the most unlikely sources at the most unlikely times. Leaders must
also exert a positive influence when they do not have formal authority —for example, the need to rely on
persuasion in dealing with foreign forces, other US Government agencies, or nongovernmental
organizations and individuals.
1-13. FORCE PROTECTION
Force protection is a critical issue that is further complicated in the LIC environment.
a. Restrictions on the conduct of operations and the use of force must be clearly explained and understood
by all echelons. Soldiers must understand that their actions, no matter how minor, may have far-reaching
effects. Reasons for this may include treating the population with respect and courtesy, which is an
important part of the intercultural preparation. Any action can be exploited rapidly, by both friendly and
enemy media and PSYOP efforts. Commanders must always consider the aspects of force protection and
how it relates to established ROE.
b. Winning the information fight is often an overlooked aspect. Language is a special consideration for all
operations, whether interfacing with the established governmental agencies or with the populace.
Considerations for the exchange of information in combined or unilateral operations must be examined.
During decentralized operations, the ability to communicate with different agencies and the local
populace helps in protecting the force.
1-14. FORCE SUSTAINMENT
The ability of friendly forces to sustain themselves in undeveloped areas and the support provided to and
received from a host country are unique. Familiar support bases may not always be available. Locally
procured support may not be suitable for US forces, and its provision may deprive the host country of
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FM 7-98 Chapter 1 - Introduction
scarce resources needed for its own use. Small US units often operate independently. To provide a logistic
base on the scene would elevate total US military presence; however, this may not be acceptable.
1-15. DISCIPLINE MAINTENANCE
Disciplined soldiers are vital to the successful performance of US forces in LIC. They must observe the
ROE while coping with the stress of daily operations. Soldiers must adjust psychologically to enemy
operations, which may include acts of terrorism, and must display acceptable practices to the local
populace.
1-16. FRATRICIDE PREVENTION
The overriding consideration in any tactical operation is the accomplishment of the mission. Commanders
must consider fratricide in their planning process because of the decentralized nature of execution in the
LIC environment. However, they must weigh the risk of fratricide against losses to enemy fire when
considering a given course of action. Fratricide is prevented by adhering to the following:
a. Doctrine. Doctrine provides the basic framework for accomplishment of the mission. Commanders
must have a thorough understanding of US, joint, and host nation doctrine.
b. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. TTPs provide a "how to" that personnel at all levels
understand. They are disseminated in doctrinal manuals and SOPs.
(1) Planning. A simple, flexible maneuver plan that is disseminated to the lowest level of command
aids in the prevention of fratricide. Plans should include the maximum use of SOPs and battle drills
at the user level. They should incorporate adequate control measures, and fire support planning and
coordination to ensure the safety of friendly troops.
(2) Execution. The execution of the plan must be monitored with regard to the location of friendly
troops and their relationship to friendly fires. Subordinate units must understand the importance of
reporting their positions. Company and battalion commanders must know the location of their
troops at all times. They must exercise positive control, particularly when employing artillery,
mortars, and helicopter and air strikes.
c. Training. Individual and collective training contain many tasks that support operations in LIC.
Well-trained soldiers know their capabilities and limitations. Training is the most important sector in
preventing fratricide. Training is supported by—
(1) Situational awareness. Well-trained soldiers can accomplish routine tasks instinctively. This
allows them to focus on what is happening around them; they can "see" the battlefield. They
maintain an awareness of the relative location of enemy and friendly personnel.
(2) Rehearsal. Rehearsal is training for the mission at hand. Commanders at every level must plan
time for this critical task.
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FM 7-98 Chptr 2 - Support For Insurgency and Cntrinsrgncy
CHAPTER 2
SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY
"I have sworn eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man. "
Thomas Jefferson
The US may assist either a government or an insurgent force that is operating against a government.
Once committed, brigades and battalion task forces (both heavy and light) augmented by SOF serve as
the "cutting edge" of the joint task force (JTF) in both insurgency and COIN operations. To be
successful, the commander must understand the insurgent as well as his specific role in COIN. This
chapter discusses insurgency operations; the tactical maneuver commander's role in COIN operations in
both offensive and defensive roles; and tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting COIN
operations in all three phases of an insurgency. Normally, US forces will not be committed until Phase
III of the insurgency. (See paragraph 2-6 .)
Section I.
THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY
Insurgents must be understood before they can be defeated. This section discusses the characteristics,
tactics, and environment of insurgency operations. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the
overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. The members of
the insurgent force are organized along political lines to support political, economic, social, military,
psychological, and covert operations. The military or paramilitary arm of insurgencies normally use
guerrilla warfare tactics. This is characterized by offensive action at the time and place of the guerrilla's
choosing. This happens when the guerrilla can develop local superiority, relying on evasion rather than
defensive combat for protection. Along with overt actions, an insurgency can be characterized by strikes,
demonstrations, propaganda, political organization, and diplomacy.
2-1. GOALS
The initial goal of the insurgent movement is to replace the established government. The insurgent
accomplishes this by—
a. Gaining support for the insurgent movement through humanitarian aid programs, propaganda,
coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support, then he seeks passive support. Silence on the part
of the populace, concerning insurgent activities, is passive support for the insurgent.
b. Using guerrilla warfare—
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FM 7-98 Chptr 2 - Support For Insurgency and Cntrinsrgncy
(1) To increase the population's vulnerability through the use of selective terrorism. The guerrilla
attacks or destroys economic and political symbols upon which the government is founded.
Overreaction by government forces or other authorities adds to the population's resentment toward
the government and its support to the insurgency.
(2) To reduce government control. The guerrilla defeats small government forces and strikes where
government forces are not located. This adds to the perception that the government cannot or will
not provide security for the population and its property. In turn, this adds to the perception that the
government cannot control the insurgents.
(3) To provide psychological victories. The guerrilla wants victories that psychologically benefit
the insurgent movement. These victories may not be key in terms of material damage to the
government or its armed forces. What the guerrilla seeks is a psychological advantage.
(4) To block government resources. The guerrillas seek to block or redirect resources that the
government is trying to use in development programs.
(5) To weaken the resolve of government military forces. By defeating smaller elements of the
government's military forces, the guerrilla further weakens limited assets. He also psychologically
weakens the government forces' resolve to continue waging war.
2-2. ENVIRONMENT
The environment in which the insurgent operates must be examined from more than a geographical point
of view. While terrain and climate are important factors, the political, economical, and sociological
environments are vital.
a. Terrain. The guerrilla prefers to continue to live in his own home. He lives in camps if security does
not permit him to live at home. The preferred camps are chosen for easy access to the target population,
access to a friendly or neutral border, good escape routes, and good observation of approach routes used
by government COIN forces. When COIN operations force the guerrilla out of his base camps, he sets up
camps in rugged, unfriendly areas that are not easily penetrated by government forces.
b. Climate. The insurgent has an advantage since he is usually a native to the area and is accustomed to
the climate. If government forces are familiar with the same climate, then the advantage is reduced.
c. Political Factors. The amount of government control in an area directly affects the ability of the
insurgent to operate. The more government control, the less successful are insurgent activities. The
insurgent will attempt to establish a shadow government, to disrupt normal government functions, and to
destroy key government facilities and personnel. The level of government control in an area is reduced as
the shadow government assumes those functions previously held by the legitimate government.
d. Economic Factors. Low standards of living and desires for economic reforms may be popular causes
of resentment toward the government's economic policies. This enhances the insurgent's chances for
success. The insurgent seeks to exploit this situation through the use of PSYOP. The insurgent obtains
most of his logistic support from the local economy, which he normally will not disrupt. Insurgent forces
can destroy a local economy as a "lesson" to the populace for obtaining support or obedience.
e. Sociological Factors. The more fragmented a society, the greater the chance for resentment by the
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populace. The insurgent attempts to increase friction between different groups in society. These groups
may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language differences or tradition can also
be a reason for alignment. Religious influences can play a major role in the sociological factors that
affect the insurgent. The effect each factor has on the insurgent and his ability to operate changes with
each situation. The commander's analysis of each factor helps determine what the effect will be before
conducting COIN operations. Therefore, all factors must be analyzed to determine their weaknesses and
strengths in relation to the insurgent. In planning for COIN operations, the commander exploits disclosed
insurgent weaknesses and deprives the insurgent of any opportunity to exploit government weaknesses.
2-3. CHARACTERISTICS
By understanding the characteristics of the insurgent, the commander can determine strengths that must
be reduced or avoided and weaknesses that can be exploited. The characteristics discussed in this
paragraph provide a base to analyze the specific threat. No two insurgencies are the same; therefore, the
commander planning COIN operations must analyze a specific situation to discover how characteristics
apply.
a. Insurgent Strengths. Insurgents typically have many strengths that must be reduced.
(1) Intelligence. The intelligence networks in the insurgent infrastructure usually provide
continuous and current information on government force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and
abilities. The need for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgent organization makes it
hard for the government to penetrate and disrupt its forces. Early intelligence collection and
analysis must be aggressive to build an effective data base. Pattern analysis and other techniques
can remove such an advantage from the insurgent. COIN forces can also overcome this
intelligence advantage through the use of deception, OPSEC, and COMSEC.
(2) Indigenous characteristics. Insurgents can blend with the local populace since they are usually
part of it. This enhances their ability to operate with secrecy. The COIN force must identify the
insurgent and remove him from the civilian populace. This is best accomplished through the use of
population and resources controls. Civilians must not be injured or mistreated due to COIN
operations.
(3) Knowledge. The insurgent's knowledge of the local populace and terrain is an advantage. It
gives him the ability to employ PSYOP effectively through coercion of the local population. The
COIN force must overcome this advantage by fostering a strong relationship between the
government forces and the populace. The insurgent's advantage can be overcome by continuous
COIN operations from a permanently stationed native COIN force and by skillful employment of
these assets. This force consists of personnel from the local populace.
(4) Motivation and discipline. The insurgent leaders are trained and motivated. They reinforce
motivation within the insurgent force by applying discipline. Usually, the insurgent is strongly
devoted to a cause.
(5) Limited responsibilities. The insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal
governmental obligations toward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations in support
of the insurgency goals. However, he may be tasked to perform certain political services (such as
tax collection) by the insurgency shadow government.
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(6) Tactics. The insurgent can employ a broad range of tactics— from terror and sabotage through
conventional warfare. This enables him to escalate or deescalate antigovemment activity almost at
will. Time is not a factor for the insurgent; he will take all the time necessary to do a thorough
reconnaissance before any action.
(7) Physical condition. One of the major advantages the insurgent has is his ability to endure
hardship. Due to the situation, he must survive with less, forcing him to adapt and be innovative.
b. Insurgent Weaknesses. Insurgents have some weaknesses that can be exploited.
(1) Limited personnel and resource. Difficulty in personnel recruitment and resupply of material
can limit his operations. The COIN force should exploit these weaknesses by interdicting supply
routes and facilities, by forcing desertion due to hardships, and by inflicting combat losses.
(2) Individual factors. The insurgent often endures a life of physical danger and privation. These
stresses can be exploited by COIN forces. Stress factors include numerical inferiority to
government forces, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured, and fear of violence to himself
and his family. Other stress factors are combat and a hostile environment that weaken insurgent
resolve. In some societies, good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation in
the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to induce
desertions.
(3) Operational factors. Operational weaknesses may include security, which requires many
resources and slows responsiveness. The insurgent's dependence on popular support is also a
weakness. If support waivers or is withdrawn, the insurgent cannot operate effectively. Another
potential operational weakness is the lack of sophisticated communications. This requires the
insurgent to spend much time in preparing an operation. Political, religious, and ethnic differences
among insurgent groups can be major exploitable weaknesses.
2-4. POPULAR AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT
Support is a major concern common to all insurgents. It can be divided into two categories: popular and
logistic.
a. Popular Support. As discussed, the insurgent must have either the active or passive support of the
populace to succeed. Popular support alone will not ensure the success of insurgent operations.
Ineffective operations, unwise decisions, and poor leadership could preclude his success.
(1) Some form of popular support should exist for the insurgent to initiate and conduct operations.
If popular support does not exist or is withdrawn, the insurgent cannot conduct operations with any
hope of success. Therefore, one of the prime considerations for the COIN force is to gain and
maintain the support of the populace. Areas where active support is given to the insurgent are good
targets for PSYOP. Populace and resource control operations are major factors in removing
support for the insurgent.
(2) In areas where only passive support is given to the insurgent, government efforts through
PSYOP and CA, as well as security provisions, must be initiated to gain active support and trust of
the government. In areas that the government controls and where the populace supports the
government, the government emphasizes the four major operations in ID AD (balanced
development, security, neutrality, and mobilization) to maintain that support.
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b. Logistic Support. This support is one of the insurgent's greatest weaknesses. In early operations, he
relies on his base of popular support for logistic requirements. As the insurgent force develops and
expands, its logistic needs may increase beyond the abilities of the internal support base. If overall goals
for the insurgent movement are not imminent, the insurgent may need extra logistic support from another
source.
(1) If the insurgent receives support from external sources, the problem of security exists for
supply lines, transport means, and storage facilities. External support should not be considered a
prerequisite to begin COIN operations. It is an added factor that enhances the abilities of the
insurgent. The COIN force should seek to interdict the logistic support network of the insurgent
force, whether it is internal or external.
(2) Since insurgent tactics operate along military lines, insurgents usually have temporary sites for
headquarters, installations, facilities, and operational units. These temporary sites are called base
camps. In these camps, the insurgent has his command posts, training areas, communications
facilities, medical stations, and logistics centers. He may also use these camps for rest, retraining,
and reequipping.
(3) The base camps are not the same as conventional force operational bases. These bases are kept
small, and usually there is more than one base in the insurgent's area of operation. Characteristics
of a base camp area are as follows:
(a) Cover and concealment. The insurgent tries to locate base camps in areas where cover
and concealment provide security against detection.
(b) Rough, inaccessible terrain. The insurgent chooses terrain that may restrict the
government's mobility and employment of heavy weapons. While the insurgent avoids
defensive combat, he emphasizes short-term defensive action in the base camp area to aid
evacuation. To preclude accidental discovery, the insurgent is not near inhabited areas.
However, because he must fulfill his logistic needs, his base camp should be no more than
one day's march from a village or town. The COIN force must locate and disrupt these
camps to keep the insurgent off balance, allowing the COIN force to gain the initiative.
(c) Suitable for bivouac. The insurgent chooses an area suitable for bivouac. He must
consider food and water supply, grade or slope of terrain, access to trails, and protective
environment.
2-5. GUERRILLA TACTICS
Guerrilla warfare is one characteristic of an insurgency. The guerrilla is the combat element to the
insurgency. When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually engage in limited or small-scale
operations. If they reach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, and training, larger
operations using more conventional tactics may be expected. Insurgent tactics are characterized by
elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent action. These tactics in the early phases can be divided into two
areas: terrorism and harassment.
a. Terrorism. The guerrilla can use terrorism to accomplish his goals. Terrorist techniques include
bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail. Not all
guerrillas use terrorism as a tool. If terrorism is used, it is usually for coercion or intimidation. Terrorism
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may also be used to discredit the government by provoking the government into overreactions that
alienate the populace or demonstrate its inability to protect them.
(1) Coercion. This persuades individuals to act favorably in given situations toward the guerrilla or
insurgent movement— for example, to persuade a local mayor to revise policy concerning the
guerrilla or to gain passive support while at the same time redirecting resources to the insurgent
movement.
(2) Intimidation. This modifies behavior. Usually, threats or fear of harm are used either toward
the individual or his family and friends. Intimidation induces the populace to silence or
noncooperation with government forces. It discourages competent citizens from accepting vital
low-level government positions— for example, the killing of servicemen to encourage draft evasion.
b. Harassment. Harassment keeps government forces on the defensive. If successful, it causes
government forces react to guerrilla operations. As a result, the government cannot conduct offensive
operations that would prevent successful guerrilla operations. Harassment also weakens the government's
resources and disrupts lines of communication. One advantage of harassment is the image it presents of
the guerrilla being able to strike anywhere. Also, the government appears ineffective and incompetent by
constantly losing small battles. This affects the morale of the government force.
