Document text
: | ~ MORALE OPERATIONS
: FIELD MANUAL -
STRATEGIC SERVICES
O88 ARCHIVES ©
: Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services
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MORALE OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL
— STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Provisional)
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Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.
26 January 1943
This Morale Operations Field Manual, Strategic Serv-
ices, (Provisional), is published for the information and
guidance of all concerned and will be used as the basic
doctrine for Strategic SerVices training for such subjects.
The contents of this Manual should be carefully con-
trolled and should not be allowed to come into unauthor-
ized hands. The Manual is intended for use of the OSS
bases and should not be carried to advance bases.
AR 308—5, pertaining to handling of secret docu- °
ments, will be complied with in the handling of this
William J. Donovan
Director
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
_ + SECTION I— GENERAL PROVISIONS
1, PURPOSE 1
2. DEFINITION 1
3. OBJECTIVES 1
4, IMPLEMENTS : 2
5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 3
SECTION II — ORGANIZATION
6. GENERAL . 4
7. MO BRANCH, WASHINGTON 5
' 8 FIELD ORGANIZATION 3)
SECTION III — SELECTION AND TRAINING
9. RESPONSIBILITIES .. 7
10. MO BRANCH OF OSS, WASHINGTON 7
11, FIELD PERSONNEL ... 7
12. TRAINING OF FIELD PERSONNEL . 8
SECTION IV— COORDINATION OF MO FIELD
ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER SERVICES
18. COLLABORATION IN DETAILED PLANNING 8
14, COLLABORATION IN OPERATIONS. . . 9
15. RELATIONSHIPS AND LIAISON . . 9
16. COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . 10
SECTION V — IMPLEMENTS
17. TYPES : ~ a 6 « « « 10
18. GENERAL CHANNELS ea A ge ee ees 10
19. PERSONAL CONTACT . . . . . . 18
20. RUMORS . o) at. a. ° 414
21. FALSE LEAFLETS, PAMPHLETS,
AND GRAPHICS rn er a re
22. FREEDOM STATIONS . .. . . .. 22
23. FORGERY. » 2 « « 26
24, BRIBERY AND BLACKMAIL sa Ste . 29
25. COORDINATION OF MO CHANNELS -
AND IMPLEMENTS ... te oR B82
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SECTION V — PLANNING
26. GENERAL ; . . 383
27. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING . . . 36
28. OVER-ALL MO PLANS . .. . . . 37
29. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES el an, Se “ig age BE
30. OPERATIONAL PLANS... . . . 39
SECTION VII — OPERATIONS
31. GENERAL... - » « 40
32. WITHIN THE ENEMY’ S COUNTRY . . . 4l
33. WITHIN ENEMY-OCCUPIED OR |
CONTROLLED TERRITORY . . . . 47
34. WITHIN OTHER AREAS ... . . Os
35. WITHIN THE ENEMY ARMED FORCES,
IN ALL AREAS ; . . . 655
36. WITHIN OSS, WASHINGTON "AND
THEATERS... So AD ae 488
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MORALE OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL
- STRATEGIC SERVICES
' (Provisional)
SECTION I—GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Manual is:
a. To present the details of Morale Operations, and
their relation to other Strategic Services activities and
to OSS objectives, as well as to actual or planned mili-
tary operations.
b. To set forth the general doctrine to be used in the
planning and conduct of morale operations.
2. DEFINITION
The term MORALE OPERATIONS as considered in
this Manual includes all measures of subversion other
-than physical used to create confusion and division, and to
undermine the morale and the political unity of the
enemy through any means operating within or purporting
to operate within enemy countries and enemy occupied or
controlled countries, and from bases within other areas,
including neutral areas, where action or counteraction
may be effective against the enemy.
8. OBJECTIVES |
. _ The objectives of subversive morale operations are:
“ag. WITHIN THE ENEMY’s countRY — To incite and
» spread dissension, confusion, and disorder; to promote
subversive activities against his government by encour-
aging underground groups, and to depress the morale of
his people.
‘b. To discredit collaborationists, to encourage and
assist in the promotion of resistance and revolt against
Axis control by the people of these territories, and to
raise their morale and will to resist.
- | ¢, ‘WYrHIN OTHER AREAS BEST SUITED TO THE PURPOSE—
~-To conduct activities which will assist in the accom-
plishment of the objectives in a, and b. above.
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d. WITHIN THE ENEMY ARMED FORCES, IN ALL AREAS—
To induce low morale and encourage rebellion.
e. WiTHin OSS anp THEATERS—To support and assist
other OSS activities, particularly SO and SI, in their
respective fields.
4. IMPLEMENTS
a. AUTHORIZED*
The Morale Operations Branch, in cooperation with
other agencies of OSS, will employ the following imple-
ments for the accomplishment of the above objectives:
(1) Contacts with and manipulation of individuals
and underground groups;
(2) Agents provocateurs;
(3) Bribery and blackmail;
(4) Rumors;
(5) Forgery, to include the writing of poison-pen
letters, forging of misleading intelligence documents,
falsification of enemy documents and periodicals, and
the printing of false orders to the enemy, regulations,
and proclamations;
(6) False leaflets, pamphlets, and graphics, to be
used for subversive deception within enemy and
enemy-occupied countries and not identifiable with
any official or semi-official United Nations agency;
(7) “Freedom stations” masquerading as the voice
of groups resistant within enemy and enemy-occu-
pied countries when used for subversive deception
and not identifiable with any official or semi-official
United Nations agency.
b. UNAUTHORIZED
The following implements are not authorized:
(1) Propaganda and publicity, including the dis-
semination of information, arguments, appeals, and
“Under JCS 155/11/D, MO activities should confine themselves to
means operating within or purporting to operate within enemy or
enemy-occupied territory, and should avoid borderline activities
such as leaflets which echo official United Nations propaganda
themes, even when these leaflets are unlabelled and might be
attributed to subversive groups in the target country.
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instructions by mass means of communications (e.g.,
radio, press, graphics, motion pictures, official pro-
nouncements) on behalf of or clearly emanating from
any official or semi-official United Nations agency.
This function is delegated to the Office of War In-
formation. :
(2) Economic pressures within the jurisdiction of
the Foreign Economic Administration.
(3) Official diplomatic pressures, which are the
formal and informal influences exerted through the
medium of our regularly constituted State Depart-
ment, MO may, however, give unorthodox support to
State Department policies and activities when such
support is desired and requested by that Department.
5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
a. Focusinc oN PrincipaL LEaDERS AND LIMITED
. GROUPS
(1) Since the implements employed by MO are
not mass means of communication, its operations are
focused on principal leaders and special groups who
exert, or are capable of exerting, real influence on and
control of larger masses of people. These leaders are
key enemy military and naval personnel, adminis-
trators, civil leaders, quislings, diplomats, and poten-
tial leaders of resistance. The groups are special elite
groups, important segments of the armed forces, such
as, Say, naval personnel, soldiers in isolated areas, or
soldiers with low morale in certain combat sectors,
_collaborationists, partisan groups, special political,
religious, labor or other organizations, and any dis-
affected group in the population whose grievances
and vulnerabilities can be exploited.
(2) The object is, therefore, to concentrate opera-
tions on those critical persons and groups whose sub-
version or cooperation will produce the most telling
effects on large masses. Thus, all morale operations
must be carefully “tailored” for the particular per-
sons or groups that are its special targets. Open
propaganda methods of wide dissemination and fre-
quent repetition of such appeals as countering enemy
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propaganda or building up general good-will for the
United States are not within the scope of MO stra-
tegic services.
b. CoORDINATION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS
(1) MO engages in operations that further actual
or planned military operations. In areas of an active
military offensive, MO focuses its operations on Key
enemy military and collaborationist personnel and
on specific groups of people at specific times when
* * and at places where its work will be of greatest assist-
ance to our forces.
(2) Similarly, in enemy areas where military ac-
tion is likely to occur, especially in rear areas of enemy
command, communication, supply and transport, MO
directs its activities toward critical military or civil-
ian leaders and other persons in specific places where
disruption of enemy activity or support of our own
projected military action will have the greatest effect.
Ct. COLLABORATION WITH UNDERGROUND NETWORKS
In order to agsist in the promotion of resistance
and revolt among people of enemy-occupied and con-
trolled territory and to discredit collaborationists, MO
will utilize, so far as is practicable, existing underground
networks for MO activities.
d. COOPERATION WITH OTHER BRANCHES OF OSS anp
witH ANALOGOUS ALLIED ACTIVITY
MO works in close liaison with SO and SI and allied
networks of operatives and agents, and cooperates when-
ever possible in joint action. MO tasks in particular
areas may be carried out by specially trained MO opera-
tives and agents or by other OSS personnel under MO
direction, as the situation requires.
SECTION II—ORGANIZATION
6. GENERAL
The organizations within OSS, Washington and in
the field, charged with the conduct of morale operations
are the following:
a. MO Branch, OSS, Washington, D. C.;
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‘b. MO Section, a part of the Strategic Services field
«base within a theater;
¢. MO Section, a part of the Strategic Services base
within a neutral area;
‘d. Field operating personnel, both within theaters
and neutral areas.
"it. MO BRANCH, WASHINGTON
; The Morale Operations Branch, Washington, a part
of Strategic Services Operations, is responsible for MO
planning, administration, and special MO indoctrination
of personnel, and for recruitment and procurement, all
through established OSS channels.
’ 8. FIELD ORGANIZATION
&. ORGANIZATION WITHIN THEATERS
(1) In each theater of operations MO activities
are directed by the MO Section Officer under the con-
trol of the Strategic Services Officer, or any general
*Operations Officer designated by the Strategic Serv-
‘jces Officer. In some theaters, the theater commander
may designate a special unit for deceptive propa-
- ganda and combat subversive operations, and call on
OSS to assign to it MO personnel, supplies, and equip-
ment.
(2) The MO Section Officer is responsible to
the Strategic Services Officer for the procurement
through established channels of all MO supplies and
equipment in his theater, the training and direction
_ of all MO’ personnel recruited in the theater, and the
administration of all MO personnel dispatched to the
.. field from Washington but not destined for opera-
- tions in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. He is
responsible to the Strategic Services Officer for the
direction of and policies and plans governing the
operations of MO operatives and agents operating in
e pate or enemy-occupied areas.
.(3) The following are suggested as assistants to -
the ‘MO Section Officer:
(a) Staff Officers
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The Staff Officers are located in the field
headquarters and may include the following
persons:
(1) The Deputy Section Officer is assist-
ant to the Section Officer and assumes charge
in the absence of his superior.
(2) Liaison Officers maintain active con-
tacts with other branches of OSS, and with
other U.S. and Allied agencies conducting
analogous activities.
(3) Desk Officers are responsible for plans
and operations within their respective desig-
nated regions.
(4) The Personnel Officer and such
assistants as he may require to recruit, pro-
cess, and train agents, operatives, and tech-
nicians within the theater.
(b) Technicians and Experts
These will include persons with special
training in the use of MO technical instruments
as required.
(c) Field Operatives and Agents
Field Operatives and Agents will be pro-
cured and utilized for field operations, both at the
base and behind enemy lines.
b. ORGANIZATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
(1) In neutral countries, MO personnel will be
under the supervision of an MO Section Chief, who
will be under the control of the Chief of OSS Mission.
(2) For reasons of security and to avoid inter-
fering with the local requirements of the State De-
partment, the strength of MO personnel should be
kept to the smallest number necessary for the effec-
tive execution of approved MO programs.
(3) In view of the critical importance of cover in
neutral countries, the cover of each authorized per-
son conducting morale operations should be approved
in accordance with OSS procedure for cover.
