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UNITED STATES v. MELISA SUSAN KYLE, No. 4:26-cr-00189-SEH (N.D. Okla.)
OPINION AND ORDER (ECF No. 62), dated and filed October 1, 2026 -- U.S. District Judge Sara E. Hill
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 26-CR-00189-SEH
MELISA SUSAN KYLE,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Defendant’s Opposed Motion to Suppress, [ECF
No. 47], which the government has responded to, [ECF No. 50]. The Court
held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion, during which the Court
heard testimony from witnesses and admitted exhibits. The Court also heard
arguments from the parties. After considering the record and applicable law,
the Court grants the motion for the reasons explained in more detail below.
I. Background
Tulsa County Deputy Sheriff Freddie Alaniz investigates crimes on the
highways in and around Tulsa, Oklahoma. He has experience in drug
interdiction, has served as a task force officer with the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), and he is certified by the Oklahoma
Council on Law Enforcement Education and Training (“CLEET”) as a
narcotics K-9 officer. Alaniz’s patrol vehicle is equipped with exterior cameras
that record the license plate number of cars that pass him. These cameras
feed into larger fixed-position camera networks that automatically capture
and log license plate numbers along with accompanying information like the
date, time, and location a license plate is seen by one of the cameras in that
network. This technology is known as Automated License Plate Reader
(“ALPR”) technology. Alaniz has access to at least two ALPR systems, Flock
and VehicleManager. These two systems have different capabilities, but they
serve the same essential function: gathering and organizing historical data
about a vehicle’s whereabouts on public roadways for use by law enforcement
across the country. It is not clear from the record how long such information
is kept, nor is it clear who keeps the information. But at least at the time of
the incident at issue in this case, Alaniz had access to at least 30 days’ worth
of vehicle location information in many states, though he did not have access
to information from California.
One evening while he was on duty, Alaniz parked his patrol vehicle on the
side of the highway to observe traffic passing by. Among other cars, Alaniz
saw a Mazda SUV with a California license plate. The Mazda’s license plate
was picked up by the camera on Alaniz’s car. Alaniz then pulled his vehicle
onto the highway to follow the Mazda for no apparent reason other than the
fact that it had a California license plate. Alaniz also ran a query on the
Flock system for the California license plate number on the Mazda SUV.
Both Flock and VehicleManager provide users an option for the reason the
query is being run. The reasons Alaniz put in those systems for running the
queries were “traffic violation,” and “investigation.” At the time of those
queries, all Alaniz knew was that the vehicle had a California license plate.
After Alaniz ran the ALPR query, he saw that the Mazda made a trip from
Locust Grove, Oklahoma, toward the California/Arizona border area, and was
heading back to the Missouri area after a short trip. Alaniz testified that the
Mazda was in the California area for about one day, but it is somewhat
unclear from the record exactly how long the car was there, especially
considering Alaniz did not have access to Flock data from California. In any
event, the time spent in California was short compared to the time it would
take to drive from Missouri and back. Alaniz’s bodycam captured the result of
Alaniz’s ALPR query:
[ECF No. 47-6 at 18:19:32].
When Alaniz followed the Mazda, he believed that he observed two main
categories of traffic violations. First, he believed that the Mazda’s driver
failed to signal a lane change at least 100 feet before making a lane change
several times, in violation of 47 O.S. § 11-309. Second, he believed that the
Mazda’s driver followed a vehicle in front more closely than is safe, in
violation of 47 O.S. § 11-310. At least with respect to driving too close to
another vehicle, the driver left only about 30 feet between the two vehicles.
These traffic maneuvers were captured by Alaniz’s dash camera:
[ECF No. 47-5 at 18:19:48].
After pulling the vehicle over, Alaniz approached the passenger side of the
car to talk with Defendant Melisa Kyle. Upon making contact, Kyle already
had both of the car’s front windows rolled all the way down. The interaction
began with Kyle appearing to explain that her lane change violations were
due to the driving directions on her cell phone. Kyle had also just lit a
cigarette moments before Alaniz reached the vehicle, and Alaniz asked her to
put it out. Kyle complied, and she did so by first sticking the cigarette out of
the driver’s-side window to remove the ash, and then she placed it on her
dashboard. Alaniz asked Kyle for her license, insurance, and registration,
and he informed her that he was not going to write her a ticket. Kyle
informed Alaniz that the vehicle was a rental, and that she had gone to
California for a couple of days. Alaniz then invited Kyle to accompany him to
his patrol car so she could search for the rental information on her phone.
After getting Kyle into the front passenger seat of his patrol vehicle,
Alaniz asked Kyle about her travel plans while he continued to review the
ALPR systems for the car she was driving. There are a few main takeaways
from this part of the conversation between Alaniz and Kyle:
• Kyle went to California for a couple of days.
• Alaniz asked Kyle when she left for California, and Kyle responded
that she had been gone for six days. Kyle further responded that she
only stayed for two nights, and that she had not “seen those people
in years.”
• Kyle explained that when she and her husband separated, she
began moving about the country because she realized she “can
actually go places.”