(1) Most guerrilla operations are offensive, not defensive. There is seldom an attempt to seize and
defend objectives.
(2) The guerrilla uses infiltration during movements. However, near the target area, small guerrilla
elements mass and then conduct operations. The most common techniques employed by the
guerrilla are the ambush, raid, and small-scale attacks. These are usually targeted against security
posts, small forces, facilities, and LOG.
(3) While government forces outnumber the guerrilla, the guerrilla seeks to attain local numerical
superiority. Then, he can attain victory over small elements of the government forces. These
tactics, if successful, compel government forces to commit larger elements to defensive tasks.
Once government forces move to the defensive, they lose the initiative and become reactive. This
allows the guerrilla time and space to develop so that he can engage larger government forces with
more conventional tactics.
2-6. DEVELOPMENT PHASES
Once an insurgent organization is established and starts its activities, it progresses through phases in its
effort to overthrow the government. The "mass-oriented" or Maoist organizational and operational
pattern consists of three phases. A distinguishing characteristic of other patterns is that they forego one or
more of these phases. The defending government cannot easily determine when the insurgency will move
from one phase to another. The activities performed in the earlier phases continue through the later
phases. These phases range from the weak insurgent movement to when the insurgent can directly
confront government forces. Also, depending on the lack of success of the movement, a reversion may
occur from Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.
a. PHASE I: Latent and Incipient Insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity,
which is only a potential threat, to situations where frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in a
pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity. The insurgent force
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does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. An insurgency could
achieve victory during this phase.
b. PHASE II: Guerrilla Warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained
enough local external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of
violence against the government. This is an attempt to force government forces into a defensive role. As
the insurgent becomes stronger, he begins to conduct larger operations.
c. PHASE HI: War of Movement. When the insurgent attains the force structure and ability to directly
engage government forces in decisive combat, he begins to use more conventional tactics. He may also
obtain combat forces from an external source. Also, the insurgent can begin conducting more extensive
defensive operations to protect the areas he controls. The host nation's military plan and the US military
support plan must be combined to govern US tactical operations. When the US employs combat forces,
they are normally assigned missions that support the security component of the ID AD strategy. This
allows the host nation to establish a secure base for mobilization and balanced development programs,
and to form and train effective security forces. US forces may conduct offensive operations to disrupt
and destroy the insurgents' combat formations or to interdict their external support. These operations can
prevent the insurgents from undertaking actions against government-controlled areas. They can also
disrupt the insurgents' efforts to consolidate and expand areas already under their control.
Section II.
BRIGADE AND BATTALION TASK FORCE
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
The COIN commander faces an enemy whose objectives, tactics, and concepts usually differ from his
own. This section examines the role of tactical COIN operations in relation to the COIN program. Also,
it discusses planning and principles for the successful conduct of COIN operations, as well as related
operations that the COIN force must know.
2-7. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AUGMENTATION FORCE OPERATIONS
FIDAF is the most common role in which US forces conduct COIN operations. It supports the host
country's national objectives and COIN plan. The FIDAF commander must consider the final goals of the
host country COIN program and how to coordinate his operations to support those goals. (For additional
information on FIDAF, see FM 100-20.)
a. Planning. Most US forces conducting COIN operations are part of a FIDAF. The commander must
understand how FIDAF operations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, the goals of the
host country COIN plan become the goals for the FIDAF and the COIN commander. A major
consideration when planning COIN operations is the effect operations will have on the populace.
Commanders must try to win the active support of the population for the government. COIN activities
must avoid incidents that the insurgent can exploit in his PSYOP.
b. Support of COIN. US forces committed to the FIDAF in the host country have a dual mission. They
must assist the host nation forces to defeat or neutralize the insurgent militarily. This allows the host
country government to start or resume functioning in once contested or insurgent-controlled areas. Also,
US forces must support the overall COIN program by conducting noncombat operations such as training.
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security assistance, intelligence, and tactical support. This provides an environment where the host
country government can win the trust and support of its people and become self-sustaining. Both aspects
ofthe COIN mission are of equal importance and must be conducted at the same time. A common
mistake made by the FIDAF when trying to gain popular support is that the FIDAF sometimes wins
popular support only for itself. The commander must ensure that popular support is for the host country
government. Credit for successful campaigns against the insurgents, or programs to help the people,
should go to the host country government.
2-8. CONDUCT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Tactical COIN operations reduce the insurgent threat or activity in the area and provide a favorable
environment for the host country's development program. These purposes are complementary. When the
insurgent threat is reduced, internal development can begin. When internal development works, the
causes of dissatisfaction, which gave rise to the insurgency, are reduced. This deprives the insurgent of
both popular support and a reason for fighting (which he needs to survive).
2-9. PLANNING
In COIN, the METT-T and political factors are considered in planning.
a. Mission. In mission analysis the commander considers the following elements.
(1) FIDAF operations include the following areas.
• Joint-combined exercises
• Intelligence operations.
• Populace and resources control operations.
• Civil-military operations (including CA and PSYOP).
• Humanitarian or civic assistance.
• Logistic support operations.
• Counter-drug operations.
• Tactical operations
• Advisory assistance.
(2) The brigade is most concerned with tactical operations. Due to the nature of counterguerrilla
warfare, a specific tactical operation or campaign usually involves all elements of FIDAF.
(3) The commander's guidance and subsequent planning are based on all probable missions. After
the brigade receives the mission, the commander's guidance becomes more specific. This includes
the extent to which the brigade becomes involved in each of the areas of FIDAF.
b. Enemy. When evaluating the insurgent abilities and limitations, the commander considers—
• Ethnic origin and cultural history.
• Political organization, dogma, and goals.
• Strength, morale, and status of training.
• Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency.
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• Ability to attack, defend, and reinforee.
• Resourees available.
• Leaders and their personalities.
• Relationship with the eivilian population.
• Status of supplies.
• Effeetiveness of eommunieations.
• Effeetiveness of intelligenee and eounterintelligenee.
• Lines of eommunieations.
• Vulnerabilities.
• External support.
• Mine/eountermine ability.
• Population eontrol.
• Reeruiting proeedures.
• Tax eolleetion.
c. Terrain and Weather. When evaluating the effeets of terrain and weather on COIN operations, the
eommander eonsiders those faetors normally eonsidered on any operation along with—
(1) Effeets of seasons of the year (to inelude planting and harvesting periods), phases of the moon,
and eoastal tides.
(2) Suitability of terrain (to inelude landing zones and piekup zones, ports, and airfields) and road
networks for taetieal and logistie operations.
(3) Urban areas that may be of vital importanee. The eommander evaluates the type and number of
struetures, and determines their effeet on military operations. He should speeifieally eonsider the
loeation of hospitals, utilities, poliee stations, military barraeks, airfields, radio/TV stations,
eommunieations eenters, bridges, tunnels, overpasses, and railroad traeks.
d. Troops and Resources Available. The eommander has a variety of eombat, CS, and CSS assets at his
disposal. These assets may be from US forees and eivilian ageneies, from host eountry forees and eivilian
ageneies, or from a eombination of these. The eireumstanees of eounterguerrilla warfare require that
senior eommanders allow subordinate leaders mueh flexibility in aeeomplishing their missions.
Sueeessful COIN operations depend on the eommander using his available assets to maximize strengths
and minimize weaknesses. To do so, the eommander appraises the abilities and limitations of his assets.
He organizes and employs them on suitable missions.
e. Time. Commanders at all levels must plan and prepare to exeeute eontingeney operations. When a
eontingeney mission arises, the basie plan ean be used as the basis for the detailed planning proeess.
Routine tasks should be identified in SOPs and understood by all.
(1) Planning time may be limited. Warning orders and OPORDs may be issued orally. In these
instanees, the one-third, two-thirds rule applies: the eommander uses one-third of the available
time for his own planning and allows two-thirds of the available time for his subordinates to
develop their plans and to issue their orders. Planning time ean be so limited that the formal
planning proeess may not be feasible. Therefore, eommanders direet their subordinates by using
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FRAGOs. The ability to execute quickly, based on real-time intelligence, is critical to success.
(2) US forces involved in FIDAF operations should expect to stay in the host country only until the
host country forces can assume missions the COIN force is accomplishing. No matter how
successful the FIDAF, the insurgency is not defeated until the political, economic, and social
problems are corrected or removed.
f. Political. The commander must face various political considerations. The military, normally working
with the host nation's forces, supports US political objectives. Success is based on the achievement of
those political objectives.
(1) US forces engaged in COIN operations function under restrictions not encountered in other
types of warfare. Some of these restrictions are treaties, limitations on movement, and ROE. These
restrictions may hamper efforts to find and destroy the insurgent.
(2) The insurgent is aware of the limitations placed on the COIN force. To capitalize on the
situation, he tries to engage US forces where US fire could cause collateral damage or fratricide.
The safety of noncombatants and their property is vital to maintaining the legitimacy of the host
government.
(3) Political factors influence the conduct of COIN operations. These operations become a contest
between the host government and insurgents concerning political, social, religious, or economic
issues. The government and its representatives must present themselves and their program as the
better choice.
(4) Commanders must prepare to operate in a broad range of political atmospheres. The host
country's form of government may be an autocracy, a struggling democracy, and so on.
(5) Regardless of the political atmosphere in the host country, the brigade commander must
effectively engage the insurgent. However, he should act within the limits of his authority to
improve the conditions of the government he was sent to support. Any incidents of corruption,
gross incompetence, or infringement on human rights should be reported to higher headquarters.
The commander can also offer ways to accomplish the same objective. The US government is
responsible for influencing the host government's attitude toward democratic principles— it is not
the commander's responsibility.
(6) Situations may arise where specific authority in a local area is not apparent. The higher
headquarters determines who is in authority before inserting US forces. However, the COIN force
commander may need to coordinate directly with local government officials to locate sources of
authority and decision. When the commander meets government officials who hinder operations
against the insurgents, he should document the incident and forward the documentation to the next
higher commander for action.
2-10. OPERATION PRINCIPLES
The commander uses several principles for determining how to organize and conduct operations within
the area of responsibility (AOR).
a. Tactical Intelligence. Tactical intelligence is the key to defeating the insurgent. It provides the
commander information on insurgent locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and plans. These help
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the commander seize the initiative. Without timely intelligence, the commander's chances of success are
limited, mainly in offensive operations. All relevant sources of information in the commander's AOR
should be exploited and include counterintelligence agents (from division to corps) and host government
civilian agencies.
b. Tactical Situation. The organization for, and conduct of, COIN operations depends on METT-T and
the Lie imperatives. Commanders organize and employ units to counter the insurgent threat. These units
conduct independent operations, such as patrols, raids, and ambushes, under centralized control (battalion
or brigade). This enables the task force commander to find the enemy with the smallest element and to
mass his forces rapidly.
c. Flexibility. Forces engaged in COIN operations must be flexible and able to adapt to a rapidly
changing tactical situations. COIN warfare requires that units make swift transitions from large-unit to
small-unit operations; adjust to extremes of terrain, weather, and visibility; move on foot, by vehicle, or
by aircraft; and function in offensive or defensive modes.
d. Mobility. COIN forces must possess mobility equal to or greater than that of the insurgent. The use of
rotary- wing aircraft, and armored and motorized vehicles to support infantry results in a tactical mobility
advantage. Also, commanders should not overburden soldiers; the soldier's load must be tailored to
METT-T factors. Resupply is executed by ground or air. Armor, cavalry, and mechanized vehicles are
good for securing key points such as major road junctions, bridges, tunnels, canal locks, dams, and power
plants.
e. Use of Force. Only the minimum required firepower is employed to accomplish the mission. Snipers
are useful when US forces come under insurgent fire. They allow the commander to fix the insurgent and
move his forces to positions from which he can engage the insurgent without endangering civilian lives
or property. The commander can employ smoke and, if authorized, riot-control agents to aid maneuver. If
the insurgents cannot be engaged without endangering civilian life or property, the commander tries to
disengage his forces and to move them to positions that block escape routes. However, the commander
uses whatever means are available to protect his forces, even though civilians may be placed at risk.
(1) The unlimited use of firepower directed against civilians or their property may cause them to
embrace the insurgent's cause. US soldiers must understand this and follow strict ROE. The right
to self-defense is never denied but may be limited.
(2) All available firepower may be brought to bear on insurgents when it does not endanger
civilian life or property.
f. Patience. COIN forces must be ready for long periods without contact. The insurgent knows he is
overmatched, and he avoids engagement unless it is on his terms. COIN forces should not develop a false
sense of security even if the insurgent appears to have ceased operations. The commander must assume
that the insurgent is observing their operations and is seeking routines, weak points, and lax security to
strike with minimum risk. An insurgent attack must be expected at any time.
g. Reserves. The commander maintains a reserve to take advantage of opportunities that occur on the
battlefield and to counter insurgent initiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of its parent
unit and the tactical situation. The reserve force is not given other specific missions.
(1) In offensive operations, a company might keep a squad or platoon in reserve; battalions might
keep a platoon; and a brigade might keep a company.
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(2) In defensive operations, due to the need for all-round security, a reserve at company and
battalion is complicated by the reduced on-line strength of the perimeter. The commander has the
following options:
• To establish a small, centrally located reserve at the expense of on-line strength.
• To establish no reserve but to specify units on-line to be ready to shift part of their strength to
other sections of the perimeter.
• To consider reducing the size of the perimeter.
(3) Brigades should also maintain a company in reserve in defensive operations. This mission
should be rotated among companies, with the company that has spent the most time in the field (or
that has seen the heaviest action) chosen as the reserve. The reserve company can rest, reconstitute,
rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission.
(4) The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is the preferred method for moving the
reserve. It is fast and does not depend on open ground routes as motorized or mechanized modes of
transport. Whatever its mode of transportation, the reserve's vehicles are dedicated to the reserve
and always available for employment. The reserve unit is prepared for contingency missions. If the
reserve is committed, the commander selects a new reserve. Normally, his least committed unit is
the first choice.
(5) Armor, cavalry, and mechanized infantry forces provide a good reaction force for both
offensive and defensive operations.
2-1 1 . TASK ORGANIZATION
Brigades and battalion task forces, as part of the JTF; are task-organized to fight as combined arms. The
combined arms organization in LIC is equally as important as in conventional war. This organization is
based on METT-T and the LIC imperatives.
a. Infantry Battalions. Battalions, whether heavy or light, provide the basic building block for the COIN
organization.
b. Infantry Brigades. Brigades provide the required command and control apparatus to conduct
sustained tactical operations in COIN. Also, they allocate resources to their subordinate battalions.
Brigades coordinate with their divisional headquarters or directly with members of the country team or
the host nation.
c. Augmentation. Because of the diverse nature of operations in a LIC environment, brigades should
expect to be augmented with—
• Military police with working dogs.
• Civil affairs units.
• Public affairs units.
• Engineers.
• Air defense artillery.
• Intelligence and electronic warfare units.
• Army aviation.
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• Psychological operations units.
• Medical units.
• Field artillery.
• Special operations forces.
• Communications units.
• Armor units.
• Transportation units.
• Quartermaster units.
d. Special Operations Forces. During COIN operations, SOF can support an allied or friendly
government against an insurgent threat. SOF capabilities make these forces ideally suited to support FID
programs in a COIN environment. The primary SOF mission in FID is to advise, train, and assist host
nation military and paramilitary forces. However, SOF may conduct MOUT operations for the release of
hostages or may recover stolen equipment or weapons. Battalion and brigade commanders must be
prepared to support these operations or to conduct MOUT operations of their own. (See FM 90 10-1.)
e. Other Joint Task Force Assets. The brigades and battalions are supported by other assets belonging
to the JTF. They include USAF and US Navy aviation of all types, NGF support, and support from the
host nation.