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SECTION III—SELECTION AND TRAINING
9, RESPONSIBILITIES
The MO Branch is responsible for indicating its re-
quirements for personnel, and, subject to OSS regulations,
assists the Services Branches in their selection. It is further
responsible for indicating to the Schools and Training
Branch the types of special training required for MO
personnel.
10. MO BRANCH OF OSS, WASHINGTON
Personnel of the MO Branch at Washington should
have wide and proven experience in the theory and prac-
tice of influencing human beings, possessing, if possible,
foreign experience and executive and planning ability. The
Chief of the MO Branch arranges for such special training
of this staff as is necessary.
11, FIELD PERSONNEL
Requirements for field personnel vary, depending
upon the duties and functions of the persons in question.
In all instances due regard for security will be observed.
The following is an indication of the requirements of each
type of MO personnel: :
a. Fretp HEADQUARTERS STAFF OFFICERS
These men should be reliable persons, of United
States citizenship, having demonstrated proficiency in
administrative affairs and the theory and practice of
influencing human beings. They should be familiar with
the area in which they are to work but do not neces-
sarily have to have excellent linguistic qualifications.
They are not required to enfer occupied or enemy ter-
ritories.
b. ExPERTS AND TECHNICIANS
These persons should be individuals usually of
United States citizenship having requisite knowledge
and skill to service, maintain, and operate the required
MO implements.
c. FIELD OPERATIVES AND AGENTS
These men should be reliable persons, not always
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of United States citizenship. They must possess lin-
guistic qualifications and a detailed knowledge of the
people and area in which they work. Normally they
serve in enemy or enemy-occupied territories, but may
also be called upon to serve at the base, either within
theaters or neutral areas.
12. TRAINING OF FIELD PERSONNEL
The training of field personnel both in Washington
and in the field includes the regular Strategic Services
basic course in secret intelligence and special operations.
In addition, this personnel receives special training in
morale operations. This training covers:
a. Purposes and organization of MO;
b. Principles of strategic and tactical planning of
MO tasks;
c. Methods of clandestine reproduction media, e.g.,
freedom stations, false printing;
. Methods of morale subversion;
Sources and analysis of current intelligence;
Irth 10 [2
Practice on field problems.
Special instruction and training dealing with the
area of their activities will be given to all field personnel
called upon to operate under cover.
SECTION IV— COORDINATION OF MO FIELD
ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER SERVICES
13. COLLABORATION IN DETAILED PLANNING
a. Morale operations will be most effective when they
are planned as part of common campaigns conducted by
various underground services and integrated closely
with actual or planned military operations and Allied
strategy.
b. The detailed plans prepared by the MO Section
Officer should therefore be worked out through the
closest liaison with SO, SI, the Allied underground
services, representatives of native underground groups,
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and with military and naval representatives. The stra-
tegic services officer facilitates, checks, and approves
- such coordinated plans.
~«= @ Where specific military operations are contem-
plated, particular attention is paid to planning MO tasks
in support of them. In addition, tasks which facilitate
and complement the work of SO and SI are emphasized.
The MO planner may be able to assist in the planning
of SO and SI missions by drawing attention to the
specific support that MO can render through bribery,
rumor-spreading, use of freedom stations and false
' pamphlets, forged documents, direct personal contacts.
14. COLLABORATION IN OPERATIONS
a. Strategic Services operations out of field head-
quarters are governed by the nature of the problem that
confronts the strategic services officer and by the size
and training of the personnel available to him. Morale
operations are treated as one integral part of the whole
OSS program. When an MO task is to be conducted,
and when there are properly placed and trained MO
operatives and agents available to do it, these will be
used. If a projected task involves physical operations or
secret intelligence work, MO men may be given special
SO and SI training in order to do the job. Similarly,
when an MO task can be best accomplished by SO or
SI men without jeopardizing their own work, these men
may be given special MO training if necessary and as-
- signed to the job.
. bk, Whenever SO or SI missions, networks, or contacts
. _ are established in a territory, MO should, whenever ad-
visable, operate through them. Similarly, if Allied net-
works or trustworthy representatives of reliable native
underground groups are available and willing to cooper-
ate, these should be employed to do MO work.
c. When specific MO tasks require it or when the
- theater commander requests it, close collaboration with
“United States or Allied propaganda agencies in the field
' should be arranged.
15. RELATIONSHIPS AND LIAISON
a. Though MO field activities are under the direction
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and control of the strategic services officer, the closest
relationship between MO Branch, Washington and the
MO Field Sections is necessary. Through appropriate
channels, the MO Section Officer will report to Wash-
ington on his needs, his recommendations, and on the
course of his operations. In turn, he will receive from
the Director of Strategic Services, Washington, supplies
and services which he may require, strategic services
programs, plans, and implementation studies, MO cam-
paigns and projects for his consideration, reports on
morale operations conducted in other theaters, and
reports on. morale operations conducted directly out of
Washington with which his own work should be coor-
dinated.
b. Liaison with intelligence services at the base in the
field is essential to effective MO field operations. This
is particularly important for R&A and SI which should
be informed as to the needs of MO.
16. COMMUNICATIONS
All communications between MO personnel, both in
the field and from the field to Washington headquarters,
‘ will be through the regularly established communication
system.
SECTION V— IMPLEMENTS
17. TYPES
The major implements employed in subversive work
are: direct personal contact by trained personnel and
agents, bribery and blackmail, rumors, false leaflets, pam-
phlets and graphics, freedom stations, forgeries. The kinds
of operations implemented by these instruments are given
in Section VII on OPERATIONS.
18. GENERAL CHANNELS
a. For the purpose of carrying out various morale
operations, the MO representative at an Allied or neu-
tral base will make use of specially trained SS agents.
However, such agents will be far too few in number to
execute all the operations that the MO representative
will desire to initiate. It will be necessary to enlist the
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aid of various individuals and organizations not in OSS
employ but strategically placed and willing to cooperate.
In many cases, contacts can be made in Allied or neutral
territory; in other cases it will be necessary for agents
in enemy territory to make the contacts.
b. UNDERGROUND REPRESENTATIVES—Selected person-
nel of underground groups afford the best means of
conducting morale operations, such as discrediting
collaborationists, winning hostile elements, and pro-
moting discord and revolt among the population. Hence
the closest cooperation is desired. OSS should attempt to
comply with reasonable requests from underground
leaders for equipment, funds, and moral support, in
order that a policy of friendly reciprocity may be
established.
¢, GOVERNMENTS-IN EXILE—Closely related to under-
ground movements are the governments in exile which
maintain. numerous contacts with the home country;
their organizations can be used, where practicable and
feasible, for promotion of morale operations. Caution
must be exercised, however; certain of the governments
in exile have strong political aspirations and may at-
tempt to adapt MO plans to their own purposes. Liaison
with such governments in exile should be controlled by
the strategic services officer.
d. OTHER U.S. sGENcIES — The State Department,
OWI, FEA, the Treasury Department, or the CIAA may
be in a strategic position, particularly in neutral coun-
tries to provide MO with considerable support in the
execution of plans.
_ @, OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS—In certain areas of
the world other members of the United Nations will be in
an advantageous position for morale operations, and
much time and labor can be saved by collaboration with
agencies of these governments.
f. LABor ORGANIZATIONS—Labor organizations have
many connections in enemy territory and in general are
among the most vigorous opponents of the enemy
regimes. Former labor organizations which have been
suppressed by the enemy may still retain remnants of
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organization that can be used. For example, pre-war
trade unions in occupied Europe, though suppressed,
may still operate as clandestine organizations. Labor
organizations have useful contacts with foreign as well
as native laborers in enemy territories.
g. RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS—Religious groups, such
as Catholics in Germany, Buddhists in Burma, Protes-
tants in Japan, if properly approached may provide effec-
tive assistance for morale operations. Clerics have a high
degree of mobility and are less harshly treated by politi-
cal authorities than ordinary citizens.
h. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS—The Communists and
the Social Democrats have hitherto been the most active
political organizations opposing the enemy within his
territory.
i, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS — Professional people
are, in general, ideologically opposed to the enemy. Dur-
ing the last war, an effective subversive organization in
Belgium was composed of professional people (it was
run by a university professor and an engineer). Profes-
sional classes have numerous international connections
and are strategically located.
j. BusINEss oRGANIZATIONS — Business organizations
with branches in enemy territory may still retain con-
nections that can be exploited. This is especially true of
business organizations located in neutral countries. The
“commercial traveler” is in an especially favorable posi-
tion for morale operations.
k. FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS — Attempts should be
made to enlist the cooperation of international fraternal
organizations, like the Masons, which may be active in
the enemy’s territory and opposed to him.
1. NEWSPAPERS AND NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS—AS-
sistance in spreading rumors and making “plants” may
be obtained from newspapers and newspaper correspond-
ents, especially in rfeutral and Allied countries, where
stories may be published that will work their way into
enemy territory.
m. SAILors — Sailors from neutral countries whose
‘ships touch enemy ports are particularly useful for
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spreading rumors and engaging in other subversive
--work. Contact with sailors in general can most usefully
-be established through trade organizations.
n, TRAVELERS—Travelers between enemy.and neutral
or Allied and neutral territories are one of our most com-
mon sources of intelligence; it should also be possible
~ to enlist the aid of certain of these travelers in MO
activities.
_ 0, FRIENDS AND RELATIVES—The frignds and relatives
"of Civilians and soldiers in enemy territory may provide a
channel for morale operations in the letters they write
; re territory.
. CIVILIANS IN OCCUPIED AREAS — Sympathetic civil-
Me ians in areas occupied by Allied troops may be allowed to
_ penetrate the lines into enemy territory and carry out
morale operations there.
19. PERSONAL CONTACT
a. Personal contact is the physical meeting or com-
munication between agents, usually operating under
cover, and other persons whose participation in morale
operations is desired. The persons contacted are usually
_ Individuals in key positions, such as leaders or potential
leaders of partisan, dissident, or enemy satellite groups,
or any persons whose acts can have important morale-
disrupting effects on the enemy.
__b, The objective in most instances is to approach
persons who can in turn influence others. The purpose is
to swing key personnel over to achieving greater coop-
eration with resistance groups, to swing over fence-
sitters and wavering personnel in enemy or satellite
~ areas, to intimidate and terrorize key enemy figures or
: active ‘collaborationists.
_- ¢ The best technique, whenever it can be used, is
» to employ persuasion backed up by promises of supplies.
. Work of this sort involves appeals to convictions, favors,
- Status pressures, exchange of information, payment of
_ legitimate expenses.
~ --d. A detailed ‘“Who’s Who” for the area of operations
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is essential intelligence for this work. Such a compila-
tion requires a full and detailed list of key native person-
alities — pro-enemy leaders, pro-Allied leaders, fence-
‘sitters, collaborationists, pseudo-collaborationists, and
key figures in organizations in the area. The amount of
prestige and influence of each person should be ap-
praised, and a thoroughly worked out description of his
background, his strengths and vulnerabilities should be
included.
e. Cover, when used in personal contacts, requires
the most careful planning. The operative or agent
should not only be trained in the principles of cover,
and be able to choose one that will protect him from
discovery —he should also be “tailored” for the most
effective approach fo the person to be contacted. He
should have the right personality, intelligence, exper-
ience, and “contacts” acceptable to the person. The
special customs of the area for meeting and negotiating
with individuals should not be violated.