• Alaniz again asked Kyle about what day she left Missouri for
California, and Kyle responded: “Monday [inaudible] … Tuesday,
no,” and that she did not leave until Wednesday. It is clear from the
context of the conversation that Kyle was talking out loud to
remember which day of the week she left, not that she was changing
her answer.
• Alaniz asked about the amount of luggage she carried for just two
days in California, and Kyle responded that she likes to pick up
clothes for her kids and “just crap, basically.” She explained that she
had to buy a suitcase while “out there” because it would look “silly”
in Walmart bags.
• Alaniz asked Kyle about what she did in California. Kyle responded
that she “went swimming,” which she said she had not done in
years, that she was just “sitting around bullshitting” and “talking
and catching up.” She also mentioned that her cousin had goats and
a farm.
• Alaniz again pressed Kyle about going so far for such a short trip.
Kyle responded that she “hadn’t gotten to go anywhere in years” and
that “the drive was … as fulfilling as … seeing people.” She further
explained that her husband was in the military and gone “all the
freaking time,” and that made her feel like “the dog that got left at
the house.” But because her children were 15 and 17, Kyle explained
that she could go wherever she wanted.
• Alaniz asked Kyle what she did for a living, and Kyle responded that
she buys and sells at garage sales and flea markets.
• Alaniz asked what part of California Kyle went to. She responded
that she stayed in Needles, and then Bullhead City, Arizona. Kyle
explained that she stayed in Needles, but her cousin lived in
Bullhead City. She described it as “around the corner,” and that “one
side’s Needles, and one side’s Bullhead.”
• Alaniz returned Kyle’s driver’s license and gave her a written
warning regarding the traffic violations.
During this portion of the conversation between Alaniz and Kyle while
Alaniz was filling out a traffic warning, another law enforcement officer
approached Alaniz’s vehicle. Alaniz told the other officer, “I think I’m good. I
appreciate ya’.” Based on the context of this interaction, the Court finds that
Alaniz perceived the other officer’s presence as an offer to assist, which he
refused.
Alaniz then completed the stop by returning Kyle’s license to her and
giving her a warning. After that was done, Alaniz asked Kyle if she would
answer some questions, which Kyle agreed to do. Alaniz told Kyle that he
“work[s] criminal interdiction on the highways” and that “we look for uh
people that are uh transporting large amounts of drugs, U.S. currency, guns,
uh human trafficking, identity theft stuff.” He then told Kyle “your short trip
to California I feel like uh—I don’t feel—I know from my training … and my
experience that people who do very short trips to California and come right
back are usually transporting large amounts of drugs.” Alaniz asked Kyle for
consent to search her vehicle, and she denied the request. Immediately after
Kyle refused, Alaniz asked for backup and told Kyle that she was detained so
he could have his dog sniff her car.
While Alaniz explained the next steps, Kyle disclosed that she had some
marijuana in the car. She asked Alaniz if she could give it to him because she
knew that Alaniz’s dog would alert to the marijuana. Alaniz stated, “I am not
worried at all for a little bit of marijuana, that’s not what I’m looking for,” but
he proceeded with detaining Kyle to deploy his dog for a drug sniff. Alaniz
also responded to a radio communication by stating “it’s non-pressing, I’ve
just got a refusal on k9 deployment.”
After Alaniz’s backup officer arrived on the scene, he told him “I asked for
consent to search her car, she … denied, so I’m gonna run my dog.” Alaniz
also told another officer: “Man, she’s nervous as all get out. Super nervous.
She went to California for two days. … Kinda making some stuff up as I’m
asking her where she stayed at. … Has a shit ton of luggage back there for
just two days to California. I asked her for consent. She’s like ‘no I don’t think
so.’ I said OK, well now you’re being detained. … Then suddenly she’s got
weed in the car.” Alaniz’s dog then sniffed the car, alerted, and the officers
conducted a search of the vehicle, which resulted in Kyle’s arrest. While
Alaniz searched Kyle’s vehicle, he told another officer that he “could see her
carotid artery in my car. That thing was about to pop out of her neck,”
meaning that Alaniz perceived Kyle as being nervous.
II. Discussion
Kyle challenges three main aspects of her interaction with Alaniz: (1)
whether Alaniz was justified in stopping her vehicle; (2) whether Alaniz
unlawfully extended the traffic stop; and (3) whether Alaniz’s use of the
ALPR systems constituted an unlawful search. Kyle asks the Court to
“suppress all evidence obtained as a result of these unconstitutional searches
and seizures.” [ECF No. 47 at 23]. The Court will address each, in turn.
A. The Traffic Stop was Justified at its Inception.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This typically requires law
enforcement officers to have probable cause before conducting a search or
seizure. But there is an exception to this requirement for brief investigatory
stops, which are more commonly known as Terry stops. In Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), the Court “created a limited exception to” the prior general rule
that “any restraint on the person amounting to a seizure for the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment was invalid unless justified by probable cause.”
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). The Court held in Terry that
“certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a
crime.” Id.
Traffic stops are analyzed under the same principles that govern Terry
stops. United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 2020). “A
traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an
observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.”
United States v. Munoz, 162 F.4th 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting
United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001)). It is the
government’s burden to prove “the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010)).
