FM 1 112 Attack Helicopter Operations

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FM 1-112

ATTACK HELICOPTER
OPERATIONS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

*FM 1-112

FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS

No. 1-112 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington, DC, 2 April 1997

ATTACK HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Paragraph Page

Preface v

Chapter 1 ATTACK HELICOPTER FUNDAMENTALS

Roles of the ATKHB 1-1 1-1

Organization 1-2 1-8

Missions, Organizational Capabilities, and

Limitations 1-3 1-12

Chapter 2 BATTLE COMMAND

Command and Control Duties and Responsibilities 2-1 2-1

Command Relationships 2-2 2-7

IPB Process 2-3 2-7

Command and Control Process 2-4 2-9

Command Posts 2-5 2-12

Command Communications Systems 2-6 2-14

Communications 2-7 2-18

OPSEC 2-8 2-18

Chapter 3 EMPLOYMENT

Section I . Organization and Roles

Organization 3-1 3-1

Roles and Responsibilities 3-2 3-6

Section II. Terms and Missions

Operational Terms 3-3 3-9

Employment Methods 3-4 3-14

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; .distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 1-112, 21 February 1991.

FM 1-112

Paragraph Page

Section III. Environmental Considerations

Environmental Factors 3-5 3-17

Section IV. Movement to the Objective Area

Preparation For Movement 3-6 3-24

Movement 3-7 3-28

Occupation of the BP/SBF Position and ABF

Position 3-8 3-41

Section V. Objective Area Overview

EA Planning 3-9 3-44

Principles of Direct Fire 3-10 3-45

Principles of Fire Control 3-11 3-46

Section VI. EA Development

Step 1. IPB 3-12 3-48

Step 2. Select the Ground for the Attack 3-13 3-49

Step 3. I ntegration of the EA 3-14 3-50

Section VII. Direct Fire Planning

Step 4. Planning the Direct Fire Fight 3-15 3-55

Step 5. Fire Commands 3-16 3-56

Step 6. Reviewing the Plan 3-17 3-61

Step 7. Rehearsing the Plan 3-18 3-62

Step 8. Executing the Plan 3-19 3-62

E A Development/Direct Fire Summary 3-20 3-63

Section VI 1 1 . Completing the Engagement

Breaking Contact 3-21 3-64

Egress Operations 3-22 3-66

Restoration 3-23 3-67

Section IX. Other Operations

Reconnaissance and Security 3-24 3-68

JAAT 3-25 3-71

FM 1-112

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.

Appendix D.
Appendix E .

Appendix F.
Appendix G.

Paragraph

COMBAT SUPPORT

Fire Support 4-1

I EW Operations 4-2

AD 4-3

Engineer Support 4-4

NBC Support 4-5

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Planning and Coordination 5-1

Fuel and Ammunition Requirements 5-2

FARPs 5-3

Vehicle and GSE Maintenance 5-4

Aircraft Support 5-5

Transportation Requirements 5-6

Personnel Services 5-7

Field Services 5-8

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Operational Concept 6-1

Principles of SASO 6-2

Employment Guidelines 6-3

Types of Operations 6-4

Lessons Learned 6-5

ATTACK AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

AIR ASSAULT SECURITY

SAMPLE ORDER AND MISSION BRIEFING
FORMATS

UNIT MOVEMENT

TACTICAL STANDING OPERATING
PROCEDURES

AIR COMBAT

ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

iii

Page

4-1

4-12

4-14

4-19

5-1

5-2

5-5

5-7

6-1

6-2

6-3

A-l

B-l

C-l

D-l

E-l

F-l

G-l

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Appendix H. DEEP OPERATIONS BY KIOWA WARRIOR ATTACK

HELICOPTER BATTALIONS H-l

APPENDIX I. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE-SEARCH AND ATTACK 1-1

Glossary Glossary-1

References References-1

Index Index-1

FM 1-112

PREFACE

This manual is the Army's doctrinal manual for attack helicopter operations. It is
designed to assist attack helicopter commanders, their staffs, and subordinate company
commanders in the conduct of training and combat operations. It also serves as a guide
for corps, division, and brigade commanders and their staffs. This manual discusses the
organization, capabilities, and employment of attack helicopter units.

This manual incorporates current Army doctrine based on FM 100-5. It describes the ARI
force structure and the associated TTP based on currently fielded systems. It is
recognized that the fielding of the Army's planned digital information systems and
modern aircraft, such as the AH -64D, will alter the TTP in this manual. During this
transition to the future, lessons learned, equipment upgrades, and digital TTP will be
captured and incorporated into the next edition of this manual.

This manual sets forth doctrinal principles that guide the conduct of light and heavy
attack helicopter operations. It addresses specific TTP to clarify or emphasize these
principles. Users must apply this doctrine within the capabilities and limitations of their
units and develop SOPs that address specific techniques and procedures.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations
on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to the
Commander, United States Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, ATTN: ATZQ-TDS-D
(FM 1-112), Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5092.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men.

This publication has been reviewed for OPSEC considerations.

FM 1-112

This publication implements the foil owing international agreements:

STANAG 2019 (Edition Three)
and QSTAG 509

STANAG 2041 (Edition Four)
and QSTAG 520

STANAG 2404

STANAG 2868 (Edition Four)

STANAG 2889 (Edition Three)
and QSTAG 742

STANAG 2999 (Edition One)
STANAG 3497 (Edition One)

QSTAG 277 (Edition Three)

Military Symbols for Land Based
Systems--APP-6

Operations Orders, Tables and
Graphics for Road Movement

J oint Anti -Armor Operations
(Draft)

Land Force Tactical Doctrine--
ATP-35(A)

Marking of Flazardous Areas and
Routes Through Them

Use of Helicopters in Land
O per at i on s-AT P -49

Aeromedical Training of Aircrew in
Aircrew NBC Equipment and
Procedures

Procedures for the Employment of
Helicopters in the Anti armor Role

FM 1-112

CHAPTER 1

ATTACK HELICOPTER FUNDAMENTALS

Attack helicopter battalions are assigned to divisional aviation brigades and corps
ATKHRs (in corps aviation brigades). They provide the supported commander a highly
mobile and lethal armor, personnel, and materiel destruction capability during the day
and night. This chapter explains what an ATKHB is, how it is organized for the different
types of divisions and the corps ATKH Rs, and its organizational capabilities and
limitations.

1-1. ROLES OF THE ATKHB

a. General .

(1) The ATKHB is an aerial maneuver unit usually employed as a battalion.
It conducts attack, reconnaissance, and security operations that complement other
maneuver forces. The ATKHB enables the supported commander to mass combat power
rapidly at the decisive time and place to affect a battle's outcome. The commander must
integrate the ATKHB into his tactical maneuver plan with other maneuver units. When
employed with other combat assets, the ATKHB can strike the enemy where and when it
is most vulnerable.

(2) An ATKHB never fights alone. Attacks are coordinated with other
maneuver, combat support, CSS, and joint forces to form a combined arms team. This
team surprises and overwhelms the enemy at the point of attack. Attacks may be
conducted out of physical contact with other friendly forces but synchronized with their
scheme of maneuver, or they may be in direct contact with friendly forces.

b. Tenets of Army Operations . Success on future battlefields depends on how
well the tenets of Army operations doctrine are applied. These tenets are initiative,
depth, agility, synchronization, and versatility. General aviation employment principles
as related to these tenets are discussed in depth in FM 1-111, Aviation Brigade
Operations, Chapter 1. Application of these tenets as related to the ATKHB are discussed
below.

(1) Initiative . Attack helicopters are offensive weapon systems. They
provide commanders the means to deliver massed firepower rapidly and accurately, thus
disorganizing enemy forces and allowing the friendly force to gain or maintain the
initiative. To be successful, the ATKHB must be integrated into the ground commander's
scheme of maneuver. This requires that commanders analyze the battlefield and decide
early where the ATKHB will be employed.

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(2) Depth . The ATKH B can attack the enemy forces anywhere on the
battlefield. Commanders must see and use the entire battlefield to strike the enemy and
prevent it from concentrating forces at a point of its choice. The speed with which attack
helicopters can mass combat power at chosen points in the battle area allows the force
commander to influence the battle to a depth that would otherwise be beyond his reach.

(3) Agility . The mobility and flexibility of attack helicopters expand the
reach of commanders to all areas of the battlefield. Terrain provides cover and
concealment for attack helicopters just as it does for armor and infantry; however, it does
not limit the mobility of the helicopter. The ATKH B can attack the enemy's flanks and
rear, thus providing ground forces the time to maneuver and engage enemy forces from
directions where they are most vulnerable.

(4) Synchronization . To survive and succeed on the battlefield, the
ATKH B must fight as an integrated member of the combined arms team. I n combat, the
fires of other attacking weapons enhance the firepower of the attack helicopter. This
combined attack strengthens the total force by overcoming limitations found in each
weapon system. As a result, total combat power is increased and survivability is
improved. When the enemy is simultaneously faced with an array of armor, infantry, FA,
TACAIR, and attack helicopter units, it can no longer concentrate on countering a single
set of weapons from one direction at a time. Rather, it is attacked throughout its depth
with a variety of weapons.

(5) Versatility . On today's and tomorrow's battlefields, the tempo of the
fight is rapid, violent, and extremely fluid. The ATKH B's primary mission is the
destruction of enemy armor or mechanized forces. The ATKH B, however, must be
prepared to conduct reconnaissance and security operations. Additionally, in OOTW, a
subversive or less distinguishable enemy may require the ATKHB to provide direct or
indirect fires in DS of friendly ground forces operating in an urban environment. The
ability of the ATKHB to transition smoothly and rapidly is the result of well-led, well-
trained, and well-equipped forces; high standards; and detailed planning. While the
ATKHB can react quickly, it requires as much mission planning time as other maneuver
battalions.

c. Framework of the Battlefield . The Army's warfi ghti ng doctri ne specifi es
that deep, close, and rear operations occur simultaneously. An ATKHB can conduct all
three during offensive and defensive operations. An ATKHB conducting deep operations
allows corps and division commanders to influence close operations before the enemy
closes with friendly forces. During the conduct of close operations, an ATKHB allows
corps and division commanders to weigh their main effort and brigade commanders to
attack the enemy in depth. An ATKHB also gives corps and division commanders the
ability to mass combat power rapidly against enemy ground penetrations and large air-
borne or heli borne assaults into the corps or divisional rear area.

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d. Attack Helicopters in Combat Operations . The force commander's
assessment of the factors of METT-T influence the missions that are assigned to the
ATKH B. With the ATKH B commander's assistance, the force commander determines
where the ATK H B wi 1 1 be used. F rom the force commander's mi ssi on and i ntent, the
ATK H B commander deter mi nes how the battal i on wi 1 1 be empl oyed. Some of the force
commander's options for employing the ATKH B are--

(1) To attack massed armored or light forces.

( 2 ) T o attack i n depth to extend the i nfl uence of the force.

( 3 ) To dominate avenues of approach.

( 4 ) T o rei nforce ground forces by fi re.

( 5 ) To mass to defeat enemy penetrations.

( 6 ) To attack to protect the flanks of a moving or halted friendly main body.

( 7 ) To provide security for the movement and passage of lines by ground

forces.

( 8 ) To conduct reconnaissance.

( 9 ) To perform search and attack missions.

e. Role in the Offense .

(1) Destroying the enemy's fighting force is the only sure way of winning any
future conflict. The operational concepts of offensive operations are concentration,
surprise, speed, flexibility, and audacity. The ATKH B gives the maneuver commander,
who conducts offensive operations, a viable force that can rapidly concentrate firepower at
the decisive time and place.

( 2 ) Corps and divisions use five complementary elements in fighting offen-
sive battles. These elements are--

(a) Main and supporting attacks.

(b) A reserve in support of an attack.

(d) Deep operations.

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FM 1-112

(e) Rear operations.

(3) ATKH Bs can operate as part of each of these elements by conducting
attacks, reconnaissance, and security operations. As part of the five elements, they can
act as part of the main attack force by conducting deliberate attacks. The ATKH B can
also conduct supporting attacks by cutting off enemy reinforcements and acting as part of
the reserves, ready to weigh the main effort and to exploit success.

f. Forms of the Offense .

(1) Movement to contact . A movement to contact is used to gain or
reestablish contact with the enemy. It may be used when contact with the enemy has
been temporarily lost, or it may be used to initiate an attack. A movement to contact
helps develop the situation and maintain the commander's freedom of action. During a
movement to contact, the ATKH B operates with ground forces and is critical to the
success of the advance forces and the main body. A movement to contact often results in
a meeting engagement; that is, forces engage each other by chance rather than by design.
As part of the covering force or advance guard, the ATKH B can destroy forward enemy
elements identified by reconnaissance, air cavalry or ground forces. The mobility and fire-
power of the ATKH B will permit the main body commander to overwhelm the enemy and
maintain the initiative. This means that the commander will not have to pause and
marshal the necessary ground combat power to attack.

(a) As part of the advance guard, the ATKH B is used to attack enemy
forces that are attempting to disrupt friendly operations. The ATKH B will operate from
successive FAAs located along the axis of advance. As lucrative targets of opportunity are
identified by other members of the advance guard, the ATKH B maneuvers to conduct
hasty attacks to destroy or disrupt them. The battalion plans these hasty attacks using
the IPB process. The ATKH B may also perform search and attack missions during a
movement to contact. This technique is used when the enemy situation is vague and the
area of operations is large.

(b) When the ATK H B i s empl oyed as part of the mai n body, it wi 1 1
exploit enemy weaknesses and attack counter-attacking forces, and operate from
successive FAAs. The ATKH B then will maneuver to reinforce attacking ground forces or
attack advancing or withdrawing enemy forces.

(c) When planning to operate as part of a movement to contact, the
ATKHB commander looks at possible EAs along the entire axis of advance and their
associated holding areas, attack routes, and attack by fire positions.

(2) Attack . The two types of attacks for attack helicopters are the hasty
attack and the deliberate attack. Each is discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

(a) Hasty attack . A hasty attack is an operation for which a unit has
not made extensive preparations. It is conducted with the resources immediately

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FM 1-112

available to maintain momentum or take advantage of the enemy situation. Hasty
attacks are normally conducted as a branch to a deliberate attack or a reconnaissance or
security operation. For attack helicopters, a hasty attack is made on an enemy force to
retai n the momentum of the enti re force. H asty attacks conducted by the ATK H B are
made with the foreknowledge of where the EAs and battle positions are located. The
exact time, EA, and the threat to be encountered during the attack, however, are not
known until shortly before the mission.

(b) Deliberate attack . A deliberate attack is conducted against an
enemy that is well -organized and cannot be turned or bypassed. It is planned and
carefully coordinated with all concerned elements. The deliberate attack is based on a
thorough reconnaissance, an evaluation of all available intelligence and relative combat
strength, an analysis of various courses of action, and other factors affecting the situation.
To conduct a successful del i berate attack, theATKHB is integrated with the overall force
scheme of maneuver. TheATKHB provides a mobile and flexible combat capability and
can execute contingency plans as well as attacks that support the main effort. During a
del i berate attack, theATKHB can conduct attacks on enemy C 2 facilities and on
counterattacking or withdrawing enemy forces.

(3) Exploitation. An exploitation usually follows a successful attack and is
made to take advantage of weakened or collapsed enemy defenses. It prevents the enemy
from reorganizing a defensive system or conducting an orderly withdrawal. An
exploitation also is conducted to secure deep objectives. During an exploitation, an
ATKHB is employed as part of a larger force. TheATKHB strikes the enemy's flanks and
rear areas disrupting its withdrawal and attempts to reorganize. TheATKHB operates as
in a movement to contact by following the ground forces and is prepared to conduct hasty
attacks on counterattacking and withdrawing enemy forces. TheATKHB can also conduct
deep attacks to further disrupt the enemy.

(4) Pursuit . A pursuit is an offensive operation taken after a successful
attack or developed during an exploitation. The pursuit takes advantage of enemy
weaknesses and its inability to establish an organized defense. As the enemy attempts to
disengage, friendly forces maintain relentless pressure in an attempt to destroy enemy
forces completely. A pursuit requires unrelenting pressure, speed, mobility, and firepower
to complete the enemy's destruction. TheATKHB is an essential element in the pursuit.
As ground forces attempt to maintain contact and flank the enemy, theATKHB and air
assault forces can maneuver deep to cut off the enemy as it attempts to withdraw. The
ATKHB and air assault forces also can block entry to relieving enemy forces and can
attack retreating enemy forces, which further deteriorates their situation. Repeated
attacks by theATKHB will quicken the disintegration of enemy forces and will destroy
their will to fight. C 2 during a pursuit is critical. Commanders must coordinate the
pursuit by ground forces and theATKHB to ensure success during a rapidly changing
combat environment. Communications may become difficult or be broken. When this
occurs, commanders must act quickly to reestablish communications and ensure
coordination between air and ground maneuvers.

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FM 1-112

g. Forms of the Defense .

(1) A successful defense requires active and passive elements working
together to regain the initiative. The objective of a defensive operation is to cause the
enemy attack to fail; preserve the force, facilities, and installations; control key terrain;
gain time; or concentrate forces elsewhere. Other objectives may be to retain captured
terrain and degrade enemy forces so that offensive operations can be resumed. Successful
defensive operations depend on-

fa) Synchronizing all available combat capabilities.

(b) Seizing the tactical initiative locally and then generally as the entire
force shifts from defense to offense.

(c) Fighting the enemy throughout the depth of its formations to delay
and disorganize it and create opportunities for offensive actions.

( 2 ) The ATK H B nor mal I y parti ci pates i n two types of defense-the mobi I e
defense and the area defense. The ATKH B uses its mobility and long range observation
and engagement capabilities to deny terrain to the enemy, as well as support the ground
defense with direct fires.

(a) Area defense . ATKHBs normally conduct an area defense when
directed to defend specified terrain, when the enemy enjoys a mobility advantage over the
defending force, when well-defined avenues of approach exist, and the defending force has
sufficient combat power to cover the likely enemy avenues of approach in sector. The
orientation of the area defense is to deny the enemy designated terrain. Maneuver within
an area defense usually consists of repositioning between defensive positions or within
sectors and counterattacks. A perimeter defense is a form of area defense, oriented in all
directions.

(b) Mobile defense . ATKHBs conduct a mobile defense by allowing
the enemy force to advance to a point where it is exposed to a decisive attack by a striking
force. The end state of the mobile defense is destruction of the enemy force. The
commander conducts a mobile defense by organizing his force into two subunits: a fixing
force and a striking force. The fixing force shapes the penetration or contains the enemy
advance, while the striking force conducts the decisive attack.

h. Deep Operations .

(1) Deep operations, or raids, are activities directed against enemy forces
that currently are not engaged but that could influence division or corps close operations
within the next 24 to 72 hours. The ATKH B will conduct deep operations at corps and
divisional levels. Deep attacks by corps ATKHBs help the corps commander to shape the
battlefield and set the terms for close operations. Deep attacks conducted by divisional
ATKHBs help the division commander to shape the battlefield and are used to allow

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FM 1-112

defending maneuver brigades to engage the enemy throughout its depth. Deep operations
will occur during both friendly offensive and defensive operations.

( 2 ) Deep operations are high-risk, high-payoff operations that must be
executed with the utmost care. Planning and I PB must be detailed and as precise as
possible to allow the ATKHB to accomplish its mission with the least amount of risk. The
ATKHB itself is a high value/high payoff target (HVT/HPT). To send it deep requires the
recognition that the target is worth the expenditure of the ATKH B and the combat
support elements that it takes to accomplish the mission.

i. Close Operations .

(1) The ATKHB may be part of the larger force's security operation as a
member of a covering force. The ATKHB is the primary force that ensures that the
covering force commander can retain the spirit of the offense. Because of the speed and
flexibility of the ATKHB, it can rapidly concentrate combat power throughout the covering
force area. The ATKHB attacks to accomplish the objectives of the covering force
commander. Employed well forward, it operates out of FAAs in the rear of the covering
force area. At corps level, the ATKHB may be attached or placed under the OPCON of
armored caval ry regi ments to i ncrease thei r I ong-range anti armor fi res. At di vi si onal

I evel , the ATK H B i s the pri mary I ong-range armor ki 1 1 er .