20. RUMORS
a. A rumor is an unauthenticated, unofficial story
or report, represented and transmitted as fact. Two broad
types of rumors can be differentiated: subversive rumors
which play upon the emotions and attitudes of their
audience for the purpose of undermining morale; and
rumors which seek primarily to mislead and deceive.
b. Subversive rumors against the enemy are used
to exploit the fear and anxiety of those who have begun
to lose confidence in military success; to instill false
optimism and over-confidence which will lead to dis-
illusionment; to cause popular antagonism to civil and
military leaders; to create division among racial, politi-
cal, religious, and military groups within a country, and
between the peoples of allied countries; to cause enemy
populations to distrust their own news sources; to lead
civilian populations to precipitate financial, food, and
other crises by panicky reactions; and to create confu-
sion and dismay by presenting a welter of contradictory
reports.
c. In addition to the above, rumors may be used to
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cause diversionary or impotent enemy action, by reveal-
ing false information about our plans and capabilities.
d. The degree to which rumors can achieve such re-
sults is determined largely by: (1) the course of military
events; (2) the effectiveness of other Allied propaganda
media; (3) the effectiveness of enemy propaganda and
enemy repressive measures; (4) the emotional state of
the audience; and (5) the artfulness and suitability of
the rumors in terms of the audiences’ background and
information. Rarely can they by themselves change
basic attitudes. Their function is to confirm suspicions
and beliefs already latent; to give sense and direction to
fears, resentménts, or hopes that have been built up by
more materialistic causes; to tip the balance when
public opinion is in a precarious state.
e. Rumor TARGETS
The following groups are most susceptible to
rumors:
(1) Groups or classes that have become fearful
and anxious about their personal well-being. Rumors
should tend to confirm the pessimistic expectations
of the group involved.
(2) Groups or classes that have become unrealis-
tically over-confident or hopeful. Rumors should
focus on “information” which supports their hopes,
which is consistent with information available to
them, but which will ultimately produce disillusion-
ment.
(3) Groups or classes that are suspicious of or
hate other groups or leaders. Rumors directed against
such groups should focus on “information” that
justifies and increases hostility.
(4) Groups or classes whose monotonous, hum-
drum lives make them particularly susceptible to
fantasy; for example, men in prisons, army camps.
(5) Highly religious groups.
(6) Primitive, highly superstitious groups whose
Aaive, traditional beliefs can be exploited.
(7) Groups with guilty feelings who fear retribu-
tion.
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(8) Special groups that lack information either
aS a result of censorship, discredited propaganda,
physical isolation, or illiteracy.
f. PROPERTIES oF A Goop Rumor
A good rumor is one which will spread widely in
a form close to that of the original story. Probably the
main factor determining whether it catches on is the
degree to which it is adapted for the state of mind of
the audience. In addition, successful rumors embody
most of the following qualities:
(1) Plausibility. A plausible rumor is tied to some
known facts, yet incapable of total verification. It
may exaggerate, but it stops short of the incredible.
It frequently appears as an “inside” story.
(2) Simplicity. A good rumor uses only one
central idea as a core. Its basic message is simple
and thus easy to remember.
(3) Suitability to task. To summarize opinions or
attitudes which are already widely accepted, slogan-
type rumors are best. (“England will fight to the
last Frenchman”). To introduce “information”
which will help build up new attitudes, however,
narrative-type rumors are best (e.g., rumors which
“prove” that Hitler is mentally ill).
(4) Vividness. Regardless of length or type,
rumors which stimulate clear-cut mental pictures
with strong emotional content are likely to be most
effective.
(5) Suggestiveness. The type of rumor which
merely hints or suggests something instead of stating
it is well adapted to spreading fear and doubt. The
listener should always be allowed to formulate his
own conclusions. ?
(6) Concreteness. The more concrete and precise
a rumor, the less likely it is to become distorted in
transmission.
g. Using Rumor CHANNELS
(1) To do an effective job of dissemination, a
thorough and systematic survey must first be made of
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all possible channels. The form and content of a
- rumor should then be adapted to the particular out-
lets through which they are to be launched. For
example, a rumor to be spread via longshoremen’s
circles might have a bit of pornography as its core.
The several channels should be regularly re-examined
to determine whether maximum circulation is being
achieved.
(2) Rumor-mongers should be natives of the terri-
tory where the rumors are to be spread. For reasons
of security, it is important that the rumor-monger
should be discreet. The rumor should be spoken
‘before an innocent but talkative person (e.g., barber,
bartender) who will unconsciously spread the desired
rumor.
(3) Rumors can also be initiated by planting
material in newspapers, by writing provocative
letters containing a purposive message, leaving the
letters lying about where people will pick them up
when they are alone, by use of denials, and by studied
indiscretion.
h. CoorpinatTion AND TIMING
‘There are no inflexible rules as to whether rumors
‘should precede or follow up other subversive implements
-in the execution of a given campaign. Rumors fre-
quently prepare the ground for the later use of sub-
versive pamphlets, for personal recruiting, and for open
propaganda broadcasts and leaflets. In other instances,
as, for example, following SO demolition, rumors may be
used most effectively to exploit and exaggerate results
- achieved. To catch on, rumors must aisually exploit the
momentary focus of public interest. Hence, one rule of
timing is always applicable: there must be as little time-
lapse as possible between the provoking event and the
launching of the rumor.
1, SpEecIAL Uses oF Rumors IN CONNECTION WITH
Miunirary Operations (to be employed only as directed
by the theater commander).
The most effective way in which rumors can be
used in direct connection with military operations is
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in the creation of panic and confusion among civilian
. populations and enemy troops. Fright rumors can be
used to direct civilian refugees into the path of a fleeing
enemy and thus block his retreat. They can be used
against enemy forces to induce surrender. Rumors
may also be employed to foster or allay guilt, ie., by
attributing violence or atrocities to enemy forces or to
our own, as the situation may require. Following mili-
tary action by our forces, they can be used to create
fear and anxiety by exaggerating the magnitude of
damage done. They have also been used effectively fol-
lowing military action to cause the enemy to release,
through refutation, information of value to our intelli-
gence services.
j. Rumor INTELLIGENCE
The basis for good rumors is accurate, detailed
intelligence. The rumor planner and the rumor operator
must keep the closest possible check at all times on the
character of the group they are trying to affect, on
their traditions, circumstances, sentiments, and in-
terests, and on contemporary happenings and develop-
ments. It is essential to have intelligence on what the
audience knows and what it does not know, on what
it fears and hopes for, on what its morale is at any given
time, on what kinds of rumors have “caught on” in
the past in the particular area. In many cases, the most
effective rumor policy will be to spread further rumors
that have arisen spontaneously in enemy territory.
21. FALSE LEAFLETS, PAMPHLETS, AND GRAPHICS
a. This type of implement refers to printed, mimeo-
graphed or writjen literature and graphics distributed
secretly in enemy territory and under concealed spon-
sorship. This includes chain and, other anonymous
letters, chalking symbols and messages on walls. The
false pamphlet sponsored by a belligerent nation at-
tempts to convey the impression that it is a bona fide
message from the people’s own fellow country-men who
are sharing the same risks as the rest of the population
and have similar aspirations, aims, and goals.
b. An appeal to nationalistic attitudes is more effec-
tive when made by the nationals of the group than when
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made by another nation which has its own nationalistic
axe to grind. Likewise, incitement to action or revolt
coming from a representative of an aggrieved group is
more effective than such incitement coming from an
“outsider.” Whenever an attempt is made to assure
potential sympathizers that they would not be alone in
resistance activities, such assurance comes better from a
group which is presumably carrying on the same activi-
ties under the same conditions and taking the same
risks.
c. Uses or Fause LEAFLETS
(1) In general, the false leaflet can be used for
dissemination of “forbidden” news, spreading of
rumors, exposing nefarious activities of enemy offi-
cials and collaborationists, giving reassurances to
potential sympathizers, instructing in sabotage, in-
citing to subversive activities, and preparing the
populace for cooperation with invading troops. The
false leaflet can be capitalized upon by propaganda
agencies in popularizing a passive resistance cam-
paign (such as the “V” campaign or the “1918”
campaign). It may be desirable to have the campaign
“planted” via false pamphlets. This “spontaneous”
activity can then be picked up by the authorized
propaganda agencies.
(2) The false pamphlet can be effectively used to
make the enemy uneasy about the loyalty of the
people in the territory. The very existence of clandes-
tine pamphlets is “evidence” of underground activity.
d. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND LIMITING FACTORS
(1) While false literature ostensibly originates in
enemy-occupied territory, it is frequently printed in
neutral or Allied countries adjacent to the countries
for which it is destined. This immediately raises im-
portant questions of (a) authenticity, (b) procure-
ment of supplies, (c) transportation and distribution,
(d) timing, and (e) security.
(2) The kind of paper, typography, ink, diction,
colloquial expressions, and general composition
should be indigenous to the country. That necessi-
tates having, in the Allied or neutral country, the
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proper supplies and equipment for printing the
pamphlets, and the personnel to compose the pam-
phlets; or providing natives within enemy territory
with proper supplies, equipment, and instruction in
clandestine methods of reproduction.
(3) The problem of distribution is two-fold: first,
the pamphlets, cuts, mats, and other supplies often
must be smuggled into the enemy-held country by
boat, submarine, plane, or agent; and second, the
pamphlets must be distributed to the ultimate con-
sumer within that country. The simplest method of
distribution — scattering pamphlets from Allied
planes — is not feasible since this would immediately
betray the real origin of the pamphlets. The airplane,
however, may be used to make pre-arranged whole-
Sale deliveries to resistance groups who would then
be responsible for retail distribution. In any event,
distribution to the final consumer requires a network
manned by native personnel in the country.
e. TIMING
In the case of pamphlets that are printed outside
the country, the transportation and distribution process
will frequently be a slow and dangerous one, and a con-
Siderable time will elapse between the period when a
pamphlet is printed and the moment it reaches the
intended reader. Therefore, such false leaflets cannot
be used to exploit events of immediate and temporary
importance.
f. SEcuRITY
(1) The problem of security is an important one
at every point of the process. The printing, whether
done externally or internally, must be kept secret
from enemy agents and even from the people to
whom the pamphlets are addressed, else the Allied
origin would be disclosed. The smuggling of pam-
phlets or supplies into enemy territory is extremely
hazardous and requires careful planning. Finally,
the internal distribution of the pamphlets endangers
the security of both the distributor and the reader.
(2) As a practical security aid, the pamphlet
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should preferably be small, probably not greater than
6 x 8 inches. This facilitates smuggling and distribu-
tion, and also tends to protect the recipient of the
pamphlet by making it much easier to hide. Not only
should the pamphlet be small, but the message itself,
whenever possible, should be brief. The message
should stress one point and suggest positive action.
(3) It is customary to conceal false pamphlets by
using the cover and format of a familiar enemy publi-
cation, such as a magazine, newspaper, or time-table;
and by inserting them in packaged goods, containers
of various sorts, books, magazines, and other pam-
phlets.
g. INTELLIGENCE
False pamphleteering can be successfully executed
only if based on accurate information regarding the
current attitudes and morale of the group for which it
is adapted. Various other types of expert information
will be necessary depending on the nature of the pam-
phlet. For example, a pamphlet that gives instructions
on sabotage must be based upon detailed technical and
regional knowledge.
h. CooRDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES
Several different agencies and types of personnel
must cooperate in false pamphleteering. MO’s function
is primarily that of writing and translating texts, and
directing distribution. The distribution of the pam-
phlets will usually be made by sympathizers and mem-
bers of underground groups in the country. The infor-
mation which goes into the pamphlet must be obtained
from every source possible, including SI, SO, FN, and
R&A. Natives of the country should be recruited by
MO for the technical job of composing the pamphlets
in order to insure authenticity in idiom and expression.