“Ultimately, ‘[t]he dispositive inquiry is whether state law provided the
officer with an objectively justifiable basis for the stop.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987, 991–92 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Based on the Court’s review of the record, Alaniz had an objectively
reasonable basis to stop the Mazda for following the car in front of it too
closely. 47 O.S. § 11-310(a) provides: “The driver of a motor vehicle shall not
follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having
due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the
condition of the highway.” As the assigned investigator from the Federal
Public Defender’s office testified, Kyle only left approximately 30 feet
between the Mazda she was driving and the gold car in front of her. Given
Kyle’s speed, Alaniz had an objectively reasonable basis to stop the Mazda for
a violation of 47 O.S. § 11-310.
B. Alaniz did not Have Reasonable Suspicion to Extend the Traffic
Stop.
“Once an officer returns the driver’s license and registration, the traffic
stop has ended and questioning must cease; at that point, the driver must be
free to leave.” Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1219 (quoting United States v. Villa, 589
F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009)). “Continued detention is lawful only if the
encounter becomes consensual or if, during the initial lawful traffic stop, the
officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the detained person is engaged in
criminal activity.” Id. (quoting United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379
(10th Cir. 2015)). This means the relevant inquiry is whether Alaniz had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before he returned Kyle’s license to
her.
Reasonable suspicion is not a demanding standard, but it requires “a
‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting’ criminal conduct under a
totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379). “This
totality of the circumstances ‘approach precludes a divide-and-conquer
analysis, where the court views each factor that would support reasonable
suspicion in isolation.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Latorre, 893 F.3d 744,
751 (10th Cir. 2018)). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than a
preponderance of the evidence, and certainly less than probable cause. Id.
Using the totality of the circumstances approach in the context of traffic
stops, “factors consistent with innocent travel may collectively amount to
reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Leon, 80 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir.
2023). “Given the specialized training and experience that law enforcement
officers have, [courts] generally defer to their ability to distinguish between
innocent and suspicious behavior, but deference becomes inappropriate ‘when
an officer relies on a circumstance incorrigibly free of associations with
criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174
(10th Cir. 2022)). In other words, an “officer must point to specific, articulable
facts. Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches do not provide
reasonable suspicion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140,
1147 (10th Cir. 2010)). An officer’s subjective motives are not relevant to the
reasonable suspicion analysis. Rather, the Court must ask whether “the facts
available to the detaining officer, at the time, warranted an officer of
reasonable caution in believing the action taken was appropriate.” United
States v. Munoz, 162 F.4th 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. Latorre, 893 F.3d 744, 751 (10th Cir. 2018)).
The government offers six1 reasons why Alaniz had reasonable suspicion
that Kyle was engaging in criminal conduct beyond the observed traffic
infractions. [ECF No. 50 at 13–21]. The Court will consider these factors in
totality, rather than in isolation, to make a determination about reasonable
suspicion. But the Court will independently address each factor in the
interest of conducting a thorough analysis, and for purposes of clarity and
organization.
1) Kyle’s Quick Turnaround Trip to California and Explanation
for her Travels.
The government points to a few factors that, in its estimation, help
establish reasonable suspicion: Kyle’s trip to California was very short
relative to the time it took to travel there and back; she had trouble
remembering when she left; her answers about being in both California and
Arizona were suspicious; and her stated purpose of “swimming” and visiting a
cousin who had goats and a farm informs the plausibility of Kyle’s story.
1 The government’s arguments on exactly what factors contributed to Alaniz’s
reasonable suspicion are unclear because there are seven subheadings in its brief on
this issue (two of which are duplicative). Later on in the brief, the government lists
nine factors. Because the government’s substantive arguments are organized by the
subheadings on pages 13–20 of its brief (rather than the nine factors listed in
summary on pages 20–21), the Court will specifically address each of these factors
while consolidating the discussion about Kyle’s marijuana disclosure for a total of
six factors.
The government is correct that, in general, “[i]mplausible travel plans can
contribute to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165,
1177 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1149
(10th Cir. 2010)). But the Tenth Circuit’s instruction “that suspicious travel
plans can form an element of reasonable suspicion should not be taken as an
invitation to find travel suspicious per se.” United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d
1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). “[L]ies, evasions or
inconsistencies about any subject while being detained may contribute to
reasonable suspicion. In contrast, this circuit has been reluctant to deem
travel plans implausible—and hence a factor supporting reasonable
suspicion—where the plan is simply unusual or strange because it indicates a
choice that the typical person, or the officer, would not make.” Simpson, 609
F.3d at 1149.
Kyle’s short trip to California might not have been something Alaniz
would have personally done. But Kyle had a reasonable explanation for the
short turnaround—that the drive was as fulfilling as seeing the people she
visited. As the Tenth Circuit has recognized, “[t]here is nothing criminal
about traveling by car to view scenery.” United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942,
947 (10th Cir. 1997).