( 2 ) Once the fi ght has moved i nto the mai n battl e area, the commander
should use the ATKHB against the enemy's main effort. To take decisive offensive action,
supported commanders can retain their ATKHBs as part of their reserve. An ATKHB
should not beheld in reserve to redeem failure. The commander commits the ATKH B at
a decisive place to exploit success or ensure accomplishment of the mission. Using an
ATKHB during the defense often comes as part of a counterattack. The ATKHB
counterattacks along with other maneuver forces to strike the enemy throughout the
depth of the battlefield and help the force seize the initiative.

(a) Attacking enemy second echelon battalions and regiments .

While ground units engage the enemy from battle positions where they can range the
leading elements of the enemy attack, the ATKHB maneuvers to attack the enemy's
follow-on battalions and regiments simultaneously. Thus they attack the enemy
throughout its depth.

(b) Massing to defeat enemy penetrations . ATKH Bs attack enemy
penetrations along with other maneuver forces to defeat them and restore the FLOT.
While other maneuver forces attack the head of the penetration, the ATKHB attacks the
penetration in depth, denying the enemy commander the opportunity to mass, bypass, or
withdraw. Once the enemy is encircled, the ATKHB can attack enemy breakouts or any
other forces that may attempt to relieve the encircled enemy force.

(c) Attacking to defeat enemy flanking forces . The ATKHB can be
used to dominate avenues of approach into the rear and flanks of friendly forces. The

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ATKHB will reinforce the flank screen or guard to defeat the threat to the flanks of the
main body.

j. Rear Operations .

(1) Rear operations are conducted to assure freedom of maneuver and
operational continuity from the corps rear boundary forward to the rear boundaries of
committed maneuver units. ATKHBs, along with ground forces, may be given on-order
missions to act as rapid reaction forces for Level II or III incursions into brigade, division,
or corps rear areas. The ATKHB can rapidly react to enemy heli borne or airborne
operations into the friendly force's rear area. The ATKHB should attempt to attack the
enemy force in its assembly area or just as it arrives in its LZ. The ATKHB is especially
valuable in rear operations when the enemy has air-landed or air-dropped light armored
vehicles.

(2) Once the enemy force has dispersed, the ATKHB becomes less effective in
the fight. Major mechanized incursions into the rear area are attacked in the same
manner as they are during close or deep operations. The ATKHB attacks until the force
commander can respond with additional forces to defeat the penetration. During rear
operations, coordination between artillery, ADA, CAS, and ATKHBs must be accomplished
by I i ai son offi cers worki ng i n the di vi si onal and corps rear operati ons cel I of the rear
command post.

(3) Care must be taken to ensure the targets the ATK H B wi 1 1 attack are
positively identified. Rear area commanders must coordinate closely with the supporting
ATKHB to identify the locations of the enemy forces and provide control measures to
deconflict friendly fires. Target handovers to elements of the ATKHB should be made by
friendly forces in contact with the enemy.

1-2. ORGANIZATION

a. Heavy Division. The aviation restructure initiative allocates two ATKH Bs
per heavy division, one active duty and one Reserve or National Guard. Each battalion is
pure AH-64 or AH-1, equipped with 24 attack helicopters in three companies of eight
each. The battalion also includes a HHC and AVUM company. (See Figure 1-1).

(1) The HHC provides C 2 , logistics support, and ground maintenance support
for the battalion. The headquarters section consists of the battalion commander, his staff,
and staff sections. The HHC consists of a company headquarters, a supply section, an
automotive maintenance section, a mess section, a battalion communications section, a
medical treatment section, and a Class 1 1 1 /V platoon. To exercise C 2 during the mission,
the battalion commander (or S3) may fly an AH-64, fly in the back of a UH-60, or C 2 from
a ground TAC. The aviation brigade general support

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3x8 AH-64

Figure 1-1. Heavy division ATKHB

aviation battalion will provide utility aircraft for theATKHB's C 2 , CS, CSS, and combat
search and rescue requirements as directed by the brigade commander.

(2) The AVUM company provides unit-level maintenance for battalion
aircraft. The company consists of a company headquarters, a quality assurance section,
an aircraft maintenance section, and an aircraft component repair section.

(3) The three ATKHCs provide the ATKH B with an anti armor, antipersonnel
and anti materiel capability. Each company consists of a headquarters section, a scout
platoon with three aircraft, and an attack platoon with five aircraft. The commander may
task organize his company as he sees fit to accomplish the mission. With eight aircraft
per ATKHC, commanders should plan for six aircraft available (75-percent FMC rate) for
missions. The two-ship "lead-wingman" team provides a high degree of task organization
options, mission flexibility, and mutual support between teams. This also simplifies C 2 for
the ATKHC commander by putting a platoon leader in each team while the company
commander flies as a member of the third team, positioning himself as he sees fit to
employ his company and fight the battle.

b. Light Division .

(1) The light division has one ATKHB organized the same as the heavy
division (HHC, AVUM, and three ATKHCs) except the light division is equipped with OH-
58D Kiowa Warriors or AH-ls. In the HHC, mess (Class I), fuel (Class III), and
ammunition (Class V) are provided by the aviation brigade HHC. (See Figure 1-2).

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FM 1-112

3x8 OH-58D (I)
(or AH-1F)

Figure 1-2. Light division ATKHB

(2) The brigade must support the aerial movement of all classes of supply
since there are no utility aircraft in the ATKHB. C 2 issues are the same as in the heavy
division. The aviation brigade's AH B will provide utility aircraft, C 2 , CS, CSS, and CSAR
for the ATKHB's requirements as directed by the brigade commander.

c. Air Assault Division .

(1) The air assault division is authorized three ATKHBs equipped with AH-
64s. The battalion organization is the same as the heavy division (HHC, AVUM, and
three attack companies). (See Figure 1-3).

(2) To exercise C 2 during the mission, the ATKHB commander (or S3) may
fly an AH-64, fly in the back of a UH-60 or command from a ground TAC. The aviation
brigade CAB will provide utility aircraft for the attack battalion's C 2 , CS, CSS, and CSAR
requirements as directed by the brigade commander.

d. Airborne Division .

(1) The airborne division has one ATKHB organized the same as the light
division (HHC, AVUM, and three attack companies), equipped with OH-58D Kiowa
Warriors. In the HHC, mess (Class I), fuel (Class III), and ammunition (Class V) are
provided by the aviation brigade HHC. (See Figure 1-4).

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3x8 AH-64

Figure 1-3. Air assault division ATKHB

3x8 OH-58D (I)

Figure 1-4. Airborne division ATKHB

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FM 1-112

e. Corps Attack Regiment .

(1) The ATK HR of the corps aviation brigade is normally allocated three AH-
64 equipped battalions. The battalion organization is the same as the heavy division
(HHC, AVUM, and three attack companies). (See Figure 1-5).

3x8 AH-64

Figure 1-5. Corps ATKHB

(2) The brigade must support the aerial movement of all classes of supply
since there are no utility aircraft in the ATKHB. C 2 issues are the same as in the heavy
division. The aviation brigade's CAB will provide utility aircraft for the attack battalion's
C 2 requirements while the combat support aviation battalion will provide utility aircraft
for CS, CSS and CSAR.

1-3. MISSIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS
a. Missions .

(1) The primary mission of an ATKHB is to destroy enemy forces using fire,
maneuver, and shock effect. To accomplish this mission the ATKHB attacks the enemy to
destroy, attrit, disrupt, or delay. It may also conduct other offensive operations, as well
as reconnaissance, security, and defensive operations.

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( 2 ) The ATKH B is most effective against massed, moving targets and least
effective against enemy forces in prepared, well -camouflaged positions. Without the
support of ground maneuver forces, the ATKH B cannot conduct missions that require the
occupation of terrain. They can, however, deny the enemy terrain for a limited time by
dominating it with direct and indirect fires.

( 3 ) TheATKHB mission is the same for all ATKHBs, regardless of the type
of division or corps to which assigned. However, depending upon the type of division or
level or assignment, employment criteria, mission priorities, and target priorities may
vary greatly.

( 4 ) The mission and the commander's intent specifies the mission success
criteria. This criteria allows subordinate commanders to assess whether or not the
mission has been accomplished at the completion of the engagement. An example of a
mission statement is:

At 221700Z MAR 96, l-112th ATKH B occupies FAA ROOSEVELT (QS 12341234).
On order, attack to attrit the 25th TR in E A THUNDER (RS 987123, RS 123456,
RS 234567, RS 567890) to delay the enemy's advance east of the Silver River
crossing.

( 5 ) The mission statement must include a concise "why" to fully define
success. Given the wide variety of potential enemies and potential theaters of operations,
the ATKH B commander must base his unit's mission statement and his intent's end state
on a thorough I PB. Based on the I PB, the commander must also articulate an endstate
that is understandable and can be quantified on the battlefield. For example, "of the 30
trucks identified in the convoy, 20 must be destroyed for mission success."

( 6 ) The following are examples of the "what" in the ATKHBs mission
statement. Included is the risk assumed by the ATKH B in accomplishing each attack
mission. Also included is planning guidance for quantifying the attack mission
statement's "why" and, based on the desired effect on the enemy, the end state portion of
the commander's intent.

(a) Attack to destroy . This is a high-risk mission for the ATKH B.
When given the mission to attack to destroy, the ATKH B uses direct and indirect fires to
physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective unless it is reconstituted. The
ATKH B must attack the enemy force with enough combat power to accomplish the
mission and meet the commander's intent. To accomplish this mission, the ATKH B must
accept a substantial risk that may cause it to become combat ineffective at the completion
of the attack.

(b) Attack to attrit . This is a high- to medium-risk mission for the
ATKHB. When given the mission to attack to attrit, the ATKH B uses direct and indirect
fires to reduce the effectiveness of an enemy force caused by loss of personnel and
materiel . The ATK H B must attack the enemy force with enough combat power to

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FM 1-112

accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent. The greater the enemy force
that the ATKH B must attrit, the greater the risk the commander must accept.

(c) Attack to delay . This is a medium- to high-risk mission for the
ATKHB. When given the mission to attack to delay, the ATKH B uses direct and indirect
fires to engage the enemy, understanding that the destruction of the enemy force is
secondary to slowing his advance to gain time. The ATKHB must attack the enemy force
with enough combat power to accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent.
The ATKHB attacks to delay the enemy's use of a geographic area (maneuver corridor,
river crossing site) for a specific period of time. The risk that the battalion accepts is
determined by the amount of time that the ATKHB must delay, location of the enemy,
and the enemy force that is encountered.

(d) Attack to disrupt . This is a medium- to low-risk mission for the
ATKHB. When given the mission to attack to disrupt, the ATKHB uses direct and
indirect fires to break apart an enemy's formation and tempo, interrupt the enemy's time
table, cause premature commitment of forces, and/or piecemeal their attack. The ATKHB
must attack the enemy force with enough combat power to achieve the desired results
with one mass attack or sustain the attack until the desired results are achieved. The
commander sets the amount of risk based on the friendly loss he is willing to accept, the
location of the attack, or the number of attacks that will be made.

NOTE: These attack criteria also apply to mission statements issued for other offensive
operations (exploitations, pursuits, or counterattacks). To the ATKHB, these missions will
most likely be conducted as attack missions, with the operation not specifically referred to
by name.

(e) Conduct reconnaissance . The ATK H B may be tasked to conduct
reconnaissance operations (zone, route, area, force oriented, or RIF). More information on
reconnaissance operations may be found in Chapter 3 and FMs 1-114 and 17-95.

(f) Provide security . The ATKH B provides security to friendly forces
as they conduct passages of lines, river crossings, air assaults, and as they maneuver in a
movement to contact. The types of security it may provide are screen, guard, cover (if
augmented), area security, and air assault security (a form of guard). It will position
itself where it can make a hasty attack to assist friendly forces to disengage or brush
aside enemy forces attempting to disrupt the operation. More information on security
operations may be found in Chapter 3 and FMs 1-114 and 17-95.

(g) Defend . The ATKHB may be tasked to conduct an area or mobile
defense in coordination with a ground force. The ATKHB will control its assets to force
the enemy to attack under unfavorable circumstances and retain decisive terrain or deny
a vital area to the enemy. M ore information on defensive operations may be found in
Chapter 3 and FM 17-95.

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FM 1-112

(7) Figure 1-6 shows the operations and their forms that theATKHB may

perform.

b. Capabilities . TheATKHB and other aviation assets dominate the third
dimension of the battlespace. This provides an invaluable maneuver capability to the
ground force commander. The capabilities of an ATKH B are as follows:

(1) Mobility . TheATKHB fully exploits the vertical dimension of the
battlefield. Aggressive terrain flight techniques allow the commander to rapidly place the
ATKHB at the decisive place at the optimum time. Typically, the area of operations for
an ATKHB is the entire corps or divisional sector.

(2) Speed . Attack helicopters move across the battlefield at speeds in excess
of 3 kilometers per minute. Although METT-T dependent, typical planning airspeeds are
100 to 120 knots during daylight and 80 to 100 knots at night. Speeds during marginal
weather are reduced commensurate with prevailing conditions.

(3) Range . The ATKHB can attack targets up to 150 km across the FLOT.

If greater depth is required, the addition of ERFS tanks can further extend the AH-64's
range with a corresponding reduction in Hellfire missile carrying capacity (four fewer
Hellfire missiles for each ERFS tank installed).

(4) Versatility . Under the ARI , the firepower available to the force
commander is increased but the employment concepts of the ATKHB remain the same. I n
a pure attack helicopter ATKHB, the traditional scout and attack missions are no longer
aircraft dependent. During the combat decision making process, the ATKHC commander
task organizes his assets and designates specific aircraft mission responsibilities based on
METT-T. He has the flexibility to maintain the traditional scout-weapon team
employment concept or focus his assets as a pure attack force. The dual role of the
airframe, coupled with the cross training of the attack helicopter crew provide the force
commander, theATKHB commander and the ATKHC commander a combat force which is
diverse and can meet the mission requirements in any environment, day or night, with
advanced forward looking infrared and night vision systems.

(5) Lethality . Commanders may vary the weapons carried on attack
helicopters to meet specific mission requirements. The AH-64 Apache, OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior, and the AH-1 Cobra are each capable of carrying a variety of armament into
combat for employment in day or night environments. As with any weapon system, the
proper mix and mass of ammunition is critical for mission success. More information on
attack helicopter capabilities may be found in Appendix A.

(a) AH-64 . The AH-64 is capable of carrying up to 16 laser-guided
Hellfire missiles, giving the battalion the capability to engage a total of 288 enemy targets
at ranges of up to 8 km. The AH-64 also can carry up to 1,200 rounds of 30 mm for the

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FM 1-112

OPERATION

FORM

DESCRIPTION

OFFENSE

ATTACK

An offensive operation characterized by movement supported by fire. The
purpose is to destroy, delay, disrupt, or attrit the enemy.

- HASTY ATTACK

An offensive operation in which preparation time is traded for speed to exploit an
opportunity.

- DELIBERATE
ATTACK

An offensive action characterized by preplanned coordinated, employment of
fires, and movement to close with and destroy the enemy.

- RAID

An operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information,
confuse the enemy, or destroy installations or forces.

MOVEMENT TO
CONTACT

Used to develop the situation, establish, or regain contact with the enemy.

PURSUIT

An offensive action against a retreating enemy force.

EXPLOITATION

The following-up of gains to take full advantage of success in battle.

DEFENSE

MOBILE

Orients on the defeat or destruction of the enemy force by allowing it to advance
to a point where it is exposed to a decisive attack by a striking force.

AREA

Orients on denying the enemy designated terrain. Conducted to defend
specified terrain, when the enemy enjoys a mobility advantage over the
defending force, when well-defined avenues of approach exist, and the
defending force has sufficient combat power to cover the likely enemy avenues
of approach in sector.

RECONNAISSANCE

ZONE

A directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all routes, obstacles,
terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries.

AREA

A directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy
activity within a prescribed area such as a ridge line, woods, or other feature.

ROUTE

A directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route.

RECON IN
FORCE

Conducted when commanders cannot obtain adequate intelligence by other
means. An aggressive form of reconnaissance.

SECURITY

SCREEN

A form of security that provides early warning.

COVER

A covering force operates independent of the main body to deceive, disorganize,
and engage the enemy. The cover may operate forward, behind, or on the
flanks of the main body.

GUARD

A form of security in which a unit is tasked to protect the main body by
preventing the enemy from being able to engage main body forces with direct
fire weapons.

AREA

Conducted when a force is given the mission to secure a specific area. Convoy
and route security are applications of area security.

AIR ASSAULT
SECURITY

A form of guard unique to aviation. Conducted during air assault operations to
protect the assaulting force.

RETROGRADE

DELAY

Mission that trades space for time while retaining flexibility and freedom of
action.

WITHDRAWAL

A planned, voluntary disengagement that anticipates enemy interference.

Figure 1-6. Operations and their forms for the ATKHB

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FM 1-112

destruction of thin-skinned and air defense targets at ranges of up to 3,000 meters. Each
of the four Hellfire missile racks may be replaced with 7 or 19 shot, 2.75-inch rocket pods.

(b) OH-58D (I) . The OH -58D (I ) Kiowa Warrior is capable of carrying
up to 4 Hellfire missiles. It can carry a .50 caliber machine gun and 500 rounds of
ammunition on the left pylon for self-protection or anti-personnel operations. It can carry
any combination of a 7-shot rocket pod, a 2-missile Hellfire launcher or a 2-missile air-to-
air stinger launcher on either side of the aircraft.

(c) AH -IF . The AH-1 is capable of carrying up to 8 tube launched,
optically tracked, wire guided missiles. The AH-1 also can carry up to 750 rounds of 20
mm for the destruction of thin-skinned and air defense targets at ranges of up to 2,000
meters. Each wing has two weapons hardpoints that may carry a 7 or 19 shot, 2.75-inch
rocket pods each. Due to power limitations, the AH-1 must trade off fuel for ammunition.
Planners must know and understand this limitation to capitalize on the effectiveness of
the AH-1. In addition, the AH-1 is primarily a day-only weapon system. However,
modified AH-lFs equipped with C-NITE telescopic sight units can engage targets with
TOW missiles and cannon during both daylight and darkness.

(6) Video reconnaissance .

(a) The video recorder systems on the AH-64 and OH-58D (I) provide
near real-time intelligence on the terrain or enemy forces for commanders to use at
critical decision points. This "birds-eye view" is an invaluable asset for current and future
operations planning.

(b) Video recorder operations can be highly successful with prior
planning. Units should develop an SOP for video recorder operations to assist in video
reconnaissance and BDA. This SOP should include procedures explaining when to record
(considering limited recording time), how to properly scan a target area, and how the crew
narrates the tape during recording, keying on aircraft location and descriptions of the
target.

c. Limitations .

(1) General . Time for planning is critical for every mission. If a unit
receives a short-notice mission or a major change in the original mission then time must
be allowed to plan and clear routes, and to brief aircrews. Follow-on units may be
committed along different routes with other combat multipliers, but the same battalion
should not be considered for reattack across the FLOT until resupplied and reequipped as
necessary.

(2) Weather . Although fully capable of operating in marginal weather,
attack helicopter capabilities are seriously degraded in conditions below a 500-foot ceiling
and visibility less than 3 km. Because of the Hellfire missile's trajectory, ceilings below
500 feet requi re the attack ai rcraft to get too cl ose to the i ntended target to avoi d mi ssi I e

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FM 1-112

loss. Below 3 km visibility, the attack aircraft is vulnerable to enemy ADA systems.
Except for C-NITE equipped aircraft, the AH-1 is not equipped with a night vision or
target designation system for periods of darkness.

(3) CSS . Helicopters consume large amounts of fuel, ammunition, and
repair parts and require a CSS distribution system across the entire battlefield. An
ATKHB will normally employ two FARPs; one active for that specific mission, the other
moving to or setting up in a new location for future operations. A FARP will normally
have four refuel or rearm points. Planning time for a complete battalion turnaround is
approximately two hours. Total time in the FARP is a factor of the amount of fuel and
ammunition which is received by the aircraft. Depending on the situation, quicker
turnarounds are feasible.