Section III.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The battalion or brigade task force is the Army component of the JTF. Battalions and brigades are
task-organized to conduct offensive operations. For purposes of organization and clarity, operations are
discussed under those phases of an insurgency in which they are most often conducted. US forces will
most likely be committed during Phase III of a counterinsurgency. However, depending on the tactical
situation, these operations, or combinations and variations of them, may be conducted during any of the
three phases of insurgent activity: latent and incipient insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and war of
movement.
2-12. PHASE I - LATENT AND INCIPIENT INSURGENCY
Phase I ranges from subversive activity with only a potential threat (latent or incipient) to situations in
which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It involves no major
outbreak of violence. Insurgent activities during Phase I may include attacks on police forces, other
terrorist activities, and minor military operations. These operations are conducted to gain influence over
the population or to provide arms for the movement and to challenge the government's ability to maintain
law and order. Also, they lay the groundwork for extensive external materiel support. This support is
vital for expanding the insurgency and its eventual success. Operations that may be conducted are as
follows:
a. Police-Type Operations. These operations control the movement of insurgents or insurgents and their
material. They are executed by host country police, paramilitary, or military forces. This is not always
possible, and US forces may need to conduct police-type operations until host country forces are
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available. (Under US law, the military cannot advise or train foreign police forces unless directed to do
so by the Department of State.)
(1) The joint patrol is the preferred technique. This type of operation involves both US and host
nation forces operating together.
(2) If US forces must conduct this type of operation unilaterally, MP units are best suited. When
MP units are not available, combat forces are used.
(3) When conducting police operations, host government representatives with US troops serve as
interpreters and advise on local customs and courtesies. When performing these duties, US troops
treat passive civilians and their property with courtesy and respect.
b. Search Operations. The need for a COIN force to conduct search operations or to employ search
procedures is continuous. They force normally conducts search operations in support of offensive
operations, but they may conduct searches as the main effort in populace and resource control operations.
A search may be oriented toward people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. It usually involves both civil
police and military personnel.
(1) Since misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations, searches must
be lawful and properly recorded to be of legal value. Proper use of authority gains the respect and
support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate search methods may temporarily
suppress the insurgent force or expose elements of it. However, such methods may increase the
civilian population's sympathy for and support of the insurgent.
(2) Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Military personnel must perform
searches only in areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful). Their purpose is to
apprehend suspects or to secure evidence that proves an offense has been committed. Usually,
special laws regulate the search powers of the military forces. These laws are given wide
dissemination.
(3) Search teams have detailed instructions on controlled items. Lists of prohibited or
controlled-distribution items, such as chemicals, medicines, and machine tools, should be
distributed. The military or civil police who administer the populace and resources control
program are contacted before the conduct of search operations. They may also be contacted again
if search operations are continuous.
(4) Search operations that involve US forces may not be effective when language problems prevent
communication with the local population. US units on a search mission must be augmented with
interrogators or host nation interpreters. Also, the distribution of leaflets before the search and the
use of loudspeaker teams during the search aid the effort by informing the populace.
(5) The pace at which a search operation is conducted is slow enough to allow for an effective
search. It must not be so slow that it allows the insurgent force time to react to the threat of the
search. If active resistance develops to the search operation, offensive operations are conducted to
counter the resistance. (See FM 7-10, Appendix A.)
(6) Search teams must consider the return to an area after the initial search. This can surprise and
remove insurgents or their infrastructure, which may not have been detected or may have returned.
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c. Search of Individuals. Any individual can be an insurgent or sympathizer. However, searchers must
avoid mistaking all suspects for the enemy. They may, in fact, support the host country government. It is
during the initial handling of individuals about to be searched that the greatest caution is required. During
the search, one member of a search team always covers the other member who makes the actual search.
(See Appendix C .)
d. Checkpoints and roadblocks. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and searches help control the movement of
vehicles, personnel, and material along a specific route. Established infantry doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures still apply in a LIC environment, but they are employed based on METT-T and the LIC
imperatives.
(1) A roadblock limits the movement of vehicles along a route or closes access to certain areas or
roads. Checkpoints are manned locations used to control movement. With a checkpoint, a
roadblock channels vehicles and personnel to the search area. Roadblocks may be set up on a
temporary, surprise basis or may be semipermanent in nature. They are used—
• To maintain a continuous check on road movement, to apprehend suspects, and to prevent
smuggling of controlled items.
• To prevent infiltration of unauthorized civilians into or through a controlled area.
• To check vehicles for explosive devices.
• To ensure proper use of routes by both civilian and military vehicles.
(2) Checkpoints can be called deliberate or hasty. The deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a
town or in the open country, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful
movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the
open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is critical for achieving success.
(a) Concealment of a checkpoint is best but often not possible. The location should hinder
turning back or reversing a vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts
may be good locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage. Drivers do not
see the checkpoint soon enough to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the
advantages of such positions. Lack of good roads increases the effect of a well-placed
checkpoint.
(b) A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by an insurgent
force. An element of the checkpoint force is positioned and concealed 100 meters or more
from the checkpoint. This prevents the escape of any vehicle or person trying to turn back
when sighting the checkpoint. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If the
checkpoint is manned for a long time, part of the force is allowed to rest. The rest area is
located near the search area so that soldiers can be assembled quickly as a reserve force.
(See EM 7-10.)
e. Search of Built-Up Areas— Cordon and Search Operations. Searches of built-up areas require
unique techniques, principles, and command and control. These operations involve dividing built-up
areas into zones and assigning a search party to each. The search party is subdivided into a search
element to conduct the search and a cordon element to surround the area. (See EM 7-10, Appendix A)
(1) Techniques. Police and military forces who operate in built-up areas practice search techniques
in built-up areas. These techniques are required for searching either a few isolated huts or
buildings, or for searching well-developed urban sections. Search operations in built-up areas
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require thorough planning and rehearsing. Emphasis should be on the following:
(a) Divide the area to be searched into zones (buildings should be numbered), and assign a
search party to each. A search party consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a
security element (to encircle the area to prevent entrance and exit, and to secure open areas),
and a reserve element (to assist).
• The search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. Normally it is organized into
teams based on METT-T.
• The security element surrounds the area while the search element moves in. Members of the
security element focus on evaders from the populated area. However, they can stop insurgents
trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and roadblocks are set up. Subsurface routes of escape, such as
subways and sewers, must be considered when operating in cities.
• The reserve element is a mobile force within a nearby area. It assists the other two elements if they
meet strong resistance. Also, this element can replace or reinforce either of the other two elements.
(b) Consider all enemy materials boobytrapped until inspection proves them safe. This
includes propaganda signs and leaflets.
(c) Search underground and underwater areas. All freshly excavated ground can be a hiding
place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater.
(d) Deploy rapidly, especially when an insurgent force is still in the area to be searched.
Surround the entire area to be searched at the same time. If this is not possible, use observed
fire to cover that portion not covered by soldiers.
(2) Principles. A principle when searching a built-up area is to conduct the search with little
inconvenience to the populace. The populace may be inconvenienced to the point where it
discourages insurgents and insurgent sympathizers from remaining in the locale, but not to the
point that it would collaborate with the insurgent force. The large-scale search of a built-up area is
normally a combined civil police and military operation. The COIN force plans it in detail and
rehearses when possible. It avoids a physical reconnaissance of the area just before a search.
Information needed about the terrain may be obtained from aerial photographs. In larger towns or
cities, the local police may have detailed maps that show relative size and location of buildings.
Eor success, the search plan must be simple and be executed swiftly.
(3) Command and control. Normally, a search involving a battalion or larger force is best
controlled by the military commander with the civil police in support. A search involving a smaller
force is best controlled by the civil police with the military in support. Regardless, host country
police perform the actual search when available in adequate numbers and when trained in search
operations. (See Appendix C .)
f. Aerial Search Operations. Search units mounted in armed helicopters use the mobility and firepower
of these aircraft to the fullest. (This may affect the morale of the insurgent force.)
(1) Air assault combat patrols, conducting an aerial search, reconnoiter an assigned area or route in
search of insurgent forces. When an insurgent force is located, the air assault combat patrol may
engage it from the air or may land and engage it on the ground. This technique has little value in
areas of dense vegetation. Use of air assault combat patrols should be limited to those operations in
which enough intelligence exists and in conjunction with ground operations.
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(2) In ground search operations, helicopters insert troops in an area suspected of containing
insurgent elements. With helicopters overwatching from the air, troops search the area. Troops are
then picked up and the process is repeated in other areas.
(3) Members of air assault combat patrols should be trained in tracking procedures or be
accompanied by trackers from the host nation. This enables the patrol to follow the insurgents to
their base. If the patrol encounters a large insurgent force, the reserves (ready forces) are
committed. Plans must provide for evacuation of prisoners, casualties, and material.
g. Civil Disturbance and Riot Control. US forces involved in COIN operations may be tasked to assist
host country police and military forces in restoring order disrupted by civil disturbance or riot. If so, US
force involvement should be limited to containing the disturbance and protecting US lives and property.
Suppressing demonstrators or riots should be left entirely to host country forces. Direct action by US
troops against demonstrators or rioters can be used by the insurgents and their sympathizers. Such action
may be misconstrued as brutal suppression of legitimate dissent and used as a propaganda weapon. (See
FM 19-15 for further information on specific techniques.)
2-13. PHASE II - GUERRILLA WARFARE
In Phase II, having gained enough local or external support, the insurgent initiates organized guerrilla
warfare or related forms of violence against the government. The major military goal is to gain control of
resources and the population in new areas. The government is forced to overtax limited assets, trying to
protect everything at the same time. Insurgent forces try to hold government troops in static defenses, to
interdict and destroy LOG, and to capture or destroy supplies and other government resources. Small-unit
operations are used against insurgent activities in Phase II of an insurgency. The search-and-attack
technique is most effective since a small unit can cover more territory than a large unit. The small unit
keeps the insurgent off balance, and friendly firepower can provide a favorable ratio in meeting
engagements. US operations include all those conducted in Phase I plus raids and ambushes. Forces
conduct extensive reconnaissance patrolling to find raid and ambush targets and sites.
a. AirLand Battle Doctrine and LIC. AirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army's approach to
generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. This doctrine applies to LIC
as in the remainder of the operational continuum. It is based on security and retaining the initiative and
exercising it to accomplish the mission. The commander accomplishes this with operations that are rapid,
unpredictable, violent, and disorienting to the insurgent. At the tactical level, the planning must be
flexible enough to capitalize on fleeting opportunities and to respond to changes, yet precise enough to
preserve synchronization throughout the battle. Success in LIC depends on the ability of battalion and
brigade commanders to carry the fight to the enemy in accordance with the tenets of AirLand Battle.
(1) Agility. The ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy is agility. Agility is the first
prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative by the COIN force commander. It permits the
rapid and repeated concentration of friendly strength against an enemy that is increasingly
vulnerable. It also allows commanders to fix with one force while attacking with another. To
achieve agility, leaders at all levels must overcome friction and "read the battlefield." Battalion and
brigade commanders must decide quickly and act without hesitation. In the LIC environment,
commanders are responsible for large areas; contacts begin with small forces. Battalion and
brigade commanders must be prepared to risk commitment without complete information. They
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must not forfeit the opportunity to act.
(2) Initiative. Setting or changing the terms of battle by action is initiative. Initiative implies an
offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The commander's goal is to force the enemy to
conform to the commander's operational purpose and tempo, while retaining freedom of action.
Initiative requires soldiers and leaders to act independently and audaciously within the framework
of the commander's intent. In the LIC environment, the insurgents must never be allowed to
recover from the initial shock of the attack. This is accomplished by a thorough and ongoing IPB
supported by aggressive patrolling. More importantly, continuous joint operations, especially
during limited visibility that targets both combat forces and logistics operations, create a rapidly
changing and ambiguous situation that denies the insurgent bases, resources, and a safe haven.
This prevents enemy commanders from massing their forces, because they lose the ability to
anticipate key events on the battlefield.
(3) Depth. The extension of operations in space, time, and resources is depth Commanders obtain
the needed space to maneuver, the needed time to plan, and the needed resources to win through
depth. Momentum in the attack is achieved and maintained when resources and forces are
concentrated to sustain operations over extended periods. In LIC, tactical commanders fight the
insurgent throughout the depth of his dispositions to degrade the insurgent's freedom of action, to
reduce his flexibility and endurance, and to upset his plans and coordination. Commanders must
retain highly mobile reserves to exploit tactical opportunities. They must also guard their own
freedom of action by protecting their rear areas and support forces.
(4) Synchronization. The arrangement of battlefield activities with regard to time, space, and
purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point is synchronization.
Synchronization includes, but is not limited to, the concentration of forces and fires at the decisive
point. Commanders must consider employing air. Army aviation, artillery, CS, and CSS assets
while covering large areas and conducting continuous operations. Also, battalion and brigade
commanders must evaluate both the capabilities and limitations of host nation forces, mainly their
ability to interface doctrinally with US forces.
b. Combat Imperatives. The seven combat imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine find their basis in the
principles of war. These imperatives are—
(1) Ensure unity of ejfort. The principles for this imperative are the objective, unity of command,
and simplicity. Unity of effort requires the commander to understand the overall US objective and
how his operations support that objective. He applies the principles underlying this imperative in
such a way that the effects of his operations are not a detriment to attaining the overall US
objective.
(2) Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. The principles for this imperative are
maneuver and surprise. The commander minimizes and protects his weaknesses, and uses his
strengths against the guerrilla's weak points. To do this, he knows the enemy's organization,
equipment, and tactics. In addition to knowing how the guerrilla fights, it is important for the
commander to understand why the guerrilla fights.
(3) Designate and sustain the main ejfort. The principles for this imperative are mass and economy
of force. The Army cannot be everywhere at once. It cannot do everything at once. Priorities are
set at tactical and operational levels to determine where the main effort is to occur and what goal is
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to be achieved.
(4) Sustain the fight. The force may have to operate for extended periods on limited logistics. To
sustain momentum, the commander deploys forces in adequate depth and arranges for service
support when needed. The commander is audacious and presses soldiers and systems to the limits
of endurance.
(5) Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. The principles for this imperative are maneuver and
mass. Speed and mobility are essential. To avoid detection, US forces employ deception
techniques, COMSEC, and OPSEC. While the overall conflict may be prolonged, the tactical
operations are executed with speed to retain initiative and freedom of action. This is balanced
against the need for patience.
(6) Use terrain and weather. The guerrilla force is familiar with the terrain and comfortable with
the climate. Reconnaissance and intelligence (if accomplished effectively) give the commander a
decisive edge in anticipating difficulties with terrain and weather. He uses both to his advantage.
(7) Protect the force. Successful commanders preserve the strength of their force. They do so
through security, by keeping troops healthy and equipment ready, and by sustaining discipline and
morale. The guerrilla seeks to degrade the morale of the force through the use of PSYOP and
harassment. His tactics are geared to wear down his opponent's will to fight. The commander trains
his soldiers and constantly reminds them of exactly what the mission is and why it is important to
complete the mission.
2-14. PHASE III - WAR OF MOVEMENT
The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgency becomes a war of movement between
organized insurgent forces and forces of the established government.
a. During Phase III insurgent activities conducted in Phases I and II are continued and expanded. As the
insurgency enters Phase III, the insurgent masses his forces and openly challenges government forces.
Larger insurgent units fight government forces and attempt to seize key geographical and political
objectives. They may begin to use conventional warfare tactics to a greater extent. The insurgent may
even elect to stand and fight in the defense of terrain if he feels that it is in his best interest to retain it. He
may deal government forces a serious military or political defeat by defending successfully. This is the
phase in which US combat forces would most likely be committed.
b. Also in this phase, conventional warfare begins. The operations that supported Phase I and Phase II
continue. Commanders conduct offensive operations that maintain unremitting, direct pressure against
the enemy while maneuvering to prevent his retreat or escape. They make full use of fire support,
maneuver forces, and offensive EW. However, actions to prevent injury or death of innocent people and
destruction of property still apply.