The Court also disagrees with the government’s assertion that Kyle could
not remember what day she left for her trip. Kyle did state three different
days: Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. But when viewing and listening to
the video from Alaniz’s interior-facing camera, it is apparent that Kyle was
talking herself through the days of the week so she could remember what day
she left. Kyle responded in the same way many would when asked about, for
example, how many items are in their cart when leaving a grocery store (e.g.
counting out loud and stating: “One, two, three; there are three items in my
cart”), or what day they last saw a friend (e.g. running through the days out
loud to remember and stating: “Monday? No. Tuesday? No. I was with them
on Wednesday.”). The government’s argument on this point might make
sense if Kyle’s statement was read from a transcript excerpt without the
surrounding conversation for context. But the most reasonable interpretation
of Kyle’s statement based on a common-sense understanding of how people
talk in normal conversation leads the Court to conclude that Kyle’s statement
adds little to nothing to the reasonable suspicion calculus.
The Court also disagrees with the government’s assertion that Kyle’s
statements about being in both California and Arizona were suspicious. Kyle
said she stayed in Needles, which was on one side, and that her cousin lived
in Bullhead City, which was on another side. Perhaps Kyle could have been
clearer, but she was correct that Needles, a city in California, is about 20
miles away from Bullhead City, a city in Arizona, and that they sit on
opposite sides of the Colorado River, which serves as the border between
California and Arizona:
Google Maps, Driving Directions from Bullhead City, Arizona, to
Needles, California, Last Accessed September 30, 2026.
Kyle’s story was also bolstered by the results of Alaniz’s ALPR search:
[ECF No. 47-6 at 18:24:50].
The ALPR search result map appears to show Kyle’s travel history as
being around the Arizona/California border. Because the area around
Needles, California and Bullhead City, Arizona sits along the
Arizona/California border, this added to the credibility of Kyle’s statement.
Finally, the Court disagrees with the government that Kyle’s stated
purpose for her travel materially adds to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
When viewed in the context of Kyle recounting her travels to Alaniz,
“swimming” was merely the first thing she told him, it was not the
centerpiece of her story. Kyle also explained that she went to visit her cousin
who had a farm, and that she had not seen the people she visited in years.
There is nothing suspicious about Kyle visiting family she had not seen in
years, and swimming is a normal activity to do with people during a visit.
Indeed, visiting family that someone has not seen for years is a good reason
to travel a long way over a short time.
Perhaps Kyle was not the best storyteller when she recounted her travel
plans for Alaniz, but in the Court’s assessment of the evidence, her
statements were at most odd. They add little to the reasonable suspicion
calculus. Though Alaniz might not have made the same choices, Kyle’s travel
plans fall within the realm of reasonableness. United States v. Simpson, 609
F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2010).
2) Luggage
The government focuses on a few issues regarding Kyle’s luggage: (1) the
number of suitcases in the car for a single passenger on a short trip; (2) Kyle’s
reason for using suitcases instead of “Walmart” bags; and (3) the fact that
Kyle did not bring an extra suitcase with her.
First, the Court is cautious to give too much weight to the number of bags
that Kyle had in the car. In some circumstances, “the presence of a bag in a
vehicle adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion calculus.” United States v.
Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Santos,
403 F.3d 1120, 1124, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) to note that the Tenth Circuit had
previously declined to give any weight to the presence of a new, locked
suitcase in the defendant’s truck). Indeed, when contents of a vehicle are
consistent with a road trip, such as food wrappers, drink containers,
miscellaneous boxes, and clothes, those items might not carry any weight in
determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. United States v. Leon, 80
F.4th 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2023). But the amount of luggage for a stated
travel plan could potentially raise suspicion. See United States v. Ledesma,
447 F.3d 1307, 1318 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the amount of luggage as
relevant to the level of suspiciousness for stated travel plans). Here, Kyle was
travelling alone, and she made a relatively short trip. It would make sense to
have a couple bags for such a trip, but Kyle had about a half-dozen with her.
But Kyle offered a plausible explanation for the bags—she liked to collect
things during her travels. So, although the number of bags in Kyle’s vehicle
minimally adds to the reasonable suspicion calculus, it does so only slightly.
Second, the government misses the mark with respect to Kyle’s statement
about using suitcases instead of Walmart bags. When Kyle was explaining to
Alaniz why she had so many suitcases, she told him that she liked to pick up
clothes for her children and “just crap, basically,” indicating that she would
pick up things other than items for her children. She further explained that
she had to buy a suitcase while “out there” because it would look “silly” in
Walmart bags. Contrary to the government’s characterization of this issue,
the context of the video shows that Kyle referenced “Walmart bags” as a
generic term to reference the type of bag (i.e. a plastic grocery-style bag one
would find, for example, at Walmart), not that she specifically went to
Walmart. Because the Court disagrees with the government’s premise on this
point, it adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion calculus.
Third, the government also argues that it did not make sense for Kyle to
purchase an extra suitcase while traveling instead of bringing one with her.
Bringing an extra suitcase would also be a reasonable thing to do, of course.
But Kyle would be in good company if she had bought more gifts and
miscellany than originally planned while traveling, and the explanation she
tendered represents a reasonable, ad hoc, solution to her problem. That the
government can identify a more efficient solution to the problem does not add
anything to the reasonable suspicion calculus.