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FM 1-112

CHAPTER 2

BATTLE COMMAND

Command, control, and communications are the most significant and difficult portions of
the employment of theATKHB. FM 1-111 describes each of these concepts in detail. This
chapter discusses the duties and responsibilities of theATKHB commander and his staff,
relevant command relationships, theC 2 process, the IPB process, command posts, and
communications.

2-1. COMMAND AND CONTROL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Commander . The ATKH B commander is responsible for the overall success
of attack helicopter operations. He receives the mission from higher headquarters,
decides how battalion assets are to be used, and directs the execution of plans. The
commander must position himself during both planning and execution phases to ensure
the success of the mission. During mission execution, the commander will normally
position himself forward with committed assets to ensure unity of effort in accomplishing
the mission. Attack helicopter battalions perform a wide range of missions. The
commander maintains control and directs the action by-

(1) Issuing specific orders.

(2) Allocating available resources to accomplish the tasks.

(3) Issuing a concept to the staff that specifies and assigns essential tasks.

(4) Developing an estimate based on METT-T.

(5) E stabl i shi ng standi ng operati ng procedures to ensure personnel
accomplish routine tasks and operations.

b. Staff . Through the staff, the battalion commander must assess the continuous
flow of information, make timely decisions, and issue concise orders. The primary function
of the staff, therefore, is to present essential information to the commander with a
recommendation so that he will be able to make the best decision. The staff must have
the latitude and flexibility to make recommendations or decisions when appropriate in
response to rapidly changing situations on the battlefield. The staff must also deal with
routine matters associated with running the battalion so that the commander may remain
focused on combat operations. FM 101-5 describes the general duties and responsibilities
of each staff officer. Additional, specific duties and responsibilities of attack helicopter
battalion staffs are discussed in the foil owing paragraphs.

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FM 1-112

(1) Executive officer . The executive officer is the principal assistant to the
commander. Although the XO may assume command in the absence of the commander,
he is not in the chain of command. As the coordinator and supervisor of the staff, the XO

i s responsi bl e for the executi on of staff tasks and for coordi nati ng the staff's efforts. H e
ensures that the staff performs as a team and not as separate staff sections. The XO
assigns responsibilities and issues the commander's decisions to the staff and subordinate
commanders on the commander's behalf. TheXO-staff relationship does not preclude the
staff from working directly with the commander. However, a staff officer is obligated to
inform theXO of instructions or requirements received from the commander. During the
commander's absence, the XO represents him and directs actions according to the
commander's policies. The XO must be prepared to assume command at any time.
Additionally, theXO is normally responsible for controlling the main command post
during the battle. This allows the XO to keep abreast of the current situation (should he
have to move forward and take the battle) and move the ATKHCs and support assets in
the AO to support the mission. He also ensures that coordination between the main CP,
theTAC CP, and other subordinate CPs is maintained.

(2) SI. The SI normally operates from the main CP. He is responsible for
all matters and issues relating to personnel in the battalion. The SI and S4 must cross-
train to facilitate the conduct of continuous operations. The Si-
te) Supervises postal services.

(b) Prepares the personnel estimate.

(d) Administers the prisoner-of-war program.

(e) Determines individual replacement requirements.

(f) Plans and supervises the use of civilian labor.

(g) Monitors unit strength and estimates personnel losses.

(h) Coordinates the development of a health services plan.

(i) Plans and supervises logistic and administrative services.

(j) Coordinates religious, legal, finance, and public affairs services.

(k) Prepares and coordinates medical and casualty evacuation plans.

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FM 1-112

(3) S2. The S2 normally remains at the main CP where communication
assets are avail able for coordinating surveillance and reconnaissance activities and
updating the current situation. The S2-

(a) Provides weather information.

(b) Prepares intelligence training materials.

(d) Computes enemy strength and determines the order of battle.

(e) Prepares intelligence and counterintelligence estimates.

(f) Develops the IPB, priority intelligence requests, and reconnaissance
and surveillance plans.

(g) Is the primary battle tracker and forecaster of enemy intentions.

(h) Provides input into the brigade and division reconnaissance and
surveillance collection plan.

(4) S3. The operations officer is the commander's principal assistant for
coordinating and planning operations. He monitors current and future operations,
ensuring essential combat assets are provided when and where required, and anticipates
developing situations and missions. The S3 and his staff section must be constantly
aware of the changing situation. They must be responsive to the directives of higher
headquarters as well as to the needs of subordinate commanders. Specifically, the S3
must be closely tied into the S2 and S4 to remain updated on the intelligence and logistics
situation. Depending upon mission execution, the S3 may locate forward with the
commander or may position himself as required to facilitate C 2 . Additionally, the S3
controls theTAC if employed. The S3-

(a) M ai ntai ns troop I i sts.

(b) I ntegrates fi re support.

(d) Predicts the effects of NBC weapons.

(e) Establishes communications priorities.

(f) Coordinates and controls civil-military operations.

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FM 1-112

(g) Coordinates and publishes operations plans, operations orders, and
fragmentary orders .

(h) Selects the general locations of the main CP, TAC, and other
subordinate CPs.

(i) Coordinates and supervises OPSEC and rear operations.

(j) Coordinates unit replacements, attachments, and detachments.

(k) Prepares tactical movement plan and supervises movement in
concert with theXO and CSM.

(l) Plans and supervises electronic warfare activities and psychological

operations.

(m) Monitors and controls battalion and company tactical operations.

(n) Develops and supervises training programs.

(o) Develops deception plans and requirements.

(P) Advises the commander on combat operations.

(5) S4. The S4 must thoroughly understand the commander's intent and
initiate timely actions to support that intent. The S4 usually collocates with the SI in the
main CP. Depending on the succession of command, the S4 may assume the duties of the
XO or S3. He must monitor the tactical situation closely to initiate timely resupply and
direct support. His duties also entail providing the commander with information on all
logistics matters. The S4 coordinates with the Brigade S4 on the status of equipment,
supplies, and future requirements. The S4-

(a) P repares I ogi sti cs esti mate.

(b) Recommends main supply routes.

(d) Plans and controls administrative movements.

(e) Plans for supply and maintenance requirements.

(f) Plans for transportation requirements and services.

(g) Procures, receives, stores, and distributes supplies.

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FM 1-112

(h) Establishes combat service support priorities with the S3.

(i) Determines requirements for civilian labor for logistics support.

(j) Collects and disposes of excess property, salvage, and captured

material.

(k) Designates lines of movement and locations of combat service
support elements.

(l) Prepares logistics orders, plans, annexes, and paragraph 4 of
operations orders or operations plans.

(6) Liaison officer . Liaison with other maneuver units is vital to ensuring
that the ATKHB is properly employed and synchronized into the battle. TheATKHB
commander is the unit's most effective liaison officer. When the commander is not
available, he must designate a liaison officer. This officer must understand the
commander's intent, must be proficient in attack helicopter operations, must know the
unit's capabilities and limitations, and must ensure that the following tasks are
accomplished:

(a) Know the status and availability of aircraft.

(b) Advise the supported commander on all matters concerning the
employment of attack helicopter assets.

(c) Ensure proper integration of the battalion within the scheme of
maneuver, recommending courses of action that are within the capabilities of the ATKHB.

(d) Keep the ATKHB commander abreast of the current situation and
any intelligence information that projects the enemy's likely courses of action.

(e) Coordi nate with the force army ai rspace command and control
element on the status of tactical operations, the location and status of ATKHB assets, and
all other information that effects the use of airspace.

(f) E ffecti vel y represent the ATK H B commander.

(7) Command sergeant major . TheCSM advises the battalion commander
on matters concerning soldiers of the battalion. He is not an administrator, however, he
must understand the administration, logistics, and operational requirements of the
battalion. The CSM will focus on any function critical to the success of the operation. AR
600-20 and FM 101-5 describe specific duties of the CSM . The following duties are
included:

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FM 1-112

(a) Focuses on soldier and soldier support matters; may monitor unit

morale.

(b) May act as liaison, lead advance or quartering parties, and monitor
key defensive preparations.

(d) Executes established policies and standards on performance,
training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel.

(e) Maintains communications and provides counsel and guidance to
NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

(f) Performs other duties as assigned by the commander, such as
reception of new soldiers, inspection of command activities, and president/member of NCO
selection boards.

(8) Special staff . Special staff officers assist the battalion commander in
professional, technical, and other functional areas. The specific number of special staff
officers will vary with the TOE authorization and the commander's desires. Special staff
officers are assigned to the H HC; however, some are representatives of organizations
providing support to, or receiving support from, the attack helicopter battalion. FM 101-5
describes the duties and responsibilities of special staff in detail. In the attack helicopter
battalion, the special staff may indude--

• S3 (air).

• A 2 C 2 personnel.

• Communications personnel.

• Chemical officer.

• Safety officer.

• Chaplain.

• Flight surgeon.

• Fire support officer.

• Engineer officer.

• Air defense arti 1 1 ery offi cer .

• Forward air controller.

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2-2. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The command relationships of theATKHB are organic, assigned, attached, and OPCON.
ATKHBs are assigned to aviation brigades at division level and to corps AT K HRs or corps
aviation brigades. When the mission dictates, an ATKHB may be attached to a unit that
can support its logistics needs. TheATKHB will be placed under OPCON of the gaining
unit when the battalion is to be used for a specific mission, the effective time of the
relationship is short, or the gaining unit is unable to provide logistics support. Normally,
control of the ATKH B remains with the aviation brigade or ATKHR and shifts to other
brigades as an allocation of combat power by division and corps headquarters. When the
mission is completed, theATKHB returns to the control of its parent brigade or ATKHR.
Table 2-1 shows the types of command relationships that can be established between an
ATKHB and other units.

Table 2-1. Possible ATKHB command relationships

GAINING UNIT

ORGANIC

ASSIGNED

ATTACHED

OPCON

Theater Army

Yes

Corps

Yes

Division

Yes

Aviation Brigade

Yes

Ground Brigade

Yes

ACR

Yes

ATKHR

Yes

Battalion/Squadron/TF

2-3. IPB PROCESS

a. Definition . FM 34-130 defines IPB as a systematic, continuous process of
analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. IPB is an essential
part of staff planning designed to support staff estimates and military decision making.
Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat
power at critical points in time and space by-

(1) Determining the threat's likely courses of action.

(2) Describing the environment the friendly unit is operating within and the
effects of the environme nt on the unit.

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b. Doctrinal Principles . Thedoctrinal principles of I PB call for-

(1) Evaluating the battlefield's effects on friendly and threat operations.

(2) Determining the threat's possible courses of action and arranging them in
order of probability of adoption.

(3) Identifying assets the threat needs to make each COA successful (high
value targets) and where they can be expected to appear on the battlefield (target areas of
interest).

(4) Identifying the activities, or lack thereof, and the locations where they
will occur that will identify the COA the threat has adopted.

c. IPB Process . Each level of command provides its subordinate units with IPB
support and products such as overlays, templates, and enemy estimates. Corps ATKHBs
will use IPB products provided by corps, corps aviation brigade, and the ATKHR.

Divisional ATKHBs use I PB products provided by corps, division, and the aviation brigade
or ground maneuver brigade. Using these I PB products as a basis, theATKHB S2
conducts an I PB. At each unit level, I PB is continuous and is assisted by the aviation
mission planning system. The process consists of four steps that will be performed each
time the IPB process is conducted. These four steps are as follows:

(1) Define the battlefield environment . In this step, the S2 identifies the
characteristics of the battlefield that will influence friendly and threat operations,
establishes the limits of the area of interest, and identifies gaps in current intelligence
holdings. This focuses the command's initial intelligence collection efforts and the
remaining steps of the I PB process.

(2) Describe The battlefield's effects . Step 2 evaluates the environment
with which both sides must contend. The S2 identifies the limitations and opportunities
the environment offers on the potential operations of friendly and threat forces. This
evaluation focuses on the general capability of each force until COAs are developed in
later steps of the I PB process. This assessment of the environment always includes an
exami nati on of terrai n and weather. 1 1 may al so i nd ude di scussi ons of the characteri sti cs
of geography (MCOO) and infrastructure (politics, civilian press, local population, and
demographics) and their effects on friendly and threat operations. Products developed in
this step may include, but are not limited to~

(a) Population status overlay.

(b) Overlays depicting the military aspects and effects of terrain.

(d) Integrated products, including MCOO.

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(3) Evaluate the threat . I n step 3, the S2 and his staff analyze the
command's intelligence holdings to determine how the threat normally organizes for
combat and conducts operations. When facing a well-known threat, the S2 may use
historical data bases and wel I -devel oped threat models. When operating against a new or
less-known threat, the S2 may need to develop his intelligence data bases and threat
models concurrently. The S2's evaluation is portrayed in a threat model that includes
doctrinal templates that depict how the threat operates when unconstrained by the effects
of the battlefield environment. Although graphic depiction is normally emphasized
(doctrinal templates), threat models sometimes emphasize matrices or simple narratives.

(4) Determine threat courses of action . Step 4 integrates the results of
the previous steps into a meaningful conclusion. Given what the threat normally prefers
to do, and the effects of the specific environment in which the threat is operating, this
step determines the threat's likely objectives and theCOAs available to him. In step 4,
the S2 develops likely COA models that depict the threat's available COAs. The S2 also
prepares event templates and matrices that focus intelligence collection on identifying
which COA the threat will execute.

d. IPB Results . I PB identifies facts and assumptions about the battlefield
environment and the threat. This enables staff planning by focusing the development of
both enemy and friendly COAs. IPB also provides the basis for intelligence direction and
synchronization. I PB is vital to the commander's estimate and his tactical decision
regarding the concept of the operation. It helps the commander to compare friendly and
enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities accurately. It also helps him to determine where,
when, and how to employ the ATKH B to ensure success. Finally, IPB contri butes to
complete staff synchronization and focuses the decision making process. Additional
information on the IPB process is found in FM 34-130.

2-4. COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS

At any level of command, the C 2 process provides the commander with the structure and
the means to make, convey, and evaluate decisions continuously. These decisions and the
higher commander's intent are translated into productive actions. Upon receipt of the
mission, theATKHB uses the decision-making process to evaluate, plan, and accomplish
the mission.

a. Decision Making . Decision making requires an organized effort by the
ATKFIB commander, his staff, and liaison officers to reach an effective solution that
supports the friendly force commander's intent. The decision-making process begins when
the mission is received from higher headquarters and continues until the mission is
accomplished. The decision-making process is a multi-step approach which may be
abbreviated if the situation dictates. If time or situation do not permit a formal decision-
making process, parts of it may be done mentally by the commander and staff.

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(1) Mission analysis . M i ssi on anal ysi s i s the fi rst maj or step of the tacti cal
decision-making process. It consists of command and staff actions related to:

(a) Gathering facts (current status or conditions), including risk

assessment.

(b) Making assumptions (a substitute for facts if the information is not

known).

the mission).

(d) Issuing commander's guidance (focus for subsequent staff planning).

(2) COA development . To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key
information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data obtained in mission
analysis. Each possible enemy COA should have at least one corresponding friendly COA
to counter it. TheATKHB will often be given its COA by higher headquarters, but this
should not stop the commander and staff from considering possible actions of an
uncooperative enemy and planning for branches, sequels, and contingencies. While
developing COAs, the staff goes through several steps-

(a) Analyze relative force ratios.

(b) Develop a scheme of maneuver.

measures.

(d) Prepare COA statement(s) and sketches.

The COA may be revised, modified, or changed during wargaming. COAs are developed
for all staff members to analyze.

(3) COA analysis and comparison . Staff analysis identifies the best COA
for recommendation to the commander. Analysis begins when theATKHB S3 briefs the
staff about each COA. At this time, a quick analysis of each COA by the other staff
members is conducted to determine any COAs that are not feasible. Those COAs should
be eliminated immediately. During this analysis, information identified by any staff
member that might effect another's analysis must be shared immediately. Subsequently,
each staff member conducts detailed analysis of each COA. Analysis evaluates each COA
against time, space, and means. If a COA is deemed inadequate in terms of feasibility the
staff must modify or eliminate the COA and restart the analysis process. Once a COA
passes the feasibility analysis, the planners can analyze it for acceptability. Each staff
member must analyze the COA using wargaming techniques. The COAs should be

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wargamed independently of one another. Once wargaming is completed, a comparison of
the COAs determines which COA best accomplishes the mission.

(4) Decision and execution . After completing COA analysis, the staff
conducts a decision brief, with a COA recommendation, to the commander. Each COA is
outlined to the commander along with the advantages and disadvantages of each. The
briefing will also contain the branches and sequels identified during the wargaming. The
commander announces his decision at the conclusion of the decision brief. After receiving
the commander's decision, the staff prepares the order or plan to implement the selected
COA. During execution of the plan, the commander and staff respond to the changing
situation through actions and orders while supervising the operation.

b. Planning . ATKHB operations must be planned in detail. Plans are based on
specific conditions or assumptions and are not static. As a result of continuing estimates
and studies, plans must be changed, refined, and updated. The ATKHB may have many
on-order missions that cover the depth and breadth of the battlefield; therefore, planning
is a challenging and never-ending process. Once a COA has been decided by the
commander, planning must begin in earnest. Concurrent planning at all levels in the
ATKHB is made possible with the AM PS. Chapter 3 contains specific information on
planning attack helicopter operations from mission receipt to target attack.

c. Orders . Orders are written or oral communications that convey information
governing the action. Some of the characteristics of a good combat order are clarity,
completeness, brevity, and timeliness. Orders are covered in FM 101-5. A sampleformat
for an operations order is contained in Appendix C of this manual.

d. Risk Management .

(1) Commanders are responsible for effectively managing risk. They must
determine the proper balance to achieve optimum performance from their command, select
the best risk-reduction options from those that the staff provides, and accept or reject
residual risk based on perceived benefits.

(2) The XO ensures integration of risk management in all aspects of staff
planning. I n the risk management process, each staff officer must recommend
appropriate control measures to reduce or eliminate risk, use risk management to assess
his or her functional area, and integrate risk control into plans and orders.

(3) Troop leaders review control measures for feasibility and report risk
issues beyond their control or authority to their seniors for resolution. In addition, they
recommend changes to improve synchronization of their operations and use the risk
management process to identify, assess, and control hazards for their mission.

(4) Risk-assessment procedures are organized into a five step risk
management process.

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(a) Step 1 . Identify . I dentify the hazards with the major events that
are expected to occur.

(b) Step 2 . Assess hazards . Determine the level of risk associated with
a given hazard and select appropriate control measures.

potential risks.

(d) Step 4 . Decide . I implement and integrate selected controls into
plans, OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals.

(e) Step 5 . Supervise . The commander must enforce controls.

(5) FM 1-111 contains more specific information on risk management.

2-5. COMMAND POSTS

a. Main Command Post . TheATKHB main CP is the control, coordination,
and communications center for combat operations. The main CP is located in or near the
battalion assembly area and is composed of the SI, S2, S3, and S4 sections, the FSE
(when present), representatives from other attached elements, and the tactical CP (when
it is not forward). Main CP vehicles and personnel must be kept to a minimum to allow
for rapid displacement; however, a sufficient number must be retained to perform C 2
functions in support of the commander. The battalion XO is overall responsible for the
main CP.

(1) Functions . The main CP monitors and assists in C 2 by maintaining
contact and coordination with higher and adjacent units and continuously updating the
enemy situation. It also plans operations, analyzes and disseminates tactical information,
maintains situation maps, and requests and synchronizes additional CS and CSS for the
battle. Factors that have immediate operational impact must be monitored by the main
CP and communicated to the commander.

(2) Operations . The primary considerations in positioning the main CP are
communications, accessibility, and survivability. Personnel who operate the main CP
must be organized to maintain the main CP functions and provide security on a
continuous basis. A sleep plan must be enforced to preserve the ability of main CP
personnel to perform continuous operations. Coordination between the S3 and the S1/S4
must be continuous to ensure that CSS is integrated into the mission effort, and the S1/S4
must continuously monitor the CSS status of the battalion and keep the XO informed.