For special MO campaigns, false pamphleteers should
coordinate their activities with those of propaganda
agencies, within limits of security. False pamphlets that
urge sabotage or open revolt must be worked out under
coordination with the theater command.
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22. FREEDOM STATIONS
Various types of cover are used by freedom stations.
They may pose as: the organ of a subversive (freedom)
group within an enemy area; a regular official station of
the enemy; the special organ of an official enemy group
(Army, Navy, or party); the organ of an anonymous or
private group within enemy territory, not openly subver-
sive. Some freedom stations have no very definite cover at
all beyond that of being a freedom station run by a colorful
personality, the question of identity being left as a
mystery.
a. USES oF FREEDOM STATIONS
Freedom station transmissions can be used for the
following purposes:
(1) To spread demoralizing rumors among enemy
Soldiers and civilians;
(2) To encourage “patriotic” resistant groups
within enemy territory by acting as their spokesman;
(3) To stimulate and direct sabotage and subver-
sive activity;
(4) To make preparations for, and direct, popular
uprisings and pro-Allied activity on D-day;
(5) To terrorize collaborationists and Axis officials
by black-balling, giving the impression of a vast and
powerful underground;
(6) To divide the enemy group from group, or
nation from nation, by spreading divisive stories, by
posing as a representative of one group or nation and
condemning, insulting, ridiculing another group or
nation;
(7) To heckle enemy broadcasts.
b. ESTABLISHING A FREEDOM STATION
(1) In addition to technical experts, the staff of
a freedom station includes broadcasters who speak
the language of the area to which the transmissions
are beamed without a trace of foreign accent and
with full knowledge of current slang. Freedom
station broadcasters must appear to be typical repre-
sentatives of the intended audience.
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(2) Whether short or medium wave is to be used
depends upon the distance from transmitter to
audience (much greater distance with the same
power can be achieved by a short-wave transmitter)
and upon the type of receiving sets possessed by the
audience (in Europe medium-wave receiving sets are
much more common than short-wave). Mountainous
obstructions reduce the range of audibility. Short-
wave transmission is very good across water, very
poor across sand.
(3) Ordinarily a freedom station is permanently
located in friendly territory as close to the enemy
area as power supply, transportation, and political
problems will permit. The audience is gradually built
up. On occasion, it may be feasible to employ mobile
transmitters or captured enemy transmitters for
freedom station purposes.
c. INTELLIGENCE
A freedom station must have detailed, up-to-the-
minute intelligence. The best sources are: interviews
with travellers from enemy areas, interviews with pris-
oners of war, reports from agents in the field, censorship
material. Excellent intelligence is necessary because the
clandestine station pretends to be closely identified with
its audience, and to be broadcasting from within enemy
or enemy-occupied territory; and because much of the
audience appeal of subversive broadcasts depends upon
its ability to reveal intimate intelligence about person-
alities and local affairs. While unverifiable rumors may
be spread on occasion, it is important to hook all broad-
cast materials onto facts which can be verified by the
audience, thereby lending prestige to the medium and
making the rumors more credible.
d. AUDIENCE TECHNIQUES
Freedom stations employ various techniques to
obtain a larger listening audience such as:
(1) Emphasizing the very mystery and danger of
being a “Freedom Station,” changing frequencies
suddenly, or breaking off transmission and returning
at a later period;
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(2) Providing “inside dope” —nhaming names,
giving facts in detail, giving the impression of eye-
witness account;
(3) Using slang, vulgarity, and pornography
when consistent with cover, giving gossip and “dirt,”
e.g., describing the sexual life of prominent enemy
officials or their wives;
(4) Providing local color through news items,
songs;
(5) Making special group appeals to youth,
women, peasants, workers, Catholics, social demo-
crats;
(6) Selecting a domestic “enemy” or object of
hate (individual leader, political, social or ethnic
group), continually attacking him and blaming him
for all evils;
(7) Predicting military developments;
(8) Pretending to have a tremendous following,
appearing to address organized groups — ‘“com-
rades”;
(9) Using catchy titles, symbols, slogans, songs,
jokes;
(10) Providing news “scoops”;
(11) Playing incidental recorded music which will
catch “dial twisters”;
(12) Making broadcasts brief (10-15 minutes), so
that the danger to listeners will be minimized and the
chances of hearing a particular message maximized;
(13) Broadcasting on enemy domestic frequencies
during lulls, between programs, and pauses in
speeches during air raids, and shortly after enemy
radios shut down for the night, thus catching the
regular enemy audience. Since a single freedom sta-
tion program uses a transmitter only a small part of
the time, it is common to use the same transmitter for
several different programs, usually directed to differ-
ent audiences.
e. SECURITY
(1) The freedom station presents an unusual
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security problem. Extreme precaution must be taken
not to reveal its sponsorship or location. Nevertheless,
there is little hope that its general sponsorship and
location can be concealed from the enemy, who will
spot it through radio engineering methods, and
therefore it must be carefully concealed to prevent
bombing attacks. Furthermore, while enemy officials
may discover the general location and sponsorship,
the chances are that they will not reveal the informa-
tion to their own public, because it would only call
attention to the freedom station and possibly in-
crease its audience (there is no record of an enemy
country ever having “exposed” a freedom station).
(2) An additional security problem arises from
the fact that a freedom station is frequently so inde-
cent and deceitful that its exposure might arouse
public opinion in one’s own country and result in
public arguments on the moral issues involved.
(3) Special precautions must be taken that the
station does not present information which, in view
of its cover, it could not be expected to know; or infor-
mation which comes from a recognizable source.
f. COORDINATION WITH OTHER OPERATIONS
A freedom station may assist SO operations in the
following ways: by giving instructions on, and stimulat-
ing sabotage and guerrilla warfare; by acting as spokes-
man for and encouraging an underground movement;
by directing popular uprisings and pro-Allied activities
on D-day.
g. COORDINATION WITH MiILiTaRY OPERATIONS
A freedom station can assist the military in a
theater of war by spreading confusion, demoralizing,
and divisive rumors; by encouraging resistance to the
enemy; and by directing sympathetic groups on D-day.
h, LIMITATIONS OF THE FREEDOM STATION
The effectiveness of a freedom station is limited by
the following conditions: the power of the transmitter;
the number of receiving sets possessed by the audiences;
the willingness of individuals in enemy areas to risk
their lives listening to a forbidden radio program; the
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severity of punishment for listening; the trust which
listeners will put in a broadcast that professes to speak
in their interest but has no authority behind it. The
freedom station is also limited by the degree to which
the listeners take the station seriously and do not feel
they are being hoaxed. A few slips, such as out-of-date
slang, misinformation easily checked up, or failure to
maintain cover, will quickly show up a clandestine
broadcast.
23. FORGERY
a. “Forgery” is understood to mean the act of falsely
making or altering any kind of document.
b. Forgeries can be used for the following purposes:
to assist the theater commander, when requested, to
deceive and confuse the enemy regarding our military
intentions and capabilities; to harass and over-burden
the enemy administration; to implicate enemy person-
nel; to spread information and rumors designed to de-
moralize and divide the enemy; to arouse false hopes.
c. Forgeries are usually intended to fall into the
hands of enemy military personnel, enemy political
police, or groups who may possess definite suspicions
that will be confirmed by the forgery, and to implicate
enemy personnel and destroy confidence in leaders.
d. Forgeries will usually be the more effective if sup-
ported by rumors and other morale operations. Con-
versely, forgeries are particularly important for confirm-
ing operations initiated through other channels.
e. Extreme care must be taken to make the forgery
appear authentic — otherwise it may have a serious
boomerang effect. It must be technically perfect. It must
fall into the proper hands through apparently normal
channels. It must be consistent with facts known and
impressions currently held by the enemy, preferably
adding fuel to an already existing fire. Too many
forgeries will defeat the purpose — unless the purpose
is that of making all documents of the given kind
suspect. A poor forgery may not only expose an agent,
but may also expose and invalidate other more com-
petent forgeries.
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{f. TYPES OF FORGERIES
Any kind of written communication can be forged.
The following are common types: (1) propaganda docu-
ments, ostensibly designed to increase the morale of the
enemy or improve his relations with an enemy ally, but
actually written in such a way that an opposite effect
will be achieved; (2) periodicals, which imitate enemy
periodicals and convey misleading or morale-disturbing
information; (3) business documents, using letterheads
or other business forms of either enemy, Allied or
neutral firms, and filled out with misleading informa-
tion; (4) cables, either Allied or enemy; (5) canards,
which are extravagant reports or documents circulated
for the purpose of deluding large sections of the public;
and (6) letters of all kinds. In addition to the above,
upon request of the military authorities, the Com-
mander can be assisted by forging military documents,
which include fake enemy military documents, especial-
ly fake orders; and fake Allied military documents, espe-
cially documents containing false intelligence on Allied
plans and capabilities.
g. IncriminaTInG DoCUMENTS
(1) Incriminating forgeries, especially letters, are
prepared to cast suspicion upon selected enemy or
collaborationist personnel actually loyal to the
enemy. Letters may be sent to the individual in ques-
tion from a neutral country and be incriminating by
virtue of the implications of their contents when in-
tercepted by enemy censors; they may be sent from
one neutral country to another and be intercepted
when passing through enemy territory; they may be
sent to enemy police, party or military officials from a
neutral country, and contain direct charges; they
may be sent anonymously from within enemy terri-
tory to police, party or military officials and contain
direct charges; or they may be left in spots where
enemy officers will “discover” them. The latter type
is dangerous, however, unless expertly done (prefer-
ably by pasting together words from newspapers)
because police efforts will doubtless be made to dis-
cover the writer.
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(2) Incriminating documents are often designed
merely to harass and over-burden the enemy secret
police. If supported by other evidence, they may,
however, succeed in causing liquidation of undesir-
able persons although this is a result that should not
be anticipated unless circumstances are very favor-
able and the case is built up with the greatest skill.
Additional results of incriminating documents may
be resentment against the secret police on the part
of individuals investigated (particularly of army
officers), and the slackening of secret police investi-
gation of really disloyal personnel, should a number
of suspect individuals turn out to be loyal and cause
embarrassment to the secret police.
(a) Targets. Collaborationists provide good
targets because enemy police are more likely to be
suspicious of these individuals than of their own
people. Certain collaborationists have, in fact,
turned out to be really working for the Allies. For
this reason extreme care must be taken in select-
ing the target. One must be absolutely sure that
he is in fact a quisling. A thorough and accurate
intelligence report must therefore be first obtained
on each potential target.
(b) Army or navy officers are usually good tar-
gets in view of the internal discord that would be
created by a secret police investigation.
(c) Officials of enemy-allied or satellite nations,
usually suspect in the eyes of the enemy, make
good targets. Only those known definitely to be
enemy sympathizers should be concentrated on.
(d) If a forged document is directed against a
party official, he should ordinarily not be so high
in rank that the lower officials will be afraid to do
anything about it, or will refuse to believe it.
(e) The incriminating case. The offense
charged or implied should be serious enough to
be worthy of secret police attention. It should be
consistent with the known past of the accused. For
example, a man of wealth, particularly one who
has often dealt with foreign firms, would be a most
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suitable person to implicate as having concealed
funds in a neutral country. A direct accusation
should be accompanied by several correct cor-
roborating circumstances. A mere general charge
that X is really not a quisling but an Allied agent
is likely to receive little attention, but a statement
of true particulars of X’s whereabouts and actions
on a certain day on which he is alleged to have
acted treasonably will produce action.