The Court agrees that the amount of luggage Kyle had in her vehicle was
a little excessive. But the problem for the government is that excessive
luggage, while odd, does not necessarily establish reasonable suspicion. The
Court acknowledges the deference owed to law enforcement officers based on
their training and experience to distinguish “between innocent and suspicious
actions.” United States v. Huerta, 166 F.4th 866, 875 (10th Cir. 2025)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). But that deference has limits. Courts
cannot allow a law enforcement officer to use training and experience as a
blank check to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 877 (10th Cir. 2025)
(“Although ‘an officer need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct’ to
satisfy the reasonableness standard, ‘there must be a concrete reason to
support [the non-innocent] interpretation,’” (citation omitted)); See Poolaw v.
Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 732 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting, in the context of
evaluating probable cause for a search warrant, that “an officer’s expertise
cannot be invoked to nullify the Supreme Court’s holding that mere
propinquity is insufficient to establish probable cause.”) (citing Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).
While Kyle’s luggage might have been somewhat odd, Alaniz and the
government fail to provide a sufficient rationale for why the amount of
luggage made it any more likely that Kyle was engaging in criminal activity
rather than one of the many lawful reasons someone would have excessive
luggage on a cross-country road trip. The closest the government gets to such
an explanation is by way of Alaniz’s testimony about his training and
experience, and how that made him believe that the facts in this case (e.g. a
short-turnaround, cross-country road trip with an individual traveler who
had excessive luggage) reasonably led him to believe that Kyle was
transporting drugs or otherwise engaged in criminal activity. When Alaniz
was questioned in more detail about his training and experience, he focused
on his conversations with other officers at training conferences, their
experiences in such investigations, and his own experience. But that does not
answer why or what about Alaniz’s training and experience, or the
information he received from other officers, gave him reasonable suspicion in
this case. Without a reasonable, articulable, concrete explanation, the Court
can only give a small amount of weight to Kyle’s luggage in the reasonable
suspicion calculus.
3) The Cigarette
The government argues that because Kyle had just lit a cigarette when
Alaniz approached her vehicle, held it inside the vehicle, and put it on her
dash after Alaniz asked her to put it out, this is an additional factor that
supports a finding of reasonable suspicion.
The Court acknowledges that people sometimes use products like air
fresheners and other things to mask the smell of contraband, and that it may
support reasonable suspicion. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174
(10th Cir. 2022). But there was nothing about Kyle’s cigarette use that could
reasonably be viewed as suspicious. Cigarettes are notoriously addictive, so it
is no surprise that someone who smokes cigarettes would do so when getting
pulled over. And after considering the circumstances in this case, Kyle’s
cigarette smoking fell well within the normal bounds of what smokers do
while smoking. The Court gives this factor no weight in the reasonable
suspicion analysis.
4) The Rental Vehicle
The government argues that Alaniz knew from “his training and
experience that rental cars are frequently used by drug traffickers to move
drugs across state lines on the highway,” thus meaning Kyle’s use of a rental
vehicle contributes to the reasonable suspicion calculus. [ECF No. 50 at 18].
The Court disagrees. “Generally, the fact that a vehicle has been rented,
standing alone, does not add to reasonable suspicion unless there are specific
facts that make the rental relevant or unusual.” Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1177.
Like the luggage issue, the government does not point to anything specific
about Alaniz’s training and experience or specific facts that make Kyle’s use
of rental car unusual or suspicious in any way. The Court does not give this
any weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus.
5) Nervousness.
The Tenth Circuit has “consistently held that ordinary nervousness bears
little weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus … because most motorists
experience some degree of nervousness when stopped by police and ‘unless
the police officer has had significant knowledge of a person, it is difficult,
even for a skilled police officer, to evaluate whether a person is acting
normally for them or nervously.’” United States v. Leon, 80 F.4th 1160, 1167
(10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). However, courts “give somewhat more
weight to extreme and persistent nervousness,” which is shown by specific
manifestations of such an extreme level of nervousness such as
uncontrollable shaking. Id. at 1167–68.
The government argues that “Deputy Alaniz observed Ms. Kyle exhibiting
several signs of persistent and extreme nervousness throughout the traffic
stop,” including, “Ms. Kyle taking deep breaths, shallow rapid breathing,
hands shaking uncontrollably, her carotid artery pulse in her neck, and her
nervousness was far more nervous than a typical driver being given a
warning for a minor traffic violation.” [ECF No. 50 at 19]. The Court does not
doubt that Alaniz perceived Kyle as being more nervous than a typical
person. But the Court simply does not perceive anything from the evidence in
the record other than Kyle exhibiting an ordinary level of nervousness for a
typical encounter with law enforcement during a traffic stop. Kyle was a bit
talkative, and her storytelling was somewhat sporadic, but she was generally
calm, had appropriate answers to Alaniz’s questions, responded in an
appropriate manner, and she had no observable shaking or physical
manifestations of nervousness that the Court could discern from the record.
Therefore, the Court gives Kyle’s ordinary nervousness little to no weight in
the reasonable suspicion calculus.
6) The Marijuana Disclosure
The government finally argues that Kyle’s statements about the
marijuana in her car provided Alaniz with “additional reasonable suspicion”
to detain her for violations of Oklahoma criminal statutes. [ECF No. 50 at
19–20]. Again, however, the government misses the mark on this front.