Section IV.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
This section discusses defensive operations that brigades and subordinate units may conduct. It also
provides guidance to commanders concerned with the defense of various types of temporary or
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semipermanent bases. These include logistic installations, support bases, airfields, and airbases under
varying conditions of security that may exist in an area of operations. This applies to the defense of
civilian communities. Commanders responsible for bases, facilities, communities, and critical sites
should exercise those principles and techniques discussed that apply to their situation.
2-15. BASE DEFENSE
Defense and security of tactical units and installations are integral parts of combat missions. (The term
"base" is used to include all types of facilities to be defended.) The area commander executes base
defense operations. His responsibilities include protecting the resources of his area from interruptions
caused by enemy activities. This is a territorial responsibility in which base commanders provide for the
local defense of their immediate base areas. Also, base commanders may provide resources for other
activities, which may be classified as rear battle. Forces set up the base defense environment in a region
controlled by friendly forces. However, the area is not secure enough to prevent insurgents from moving
in small groups, establishing firing positions, or mounting small-scale attacks. The best technique is the
perimeter defense. (See FM 7-20 and FM 7-30.)
a. Conditions that may characterize the environment for base defense are as follows:
(1) US forces are in a host country.
(2) Other nations in similar roles may be in the same host country.
(3) Unity of command or a combined headquarters may exist.
(4) Although there is organized armed conflict, there is no recognized state of war.
(5) External support may be provided to the insurgents, both overtly and covertly. Nations or
groups supporting the insurgents may provide sanctuaries where insurgent forces may establish
base areas.
(6) Paramilitary forces may assume increased responsibilities.
(7) The insurgents do not normally maintain contact.
(8) Insurgents usually do not hold territory. They may disperse and avoid combat at the appearance
of a stronger force.
b. A base defense consists of both normal and emergency local military measures to nullify or reduce the
effect of enemy attacks or sabotage. It ensures the continued effectiveness of its facilities and units to
fulfill their missions.
c. The base commander is responsible for perimeter defense of his base. All forces, regardless of branch
of service, that are assigned to the base are OPCON to the base commander for the purpose of its
defense. Forces assigned to the base for other purposes also assist in local defense during an attack. Each
commander of forces located at a base is responsible for—
(1) Participating in preparation of base defense plans, and training his forces for base defense.
(2) Providing facilities and personnel for the base defense operations center and the base defense
force staff.
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(3) Providing for internal security of his own command.
d. Command relationships for base defense operations provide unity of command. The urgency of base
defense operations requires a chain of command, which is understood by all personnel.
2-16. FUNDAMENTALS OF BASE DEFENSE
Commanders establish a base defense with available forces to provide all-round security. This base
defense includes detailed planning and centralized control. Security measures may also include
provisions to protect adjacent civilian communities. Constant and aggressive action by friendly elements
against enemy forces constitutes a major element of base defense. Vigilance and sound security measures
reduce enemy interference with operations at the base. It also tends to cause enemy forces to divert their
operations from the area. (For joint operations, see FM 90-12.)
a. Use of Terrain. Proper area evaluation and organization are vital to reduce the number of forces
required for base defense. Factors are as follows:
(1) The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
(2) Existing roads and waterways for military LOC and civilian commerce.
(3) The control of land and water areas and avenues of approach surrounding the base complex to
a range beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets.
(4) The control of airspace.
(5) The proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power generation plants, and civic buildings.
b. Security. Early warning of pending enemy actions provides the base commander time to react to any
threat. Outposts, patrols, MP, ground surveillance and countermortar radar, military working dogs, and
air R&S provide early warning. Civilian informants and actions of indigenous personnel near the base
indicate pending enemy actions. Security measures vary with enemy threat, forces available, and other
factors; all-round security is essential.
c. Mutual Support. Defending forces ensure mutual employment of defensive resources, which include
fires, observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between defensive elements requires careful
planning, positioning, and coordinating due to the circular aspects of the base area. To control gaps,
forces employ surveillance, obstacles, prearranged fires, and maneuver. Defensive plans provide for the
use of all available support, including attack helicopters, AC- 130 and CAS. Eratricide must be avoided.
d. Perimeter Defense. A perimeter defense is oriented in all directions. The battalion can organize a
perimeter defense to accomplish a specific mission or to provide immediate self-protection such as
during resupply operations. A perimeter is established when the battalion or brigade must hold critical
terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units. This can occur when the battalion or
brigade is operating behind enemy lines or when it is securing an isolated objective such as a bridge,
mountain pass, or airfield. The battalion or brigade may also form a perimeter when it has been bypassed
and isolated by the enemy and must defend in place.
(1) The need to hold or protect features, such as bridges, airfields, or LZs, from enemy observation
and fires may restrict the positioning of units within a perimeter. These factors, and an inability to
achieve depth, also make a perimeter defense vulnerable to armor. The commander reduces these
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vulnerabilities by doing the following:
(a) Positioning antiarmor weapons systems on armor-restrictive terrain to concentrate fires
on armor approaches.
(b) Providing as much depth as the diameter of the perimeter allows through his location of
security elements, the reserve, and secondary sectors of fire of antitank weapons.
(c) Constructing obstacles to fix or block the enemy so he can be effectively engaged.
(2) Perimeters vary in shape, depending on the terrain and situation. If the commander determines
the most probable direction of enemy attack, he may weight that part of the perimeter to cover that
approach. The perimeter shape conforms to the terrain feature that best uses friendly observation
and fields of fire. The effectiveness of the perimeter may be enhanced by tying it in to a natural
obstacle, such as a river, allowing combat power to be concentrated in more threatened sectors.
(3) Several methods may be used to organize a battalion or brigade perimeter. One method is to
place all platoons or companies in the battalion in positions on the perimeter. This is least desirable
since it facilitates an enemy penetration. However, certain positioning techniques can create some
depth in the defense.
(a) The perimeter is divided into company sectors with boundaries and coordinating points,
which are established based on the same considerations discussed earlier. When possible,
two platoons (each with three squads abreast) are placed on the outer perimeter and one
platoon is placed on the inner perimeter. This gives depth to the company position and
facilitates control. It also gives one platoon from each rifle company the mission to support
front-line platoons (just as in the defense). Also, it enables the company commander to
locate his CP and his 60-mm mortars near the reserve platoon, enhancing control and
security.
(b) The battalion commander may elect to assign two rifle companies to the outer perimeter
and the third to an inner perimeter. Regardless of the method used, the inner perimeter
should be far enough from the outer perimeter to prevent the enemy from suppressing both
with the same fires. However, the inner perimeter must be close enough to support the outer
perimeter with small-arms fire. Gaps on the outer perimeter that may exist between units in
open terrain must be covered by fire. When units are in restrictive terrain with restricted
fields of fire and observation, no gaps should be allowed, and a narrower frontage may be
required. This may also require the company commander to deploy all his platoons on line.
(4) The commander ensures the outer perimeter positions have rearward protection from inner
perimeter weapons, once the inner perimeter is established.
(5) Combat vehicles supporting the defense are normally assigned firing positions on the
perimeter, covering the most likely mounted avenue of approach. Additional firing positions and
routes to them should be selected and prepared. If the perimeter has several mounted approaches,
combat vehicles may be held in a mobile position. Therefore, for all positions, units must prepare
routes, firing positions, and range cards in advance. Also, commanders must ensure that vehicles
do not destroy wire communications.
(6) Isolation may drive the battalion or brigade commander to form a perimeter. If so, combat and
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combat support elements from other units may seek the battalion's protection. These units are
given missions based on their support abilities. Any fire support provided from outside the
perimeter is coordinated and integrated into the overall defensive plan. This extra fire support
conserves the ammunition of units within the perimeter.
(7) Each battalion commander normally employs the scout platoon outside the perimeter for early
warning. He may augment security with squad- sized or smaller elements, which are provided and
controlled by units on the perimeter. The security elements are positioned to observe avenues of
approach. Patrols cover areas that cannot be observed by stationary elements. If the scout platoon
remains under battalion control, it must coordinate with units on the perimeter for a passage of
lines.
(8) Reserve elements may consist of a designated unit or a provisional force organized from
headquarters and support personnel. They form the second line of defense behind the perimeter
elements. Ideally, reserves are mobile enough to react to enemy action in any portion of the
perimeter. They are positioned to block the most dangerous avenue of approach and are assigned
on-order positions on other critical avenues. If available, combat vehicles initially occupying firing
positions on the perimeter may be tasked to reinforce the reserve on-order.
(9) The perimeter defense is conducted much like a forward defense. Mortars, FA, tanks, and
TOW missile systems engage the enemy at long ranges. As the enemy comes within small-arms
range, other weapons on the perimeter engage him. If the assault continues, EPFs are fired. If the
perimeter is penetrated, the reserve blocks the penetration or counterattacks to restore the
perimeter. After committing the initial reserve, the commander must reconstitute a reserve to meet
other threats. This force normally comes from an unengaged unit in another portion of the
perimeter. If an unengaged force is used to constitute a new reserve, sufficient forces must be
retained to defend the vacated sector.
(10) CSS elements may support from within the perimeter or from another location, depending on
the mission and status of the battalion, the type of transport available, the weather, and the terrain.
Resupply is often by air. The availability of LZs and DZs protected from the enemy's observation
and fire is a main consideration in selecting and organizing the position. Since aerial resupply is
vulnerable to weather and enemy fires, commanders must emphasize supply economy and
protection of available stocks.
e. Defense in Depth. Commanders in a LIC environment must recognize the possibility of tying their
forces to installations. However, some critical sites may require added protection provided by defense in
depth. This must be carefully balanced with the need for aggressive offensive action. Defense in depth
will include developing alternate and supplementary positions, allocating more fire support, or simply
emphasizing obstacles.
f. Responsiveness. Attacks against a base may range from long-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fire to
attacks by suicide demolition squads or by air or major ground forces. The enemy has the advantage of
deciding when, where, and with what force he will attack. The defender positions his forces and plans
fire and movement so he can respond to the widest range of enemy actions. He prepares plans to include
counterattack plans, and he rehearses, evaluates, and revises them as needed.
g. Maximum Use of Offensive Action. Since the objective of the base defense is to maintain a secure
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base, the defender engages enemy forces with offensive action outside the base. On initial occupation of
the base site, friendly forces take offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the area. The area
commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, air attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy a
remaining enemy force. Also, laser countermeasure systems are excellent means to defeat insurgent
attempts to observe defensive preparations. Once the enemy has been cleared from the area, the base can
be defended by a smaller force. The BDF commander maintains constant liaison with major tactical unit
commanders in the area to stay abreast of efforts to remove the threat.
h. Use of Passive Defense. All units in the base area are responsible for implementing passive defense.
Passive defense reduces the probability (and the effects) of damage caused by hostile action.
Responsibility for the conduct of special passive defense measures is assigned to fire fighting units,
chemical units, medical units, and other units that can meet passive defensive needs. Also, all units
assigned to the base initiate passive defensive measures such as dispersion, camouflage, blackout, and
use of shelters. These measures assist in preserving the operating integrity of the base and in ensuring
decisive and effective action against enemy attack.
i. Defense Preparations. Implementing base defensive measures in a new base should start before base
units arrive. Normally, combat units provide the initial defense in a new base area. These combat forces
remain in the base area, conducting aggressive offensive actions, until base units can assume the mission.
When base units arrive, they start organizing the base defense. They perform many of the tasks at the
same time. However, some tasks require priority. The base commander specifies the sequence for
preparing the defensive system. (See FMs 7-8, 7-10, and 7-20 for a recommended sequence for tactical
defense.)
j. Reserves. The commander always maintains a reserve to take advantage of sudden opportunities and
to counter guerrilla initiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of its parent unit and the
tactical situation. In offensive operations, a company might keep a squad in reserve; battalions, a platoon;
and brigade, a company. In defensive operations, because of the need for allround security, a reserve at
company and battalion is complicated by the fact that the on-line strength of the perimeter is reduced.
(1) The company or battalion commander may have to spread his forces thin to protect his
perimeter. In these instances, the commander has four options: establish a small, centrally located
reserve at the expense of on-line strength; establish no reserve but specify units on-line to be
prepared to shift a portion of their strength to other sections of the perimeter; establish no reserve
but reinforce the most heavily contested section of the perimeter by fire; and consider reducing the
size of the perimeter.
(2) Brigades should also maintain a company in reserve in defensive operations. This mission
should be rotated among companies, with the company that has spent the most time in the field (or
that has seen the heaviest action) being designated as the reserve. The reserve company can rest,
rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission.
(3) The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is the preferred method for moving the
reserve, because it is fast and does not depend on open ground routes as do motorized or
mechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode of transport, the reserve's vehicles are
dedicated to the reserve and immediately available for employment.
(4) Reserve units are prepared for contingency missions. If the reserve is committed, the
commander designates a new reserve. In this case, his least committed unit is the first choice.
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2-17. PATROLS
Detailed reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance plans, based on IPB, greatly enhance the security of
any base. Base defensive operations to counter small groups of enemy forces include aggressive, frequent
patrolling by squad-size and platoon-size forces. Night patrols are particularly effective as they will keep
the enemy off balance and ensure that US forces own the night. These forces detect and capture or
destroy small groups of insurgents. Use of military working dogs adds security and detection ability to
patrol operations.
a. Small, highly mobile units who move on foot or by vehicles conduct patrolling during daylight and
darkness. The unit may use aircraft or boats. Armor, cavalry, and mechanized infantry forces can be used
to patrol regions where the terrain is flat, rolling, and a mixture of open areas and small woods. The
mobility and firepower of heavy forces allow for rapid traverse of large areas and the ability to quickly
destroy insurgent units encountered. The unit searches populated areas near the base. Also, it establishes
surprise checkpoints along known or suspected routes of insurgent communications and employs lEW
assets to detect insurgent use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
b. Concealed night ambush sites are randomly manned outside the barrier system trace. Indigenous
personnel should accompany ambushes near populated areas. Their knowledge of the local populace and
terrain assists the ambush mission. Artillery and mortar targets are registered and plotted to provide rapid
on-call support. The unit emplaces detectors and sensors to provide early warning.
c. BDF or other base unit reconnaissance patrols obtain target acquisition data. They may penetrate
known insurgent-controlled territory to install sensors that report the enemy's presence along infiltration
and supply routes. Also, such patrols observe known infiltration and supply routes, and report activity
along these routes. They provide early warning of insurgent assembly of personnel; movement of
weapons, ammunition, or other supplies; and preparation of mortar and rocket firing sites.
Reconnaissance patrols may also locate suspected areas where other types of surveillance or acquisition
systems may be employed to obtain information. Indigenous personnel are assets to reconnaissance
patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain, ability to operate in the environment, knowledge of the language,
and familiarity with local customs are essential.
d. Units employ combat patrols in difficult terrain far from the base but normally within range of
supporting artillery. These patrols may operate out of artillery range when supported by attack
helicopters, CAS aircraft, or AC- 130 aircraft. They may be supplied by air and equipped to communicate
with the base and supporting aircraft. Such patrols vary in size from squad to platoon and are conducted
at random times so as not to set a pattern. They perform planned searches to locate areas used by
insurgents to hide supplies, regroup, rest, train, or prepare for offensive actions. Small groups of
insurgents are engaged and destroyed; large groups are reported and kept under surveillance until they
are attacked. Augmentation in the form of local paramilitary guides or trackers increases the effect of
combat patrols.
(1) Reaction force operations. When an insurgent unit is located, the reaction force is deployed
rapidly to engage the unit, to disrupt its cohesion, and to destroy it. If the insurgent force cannot be
contained and destroyed, patrols maintain contact; reinforcements are dispatched; and the
insurgents are pursued. When escape routes have been blocked, the attack continues to destroy the
enemy force. Ground and air vehicles and rapid foot movement provide the needed mobility.
Wheeled and armored vehicles for reaction forces are also designated.
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(a) Reaction operations are simple, planned, and rehearsed day and night. Primary and
alternate points are designated for the release of reaction forces from centralized control.