(f) A letter of accusation should be written in
the way in which the purported sender would be
expected to write. If, for example, it purports to
come from an Argentine banker and to acknowl-
edge to a Swiss banker the receipt of funds for the
account of a French client, ordinary commercial
language should be used. The accusation should -
not be so subtly concealed that the censor or other
intended reader will fail to discover it. A number
of incriminating letters accusing different people
should not be sent from the same source in the
same style, with the same paper.
24. BRIBERY AND BLACKMAIL
a. Bribery and blackmail, while in many cases ex-
tremely effective, must be used with great caution.
Unless done skillfully, they may result in exposure of
the operator. This is especially true for bribery, since the
art of double-crossing is an ancient one, and the bribed
individual is apt to be an unscrupulous person willing
to work for either side.
b. Bribery and blackmail must be adjusted to the
social customs and expectations of the recipient. In
some areas of the world (particularly in the East) and
among some classes of people, bribery is almost as com-
mon as tipping in the United States; in other areas and
among other classes of people, the mere suggestion of
bribery is highly insulting.
¢. Such individuals as political and military leaders,
newspaper editors and reporters, radio broadcasters,
heads of business houses, religious, professional and
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labor leaders, police, petty officials, customs officers, and
sentries are the most useful targets of bribery.
d. Usss oF BRIBERY
(1) In rare instances, bribery may be effective in
accomplishing important strategic secret diplomatic
acts, especially in enemy satellite countries (see para-
graph 33-e). Typically, bribery is used to aid in
carrying out less ambitious operations. Thus, for
the purpose of spreading rumors, it may be desirable,
especially in neutral areas, to bribe newspaper men
or radio announcers to plant the rumors in news-
papers or in broadcasts. Bribing of police officials may
facilitate the creation of an “incident” or riot.
(2) In some cases, bribery can, by itself, achieve
certain MO objectives. Thus by judicious bribing of
local leaders of various enemy or fence-sitting politi-
cal, religious, labor or professional groups, the group
may be induced to engage in subversive work — or
by selective bribing of such officials, dissension might
be created in the rank of the organization. Successful
bribery of an enemy or collaborationist official fol-
lowed by exposure to the enemy authorities can also
be used to discredit or neutralize the effectiveness of
such officials and create doubt and suspicion of all
officials.
é. OPERATION OF BRIBERY
(1) It is often desirable for the first services pur-
chased to be of a minor character, and one not in-
volving great risk on his part. Once the initial bribe
has been accepted, and evidence of such bribery has
been obtained, the demands can become successively
greater. Where possible, the “reward” or bribe should
also be of such a nature as to become increasingly
indispensable to the recipient.
(2) In many cases money may be less effective
than goods or services, particularly in areas where
certain goods and services are relatively inaccessible
while money is plentiful. The following may be useful
depending on the needs and susceptibilities of the
recipient: food, medicines, drugs (this may involve
first inducing a dependency in the individual upon a
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drug), clothes, liquor, employment, escape to neutral
countries, transportation of letters to friends and
relatives outside, release of relatives or recipient from
prison, protection, business tips, social and political
favors, especially aid to the recipient’s family.
(3) Indirect or covert bribery may be used where
it will reduce the danger of exposure and avoid the
possibility of insulting the recipient. Covert bribery
involves the use of such techniques as the following:
selling goods below their value; buying goods above
their value; losing to the recipient at gambling;
making unwinnable bets with him; presenting him
with expensive gifts; making heavy “loans”; grant-
ing monopolistic rights to certain revenues, products
or services; establishing “philanthropic” organiza-
tions as fronts; subsidizing corporations.
f. Typr oF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED
To carry through successful bribery it is essential
to have full intelligence on the character of the recipient
—his needs, weaknesses, grievances, fears, hopes, hon-
esty, and integrity. What he feels deprived of in the way
of goods and services should be known. Closest collab-
oration with X-2 should be maintained.
g. BLACKMAIL
(1) Blackmail is directed against the same targets
and can be used for the same purposes as bribery. It
differs from bribery in that threats, rather than re-
wards, are used to induce action. They are ordinarily
threats to divulge information about the individual
which would cause him serious harm, socially, politi-
cally, or physically. This information can be based on
acts committed by the individual in the past, acts
now being committed, acts which the individual
believes he has commited, or acts which he has not
in fact committed but for which evidence is planted
against him.
(2) Threats to reveal infractions of rules —
especially military regulations — constitute a good
hold on a man. In wartime, regulations are so numer-
ous, complex, and severe, that it is difficult for any-
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one not to break some of them, or to fear one has
broken them.
(3) Blackmail is often a secondary stage of
bribery. After a man has accepted bribes, he is kept
in line by threats that his duplicity will be exposed;
or both may be used at the same time.
(4) The action demanded of the victim should be
consonant with the blackmail risk involved. That is,
care should be taken to see to it that the action de-
manded of him does not entail greater risks than the
consequences of exposure of his original ‘“misdeed.”
h. Type or INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED
(1) Blackmail requires intimate intelligence on
the man, his family, his friends, or his associates.
Documentary or photographic evidence is valuable.
(2) When incriminating information is difficult
to secure, or when no such information exists, it may
be possible either to create it or to plant it. A study
of the individual’s character should suggest special
vulnerabilities (drugs, alcohol, women, luxury,
power), which may be exploited and result in trans-
gressions. If this is not feasible, spurious documents,
and bits of “telltale evidence” can be used to build up
a case. The latter procedure, however, will be ex-
tremely difficult and dangerous. Closest collaboration
with X-2 should be maintained.
i, COORDINATION WITH OTHER OSS AGENCIES
Inasmuch as bribery and blackmail are two tech-
niques which will also be used by SO and SI, projected
operations should be checked with these branches. Fre-
quently an individual who has been successfully used
by one branch can be used by the other.
25. COORDINATION OF MO CHANNELS AND IMPLE-
MENTS
a. A morale operation will be the more effective if
_ several implements are used to carry it out. For example,
..@ rumor or an anti-Axis slogan may be planted in a
freedom station broadcast. A few days later it may be
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carried also in a false pamphlet. Through personal per-
suasion or possibly bribery, a newspaper in a neutral
capital picks it up. Evidence (forged) is discovered con-
firming it. Finally the propaganda radio picks up the
item.
b. Certain channels naturally supplement each
other. The same appeals can be made by freedom station
and false pamphlet. In fact, it is common for false pam-
phlet writers within enemy territory to obtain much of
their material from clandestine broadcasts. Bribery and
blackmail may be employed to facilitate rumor-spread-
ing and false pamphlet distribution. Forgeries will con-
firm suspicions about individuals initially raised by
freedom stations, false pamphlets, or rumors. And
conversely, a false pamphlet, for example, can photostat
and publicize an incriminating forged document.
c. When several implements are used to carry out an
MO project and when the project is developed through
the coordinated use of several implements and channels,
the operation is referred to as an MO “campaign”. The
most important projects should, if possible, be carried
out in this fashion.
SECTION VI— PLANNING
26. GENERAL
a. NOMENCLATURE
For convenience in planning, the meanings of
the following general terms are indicated below:
(1) Over-All Program for Strategic Services Ac-
tivities; a collection of objectives, in order of priority
(importance) within a theater or area.
(2) Objective; a main or controlling goal for ac-
complishment within a theater or area by strategic
services as set forth in an Over-all Program.
(3) Special Program for Strategic Services Ac-
tivities; a group of detailed missions, assigned to one
or more Strategic Services branches, designed to
accomplish an objective, having also a general state-
ment of the situation and the general methods of
accomplishment.
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(4) Mission; one or more subsidiary goals set
forth in a special program which together result in
the accomplishment of an objective, and are usually
assigned to one Strategic Services branch.
(5) Operational Plan; an amplification or elabo-
ration of a special program, containing in greater
detail the means of carrying out the specified activities.
(6) Task; a detailed operation, usually planned in
the field, directed toward the accomplishment of a
mission.
(7) Target; an individual place, establishment,
person, or individual which is involved in the accom-
plishment of a task or result desired.
(8) The Field; all areas outside of the United States
in which Strategic Services activities take place.
(9) Field Base; an OSS headquarters in the field,
designated by the name of the city in which it is
established, e.g. OSS Field Base, Cairo.
(10) Advanced or Sub-Base,; an additional base es-
tablished by and responsible to an OSS field base.
(11) Operative; an individual employed by and re-
sponsible to the OSS and assigned under special
programs to field activity.
(12) Agent; an individual recruited in the field who
is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by
a field or sub-base.
(13) Cover; an open status, assumed or bona fide,
which serves to conceal the secret activities of an
operative or agent.
(14) Cutout; a person who forms a communicating
link between two individuals, for security purposes.
(15) Resistance Groups; individuals associated to-
gether in enemy-held territory to injure the enemy
by any or all means short of military operations, e.g.,
by sabotage, espionage, non-cooperation.
(16) Guerrillas; an organized band of individuals in
enemy-held territory, indefinite as to number, which
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conducts against the enemy irregular operations
including those of a military or quasi-military nature.
b. SrratEcic Tasks
In deciding on the general MO strategy for a given
territory, the major subversive tasks most suitable to
the situation existing in the area are selected. Below
are listed the major tasks which may achieve. the MO
objectives within the areas cited in Section I, para-
graph 3.
(1) Within the enemy’s country
(a) Dividing the enemy.
(b) Inducing panic in enemy population.
(c) Strengthening the enemy civilians’ desire
for peace, and raising false hopes.
(d) Subverting enemy civilian populations
during a ground offensive.
(2) Within enemy occupied or controlled territory
(a) Promotion of resistance and _ revolt
against the enemy. ,
(b) Interfering with the enemy’s consolida-
tion and use of an occupied country’s capabilities.
(c) Producing civilian disorder in support of
military operations.
(d) Increasing terror, friction, and demoral-
ization among collaborationists.
(e) Provoking rebellion or a coup d@etat in a
satellite country or inducing its separation from
the Axis.
(3) Within other areas
(a) Establishing an MO section of a base ina
neutral country for operations in enemy and
enemy-dominated countries.
(b) Assisting the chief of the diplomatic mis-
sion in special work requested by him.
(4) Within the enemy armed forces, in all areas
7 , (a) Fostering rebelliousness within enemy
armed forces.
(b) Inducing surrender.
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(5) Within OSS, Washington and theaters
(a) Within OSS, Washington, over-all plan-
ning for and servicing of field operations.
(b) Assistance desired by the theater com-
mander.
27. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING
All plans prepared by MO must be for the purose of
attaining the purpose of the over-all program for a given
theater or area and of the special MO programs pertaining
thereto. In such inplementation the following general
principles should be observed:
a. SUITABLE OBJECTIVES — Successful planning and
execution of MO tasks require that specific MO objec-
tives be clearly delineated. These objectives are those
which, when fully achieved, produce the most damaging
morale disrupting effects on the enemy.
b. FEasipitiry — Only those MO tasks are planned
in which all the operations required to accomplish the
objectives are practical of execution with the means OSS
possesses or can reasonably expect to obtain from the
theater commander and other cooperating agencies or
media.
c. ACCEPTABILITY — All subversive operations should
lie within the scope of MO policy. as authorized, and
should justify the costs involved. Since MO activities
by their nature are deceptive and not attributable to
any official or semi-official United States or United
Nations agency, morale operations need not conform
to public statements of policy. However, they should
be so planned and executed as not to jeopardize United
States state of war policy.
d, OFFENSIVE — In general, MO tasks should consist
of aggressive, determined, continuous, and unrelieved
action against the enemy.
e. TIMING AND PLAcING—The military, and espe-
cially the political and social situation in which the
task is to be carried out, should be carefully studied and
the subversive action planned for the exact time when,
and place where, its total effect will be greatest.