The security of the main CP is enhanced by its capability to displace rapidly and maintain
a small electronic signature. Displacements are planned to ensure that the main CP is
stationary during critical phases of the battle.

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b. TAC CP . When established, theTAC CP is the forward echelon of the
ATKHB headquarters. It usually consists of staff elements from the S2, S3, and any fire
support control elements attached to the battalion. The S3 is usually located at, and has
overall responsibility for, theTAC CP. TheTAC CP is located well forward on the battle-
field so the commander is near his subordinate units and can lead the battalion. The
TAC CP is established in or near the forward assembly area. Once the ATKHB has
crossed the LD and begun operations, the commander moves to a position from which he
can coordinate operations. While the battalion is in the forward assembly area, theS3's
and commander's vehicles normally compose the tactical CP. Upon execution of the
mission, the command group moves to wherever the commander deems as the best place
to C 2 . This could be from an aircraft or from a ground vehicle. Figure 2-1 shows theTAC
CP organization and its approximate position on the battlefield.

Figure 2-1. CP organization and location

c. Command Group . The command group consists of the commander and those
personnel he sel ects to go forward to assi st hi m i n control I i ng maneuver and fi res duri ng
the battle. The command group normally includes the FSO (if attached), FAC (if
attached), and S3. There is no requirement for these people to collocate. For example,
the commander and the S3 may fly in different aircraft so that during a continuous
mission the S3 will remain on station to control the battle when the commander's aircraft
must return to the forward arming and refuel point. To permit optimum C 2 of his unit

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during battle, the commander determines the composition, nature, and tasks of the
command group.

2-6. COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

a. Attack helicopters play a key role in each of the functional areas of
information operations. These functional areas are--

(1) Gatheri ng i ntel I i gence.

(2) Attacking enemy C 2 .

(3) Protecting friendly C 2 .

(4) Construction of the information battlespace.

Attack helicopter operations in support of these functions may be conducted for
commanders at the tactical to strategic level in every combat environment.

b. Command Responsibilities . The command transmits and receives
information and orders through command communications systems. The commander
must understand the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of his communication
systems. Enemy radar, radios, and lasers may operate in the same electromagnetic
spectrum as friendly equipment. The commander must expect unintentional interference
from friendly units as well as interference from enemy units. Transmissions may also be
hindered by terrain, atmospheric conditions, or electromagnetic pulse from nuclear blasts.
To compensate for these, the commander should-

(1) Provide for redundancy in the means of communication.

(2) E nsure that subordi nates understand hi s i ntent so that they wi 1 1 know
what to do when communications are interrupted.

(3) Avoid overloading the communication systems by using them only when

necessary.

(4) U se wi re or messenger when possi bl e i nstead of radi o.

(5) Ensure proper signals security practices are foil owed.

c. Signal Support . Maintaining communications with higher and subordinate
headquarters presents a challenge for the battalion's communications section. Assets
available to the ATKHB are limited, particularly for FM(s) sets. I n addition to the FM
radios on battalion vehicles and aircraft, communications support for the ATKFIB
headquarters is provided by two organizations--the communications section in the
battalion FH FH C and the signal platoon in the brigade FI FI C. The communications section

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provides primarily FM and wire communications. The brigade's signal platoon assists in
providing MSE and SATCOM as required.

d. Unit/Staff Responsibilities . All levels of command and staff must gain and
maintain communications with the necessary headquarters and personnel. The
traditional communications responsibilities of ATKHBs are covered below.

(1) Higher to subordinate . The battalion headquarters must ensure that
its radio nets (command, O&l, administrative and logistics, and fire support) are con-
tinually operational. The RETRANS system must be dedicated to on-call restoration of
communications on any net. Possible RETRANS locations must be identified and checked
before starting operations. All key personnel must understand the operation of the
RETRANS system.

(2) Subordinate units . Subordinate units within the battalion must
continually monitor key battalion level radio nets. At a minimum, subordinate units must
monitor the battalion command and O&l nets.

(3) Supporting to supported . Liaison elements supporting the battalion
must maintain communications between their organization providing the support and the
ATKHB. Once located at the tactical CP, main CP, or rear CP, these units will be con-
trolled by the battalion staff and the headquarters commander.

(4) Lateral communications . Responsibility for establishing
communications between adjacent units may be fixed by the next higher commander. If
responsibility is not fixed by orders, the commander of the unit on the left is responsible
for establishing communications with the unit on the right. The commander of a unit
positioned behind another unit establishes communications with the forward unit.

(5) Restoration . Regardless of the responsibility, all units act promptly to
restore lost communications.

e. Command Communications Systems Architecture .

(1) Army aviation is required to deploy anywhere in the world and operate
under most types of environmental conditions. Mission parameters, therefore, require a
C 2 system designed to support the commander's needs throughout every phase of the
force-projection cycle. The Army has selected battlefield digitization to support the
commander's communications requirements.

(2) Digitizing the battlefield is the application of technologies to acquire,
exchange, and employ timely digital information throughout the battlespace, tailored to
the needs of each decider, shooter, and supporter. Digitization allows each soldier to
maintain a clear and accurate vision of the common battlespace necessary to support
planning and execution. This common picture/situational awareness permits commanders

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FM 1-112

at all echelons to better control forces, synchronize effects, and achieve decisive victory
with minimal casualties.

( 3 ) Integrated digital system networks (command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence and weapons systems) provide commanders, staffs, sensors,
and shooters with a great technological advantage. Information exchange between
command communications systems includes, or will include, relative positioning,
identification, time, way points, direction, azimuth, targeting, support, coordination, etc.

( 4 ) Some of the key command systems provi di ng for ATK H B 's
internal/external communications linkages areas follows:

(a) CNR . ATKHBs will conduct operations over extended distances
using CNR as the primary means of communication. CNR is a system of systems. CNR
consists of a single channel ground airborne radio system, a TACSAT communications
system, and high frequency radios.

(b) MSE . MSE is a compact mobile communications system providing
secure voice, data, and facsimile capabilities. MSE allows the commander to exercise C 2
over forces in a rapidly changing environment. The system is interoperable with CNR,
commercial, and NATO standard systems.

(c) HF NOE COM . The H F NOE COMM provides the commander
with uninterrupted NOE communications over extended distances. This radio is equipped
for digital communications, and can adjust input/output to accommodate interference and
path loss.

(d) Have Quick II . Have Quick 1 1 helps the commander facilitate
Army and joint services communication. Thesystemisa UHF radio that frequency hops
to reduce its susceptibility to jamming and interference. The radio can be used for digital
target handover and information/intelligence flow between Air Force close air support,
OH-58D (I) Kiowa Warrior, andtheAH-64D Apache Longbow.

(e) MCS-P . One element of the Army battle command system, MCS
provides two major functional capabilities; maneuver functional area control (maneuver
unit situational awareness) and force level information (critical sustainment information).
MCS provides commanders and staffs the capability to collect, coordinate, and act on
near-real -time battlefield information. Commanders and staffs can readily access
information and display current situation reports that assess enemy strength and
movement, as well as the status of friendly forces. MCS can then aid the battle staff in
rapidly disseminating the commander's orders.

(f) Aviation mission planning system . The AM PS provides the
commander and staff an automated mission planning and battle synchronization tool.
AMPS functions include tactical C 2 , mission planning, mission management, and
maintenance management. TheAMPS provides an interface to the MCS. This provides

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FM 1-112

the aviation commander with continuous updates of the friendly and enemy situation and
allows the commander to rapidly adjust current and future operational plans.

(5) Other key elements of the Army battle command system that the ATKH B
will have to interface with include:

(a) AS AS . TheASAS provides IPB information used by all echelons for
planning combat operations. The ASAS cell is located at the division and corps TOCs and
the Aviation Brigade will interface with it via the MCS computer through an area
common user system network. During operations, the MCS alone is unable to update the
current intelligence picture frequently enough for Army Aviation operations. Real time
air threat, ground ADA, and SAM locations must be passed to aviation TOCs, both ground
and airborne within seconds of discovery. The commander's tactical terminal hybrid
system will provide the commander with this near real time tactical intelligence. It is a
receiver processor that extracts intelligence broadcasts from several overhead sources.

(b) AFATDS . The AFATDS controls all fire support operations for the
corps and division artillery brigades. The Aviation Brigade and battalion TOCs nominate
targets and submit requests for fire support through the MCS computer via the ACUS.
The fire support element at brigade determines which targets will be serviced by assets
under brigade control. The rest are submitted to division that performs the same filtering
process and sends a consolidated list to the corps FSE. During the conduct of tactical
operations, the ATKFIB coordinate directly via SI NCGARS and Flave Quick radios to fire
support teams and forward air controllers to place ordnance at the right place and time.
These communications are mostly digital, using modems, and the message formats of
AFATDS or the variable message formats.

(c) FAAD . The FAAD provides an overlay of battery coverage areas to
the MCS computer via ACUS. The FAAD system accepts fe«Js from AWACS and organic
ground based radars to generate a real time air picture. The Aviation brigade will access
this information via EPLRS over a local area users network and pass the critical elements
to its aircraft digitally using FIF-NOE-COM radios and modems.

(d) CSSCS . The CSSCS is a computerized system for the control of
most classes of supplies, equipment, and personnel replacements. The CSSCS provides
information on the status of units and equipment to the MCS computer for transmission
to users over the ACUS. The ATKFI B uses CSSCS software on a common computer to
perform its administrative and logistics requests and reporting functions.

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FM 1-112

f. Transmission Limitations .

(1) Because of the ATKHB's mobility and potential for operating throughout
an entire AO, the primary means of communication will be radio. However, some radio
communications are limited by range and I i ne-of-si ght restrictions. In these situations,
commanders may lose contact with their aviation units unless radio relays are used.

Radio communications should be kept to an absolute minimum until enemy contact is
made. Other means to communicate should be used until the radio is necessary so that
detection by enemy direction-finding equipment is avoided.

(2) Satellite channel availability may be limited for several reasons,
especially during early entry operations. Factors such as world-wide geographical location
and unit density per satellite ratios may restrict commanders from continuous
transnational/over-the-horizon communications.

2-7. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Radio Nets . Successful employment of the ATKH B depends on its ability to
communicate with all echelons. The primary means of tactical communications within the
ATKHB is the FM-secure net. The use of UHF and VHF radios in battalion aircraft helps
reduce the load on the FM-secure nets. These radios are primarily used by the ATKHC to
control the platoons. The ATKHB commander normally communicates from his aircraft to
higher headquarters using the FM-secure net. The battalion command net is also FM-
secure; however, this requires that the commander relay messages to higher headquarters
through the main CP, TAC CP, or change frequencies when communications are necessary
with higher headquarters. Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show sample radio nets for an ATKHB.

b. Wire . Though its wire laying capability is limited, the ATKH B has the assets
to establish wire communications in the assembly area. This wire network links the main
CP with elements of the HHC, the AVUM company, and ATKHCs. Figure 2-4 shows a
battalion wire net.

2-8. OPSEC

Security measures must betaken during any military operation to deny the enemy infor-
mation about friendly forces. The OPSEC concept includes all security measures that
allow units to surprise or deceive the enemy. OPSEC includes physical security,
information security, SIGSEC, and deception and countersurveillance activities. Because
these categories are interrelated, the ATKHB commander normally chooses to employ
more than one security technique to counter the threat. He may also use SI GSEC pro-
grams such as electronic warfare and SIGINT. By analyzing hostile intelligence efforts
and vulnerability, executing OPSEC countermeasures, and surveying the effectiveness of
countermeasures, the ATKHB commander can counter specific hostile intelligence efforts.
Aviation OPSEC is described in detail in FM 1-111.

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Figure 2-2. Sample battalion command FM net (Secure)

RED TEAM

WHITE TEAM

BLUE TEAM

Figure 2-3. Sample company nets

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CHAPTER 3
EMPLOYMENT

Section I. Organization and Roles

3-1. ORGANIZATION

a. ATKHB . The ATKH B is task-organized according to the factors of M ETT-T.
As the situation dictates, the aviation brigade commander can organize the ATKH B with
other assets to form TFs to better perform specific missions.

(1) Pure . To take advantage of its speed and mobility against armored
forces, the ATKHB fights pure. When commanders desire to emphasize the shock and
killing effect of massed ATKHBs, they will use the organic structure of the battalion.

(2) IF.

(a) To provide lift capability to an ATKHB, the brigade commander can
attach a platoon of assault helicopters from an assault helicopter company. Figure 3-1
shows additional lift assets attached to an ATKHB. The addition of utility helicopters
allows the ATKHB to move Cl ass MIA/ supplies by air. ATKHCs may be OPCON or
attached to other aviation units based on the duration of the commitment and
sustainment support capability.

(b) When there is a constant requirement for attack helicopters to
provide security for assault helicopters, the aviation brigade commander may task-
organize both the ATKHB and assault helicopter organizations by moving elements
between the two. Figure 3-2 shows two TFs formed in a heavy division. When creating
two TFs, the aviation brigade commander trades the ability to mass his attack helicopters
for better security for his assault helicopters. When attack helicopter companies are
attached to assault helicopter units to form TFs, sufficient Class V and armament support
must also be attached. ATKH Bs may also form TFs with ground forces. Ground maneu-
ver units may be placed under OPCON of the ATKHB to perform specific missions. The
ATKHB may place an ATKHC under OPCON to a ground brigade for limited periods of
time or for a specific mission at the direction of the brigade commander.

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FM 1-112

(3) Augmented . At times, an ATKHR or aviation brigade commander may
be required to reinforce an attack battalion with an additional ATKHC (Figure 3-3). An
ATKHB can control up to five maneuver companies; more than five companies will tax the
battalion's capability to support them logi stically.

Figure 3-3. Augmented ATKHB

b. ATKHC .

(1) ATKHBs are organized with ATKHCs. These companies are organized
into two platoons. An ATKHC has a standard chain of command that leads and fights the
unit as a company. The chain of command includes a company commander and two
platoon leaders. The battalion assigns the ATKHC specific missions as part of the batta-
lion's plan of attack.

(2) The ATKHC commander task-organizes his company for combat based
upon the factors of METT-T. There is no single method to task-organize an ATKHC.
Company commanders must understand the battlefield and adjust for conditions and the
availability of aircraft when deciding how to organize for combat. The organization of
ATKHC assets is based on pairs of aircraft (LA N) known as "teams" operating together to
provide mutual security. If there is an odd number of aircraft, one team will consist of a
lead aircraft and two wingmen. Aircraft without wingmen are vulnerable.

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(3) When task-organizing the company, theATKHC commander will always
attempt to create a balance between the combat power necessary to accomplish the
mission and the need to provide security for each aircraft and the company as a whole.
References to "scout" or "attack" aircraft indicate the role of the aircraft, not the aircraft
type. This reflects the pure (ARI) structure of the ATKHC, as well as the "scout" and
"attack" platoons specified by the MTOE. This organization allows flexibility, and aircraft
configurations will vary to perform the scout or attack role. Below are several examples
of how an ATKHC may be task-organized for combat.

(a) L/W teams . The ATKHC commander may organize the company
into L/W teams. For planning purposes, three L/W teams should be available per
company; however, the commander will use the available aircraft as necessary to
accomplish the mission. This organization allows greater freedom of maneuver and
maximum employment flexibility. Each L/W team is made up of two aircraft that can
operate and provide mutual security for each other. Using three L/W teams facilitates C 2
by placing a platoon leader in two of the teams and the company commander in the third
team. Figure 3-4 shows an ATKHC task-organized into L/W teams.

PLT LDR CO CDR PLT LDR

RED TEAM WHITE TEAM BLUE TEAM

Figure 3-4. ATKHC task-organized into L/W teams

(b) Platoons . L/W teams combine to form platoons that can provide
security, facilitate C 2 or be assigned specific tasks or responsibilities (calling for FS,
controlling air assets, etc.). These platoons, based upon the missions and C 3
requirements, may be called heavy and light platoons, scout and attack platoon, or a

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generic name (such as red and blue platoons). The platoon may be made up of L/W teams
that contain either two attack aircraft, two scout aircraft, two scout/attack aircraft, or one
scout and one attack aircraft. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show an ATKHC task-organized into
platoons.

Figure 3-5. ATKHC task-organized into platoons

Figure 3-6. ATKHC task-organized into two platoons

NOTE: The terms "heavy" and "light" refer to the mission and weapons load of the attack
aircraft, not the number of aircraft. Heavy platoon aircraft will normally befitted with
more ATGMs and concentrate on heavy armored targets. Light platoon aircraft will
normally be loaded with more rockets and machine gun/cannon ammunition and will
attack targets of opportunity and provide suppressive fires for the heavy platoon.

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3-2. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

TheATKHC is a versatile organization that can conduct offensive operations (attack,
movement to contact), defensive operations (area defense, mobile defense), reconnaissance,
and security. In addition, the ATKHC can conduct special purpose operations such as air
assault security (an advance guard that is a combination of attack, reconnaissance, and
security) and raids (commonly referred to as deep attacks).

a. Key Leaders .

(1) ATKHC commander . TheATKHC commander is responsible for
everything that his company does or does not do. H e fights the battle. The commander
establishes attack priorities, plans and directs fire distribution, and controls supporting
fires. He normally operates from an attack aircraft and maneuvers attack and scout
assets during an engagement. TheATKHC commander-

(a) Receives the mission from the battalion.

(b) T ask-organizes the company.

(d) Coordinates with supported ground units.

(e) Confirms BPs for the company and selects platoon and team BPs.

(f) Plans routes to the HA and BP.

(g) Coordinates indirect FS and CAS.

(h) Keeps the battalion informed through situation, spot, and BDA

reports.

(i) Plans for local security in the assembly area, the FAA, and HAs en
route and in the BP.

U) Plans the engagement from the BP and makes a detailed prepa-
ration of the EA.

(k) Controls the joint air attack during company-level J AAT operations.

(l ) C ontr ol s company fi res.

(m) Coordinates battle handover and receives a briefing from the unit to

be relieved.

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(n) Briefs the incoming ATKHC commander during relief on station.

(o) Maneuvers the company to the F ARP and controls refueling and
rearming operations.

(P) Conducts the debriefing.

(q) Prepares for future operations.

(2) Company first sergeant . The ATKHC first sergeant is the
commander's advisor for all matters concerning enlisted soldiers. Additionally, he is the
key logistician for the company and the leader and mentor to the company's enlisted
soldiers. He--

(a) Assists the commander with the training, maintenance, logistics,
and administration of the company.

(b) Checks soldiers, to ensure they are physically and mentally
prepared for combat.

(d) Normally leads the company quartering party and ground assets to
a new assembly area.

(e) Plans and supervises the company CSS plan, receiving and
processing logistics reports from the platoons and coordinating for supplies, equipment,
and personnel.

(f) Orients new personnel to the company and assigns them to

platoons.

(g) Coordinates company force protection measures.

(3) Platoon leader . ATKHC platoon leaders are responsible for leading
their platoons. The platoon leaders are critical to the successful employment of the
ATKHC. When the platoon is task-organized, the platoon leaders control the task-
organized platoon or a team. Platoon leaders-

(a) Assist in planning company missions.

(b) Control the fire and maneuver of their platoons or teams.

(d) Assist the ATKHC commander, at his direction, to execute missions.

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b. Aircrews .

(1) Scout . The mission of ATKHC scouts is to seethe battlefield, find the
enemy, coordinate its destruction, and provide security against ground and air threats.
Normally, scouts in each task-organized platoon accomplish the scouting tasks; however,
both the designated scout and attack aircrews must be able to perform them. Regardless
of which aircrew is performing the mission, the scouting tasks must be performed. These
tasks include:

(a) Requests and adjusts indirect fires and CAS.

(b) Provides early warning and confirms BPs.

(d) Assists the company commander in controlling] AAT operations.

(e) Assists with the movement of attack helicopters to BPs.

(f) Designates targets for acquisition and engagement by laser-guided

munitions.