This eases movement against multiple targets. Such points are reconnoitered and
photographed for use in planning and briefing. Within security limitations, actual RPs
promote familiarity with the area during rehearsals.
(b) Immediate reaction to any type of attack is vital. It is attained through employing
firepower and moving forces and their equipment. Immediate reaction to accurate and
timely intelligence may permit destruction of the insurgent force before an attack.
Immediate reaction to standoff mortar or rocket fire may permit destruction of the insurgent
force during an assault on the base and facilitate blocking routes of withdrawal.
(2) Host and third country forces. The BDE commander normally considers integrating host and
third country forces in the overall base defensive effort with the approval of the JTF commander.
The commander emphasizes integration of host country forces in patrol and populace control
activities. Both host and third country forces provide local security for their own units; however, to
ensure maximum benefit, all local plans should be coordinated with, and integrated in, the base
master defense plan. The extent of participation in base defense by host and third country forces
depends on the orders and guidance of their governments.
2-18. SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Insurgents may try to sever LOC by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways can be mined;
ambush sites can be located adjacent to LOC; or bridges and tunnels can be destroyed by demolitions.
Long LOC cannot be fully secure; however, measures can be enforced to reduce the effect of insurgent
activity against LOC.
a. Patrolling by COIN forces increases the chances of detecting insurgents before insurgents can emplace
mines or demolitions, or establish ambushes or roadblocks. During Phases I and II of an insurgent action,
MP can do some of the patrolling of ground LOC. However, the tactical situation may dictate that
combat forces have to perform this mission. These patrols are most effective as combined arms
operations that integrate armor, cavalry, and heavy mechanized forces. These forces augmented with
engineers, light infantry, ADA, and Army aviation assets are ideal for patrolling and securing LOC.
b. Patrolling is performed regularly, but patrols should not establish a routine. This helps the insurgent to
avoid or ambush them. Patrols must be aware of probable ambush sites and choke points where
roadblocks or mines and demolitions would be effective.
c. Aerial patrols effectively cover a large area in a short time. Surface patrols are slower, but they can
check routes in greater detail. Surface patrol members must be trained in detecting mines and booby
traps. Mine detectors and military working dogs, if available, can aid in this task.
d. The main function of a patrol is to check the security of its routes. Usually, manpower constraints
prohibit a patrol from being organized and equipped to counter a large insurgent force; however,
reinforcement by artillery and attack helicopters increases a patrol's ability to deal with insurgents they
encounter. Patrols are organized with enough combat power to survive an initial contact. Recent
insurgent activity provides guidance on the organization of patrols. If the insurgent is found in strength,
his destruction is a mission for the reaction force. Also, patrols try to make initial contact with the
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smallest of their elements, which must be skilled in counterambush techniques.
e. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and guard posts at crucial choke points (such as bridges and tunnels)
effectively prevent acts of sabotage. Forces stop and search vehicles and persons before they proceed.
Forces do not allow vehicles to stop on or under bridges or in tunnels.
f. Personnel watch critical choke points carefully at night by use of night vision equipment and watch
curves on railroads. GSR and sensors cover the immediate, surrounding area. Mining indirect approaches
to sensitive areas may help lessen the chances of ground attack. The area is ringed with planned artillery
fires. Also, personnel construct bunkers to protect guard personnel and to provide positions from which
to fight until reinforced. They reinforce underwater approaches to bridges by using booby-trapped
obstacles.
g. Engineers help keep LOG open. They can locate and clear mines, clear the terrain at potential ambush
sites, and repair damage to roads and trails. They can also prepare defensive systems around choke
points.
h. Armor, cavalry, and heavy mechanized units initially secure key points such as major road junctions,
bridges, tunnels, canal locks, dams, and power plants.
2-19. DEFENSE AGAINST GUERRILLA OFFENSIVE
When insurgent action enters Phase III, the insurgent may begin to attack using conventional tactics. His
intentions are to capture and hold facilities, installations, bases, communities, and territory. He also tries
to permanently sever crucial LOG.
a. These attacks are similar to those conducted by conventional forces. The insurgent may strike from
one or many directions at the same time. As host government and US forces react, enemy and friendly
LOG may evolve; however, during the initial stages of the insurgent's offensive campaign, friendly bases,
facilities, installations, and even cities may be surrounded and come under siege.
b. The organization of the defense and the construction of physical defenses must be partly completed
before the insurgent's attack. This helps the defenders until a counterattack can begin. Once enemy and
friendly LOG are established, both sides employ conventional tactics. Initially, however, US forces may
need to conduct limited attacks to reopen LOG or to relieve besieged areas.
Section V.
COMMON OPERATIONS
Forces can conduct common operations to offensive and defensive COIN operations during any of the
three phases of an insurgency. The extent to which these operations are used depends on the tactical
situation.
2-20. MOVEMENT SECURITY
Commanders plan and conduct all movements of troops and supplies as tactical operations. Emphasis is
on extensive security measures. Organization of the movement depends upon the type of movement and
whether by ground, air, or water.
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a. These security measures may include—
(1) Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strict noise and light discipline during
movement, and varying routes and schedules of movement.
(2) Security forces organized and equipped to ensure effective front, flank, and rear security during
movement and halts. Effective all-round security is critical during movement, especially at those
points along the route where the formation is most vulnerable to ambush.
(3) Coordination with supporting air units to ensure an understanding of CAS used to assist the
movement, both in enforcing preventive measures and in conducting close combat operations. The
need for secrecy may preclude initial air cover, but it will not preclude use of CAS. The use of
aerial photographs is crucial.
(4) Fire support elements that provide close and continuous fire support for the movement.
(5) Maneuver for counterambush actions. This includes contingency plans for immediate action
against an ambush and use of formations, which allow part of the column to be in position to
maneuver against an ambush force.
(6) Communications with supporting units, adjacent host country forces, and higher headquarters
to include airborne radio relay.
(7) Various locations for leaders, communications, and automatic weapons within the movement
formation.
(8) Questions asked of the local civilians along the movement route for intelligence information to
include possible insurgent ambush sites.
(9) Movement by bounds with overwatching fire.
(10) Use of military working dogs and other ambush detection means.
b. Leaders coordinate planning for movement with military units along routes of movement and consider
the following:
(1) Communications. Communications are vital to the success of movements. Leaders plan radio
communication and ensure availability between convoy serials and march units, with artillery FOs
and air controllers, and with units and population centers in the areas along the route of movement.
Visual and sound signals are prearranged. These signals include colored smoke, identification
panels, and whistle or horn signals. While limited, these communication means are effective when
prearranged signals and responses are understood and rehearsed.
(2) Artillery and mortar support. Units may provide artillery and mortar support that is within
range of the route of movement or within range of the proposed route. Movements requiring
artillery and mortar support have FOs either with them or in supporting observation aircraft. Strip
maps marked with planned targets enable personnel (other than FOs) to request fires. Coordination
with FDCs that can provide fire along the route of movement ensures that FOs can enter the FDC
net, send routine location reports, and request and adjust fires. Leaders must coordinate call signs,
frequencies, authentications, areas of possible employment, schedules of movement, and target
numbers.
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(3) Aircraft. History shows that the presence of aircraft deters ambushes. Column movement
covered by traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch attack helicopters may be requested. These
are in conjunction with a route reconnaissance by scout helicopters or fixed-wing strike aircraft.
Planning includes the type, number, and method of employment of aircraft. Methods of
employment include column cover, air alert, and ground alert. Column cover by fighter aircraft is
expensive in terms of crew fatigue and equipment maintenance. Therefore, light observation-type
aircraft that can direct on-call air support are used for short movements over often-used routes in
more secure areas. When air support is planned, communications information concerning radio
frequencies, call signs, and identification procedures is provided units who may use them. Also,
the supporting air unit knows the maneuver intentions of the ground element if an ambush occurs.
(4) Route clearing. This operation must be conducted before critical movements. Route-clearing
operations are preceded by a reconnaissance and depend on METT-T considerations. Normally,
the units responsible for the area through which the movement will pass are used in routeclearing
operations. These route-clearing forces normally include both mounted and dismounted elements.
Along with a thorough reconnaissance of the main route of movement, units secure critical terrain
near the route by selectively placing tactical units. Engineers with the reconnaissance element
identify mobility tasks along the route. Mobility tasks include mine and booby trap clearance,
repair of bridges, preparation of fords and bypasses, and route maintenance.
(5) Reserves. Reserves (ready forces) are vital to countering ambushes. However, the insurgent
must be convinced that ambushes produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by COIN
supporting forces. These include air strikes and ground pursuit. Before a movement, reserve force
commanders and aviators are briefed on the general area of operations, landing zones, and known
and suspected insurgent locations. The briefing emphasizes communications. Reserves may have
to be moved forward in order to respond quickly if the convoy is moving a long distance.
2-21. MOTOR MOVEMENT
Special escort attachments may not be available to support all motor movements. Therefore, leaders must
prepare convoys to secure themselves for part or all of the distance.
a. When leaders designate a maneuver unit to provide escort for a vehicle convoy, elements of the unit
provide escort through their respective areas of responsibility. Armor or armored cavalry units are best
suited to provide convoy escorts. Reconnaissance of the route just before the passage of the convoy is
best. A single unit may provide escort through other units' areas of responsibility. Therefore, it
coordinates closely with the other units to ensure adequate fire support and available reinforcements
during passage. Since there is seldom time to issue orders during an ambush, leaders plan the security
detachment's actions, which should be rehearsed by drills before movement.
b. Convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed throughout the chain of command ( Eigure 2-1 ). The
commander and his subordinates are briefed on the latest information about the area through which they
are to pass. The commander formulates his plans and issues his orders to include formation, intervals
between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans for action if an insurgent force attacks
the convoy. All personnel board their vehicle for rapid dismount into predrilled formations. Arms and
ammunition are readied for immediate action. Also, vehicle commanders assume responsibility for
keeping personnel alert.
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Figure 2- 1 . Convoy command responsibility.
c. Units must harden vehicles for protection against mines. They sandbag the floors and sides and place
heavy rubber mats over the sandbag flooring to reduce secondary fragments.
2-22. RAIL MOVEMENT
The primary mission of train personnel and combat or security troops is to ensure the train reaches its
destination.
a. Concept. As long as the train continues to move, control remains with the train crew. If an ambush or
firefight develops and the train cannot disengage by movement forward or backward, the escort
commander assumes command. He defends the train with all available personnel. If there is no escort,
the senior military member aboard assumes command. Radio communications are used to call for
assistance. Security detachments guarding the right of way have their own communication system, which
may be tied into the railway communication system.
b. Organization. Railway installations and rail traffic are secured by establishing defined areas of
responsibility. The highest level of command normally publishes SOPs on organization for rail
movement. Leaders coordinate rail security with area and tactical commands that provide support.
c. Operations. Leaders use armored trains for patrolling track where insurgent activity is expected. They
operate tactically under orders of the appropriate military commander. Since the operation of an armored
train is different from that of other trains, the military transportation service assigns a specially selected
train crew. This crew coordinates the train movement with that of other trains, considering the tactical
situation. Railway flatcars can be prepared for defense by piling sandbags on the floor and at the sides,
and by mounting machine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers. These cars must not be placed next to cars
containing gasoline, ammunition, or other flammables. Locomotives should be preceded by two or more
cars loaded with sandbags, rocks, or scrap material for protection against mines and obstructions. On a
single-track rail division subject to insurgent attack, leaders employ the positive-block method of
operations. In this method, a following train is not permitted to enter a block until the preceding train has
cleared it. This permits the train in the block, if attacked, to back up and receive reinforcements by train
from either direction.
2-23. WATER MOVEMENT AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS
Leaders can conduct COIN operations in large inundated areas (lakes, coastal waters, flooded delta areas,
and inland water ways) that are inhabited by large population segments and have limited rail and road
nets. The ability of the COIN force to operate in these areas is required for successful missions. (See FMs
31-11 and 31-12 for amphibious operations.)
a. Mission and Concept. Personnel may use boats to perform many tactical and logistic tasks. Waterway
movement of troops and supplies is planned and conducted in much the same manner as mounted
movements on land; however, special characteristics of water transportation must be considered. The
COIN force may engage in riverine operations along with host country ground and naval forces,
paramilitary forces, US Army waterborne transportation forces, and US Navy forces.
b. Organization. When a large waterborne force moves, it adopts a march formation similar to a ground
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convoy. Advance and rear guards in boats are organized. Patrols in boats may provide flank security in
adjacent streams or on foot on the banks. Unlike ground convoy procedures, movement is not always in
file or column formation. The formation depends upon the purpose of the movement, the strength of the
friendly force, and the width of the stream. It is based on the same considerations as those for combat
formations on land. These include control, security, flexibility, speed of reaction, observation, and fields
of fire.
c. Operations. Waterways afford little cover and concealment. Power-driven boats are noisy and attract
attention, and they can be seen and fired on easily in daylight. However, this disadvantage can be
reduced by night movement and by traveling close to the stream banks where shadow and overhead
branches aid concealment. Boats must go to or near the shore to unload, thus affecting the reaction time
if an ambush occurs. Crew-served weapons transported on water craft must be in position at all times to
engage insurgent ambush forces.
(1) Landing operations may be difficult due to unfavorable formations along the banks. However,
transported troops should be assigned firing positions on board their vessels for defense against
ambush. The transportation units should position the maximum number of crew-served weapons
on board to engage enemy on the near bank or both banks of the waterway.
(2) The COIN force can devise combinations of blocking, attacking, and screening tactical actions
using the mobility of naval forces (river assault groups) and air assault units. Teamwork between
ground forces moving along river banks and supporting naval craft firepower and floating artillery
can result in successful operations against insurgent forces in water areas.
(3) The time required for planning increases with the size of the force involved. Planning should
be as detailed as time permits, but quick reaction is needed to capitalize on current intelligence.
Planning includes the following:
(a) Reducing all planning facets of embarking and debarking of troops and equipment to
SOP.
(b) Integrating and combining plans for US, allied, and host country military forces and
civilian agencies.
(c) Facilitating command and control means to unify command and coordination of fires and
other support.
(d) Reducing rehearsals to a minimum, based on habitual employment; reducing activities to
SOP; reducing equipment and logistic requirements.
(e) Obtaining detailed intelligence from the population and civilian police.
(f) Obtaining information on currents and tides at H-hour, beach conditions, and conditions
of banks or shores for exit routes.
(g) Obtaining information on insurgent use of water mines.
(h) Analyzing the route to determine potential water mine sites. Ideal mining sites are in
restrictions or bends in waterways that tend to channel traffic over definite routes.
(i) Conducting mine sweeping of the water way.
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2-24. FOOT MOVEMENT
Small units plan and conduct dismounted movements using the principles for patrolling. For larger units,
the principles for movement to contact apply. (See FMs 7-8, 7-10, 7-20, and 21-18.)
2-25. AIR MOVEMENT
Air movement is an integral part of COIN operations. The principles governing security of such
movements are contained in FMs 7-10, 7-20, and 90-4. COIN forces are highly vulnerable during air
movement due to the increase of MANPADS in Third World countries.
2-26. BORDER OPERATIONS
Operations to control borders are normally a civilian security agency mission. However, the brigade may
engage in these operations by reinforcing or assuming responsibility for border surveillance and control.
Brigades conducting offensive operations may become involved in border control activities. Sometimes,
the scope and combat requirements of controlling a border may make border operations more of a tactical
than a civilian security force problem. The brigade may need to conduct sustained operations in its area
of operations to gain or regain control of the border.
a. Purpose. Border control operations require effective measures to secure extensive land border or
seacoast areas. Measures may also involve preventing communication and supply operations (aerial
resupply) between an external sponsoring power and insurgent forces.
(1) Concept. In Phase I of insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police,
customs, and other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these
organizations, particularly in remote areas. In Phases II and III, denial of external support for the
insurgency may require combat operations in border areas. These operations require close
coordination and cooperation between the armed forces, paramilitary forces, and all government
agencies involved. Physically sealing the border may not be possible, since it could require the
commitment of more government forces and materiel than overall national resources permit. Since
placing forces and barriers at all crossings or entry sites may not be possible, commanders should
establish priorities. However, natural barriers must be used where possible. Using patrols, sensors,
and obstacles in selected areas increases the effect of natural barriers. Commanders establish
barrier and denial operations after careful consideration of the threat, environment, and location of
the infiltrator's probable targets and methods of operation.