“An officer may not prolong [a] traffic stop to conduct an unrelated
investigation without reasonable suspicion that the detainee is engaged in
criminal activity.” United States v. Leon, 80 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)). In the context of
a traffic stop, it “must be justified at its inception and the officer’s actions
must be ‘reasonably related in scope’ to the ‘mission of the stop.’” Frazier, 30
F.4th at 1173. Additionally, “an unlawful seizure occurs when an officer (1)
diverts from the traffic-based mission of the stop to investigate ordinary
criminal conduct, (2) in a way that ‘prolongs’ (i.e., adds time to) the stop, and
(3) the investigative detour is unsupported by any independent reasonable
suspicion.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Even de minimis delays caused by unrelated inquiries violate the Fourth
Amendment in the absence of reasonable suspicion.” Id. The moment an
officer needs additional reasonable suspicion is referred to as the “Rodriguez
moment.” United States v. Leon, 80 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023). “Facts
learned later in the investigation are irrelevant,” and “seizure of the
individual remains illegal from that point forward.” Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1179.
Alaniz ended the traffic-based portion of the stop by returning Kyle’s
license to her. United States v. Munoz, 162 F.4th 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 2025).
Alaniz also made it even more clear that this was the Rodriguez moment
because he specifically announced that Kyle was being detained. Critically,
this happened before Kyle made any disclosures about marijuana being in her
vehicle. Because Alaniz extended the stop to investigate unrelated drug
crimes without reasonable suspicion (for the reasons explained in more detail
below under a totality of the circumstances approach), Kyle’s seizure became
unlawful at that point.
7) Totality of the Circumstances
Although the Court has addressed each factor identified by the
government individually for purposes of organization and clarity, the Court
evaluates the facts under the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Leon, 80 F.4th at 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2023). At the Rodriguez moment in
this case, Alaniz knew the following relevant information about Kyle and her
travels available to him:
• She made a short trip to California that required a long drive to and
from her departure in Missouri over a short period;
• She audibly recounted what day she left for her trip;
• She went swimming on her trip, bought items for her kids and other
things, she visited her cousin, and she had not seen the people she
visited in years;
• She stayed in a town on one side of the Arizona/California border,
and visited someone in a town on the other side of the border;
• She had excessive luggage in her car with a somewhat odd
explanation for the amount and type of luggage she used;
• She smoked a cigarette in her car;
• She was driving a rental vehicle; and
• She was nervous, but not extremely or persistently nervous.
In the Court’s view, Alaniz did not have enough information to reasonably
believe that Kyle was engaged in unlawful conduct. The factors that the
government relies upon are the same type of circumstances that everyday
Americans encounter on long road trips for many legitimate reasons. Many of
us drive longer than we want to get to a desired destination, or to no
destination at all other than the road and sights ahead. Many of us lose track
of what exact day of the week it is when we are traveling, even if it is for just
a moment. Many of us travel for myriad reasons (some better than others),
cross state lines, pack too much, buy too much, smoke cigarettes, and rent
cars. And many of us even get a bit nervous when talking to law enforcement.
At the end of the day, the unavoidable hole in the record for the
government is that it does not tie any of this to a specific, articulable reason
why any one or combination of factors gave Alaniz a reasonable basis to
believe Kyle engaged in criminal activity. The Tenth Circuit stated it well in
United States v. Leon:
The factors cited by the … government are not inconsistent with
drug trafficking, but they are also not meaningfully indicative of
drug trafficking. Although reasonable suspicion is a low bar,
“[t]he articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a
substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement
of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.” This is a close case, but
we cannot say the factors operate together to eliminate a
sufficient portion of innocent travel. “Reliance on the mantra ‘the
totality of the circumstances’ cannot metamorphose these facts
into reasonable suspicion.”
80 F.4th at 1170. Because the government fails to eliminate a
substantial portion of innocent travelers or otherwise provide the Court
with a reasonable, articulable explanation why Kyle’s conduct indicated
criminal activity rather than innocent travel plans, the Court finds that
Alaniz’s suspicion was “inchoate rather than reasonable.” Id.
The Court finds a nexus between Alaniz’s unlawful extension of the stop
after he returned Kyle’s license to her and all evidence obtained thereafter.
Such evidence would not have been acquired without Alaniz unlawfully
extending the stop. Because the government does not identify any applicable
exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court finds all evidence recovered as a
result of the stop must be suppressed.
C. Alaniz’s use of the ALPR Systems was an Unconstitutional
Warrantless Search.
Kyle also challenges the constitutionality of Alaniz’s use of the ALPR
systems in his investigation. From Kyle’s perspective, she “has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the location data which tracked her movements over
several weeks,” and the collection and use of that information violated her
privacy interest. [ECF No. 47 at 17–18]. More specifically, she argues that
her reasonable expectation of privacy in her historical location data is
recognized by society, that the ALPR search was an unreasonable
governmental intrusion of protected privacy rights, and that compliance with
internal policy or state law is not decisive under the Fourth Amendment. [Id.
at 18–22]. Based on the alleged Fourth Amendment violation for the ALPR
search, Kyle further argues that the evidence derived from her detention and
search of her vehicle, as well as her statements about possessing marijuana,
should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. [Id. at 22–23].