(g) Hands-over targets verbally or digitally.

(h) Maintains enemy contact as attack helicopters move between BPs.

(i) Acquires, identifies, reports, and designates targets.

(j) Provides attack helicopters with local security and protection from
air threats while they engage targets.

(k) Assists attack aircraft by confirming or selecting firing positions
that provide concealment and standoff ranges.

(2) Attack . Attack aircrews destroy enemy forces and their supporting
systems. Regardless of which aircrew is performing the mission, the attack crew-

(a) Coordinates with the scout.

(b) Moves to the BP, selects the firing position, and receives the target
handover from the ATKHC commander or scout.

(d) Moves to an alternate position and reengages.

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(e) Moves to a successive or supplementary position or HA or returns to

the FARP.

(3) Scout/attack . Scout/attack is the preferred role for aircraft in ATKH Bs.
Scout/attack refers to performing a combination of the scout and attack tasks during the
conduct of a mission. I n addition, crews must be prepared for the role of the scout/attack
crew may change during a mission.

(4) Utility aircrews . Utility aircrews and their aircraft will support attack
helicopter operations. Utility aircraft are required for the successful conduct of most
attack missions. Some of their uses include--

(a) Commanding and controlling assets at battalion level.

(b) Conducting CSAR.

(d) Providing lift capability for logistics operations such as jump FARPs

and jump TOCs.

NOTE: Utility aircrews habitually supporting ATKH B operations must become familiar
with this manual and with the SOPs of the supported attack unit.

Section II. Terms and Missions

3-3. OPERATIONAL TERMS

a. Assembly Area . An assembly area is a location where the ATKH B prepares
for future operations, issues orders, accomplishes routine maintenance, and completes
Class I, III, and V resupply activities. The battalion main CP is located in or near the
assembly area. Assembly areas should be located out of enemy artillery range and be
large enough for dispersion of the unit. Assembly areas are normally located in the corps
or division rear area and in the aviation brigade assembly area. However, corps and
division aviation brigade assets are normally dispersed over large areas to preclude their
becoming lucrative targets. Assembly areas will not be located along an axis of advance.
Other considerations involved in selecting appropriate assembly areas are--

(1) Security.

(2) Concealment.

(3) Accessibility to MSRs.

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( 4 ) Air avenues of approach.

( 5 ) Location of friendly units.

( 6 ) Suitability of ingress and egress routes.

b. FAA . An ATKHB occupies FAAs for extended periods while awaiting orders to
execute missions. FAAs are located near the controlling headquarters to improve C 3 I and
response times. The FAA should be located out of range of enemy medium artillery.
Limited maintenance personnel may be located in the FAA as contact teams move forward
to repair aircraft. Considerations for selecting FAAs are the same as those for selecting
assembly areas.

c. HA. A HA is a covered, concealed position that is occupied for short periods.
Occupation of a HA allows for final reconnaissance and coordination of assets by the
ATKHC commander. It is located between the FAA and the objective area. While occupy-
ing a HA, aircraft may be hovered or landed but they will not be shut down. Based on
METT-T, the attack helicopter crews should consider moving to an alternate HA or
returning to the FAA if they have to wait longer than a few minutes. Units that occupy
HAs should ensure that-

(1) Aircraft maintain operating RPM.

( 2 ) Crews maintain radio listening, silence.

( 3 ) Separate HAs are established for each company.

( 4 ) Aircraft remain at NOE altitudes at and near the HA.

( 5 ) Aircraft establish positions that provide 360-degree security.

( 6 ) The HA is terrain-masked and free of sources of rotor wash signature.

( 7 ) Copilot-gunners dismount for face-to-face coordination with the ATKHC
commander and scouts.

( 8 ) Aircraft are dispersed and maintain platoon integrity while keeping
intervisibility for security.

d. Attack Route . Attack helicopters move from the HA to the BP over attack
routes. Properly selected attack routes allow attack helicopters to move undetected,
ensuring initial surprise in the attack. Scouts select attack routes that provide cover and
concealment and have prominent terrain features to assist in navigation. When used
properly, vegetation and various terrain features can reduce helicopter noise and decrease
the possibility of detection. ATKHCs may have multiple ingress and egress routes.

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e. BP.

(1) The ATKHC may engage targets from concealed BPs designated in the
OPORD or FRAGO. BPs are ideally suited for dose-coordination attacks, such as those
conducted in the ground unit's sector in the defense or deep attacks where there is
extensive intelligence or operational reason mandating the specific place in the

battl espace from which the attack must be made.

( 2 ) The ATK H C commander uses i nformati on from the scouts to confi rm B Ps
and assign platoon BPs and sectors of fire. The ATKHC disperses in the BP based on
terrain. Scouts maintain contact with the targets and call up attack helicopters as enemy
forces come into range, which reduces the exposure time of the attack helicopters. As the
attack helicopters engage targets, scouts provide security and early warning by observing
ground and air avenues of approach into the BP. BPs and their preparation are described
in paragraph 3-8. Figure 3-7 shows the layout of the battlefield.

f. ABF Position . If the enemy situation is vague, as in a movement to contact,
and the ATKHB commander has been assigned his own sector, ABF positions may be
used. An ABF position is one from which a unit will engage a target, but not maneuver
over it, with the intent of inflicting some level of damage. ABF positions are less
restrictive than BPs, and better suited to a fluid battlefield. The commander must,
however, control all indirect fires into his sector and know the locations of all hisATKHCs
to clear those fires. See figure 3-8.

g. SBF Position . TheSBF position will normally be used in conjunction with
the ABF position, as a base of fire or overwatch position. It can be used to engage a
target while ground or air assets move to or around it. Engagements from the SBF
position may range from suppression to destruction of the target, but the primary mission
is to fix the target so another force may maneuver. See figure 3-9.

h. Firing Position . Attack helicopter PCs select the actual firing positions that
provide standoff ranges and good fields of fire within their BP, ABF, or SBF. Ingress and
egress routes should be well -concealed, and the background of the firing position should
reduce the risk of visual acquisition by the enemy. Selected firing positions must also
allow freedom of movement for the attack helicopters and permit them to be hovered
without raising dust or debris. To increase aircraft survivability, attack helicopter
aircrews should limit the number of engagements from a single firing position and move
before they receive effective counterfire.

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I lE&J

Figure 3-9. SBF used to overwatch ground maneuver

i. EA. The EA is an area in which the commander intends to trap and destroy
an enemy force with the massed fires of all available weapons. Commanders must use
obstacles, FS, fire distribution plans, and a thorough IPB to coordinate both combined and
joint fires and mass them against the enemy force as it arrives in the EA. To exploit
enemy weaknesses and maximize the advantages of terrain, battle and firing positions are
selected in relation to EAs. A good EA should have at least the four characteristics listed
below.

(1) BPs . The EA should have several BPs for attacking the enemy from
various directions.

(2) Obstacles to movement . Obstacles, either natural or man-made, are
desirable in the EA to slow target movement and permit the effective use of direct and
indirect fires.

(3) Long-range fires . To enhance aircraft survivability, an EA should allow
aircrews to engage targets at the maximum range that permits a high P k .

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(4) Continuous target visibility . Long-range engagements require that
the target be in view during terminal guidance. As a rule, EAs should provide an
unobstructed view of the target from firing or designating positions. Planning should
concentrate on sensor ranges, not weapon maximum standoff ranges, for EAs.

j. Rally Point . A rally point is a designated area where separated or dispersed
elements of the ATKHC reassemble. It may be used to reform the light and heavy
platoons after an attack or to regroup a team, platoon, or company after a hasty
withdrawal from untenable BPs.

3-4. EMPLOYMENT METHODS.

TheATKHB commander employs the battalion through the coordination of his ATKHCs,
CS, and CSS. He uses his attack companies to destroy enemy forces. To do this, he
applies one of three methods of employment-continuous attack, phased attack, or
maximum destruction. Timing is critical in the employment of the ATKH B. Employed
too early, it may have to be disengaged before mission completion because of low fuel.
Employed too late, it may miss part or all of the targeted unit and fail to destroy the
enemy forces at the critical time and place. TheATKHB should be employed when a
lucrative target has been identified and selected for engagement.

a. Continuous Attack . To exert constant pressure on the enemy force, the
ATKHB commander employs the ATKHCs using the continuous attack method. This
method ensures that at least one company will be in the battle at all times. While one
company is in the battle, the other two prepare to relieve the engaged company as they
remain in HAs or the FARP or move between the FARP and the battle. Many times dur-
ing a continuous attack the ATKHC commander on station may send only the attack
helicopters to rearm and refuel. This allows the scouts to remain in enemy contact,
coordinate with the relieving ATKHC commander, and reconnoiter successive BPs.
Multiple BPs, ABF positions, or SBF positions selected during mission planning provide
the flexibility needed for a coordinated battle handover between companies. The con-
tinuous attack method provides the most flexibility and the most efficient FARP
operations. It also provides sustained fires over long periods. Figure 3-10 shows the con-
tinuous attack method.

b. Phased Attack . The phased attack method is a modification of the
continuous attack method and is used to increase the initial firepower of the battalion.
Using this method, the commander initially employs one company to begin the attack. He
then quickly phases in the second company from a different BP. The third attack
company is phased into the fight when either of the other companies is low on fuel or
ammunition. The phased attack method may be reversed, or the commander may vary
how the phased attack is conducted. For example, he may employ one company to set
upthe fight and then exploit the attack with his other two companies. If the phased
attack method is used, aircraft turnaround time in the FARP must be kept as short as

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possible. Because of FARP limitations, eventually the phased attack method reverts to
the continuous attack method. Figure 3-11 shows the phased attack method.

Figure 3-10. Continuous attack method

Figure 3-11. Phased attack method

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c. Maximum Destruction . If the ATKH B commander wishes to place as much
combat power as possible into the battle, he uses the maximum destruction method. To
overwhelm the enemy with massed fires, the battalion deploys with all three companies in
contact from different positions. I n this situation, the supported commander must realize
that the ATKH B will be out of the fight for 20 to 90 minutes at the completion of its
initial attack. The exact time depends upon the distance to the F ARP and the time it
takes to replenish fuel and ammunition after the initial engagement. Figure 3-12 shows
the maximum destruction method.

PL BLUE

PL RED

Figure 3-12. Maximum destruction method

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Section III. Environmental Considerations

3-5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.

On the battlefield, each belligerent will attempt to use the environment to his advantage.
The environment includes what we can see (terrain, visible light, weather, and
obscurants) and what we cannot see (electromagnetic measures, CB pollution, and
battlefield stress). As part of the planning process, commanders must consider these
environmental factors and attempt to use either the environment in their favor or negate
its effects as much as possible.

a. Weather and Visibility . Weather and visibility create advantages and
disadvantages for opposing forces. To fight effectively, commanders must know how they
are limited by poor weather and visibility. At times, theATKHB may not be able to
execute a mission because of the weather. Therefore, the ATKH B commander must
advise the force commander of the restrictions that bad weather and visibility place on the
ATKH B.

(1) Weather . Weather affects soldiers, equipment, operations, and terrain.
Cloud cover, wind, rain, snow, fog, dust, light conditions, and temperature extremes
combine in various ways to affect human efficiency and limit the use of weapons and
equipment. ATKH B assets are greatly influenced by the effects of weather, but so are
enemy assets. Rain can degrade the FUR systems used on AH -64s and OH-58DS for
piloting the aircraft and targeting. However, rain also inhibits the cross-country
maneuverability of enemy mechanized forces, causing their movement to slow or
channelize on roads. High winds makes gunnery for attack helicopters more difficult, but
it also makes enemy obscurants less effective. Each system used on the battlefield has its
strong and weak points in relation to the environment. Commanders must know the
strengths of each system and use them to attack the weaknesses of enemy systems.

(2) Visibility . Limited visibility affects operations and favors the attacker
by masking his maneuver. However, darkness, fog, and smoke reduce the useful ranges
of most weapons, including enemy AD weapons. During periods of limited visibility,
attack helicopters must maneuver closer to the enemy for successful engagements. The
winner of an engagement will usually be the soldier or aircrew that gains surprise,
acquires the target, and accurately fires the fastest. ATKHC commanders must maneuver
their forces to a positional advantage using the terrain and concealment afforded by the
limited-visibility environment. Once in position, crew members will have to acquire the
target, fire rapidly, and then move. At close range, any delay in effectively engaging the
enemy and repositioning gives the enemy time to react and return fire.

b. Terrain . "Geography and ground can affect military operations in three
ways-as an obstacle to the approach, as an impediment to visibility, and as cover from
fire." Clausewitz, On War .

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(1) Analysis . Terrain analysis is a critical skill; all members of the ATKH B
must develop an understanding of the limitations and opportunities that terrain affords.
ATKHB commanders and their staffs perform terrain analysis in light of their units'
missions. Whether using the advanced capabilities of the AMPS and ASAS or paper
maps, they evaluate the terrain's potential for cover and concealment, its impact on their
maneuver and the enemy's movements, and its use for observation and direct fire effect.
The key elements of terrain analysis are summarized in the mnemonic OCOKA--

(a) Observation and fields of fire.

(b) Cover and concealment.

(d) Key terrain.

(e) Avenues of approach.

(2) Reinforcement . The proper use of natural obstacles and the re-
inforcement of terrain must bean integral part of the ATKHB commander's plan.

Artillery fires, direct fire E As, and obstacles must all be combined in the tactical plan.
Engineers use obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the enemy. Disruptive obstacles
cause enemy formations to separate or bunch up, which disrupts their maneuver and
attack. Fixing obstacles slow enemy progress and allow friendly artillery and direct fires
the opportunity to mass. Turning obstacles drive the enemy toward friendly EAs and
massed fires or force them to expose their flanks, allowing friendly gunners to achieve a
positional advantage. Blocking obstacles deny the enemy access to a given area or
prevent his advance in a given direction. Although the ATKHB will seldom have engineer
support to establish obstacles, the ATKHB commander must understand the force
commander's obstacle plan and use it to the battalion's advantage.

(3) Intelligence . The commander must be familiar with the terrain before
combat. Because maps are sometimes inaccurate or incomplete, commanders should
conduct a detailed, personal reconnaissance. Company commanders should ensure that
their aircrews are familiar with the terrain and scheme of maneuver. If possible, crews
should visit battle and firing positions, perform a map reconnaissance, and conduct sand
table exercises before executing a mission. These actions will help them to understand
the scheme of maneuver, commander's intent, and terrain and quicken their reactions
during the chaos of battle. All sources of intelligence must be considered. Aerial
photographs, satellite imagery, HUMINT, SIGINT, and ELI NT can each be critical assets.

c. Special Environments . The ATKHB operates best over open, rolling terrain,
which is also favored by mechanized forces. It is least effective against enemy forces that
are stationary, well -camouflaged, and in prepared positions. The ATKHB will be called
upon to execute its mission in a variety of environments. The following paragraphs cover
specialized environments in which the ATKHB may be expected to operate.

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(1) Urbanized terrain .

(a) Commanders can employ attack helicopters in urban terrain.
However, there are special planning considerations for this type of employment. In urban
areas, fields of fire are restricted and buildings provide cover for enemy light forces to
engage attack helicopters with near impunity. This type of terrain can negate the
effectiveness of the long-range, precision munitions of the attack helicopter. Rockets and
cannons can be used against light structures; however, they may not have sufficient
explosive power to be used against well -constructed buildings of reinforced brick and
concrete. While there are challenges for commanders employing attack helicopters in
urban environments, experience has shown that attack helicopters are much more
effective and flexible than mortars and artillery in urban operations.

(b) TheATKHB is well-suited for employment on the outskirts of an
urban area, attacking forces that are attempting to bypass, envelop, or reinforce the built-
up area. If employed in urban terrain, special consideration should be given to the
munitions selected. Collateral damage near targets engaged by Hellfire ATGMs will be
higher than near those engaged by 30 mm TP rounds. Consideration should also be given
to high-energy, high-altitude tactics, such as diving fire, to overcome the vertical
restrictions of built-up terrain. For planning, the commander must keep in mind the
following challenges of MOUT:

• Flight routes in urbanized terrain may increase employment times and fuel
consumption.

• Buildings limit maneuverability and engagement range, as do mountains.

• Urbanized terrain may limit FARP size, location and response times.

• Extensive urban sprawl and high buildings degrade communications and may
require extensive relay and retransmission sites.

• Urbanized terrain masks IEW acquisition capabilities.

• The numerous buildings and streets and few map references complicate
navigation in built-up areas.

• Urban areas directly affect weather, especially wind patterns.

• Landing and pickup zones may be severely limited; operations from rooftops
may be required.

(2) Mountains . Mountainous areas provide unique challenges for attack
helicopters. While high altitude limits the load-carrying capability of the attack
helicopter, the terrain is compartmentalized, allowing for rapid movement to the flanks
and rear of an isolated enemy force. Enemy mechanized forces will be slowed and

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channelized as they move up steep grades and down narrow valleys or are restricted to
roads and trails. Mountains provide excellent terrain-masking and allow easy avoidance
of radar and visual acquisition. However, high ridges also provide effective firing
positions for AD guns and hand-held missiles. The nature of the terrain and the dis-
tances that must be traversed to get into position to attack may require that the ATKH B
engage the enemy force without the support of other combined arms.

(3) I unqles . Dense jungles and wooded areas severely limit the capability of
the ATKH B to effectively employ precision-guided munitions. Heavily wooded areas
degrade fields of fire and target identification. Although the capability of the ATKH B to
employ precision-guided munitions is degraded, it can still provide supporting fires for
other members of the combined arms team. Attack helicopters can carry large loads of
nonprecision guided munitions, such as rockets and cannon. When directed by scouts or
ground forces, they can place heavy fires on the enemy. These fires can suppress the
enemy, block his withdrawal, or destroy massed light forces. ATKHB fires should be
maximized against enemy targets that oppose the friendly main effort. Somethings to
remember when operating in a jungle environment include the following:

(a) Aircraft should not overfly the target.

(b) Humid tropical air decreases aircraft lift capabilities, decreasing

payload.

(d) Attacks should be made simultaneously from more than one
direction to confuse the enemy.

(e) Attacks should be made along the length of the enemy force, not
perpendicular to it.

(f) The location of friendly forces should be marked and easily
identified from the air.

(g) Constant communications and liaison are needed between the
attacking ATKHB and the element of the supported ground force in contact.

(h) Attacks should not be made over the heads of friendly ground forces.
(Expended shells falling from the attack aircraft may cause confusion among friendly
troops, leading to possible fratricide. This is true for all types of terrain.)

(4) Deserts . The ATKHB can effectively operate in the desert or in open
terrain. However, it is vulnerable to enemy long-range observation, acquisition, and
harsh environmental conditions. Shifting sand dunes make maps obsolete quickly, and
the lack of any NAVAIDS, man-made or natural, make navigation extremely difficult
without GPS or Doppler navigation assistance. Heat limits weapon and fuel loads that

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each attack aircraft can carry, and sand and dust can cause damage and increased
maintenance requirement for the aircraft. Attack aircraft flying low and slow may
produce large dust clouds. Clouds of dust are easily detected and obscure aircraft
acquisition systems. These severe conditions require proper maintenance, engagement
techniques, and positioning of Class MIA/ resources. Extra maintenance will help correct
the problems of heat, sand, and dust. Both air and ground crews must be aware that
engines have to be cleaned and filters changed more often during desert operations.

Firing while flying above ETL airspeed diminishes the dust signature and aids in surviv-
ability. The loss of load capabilities is overcome by placing FARPs closer to the objective
areas. When operating above ETL, attack aircraft can operate at higher gross weights
than when hovering fire is used.

d. NBC Weapons .

(1) Because of the world-wide proliferation of NBC weapons since the end of
the Cold War, potential enemies of the United States may be expected to use NBC
weapons. Weapons of mass destruction may be the enemy's alternative to conventional
warfare. Nuclear and chemical weapons could have a devastating effect if friendly forces
are unprepared for their use.