(2) Organization. National border forces may consist of border police and guards. They may
include paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with supporting or direct responsibility for
parts of the international border.
(3) Command and control. Border operations are planned and directed from the national level.
Authority to conduct these operations may be delegated to subnational and other area
commanders.
(4) Unit structure. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in their
assigned areas. They should contain enough CS and CSS elements to support operations for
extended periods. Light cavalry squadrons are well-designed for this mission due to their
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combination of air and ground assets. They need infantry augmentation in restrictive terrain.
b. Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance is required. Commanders should determine
infiltration and exfiltration routes and support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of
transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions,
and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries.
(1) Surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated
ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategic OPs
along the shoreline, and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and
civilian watercraft.
(2) Certain parts of an international land border or shoreline may be placed under effective
surveillance and control by use of static security posts, reserve forces, ground and aerial observers,
and patrols. However, the continuous surveillance and control of an extensive land border or
shoreline are difficult. Since it may not be possible to place brigade forces at all crossings or
landing sites, leaders establish a priority system for the sites requiring military forces.
c. Military Operations. Border units establish OSBs at battalion and company levels to direct
operations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire support augmentations are usually required. These are
normally found in the brigade support base if not augmenting subordinate units.
d. Border Control Methods. Two operational concepts for the control of extensive land borders are the
restricted zone and friendly population buffer.
(1) Restricted zone. Leaders should use this method only when the situation demands it. The
actions can mean disaster to the ID AD effort and must be considered before execution. Under this
concept, an area of predetermined width along the border is declared a restricted zone.
(a) Leaders issue proclamations to the population so that everyone understands that any
individual or group encountered in the zone will be considered an element of the insurgent
force, paramilitary force, or similar organization. The restricted zone is cleared of vegetation
and other obstacles to observation over the area. Earth-moving equipment may be used for
this purpose. Defoliants, if authorized, may also be used but only when no other method is
feasible.
(b) Since the clearance of the zone along the entire border is normally not feasible, a priority
of areas for clearance is needed. The restricted zone is controlled by the use of ground and
aerial observers, electronic sensor devices, patrols, mines, and obstacles. These activities are
best conducted by host country civil police and paramilitary forces. This allows the
available combat power to be used in tactical operations.
(2) Friendly population bujfer. The civilian population-in the area of operations is redistributed.
This ensures that all civilians residing near the border are sympathetic to the host country
government. This may entail the screening of all persons settled along the border, relocation of
those persons of doubtful sympathy, and supplementary resettlement of the border area with
friendly civilians.
(a) This concept provides a potential informant net along the border. It provides friendly
local civilians for employment in self-defense units to control the border area. It also denies
potential civilian contacts and houses of refuge for use by the insurgents in border-crossing
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activities. Relocation of civilians is a sensitive legal and political issue and should be
undertaken with host country authority in compliance with host countrylaw. US personnel
should not be actively involved. US relocation activities in an international conflict
environment must comply with applicable provisions of Geneva Convention IV.
(b) Relocation operations must be preceded by detailed economic, social, psychological, and
political preparation so the socio-economic stability of the area is not endangered by the
shifts in population. The conduct of these operations without such preparation can result in
political instability, extensive unemployment, unfair land distribution, poor public utilities,
lack of good housing, and intermingling of the population with conflicting religious beliefs
and social mores.
(3) Planning and Implementation. Leaders must carefully plan either of these operations, which
could require relocating persons. Although armed forces may assist, civil authorities normally are
responsible for planning and implementing a relocation program. Forced relocation is held to a
minimum. The 1949 Geneva Convention prohibits forced population resettlement unless there is
clear military need.
e. Waterline Borders. The surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas and shorelines normally
require the use of—
(1) Coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline.
(2) Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shoreline and river delta areas.
(3) Reinforced aerial, visual, and photographic surveillance of the offshore waters and the
shoreline.
(4) OPs along the shoreline near river mouths, ground LOC, and accessible parts of the shoreline.
(5) An effective system of licensing and identifying all friendly military and civilian watercraft
using the offshore waters.
(6) Effective, centralized control and coordination of all these activities.
f. Sanctuaries. Insurgents may establish base camps and conduct cross-border operations from countries
adjacent to the host country. They take advantage of an international boundary to launch operations or to
evade pursuit. Commanders operating in border areas must respect the sanctity of international
boundaries. However, they can conduct combat operations against the insurgent force once the force
crosses back over the border. Ambush patrols are an excellent means of dealing with insurgents who try
to use an international border as a sanctuary.
2-27. URBAN OPERATIONS
As the center of gravity of most countries lies in urban areas, US forces can expect most COIN
operations to involve urban operations. (See FM 90-10-1.)
a. Operations in an urban environment require different emphasis and different techniques than those in
rural areas. The presence of many people and the characteristics of the area influence both insurgent and
government operations. During Phases I and II, these areas are usually unfavorable for guerrilla warfare
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FM 7-98 Chptr 2 - Support For Insurgency and Cntrinsrgncy
operations. However, insurgent elements in the urban areas may incite rioting, use terrorist tactics, or
seize portions of the city and key facilities. Armed forces may be required to reinforce police in
combatting riots and disorders provoked by the insurgents. Tactical operations may be required if the
insurgents take direct action to seize urban areas or crucial installations within them. (See FM 90-10-1
and FM 19-15.) b. The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethal weapons and the
careful use of weapons of destruction. When applying minimum-essential force to minimize loss of life
and destruction of property, leaders must consider detailed planning, coordination, and control.
c. Covert insurgent activity is extensive in urban areas. The government must emphasize intelligence and
police operations to counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistic, and terrorist activities.
ID AD operations in urban areas may be part of a consolidation campaign.
d. Urban areas are crucial and require a continuing ID AD effort whether they are included in a specific
campaign. Military forces should be part of ID AD planning and operations in urban areas during all
phases of insurgency. This prepares forces to assist other national security and law enforcement agencies.
(1) Government activity. Urban areas need more emphasis on government functions and services
than rural areas. This requires more and possibly larger government organizations for operations.
Commanders should consider the activities and abilities of all government agencies when planning
and executing ID AD operations.
(2) Subversive activities. A subversive element intent on destroying the government may strain the
abilities of local authorities. The insurgents try to exploit local civilian organizations by subverting
their goals and objectives. They also try to place these organizations in opposition to the
government. Terrorist activities and PSYOP occur along with covert insurgent organizational,
intelligence, and logistic operations. Police, internal security, and other government organizations
are high-priority targets to the insurgents.
(3) Operations. Operations require careful planning and coordination, mainly those that involve
applying force. Military forces designated to provide assistance compose plans and prepare to
implement them. Military forces must be able to communicate with police and other agencies
involved in the operations. They must collect and have detailed information on area characteristics
and vital installations.
(4) Tactical operations. Tactical operations may be required inside or near an urban area to defeat
an insurgent attack. Any insurgent attempt to seize and hold an urban area probably involves
operations in nearby areas as well. When the police and other internal security forces can cope
with the attack inside the urban area, military forces can best participate by setting up security
around the urban area and by denying the insurgent reinforcement or support.
(a) When military forces must reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the urban
area, leaders must closely control and coordinate operations. Military forces should be
withdrawn as soon as police forces can manage the situation.
(b) When an urban area has been seized by insurgent forces, leaders must decide whether to
recapture it using major military force or using other techniques, considering both a tactical
and psychological perspective. The amount of force and the specific techniques to be used to
recapture the area are decided based on the probable psychological effect on the enemy,
civilians, and friendly troops; the safety of civilians and friendly troops; the destruction of
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FM 7-98 Chptr 2 - Support For Insurgency and Cntrinsrgncy
buildings; and the military forces available. The principle of minimum-essential force helps
reduce casualties in the noncombatant civilian population.
(c) When authorized, commanders can use riot control munitions against targets so that
military forces can close with and capture the enemy with minimum injury to the
noncombatants. Operations may be in the form of assistance to civilian police. Regardless,
commanders must coordinate military operations with the civilian police. (See Appendix A .)
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Figuj« 2-1* Convoy cocnmBnd responsibility.
Figure 2-1
FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
CHAPTER 3
COMBATTING TERRORISM
"Kill one, frighten ten thousand. "
Sun Tzu
This chapter discusses terrorism and efforts by the commander to deter the threat of terrorism. It also
presents measures and precautions that should be enforced across the operational continuum. The major
focus must be on stopping a terrorist act before it happens. Vulnerability must be reduced by providing
conditions unfavorable to the terrorist. The commander achieves success by not having a loss of life,
equipment, or material through an act of terrorism. (See FM 100-37.)
Section I.
TERRORISM
To counter terrorism, the commander must understand terrorism. Also, he must know the
countermeasures that reduce the chance of a successful terrorist attack against installations, units, and
personnel.
3-1. DEFINITION
The DOD defines terrorism as "the unlawful use— or threat— of force or violence against people or
property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or
ideological objectives." A terrorist's activities do not conform to rules or laws of warfare. His methods
include hostage taking, hijacking, sabotage, assassination, arson, hoaxes, bombings, raids, seizures, use
of NBC weapons, and so on. Victims are often noncombatants, symbolic persons and places, and
political/military figures. Often the victims have no role in either causing or correcting a terrorist's
grievance.
3-2. NATURE OF TERRORISM
The use of terrorism is not limited to the early stages of a conflict. It can and probably will occur in any
level of conflict from peace through general war. Terrorist tactics are deseribed as elusive, surprising,
and brief violent actions.
3-3. COMMON STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
The common strategy of the terrorist is to commit acts of violence. These acts draw the attention of the
people, the government, and the world to his cause. The media plays a crucial part in this strategy by
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giving terrorists international recognition. The danger is that this kind of attention tends to incite acts of
violence by other terrorist groups.
a. The victim of the terrorist is seldom his target. The target, or focal point, more often includes the
general public, government, or perhaps the business sector.
b. Some common tactics terrorists use include the following:
(1) Bombing. The tactic common to most terrorist groups is bombing. Of all terrorist incidents
recorded during the 1980s, 67 percent resulted from the terrorist bomb. The bomb is a popular
weapon, because it is cheap to produce, easy to make, has variable uses, and is difficult to detect
and trace after the event. The increase in bombing activity and the sophistication of devices used
caused the NATO EOD Standardization Committee to classify all terrorist bombs as improvised
explosive devices (lEDs). The term lED is now used by many law enforcement agencies as well as
military forces. Some lED subclassifications include:
(a) Delivery means. Methods of getting the bomb to the target.
• Vehicle bombs— booby-trapped vehicles, attached devices, and car bombs (cars filled with
explosives).
• Laid charges— bombs placed by hand.
• Projected bombs— bombs thrown by hand or projected by a mortar device.
• Postal bombs.
• Bicycle bombs.
(b) Activation means. Three ways to activate an lED.
• Command activation— by radio, electric leads, pull wire/mechanical strikers.
• Action by the subject/target— trip wire, pressure device, light sensitive device, electric.
• Time delay— clock, burning fuse, chemical delay, atmospheric pressure.
(c) Usage. Two broad classifications.
• Tactical improvised explosive devices (lED)— normally regarded as being those used against an
individual. These include nail bombs, claymore devices, and covert bombs. In fact, any lED can be
classified as a tactical lED.
• Strategic lEDs— considered to be those used indiscriminately to gain world attention— for example,
in crowded shopping centers, on aircraft, and so on. They are those bombs designed to strike at
society, the government, and the present system.
(d) Hoaxes. Whatever the type of lED, the terrorist often uses it to gain recognition and to
show he is serious. Once he has established himself as a bomber, he can continue to disrupt,
though not destroy, by using well-made and wellplaced hoax bombs. The use of hoaxes with
live lEDs can keep security forces occupied and disrupt counterterrorist operations.
(2) Arson. Although not a popular tactic among terrorists, arson can destroy and disrupt such
targets as public utilities, political headquarters, and, more commonly, economic/industrial targets
(shops, factories, hotels). The most popular method of starting fires is with time-delay incendiary
devices, often carried in a cigarette packet or cassette tape container. These devices are easy to
conceal and difficult to detect. As with bombing, incendiary devices are cheap and easy to make.
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
(3) Hijacking. Hijacking and skyjacking were common during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s.
Hijacking of vehicles carrying staple foods was a favored tactic of the Supemaros and suited their
style of armed propaganda. The hijacking would be followed quickly by the free distribution of the
vehicle's cargo to the poor and needy along with terrorist propaganda that advertised the terrorists'
cause. In any continuing terrorist activity, such as in Spain or Northern Ireland, the hijacking of a
vehicle will likely be associated with a future atrocity. For example, a hijacked gasoline truck may
appear later as a 50,000-pound benzine bomb wired with explosives. Also, hijacked "legitimate"
vehicles give the terrorist an easy means to gain entry to a closed military post.
(4) Ambush. Well-planned ambushes seldom fail. Ambushes usually include the use of diversions
and early-warning teams. Properly rehearsed, they are executed with precision. The terrorist has
time on his side and spends weeks or months preparing for an operation and waiting for the right
opportunity. The terrorist can chose his own time and place of operation and, if his intended victim
habitually uses the same route, the terrorist can conduct countless rehearsals before execution.
(5) Kidnapping. Not all ambushes are designed to kill the principal. Kidnapping for ransom
accounted for 7.9 percent of terrorist incidents in the last decade and must still be viewed as a
serious option for terrorist groups. The kidnapper confines his victim in a secret hideaway and
makes material demands (money, weapons, exchange of personnel, and so on). A failed
kidnapping may result in hostage taking.
(6) Hostage taking. The difference between hostage taking and kidnapping is minimal. The
hostage taker normally confronts authorities and openly holds his victims for ransom. The hostage
taker demands more than just material things— political concessions are often demanded in
exchange for the lives of the hostages. Hostage taking is a new and popular terrorist tactic. By its
nature, hostage taking attracts the media; the fact that live hostages are involved increases the
drama of the event. The hostage is a tangible asset with which to bargain. Therefore, terrorists can
apply pressure to force concessions that otherwise might not be made. Through kidnapping and
hostage taking, terrorists can acquire large gains at minimal cost, although risks are involved.
(7) Assassination. Assassination is perhaps the oldest terrorist tactic and is still used today. Targets
are often predictable, and terrorist groups claim them after the event. Targets include government
officials, corporate executives, police, military personnel, and security officials.
(8) Other tactics. Whatever tactics terrorists use, they are simple to apply, dynamic in effect,
hit-and-run by nature, and designed to strike their objective rather than the victim. Terrorists will
always do a thorough reconnaissance and a detailed plan. Time is not a factor. Commanders must
be aware of the tactics of potential terrorists in their AOR. Other possible tactics include the use of
chemicals, harassment, raids, sabotage, seizures, and maimings.
3-4. INTERNATIONAL NETWORK
Terrorist groups today do not operate alone and ignorant of one another. An international network exists
that provides great benefits for those who have paid their "membership fee." It is not suggested that some
international headquarters plans terrorist acts across the globe. However, it is proven that a type of
international terrorists' support network does exist. The benefits gained from such a network seem
endless: arms, ammunition, money, intelligence, explosives, safe houses. Most important is the
experience and assistance given in training and support facilities. Along with the resultant trained
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manpower, the network grows.
3-5. CATEGORIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS
A terrorist group's choice of targets and tactics is also a function of the group's government affiliation.
They are categorized by government affiliation. This helps security planners foresee terrorist targets, and
his sophisticated intelligence and weaponry. Terrorist groups are divided into three categories:
a. Nonstate supported— a terrorist group that operates autonomously, receiving no support from any
government.
b. State supported— a terrorist group that operates alone but receives support from one or more
governments.
c. State directed— a terrorist group that operates as an agent of a government, receiving substantial
intelligence, logistic, and operational support.