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28. OVER-ALL MO PLANS
All subversive operations in a given territory should
be in conformity with an objective in a special program.
MO should prepare MO plans for the implementation of
these special programs and although no rigid form is
necessary for such a plan, the MO section of it should, in
conformity with the basic principles listed above, contain
the following:
a, Abrief statement of the missions in the special pro-
grams that MO is charged to accomplish.
b. A succinct survey of the situation, including only
data that has direct bearing on the MO tasks which will
carry out the stated missions. This survey would nor-
~ mally include summaries of the military situation, of
the capabilities of the enemy, and of the capabilities of
MO and its cooperating agencies and media.
c, A listing of the proposed tasks or courses of action
which will achieve the stated missions. If necessary,
order of priority should be given, and any timing or plac-
_ ing requirements. The cooperative relation of these tasks
- to military operations, to other strategic services opera-
tions, to subversive strategic plans of Allied partners,
and (when relevant) to MO plans in other territories
and theaters should be shown. It is to be assumed that
all the tasks have been checked for acceptability, but if -
any question is to be anticipated, a statement clearing
up the matter should be included.
_ @. A statement of requirements for the projected
tasks, including an indication that arrangements for
carrying out all the necessary operations have been
made.
e. If necessary, a statement of any important con-
tingencies that may seriously alter the plan, and how
these contingencies will be met.
29. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES
_ a. Tactics are the particular morale operations nec-
essary to carry out the general tasks laid down in the
over-all MO basic plan. Operational planning requires
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decisions on what specific tasks are to be engaged in,
precisely when and where the job is to be done, what
specific operatives, agents, collaborating persons are to
be employed, what particular persons or groups are the
objects of subversive action, and what implements are
necessary.
b. Originality, knowledge of the situation, enter-
prise, and practical judgment determine good tactics.
Nevertheless, specific courses of subversive action are
always more effective if governed by a few simple prin-
ciples. If these are ignored, results are often ineffective
or wasteful, if not disastrous.
c. The principles of strategy apply equally to tactics—
those of object, offensive, timing and placing, feasibility,
and acceptability. In addition, there are a few principles
dealing specifically with subversive tactics.
d. Most work of this kind involves inducing individu-
als or special groups to think, feel, and finally to act,
wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly, in a
desired manner. To get them to act requires inciting
them to act by so capitalizing on strong desires and
emotions that they see and feel real personal or group
advantages in acting, despite the personal danger in-
volved, and presenting the lines of action in the proper
way so they know clearly what should be done and find
it within their means to do it. Getting people to act is
not entirely a matter of intuition. A few broad principles
are known to practitioners:
(1) Simplicity — Proposed ideas or actions should
be simple and clear and be presented in a form easy
to remember.
(2) Plausibility and feasibility—Proposed ideas or
actions should be within the understanding of the
persons or groups approached; and the desired work
should be action they feel or are led to feel they can
actually carry out.
(3) Suggestion (especially in deception) — Pro-
posed ideas or actions are usually more effective when
presented by indirection, so that persons or groups
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are led to believe they have arrived at their own con-
. clusions, and that they voluntarily participate in the
work.
@. INCITEMENT AND INDUCEMENT—Many persons or
groups who will do effective MO work already have a
strong desire for action. Verbal appeals to their own
self-interests are likely to sound naive to them. They
need little incitement — what they need is encourage-
ment, guidance, and above all, support or subsidy.
Fence-sitters, collaborationists, and enemy personnel
with low morale can be induced to act subversively only
if strongly impelled to do so in their immediate or future
self-interest. It is necessary, therefore, to discover what
will impell them to act, and, in terms of these impelling
emotions and desires to use suggestion, bribery, or black-
' mail to induce action. In particular, the following
should be exploited:
(1) Fears, anxieties, hatreds, feelings of discrimi-
nation, grievances, and mysticisms.
(2) Hopes and desires for personal gain.
(3) Conceptions of right and wrong.
(4) Social position (prestige, face, vanity).
(5) Desire for personal security.
30. OPERATIONAL PLANS
a. The MO Section Officer should delegate staff per-
sonnel to draw up detailed plans for every important
MO tactical operation. These plans will show how the
projected morale operations implement the approved
special programs or directives based thereon.
b. These plans should be as detailed as possible, for
they constitute a blue-print of action. They should be
written, in order to insure that all important details
have been considered, to facilitate conferring with col-
laborating personnel who are directly involved in the
operations, to permit approval by the strategic services
officer, and to provide for the briefing of operatives and
agents who will put the plan into effect.
¢. Responsibility for the development of the details
of operational plans lies with the MO Section Officer.
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These plans will implement the MO Programs. The Im-
‘plementation Studiés sent from Washington will be use-
ful in formulating these programs as well as specific
_ information on which these plans are based obtained
in the theater base from SI and R&A representatives,
from G-2, A-2, ONI, JICA, and from Allied sources.
d. The nature of the problem will determine the form
of an operational plan. It should, however, include the
following:
' (1) A precise delineation of the MO targets of the
‘operation, with a brief statement indicating how the
particular targets are, under the circumstances, the
most suitable in implementing the special program.
(2) An adequate survey of intelligence bearing on
the problem, including only such matters as collab-
orating personnel and MO personnel must know in
order to execute the projected tasks.
(3) A complete detailing of all the important op-
erations required. Progressive steps in the action
should be indicated, showing the times when and
places where action will occur, specific persons and
groups involved, nature of cover, specific use of MO
implements and the coordination of them, probable
enemy counter-action to be anticipated, and how it
is to be met.
(4) All details of collaboration with the armed
services, with SO and SI, with Allied agencies, with
native underground personnel, and with propaganda
agencies (if involved).
e. To insure that all the operations are feasible, suf-
ficient detail should be included showing the require-
_ ments of the operations and how they are met, covering
_such matters as equipment, communications, transport,
_. supplies, liaison, and the selection and briefing of opera-
_ tives and agents. ,
RLS ERE SECTION VI — OPERATIONS
31. ‘GENERAL ee
2 This. seition aescrbea: ‘the. scbeeeiee aperations
Shieh: -may: be-especially suitable in carrying out “the
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Strategic tasks of MO as set forth in Section VI, para-
graph 26 b.
bk. Under each of these strategic tasks there is pre-
sented a statement of mission and of practical principles
- which may be helpful in planning and directing these
operations.
c. This section does not attempt to show the de-
tailed administration of personnel engaged in the sub-
versive operations to accomplish these strategic tasks.
In general, however, the strategic services officer will
administer the personnel engaged in all morale opera-
- tions including MO operatives and agents in enemy or
enemy-occupied territory and at the base. These MO
operatives and agents, though acting under the direc-
tion and policies of MO, will conduct their activities
under the administration and discipline of an OSS officer
responsible for operations of both MO and SO agents.
Such activities will therefore call for the closest joint
planning by the MO-SO staff personnel.
d. The actual implements and channels employed
in these operations are also not developed in this section,
except by way of illustration. The actual means avail-
able to the MO Section Officer in each theater base —
- and they may vary greatly from one base to another —
will determine by what direct and indirect media he
will effect these operations. At some bases, some of the
implements required for MO work, especially radio and
printing facilities, may be assigned by the theater com-
mander to a special combat propaganda unit not under
the jurisdiction of the strategic services officer. In this
case, MO personnel, supplies, and equipment may be
assigned to this unit to effect that part of the MO pro-
gram requiring these implements. For effective action
in this situation, the closest collaboration between the
5 MO Section Officer and the officer in charge of this spe-
' ¢lal unit is necessary.
32. WITHIN THE ENEMY’S COUNTRY
a, DIVIDING THE ENEMY
_ (1) The mission is to destroy unity among enemy
4 ““* groups and people by alienating group from group,
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people from leaders, and nation from nation. A di-
vided home front and a split between enemy nation-
als are major factors in enemy collapse.
(2) Divisive activities are most profitably carried
on with greatest intensity following enemy military
reverses or domestic crises, since at these times dor-
mant splits begin to reappear. These divisive activi-
ties, whether on a local or on an international scale,
concentrate on exploiting long-standing cleavages
and issues.
(3) The following activities serve to divide group
from group: launching subversive radio, press, or
rumor programs which attack one group (e.g., the
Army) but do not attack and may even defend an-
other group (e.g., the Party); planting evidence of
treason on political or military leaders by such means
as: sending compromising decipherable messages by
radio or telegraph, having the individual in question
receive especially favorable mention in clandestine
leaflets which will be picked up by the police; arrang-
ing leaks in neutral countries by diplomatic personnel
revealing that selected individuals can be “depended
upon”; spreading evidence to show that big industri-
alists are profiteering; spreading rumors that army
divisions drawn from “politically difficult” areas are
being sent to the most dangerous fronts; spreading
rumors that more members of a given group or class
have surrendered or deserted to Allied forces than
others. Minor leaders of a political or economic group
which has grievances against other groups should
be encouraged by bribery and persuasion to take a
militant stand against the offending group. The pos-
sibility of simultaneously encouraging and bribing
the second group to similar aggressive action should
also be investigated.
(4) Tactics that divide people from leaders are:
spreading rumors that leaders are protecting their
future by buying securities and durable goods in neu-
tral countries; arranging for agents actually to pur-
chase money, jewels or precious works of art in a
neutral capital, then letting it leak that these are
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. being bought for prominent leaders; introducing in-
to the enemy country picture postal cards of famous
castles, villas, and in the descriptive paragraph in-
cluding such sentences as “The recently purchased
villa in Sweden of Herr von Ribbentrop is very similar
in architectural design to this beautiful building”;
spreading subversive songs, jokes, cartoons, which
attack the government; sending tips to the secret
police of alleged hoarding and black market opera-
tions; circulating reports that deplore or commend
the brilliance of methods by which the sons and rela-
tives of officials are avoiding the draft, getting easy
jobs, buying restricted food.
(5) Where authentic evidence is available that
some leaders are engaged in one or more of the illegal
actions described above, opportunities should be put
in their way for expanding these activities, to be fol-
lowed by exposure or blackmail.
(6) To divide nation from nation, the following
activities are effective; exploiting incidents in which
friction occurs between Axis soldiers from different
’ eountries; provoking fights and brawls wherever ditf-
ferent Axis nationals come together; circulating
reports that the reason for moving prisoners of war
from one camp to another is enmity between the
nationals; circulating rumors and reports of all cases
in which forces of the stronger Axis countries desert
the troops of the weaker Axis members; circulating
statistics of disproportionate casualties of the differ-
ent nationals; when troops of one country are quar-
tered in another Axis area, exploiting all social prob-
lems, especially sexual, which inevitably arise, in-
crease of juvenile delinquency, adultery, pregnancy,
venereal diseases; circulating in one enemy country
political statements, jokes and satires derogatory to it
which are ascribed to the nationals of the other.
b. InpUcING Panic IN ENEMY POPULATIONS
(1) The mission is to augment feelings of insecur-
ity, anxiety, and panic in enemy civilian population.
Such a program is especially desirable just before a
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military offensive. But even when a battle is not im-
minent, neurotic anxiety adds greatly to the political
and administrative problems of the enemy. Further,
the mental state of the civilians at home inevitably is
communicated to men at the front through letters or
via soldiers returning from furloughs, and thus a
panicky civilian population helps to demoralize sol-
diers in combat zones.
(2) Operations are preferred which augment nor-
mal fright reactions to war events, such as inducing
sympathizers to scream hysterically in factories and
shelters during air raids or upon the publication of
casualty lists; distributing small clandestine leaflets
purporting to tell how to avoid alleged horrible con-
Sequences of incessant bombings — insanity and
feeblemindedness, stunting of growth, various nervous
disorders, sexual impotency or frigidity, sterility, mis-
carriage, deafness, blindness; spreading “informa-
tion” on the methods of avoiding these terrible effects,
say, by recommending going to a doctor within 24
hours after a bombing for examination whether the
person appears injured or not.