( 2 ) The ATKFIB commander must take the exposure guidance of his higher
headquarters, the enemy's intent and capability, and the mission and condition of the unit
into account when setting the battalion mission oriented protective posture level. If the
enemy can use or has used chemical weapons any-where on the battlefield, commanders
must immediately take precautionary measures to protect their battalions. This will
normally mean that the ATKFIB will conduct operations in MOPP 2 before chemical
weapons are used and goto MOPP 4 when their use is imminent or after they are used.
The ATKFIB will survive by anticipating nuclear or chemical attacks. To avoid becoming
lucrative targets, commanders must-

(a) Avoid detection.

(b) Retain mobility.

operations.

(d) Seek terrain shielding by carefully selecting assembly areas and
preparing shelters/fighting positions.

(e) Be aware of flying debris in a nuclear environment.

(f) Be alert to the possibility of a nuclear or chemical attack and adjust
the MOPP level and unit dispersion according to the threat.

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(g) Instill discipline and physical conditioning to prepare troops for the
confusion and physical demands of a nud ear/chemical environment.

e. EW . EW is an essential element of combat power. Its contribution lies in
exploiting enemy weaknesses, protecting friendly freedom of action, and reducing security
and communication vulnerabilities. Modern military forces depend on electronics for C 2 of
forces and employment of weapon systems. Friendly and enemy forces are vulnerable to
actions that can reduce the effectiveness of their electronics. Properly applied EW can
locate, identify, target, deceive, delay, disorganize, and destroy the enemy when
integrated into the overall concept of the operation. FMs 34-1, 34-7, and 34-10 provide
detailed information on EW.

(1) E_S. ES involves actions to intercept, locate, and identify threat sources.
ES provides combat information for the S2 to meet the commander's I R/PI R. The S2,
following the commander's guidance, must establish priorities for ES orders and requests,
continuously update ongoing ES operations, and anticipate future ES operations by
tasking organic ES assets and coordinating with the IEW support element within the
ACE.

(2) EA. E A involves actions taken to prevent or reduce the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum by hostile forces. The aviation S3 has staff responsibility for
overall planning and coordination of EW operations. Fie primarily directs the EA in
jamming and deception roles. With the S2, FSO, and IEW support element, the S3 will
establish priorities for targets. EA is directed against targets to degrade the enemy's
ability to respond quickly and effectively.

(3) EP. EP involves actions taken to retain friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The S3 will coordinate with the signal officer to establish EP
to protect friendly signal operations. Training in the correct employment of the signal
emitters and emitter capabilities and design is necessary for successful EP. Equally
important is training in the correct use of Signal Operating Instructions, communications
discipline, and proper radio/telephone operating procedures.

f. Smoke and Obscurants .

(1) Smoke and obscurants are i ntegral to the former-Sovi et U ni on's doctri ne,
tactics, equipment, and training. The threat will use smoke to increase its effectiveness
and reduce its vulnerability. Specifically, smoke can-

(a) Deny information.

(b) M ask the use of chemical weapons.

(d) Restrict NOE and contour approaches to EAs.

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(e) Reduce the effectiveness of sensors, range finders, and target

designators.

( 2 ) The ATKHB can also use smoke to enhance its survivability. Through
the use of artillery-fired smoke or 2.75-inch FFAR white phosphorus rounds, theATKFIB
can achieve the same results as the enemy. Additional benefits of the use of smoke by
ATKFI Bs are--

(a) To suppress visually sighted enemy ADA systems and small arms.

(b) To sector portions of the EAs, isolating part of the enemy force.

g. Battlefield Stress .

(1) As they plan and conduct operations, commanders must remember the
effects of combat stress and minimize adverse consequences. While ground forces will
carry the brunt of the fighting, the enemy's main effort will not always affect the same
units. Because the ATKFI B can maneuver quickly and mass combat power at the critical
time and place, it can expect to engage in direct combat more often than other maneuver
units. Therefore, minimizing the adverse effects of battlefield stress is an important
factor in ATKFIB combat effectiveness.

( 2 ) The adverse effects of battlefield stress may occur as-

(a) Physical and mental fatigue from sleep loss.

(b) Continual physical /mental effort under high work load and time

pressures.

(c) Physiological stress from extreme temperatures; noise; vibration;
blasts, flashes and radiation; battlefield air pollution; all degrees of effects from chemical
weapons and their antidotes; and other-than-fatigue effects from the factors listed above.

(d) A generally incapacitating, long-term (days, months, or sometimes
years) psychological stress casualty syndrome (combat fatigue).

(e) Transient, severe degradation or breakdowns in mental capabilities
(and physical capabilities under some extreme situations) during the extreme fear of
actual combat and anticipation of actual combat.

( 3 ) A combination of all these effects exists in some degree (usually a
substantial degree) in every individual in every combat situation. This combination of
stress effects will initially reduce the combat effectiveness of individuals and units below

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that demonstrated during peacetime training. As their combat experience increases, most
individuals will learn to cope with the adverse effects of battlefield stress on their combat
performance. However, even a combat-experienced unit's performance can be expected to
remain below that demonstrated during peacetime training.

(4) Leaders at all levels must be able to recognize the signs of fatigue and
battlefield stress. Fatigue and battlefield stress will cause non combat- related accidents
that will diminish the combat power of the ATKHB, risking lives, aircraft, and a highly
trained crew. Fatigue can be controlled through rest; aircrews that fight all day cannot
expect to fight well all night. Prompt treatment of stress casualties in forward areas can
return most soldiers to duty rapidly. Both ATKHB and ATKHC commanders must make
a realistic evaluation of the condition of their soldiers and then make recommendations to
the force commander about their capability to continue the fight.

Section IV. Movement to the Objective Area

3-6. PREPARATION FOR MOVEMENT

a. General . Fighting the battle involves taking the plan that has been
formulated and shaping it to fit the situation. To plan the battle, the ATKHC commander
selects routes, flight modes, and platoon BPs; coordinates fire control measures; devises a
plan that considers the factors of METT-T; and accomplishes the mission. The ATKHC
commander's plan must be flexible enough to allow for rapid deviation to meet the actual
situation. When deciding his courses of action, the ATKHC commander must consider the
mission, threat, movement, occupation of the BP, actions in the BP, egress and
restoration. He must also consider when to begin the engagement and when to maneuver.

(1) Mission . The mission of the ATKHC is a subset of the mission assigned
to the ATKHB. The success or failure of the ATKHB directly relates to the success or
failure of its companies. ATKHC commanders use the ATKHB commander's intent and
mission statement to decide how to accomplish the company's mission. However, it is
possiblethat the ATKHC will have a mission that is different from that of the battalion.
An example is an ATKHC that is supporting the attack of its parent battalion. The
ATKHB has the mission to disrupt an enemy TR, and one of the ATKHCs has the mission
to screen intheATKHB's sector.

(2) Threat . J ust as the ATKH B conducts an I PB during planning, so must
the ATKHC. The ATKHC IPB is based upon the IPB that is prepared by the ATKHB,
and is oriented toward confirming the battalion's IPB. It involves plotting the routes
through the EA where groups of vehicles will maneuver and determining the location of
priority targets and AD systems. With this information, the ATKHC commander will be
better prepared to select BPs for his platoons or teams and designate their sectors of fire.

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b. Precombat Checks .

(1) Commanders conduct precombat checks to ensure the unit is prepared for
the mission. Aircrews and aircraft require extensive precombat checks to ensure mission
readiness.

( 2 ) Precombat checks are a part of all missions and are included in this
manual to increase the probability of successful completion of all operations. The
following paragraphs contain a suggested format for the aircrew precombat checks.

c. Before Mission Receipt Checks .

(1) Aircraft should be preflighted per appropriate checklist with PPC in
progress. Aircraft logbook should be in a known location, preferably in the aircraft.

( 2 ) Aircraft should be full of fuel and loaded with ammunition (if applicable).
Weight and balance should be computed for aircraft load.

( 3 ) Aircrew on appropriate crew rest schedule should be tracked by
commander and ASO.

d. Upon Mission Receipt . The commander and company planners provide the
following information. This information is gathered from the various unit staff sections:

*(1) Assessment of the enemy capability.

*(2) Mission graphics.

( 3 ) Navigation/air route planning according to posted A 2 C 2 plan.

( 4 ) FS and fire distribution on the objective.

*( 5 ) Actions on contact.

*( 6 ) Communication card or SOI s.

*( 7 ) COMSEC/IFF codes for aircraft.

*( 8 ) Weather, light data, and fuel requirements

( 9 ) Tactical FPLN preparation and filing.

( 10 ) Risk assessment.

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*NOTE: Much of this information may be developed concurrently with the staff. The
items marked with the asterisk contain information that can be continuously tracked and
updated prior to mission receipt.

e. Preparing for the Mission . Following receipt of the mission briefing (either
written or oral), the ATKHC executes the following:

(1) The commander conducts a briefing to cover more detailed flight and
tactical procedures for the mission aircrews. A mission briefing format can be found in
Appendix C.

(2) The company planners receive updates from the staff, continuously
updating the friendly and enemy situation, as well as weather and environmental
considerations.

(3) By backward planning from the EA to the assembly area, the commander
and company planners determine the mission's time sequence.

(4) A FPLN or field strip is filed at flight operations with a current risk
assessment for the mission.

f. Final Checks . Before the crews move to the aircraft, the following checks
should take place:

(1) Graphics . The commander or a designated platoon leader should inspect
the mission graphics of the mission crews for completeness and accuracy. Use a known,
properly prepared map as a baseline. This technique can be ongoing through the
planning process, but a quick check prior to the mission is critical.

(2) Communication card . I f the crews had to copy thei r own frequenci es
and call signs, designate a crew member to read the card aloud to the crews to check
accuracy. Ensure crews know the proper frequencies for conduct of communication check.

(3) Mission statement and commander's intent . The commander will
read the mission statement and the commander's intent to the crews.

(4) Chain of command . Restate the chain of command and reiterate the
downed pilot points and the SERE plan. Ask for questions, and send the crews to their
aircraft.

g. Crew Checks . Crews should check the following items before getting into the
aircraft:

(1) Crew members within limits of crew endurance policy.

(2) Aircraft ignition key is present.

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( 3 ) ALSE, both personal and crew, present.

( 4 ) Checklist, -10 manual, and all mission-related publications available.

( 5 ) At least one canteen and one MRE available per crew member.

( 6 ) Special mission equipment (such as NVGs and sidearms) available and
function check complete.

( 7 ) COMSEC and IFF codes loaded in appropriate equipment.

h. Run-Up Checks .

(1) Crews must complete start sequence according to the appropriate -10

checklist.

( 2 ) Crews must complete weapons system initialization according to the
appropriate aircraft aircrew training manual. For armed helicopters, weapons checks and
boresights are considered one of the most critical precombat checks.

i. Communications Check . The communication check described below may
not be compatible with all communications packages in armed helicopters. The
commander may use this technique for SOP development.

(1) Chalk 1 starts the check on FM, selects U FH F and transmits, and then
selects VFIF and transmits. For example, "This is (call sign) on 1 (FM internal frequency
nonsecure), 2 (U FH F internal frequency), and 3 (VFIF internal frequency)."

( 2 ) This process continues through the chalk order until all aircraft in the
flight have checked. All aircraft will monitor to determine which radios work on which
aircraft.

( 3 ) Chalk 1 announces "This is (call sign), go secure on 1." This instructs the
flight to select the secure mode for their FM radio. The check progresses as (1) above, but
only the FM is used.

( 4 ) OnceFM secure is checked, the flight can go active on FI ave Quick, with
a designated aircraft in the flight sending the time.

(a) If crews use this procedure during all training missions,
communication checks become quick and routine. The commander may need to readjust
radio nets due to nonfunctioning radios in the flight. It is very important to let all crews
know which radios the nets are on before takeoff.

(b) Once all checks are complete and the commander is satisfied the
flight can communicate, he will call "execute card." This will tell the crews to tune their

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radios to the predetermined nets for the mission, and will most likely be the last radio
transmission until takeoff.

j. Conclusion . When the commander or AMC calls for takeoff, he must assume
that the crews in his flight have conducted all weapons systems checks. Units must
practice precombat checks prior to all training missions. When practiced regularly, these
checks will become routine and easily accomplished.

3-7. MOVEMENT

a. Principles of Overwatch . ATKHCs maneuver to fight the enemy in much
the same way as mechanized maneuver forces. The major difference is that terrain does
not hinder helicopter movement. The maneuvering force's use of terrain as an ally
applies equally to both ground vehicles and attack helicopters. Therefore, the ATKHC
must adapt its flight mode and technique of movement to maintain security. The
principles of overwatch that apply to attack helicopter units are discussed below.

(1) Find the enemy with a minimum of forces . Scouts move ahead of
attack elements to assist in locating the enemy and reconnoiter the BP. During the move,
scouts should provide rear security and reconnoiter frequently to locate enemy ground and
air threats.

(2) Use all available cover and concealment . The ATKHC must use
stealth to maneuver into position to engage the enemy. The use of the surrounding
terrain and vegetation will allow the company to arrive undetected at the BP.

(3) Overwatch lead elements and be prepared to fire and maneuver .

This principle applies when the company approaches a BP, attacks in sector, or takes part
in an exploitation or a pursuit. The battlefield has no secure positions.

(4) Adjust the movement technique and type of terrain flight to the
factors of METT-T . The ATKHC will use traveling, traveling overwatch, or bounding
overwatch techniques depending on the likelihood of enemy contact. Low-level, contour,
or NOE flight will be used as appropriate.

b. Movement Techniques.

(1) Traveling . Traveling is used when speed is important and contact with
the enemy is not likely. Traveling is used to move rapidly in relatively secure areas; for
example, in a corps or division rear area. The ATKHC can use traveling with both
platoons in one flight or separate platoons in multiple flights. In either case, the company
moves at a constant airspeed using the appropriate type of terrain flight.

(2) Traveling over watch . Traveling overwatch is used when enemy
contact is possible. Precautionary measures are justified, but speed is desirable. The
ATKHC leads with its light platoon, which moves at a constant rate; the heavy platoon

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trails and moves as necessary to provide overwatch of the light platoon. The
overwatching platoon observes the terrain where the enemy might be positioned to fire on
the lead platoon.

(3) Bounding overwatch . Bounding overwatch is used when enemy
contact is expected. From a covered, concealed position, the overwatching platoon
monitors the progress of the bounding platoon. Each platoon may bound or overwatch in
turn; however, the movement may also be executed with the light platoon always
bounding and the heavy platoon always overwatching. The overwatch position should
offer observation and fields of fire against potential enemy positions. Table 3-1 lists the
techniques of movement, and Figure 3-13 shows the techniques of movement in relation to
the battlefield.

Table 3-1. Techniques of movement

Technique

Contact

Terrain Flight

Traveling

Traveling overwatch
Bounding overwatch

Not likely
Possible
Expected

Low-level or contour
Contour or NOE
NOE

c. Axis of Advance . The effective movement of ATKFICs throughout the
battlefield is one of the keys to mission success. The ATKFI B uses an axis of advance, a
general direction of movement, which is divided into routes for each ATKFIC, between the
FAA and the battalion sector. It is planned and plotted to correspond with the A 2 C 2 plan,
avoid known enemy concentrations, and take advantage of the terrain. The ATKFIC
routes within the axis are wide enough to allow for maneuver (approximately 1 kilometer
wide or 500 meters either side of the centerline). Each company route is 4 to 5 kilometers
apart (centerline to centerline) and uses the standard control measures of an LD or SP,
ACP, and RP. The SPs, ACPs, and RPs are located along the centerline to orient the
ATKFICs as they maneuver toward their sectors and FI As. Figure 3-14 shows three
separate routes (one for each company). A 2 C 2 is discussed in-depth in FMs 100-103 and 1-
111 .

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Figure 3-14. ATKHB axis of advance broken down into company routes

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FM 1-112

d. Multi helicopter Operations . Commanders designate formations for the
company to establish the relationship of one platoon to another in the air, establish the
concept of where the enemy will be and how the company will react to contact, and
establish the degree of security desired. The basic attack aviation tactical unit is the two-
aircraft, L/W team.

(1) L/W team movement . Three team techniques of movement are free
cruise, combat cruise, and combat spread. These techniques are designed to provide
team security and flexibility, and they are the building blocks of platoon and company
formations. I n each case, the lead aircraft designates the primary direction of travel and
thewingman maintains his position in relation to the lead aircraft. The general rule for
the L/W relationship is "follow me and do as I do". Teams are purposely spread out; a
spread-out team allows the wingman to spend most of his effort searching for threats and
less time watching the lead aircraft.

(a) Free cruise . Free cruise is used when teams desire to move
quickly and maximize the use of terrain for masking. It gives the team freedom to
maneuver and allows the wingman to provide security for his lead. Free cruise permits
the wingman to maneuver in the zone extending 45 degrees on either side and to the rear
of the leader's tail. The wingman should avoid the area directly behind the lead (6 o'clock
position) because of his inability to provide suppressive fires for lead, his limited forward
observation, and the possibility that his lead's presence alerted the enemy in his flight
path. Figure 3-15 shows an example of a free cruise formation.

Figure 3-15. Example of a free cruise formation

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FM 1-112

(b) Combat cruise . Unlike free cruise, combat cruise requires the
wingman to remain in either right or left cruise and change sides only after being directed
to do so by the lead aircraft or after he communicates to the lead aircraft his intentions to
change sides. Using combat cruise, the wingman should fly an arc from 10 to 75 degrees
aft the lead aircraft (right cruise) or the same approximate location on the other side of
the lead aircraft (left cruise). The optimum position for the wingman is 45 degrees aft the
lead aircraft. For planning, the wingman should maintain an approximately 10-rotor
diameter (rotor tip to rotor tip) separation from his lead. The wingman should avoid the
area directly behind the lead, as in free cruise. Figure 3-16 shows an example of a
combat cruise formation.

Figure 3-16. Example of a combat-cruise formation

(c) Combat spread . The combat-spread is used when enemy contact is
imminent. This formation promotes security by providing maximum firepower forward
and overlapping fields of view. It is flown with the wingman in a plus or minus 10-degree
abeam position on either the left or right side (spread left or spread right) of the
lead aircraft. For planning, the wingman should maintain an approximately 10-rotor
diameter (rotor tip to rotor tip) separation from his lead. Commanders may vary the
maximum lateral separation between aircraft based on visibility, maneuver space
available, and expected enemy weapon ranges. Figure 3-17 shows an example of a
combat-spread formation.

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Figure 3-17. Example of a combat-spread formation

(d) Line formation . A variation on the combat-spread is the line
formation. It may be used to facilitate movement into BPs, SBF positions, and ABF
positi ons. The I i ne formati on i s formed by pi aci ng two teams usi ng the combat-spread
formation side-by-side. This technique is also known as "stacking right" or "stacking left."
The line formati on has advantages. It provides excellent firepower forward. It provides a
wide area of protection to ground elements if used during an overwatch. It also allows the
maximum number of helicopters to close on an objective in the shortest time. The line
formation has disadvantages. It provides minimum fires to flanks. It is less secure than
regular combat spreads because of the lack of depth. It is more difficult to control than
team combat spreads. It also decreases freedom of maneuver. An example of a line
formation is shown in Figure 3-18.

Figure 3-18. Example of a line formation

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(3) Platoon/company formations .

(a) There is normally little tactical advantage for using tight, rigid
formations for attack helicopters. Commanders lose their maneuver advantage, and they
may jeopardize weapons effectiveness by trying to maintain tight formations during
terrain flight near the objective area. In addition, a team's ability to properly execute
actions on contact is contingent upon maneuver space and may be significantly hindered
by helicopters flying too closely.

(b) Platoon and company formations are built from L/W teams. The
commander does not normally employ rigid formations, but he does employ techniques
such as travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch during contour and NOE flight.
However, the commander may choose to employ the formations listed in the paragraph
below during low-level flight or during nonterrain flight modes, based on METT-T. These
formations are normally used when enemy contact is not expected, speed of movement is
desired, or to cross a specific point quickly (for example, a FLOT passage point).

e. Tactical Formations . The following are example formations for attack
helicopter platoons and companies. When using these formations, the commander should
plan to separate teams by no less than approximately 10 rotor diameters (rotor tip to
rotor tip). Individual aircraft should move in the same relative position within the
formation. This will ensure that each crew knows whereto move, who is behind them,
and where to observe and direct fires. The four basic formations are staggered column,
wedge, combat trail, and echelon.