3-6. TERRORIST OBJECTIVES
The immediate objective of any terrorist attack normally complies with one or more categories. The
goals may be either immediate or long range. Terrorists demonstrate group power, demand revenge,
obtain logistic support, and cause a government to overreact. They are recognized by coercion,
intimidation, and provocation. At the same time, terrorists gain support for themselves or an insurgency.
a. Immediate Goals.
(1) Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause.
(2) Force government reaction, overreaction, and repression leading to immediate public
dissension.
(3) Harass, weaken, or embarrass government, military, or other security forces.
(4) Obtain money or equipment.
(5) Show a government's inability to protect its citizens.
(6) Disrupt or destroy primary means of mobility or communications.
(7) Demonstrate power or threat credibility.
(8) Prevent or delay decisions or legislation.
(9) Cause strikes or work slowdowns.
(10) Discourage impending foreign investments or foreign government assistance programs.
(11) Free prisoners.
(12) Seek vengeance.
b. Loug-Rauge Goals.
(1) Cause dramatic changes in government such as revolution, civil war, or war between nations.
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(2) Disrupt and discredit an established infrastructure in support of an insurgency.
(3) Influence local, national, or international policy decision making.
(4) Gain political recognition as the legal body representing an ethnic or national group.
3-7. TERRORIST TARGETS
Anyone or anything can be a target or victim of a terrorist act. However, to the terrorist, the military
represents a source of arms and material as well as a political or national body. This places the military at
great risk. The list below contains some possible military targets of terrorists; it provides some areas of
concern. Targets may change as security is increased.
• Sensitive night vision and communication items.
• Arms.
• Ammunition.
• Command and control facilities.
• Explosives.
• Military officer training facilities.
• Areas catering to personal needs (mess halls, barracks, post exchange, commissary, gyms,
religious activities, bars, community centers).
• Hydroelectric plants, dams, gas pipelines, nuclear facility sites.
• Communication lines/facilities, computer facilities.
• Chemical storage sites.
• Equipment warehouses.
• Transportation centers, parking lots, airports, railheads, bus depots, rail lines, shipyards.
• Members of military force and their dependents.
• Key leaders of the military.
• Post offices and mail trucks.
Section II.
ANTITERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Combatting terrorism consists of two major categories. The commander must develop a plan that
includes the aspects of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. The plan should reduce the vulnerability of
installations, units, and personnel during peacetime, predeployment, deployment, and redeployment. It
should also include measures for preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism.
3-8. ANTITERRORISM
Installations, units, and individuals employ antiterrorism measures to reduce the chance of falling victim
to a terrorist act. These measures are considered both active and passive, designed to prevent a terrorist
incident. They must involve each member of the military community— military, civilian, and family
members. The cornerstone for this program includes collecting and disseminating timely threat
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information, conducting information awareness programs, and implementing sound defensive measures.
Three types of security measures to consider are physical security, OPSEC, and personal security.
a. Physical Security. Physical security measures protect information, material, and persons, as well as
prevent criminal acts. Although terrorist activities are criminal acts, there are some differences that must
be considered when providing physical security against terrorists. Terrorists are likely to be more
organized, better trained and educated, and more highly motivated than other criminals. They are heavily
armed and sophisticated in their ability to defeat physical security measures. To provide physical security
against terrorists, leaders must consider the terrorist whose goal may include his own self-destruction.
This is different from security against other criminals or a conventional enemy. Several actions can help
determine what physical security measures are needed.
(1) Review crime-prevention surveys/inspections. These surveys consider the entire installation as
well as the effect on the surrounding civilian locale.
(2) Provide photos of known terrorists to key personnel. These photos can be obtained through
local civilian and military authorities. The photos can also be prominently displayed in common
areas so that all personnel have access to them.
(3) Review physical security surveys/inspections. This survey recommends action as a result of
on-site inspection of barriers, guard forces, communications, transportation, contingency support,
protective lighting, intrusion lighting, intrusion detection system, and other physical security
measures. These actions protect installations from loss, theft, destruction, sabotage, or
compromise.
(4) Review status of work orders; establish the priority of work based on threat assessment.
(5) Determine if the installation is closed or open. It is closed if ground and water access is limited
by a perimeter fence, controlled entry points, or other physical barriers. If not, the commander
must compensate by designating restricted areas, providing entry control, and maintaining
contingency plans to secure or close all or part of the installation.
(6) Consider physical security aspects.
• Protective obstacles and barriers.
• Electro-optical and night vision equipment.
• Bomb threats.
• Closed-circuit television.
• Communications.
• Entry control.
• Intrusion detection systems.
• Lighting.
• Lock and key control.
• Package and mail control.
• Personnel reliability.
• Location of restricted areas.
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• Inspection of water and food.
• Inspection of key personnel vehicles.
The physical security plan must be balanced in its orientation, with equal emphasis on preventing
criminal acts as well as terrorist acts. The commander must update his plan continuously based on threat
assessment.
b. Operational Security. Protecting information is the cornerstone of the OPSEC program. The OPSEC
program coordinates all actions needed to prevent an enemy or terrorist from learning about plans and
operations. Techniques of deception, physical security, SIGSEC, and information security are
interrelated and occur at the same time. All planning must include measures to keep the potential terrorist
from obtaining information that could aid in a terrorist incident. Eour areas of information that terrorists
can exploit are as follows:
(1) Human intelligence. HUMINT involves using people to gather information about military
abilities and intentions to include installation day-to-day activities. HUMINT sources can include
seemingly unimportant bar or restaurant conversations concerning operations, or the release of
phone numbers and addresses of key personnel. This threat can be countered by adhering to
physical security and information security practices, and by using countersurveillance and
counterintelligence activities.
(2) Signal intelligence. SIGINT concerns all forms of communications and signal emission
equipment. Terrorists may not be able to compromise sophisticated equipment, but they can affect
routine day-to-day communications activities. Eor example, police or fire department frequencies
are not changed when radios are stolen, or telephones in sensitive areas are not checked for
bugging devices. This threat is countered by establishing communications security and information
security.
(3) Photo intelligence. Terrorists use PHOTOINT to gain information through coverage from
aircraft, high terrain features, automobiles, and so on. PHOTOINT can be countered through
counterintelligence and countersurveillance programs.
(4) Operational patterns. Operational patterns of military organizations provide information to a
terrorist. To counter this threat, leaders must eliminate patterns when possible. Otherwise, they
should use deception measures to mask the established pattern.
c. Personal Security. No person is immune to the threat of terrorism. Representatives of the US
Government are possible targets of terrorist activities. Terrorists may preselect offices, manufacturing
plants, or other installation assets as targets for bombing, sabotage, demonstrations, abductions, and
murders. Who occupies these buildings may be of little concern to the terrorists. Measures that may be
useful in deterring such acts are as follows:
(1) Control access to sensitive areas and command offices, both day and night.
(a) Prevent direct access to sensitive areas most likely to be targets of terrorism. Do not
locate command offices on the ground floor.
(b) Equip entrances to sensitive areas and command offices with an alarm.
(c) Have an access roster; escort visitors.
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(d) Ensure direct- security force personnel check command areas in their after-hours tour.
(e) Lock all restrooms on floors where command offices are located (as well as others in a
multistory office building) to deter public access.
(f) Lock doors to janitorial and other maintenance closets at all times.
(g) Lock doors to telephone and electrical equipment rooms. Give access to maintenance
and telephone personnel only when they have such need.
(2) Select an interior safe room for use if terrorists attack; do not identify it as a safe room.
(3) Maintain emergency supplies such as first-aid equipment, bomb blankets, candles, rations,
water, lanterns, and so on. Inform key personnel as to where supplies are kept, and the location of
emergency exits and escape routes.
(4) Restrict the personal history data on key personnel since this information could be used by
terrorists to select victims or to identify their homes and families.
(5) Recommend key personnel parking areas not be identified by name but rather by number.
(6) Limit information on travel agendas and plans of command or key personnel to only
need-to-know personnel.
(7) Increase the effect of command and key personnel protective measures by encouraging them—
(a) To maintain a low profile.
(b) To be taught to recognize the signs of surveillance by strangers.
(c) To use simple, effective, verbal code signals to alert family or organizational members to
a physical threat.
(d) To vary routes to and from work.
(e) To attend defensive and evasive driving school.
(f) To inspect vehicles before moving.
(g) To use protective vests.
(h) To avoid likely terrorist targeted areas.
(i) To drive with windows closed and doors locked.
(j) To know key phrases in the native language.
(k) To carefully screen all domestic help.
(l) To know terrorist techniques and methods of operation.
(m) To perform roadmap reconnaissance to avoid suspected terrorist concentrations when
traveling to new destinations (restaurants, hotels, shopping, and so on).
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3-9. TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS
The following terrorist threat conditions describe progressive levels of terrorist threat to US military
facilities and personnel. As Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved terminology, these terms, definitions, and
security measures implement a standardized terrorist alert system throughout the DOD. MACOMs and
subordinate commands are not authorized to change the basic system; however, supplements to the
system may be published. The selection of appropriate responses to terrorist threats remains the
responsibility of the commander having jurisdiction or control over threatened facilities or personnel.
a. Threat Condition Alpha(Low).
(1) Definition. A general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel, of
unpredictable nature and extent, when circumstances do not justify full implementation of
measures contained in a higher threat condition. Selected measures from higher threat conditions
may be implemented as needed.
(2) Measures To Be Taken.
(a) At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including dependents, to be suspicious and
inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers; to be
alert for unidentified vehicles on or near US installations; and to be alert for abandoned
parcels or suitcases, or for any unusual activity.
(b) Keep the duty officer or other appointed personnel available to evacuate buildings and
areas, and to seal off areas where an explosion or attack has occurred. Keep key personnel
on call to implement security plans.
(c) Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
(d) Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering installations and
nonclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the US command and agency.
(e) Limit access points for vehicles and personnel.
(f) As a deterrent, apply one of the following measures from threat condition Bravo
individually and randomly:
• Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
• At the beginning and the end of each workday, and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect
the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or packages.
• Check all deliveries to installation activities and advise dependents to check all home deliveries.
• As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations (schools, messes,
clubs, and other soft targets) to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among
the staff and dependents.
(g) Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the
introduction of the higher threat condition.
(h) Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel.
b. Threat Condition Bravo (Medium).
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(1) Definition. An increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no
particular threat has been identified.
(2) Measures to be Taken.
(a) Remind all personnel to be cautious and inquisitive about suspicious persons, vehicles,
and activities. Warn personnel of any form of attack to be used by terrorists.
(b) Keep all personnel on call who are involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency
plans.
(c) Check plans for implementing measures contained in the next threat condition.
(d) Where possible, move cars and other objects at least 25 meters from buildings,
particularly those buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider the use of
centralized parking.
(e) Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
(f) Make regular and frequent inspections of the interior and exterior of buildings for
suspicious packages.
(g) Thoroughly examine all mail for letter or parcel bombs.
(h) Check all deliveries to installation activities and advise dependents to check all home
deliveries.
(i) As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations (schools,
messes, clubs, and other soft targets) to improve deterrence and defense, and to build
confidence among the staff and dependents.
(j) Keep the staff and dependents informed of the general situation to stop rumors and
prevent unnecessary alarm.
(k) At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of any action being
taken and why.
(l) Upon entry of visitors to the unit, physically inspect them and a percentage of their
suitcases, parcels, and other containers.
(m) Wherever possible, operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.
(n) Protect off-base military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared
plans. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of checking
before they enter and drive a car.
(o) Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel.
(p) Brief personnel who may augment the guard force on directives and regulations
concerning the use of deadly force.
(q) Conduct a random search of vehicles entering the installation.
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c. Threat Condition Charlie (High).
(1) Definition. A terrorist incident has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that
some form of terrorist action is imminent.
(2) Measures to be Taken.
(a) Continue all threat condition Bravo actions or introduce those not already implemented.
(b) Keep all personnel on duty who are responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans.
(c) Limit access points to absolute minimum.
(d) Strictly enforce control of entry and search all vehicles.
(e) Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.
(f) Issue weapons to guards. (Local orders should include specific instructions on issue of
ammunition.)
(g) Increase patrolling of the installation.
(h) Protect all designated vulnerable points and give special attention to vulnerable points
outside military establishments.
(i) Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.
d. Threat Condition Delta (Imminent).
(1) Definition. Terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received
that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this threat condition is declared
as a localized warning.
(2) Measures To Be Taken.
(a) Continue or introduce measures listed for threat conditions Bravo and Charlie.
(b) Augment guards, as needed.
(c) Identify all vehicles already on the installation within operational or mission support
areas.
(d) Search all vehicles entering the complex or installation as well as vehicle contents.
(e) Control all access and implement positive identification of all personnel.
(f) Search all suitcases, briefcases, and packages brought into the complex or on the
installation.
(g) Enforce measures to control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the US command
or agency concerned.
(h) Check often the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.
(i) Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.
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(j) Consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities that
might make sites more vulnerable to terrorist attack.
e. Threat Assessment Guidelines. The following general guidelines provide for uniform
implementation of security alert conditions. Assessment factors are defined as—
(1) Existence. Applies when a terrorist group is present in an area of concern. The group need not
have posed a threat to US or DOD interests in the past.
(2) Capability. Applies when a terrorist group has the ability to implement an operation against US
interests in areas of concern. This includes resources such as intelligence, mobility, personnel, and
equipment (explosives, arms, and ammunition).
(3) History. Applies when a group's history of terrorist acts and behavior reflects an anti-US stand
or includes previous attacks against US interests.
(4) Trends. Applies if the group has, over the past year, displayed terrorist activity that appears to
be continuing or increasing. Activity need not have been violent; terrorist attacks against US or
DOD interests may be merely threatening statements.
(5) Targeting. Applies if there are known plans or confirmed intentions of a terrorist group to
target US or DOD interests. Targeting can be either specific or nonspecific. If targeting is not
against US or DOD interests, this factor should not be considered.
A combination of positive answers to any or all of the above assessment factors will produce a threat
level of either low, medium, high, or imminent. These guidelines apply only to the assessment of terrorist
threat against US or DOD interests.
f. Threat Condition Reporting Procedures. Department of the Army requires MACOMs that own
installations to implement a reporting system within their respective commands. This system will provide
DA and senior Army leaders current information on the antiterrorist posture so that resources are
dedicated where they are most needed. (See applicableregulations for reporting procedures.)
3-10. COUNTERTERRORISM
Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism. This is the final phase in combatting terrorism. It is reactive and validates the extensive
preparation, planning, and response measures established in terrorism counteraction plans. The type of
forces and command and control relations used in counterterrorism operations depend on the location,
type of incident, and degree of force required. Force selection criteria are governed by legal and political
constraints. Some military operations executed by US forces in response to terrorist acts may be carried
out by conventional forces. However, usually these forces provide support to a specially organized,
equipped, and trained counterterrorism unit. In executing counterterrorism actions, leaders should ensure
organizational planning addresses the following tasks:
a. Intelligence. A well-planned, organized, all-source intelligence program is vital in order to identify the
threat and to provide timely threat intelligence. (See Chapter 6 .) This includes evaluating terrorist
abilities, tactics, and strategy.
b. Hostage Negotiations. Due to jurisdictional considerations, hostage negotiations are normally the
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
responsibility of another US government ageney or the host nation.
c. Hostage Rescue. Speeially organized, trained, and equipped personnel and units are maintained to
reseue and proteet hostages.
d. Assault of Terrorist Positions. An objeetive of national poliey is to deter the terrorist through the
threat of retaliation. When this beeomes neeessary, US military personnel normally eonduet the
operation. This mission eould be assigned to either speeial operations forees, eonventional forees, or
both. If SOFs are used, the US military eommander must still plan to establish an inner seeurity
perimeter of MP units. He also establishes an outer seeurity perimeter of soldiers and a speeial reaetion
element to respond to other isolated ineidents within the AOR.
Section III.