The government primarily responds to Kyle’s argument by noting that the
data obtained by ALPR technology is in plain view on public roadways;
meaning, Kyle did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information. [ECF No. 50 at 22–23]. The government further argues that
Oklahoma law regarding ALPR use is not relevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis. [Id. at 23–24].
Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have decided whether
law enforcement’s use of ALPR technology is a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. The issue is still working its way through trial and appellate courts
across the country. Based on the Court’s research, it appears that nearly
every court examining the issue to date has determined that ALPR
technology use is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because people
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on public
streets. Indeed, several other Oklahoma federal courts have decided the issue
this way. United States v. Schoggins, No. CR-25-189-JFH, 2026 WL 713083
(E.D. Okla. Jan 28, 2026); United States v. Brown, No. CR-25-188-D, 2025
WL 2444596 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 25, 2025); United States v. Acosta, No. 25-CR00239-GKF, 2025 WL 2427700 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2025). But the Court is
concerned that many of these decisions give too much weight to the language
in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), without adequately accounting for the context of ALPR technology
and the principles underlying the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions on
large-scale data collection on an individual’s whereabouts.
In Knotts, the Supreme Court found that “[a] person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another.” 460 U.S. at 281. But that
language exists in the context of the facts presented in the case. Rather than
a large-scale, dragnet-type surveillance system like the ALPR technology in
this case, the Court in Knotts was confronted with much less sophisticated
technology. In Knotts, a chemical manufacturer notified law enforcement that
one of its former employees had stolen chemicals that could be used to
manufacture drugs. Id. at 278. As a part of the investigation, law
enforcement put a “beeper” in one of the chemical containers, and used the
beeper to assist in tracking the vehicle that the container was in. Id. The
Supreme Court determined this was neither a search nor seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes. But the defendant in that case raised concerns that
“the result of the [Court’s] holding sought by the government would be that
‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible,
without judicial knowledge or supervision.’” Id. at 283 (citing Br. For Resp.,
at 9). The Court addressed the defendant’s concern:
But the fact is that the “reality hardly suggests abuse[;]” if such
dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions
should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable. Insofar as respondent’s complaint appears to be
simply that scientific devices such as the beeper enabled the
police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no
constitutional foundation. We have never equated police
efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.
Id. at 283–84 (cleaned up).
More than 40 years have passed since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Knotts, and this Court is now faced with technology that appears to be
approaching the dragnet type law enforcement practice Mr. Knotts warned
of. Therefore, lower courts need to reexamine the result in Knotts as
technology advances past the rudimentary beeper in that case. Adhering too
strictly to the Supreme Court’s language in Knotts about a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in “his movements from one place to
another” risks ignoring the Fourth Amendment principles at stake. Id. at
281.
The Court must keep in mind the basic underlying principle that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). That is why “‘[w]hen an individual seeks to preserve
something as private and his expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ then governmental ‘intrusion into that
private sphere generally qualifies as a search.’” Chatrie v. United States, 609
U.S. ___, 146 S.Ct. 2193, 2204 (2026) (citation omitted).
The Court acknowledges that people, in at least a broad sense, do not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on a public roadway.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). But the rapid
development of technology requires courts to take a more nuanced approach
than following Knotts in a vacuum. The Supreme Court has paid particularly
close attention to cell phones, which collect immense amounts of information
about people’s whereabouts in fine detail. In Carpenter v. United States, the
Court held that the government’s acquisition of cell-cite location records was
a search under the Fourth Amendment. 585 U.S. 296, 320 (2018). Certainly,
the Carpenter majority distinguished cell phones from automobiles: “While
individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones
with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” Id. at 311. But the
Court nevertheless also pointed out that “[a] majority of this Court has
already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the whole of their physical movements.” Id. at 310.
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of law
enforcement obtaining “geofence” warrants, a tool that allows one to “draw a
“geofence”—a virtual perimeter—around the crime scene and get a warrant
compelling a company to hand over data about the cell phones located in that
area near the time of the crime. Following a process specified in the warrant,
the company will turn over the cell-phone data and eventually identify by
name one or more of the users thus disclosed.” Chatrie v. United States, 609
U.S. ___, 146 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 (2026). The majority in Chatrie concluded that
“the police conducted a search when they gained access to Location History
data,” and that “[a]n individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
records about his cell phone’s location.” Id. In reaching its conclusion in
Chatrie, the Court pointed to its previous decision in Carpenter, which noted
that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car.” Id. at 2207 (quoting
Carpenter, 585 U.S., at 310). In the Court’s view, it is not dispositive that
someone’s movements occur in public. The underlying principle to take away
from Carpenter and Chatrie is that people “have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the whole of their physical movements.” Id. at 2206 (quoting
Carpenter, 585 U.S., at 310).