(1) Staggered . The staggered column is normally the formation of choice for
movement in the attack helicopter platoon and company. This formation allows team
integrity, while maintaining separation between elements. The staggered column is used
as a general purpose travelling and travelling overwatch formation when the terrain
allows for dispersion and allows the commander to array his aircraft to the left of right of
the lead aircraft, also known as "staggered right" and "staggered left". (NOTE: Staggered
right is particularly well-suited for AH-64s conducting night system flight. It allows the
pilot's unaided (left) eye to watch the lead aircraft's position lights while the aided (right)
eye focuses on the night system display.)

(a) The staggered column formation has advantages. It provides
excellent control. It provides excellent firepower to the flanks. It facilitates rapid
deployment to other formations. It also facilitates rapid movement. The dispersion and
depth increases security against enemy air and ground attacks.

(b) The staggered column formation has disadvantages. It provides
limited firepower forward. C 2 is difficult as the formation elongates.

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JL W2

STAGGERED LEFT

STAGGERED RIGHT

Figure 3-19. Example of a staggered formation

(2) Wedge . The wedge formation may be used when a platoon or company is
providing overwatch for another element (for example, acting as an advanced guard for an
air movement) and the terrain is open or rolling. The wedge formation is formed by two
combat-cruise formations (a left cruise on the left and a right cruise on the right).

(a) The wedge has advantages. It permits excellent fire to the front and
good fire to each flank when leading ground maneuver formations, other aviation
elements, and convoys. It allows the platoon leader excellent observation up front while
being covered by a wingman.

(b) The wedge has disadvantages. It requires lateral space for
movement; therefore, it is difficult to use in closed terrain. It may expose the entire
platoon to enemy fire simultaneously.

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Figure 3-20. Example of a wedge formation

(3) Combat trail . The combat trail formation is used most often when
passing through defiles or dose terrain, during air movements, and during movements
whenspeed is required. The combat trail formation is formed by two free-cruise
formations (one behind the other).

(a) The combat trail formation has advantages. It provides good C 2 and
speed when closing a large number of helicopters on an objective in a short period of time.
It allows rapid movement through rugged, closed terrain. It provides ample maneuver
room for actions on contact. It also is less fatiguing to crews because they do not have to
concentrate on rigid aircraft orientation, particularly in poor weather.

(b) The combat trail has disadvantages. It provides minimal firepower
forward. It is less secure than other formations because of the lack of depth. It may
cause disorientation during night flights due to the lack of depth of field in NVDs. I n
addition, this is a very difficult formation to maintain during night landings because rate
of closure is difficult to judge.

(4) Echelon . The echelon formation is normally used during travelling
overwatch, when speed is required. The echelon formation allows the platoon leader to
array his aircraft to the left of right of the lead aircraft. Normally, the platoon leader and
his wingman lead, followed by the team leader and wingman. This formation is used in
situations the tactical situation does not favor a trail formation, and firepower must be
focused forward.

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Figure 3-21. Example of a combat trail formation

(a) The echelon formation has advantages. It provides excellent fires
to the front. It allows the speed of a combat trail formation with a wider front. It also
facilitates rapid deployment to other formations.

(b) The echel on formati on has di sadvantages. It I i mits fi res to the
front. It is more difficult to maintain orientation than in a combat trail. It also provides
less control in restricted terrain.

4, W2

ECHELON LEFT

ECHELON RIGHT

Figure 3-22. Example of an echelon formation

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(d) ATKHC commanders may use a combination of formations to
maneuver his company, mixing techniques between platoons or teams, based on METT-T.
As an example of mixed formations, Figure 3-23 shows a heavy platoon using a wedge
formation and a light platoon using the combat-spread formation.

LIGHT PLATOON

HEAVY PLATOON

afe W3

Figure 3-23. Heavy platoon using a wedge formation;
light platoon using a combat-spread formation

f. Passage of Lines . A passage of lines is an operation in which one unit is
passed through the position of another. The ATKHB does not pass through a unit in the
same sense as a ground maneuver unit. The ATKHB will, however, passthrough the
airspace of other units' positions, which can be equally as dangerous. Up to the
coordinating altitude, this airspace is controlled by the ground commander. When it is
unable to bypass a ground unit, the ATKHB must coordinate its movements over the
ground unit through the use of the various echelons of A 2 C 2 . However, when the ATKHB
crosses forward of friendly lines, it should establish liaison with those units that will be
passed, especially during a rearward passage of lines.

(1) A passage of lines is necessary when one unit cannot bypass another.
The ATK H B may conduct a passage of I i nes to~

(a) Counterattack.

(b) Conduct a raid.

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(d) Pursue a fleeing enemy.

(e) Exploit an attack by ground forces.

(f) Withdraw from a covering force mission.

( 2 ) The ATKHB commander must ensure that liaison is established with the
stationary force. Early liaison ensures coordination and security for the execution of the
passage of lines. The liaison officer is responsible for ensuring that ground commanders
(down to company level) know the time and place of the passage of lines and the route
that the ATKHB will be using. The liaison officer should be at the passage point when
the ATKHB conducts its passage of lines. Because of the nature of attack helicopter
operations, this will mean that the liaison officer may be at the ground unit's location for
several hours.

( 3 ) Direct and indirect fires of the stationary unit can be integrated into the
SEAD plan of the passing ATKH B. Liaison will ensure coordinated and responsive
support.

( 4 ) A thorough reconnaissance should be executed prior to the passage of
lines. The reconnaissance should note existing and proposed troop locations. A technique
to help ensure deception during a passage of lines is to limit the number and size of
reconnaissance parties and use the vehicles of the stationary unit.

( 5 ) During the planning process, commanders and staffs of the units involved
must coordinate--

(a) E xchange of i ntel I i gence.

(b) Exchange of SOI information.

(d) Arrangements for reconnaissance.

(e) Tactical cover and deception plans.

(f) Security measures during the passage.

(g) Fires and other CS to be provided by the unit in contact.

(h) AD weapons status during the passage, which should be weapons

hold.

( 6 ) For a passage of lines, the commander will normally try to pass all of his
helicopters through the passage point as quickly as possible. Based on the threat and the
terrain, the commander should use a staggered formation, while exercising the option of

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reducing the gaps between the teams to less than 10 rotor diameters (rotor tip to rotor
tip). This formation will allow the teams to maintain orientation, while leaving maneuver
space.

g. Actions on Contact .

(1) Appendix F describes detailed TTP for performing actions on contact.
This appendix establishes the battle drill doctrine of "avoid, evade, threaten, and engage,"
and applies it to air and ground threats.

( 2 ) Air movement during an attack may result in a meeting engagement.
Such engagements occur when contact with the enemy is made suddenly, with little or no
prior information concerning its size, location, and disposition. For example, on a raid,
the mission may become unhinged by one encounter with a threat. The intent is to avoid
the threat, report its position, maneuver to destroy it, if possible, and continue the

mi ssion.

( 3 ) During movement, a stationary or moving enemy force may be
encountered. When contact is made, the reactions of leaders in the first few seconds or
minutes may determine the fight. Generally, the platoon under fire moves aggressively
using fire and maneuver to suppress the enemy, seeks covered and concealed fighting
positions, and establishes a base of fire. These actions will be accomplished through
battle drills executed by the platoon and team. The platoon leader will send a contact
report, and the company commander will determine whether to develop the situation or
bypass and continue the mission.

( 4 ) The element in contact continues the fight and gains information. The
density and type of enemy fire and other terrain information helps to assess enemy
capabilities. The platoon in contact reports all information to the commander. If the
platoon in contact is unable to maneuver, the commander may use another platoon(s)
and/or indirect fire to put pressure on the enemy in an effort to develop the situation.

( 5 ) Based on the estimate of the situation, the commander should choose one
of the foil owing courses of action:

(a) Continue to develop the situation.

(b) Conduct a hasty attack.

a hasty attack.

(d) Bypass.

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3-8. OCCUPATION OF THE BP/SBF POSITION AND ABF POSITION

Occupation of the BP and SBF are very similar. Occupation of the ABF, while deliberate,
is normally characterized by greater freedom of movement than the occupation of the
BP/SBF. The paragraphs below will describe, while making distinctions between the
actions during occupation of these positions. Except where noted otherwise, the
paragraphs below discuss an ATKFIC task organization of heavy/attack and light/scout
platoons, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

a. ABF Position/SBF Position/BP Identification . To keep confusion to a
minimum in the objective area, each company should have its own numbering or lettering
scheme to identify its positions. For example, Charlie Company's BPs are always
numbered in the "30s" (such as BP 31, 32, and 33) while Bravo Company's BPs are always
numbered in the "20s." This will also help prevent confusion when copying graphics.

b. Battle Handover .

(1) Procedures for battle handover are similar for BP/SBF and ABF
positions. The major difference is in the time available for coordination. Generally,
occupation of the ABF is more time constrained than a BP/SBF.

(2) If a battle handover is being accepted from another company or troop, the
ATKFIC commander and scouts may move to a FI A to meet face-to-face with the ATKFIC
or reconnaissance troop whom they are relieving. This technique may not always be
practical, particularly during raids. Once the situation has been briefed, the ATKFIC
scouts relieve the on-station scouts and begin continuous observation. The ATKFIC
commander briefs the heavy and light platoons then orders them to move forward to the
selected position using appropriate movement techniques, understanding the scouts have
already cleared the route. If the movement requires bounding overwatch, the light
platoon leads and the heavy platoon overwatches. At the BP, each platoon takes up its
assigned position and receives a target handover from the scouts.

(3) When time is critical, such as when the enemy is already in the EA when
scouts arrive in the selected position, the commander may elect to order holding platoons
forward as the scouts clear the position. These platoons move as quickly as tactically
possible along the attack route and meet their scouts behind the BPs. The scouts direct
the platoons to their positions and give them a target handover.

c. Preparation .

(1) BP/SBF position . The occupation of a BP or SBF begins when the
scouts reconnoiter the attack route from the FI A to the position. Once in the position, the
scouts deploy to clear the position, confirm map or previous physical reconnaissance
information, and determine if the EA is occupied. Further ATKFIC action depends upon
the enemy situation.

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(a) If the enemy has not yet arrived in the EA, the scouts will continue
to observe. The scout sends the ATKHC commander a spot report on the enemy situation
and the suitability of platoon BPs. Before the enemy arrives in the EA, a scout sends the
ATKHC commander a spot report. The commander then orders his elements to move
forward to the position using appropriate movement techniques, understanding the scout
has already cleared the route.

(b) When occupying an SBF in conjunction with a ground attack, the
ATKHC commander must maintain constant communications with the ground
commander. This communication will allow the ATKHC to synchronize his occupation of
the SBF with the approach or assault of the ground maneuver unit.

(2) ABF position . Because the ABF is a force-oriented control measure, the
ATKHC will normally establish multiple ABFs in a sector during mission planning. If
conducting a movement to contact, the ATKHC will likely move his company by teams
using bounding overwatch. Unlike BP and SBF occupation, the process of clearing the
route and position will occur during the course of the movement of the entire ATKHC, not
just the scouts.

d. Occupation .

(1) BP/SBF position . Once the commander issues the order to move to the
BP/SBF, the light platoon leads as the heavy platoon overwatches during movement along
the attack route. The light platoon will normally occupy the most forward position
affording the best view of the target area while exposing the fewest number of helicopters.
At the BP/SBF, each platoon takes up its assigned position and receives a target handover
from the scouts. If all indications are that the enemy is in the EA and cannot be seen, the
ATKHC may have to move forward to get the enemy within sensor range. Sensor range,
not weapon range, is the key planning factor when selecting a BP/SBF.

(2) ABF position .

(a) When enemy contact has been gained, the commander issues the
order for the company to move into the ABF. Based on the positions of the platoons in
relation to the enemy and the selected ABF, the platoon nearest the ABF generally
occupies first and secures the position to accept the other platoon. The scouts lead into
the ABF, keeping the enemy under observation while clearing the route into the ABF.

(b) The commander may elect to set both platoons in one ABF or use
separate ABFs for each platoon. Based on M ETT-T, the commander may choose one ABF
for the entire company or separate platoon ABFs. Whichever method is used, once both
platoons are set in the ABF, the commander can begin engagement of the enemy. If the
enemy is out of sensor range, the commander may decide to move forward for the
engagement.

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e. Aircraft Positioning .

(1) Standard set . All aircraft key off the lead aircraft and begin occupying
firing positions to the right of the lead aircraft, in chalk order. This formation may be
used unless the commander declares a nonstandard set. Figure 3-24 shows an example of
a standard set.

(2) Nonstandard set . All aircraft key off the lead aircraft and begin
occupying firing positions to the left of the lead aircraft, in chalk order. Figure 3-25
shows an example of a nonstandard set.

Figure 3-25. Nonstandard set

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FM 1-112

f. Security .

(1) Both scouts and attack aircraft provide security for the position, whether
an ABF, SBF, or BP. After the target handover to the attack aircraft, the scouts move to
a position to observe avenues of approach into the position. If a scout makes contact with
the enemy, he may engage with his organic weapons or FS, or the ATKFIC commander
may maneuver one of the platoons into a supplemental BP to meet the threat. The
commander may position one of his platoons or teams in an overwatch position to engage
enemy air or ground threats.

(2) The commander may choose to position his team to the rear of the other
two teams to facilitate C 2 , as well as security. I n addition, the commander's aircraft may
launch remote missiles for the lead teams without interfering with the commander's C 2 of
the battle.

Section V. Objective Area Overview

The following paragraphs contain detail on EA and direct fire planning. Based on the
nature of the mission, commanders must ensure that staffs and aircrews understand
these procedures. Effective EA planning and direct fire employment are the essence of
attack helicopter operations.

3-9. EA PLANNING

a. Detailed planning is the cornerstone of successful attack helicopter operations.
As part of the deliberate decision-making process, this section will concentrate on
planning and executing actions on the objective. This planning includes building EAs and
executing direct fire in those EAs.

b. The goal of attack helicopter operations is to destroy targets. To destroy
targets effectively, without overkill, takes the focusing and massing of fires. Crews must
be able to engage targets throughout the depth and length oftheEA, killing those targets
quickly and efficiently without wasting a single round on a target already destroyed.

c. Attack helicopter units participate in many diverse missions. This diversity
can present challenges to unit planners developing EAs and planning direct fire
employment. With this in mind, planners must be aware of the differences between attack
and reconnaissance and security (reconnaissance) missions. These differences are as
follows:

(1) Attack missions normally include massing effects of the unit in a single
specified EA. Reconnaissance missions include numerous EAs spread over a wide
geographic area using teams of aircraft, rather than the entire unit to engage the enemy.

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(2) Attack missions mass precision guided munitions on a readily identifiable
enemy. Reconnaissance missions may employ nonprecision munitions such as rockets and
artillery to develop the situation and to find the enemy's disposition.

(3) Prior to launching an attack mission, crews normally have a well-
developed picture of the enemy situation, and they have high confidence that the enemy
force will be in the EA. Reconnaissance missions, like a "search and attack", may not
have a well developed enemy situation before commitment of aviation forces.

(4) Weapons loads on attack missions will normally favor precision-guided
missiles. Reconnaissance missions, particularly during movement to contact and search
and attack will normally include heavier reliance on rockets and cannon.

(5) C 2 headquarters for attack missions are normally the attack battalion
and aviation brigade. Security missions are normally controlled by a ground maneuver
TF headquarters.

d. While there are differences in attack and reconnaissance missions, attack
mission planning factors vary between close and deep operations. These differences
include the foil owing:

(1) Graphics for close operations will normally include restrictive control
measures to prevent fratricide during engagements in close proximity to friendly
el ements.

(2) Actions on the objective: what if the enemy is not in the EA? In a close
fight, the attack unit would maneuver to establish contact with the enemy force. I n deep
operations, units normally lead with one company, whose mission is to develop the
situation. Upon making contact with the enemy force, the remaining companies close to
mass fires in the EA.

(3) Weapons loads for AH -64s may vary as auxiliary fuel tanks may be added
for long-duration deep attacks. In addition, commanders may choose to include auxiliary
fuel tanks on aircraft in close fights to increase station time in the objective area.

(4) C 2 headquarters for close fights are normally the ground element in
contact. Deep attacks are normally controlled at the aviation brigade level, with
additional guidance from the division or corps DOCC.

3-10. PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT FIRE

a. Mass Fires . Commanders must mass the effects of organic onboard weapons
in the EA. Additionally, they should use complimentary systems, such as artillery, CAS,
mortars, and other available systems to overwhelm the enemy at the decisive place and
time.

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FM 1-112

b. Leaders Control Fires . Piecemeal fires limit the capability of the attack
helicopter unit. There must always be two methods of executing the fires. One method
can be voice, but there has to be a backup.

c. Focus Fires . Fires must be focused on the critical point, at the critical time
as identified by the I PB. The three key elements to successful massing of direct fires
against any target are--

(1) Clearly conveying instructions to fire elements.

(2) Using recognizable control measures, whether friendly, enemy, or terrain-

based.

(3) Detailed training, SOPs, and planning for the engagement.

d. Distribute Fires . Figure 3-26 shows the methods for di stri buti ng di rect fi res
in the EA. Principles for distributing fires are as follows:

(1) Critical targets are engaged first.

(2) Engagements are conducted laterally and in depth simultaneously.

(3) Which weapons will engage which targets is decided beforehand.

(4) The order in which to engage targets has been decided.

e. Shift Fires . Fires must be controlled and shifted to react to the enemy's
actions. The shifting should be planned and rehearsed.

f. Fire Plan . All crew must understand the fire plan. This includes
understanding the mission and the commander's intent.

g. Rehearse the Fire Plan . The fire plan rehearsal will allow every crew to
understand it and point out any shortcoming in the plan before execution.

3-11. PRINCIPLES OF FIRE CONTROL

a. Avoid Target Overkill . More than any other factor, this will increase a
weapon's P k . In a target-rich environment, a unit may expend its ammunition and still
not meet the defeat criteria stated in the commander's intent. For example, fire discipline
will prevent crews from firing 10 ATGMs simultaneously at only two vehicles.

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FM 1-112

1. CLOSEST TRP

Commanders may establsih TRPs using
man-made structures, terrain features, enemy
formations, or artificial illumination. TRPs should
be easily recognizable, as well as easy to locate
in the EA when directing or shifting fires.

2. QUADRANTS

Commanders may divide the EA into quadrants.
Using recognizable terrain features or man-made
structures, fires can be directed or shifted quickly
by using the assigned quadrant name.

3. FIRE PATTERNS

Fire patterns are en enemy-oriented method of
engagement where the focus and distribution of
fires are determined by the enemy's formations or
location. Fire patterns are frontal and depth, and
can be used to direct and shift fires quickly. The
commander directs "near, far, left, or right" when
directing or shifting fires.

5. SECTORS

Using broad sectors for companies or teams
ensures overlapping fires throughout the EA.
This techinique requires careful direct fire
planning to prevent target overkill in the
complementary sectors. As will all techniques,
the battalion must select the trigger mechanism
to initiate the fires -- this is critical with sectors
because all fires may not begin simultaneously.

Figure 3-26. Techniques of fire distribution and control

4. TARGET ARRAY

Focusing fires on the enemy target array is a
technique where the commander issues specific
portions of the formation for engagement. For
this technique to be successful, definable
portions of the target array must be observed by
the commander and the firing crews, particularly
during the shifting of fires.