(3) One of the most disorganizing civilian anxie-
ties is the belief that there exists a widespread fifth-
column group, that there is no one in whose loyalty
one can have faith. To exploit this fear is dangerous,
as it may result in reprisals on bona fide agents and
sympathizers. When, however, an hysterical state can
be so fostered that mob action can be turned on
civilians not in the underground, then this work is
most effective.
c. STRENGTHENING THE ENEMY CIVILIANS’ DESIRE FOR
PEACE, AND RaIsInc Fase Hoprs
(1) The mission is to subvert the fighting spirit of
enemy civilians by causing them to agitate for peace
and by raising false hopes. Any degree of success not
only adds to the crippling of enemy civilian war work,
but communicates poor morale to the fighting forces.
(2) Enemy civilians who are susceptible to peace
stimuli can be divided into two general categories:
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(a) Those who are resistant to the regime and
who use pacifist propaganda as a cover to excuse
. their activities and protect them from charges of
treason.
(b) Those who are loyal to the regime but
siricerely desire peace.
d (3) To exploit both these groups, clandestine agi-
tation for peace should be kept on a lofty plane. It
... should not be complicated by tirades against enemy
leaders. It should not be suspect as originating out-
side the country. Peace is urged as a desirable end in
\ itself.
\ (4) Two major lines of action may be employed:
¥ playing up the horrors of war, and exploiting the paci-
} fistic or religious attitudes of the civilians.
(5) For the horror approach, subversive pictures,
i for example, may be circulated of burned and muti-
' ‘ lated Soldiers, asking, “Will your son or husband be
t next? Save him from this by demanding peace.” These
: pictures should be distributed ostensibly, say, by a
' peace society made of enemy underground nationals.
: The maimed and crippled may be encouraged to dis-
play themselves in public as much as possible. A
i rumor may be spread that a certain shrine in a large
: city has miraculously cured war injured. All war in-
jured are encouraged to make pilgrimages to that
shrine.
(6) Religious pacifism is exploited by suggestion;
for example, numerous small crosses may be distrib-
- uted with the single word ‘“‘peace” written thereon. .
A rumor may be spread that because of the appear-
’ ance of a certain saint who also appeared shortly
after the end of the last war thousands of women are
: now. praying for peace at noon every day (that being
0 ’ the hour designated by the saint). Reports may be
~ afrculated that certain women who have prayed for
peace at a certain shrine (in a large city) have mirac-
‘ulously been spared death in the family.
| . « . (7) Desire and action for peace will be increased if
-.. enemy civilians are made to believe that there is real
\ -» evidence that peace is within immediate reach. It is
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important that such “evidences” be confined to ene-
my territory. For example, reports may be circulated
that engineers are already planning the conversion
of enemy factories to peace-time production.
(8) When the object of circulating “evidence” of
peace is the raising of false hopes, it is necessary that
the hopes raised be “proved” in due course to be actu-
ally false. The natural course of events may provide
such proof. However, it is best to plan for the pricking
of the bubble whenever possible. This may be accom-
plished in two ways:
(a) By circulating the “evidences” of peace
at an appropriate interval before the occurrence of
an actual event (secretly known to OSS) which
will prove the first reports of peace to be false.
(b) By following the first “evidences” of peace
after an appropriate interval by “new evidence”
which proves the first reports to be untrue.
d. Susverting ENemy Civiuian POPULATIONS DURING
A GROUND OFFENSIVE
(1) The mission is two-fold: first, during offensive
action in enemy home territory, to create such con-
fusion and panic among civilians as will disrupt
enemy military action and demoralize his troops, and
second, to invite cooperation of war-weary civilians
with our own invading forces so as to decrease our
own military problems.
(2) Demoralization and terrorization attacks on
civilian populations in enemy countries can, if not
immediately followed through by military conquest, .
have the unintended effect of consolidating the
group, improving its morale, and making it more de-
termined than ever. Therefore, all-out terroristic
operations should be carried out in areas that com-
prise the immediate objective of our armed forces.
(3) When the proper time and place have been
determined, sympathizers and agents may be in-
structed to create false air raid alarms; start street
fighting and riots; spread rumors that the town will
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be utterly destroyed by bombings; that Allied para-
troopers have already landed in certain sections of
the town; that enemy forces at one point have been
utterly destroyed; that the enemy military (at times
when their retreat seems imminent) have planted
mines in all the city streets, have polluted the water
supply.
- (4) At this time a bribed police force is of particu-
lar value for augmenting or for not interfering with
such disorders as may occur. Further, at this time the
police force is particularly susceptible to bribery and
8 subversion since the police force knows it must remain
in the town after the enemy troops have evacuated
it and will therefore be ready to be “persuaded” to
change sides.
(5) A terrorized civilian group threatened with the
devestation of military action will, unless provided
with a feasible and hopeful means of escape and posi-
tive courses of action to implement it, develop a “back-
to-the-wall” attitude, and become a dangerous con-
solidated adversary. All feasible subversive means
of providing hope should therefore be employed. For
example, reports of fair treatment which other enemy
civilians have received at the hands of our forces may
be circulated. Specific methods of signifying capitula-
tion should be clandestinely circulated, such as stay-
ing indoors, displaying signs, flags, reporting hidden
stores.
(6) Frequently, during ground operations directed
against an inhabited point, terrorization can be em-
ployed to exploit the tendency of the population to
flee from such towns or cities. It is possible, through
the use of rumors both to speed up such pell-mell
evacuation and to direct it along roads which the
enemy would rather keep open and free from civilian
traffic.
33. WITHIN ENEMY -OCCUPIED OR CONTROLLED
TERRITORY
a. PROMOTION OF RESISTANCE AND REVOLT AGAINST THE
ENEMY
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(1) The mission is to induce a greater resistance
among the population and to promote the organiza-
‘tion of the resistance under good leadership.
(2) OSS will not, in most cases, use its own opera-
tives and agents in directly inciting potentially resist-
ant masses of people. This job can usually best be
done by selected native influential persons on the
spot who know the people of the area. The OSS task
-is therefore reduced to supplying through personal
contact and other inducements, materials, and guid-
ance by means of which native persons can do the
work of incitement.
(3) As for materials which MO personnel will pre-
pare outside the territory (as by freedom stations),
the following principles should be kept in mind:
(a) Direct and specific appeals should be
made to the individual’s fear of personal harm,
social ostracism, prejudices, resentments, and hope
for rewards.
(bo) The impression should be created that
the resistant movement is popular, that everyone
is “joining up.” Special signs, symbols, songs, etc.,
are issued.
(c) Since actual participation in a movement
(doing something) tends to increase the feeling of
personal identification with the cause of the move-
ment, acts that every member of a resistant group
can carry out should be urged (within limits of
personal security). The simplest act, the smallest
child should not be neglected. Simple instructional
leaflets, or talks on freedom stations covering
methods of simple sabotage may be effective.
(d) The important contribution of each act,
__ especially the minor undetectable, subtle kinds of
“sabotage should be emphasized; how these acts
divert troops, supplies, and officers; how they
Con cAarass the enemy; how they slow down production
or lift the morale of other resistant groups.
zo 72 ..../..(e) The feeling of success increases the peo-
ple’s willingness to continue subversive work.
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Therefore, all clandestine (and cooperating white)
means may be used to circulate reports and rumors
'. of successful activities, especial care being taken,
- of course, to protect the people from reprisals.
(f) The personal safety of the citizen-saboteur
‘ should be safeguarded. Instruction should be given
on methods of making sabotage appear to be acci-
: dental or the result of natural causes.
b. INTERFERING WITH THE ENEMY’sS CONSOLIDATION AND
USE OF AN OccUPIED CoUNTRY’sS CAPABILITIES
_ (1) The mission is to hamper the enemy’s efforts
to exploit the industrial and civilian administration
’ of an occupied country and to harass enemy govern-
ment administration. Success in this work pins down
enemy troops in troublesome areas and upsets enemy
calculations concerning supplies based upon ex- |
pected production. In addition, augmenting the “nor-
mal” problems of civilian administration will produce
irritation, confusion and inefficiency in enemy or
collaborationist administration. .
(2) The technique most suitable for this work is
that of fostering “simple sabotage” by the populace.
Simple sabotage refers to inconspicuous acts which
destroy enemy targets or obstruct enemy production,
, administration, and political consolidation. In con-
trast to major sabotage, simple sabotage is per-
formed without the use of specially prepared tools or
equipment; it’ is executed by an ordinary citizen who
acts individually and without necessarily any active
connection with an organized subversive group; and
it is carried out in such a way as to involve a mini-
mum danger of injury, detection and reprisal.
(3) Simple sabotage may consist of (a) physical
_ «destruction of equipment and installations, or (b)
%, functional interference with operations. Detailed
treatment of this subject will be covered in a Stra-
- tegic Services Field Manual.
’.-¢. PropUcING CIvILIAN DIsoRDER IN SUPPorRT oF MILI-
~ ary OPERATIONS
(1) The mission is to deceive the enemy com-
-, Ynander so that he may make false moves based upon
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incorrect estimates of civilian resistance. Inducing
the enemy command erroneously to anticipate large
civilian uprisings pins down enemy troops in such
areas and assists our armed services if they wish such
a diversion. On the other hand, successfully inducing
the enemy command to believe that civilian spirit is
low and that extra military precautions are unneces-
sary permits OSS and the armed services to operate
with less enemy interference.
(2) Strategic and tactical planning at the highest
military echelon is required in this work in order to
assist the theater commander in his military pro-
gram. The success of this work furthermore requires
the closest collaboration with the underground.
(3) It is necessary, first, to determine whether to
give the impression of spontaneous revolt or of an
elaborately organized underground at work. The
needs of the specific situation will provide the answer.
(4) If it is to be an impression of spontaneous and
widespread revolt, minor subversive activities at
widely scattered points are planned and numerous
outbreaks committed simultaneously. Thus, at a pre-
determined time, civilians at various places break
windows, start fires, street fights, and riots. Judicious
and effective bribing of police officials can help in the
successful staging of street fights and riots, without
endangering the security of the agent. The police can
be bribed either to stay away from the scene until it
has developed into a riot of its own momentum, or to
make wholesale arrests of innocent by-standers and
thus create the impression of greater participation in
the riot than actually existed.
(5) If it is to be the impression of an elaborately
organized underground at work, coordinated sabo-
tage acts aimed at destroying a single extensive facil-
ity are planned. Thus, sympathizers are incited to
carry out, under clandestine direction, certain sabo-
tage acts, all of which when taken together tend to
demolish or disrupt a given communication, trans-
port or supply system.
(6) Where the enemy is to experience a false sense
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of security, sympathizers are clandestinely instructed
to cease from all kinds of sabotage. In accordance
with the principle of proper timing, it is important
that, when possible, such instructions are given after
a particularly determined attempt of the enemy
authorities to prevent sabotage. The sudden cessation
of sabotage activities at any other time would tend to
put the enemy authorities even more on their guard.
d. IncREASING TERROR, FRICTION, AND DEMORALIZATION
AMONG COLLABORATIONISTS
(1) The mission is to create friction between col-
laborationists and Axis officials, and among collabora-
tionists themselves, and to incite sympathizers to
_ . engage in terroristic operations against collabora-
‘ tionists. Disruption of the work of collaborationists
increases the difficulties of the enemy command inas-
much as the collaborationists relieve the enemy mili-
tary command of many of the responsibilities of
civilian administration.