COMBATTING TERRORISM IN LIC
Commanders must take aetion to eounter terrorists. During peaeetime, they must develop and employ
antiterrorist plans. The measures to deter, prevent, and respond to threat are based on the terrorist threat
eonditions. The plan must eorrespond to and be ineluded in the seeurity plan. This ineludes physieal
seeurity, OPSEC, and personal seeurity. As the unit deploys for COIN operations, PKOs, or PCOs, the
ehanees of a terrorist aet inereases. Based on the threat, eommanders must guard unit personnel and
equipment.
3-11. DEPLOYMENT IN CONTINGENCIES
A eommander with a deployment mission must reduee the vulnerability of his unit to terrorist attaek.
These preeautions must be ineluded during predeployment, deployment, and redeployment.
a. Predeployment. The eommander must develop his unit's seeurity to eomplieate the terrorist's deeision
making. As he plans his eoneept of the operation, he assesses the threat. From this, the operational plans,
equipment, and speeial skills ean be ehosen that inerease risk to the terrorists.
(1) The eoneept should—
(a) Inelude seeurity against terrorism in all orders, plans, and training.
(b) Inelude seeurity in the eommander's guidanee.
(e) Deter or ereate risk for the terrorist through seeurity programs.
(2) The planning proeess must inelude—
(a) Mission analysis.
• How ean the mission be affeeted by a terrorist attaek?
• What are the seeurity aspeets of both speeified and implied tasks?
• Continue to review unit weaknesses throughout predeployment, deployment, and redeployment.
(b) Threat assessment.
• Identify terrorist groups operating in the deployment area.
• Develop a list of PIR: methods of operation, attaek methodology, and preattaek indieation.
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
• Identify sources of information on terrorist groups; know how to access them quickly and
routinely.
• Routinely include threat assessment in intelligence estimates.
(c) Combat service support considerations.
• Procurement of special security equipment ( Table 3-1) .
• Protection of storage and distribution areas.
• Maintenance of special equipment.
• Security of maintenance unit if separate from main body.
• Security during movement (based on threat).
• Security in staging areas.
• Liaison with security agencies that support the move or with controlling areas that move (host
country).
(d) Combat support considerations.
• Engineering priority of work based on the mission and terrorist threat.
• Special engineer equipment for conducting countermine and EOD; protective obstacle
emplacement; constructing roadblocks; critical site, asset, and troop protection.
• Special engineer equipment.
• Engineer training to maneuver units on visual detection/recognition of mines/booby traps.
• MP check/inspect/improve unit physical security.
• MP liaison with local police/security personnel.
• MP assist in security planning and training.
• Host nation security forces assisted by MP screen civilian and host nation employees.
• No hiring of civilian employees, if possible.
• If employed, special security procedures for screening and monitoring civilians.
• In many countries, a fee for information is expected. Coordinate with the State Department for a
means to pay for information.
(e) Operational considerations.
• Unit plans. Include security in each plan, SOP, OPORD, and movement order.
• Security plans. Prepare, review, and update unit security plans (physical security, crime
prevention, and so on), and individual security plans (guard orders).
• Security programs. Develop specific security programs such as threat awareness and OPSEC.
• Special teams. Due to the terrorist threat, consider a different task organization (search teams,
special reaction teams, protective service teams).
• Special skills. To counter the terrorist threat, add special skills to units (interrogators, linguists,
EAOs, EOD personnel, public affairs, SOE liaison, CA officer). Some may need to go with
advanced parties.
• Command and support relationships. These may differ from the routine (State Department, host
nation, country team, SOE teams). Resolve command and support relationships between the
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
advance party of the JTF and the brigade and other agencies before deployment.
(f) Specialized skills training. Institutional training for specialized skills (instructor
qualification, evasive driving, special reaction teams, threat awareness, search techniques,
hostage negotiation, roadblocks, sentry duties, joint police action with host country).
(g) Transit to deployment area.
• Consider overall security of the unit throughout the entire movement: emergency action
procedures, alternative routes or diversions, and organic security teams with each movement
element.
• Implement en route planning and training.
• Immediately update intelligence/threat assessment before arrival.
Table 3-1. Specialized equipment.
b. Deployment. Deployment is the second stage of the mission. As units move and establish operation
bases, commanders must not create lucrative targets.
(1) Advanced party considerations.
(a) Composition. More personnel are needed for security and liaison with host nation
security agencies, because a means for added intelligence on terrorism is required.
(b) Deployment. The primary security consideration for the advanced party is whether it
should be standard or low profile (uniform or plain clothes, military or civilian transport).
(c) Validation. The advanced party must validate the mission and PIR. Required tasks
include determining if the terrorist threat assessment tracks with actual threat and if the
threat from in country affects the accomplishment of the mission; and, discovering the
mission, if it is the same as the commander's.
(d) Rules of engagement. The advanced party must confirm planned rules of engagement. It
must determine if they are the same as those during the predeployment phase. Problems
must be resolved before the main body arrives.
(2) OPSEC measures in deployment.
(a) Avoid making known the time and place of arrival; otherwise, increase security.
(b) Avoid setting patterns of behavior/operation.
(c) Set up secure communications with main body and advanced party.
(3) Pass policy. On extended operations, the morale of soldiers must be considered. A pass policy
may be established in the mission area. However, soldiers must keep a low profile. Commanders
should do the following:
(a) Provide troop information briefings on the threat.
(b) Establish pass policies using the buddy system.
(c) Establish off-limits areas.
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
(4) Force protection. In setting up operating bases and in day-to-day operations, commanders must
consider the security of his forces. This is a major concern when the rules of engagement are
restrictive. Some considerations are as follows:
(a) Coordinate with security forces that protect forces (MP, host nation forces, directing
staff), (b) Avoid providing lucrative targets (troop concentrations, motor pools, large static
logistic installations).
(c) Transit within deployment area.
(d) Continue threat assessment along routes for each movement.
(e) Include security in all movement orders.
(f) Provide security at departure and arrival points.
(g) Employ security forces during transit.
(h) Establish liaison and coordinate with all security agencies along route.
(5) Security enhancement. Commanders should use TOE and specialized equipment to provide
security based on threat assessment.
(a) Assign the provost marshal or a military police officer the responsibility for physical
security.
(b) Ensure all personnel know the governing regulations (guard orders, rules of engagement,
local restrictions).
(c) Stay aware of training and the troop information program.
(d) Include force/base protection when arranging unit positions (good defense/barrier plan,
dispersion of high-value targets away from access roads, perimeter fences).
(e) Maintain a low profile (restrict passes).
(f) Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit's location. Restrict the number of
vehicles within perimeters and keep parking away from buildings. Perform stringent
identification checks.
(h) Constantly portray an image of professionalism and readiness.
(i) Continue to reassess the environment.
c. Redeployment. During the redeployment phase, preparing for a terrorist attack is as vital as during the
other phases. In fact, units tend to relax after an operation. Redeployment depends on the mission, the
publicity, and the international reaction. It may be the most vulnerable phase for aterrorist attack.
(1) The advance party must keep a security alert and awareness posture until all of the unit has
returned. The advance party should develop PIR for return to home station.
(2) Stay-behind personnel are most open to terrorist attack since the armed presence is less. They
must keep a security posture that reflects the chance of a greater threat. Actions include
maintaining liaison with security forces, adding to security measures, and keeping tight controls on
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
personnel.
(3) The following should be considered for reverse deployment:
(a) The security of the port of entry and lines of communications for the return trip.
(b) If the mission has changed the situation at home. An unpopular political decision may
expose the unit to a threat upon its return to the US.
(c) To adopt the security measures used during transit to, and movement within, the
deployment area. Coordinate reaction ability with security agencies along the route.
(4) A coordinated PAO policy should be developed to incorporate the following:
(a) Control of information released to the media ensures accuracy and completeness.
(b) Troops should be briefed as to release of information to outside agencies. Only public
affairs personnel have release authority.
(5) Debriefing should be conducted. The stress increase in soldiers during intense deployment
operations must be allowed to subside. This helps to adjust back into a peacetime environment.
These debriefings include:
(a) Briefing soldiers to change their orientation from LIC duty back to peacetime.
(b) Updating soldiers regarding new policies, incidents, or threats that developed since the
deployment operation.
(c) Inspecting soldiers for maps, souvenirs, ordnance, and weapons.
(6) A thorough after-action report should be prepared. It provides two vital services for units that
conduct future operations. It provides future commanders a benefit from lessons learned. Also, it
serves as a resource for validating terrorism counteraction procedures for future operations.
3-12. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND LOCAL TERRORISM INDICATORS
Combatting terrorism, more than any other form of warfare, requires knowledge of the enemy's goals and
abilities. Intelligence officers, supporting a deploying unit, must always consider the terrorist's concerns
when developing EEIs and a list of local terrorism indicators.
a. Priority Intelligence Requirements. The following terrorist concerns can assist the intelligence
officer in developing PIR:
• Organization, size, and composition of group.
• Motivation, long-range goals, and short-range goals.
• Religious, political, ethnic affiliation, or a combination of these.
• International and national support (moral, physical, financial).
• Recruiting methods, locations, and targets (students).
• Identities of group leaders, opportunist, and idealists.
• Group intelligence abilities.
• Sources of supply/support.
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
• Important dates (religious holidays, martyrdom anniversaries).
• Planning competence.
• Degree of discipline.
• Preferred tactics and operations.
• Willingness to kill.
• Willingness for self-sacrifice (professed or demonstrated).
• Group skills (sniping, demolitions, masquerade, forged documents, industrial sabotage,
airplane/boat operations, tunneling, underwater electronic surveillance, poisons/contaminants).
• Equipment and weapons on hand and required.
• Transportation on hand and required.
• Medical support available.
• Freedom of access to media and skill in using it.
b. Local Terrorism Indicators. Some conditions that may indicate politically motivated violence in
certain locations are as follows:
(1) Dissent for political, social, or ethnic reasons. Charges brought against local government.
(2) Formation of radical groups, branches of national subversive groups, or secret societies.
(3) Antigovemment, anti-US agitation; identification of government or US as the root of the
problems.
(4) New spokesmen for the people's causes emerging; out-of-town organizers arriving.
(5) Meetings, rallies, and demonstrations being organized; grievances taking political overtones;
inflammatory speeches and charges made; provocation of authorities to intervene, or overreact;
police or military brutality charged.
(6) Appearance of antiestablishment posters, leaflets, underground press; taking people's concern
into political arena; politicization of social causes.
(7) Use of known personalities as draws for rallies, especially those that have been identified with
radical causes.
(8) Demonstrations, civil disobedience, or protest marches with causes overshadowed by political
rhetorics.
(9) Increased recruiting, by known front groups and radical organizations; support sought among
workers.
(10) Increased activism in political spheres at colleges and universities.
(11) Speeches and communications stating violence as the only means of solution.
(12) Identification of foreign influence or aid.
(13) Threats against public works, utilities, or transportation; threats of violence against prominent
personalities.
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
(14) Agitation in refugee, minority, or foreign communities; polarization; arming segments of
society.
(15) Reports of stolen firearms and explosives; raids on armories, and sporting goods stores.
(16) Violence against property, looting, destruction, and arson; mainly during demonstrations,
marches, or mob actions.
(17) Violence against persons, murders, attempted murders, beatings, threats, abductions, or public
targeting of people.
(18) Increased purchases of high-performance weapons; appearance of automatic weapons, mainly
of foreign manufacture.
(19) Discovery of weapons, ammunition caches, and explosives; indication of terrorist training;
increased terrorist surveillance.
(20) Open attacks on police, military, and other authorities.
(21) Reports of stolen identification cards, membership cards, and so on.
3-13. OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES
Commanders can implement certain measures to avoid stereotyping and to deny intelligence information
to the enemy.
a. Commanders should adhere to the following OPSEC measures:
(1) Use EEFI to guide the OPSEC program. Develop EEEI— those items/activities of planning that
terrorists can use.
(2) Present random action in unit operating procedures (change patrol schedules, routes, check
points, sentry, or guard positions.
(3) Avoid any set pattern for commanders, meetings, meal schedules, resupply activity, religious
services, or sentry or guard reliefs.
(4) Employ protective obstacles (perimeter and internal).
(5) Check identification of all personnel entering and leaving the perimeter or installation.
(6) Employ added security to restricted areas (communications posts, communication centers,
motor parks, high-density troop areas).
(7) Control distribution of itineraries of VIPs/high-risk personnel.
(8) Establish dismount points and parking areas away from buildings. If possible, these should not
be seen from outside the base.
b. The following are examples of intelligence indicators that might assist a terrorist in gathering
intelligence on a unit. This is a sample listing and should not be construed as all inclusive.
(1) Operation Indicators.
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FM 7-98 Chapter 3 - Combatting Terrorism
(a) Troops restricted to the post before a move or operation.
(b) Increased patrolling/air reconnaissance.
(c) No patrolling at all.
(d) Increased movement between locations caused by task organizations before an
operation.
(e) Special requisitions to increase rations, transport, and ammunitions.
(2) HUMINT Indicators.
(a) Newspaper or other media coverage.
(b) Farewells and last-minute visits by VIPs or senior officers.
(c) Church services the night before an operation.
(d) Bulletin notices stating that enforced rest is required; dispensary hours are changed.
(e) Public signs announcing changes in procedures (restricting civilian travel/access).
(f) Photography developed by local contractors showing in-camp scenes and preparations.
(3) Communication Indicators.
(a) Change in call signs and frequencies before an operation.
(b) Movement of auxiliary communication equipment (new aerials) to a new area.
3-20
GENERAL
ROADBLOCKS
SEARCHES
SPECIAUSTS
ENGINEERS
Pyrotechnic platoli
Fiot gun*
T««rgM teunchtiv
Hand-held lluhlights
Afitiriot halmata
Shiaida 3ft 6in
Shield* 6ft
Police batons
Handcuffs
Body arnior
Marshalling wands
Telescopes and
tripods
Binoculars
Infrared devices
Loud speakers
Fire axtingulsher
Cameras with flash
attachment* and
tripods
Telesopic sight*
Photographic fitter
Polaroid cameraa
Whistle*
Hend-held radio* (for
use in urban areas|
Portebla lampa/ilghta
Marker light*
Traffic cones
Traffic signs
Visor aleeves
Car puntui* chains
Oire^onal arrow
Lightweight barriers
Mirror*
Laddsrs
Flashlights
Picks, shovtls
Wrscking bar*
Hand toola, floraaeant
(hammara. plier*,
acrswdrivsis)
Rope
Magnets
Telescopic mirror
Axe
Min* merkers
Harriets
Whhe tape
Mins detector*
Eye ehielde
Messuring lap*
Metal cutting toola
Chisels
Knives
Sawa
Mina probes
Safety harness
Explosive detectors
Femote light uni
Femote- controlled
EOD device
Endoscope
Engineer heavy
equipment
Concrete mixers
Mobile lighting
Portable compressor
Hydraulic pisiform
Engineer traciora
Platform hoist
Equipmerrl in static
dsfsnss column
X-ray aqu^mant
Metal detectors
Portable eonaors
Portable alarm*
Portable lighting
eyetem
Barriers (drop arm
and awing arm}
Roadblock
equipmont for
exl/entry control
Cloead-circuH TV
Shot direction
indicator
Barbed wire
Wire netting
Corrugated iron
Fence material*
Steel girdera
Scaffolding
Table 3-1. Specialized equipment
Table 3-1
FM 7-98 Chapter 4 - Peacekeeping
CHAPTER 4
PEACEKEEPING
"Peacekeeping isn't a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it. "
Anonymous Member,
Peacekeeping Force
International peacekeeping efforts dominate today's conflict resolution. The US may enter into PKOs
under the auspice of an international organization in cooperation with other countries or unilaterally. This
chapter provides details on employing Army units for these operations. It explains how PKOs are
established, controlled, planned, operated, and supported. Also, the possible mission of a peacekeeping
force is discussed along with TTPs for conducting the specified and implied tasks of PKOs.
Section I.
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION
This
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