The use of the ALPR camera system described by Alaniz in this case
credibly invokes concerns raised in both Carpenter and Chatrie. Alaniz had
access to an entire month’s worth of location data tied to the license plate on
Kyle’s car, including more than fifty sightings across multiple states. [ECF
No. 50-3]. This is not the same fine-tuned level of detail that something like a
cell phone reveals about the whole of someone’s physical movements. But by
virtue of how ALPR technology works, Alaniz and other officers using these
systems have access to a continuously updated location history for all
vehicles caught on ALPR cameras within the network. This is a type of
indiscriminate mass surveillance. It is not targeted on a single individual, as
in Carpenter. It is a tool that collects information about all vehicles that pass
by any network-connected camera at all times, and it serves up the
information to law enforcement on demand.
Think about it this way. We might reasonably expect our friends and
family to tell us something like: “Hey, I saw you out driving by the store last
week.” But we do not expect people we know—let alone strangers, and
especially not law enforcement—to randomly approach us to say: “Hey, I have
been following your car for the last 30 days, and here is a detailed log of every
place your vehicle has been with supporting photographic evidence. I am also
going to share this information with law enforcement throughout the country
so they know your whereabouts, too.” Freedom from persistent, dragnet-style
surveillance while in public is not a foreign concept in our society, and it is a
reasonable expectation that society already accepts. This is the same
expectation of privacy that the Supreme Court has continued to recognize in
cases like Carpenter and Chatrie. Cell phones also move in public places
where people can see you in plain view. But it becomes constitutionally
problematic when law enforcement can indiscriminately and passively
catalog your whereabouts over an extended period of time and then use that
information for any purpose whenever convenient.
Here, of course, no single vehicle was being followed. Instead, every vehicle
was being indiscriminately tracked until law enforcement needed information
about a particular vehicle driving down an Oklahoma highway with a
California plate. The apparent nationwide scale of the ALPR systems Alaniz
had access to is concerning enough. But it is also consequential that we are
not just dealing with stationary cameras. The cameras on Alaniz’s vehicle
itself feed information into these systems. It is not difficult to imagine what is
next: more cameras on more street signs, buildings, and perhaps on more
police cars. It is also no longer difficult to imagine law enforcement using a
fleet of drones hovering over an entire city so they don’t miss the movement
of a single vehicle. This is not hypothetical catastrophizing. The Court “must
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (10th Cir. 2001). The
Supreme Court echoed this principle in Carpenter:
As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is
obligated—as “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the Government”—to ensure
that the “progress of science” does not erode Fourth Amendment
protections. Here the progress of science has afforded law
enforcement a powerful new tool to carry out its important
responsibilities. At the same time, this tool risks Government
encroachment of the sort the Framers, “after consulting the
lessons of history,” drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.
585 U.S. 296, 320 (2018) (citations omitted); see also Chatrie, 609 U.S. __, 146
S.C.t 2193, 2207 (2026) (“A new technology should not transform what
individuals had reasonably thought they could withhold from the
Government.”).
To be sure, ALPR technology does not provide the same precision in
location information as cell phones. But it could still reveal a lot about a
person’s whereabouts, and it is easy to imagine the kinds of sensitive
information it collects. It could track and log a couple struggling to start a
family at the fertility clinic. It could show how often someone visits a liquor
store or casino. It could show which doctor someone goes to or what lawyer’s
office someone visits. It also collects mundane information about people’s
commutes, but it collects a tremendous amount of such information all the
time. It is possible that a dedicated team of law enforcement officers could
constitutionally collect this information about one car—and its driver—by
following that vehicle on public roadways over a month. But this leaves the
question of why is it the government’s business where everyone goes all the
time? The government cannot go snooping through our personal lives and
business without an adequate basis to do so. That is what the Supreme Court
has said since its decision in Katz through its decision in Chatrie this year,
nearly sixty years later. It is not too much to draw the line at indiscriminate
mass surveillance.
No doubt, ALPR technology comes with remarkable benefits that the
Court cannot ignore. But the Fourth Amendment requires courts to draw a
line when the cost is too great. Alaniz’s search in just the ALPR system
provided him with more than 50 individual records of Kyle’s whereabouts
across the country for an entire month. The Court finds that because the
ALPR systems Alaniz used to search Kyle’s historical location information
intruded on her reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of her physical
movements, it was a search under the Fourth Amendment. Based on the
information in the record, the only reason Alaniz conducted that search was
because he saw her license plate was from California. That search was not
supported by probable cause, and it was done without a warrant in violation
of Kyle’s Fourth Amendment rights. That search also has a nexus to the
remainder of the traffic stop because Alaniz began following Kyle’s car while
he conducted the ALPR search, which led to the rest of the evidence obtained
during the traffic stop. Because the government does not identify any
adequate exception to the exclusionary rule, all evidence obtained after
Alaniz initiated the ALPR search must be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree.
III. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Opposed Motion to
Suppress [ECF No. 47] is GRANTED for the reasons explained above.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2026.
Sara E. Hill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DOCKET STATUS AS OF 4 OCTOBER 2026 (CourtListener RECAP): the jury trial set for 6 Oct 2026 was stricken and a status conference set for 5 Oct 2026 before Judge Hill (ECF 66, 67). A defence motion to vacate the detention order, docketed as unopposed (ECF 63), was set for hearing on 5 Oct 2026 before Magistrate Judge Mark T. Steele (ECF 65). No notice of appeal appeared on the docket. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 the United States may appeal a suppression order to the Tenth Circuit within 30 days.