(2) The period during major battles is a period for
increased terroristic acts of this sort. Extensive and
all-out terroristic activities should be urged through
every available channel and individual initiative in
these activities is encouraged against bona fide col-
laborationists. Such acts as the following are suitable
’ methods of terrorizing collaborationists: inciting the
populace to dispose of them and, where possible, to
plant evidence at the scene indicating the existence
of a powerful society which has set itself up to deal
with all collaborationists; spreading black lists of
quislings; smearing symbols on their houses and vehi-
cles and committing terroristic acts against them;
writing anonymous letters and making anonymous
telephone calls threatening the lives of collabora-
tionists and their families; preparing documents to
be “discovered” by the collaborationists which will ap-
pear to give directions for the disposition of collabora-
tionists on D-day; deluging religious authorities with
such theological questions as whether or not a quis-
ling who is hanged can be buried in consecrated
ground.
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(3) Projects designed to create friction among col-
laborationists should be geared into combat activities
wherever possible. Most effective are acts which sug-
gest to the Axis officials that the collaborationist is
“selling out” or is untrustworthy in a battle situation.
For example, “secret” documents may be discovered
by the military officials listing the names of collabo-
rationists who have allegedly appealed to the under-
ground for clemency and who have affirmed their
readiness to come over to our side on D-day. Quislings
may be tipped off with false information which they
transmit to enemy authorities. Tips may be sent to
enemy officials and secret police concerning collab-
orationists who are dealing with the enemy, with
underground forces. :
(4) Collaborationists, both political and indus-
trial, are concerned with questions of power and
status. This battle for status may be exploited by
such means as preparing a document ostensibly origi-
nating with one group of collaborationists protesting
against the activities of another group of collabora-
tionists, who “find” the document.
€. PROVOKING REBELLION OR CouP D’ETAT IN A SATEL-
LITE COUNTRY OR INDUCING ITS SEPARATION FROM THE AXIS
(1) The mission is to aid in the inciting and carry-
ing through of revolutions, incidents, changes in
governments, or coup d’etat in satellite. or other
enemy-dominated countries. Since many of the opera-
tions are in the nature of secret diplomacy, close
consultation with the State Department may be
necessary.
(2) In many cases, the contribution of OSS will
consist of supplying the State Department or our
military commanders with channels of communica-
tion or with agents who can conduct necessary secret
negotiations. Frequently, however, through its con-
tacts with the underground or through neutral coun-
tries, OSS may discover and suggest to the State
Department opportunities for political or economic
operations against the enemy. Influential persons in
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a satellite country who are in a strong enough posi-
_tion to evoke a coup d’etat, rebellion, or other im-
portant strategic act against a collaborationist regime
will often require postwar commitments. OSS is not
authorized to make such commitments. These must
} come from the highest authority.
(3) A second category of activities is that of pro-
voking an “incident” between the enemy country and
its satellites, and then suitably exploiting the “inci-
dent” by freedom stations and false leaflets. In the
provoking of an “incident” the agent provocateur
usually plays an important role. For example, such
an agent who has succeeded in establishing himself
as an enemy official can be tactlessly or ruthlessly
carrying out administrative orders—increase. the an-
tagonism of the people of the country against the
enemy government. The agent who has penetrated
a pro-Axis political group in a satellite country can
incite other members to militant action or to ill-
considered policies and thus help create incidents
which will discredit the pro-Axis group, or which will
call for retaliatory action from opposition groups.
34, WITHIN OTHER AREAS
a. ESTABLISHING AN MO Section oF A Base IN A NEU-
TRAL COUNTRY FOR OPERATIONS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY-
DOMINATED COUNTRIES
(1) All SS activities must be under the direction
-. of the Chief of OSS mission. Such activities may be in
' support of programs initiated in other theaters or
areas or may be activities pursuant to another ap-
“proved program.
(2) The mission is to make the necessary personal
contacts and to utilize neutral implements and chan-
nels for such operations. Establishing a neutral base
for these purposes is a critical necessity, for many of
_ the missions described in other parts of this section
require operating from a neutral base.
(3) No MO activity should result in the jeopardy
- of national policy, as expressed and put into effect by
the chief of the diplomatic mission. Hence, he should
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be apprised in general, of MO activities in the area to
which he is assigned.
(4) Personal contact work will usually be of three
sorts:
(a) Contacts through appropriate channels
with influential persons in enemy-dominated
countries and, when the situation within the
enemy country itself promises internal collapse
with influential persons therein.
(b) Contacts with the underground that is
collaborating with SS for MO work in areas bor-
dering the neutral country.
(c) Such contacts as will facilitate the intro-
duction into bordering areas of SS agents en-
gaged in special MO missions.
(5) Direct use of neutral implements and chan-
nels for MO purposes may often be possible. For
example, rumors designed for consumption in enemy
areas may be spread by word of mouth or by news-
paper or radio “plants.” Forged documents may be
planted in such a way as to fall in enemy hands. The
mail into enemy zones may be used for transmitting
poison-pen or other subversive materials.
(6) The special status of a neutral country re-
quires the closest collaboration between SS person-
nel doing MO work and other SS personnel. In the
first place, the enemy has legitimate access to and
representatives in the country. There is, therefore,
continual danger of enemy penetration into the SS
organization. MO personnel should work closely, if
indirectly, with SS men assigned the duty of pro-
tecting OSS from penetration, and should individu-
ally and vigilantly observe security measures.
(7) In the second place, SS intelligence men in
a neutral country are in a special position to provide
information on MO targets of opportunity. This ad-
vantage comes from the presence of official repre-
sentatives of the enemy, refugees, neutral observers,
and enemy nationals travelling into and out of enemy
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- territory. When operations are planned for such tar-
gets of opportunity, care should be exercised to see
that they are consistent with the authorized over-all
MO program.
b. ASSISTING THE CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN
SPECIAL WorRK REQUESTED BY Him
The mission is to assist the chief of the diplomatic
mission by conducting any operations requested by him
that fall within the province and capabilities of MO. The
enemy will usually conduct subversive activities in the
neutral country, either openly, or by a fifth column, or
by native persons or organizations which collaborate
with him. In order to protect the United States war
policy and interests, the chief of diplomatic missions
may find it necessary to call upon OSS for special MO
work deemed by him not to be expressly prejudicial to
the relations between the United States and the neutral
country. Any such work should be authorized by OSS,
Washington.
35. WITHIN THE ENEMY ARMED FORCES, IN ALL
AREAS
&. FOSTERING REBELLIOUSNESS WITHIN ENEMY ARMED
FORCES
(1) The mission is to increase in enemy troops a
spirit of rebelliousness against their officers and polit-
ical leadership, especially among occupation forces.
Even partial achievement of this aim would tend to
communicate the rebellious spirit to soldiers in com-
bat areas.
(2) Rebelliousness among soldiers occurs when
they lose fighting spirit, and develop acute friction
among themselves.
(3) To weaken the fighting spirit, advantage is
taken of the fact that the enemy soldier, stationed
behind the lines, has most of his contacts with civil-
ians and tends to think, hope, and fear very much
_ like a civilian. Most subversive work, therefore, focuses
- on the civilian attitudes of these soldiers. Every at-
tempt is made to induce anxiety among the troops
about conditions at home and to strengthen their
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nostalgia for home. For example, rumors may be
circulated about the conditions of families due to
air raids, disease, overwork, adultery with foreign
workers or with stay-at-home soldiers or civilians;
letters from foreign workers in the home country may
also be forged, describing the above conditions, and
then allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy
troops. To increase the feeling of isolation, civilians
may be urged to talk sympathetically with enemy
soldiers about the dangers at home confronting their
children, wives, and relatives, but in marked contrast,
to treat them coldly during their own church festi-
vals, family gatherings.
(4) To increase friction and mutual distrust
among enemy military personnel, natural cleavages
based on differences in status and ethics among the
troops are the logical points of attack. Such cleavages
may be discovered between enlisted men and their
officers; between soldiers from one nationality or geo-
graphic area and soldiers from another nationality
and area; or between one group of soldiers with one
set of traditions and political ideology and another
group of soldiers with another set (as between the
Wehrmacht and the SS). Thus, wherever political
police of other classes or soldiers have special privi-
leges, clandestine leaflets may be distributed describ-
ing these privileges in detail. Ridicule is employed,
eg., toilets are marked “Reserved for Gestapo.”
Poison-pen letters may be written to officers and men
implicating others who are disliked in treasonable,
immoral, or unsporting acts. Rumors may be spread
indicating how the political police are growing fat on
- _ corruption, are at home enjoying the wives and sweet-
_ hearts of the front-line soldiers, how the political and
military elite. are preparing for escape to neutral
_. countries in anticipation of losing.the war. Attempts
_ may be made to cause some. troops.to feel that they
.. are sharing greater risks than others, or that some
>. will. incur-reprisals for “war erimes: while others will
2-nok be -held-responsible.. ie
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b. InpuciInG SURRENDER
(1) The mission is to increase the demoralization
~ of enemy troops to the point of greater willingness to
' surrender. The voluntary surrendering of enemy sol-
diers obviously increases the relative strength of our
armed forces, and reduces the fighting spirit of the
* remaining enemy troops.
(2) This work can be most effectively carried out
only when the morale of enemy soldiers is low, espe-
cially during and after military reverses, or when
they are green and untrained.
(3) The enemy soldier fears annihilation on the
one hand, and an imagined harsh treatment as
prisoner on the other. The contrast between horrible
destruction and decent treatment as prisoner is there-
fore plausibly built up through subversive means. For
example, rumors may be floated of the number of
_ Axis soldiers who have broken down mentally under
terrific air attack or cannon barrage. Sympathizers
‘ may be urged to contaminate enemy food, and burn
enemy buildings and supplies during confused enemy
military operations. Timed with these activities,
rumors, réports and evidences of,good treatment of
prisoners should be circulated by every means behind
enemy lines.
(4) On grounds of military ethics, the enemy
soldier believes that surrender gives him dishonorable
status as a soldier. He must be made to believe that
this is untrue. Reports may therefore be circulated
about wholesale desertion and surrender at other
Be sectors, about “respect” accorded surrender, e.g.,
officers may retain their sidearms.
(5) The soldier fears for his security in the act of
surrendering; he may be shot by his officers or by our
own forces. He must be informed how not to reveal to
his officers his intent to surrender, and learn to look
for leaflets, pass words, gestures, which will assure
safe passage.
- (6) Such morale subversion activities should be
timed with and support open front propaganda.
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Though often effective, official front appeals by radio,
leaflets are too obviously a “selling-job.” Such appeals
“substantiated” by allegedly bona fide reports and
rumors within and behind enemy lines carry greater
weight.
36. WITHIN OSS, WASHINGTON AND THEATERS
a. WiTHIN OSS, WasHINGTON, OVER-ALL PLANNING FOR
AND SERVICING OF FIELD OPERATIONS
For a description of the planning and servicing
activities of OSS, Washington, see Section II.
b. ASSISTANCE DESIRED BY THEATER COMMANDER
The theater commander may request to use MO
personnel and equipment for special combat subversive
activities in forward areas in support of United States
Army operations. OSS personnel may, for example, be
asked to serve as members of intelligence squads having
as a special mission the collection of information useful
to subversive work, for example, the locating and ap-
praisal of radio, press and other equipment in forward
enemy areas. OSS may also be asked to contribute plans,
linguists, technical help and equipment to operating
crews engaged in combat subversion or deception, in-
cluding the operating of mobile radios, loud speakers
and presses.
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