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FM 1-112

b. Use Each Weapon System in its Best Role . If all ATGMs have been
expended against the trucks in a formation, and a tank battalion enters the EA, the
attack helicopter unit may not be able to accomplish its mission. A complete I PB will
help the commander decide which targets should be serviced by which weapon.

c. Destroy the Most Dangerous Targets First . These targets pose the
greatest threat to the force, and must be destroyed to expose the more lucrative targets.
Commanders must ensure engagement priorities are understood by all crews.

d. Concentrate on Long-Range Targets . This principle will provide standoff,
and allow the commander time and maneuver space should the enemy maneuver toward
his position. The commander must understand, however, the limitations of his crews,
weapons, and sensors to make the determination at what ranges targets can be engaged
while retaining a high P k . Environmental conditions may reduce the useable range of
ATGMs. For example, a Hell fire missile can be used to engage targets at ranges in excess
of 8 kilometers. However, environmental conditions may affect the tracking sensor,
reducing the useable range to half of the maximum range.

e. Take the Best Shots . The I ast pri nci pi e of fi re control i s to take the best
shots and expose only those aircraft. This principle maximizes the P h and P k . It also
protects the aircraft as long as possible and will lead to confusion among the enemy as to
the size and disposition of your force.

Section VI. E A Development

Battalions plan EAs and companies conduct direct fire planning. The following
paragraphs, divided into three steps, explain the process of EA development.

3-12. STEP 1: IPB. (See Figure 3-27.)

a. Once the battalion receives its mission, the S2 begins the I PB process. This
process consists of several steps-

(1) Battlefield area evaluation.

(2) Terrain analysis.

(3) Weather analysis.

(4) Enemy evaluation.

(5) Enemy integration.

b. This process gives the commander possible enemy courses of action. The S2
lists these courses (most probable through most dangerous) in descending probability and

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FM 1-112

selects areas or points along enemy mobility corridors that confirm or deny a particular
enemy COA. These areas or points are called NAI . Enemy activity, or lack of activity, in
an NAI assists the S2 in further refining his estimate of the enemy courses of action.

c. The S2, in conjunction with the S3, selects areas or points along these enemy
mobility corridors where interdiction of enemy forces by maneuver, fires, or jamming will
deprive the enemy of a particular capability. These areas or points are called target areas
of i nterest.

d. Further points are selected, based on time and space, where critical events will
occur which will necessitate a decision. These points are called decision points. For
example, the commander may designate the enemy's crossing of DPI as the event that
requires his decision whether or not to launch the attack.

e. ThelPB process drives the formulation of subunit plans. When the company
commander receives the OPORD, he performs the I PB process on his piece of the
battlefield. At a minimum, theS2 should have answered the following questions:

(1) Where is the enemy currently located?

(2) Where i s the enemy goi ng?

(3) Where can we best engage the enemy?

(4) When will the enemy be there?

(5) What weapons systems does the enemy have that can affect the unit?

f. Answering these five questions will yield the enemy's "most probable" COA.
After the plan is complete, the S2 shows how the enemy action can unhinge the unit plan.
These enemy actions constitute the "most dangerous" COA.

3-13. STEP 2: SELECT THE GROUND FOR THE ATTACK (See Figure 3-27)

a. Once the S2 identifies the enemy's most probable COA, the battalion
commander picks the point on the ground where he wants to kill the enemy. This point is
where the commander intends to mass his combat power.

b. During this step, the commander issues or reconfirms his nine elements of
commander's guidance. These nine elements are listed below.

(1) Guidance on enemy COA . This element lets the staff know which
actions to focus on and which actions to dismiss.

(2) The restated mission . This element is the approved mission by the
commander that includes all specified and implied tasks.

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FM 1-112

(3) The commander's intent . This element is the purpose, method, and
end state of the mission. It clearly states what is to be done.

(4) The concept of operation . This element features the where, when, and
how the commander expects to accomplish the mission.

(5) The deception objective . This element is the deception (if applicable)
tied into the higher commander's plan. This may include "deception SEAD" .

(6) Priorities . These elements are the commander's CS and CSS priorities.
Focus on the fueling, fixing, and rearming functions for the fight.

(7) The time plan . This element focuses the staff on the amount of time
available to the battalion for EA planning, as well as the time available to the companies
for direct fire planning.

(8) The type of order to issue . This element gives the staff guidance on
the type of order to issue to the companies so they can complete their plan.

(9) The type of rehearsal to conduct . This element is critical prior to

execution.

3-14. STEP 3: INTEGRATION OF THE EA (Figures 3-28 through 3-30.)

The EA is an area in which the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force
with the massed fires of all available weapons. EAs are terrain-oriented control measures
that focus the fires, but normally will not help to distribute them throughout the target
without additional direct fire planning by the companies. The commander and staff must
consider the following when integrating the BOSs in the EA.

a. The staff picks preliminary BPs for the engagement area. These locations are
based on the commander's guidance, the terrain, and a sensor range that will produce a
75-percent P k for the helicopter's primary precision guided weapon. (An AFI-64 night
missile engagement using FLI R at a range of 8,000 meters does not meet these criteria.)

I ntegrati on of di rect fi re must al so consi der the fol I owi ng:

(1) Enemy avenues of approach.

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FM 1-112

Figure 3-27. Steps 1 and 2

Step 1. The S2 determines where the enemy is currently located, where the enemy is going, where
can we best engage the enemy, when the enemy will be there, the weapons systems the enemy
hasEA that can affect the unit. (Enemy mobility corridor is depicted by arrow, entering objective
area from N W).

Step 2. The commander selects the spot on the ground where he wants to mass combat power and
kill the enemy. (Circle at road junction indicates commander's designated area.)

(2) E nemy rate of march.

(3) Key terrain that will give the advantage for specific avenues of approach.

(4) What formation(s) the enemy will use, and at what point he is likely to
change formation.

(5) Expected range of engagement.

( 6 ) When the enemy will begin counter-engagements.

(7) Effect of enemy indirect fires.

( 8 ) Where deadspace is in the EA, and how it may be covered.

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FM 1-112

Figure 3-28. Step 3, part 1

Step 3 (Part 1). The S3 decides on the general dimensions of the EA based on the commander's
guidance on where he wants to mass the combat power. The S3 picks initial battle positions based
on terrain and 75 percent P k for the helicopter's primary weapon system. In this example, the S3
picks BPs for three companies.

b. During EA integration, the staff will wargame enemy and friendly actions on
the objective. The S2 must portray an uncooperative enemy during wargaming to prevent
the staff from drawing false conclusions. Specifi cal ly,—

(1) How do we expect the enemy to react upon entering the EA? What
tactics will the enemy use?

(2) What will he do when we start firing at him?

(3) Where the enemy is likely to dismount and assault?

c. Based on the outcome of the wargame, the F SO, S3, and S2 will integrate the
use of artillery, CAS, and mortars to shape the battlespace for the direct fire fight. This
integration is based on the commander's intent for fires on the objective. The following
questions must be answered:

(1) What i s the end state of the i ndi rect fi re pi an?

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FM 1-112

Figure 3-29. Step 3, part 2

Step 3 (Part 2) . The S3 further refines the EA, and determines that A Company's BP must be
moved to ensure complementary direct fires. I n this example, fans are added to the BP to
represent direct fire sensor ranges of the helicopters.

(2) How much artillery/CAS/mortars is available for employment in the EA?

(3) Who will initiate the fires?

(4) How will the unit shift fires?

(5) Who wi 1 1 cl ear fi res once the di red fi re fi ght begi ns.

d. One area of concern that rarely receives proper planning is the obscured EA.
While the EA may be perfedly clear when the first rounds are fired, burning vehicles and
munition impads may quickly obscure the view from the planned battle positions. The
staff must consider the foil owing during planning:

(1) Prevailinq/forecast winds . The wind diredi on in the E A is very
important. During the planning process, forecast winds in the EA that will obscure either
the BP or the EA must be considered for engagement priorities and techniques. Smoke
and dust in the EA or BP may cause laser ranging and designation to be unreliable.

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FM 1-112

Figure 3-30. Step 3, part 3

Step 3 (Part 3) . Based on the wargame, the S3, S2, and FSO further refine the EA, integrating FS
into the EA. I n this example, TRPs are added to cover possible escape routes in the northeast and
southeast, as well as covering dead space near C Company's BP in the north.

(2) Nature of the target. If the targets to be engaged have the propensity
to burn after being hit, thought must be given to engagement priorities. For example, a
brightly burning light skinned vehicle near the battle position may obscure heavier, more
dangerous vehicles in the EA.

(3) Number of targets . If the plan specifies killing a large number of
targets with direct fire, consider engaging targets across the depth of the formation
simultaneously. This will tend to disorganize the formation quickly, and allow
engagements throughout the EA with rockets and indirect fire.

(4) Terrain . Cover deadspace with indirect fire or rockets. Also be aware
that smoke tends to cling in the low ground during hours of darkness. This may allow
vehicles to move undetected. If they are detected, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
engage vehicles in smoke with laser-guided weapons.

(5) Planned obscurants . FLI R sights may be required during daylight
operations for target engagement to see through deliberate enemy, and possibly friendly
obscurants, such as smoke screens. Aircrews must complete boresights and operational
checks of all sights, whether or not the crew expects to use them during the mission.

e. Once the staff planning is complete, the commander should be able to answer
yes to each of the questions in EA checklist (Figure 3-31). Once the staff planning
identifies the EA and FS plan, the staff should integrate company direct fire planning.

3-54

FM 1-112

DOES THE PLAN -

YES

AVOID OVERKILL (CONSERVE AMMUNITION, COMBAT POWER)?

CONCENTRATE ON LONG RANGE TARGETS?

ENGAGE TARGETS WITH HIGH P H ?

TAKE BEST SHOTS?

MINIMIZE RISK?

DESTROY MOST DANGEROUS FIRST?

MAXIMIZE EACH WEAPON SYSTEM?

Figure 3-31. EA checklist

Section VII. Direct Fire Planning

3-15. STEP 4: PLANNING THE DIRECT FIRE FIGHT (See Figures 3-32 and 3-33.)

The staff identifies the EA and integrates FS on the terrain to engage the tempi ated
enemy force. This plan supports the commander's intent for the EA, but more detailed
planning is required. The staff passes the EA information to the companies for more
detailed planning. This information may be passed for concurrent planning with the
battalion staff, or in the form of an OPORD or plan for subsequent planning.

a. The company commander gathers his crews or designated planners initially to
get a view of the battalion's plan. Using the overlay and any additional information
provided by the staff, he ensures that everyone can identify theTRPs, obstacles, avenues
of approach, prominent terrain features, and dead space present in the EA.

b. Using TRPs, terrain features, or man-made obstacles, the company commander
sectors the EA by ensuring each crew has a well-defined and understood responsibility.

An individual helicopter sector should be wide enough to allow some overlap with adjacent
helicopters, but narrow enough to prevent overkill. This reduces the scanning required by
the gunner and the potential for overkill; it also ensures the entire EA or sector is covered
by di red fi re.

c. Based on the commander's guidance, the company commander establishes
control measures for the di red-fire fight and other adions that are time or space
dependent. Ninety-nine percent of the time the battalion commander establishes a trigger
line for the di red fire fight, but the company commander initiates it. Further
visualization will help the commander decide whether to have all his crews orient on the
TRPs assigned by the battalion, or to have a leader and wingman or individual helicopters
orient in slightly different areas. For example, if the platoon leader is told to orient on

3-55

FM 1-112

TRP 0006, he might decide on one of the following missions for his subordinates, based on
the enemy and terrain:

(1) All crews orient on TRP 0006.

(2) The platoon leader's team orients to the left of TRP 0006, while the other
team orients to the right (designating targets 0006A and 0006B).

d. When the company commander decides how to use his helicopters to best meet
the battalion commander's intent, he ensures sectors of fire provide full mutual support
between helicopters and integrates FS. This planning includes the following:

(1) The commander must plan for rear and flank security in the BP. One to
two of the attack helicopters in the company may be designated to provide this security
during the engagement.

(2) The direct fire plan will designate responsibilities for long range direct
fires. However, the commander must also define the areas designated for engagement
with rockets and cannon, and how those fires are initiated. For planning purposes, "fans,"
or arcs should be drawn on the sector sketch to represent weapons ranges and when they
should be employed. This planning factor helps the crews to select the proper weapon for
the target at certain ranges.

(3) Crews must also be ready to repel dismounted infantry and other vehicles
in the battle position. They must also know the positions of friendly elements in the area.

e. The commander must ensure that supplementary battle positions integrate the
same level of planning and FS as the primary positions. Each crew must have a thorough
understanding of the criteria for movement from the primary to the supplemental battle
positions.

f. Last, the company commander must devise a method to determine if his
company accomplished its mission. Because the destruction criteria and end state is in
the commander's intent, the commander must be sure the engagement does not conclude
until the destruction criteria is met.

3-16. STEP 5: FIRE COMMANDS

a. The commander uses two processes to control fires and always has a primary
and alternate method in effect: fire planning (triggers) and fire commands (radio
messages). He decides how to control fires based on the situation and the time available
to plan and prepare.

3-56

FM 1-112

Figure 3-32. Step 4, part 1

Step 4, Part 1. The company commander and his planners examine the EA and start development
of their assigned terrain. This example shows A Company's assigned sector of the EA.

Figure 3-33. Step 4, part 2

Step 4, Part 2. The company commander and his planners further refine the battalion's plan for
the EA. I n this example, the commander divides the EA into three team-size sectors (Teams 1, 2,
and 3). The battalion coordinates PL CHEVY and PL FORD as triggers for A Company to
commence the direct fire fight. (The battalion S2 predicts the enemy will move generally eastward
through the E A. PLs CH E VY and F ORD are designed so A Company has flank shots on the
enemy. They also allow synchronization of fires with B and C Companies.) Company TRPs (A1
through A5) are placed to allow for rapid shifting of fires. Two registered artillery TRPs (009A and
010A) are placed in the EA to allow rapid adjustment of indirect fires (Team 2 is responsible for
artillery calls). PL BUD, a "no penetration" (NO PEN) line, is placed near the BP. If enemy
elements cross PL BUD, crews are instructed to move to the alternate battle position.

3-57

FM 1-112

(1) I n a meeting engagement or in a movement to contact when time to plan
is limited, the commander initiates fires with a fire command. During the fight, fires are
controlled by fire patterns (See figure 3-34) as specified in the SOP.

"BLUE- THIS IS BLUE SIX-

Alert

THREE TANKS, MULTIPLE BMPs

Description

VICINITY TRP ZERO ONE SIX -

Orientation

AT MY COMMAND - FIRE"

Execution

Figure 3-34. Unit fire command

(2) In a del i berate attack with prior planning time available, the commander
initiates the fight with a fire command or an event (enemy crossing a trigger line). He
relies on detailed planning and preparation to distribute fires during the fight. Further
fire commands may be required, but the object of the planning phase is to anticipate
events and coordinate fires before the fight starts.

(3) A coordinated fire plan requires minimum radio traffic over the net
during execution; trigger points, priority of engagements, and targets are established in
advance. A trigger point, in concert with a fire command should be used to initiate fires.
This assures that direct fires are placed on the enemy even if communications are
interrupted or the unit leadership is disabled.

REMEMBER: The use of fire commands is based on knowledge of enemy and time
avail able to plan, prepare, and rehearse.

b. Standardized fire commands are established in the unit SOP and should be
practiced by the chain of command. Using a standard format for a fire command ensures
that all essential information and control measures are given quickly and accurately.

Even under the most adverse conditions, this causes positive reaction by the unit. Brevity
and clarity are essential. Abbreviated methods for identifying target locations are
encouraged, but they must be familiar and understandable.

c. Coordinating instructions for additional information may be given by the
commander to individual aircraft; this information is not part of the fire command. When
a crew renders a contact or spot report and it is reasonable to believe all other aircraft in
the company received it, the commander issues only the elements needed to complete a

3-58

FM 1-112

fire command. I n all cases, a crew has the freedom to engage a target without a company
fire command if he is under immediate threat.

d. A standard unit fire command may include as many as five elements in the
following order:

• Alert.

• Weapon or ammunition.

• Target description.

• Orientation.

• Execution.

The paragraphs below describe each element in detail.

(1) Alert . The alert element addresses the crew to fire and does not require
the individual initiating the fire command to identify himself. When time is not vital, the
individual giving the alert may identify himself. SOP codewords may be used as the
alert element. The fire command examples in this chapter use the following codewords:

• BLUE -Entire company prepare to fire (This assumes the other platoons use
"RED" or "WHITE" as identification)

• ALPHA -Platoon leader and his wingman(Team 1) prepare to fire

• BRAVO - Team 2 prepare to fire

NOTE: When the commander is controlling the fire commands, he may designate his
teams separately. For example, Charlie Company is "BLUE" (with Alpha Company
"RED" and Bravo Company "WHITE"), and his four teams designated ALPHA through
DELTA.

(2) Weapon or ammunition . The PC and CPG select the ammunition
based on the fire distribution plan, the enemy targets, and the status of ammunition (How
many PD rockets? M PSM?). The PC decides with which weapon to engage and what type
and number of rounds to expend.

(3) Target description . The target description briefly describes the target
and must contain number, type, and activity ("THREE TANKS MOVING EAST TO
WEST, EA SLAM, Sector A"). If the target is stationary, the activity may be omitted.

(4) Orientation . The commander orients the company on the EA and
targets using one of the techniques shown in Figure 3-26.

3-59

FM 1-112

(5) Execution . The execution element indicates when firing will begin.
Normally, this is simply the command "FIRE." If surprise and simultaneous fire are
desired, or if the company's fire is to be coordinated with other direct or indirect fires, the
execution element "AT MY COMMAND" will be given first. This slight delay allows the
coordination of all fires to be completed while the individual crews selects their targets,
issue crew fire commands, and prepare to engage. If, for any reason, a crew is not
prepared to fire (equipment malfunction), the PC informs the platoon leader and his L/W
immediately. The PC also estimates and reports the time required for the crew to get the
helicopter ready to fight.

e. Control .

(1) The nature of the target will dictate the type of fire pattern used. During
premission planning, each crew must have a thorough understanding of how the threat
will "look" in the EA and what effects the engagement is expected to have. Whether the
company is engaging massed armor formations, or a fixed target such as a radar site, the
way each crew executes his fires must be understood. While this is not an element of the
fire command, crews will consider their unit fire pattern when engaging.

(2) Crews must be trained on and thoroughly understand the two basic fire
patterns-frontal and depth. Each crew member must understand its responsibilities for
target engagement by SOP. These two fire patterns cover most situations and promote
rapid, effective fire distribution. Regardless of which fire pattern is used, the goal is to
engage far and flank targets first, then shift fires to near and center targets. Crews
should engage targets, most dangerous to least dangerous, in their sector. The
commander may make exceptions to engage most dangerous to least dangerous targets or
to engage a designated priority target (C 2 vehicles).

(a) The frontal pattern is used when all engaging helicopters have
unobstructed fields of fire to their front. Flank helicopters engage targets to the front
(right helicopter shoots right target, left helicopter shoots left target) and shift fires
toward the center as targets are destroyed. The frontal engagement rule is "near to far -
flank to center." Frontal will normally be the initial fire pattern used if neither is
specified.

(b) The depth fire pattern is used when targets are exposed in depth.
This is position and formation dependent. The whole company may be required to fire on
a column formation in depth, or individual helicopters engaging in their sector may have
to fire in depth. If the whole company is firing, it may be possi bl e for each helicopter to
fire in depth on a portion of the enemy formation. The far left helicopter engages the far
target an
…[truncated]

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4-c )11 S PA L. C. PROJEC UNIT Form -3 .Accessioxilt0. W/JR 61 7 Date received ..+0 A.., /ye, Consignment no. Shipped from k/.24a4rie.e. Label Amount /M (40.&440_7,4, Collection (or Type) 1/4-.A..#2s7Va-ss. Place of orig…
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tA Forms to be Filled out for Each Interview FORMA Circumstances of Interview STATE New York NAME OF WORKER SAUL LEVITT ADDRESS 27 Hamilton Terrace, New York City DATE October 31, 1938 SUBJECT "LAIIDLUBBES CRUISE" --CHAR…
[Pioneer Day Stories]
Accession no. WPA L. C. PROJECT Form -11 Write/rat UNIT W 9653 Date received 10/10/40 Consignment no. 1 Shipped from Wash. Office Label Amount 9p. (incl. forts &—D) 4.311Are Collection (or Type) Place of origin _Portia:A…